"note":"<strong>note:</strong> includes Perim, Socotra, the former Yemen Arab Republic (YAR or North Yemen), and the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY or South Yemen)"
"text":"200 nm or to the edge of the continental margin"
}
},
"Climate":{
"text":"mostly desert; hot and humid along west coast; temperate in western mountains affected by seasonal monsoon; extraordinarily hot, dry, harsh desert in east"
},
"Terrain":{
"text":"narrow coastal plain backed by flat-topped hills and rugged mountains; dissected upland desert plains in center slope into the desert interior of the Arabian Peninsula"
"text":"the vast majority of the population is found in the Asir Mountains (part of the larger Sarawat Mountain system), located in the far western region of the country"
"text":"<p>sandstorms and dust storms in summer</p><p><strong>volcanism:</strong> limited volcanic activity; Jebel at Tair (Jabal al-Tair, Jebel Teir, Jabal al-Tayr, Jazirat at-Tair) (244 m), which forms an island in the Red Sea, erupted in 2007 after awakening from dormancy; other historically active volcanoes include Harra of Arhab, Harras of Dhamar, Harra es-Sawad, and Jebel Zubair, although many of these have not erupted in over a century</p>"
"text":"Arabic (official); note - a distinct Socotri language is widely used on Socotra Island and Archipelago; Mahri is still fairly widely spoken in eastern Yemen"
"text":"<br>كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
"text":"Muslim 99.1% (official; virtually all are citizens, an estimated 65% are Sunni and 35% are Shia), other 0.9% (includes Jewish, Baha'i, Hindu, and Christian; many are refugees or temporary foreign residents) (2020 est.)"
"text":"the vast majority of the population is found in the Asir Mountains (part of the larger Sarawat Mountain system), located in the far western region of the country"
"text":"Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping-London Protocol, Nuclear Test Ban, Ozone Layer Protection, Wetlands"
},
"signed, but not ratified":{
"text":"Climate Change-Paris Agreement, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban"
}
},
"Air pollutants":{
"particulate matter emissions":{
"text":"44.96 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions":{
"text":"10.61 megatons (2016 est.)"
},
"methane emissions":{
"text":"8.03 megatons (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Climate":{
"text":"mostly desert; hot and humid along west coast; temperate in western mountains affected by seasonal monsoon; extraordinarily hot, dry, harsh desert in east"
"text":"due to conflict, poverty, floods, high food and fuel prices - between January and June 2021, the number of food insecure was projected to increase by nearly 3 million to 16.2 million people; out of these, an estimated 11 million people will likely be in \"Crisis,\" 5 million in \"Emergency,\" and the number of those in \"Catastrophe\" will likely increase to 47,000; economic conditions in the country remain dire; the conflict is further hampering the already constrained livelihood activities and humanitarian access; income earning opportunities have declined due to COVID‑19‑related business disruptions (2021)"
"text":"Yemen Arab Republic [Yemen (Sanaa) or North Yemen] and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [Yemen (Aden) or South Yemen]"
},
"etymology":{
"text":"name derivation remains unclear but may come from the Arab term \"yumn\" (happiness) and be related to the region's classical name \"Arabia Felix\" (Fertile or Happy Arabia); the Romans referred to the rest of the peninsula as \"Arabia Deserta\" (Deserted Arabia)"
}
},
"Government type":{
"text":"in transition"
},
"Capital":{
"name":{
"text":"Sanaa"
},
"geographic coordinates":{
"text":"15 21 N, 44 12 E"
},
"time difference":{
"text":"UTC+3 (8 hours ahead of Washington, DC, during Standard Time)"
"text":"22 governorates (muhafazat, singular - muhafazah); Abyan, 'Adan (Aden), Ad Dali', Al Bayda', Al Hudaydah, Al Jawf, Al Mahrah, Al Mahwit, Amanat al 'Asimah (Sanaa City), 'Amran, Arkhabil Suqutra (Socotra Archipelago), Dhamar, Hadramawt, Hajjah, Ibb, Lahij, Ma'rib, Raymah, Sa'dah, San'a' (Sanaa), Shabwah, Ta'izz"
},
"Independence":{
"text":"22 May 1990 (Republic of Yemen was established with the merger of the Yemen Arab Republic [Yemen (Sanaa) or North Yemen] and the Marxist-dominated People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [Yemen (Aden) or South Yemen]); notable earlier dates: North Yemen became independent on 1 November 1918 (from the Ottoman Empire) and became a republic with the overthrow of the theocratic Imamate on 27 September 1962; South Yemen became independent on 30 November 1967 (from the UK)"
"text":"adopted by referendum 16 May 1991 (following unification); note - after the National Dialogue ended in January 2015, a Constitutional Drafting Committee appointed by the president worked to prepare a new draft constitution that was expected to be put to a national referendum before being adopted; however, the start of the current conflict in early 2015 interrupted the process"
"text":"mixed legal system of Islamic (sharia) law, Napoleonic law, English common law, and customary law"
},
"International law organization participation":{
"text":"has not submitted an ICJ jurisdiction declaration; non-party state to the ICCt"
},
"Citizenship":{
"citizenship by birth":{
"text":"no"
},
"citizenship by descent only":{
"text":"the father must be a citizen of Yemen; if the father is unknown, the mother must be a citizen"
},
"dual citizenship recognized":{
"text":"no"
},
"residency requirement for naturalization":{
"text":"10 years"
}
},
"Suffrage":{
"text":"18 years of age; universal"
},
"Executive branch":{
"chief of state":{
"text":"President Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI (since 21 February 2012); Vice President ALI MUHSIN al-Ahmar, Lt. Gen. (since 3 April 2016)"
},
"head of government":{
"text":"Prime Minister Maeen Abd al-Malik SAEED (since 15 October 2018)"
},
"cabinet":{
"text":"appointed by the president"
},
"elections/appointments":{
"text":"president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 7-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 21 February 2012 (next election NA); note - a special election was held on 21 February 2012 to remove Ali Abdallah SALIH under the terms of a Gulf Cooperation Council-mediated deal during the political crisis of 2011; vice president appointed by the president; prime minister appointed by the president"
},
"election results":{
"text":"Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI (GPC) elected as a consensus president with about 50% popular participation; no other candidates"
"text":"bicameral Parliament or Majlis consists of:<br>Shura Council or Majlis Alshoora (111 seats; members appointed by the president; member tenure NA)<br>House of Representatives or Majlis al Nuwaab (301 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 6-year terms)"
"text":"<br>percent of vote by party - GPC 58.0%, Islah 22.6%, YSP 3.8%, Unionist Party 1.9%, other 13.7%; seats by party - GPC 238, Islah 46, YSP 8, Nasserist Unionist Party 3, National Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party 2, independent 4"
"text":"Supreme Court (consists of the court president, 2 deputies, and nearly 50 judges; court organized into constitutional, civil, commercial, family, administrative, criminal, military, and appeals scrutiny divisions)"
},
"judge selection and term of office":{
"text":"judges appointed by the Supreme Judicial Council, which is chaired by the president of the republic and includes 10 high-ranking judicial officers; judges serve for life with mandatory retirement at age 65"
},
"subordinate courts":{
"text":"appeal courts; district or first instance courts; commercial courts"
"text":"General People’s Congress or GPC (3 factions: pro-Hadi [Abdrabbi Mansur HADI], pro-Houthi [Sadeq Ameen Abu RAS], pro-Saleh [Ahmed SALEH]<br>National Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party [Qassem Salam SAID]<br>Nasserist Unionist People's Organization [Abdulmalik al-MEKHLAFI]<br>Southern Transitional Council or STC [Aidarus al-ZOUBAIDA] <br>Yemeni Reform Grouping or Islah [Muhammed Abdallah al-YADUMI]<br>Yemeni Socialist Party or YSP [Dr. Abd al-Rahman Umar al-SAQQAF]",
"text":"ambassador (vacant); note - on 18 December 2020, former Ambassador Ahmad Awadh BIN MUBARAK (since 3 August 2015) was appointed Yemen's Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates"
"text":"ambassador (vacant); Chargé d’Affaires Cathy WESTLEY (since 23 May 2021); note - the embassy closed in March 2015; Yemen Affairs Unit currently operates out of US Embassy Riyadh"
"text":"three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and black; the band colors derive from the Arab Liberation flag and represent oppression (black), overcome through bloody struggle (red), to be replaced by a bright future (white)",
"note":"<strong>note:</strong> similar to the flag of Syria, which has two green stars in the white band, and of Iraq, which has an Arabic inscription centered in the white band; also similar to the flag of Egypt, which has a heraldic eagle centered in the white band"
"text":"<p>Yemen is a low-income country that faces difficult long-term challenges to stabilizing and growing its economy, and the current conflict has only exacerbated those issues. The ongoing war has halted Yemen’s exports, pressured the currency’s exchange rate, accelerated inflation, severely limited food and fuel imports, and caused widespread damage to infrastructure. The conflict has also created a severe humanitarian crisis - the world’s largest cholera outbreak currently at nearly 1 million cases, more than 7 million people at risk of famine, and more than 80% of the population in need of humanitarian assistance.</p><p></p><p>Prior to the start of the conflict in 2014, Yemen was highly dependent on declining oil and gas resources for revenue. Oil and gas earnings accounted for roughly 25% of GDP and 65% of government revenue. The Yemeni Government regularly faced annual budget shortfalls and tried to diversify the Yemeni economy through a reform program designed to bolster non-oil sectors of the economy and foreign investment. In July 2014, the government continued reform efforts by eliminating some fuel subsidies and in August 2014, the IMF approved a three-year, $570 million Extended Credit Facility for Yemen.</p><p></p><p>However, the conflict that began in 2014 stalled these reform efforts and ongoing fighting continues to accelerate the country’s economic decline. In September 2016, President HADI announced the move of the main branch of Central Bank of Yemen from Sanaa to Aden where his government could exert greater control over the central bank’s dwindling resources. Regardless of which group controls the main branch, the central bank system is struggling to function. Yemen’s Central Bank’s foreign reserves, which stood at roughly $5.2 billion prior to the conflict, have declined to negligible amounts. The Central Bank can no longer fully support imports of critical goods or the country’s exchange rate. The country also is facing a growing liquidity crisis and rising inflation. The private sector is hemorrhaging, with almost all businesses making substantial layoffs. Access to food and other critical commodities such as medical equipment is limited across the country due to security issues on the ground. The Social Welfare Fund, a cash transfer program for Yemen’s neediest, is no longer operational and has not made any disbursements since late 2014.</p><p></p><p>Yemen will require significant international assistance during and after the protracted conflict to stabilize its economy. Long-term challenges include a high population growth rate, high unemployment, declining water resources, and severe food scarcity.</p>"
"text":"crude oil production and petroleum refining; small-scale production of cotton textiles, leather goods; food processing; handicrafts; aluminum products; cement; commercial ship repair; natural gas production"
"text":"<p><strong>note:</strong> most people are employed in agriculture and herding; services, construction, industry, and commerce account for less than one-fourth of the labor force</p>"
"text":"large percent of the population is in need of humanitarian assistance and telecom services are vital but disrupted; mobile towers are often deliberately targeted; maintenance is dangerous to staff; aid organizations rely on satellite and radio communications; scarcity of telecom equipment in rural areas; ownership of telecom services and the related revenues and taxes have become a political issue; Chinese company Huawei helping to rebuild some equipment (2020)"
"text":"the national network consists of microwave radio relay, cable, tropospheric scatter, GSM and CDMA mobile-cellular telephone systems; fixed-line teledensity remains low by regional standards at roughly 4 per 100 but mobile cellular use expanding at over 55 per 100 (2019)"
"text":"country code - 967; landing points for the FALCON, SeaMeWe-5, Aden-Djibouti, and the AAE-1 international submarine cable connecting Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Southeast Asia; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (2 Indian Ocean and 1 Atlantic Ocean), 1 Intersputnik (Atlantic Ocean region), and 2 Arabsat; microwave radio relay to Saudi Arabia and Djibouti (2020)"
"note":"<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
"text":"state-run TV with 2 stations; state-run radio with 2 national radio stations and 5 local stations; stations from Oman and Saudi Arabia can be accessed"
"text":"<p>as of 2021, military and security forces operating in Yemen consisted of a patchwork of government, non-state, and foreign-backed regular, semi-regular/militia, and paramilitary forces, often with informal command organizations and conflicting, fluid, or overlapping agendas, loyalties, and relationships; in addition, the Huthis maintained opposition military and security forces</p> <p>Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) forces; Ministry of Defense: Yemeni National Army, Air Force and Air Defense, Navy and Coastal Defense Forces, Border Guard, Strategic Reserve Forces (includes Special Forces and Presidential Protection Brigades, which are under the Ministry of Defense but responsible to the president), Popular Committee Forces (government-backed tribal militia); Ministry of Interior: Special Security Forces (paramilitary; formerly known as Central Security Forces), Political Security Organization (state security), National Security Bureau (intelligence), Counterterrorism Unit</p> <p>Saudi-backed forces: paramilitary/militia border security brigades based largely on tribal or regional affiliation (deployed along the Saudi-Yemen border, especially the areas bordering the governorates of Saada and Al-Jawf)</p> <p>United Arab Emirates-backed forces included tribal and regionally-based militia and paramilitary forces (concentrated in the southern governates): Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces, including the Security Belt Forces, the Shabwani and Hadrami “Elite” Forces, the Support and Backup Forces (aka Logistics and Support Forces), Facilities Protection Forces, and Anti-Terrorism Forces; Republican Forces; Joint Forces; note – under the 2019 Riyadh Agreement, the STC forces were to be incorporated into Yemen’s Ministries of Defense and Interior under the authority of the HADI government</p> <p>Huthi: ground, air/air defense, coastal defense, presidential protection, special operations, missile, and tribal militia forces</p><br><br>note – a considerable portion--up to 70 percent by some estimates--of Yemen’s military and security forces defected in whole or in part to former president SALAH and the Huthi opposition in 2011-2015",
"note":"note – a considerable portion--up to 70 percent by some estimates--of Yemen’s military and security forces defected in whole or in part to former president SALAH and the Huthi opposition in 2011-2015"
"text":"information limited and widely varied; ROYG: up to 300,000 estimated military, paramilitary, and militia forces; UAE- and Saudi-backed forces: 150-200,000 estimated trained fighters; Huthis: up to 200,000 estimated fighters (2021)"
"text":"the inventory of the Yemeni Government forces consists primarily of Russian and Soviet-era equipment, although much of it has been lost in the current conflict; since the start of the civil war in 2014, it has received limited amounts of donated equipment from some Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and UAE (2021)"
"text":"18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary military service; conscription abolished in 2001; 2-year service obligation (note - limited information since the start of the civil war) (2021)"
"text":"<p>in 2015, a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states intervened militarily in Yemen in support of the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) against the separatist Huthis; as of late 2021, the conflict had become largely stalemated, but the coalition (consisting largely of Saudi forces), ROYG forces, and the Huthis continued to engage in fighting, mostly with air and missile forces, although heavy ground fighting was also taking place over the key oil-rich province of Marib; the Saudis have conducted numerous air strikes in northern Yemen, while the Huthis have launched attacks into Saudi territory with ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles armed with explosives; Saudi Arabia also has raised and equipped paramilitary/militia security forces in Yemen based largely on tribal or regional affiliation to deploy along the Saudi-Yemen border, especially the areas bordering the governorates of Saada and Al-Jawf; as of late 2021, the Saudi-led coalition continued to control Yemen’s airspace and the port of Hodeida</p> <p>the United Arab Emirates (UAE) intervened in Yemen in 2015 as part of the Saudi-led coalition with about 3,500 troops, as well as supporting air and naval forces; UAE withdrew its main military force from Yemen in 2019, but has retained a small military presence while working with proxies in southern Yemen, most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC); as of 2021, UAE had recruited, trained, and equipped an estimated 150-200,000 Yemeni fighters and formed them into dozens of militia and paramilitary units</p>"
"text":"<p>the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued Maritime Advisory 2020-017 (Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean-Violence Due to Regional Conflict and Piracy) effective 14 December 2020, which states in part the \"Conflict in Yemen continues to pose potential risk to US flagged commercial vessels transiting the southern Red Sea, Bab al Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden. Threats may come from a variety of different sources including, but not limited to, missiles, rockets, projectiles, mines, small arms, unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned surface vessels, or waterborne improvised explosive devices. These threat vectors continue to pose a direct or collateral risk to US flagged commercial vessels operating in the region. Additionally, piracy poses a threat in the Gulf of Aden, Western Arabian Sea, and Western Indian Ocean.\"</p>"
"note":"<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T"
"text":"<p>Saudi Arabia has reinforced its concrete-filled security barrier along sections of the fully demarcated border with Yemen to stem illegal cross-border activities</p>"
