"note":"<p><strong>note:</strong> includes Perim, Socotra, the former Yemen Arab Republic (YAR or North Yemen), and the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY or South Yemen)</p>"
"text":"200 nm or to the edge of the continental margin"
}
},
"Climate":{
"text":"mostly desert; hot and humid along west coast; temperate in western mountains affected by seasonal monsoon; extraordinarily hot, dry, harsh desert in east"
},
"Terrain":{
"text":"narrow coastal plain backed by flat-topped hills and rugged mountains; dissected upland desert plains in center slope into the desert interior of the Arabian Peninsula"
},
"Elevation":{
"mean elevation":{
"text":"999 m"
},
"lowest point":{
"text":"Arabian Sea 0 m"
},
"highest point":{
"text":"Jabal an Nabi Shu'ayb 3,666 m"
}
},
"Natural resources":{
"text":"petroleum, fish, rock salt, marble; small deposits of coal, gold, lead, nickel, and copper; fertile soil in west"
"text":"the vast majority of the population is found in the Asir Mountains (part of the larger Sarawat Mountain system), located in the far western region of the country"
"text":"<p>sandstorms and dust storms in summer</p><p><strong>volcanism:</strong> limited volcanic activity; Jebel at Tair (Jabal al-Tair, Jebel Teir, Jabal al-Tayr, Jazirat at-Tair) (244 m), which forms an island in the Red Sea, erupted in 2007 after awakening from dormancy; other historically active volcanoes include Harra of Arhab, Harras of Dhamar, Harra es-Sawad, and Jebel Zubair, although many of these have not erupted in over a century</p>"
"note":"<p><strong>note:</strong> a distinct Socotri language is widely used on Socotra Island and Archipelago; Mahri is still fairly widely spoken in eastern Yemen</p>"
"text":"Muslim 99.1% (official; virtually all are citizens, an estimated 65% are Sunni and 35% are Shia), other 0.9% (includes Jewish, Baha'i, Hindu, and Christian; many are refugees or temporary foreign residents) (2010 est.)"
"text":"the vast majority of the population is found in the Asir Mountains (part of the larger Sarawat Mountain system), located in the far western region of the country"
},
"Urbanization":{
"urban population":{
"text":"37.9% of total population (2020)"
},
"rate of urbanization":{
"text":"4.06% annual rate of change (2015-20 est.)"
}
},
"Major urban areas - population":{
"text":"2.973 million SANAA (capital), 980,000 Aden (2020)"
"text":"Yemen Arab Republic [Yemen (Sanaa) or North Yemen] and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [Yemen (Aden) or South Yemen]"
},
"etymology":{
"text":"name derivation remains unclear but may come from the Arab term \"yumn\" (happiness) and be related to the region's classical name \"Arabia Felix\" (Fertile or Happy Arabia); the Romans referred to the rest of the peninsula as \"Arabia Deserta\" (Deserted Arabia)"
}
},
"Government type":{
"text":"in transition"
},
"Capital":{
"name":{
"text":"Sanaa"
},
"geographic coordinates":{
"text":"15 21 N, 44 12 E"
},
"time difference":{
"text":"UTC+3 (8 hours ahead of Washington, DC, during Standard Time)"
"note":"<br><br><strong>etymology:</strong> the name is reputed to mean \"well-fortified\" in Sabaean, the South Arabian language that went extinct in Yemen in the 6th century A.D."
"text":"22 governorates (muhafazat, singular - muhafazah); Abyan, 'Adan (Aden), Ad Dali', Al Bayda', Al Hudaydah, Al Jawf, Al Mahrah, Al Mahwit, Amanat al 'Asimah (Sanaa City), 'Amran, Arkhabil Suqutra (Socotra Archipelago), Dhamar, Hadramawt, Hajjah, Ibb, Lahij, Ma'rib, Raymah, Sa'dah, San'a' (Sanaa), Shabwah, Ta'izz"
},
"Independence":{
"text":"22 May 1990 (Republic of Yemen was established with the merger of the Yemen Arab Republic [Yemen (Sanaa) or North Yemen] and the Marxist-dominated People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [Yemen (Aden) or South Yemen]); notable earlier dates: North Yemen became independent on 1 November 1918 (from the Ottoman Empire) and became a republic with the overthrow of the theocratic Imamate on 27 September 1962; South Yemen became independent on 30 November 1967 (from the UK)"
"text":"adopted by referendum 16 May 1991 (following unification); note - after the National Dialogue ended in January 2015, a Constitutional Drafting Committee appointed by the president worked to prepare a new draft constitution that was expected to be put to a national referendum before being adopted; however, the start of the current conflict in early 2015 interrupted the process"
"text":"mixed legal system of Islamic (sharia) law, Napoleonic law, English common law, and customary law"
},
"International law organization participation":{
"text":"has not submitted an ICJ jurisdiction declaration; non-party state to the ICCt"
},
"Citizenship":{
"citizenship by birth":{
"text":"no"
},
"citizenship by descent only":{
"text":"the father must be a citizen of Yemen; if the father is unknown, the mother must be a citizen"
},
"dual citizenship recognized":{
"text":"no"
},
"residency requirement for naturalization":{
"text":"10 years"
}
},
"Suffrage":{
"text":"18 years of age; universal"
},
"Executive branch":{
"chief of state":{
"text":"President Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI (since 21 February 2012); Vice President ALI MUHSIN al-Ahmar, Lt. Gen. (since 3 April 2016)"
},
"head of government":{
"text":"Prime Minister Maeen Abd al-Malik SAEED (since 15 October 2018)"
},
"cabinet":{
"text":"appointed by the president"
},
"elections/appointments":{
"text":"president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 7-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 21 February 2012 (next election NA); note - a special election was held on 21 February 2012 to remove Ali Abdallah SALIH under the terms of a Gulf Cooperation Council-mediated deal during the political crisis of 2011; vice president appointed by the president; prime minister appointed by the president"
},
"election results":{
"text":"Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI (GPC) elected as a consensus president with about 50% popular participation; no other candidates"
"text":"bicameral Parliament or Majlis consists of:<br />Shura Council or Majlis Alshoora (111 seats; members appointed by the president; member tenure NA)<br /> House of Representatives or Majlis al Nuwaab (301 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 6-year terms)"
"text":"<br />percent of vote by party - GPC 58.0%, Islah 22.6%, YSP 3.8%, Unionist Party 1.9%, other 13.7%; seats by party - GPC 238, Islah 46, YSP 8, Nasserist Unionist Party 3, National Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party 2, independent 4"
"text":"Supreme Court (consists of the court president, 2 deputies, and nearly 50 judges; court organized into constitutional, civil, commercial, family, administrative, criminal, military, and appeals scrutiny divisions)"
},
"judge selection and term of office":{
"text":"judges appointed by the Supreme Judicial Council, which is chaired by the president of the republic and includes 10 high-ranking judicial officers; judges serve for life with mandatory retirement at age 65"
},
"subordinate courts":{
"text":"appeal courts; district or first instance courts; commercial courts"
"text":"General People’s Congress or GPC (3 factions: pro-Hadi [Abdrabbi Mansur HADI], pro-Houthi [Sadeq Ameen Abu RAS], pro-Saleh [Ahmed SALEH]<br />National Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party [Qassem Salam SAID]<br />Nasserist Unionist People's Organization [Abdulmalik al-MEKHLAFI]<br />Southern Transitional Council or STC [Aidarus al-ZOUBAIDA] <br />Yemeni Reform Grouping or Islah [Muhammed Abdallah al-YADUMI]<br />Yemeni Socialist Party or YSP [Dr. Abd al-Rahman Umar al-SAQQAF]",
"text":"Ambassador Ahmad Awadh BIN MUBARAK (since 3 August 2015)"
},
"chancery":{
"text":"2319 Wyoming Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008"
},
"telephone":{
"text":"[1] (202) 965-4760"
},
"FAX":{
"text":"[1] (202) 337-2017"
}
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US":{
"chief of mission":{
"text":"Ambassador Christopher HENZEL (since 20 May 2019); note - the embassy closed in March 2015; Yemen Affairs Unit currently operates out of US Embassy Riyadh"
"text":"three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and black; the band colors derive from the Arab Liberation flag and represent oppression (black), overcome through bloody struggle (red), to be replaced by a bright future (white)",
"note":"<p><strong>note:</strong> similar to the flag of Syria, which has two green stars in the white band, and of Iraq, which has an Arabic inscription centered in the white band; also similar to the flag of Egypt, which has a heraldic eagle centered in the white band</p>"
"text":"<p>Yemen is a low-income country that faces difficult long-term challenges to stabilizing and growing its economy, and the current conflict has only exacerbated those issues. The ongoing war has halted Yemen’s exports, pressured the currency’s exchange rate, accelerated inflation, severely limited food and fuel imports, and caused widespread damage to infrastructure. The conflict has also created a severe humanitarian crisis - the world’s largest cholera outbreak currently at nearly 1 million cases, more than 7 million people at risk of famine, and more than 80% of the population in need of humanitarian assistance.</p><p></p><p>Prior to the start of the conflict in 2014, Yemen was highly dependent on declining oil and gas resources for revenue. Oil and gas earnings accounted for roughly 25% of GDP and 65% of government revenue. The Yemeni Government regularly faced annual budget shortfalls and tried to diversify the Yemeni economy through a reform program designed to bolster non-oil sectors of the economy and foreign investment. In July 2014, the government continued reform efforts by eliminating some fuel subsidies and in August 2014, the IMF approved a three-year, $570 million Extended Credit Facility for Yemen.</p><p></p><p>However, the conflict that began in 2014 stalled these reform efforts and ongoing fighting continues to accelerate the country’s economic decline. In September 2016, President HADI announced the move of the main branch of Central Bank of Yemen from Sanaa to Aden where his government could exert greater control over the central bank’s dwindling resources. Regardless of which group controls the main branch, the central bank system is struggling to function. Yemen’s Central Bank’s foreign reserves, which stood at roughly $5.2 billion prior to the conflict, have declined to negligible amounts. The Central Bank can no longer fully support imports of critical goods or the country’s exchange rate. The country also is facing a growing liquidity crisis and rising inflation. The private sector is hemorrhaging, with almost all businesses making substantial layoffs. Access to food and other critical commodities such as medical equipment is limited across the country due to security issues on the ground. The Social Welfare Fund, a cash transfer program for Yemen’s neediest, is no longer operational and has not made any disbursements since late 2014.</p><p></p><p>Yemen will require significant international assistance during and after the protracted conflict to stabilize its economy. Long-term challenges include a high population growth rate, high unemployment, declining water resources, and severe food scarcity.</p>"
"text":"crude oil production and petroleum refining; small-scale production of cotton textiles, leather goods; food processing; handicrafts; aluminum products; cement; commercial ship repair; natural gas production"
"text":"<p><strong>note:</strong> most people are employed in agriculture and herding; services, construction, industry, and commerce account for less than one-fourth of the labor force</p>"
"text":"large percent of the population is in need of humanitarian assistance, and given the civil conflict, telecommunications services are vital but disrupted; mobile towers are often deliberately targeted; maintenance is dangerous to staff; aid organization rely on satellite and radio communications; there is a scarcity of telecommunications equipment in rural areas; ownership of telecommunications services and the related revenues and taxes have become a political issue; Chinese company Huawei helping with rebuilding and moving some equipment; little progress in the near future until civil unrest stabilizes; earlier damage to the FALCON submarine cable, left Internet service interrupted for a month until repaired (2020)"
},
"domestic":{
"text":"the national network consists of microwave radio relay, cable, tropospheric scatter, GSM and CDMA mobile-cellular telephone systems; fixed-line teledensity remains low by regional standards at 4 per 100 but mobile cellular use expanding at 55 per 100 (2019)"
},
"international":{
"text":"country code - 967; landing points for the FALCON, SeaMeWe-5, Aden-Djibouti, and the AAE-1 international submarine cable connecting Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Southeast Asia; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (2 Indian Ocean and 1 Atlantic Ocean), 1 Intersputnik (Atlantic Ocean region), and 2 Arabsat; microwave radio relay to Saudi Arabia and Djibouti (2020)"
"note":"<br><br><strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 outbreak is negatively impacting telecommunications production and supply chains globally; consumer spending on telecom devices and services has also slowed due to the pandemic's effect on economies worldwide; overall progress towards improvements in all facets of the telecom industry - mobile, fixed-line, broadband, submarine cable and satellite - has moderated"
"text":"state-run TV with 2 stations; state-run radio with 2 national radio stations and 5 local stations; stations from Oman and Saudi Arabia can be accessed"
"text":"Land Forces (includes seven Military Regional Commands, supported by Strategic Reserve Forces), Naval and Coastal Defense Forces (includes naval infantry/marines and Coast Guard), Air and Air Defense Force (although it still exists in name, in practice many of the officers and soldiers in this branch have been distributed to other military branches and jobs), Border Guards, Strategic Reserve Forces (supports the Land Forces at the discretion of the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief; includes a Missile Group, Presidential Protection Brigades, and Special Operations Forces) (2018)"
"Military and security service personnel strengths":{
"text":"N/A; note: prior to the civil war, Yemeni Government armed forces had approximately 70,000 active personnel, including about 60,000 Army (2019 est.)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions":{
"text":"the inventory of the Yemeni Government forces consists primarily of Russian and Soviet-era equipment, although much of it has been lost in the current conflict; since 2010, it has received limited amounts of equipment from a variety of countries, including Belarus, Czechia, Jordan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, UAE, Ukraine, and the US (2019 est.)"
},
"Military service age and obligation":{
"text":"18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary military service; no conscription; 2-year service obligation (2018)"
},
"Maritime threats":{
"text":"the International Maritime Bureau reports offshore waters in the Gulf of Aden are high risk for piracy; numerous vessels, including commercial shipping and pleasure craft, have been attacked and hijacked both at anchor and while underway; crew, passengers, and cargo have been held for ransom; the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators reduced the incidence of piracy in that body of water; one attack was reported in 2016 while three ships reported being fired upon in 2017"
}
},
"Terrorism":{
"Terrorist group(s)":{
"text":"Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps/Qods Force; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham - Yemen; al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (2020)",
"note":"<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>"
"text":"<p>Saudi Arabia has reinforced its concrete-filled security barrier along sections of the fully demarcated border with Yemen to stem illegal cross-border activities</p>"
"text":"Yemen is a source and, to a lesser extent, transit and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and women and children subjected to sex trafficking; trafficking activities grew in Yemen in 2014, as the country’s security situation deteriorated and poverty worsened; armed groups increased their recruitment of Yemeni children as combatants or checkpoint guards, and the Yemeni military and security forces continue to use child soldiers; some other Yemeni children, mostly boys, migrate to Yemeni cities or Saudi Arabia and, less frequently Oman, where they end up as beggars, drug smugglers, prostitutes, or forced laborers in domestic service or small shops; Yemeni children increasingly are also subjected to sex trafficking in country and in Saudi Arabia; tens of thousands of Yemeni migrant workers deported from Saudi Arabia and thousands of Syrian refugees are vulnerable to trafficking; additionally, Yemen is a destination and transit country for women and children from the Horn of Africa who are looking for work or receive fraudulent job offers in the Gulf states but are subjected to sexual exploitation or forced labor upon arrival; reports indicate that adults and children are still sold or inherited as slaves in Yemen"
"text":"Tier 3 – Yemen does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; weak government institutions, corruption, economic problems, security threats, and poor law enforcement capabilities impeded the government’s ability to combat human trafficking; not all forms of trafficking are criminalized, and officials continue to conflate trafficking and smuggling; the status of an anti-trafficking law drafted with assistance from an international organization remains unknown following the dissolution of the government in January 2015; the government did not report efforts to investigate, prosecute, or convict anyone of trafficking or slavery offenses, including complicit officials, despite reports of officials willfully ignoring trafficking crimes and using child soldiers in the government’s armed forces; the government acknowledged the use of child soldiers and signed a UN action plan to end the practice in 2014 but made no efforts to release child soldiers from the military and provide them with rehabilitative services; authorities failed to identify victims and refer them to protective services; the status of a draft national anti-trafficking strategy remains unknown (2015)"
