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africa/ag.json
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@ -821,10 +821,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "54.15 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$54.15 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "70.2 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$70.2 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/ao.json
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@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
"text": "Roman Catholic 41.1%, Protestant 38.1%, other 8.6%, none 12.3% (2014 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>More than two decades after the end of Angola's 27-year civil war, the country still faces a variety of socioeconomic problems, including poverty, high maternal and child mortality, and illiteracy. Despite the country's rapid post-war economic growth based on oil production, about 40 percent of Angolans live below the poverty line and unemployment is widespread, especially among the large young-adult population. Only about 70% of the population is literate, and the rate drops to around 60% for women. The youthful population - about 45% are under the age of 15 - is expected to continue growing rapidly with a fertility rate of more than 5 children per woman and a low rate of contraceptive use. Fewer than half of women deliver their babies with the assistance of trained health care personnel, which contributes to Angola's high maternal mortality rate.</p> <p>Of the estimated 550,000 Angolans who fled their homeland during its civil war, most have returned home since 2002. In 2012, the UN assessed that conditions in Angola had been stable for several years and invoked a cessation of refugee status for Angolans. Following the cessation clause, some of those still in exile returned home voluntarily through UN repatriation programs, and others integrated into host countries.</p>"
"text": "<p>More than two decades after the end of Angola's 27-year civil war, the country still faces a variety of socioeconomic problems, including poverty, high maternal and child mortality, and illiteracy. Despite the country's rapid post-war economic growth based on oil production, about 30 percent of Angolans live below the poverty line and unemployment is widespread, especially among the large young-adult population. Only about 70% of the population is literate, and the rate drops to around 60% for women. The youthful population - about 45% are under the age of 15 - is expected to continue growing rapidly with a fertility rate of more than 5 children per woman and a low rate of contraceptive use. Fewer than half of women deliver their babies with the assistance of trained health care personnel, which contributes to Angola's high maternal mortality rate.</p> <p>Of the estimated 550,000 Angolans who fled their homeland during its civil war, most have returned home since 2002. In 2012, the UN assessed that conditions in Angola had been stable for several years and invoked a cessation of refugee status for Angolans. Following the cessation clause, some of those still in exile returned home voluntarily through UN repatriation programs, and others integrated into host countries.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
@ -851,10 +851,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "37.02 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$37.02 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "45.44 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$45.44 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/bc.json
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@ -126,7 +126,7 @@
"text": "Christian 79.1%, Badimo 4.1%, other 1.4% (includes Baha'i, Hindu, Muslim, Rastafarian), none 15.2%, unspecified 0.3% (2011 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Botswana has experienced one of the most rapid declines in fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa. The total fertility rate has fallen from more than 5 children per woman in the mid 1980s to approximately 2.4 in 2013. The fertility reduction has been attributed to a host of factors, including higher educational attainment among women, greater participation of women in the workforce, increased contraceptive use, later first births, and a strong national family planning program. Botswana was making significant progress in several health indicators, including life expectancy and infant and child mortality rates, until being devastated by the HIV/AIDs epidemic in the 1990s.</p><p>Today Botswana has the third highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in the world at approximately 22%, however comprehensive and effective treatment programs have reduced HIV/AIDS-related deaths. The combination of declining fertility and increasing mortality rates because of HIV/AIDS is slowing the population aging process, with a narrowing of the youngest age groups and little expansion of the oldest age groups. Nevertheless, having the bulk of its population (about 60%) of working age will only yield economic benefits if the labor force is healthy, educated, and productively employed.</p><p>Batswana have been working as contract miners in South Africa since the 19th century. Although Botswana’s economy improved shortly after independence in 1966 with the discovery of diamonds and other minerals, its lingering high poverty rate and lack of job opportunities continued to push workers to seek mining work in southern African countries. In the early 1970s, about a third of Botswana’s male labor force worked in South Africa (lesser numbers went to Namibia and Zimbabwe). Not until the 1980s and 1990s, when South African mining companies had reduced their recruitment of foreign workers and Botswana’s economic prospects had improved, were Batswana increasingly able to find job opportunities at home.</p><p>Most Batswana prefer life in their home country and choose cross-border migration on a temporary basis only for work, shopping, visiting family, or tourism. Since the 1970s, Botswana has pursued an open migration policy enabling it to recruit thousands of foreign workers to fill skilled labor shortages. In the late 1990s, Botswana’s prosperity and political stability attracted not only skilled workers but small numbers of refugees from neighboring Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.</p>"
"text": "<p>Botswana has experienced one of the most rapid declines in fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa. The total fertility rate fell from more than 5 children per woman in the mid 1980s to approximately 2.4 in 2013, and remains at that level in 2022. The fertility reduction has been attributed to a host of factors, including higher educational attainment among women, greater participation of women in the workforce, increased contraceptive use, later first births, and a strong national family planning program. Botswana was making significant progress in several health indicators, including life expectancy and infant and child mortality rates, until being devastated by the HIV/AIDs epidemic in the 1990s.</p> <p>In 2021,  Botswana had one of the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the world at approximately 22%, however comprehensive and effective treatment programs have reduced HIV/AIDS-related deaths. The combination of declining fertility and increasing mortality rates because of HIV/AIDS is slowing the population aging process, with a narrowing of the youngest age groups and little expansion of the oldest age groups. Nevertheless, having the bulk of its population (about 60%) of working age will only yield economic benefits if the labor force is healthy, educated, and productively employed.</p> <p>Batswana have been working as contract miners in South Africa since the 19th century. Although Botswana’s economy improved shortly after independence in 1966 with the discovery of diamonds and other minerals, its lingering high poverty rate and lack of job opportunities continued to push workers to seek mining work in southern African countries. In the early 1970s, about a third of Botswana’s male labor force worked in South Africa (lesser numbers went to Namibia and Zimbabwe). Not until the 1980s and 1990s, when South African mining companies had reduced their recruitment of foreign workers and Botswana’s economic prospects had improved, were Batswana increasingly able to find job opportunities at home.</p> <p>Most Batswana prefer life in their home country and choose cross-border migration on a temporary basis only for work, shopping, visiting family, or tourism. Since the 1970s, Botswana has pursued an open migration policy enabling it to recruit thousands of foreign workers to fill skilled labor shortages. In the late 1990s, Botswana’s prosperity and political stability attracted not only skilled workers but small numbers of refugees from neighboring Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
@ -846,10 +846,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "5.305 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$5.305 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "5.478 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$5.478 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/bn.json
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@ -646,7 +646,7 @@
}
},
"Political parties and leaders": {
"text": "African Movement for Development and Progress or MADEP [Sefou FAGBOHOUN]<br>Alliance for a Triumphant Benin or ABT [Abdoulaye BIO TCHANE]<br>Benin Renaissance or RB [Lehady SOGLO]<br>Cowrie Force for an Emerging Benin or FCBE [Yayi BONI]<br>Democratic Renewal Party or PRD [Adrien HOUNGBEDJI]<br>National Alliance for Development and Democracy or AND [Valentin Aditi HOUDE]<br>New Consciousness Rally or NC [Pascal KOUPAKI]<br>Patriotic Awakening or RP [Janvier YAHOUEDEOU]<br>Social Democrat Party or PSD [Emmanuel GOLOU]<br>Sun Alliance or AS [Sacca LAFIA]<br>Union Makes the Nation or UN [Adrien HOUNGBEDJI] (includes PRD, MADEP)<br>United Democratic Forces or FDU [Mathurin NAGO]",
"text": "African Movement for Development and Progress or MADEP [Sefou FAGBOHOUN]<br>Benin Renaissance or RB [Lehady SOGLO]<br>Cowrie Force for an Emerging Benin or FCBE [Yayi BONI]<br>Democratic Renewal Party or PRD [Adrien HOUNGBEDJI]<br>National Alliance for Development and Democracy or AND [Valentin Aditi HOUDE]<br>New Consciousness Rally or NC [Pascal KOUPAKI]<br>Patriotic Awakening or RP [Janvier YAHOUEDEOU]<br>Progressive Union for Renewal [Joseph DJOGBENOU]<br>Republican Bloc [Abdoulaye BIO TCHANE]<br>Social Democrat Party or PSD [Emmanuel GOLOU]<br>Sun Alliance or AS [Sacca LAFIA]<br>The Democrats [Eric HOUNDETE]<br>Union Makes the Nation or UN [Adrien HOUNGBEDJI] (includes PRD, MADEP)<br>United Democratic Forces or FDU [Mathurin NAGO]",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> approximately 20 additional minor parties"
},
"International organization participation": {
@ -862,10 +862,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "1.578 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.578 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "2.152 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$2.152 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/by.json
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@ -857,10 +857,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "536.7 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$536.7 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "729.6 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$729.6 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/cd.json
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@ -873,10 +873,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "1.337 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.337 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "1.481 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.481 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/cf.json
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@ -891,10 +891,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "1.965 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.965 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "2.578 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$2.578 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/cg.json
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@ -901,10 +901,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "4.634 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$4.634 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "5.009 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$5.009 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/cm.json
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@ -904,10 +904,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "5.363 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$5.363 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "6.556 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$6.556 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>Cameroon has committed approximately 2,000-2,500 troops to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups operating in the general area of the Lake Chad Basin and along Nigeria's northeast border; national MNJTF troop contingents are deployed within their own country territories, although cross‐border operations occur occasionally"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "as of 2022, the FAC was largely focused on the threat from the terrorist group Boko Haram along its frontiers with Nigeria and Chad (Far North region) and an insurgency from armed Anglophone separatist groups in the North-West and South-West regions (as of late 2022, this internal conflict has left an estimated 4,000 civilians dead and over 700,000 people displaced since fighting started in 2016); in addition, the FAC often deployed units to the border region with the Central African Republic to counter intrusions from armed militias and bandits"
"text": "as of 2023, the FAC was largely focused on the threat from the terrorist group Boko Haram along its frontiers with Nigeria and Chad (Far North region) and an insurgency from armed Anglophone separatist groups in the North-West and South-West regions (as of 2023, this internal conflict has left more than 3,500 civilians dead and over 500,000 people displaced since fighting started in 2016); in addition, the FAC often deployed units to the border region with the Central African Republic to counter intrusions from armed militias and bandits"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of maritime kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""

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africa/cn.json
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},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "165.2 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$165.2 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "207.3 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$207.3 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/ct.json
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@ -846,10 +846,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "282.9 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$282.9 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "300.1 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$300.1 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/cv.json
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@ -790,10 +790,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "493.5 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$493.5 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "546.7 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$546.7 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/dj.json
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@ -813,10 +813,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "717 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$717 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "899.2 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$899.2 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/eg.json
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},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "42.32 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$42.32 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "62.61 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$62.61 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -1273,7 +1273,7 @@
"text": "Ain Sukhna terminal, Sidi Kerir terminal"
},
"container port(s) (TEUs)": {
"text": "Port Said (East) (3,816,084) (2019)"
"text": "Port Said (East) (4,764,583) (2021)"
},
"LNG terminal(s) (export)": {
"text": "Damietta, Idku (Abu Qir Bay), Sumed"

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africa/ek.json
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},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "2.114 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$2.114 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "2.523 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$2.523 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/er.json
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@ -797,10 +797,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "2.029 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$2.029 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "2.601 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$2.601 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/et.json
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},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "11.24 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$11.24 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "13.79 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$13.79 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/ga.json
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@ -850,10 +850,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "300.4 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$300.4 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "339 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$339 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/gb.json
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@ -122,7 +122,7 @@
}
},
"Ethnic groups": {
"text": "Gabonese-born 80.1% (includes Fang 23.2%, Shira-Punu/Vili 18.9%, Nzabi-Duma 11.3%, Mbede-Teke 6.9%, Myene 5%, Kota-Kele 4.9%, Okande-Tsogo 2.1%, Pygmy .3%, other 7.5%), Cameroonian 4.6%, Malian 2.4%, Beninese 2.1%, acquired Gabonese nationality 1.6%, Togolese 1.6%, Senegalese 1.1%, Congolese (Brazzaville) 1%, other 5.5% (includes Congolese (Kinshasa), Equatorial Guinean, Nigerian) (2012 est.)"
"text": "Gabonese-born 80.1% (includes Fang 23.2%, Shira-Punu/Vili 18.9%, Nzabi-Duma 11.3%, Mbede-Teke 6.9%, Myene 5%, Kota-Kele 4.9%, Okande-Tsogo 2.1%, Pygmy 0.3%, other 7.5%), Cameroonian 4.6%, Malian 2.4%, Beninese 2.1%, acquired Gabonese nationality 1.6%, Togolese 1.6%, Senegalese 1.1%, Congolese (Brazzaville) 1%, other 5.5% (includes Congolese (Kinshasa), Equatorial Guinean, Nigerian) (2012 est.)"
},
"Languages": {
"text": "French (official), Fang, Myene, Nzebi, Bapounou/Eschira, Bandjabi"
@ -834,10 +834,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "2.634 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$2.634 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "2.914 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$2.914 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/gh.json
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@ -877,10 +877,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "9.544 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$9.544 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "12.36 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$12.36 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/gv.json
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@ -862,10 +862,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "1.7 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.7 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "1.748 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.748 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/iv.json
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@ -882,10 +882,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "7.749 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$7.749 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "9.464 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$9.464 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/ke.json
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@ -882,10 +882,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "13.95 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$13.95 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "19.24 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$19.24 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/li.json
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@ -119,7 +119,7 @@
}
},
"Ethnic groups": {
"text": "Kpelle 20.3%, Bassa 13.4%, Grebo 10%, Gio 8%, Mano 7.9%, Kru 6%, Lorma 5.1%, Kissi 4.8%, Gola 4.4%, Krahn 4%, Vai 4%, Mandingo 3.2%, Gbandi 3%, Mende 1.3%, Sapo 1.3%, other Liberian 1.7%, other African 1.4%, non-African .1% (2008 est.)"
"text": "Kpelle 20.3%, Bassa 13.4%, Grebo 10%, Gio 8%, Mano 7.9%, Kru 6%, Lorma 5.1%, Kissi 4.8%, Gola 4.4%, Krahn 4%, Vai 4%, Mandingo 3.2%, Gbandi 3%, Mende 1.3%, Sapo 1.3%, other Liberian 1.7%, other African 1.4%, non-African 0.1% (2008 est.)"
},
"Languages": {
"text": "English 20% (official), some 20 ethnic group languages few of which can be written or used in correspondence"
@ -128,7 +128,7 @@
"text": "Christian 85.6%, Muslim 12.2%, Traditional 0.6%, other 0.2%, none 1.5% (2008 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Liberia’s high fertility rate of nearly 5 children per woman and large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – will sustain a high dependency ratio for many years to come. Significant progress has been made in preventing child deaths, despite a lack of health care workers and infrastructure. Infant and child mortality have dropped nearly 70% since 1990; the annual reduction rate of about 5.4% is the highest in Africa.</p><p>Nevertheless, Liberia’s high maternal mortality rate remains among the world’s worst; it reflects a high unmet need for family planning services, frequency of early childbearing, lack of quality obstetric care, high adolescent fertility, and a low proportion of births attended by a medical professional. Female mortality is also increased by the prevalence of female genital cutting (FGC), which is practiced by 10 of Liberia’s 16 tribes and affects more than two-thirds of women and girls. FGC is an initiation ritual performed in rural bush schools, which teach traditional beliefs on marriage and motherhood and are an obstacle to formal classroom education for Liberian girls.</p><p>Liberia has been both a source and a destination for refugees. During Liberia’s 14-year civil war (1989-2003), more than 250,000 people became refugees and another half million were internally displaced. Between 2004 and the cessation of refugee status for Liberians in June 2012, the UNHCR helped more than 155,000 Liberians to voluntarily repatriate, while others returned home on their own. Some Liberian refugees spent more than two decades living in other West African countries. Liberia hosted more than 125,000 Ivoirian refugees escaping post-election violence in 2010-11; as of mid-2017, about 12,000 Ivoirian refugees were still living in Liberia as of October 2017 because of instability.</p>"
"text": "<p>Liberia’s high fertility rate of nearly 5 children per woman and large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – will sustain a high dependency ratio for many years to come. Significant progress has been made in preventing child deaths, despite a lack of health care workers and infrastructure. Infant and child mortality have dropped nearly 70% since 1990; the annual reduction rate of about 5.4% is the highest in Africa.</p> <p>Nevertheless, Liberia’s high maternal mortality rate remains among the world’s worst; it reflects a high unmet need for family planning services, frequency of early childbearing, lack of quality obstetric care, high adolescent fertility, and a low proportion of births attended by a medical professional. Female mortality is also increased by the prevalence of female genital cutting (FGC), which is practiced by 10 of Liberia’s 16 tribes and affects more than two-thirds of women and girls. FGC is an initiation ritual performed in rural bush schools, which teach traditional beliefs on marriage and motherhood and are an obstacle to formal classroom education for Liberian girls.</p> <p>Liberia has been both a source and a destination for refugees. During Liberia’s 14-year civil war (1989-2003), more than 250,000 people became refugees and another half million were internally displaced. Between 2004 and the cessation of refugee status for Liberians in June 2012, the UNHCR helped more than 155,000 Liberians to voluntarily repatriate, while others returned home on their own. Some Liberian refugees spent more than two decades living in other West African countries. Between 2011 and 2022, more than 300,000 Ivoirian refugees in Liberia have been repatriated; as of mid-2023, less than 2,300 Ivoirian refugees were still living in Liberia.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
@ -831,10 +831,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "553.6 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$553.6 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "693.8 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$693.8 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/lt.json
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},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "1.09 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.09 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "1.255 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.255 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

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africa/ly.json
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@ -136,7 +136,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> non-Sunni Muslims include native Ibadhi Muslims (&lt;1% of the population) and foreign Muslims"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Despite continuing unrest, Libya remains a destination country for economic migrants. It is also a hub for transit migration to Europe because of its proximity to southern Europe and its lax border controls. Labor migrants have been drawn to Libya since the development of its oil sector in the 1960s. Until the latter part of the 1990s, most migrants to Libya were Arab (primarily Egyptians and Sudanese). However, international isolation stemming from Libya’s involvement in international terrorism and a perceived lack of support from Arab countries led QADHAFI in 1998 to adopt a decade-long pan-African policy that enabled large numbers of Sub-Saharan migrants to enter Libya without visas to work in the construction and agricultural industries. Although Sub-Saharan Africans provided a cheap labor source, they were poorly treated and were subjected to periodic mass expulsions.</p><p>By the mid-2000s, domestic animosity toward African migrants and a desire to reintegrate into the international community motivated QADHAFI to impose entry visas on Arab and African immigrants and to agree to joint maritime patrols and migrant repatriations with Italy, the main recipient of illegal migrants departing Libya. As his regime neared collapse in 2011, QADHAFI reversed his policy of cooperating with Italy to curb illegal migration and sent boats loaded with migrants and asylum seekers to strain European resources. Libya’s 2011 revolution decreased immigration drastically and prompted nearly 800,000 migrants to flee to third countries, mainly Tunisia and Egypt, or to their countries of origin. The inflow of migrants declined in 2012 but returned to normal levels by 2013, despite continued hostility toward Sub-Saharan Africans and a less-inviting job market.</p><p>While Libya is not an appealing destination for migrants, since 2014, transiting migrants – primarily from East and West Africa – continue to exploit its political instability and weak border controls and use it as a primary departure area to migrate across the central Mediterranean to Europe in growing numbers. In addition, more than 200,000 people were displaced internally as of August 2017 by fighting between armed groups in eastern and western Libya and, to a lesser extent, by inter-tribal clashes in the country’s south.</p>"
"text": "<p>Despite continuing unrest, Libya remains a destination country for economic migrants. It is also a hub for transit migration to Europe because of its proximity to southern Europe and its lax border controls. Labor migrants have been drawn to Libya since the development of its oil sector in the 1960s. Until the latter part of the 1990s, most migrants to Libya were Arab (primarily Egyptians and Sudanese). However, international isolation stemming from Libya’s involvement in international terrorism and a perceived lack of support from Arab countries led QADHAFI in 1998 to adopt a decade-long pan-African policy that enabled large numbers of Sub-Saharan migrants to enter Libya without visas to work in the construction and agricultural industries. Although Sub-Saharan Africans provided a cheap labor source, they were poorly treated and were subjected to periodic mass expulsions.</p> <p>By the mid-2000s, domestic animosity toward African migrants and a desire to reintegrate into the international community motivated QADHAFI to impose entry visas on Arab and African immigrants and to agree to joint maritime patrols and migrant repatriations with Italy, the main recipient of illegal migrants departing Libya. As his regime neared collapse in 2011, QADHAFI reversed his policy of cooperating with Italy to curb illegal migration and sent boats loaded with migrants and asylum seekers to strain European resources. Libya’s 2011 revolution decreased immigration drastically and prompted nearly 800,000 migrants to flee to third countries, mainly Tunisia and Egypt, or to their countries of origin. The inflow of migrants declined in 2012 but returned to normal levels by 2013, despite continued hostility toward Sub-Saharan Africans and a less-inviting job market.</p> <p>While Libya is not an appealing destination for migrants, since 2014, transiting migrants – primarily from East and West Africa – continue to exploit its political instability and weak border controls and use it as a primary departure area to migrate across the central Mediterranean to Europe in growing numbers. In addition, approximately 135,000 people were displaced internally as of  August 2022 by fighting between armed groups in eastern and western Libya and, to a lesser extent, by inter-tribal clashes in the country’s south.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
@ -768,10 +768,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "15.78 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$15.78 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "23.46 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$23.46 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@
"text": "18,831 (Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 14,356 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers), 5,318 (Eritrea) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "159,996 (conflict between pro-QADHAFI and anti-QADHAFI forces in 2011; post-QADHAFI tribal clashes 2014) (2022)"
"text": "134,787 (conflict between pro-QADHAFI and anti-QADHAFI forces in 2011; post-QADHAFI tribal clashes 2014) (2022)"
}
}
}

4
africa/ma.json
View file

@ -845,10 +845,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "1.828 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.828 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "2.136 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$2.136 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
africa/mi.json
View file

@ -862,10 +862,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "1.356 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.356 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "1.567 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.567 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

8
africa/ml.json
View file

@ -881,10 +881,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "3.075 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$3.075 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "3.513 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$3.513 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@
"text": "information varies; approximately 20,000 active FAMA personnel (includes up to 2,000 Air Force); approximately 5,000 Gendarmerie; approximately 10,000 National Guard (2022)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the FAMA's inventory consists primarily of Soviet-era equipment, although in recent years it has received limited quantities of mostly second-hand armaments from more than a dozen countries, including Russia (2022)"
"text": "the FAMA's inventory consists primarily of Soviet-era equipment, although in recent years it has received limited quantities of mostly second-hand armaments from more than a dozen countries, including Russia (2023)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "18 years of age for men and women for selective compulsory and voluntary military service; 2-year conscript service obligation (2022)"
@ -1278,7 +1278,7 @@
"text": "<strong>note: </strong>until announcing its withdrawal in May of 2022, Mali was part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger; Mali had committed 1,100 troops and 200 gendarmes to the force"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "prior to the coup in August 2020 and military takeover in May 2021, the Malian military had intervened in the political arena at least five times since the country gained independence in 1960; two attempts failed (1976 and 1978), while three succeeded in overturning civilian rule (1968, 1991, and 2012); the military collapsed in 2012 during the fighting against Tuareg rebels and Islamic militants; it has been since rebuilt, but continues to have limited capabilities and is heavily reliant on external assistance <br><br>as of 2022, Malian security forces were actively engaged in operations against several insurgent terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), as well as other rebel groups, communal militias, and criminal bands spread across the central, northern, and southern regions of the country; the government was reportedly in control of only an estimated 10-20% of the country's central and northern territories, and terror attacks were increasing in the more heavily populated south, including around the capital Bamako; the Macina Liberation Front (FLM), part of the Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) coalition of al-Qa'ida-linked terror groups, has played a large role in a surge in violence in Mali’s central and southern regions; in the north, the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) has been able to reassert itself in 2022 <br><br>the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has operated in the country since 2013; the Mission's responsibilities include providing security, rebuilding Malian security forces, protecting civilians, supporting national political dialogue, and assisting in the reestablishment of Malian government authority; as of mid-2022, MINUSMA had around 15,000 personnel deployed; in June 2022, the UN extended its mission another 12 months<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM-M) and the French military (under a separate, bi-lateral mission) have also operated in the country since 2013; the EUTM-M provides advice and training to the Malian Armed Forces and military assistance to the G5 Sahel Joint Force; as of May 2022, the mission included about 1,100 personnel from more than 20 European countries; in April of 2022, the EU said it would suspend its training program in Mali, citing issues with the ruling military government, including human rights abuses and the presence of Russian private military contractors; in August 2022, France completed withdrawing the last of its forces from Mali, also citing obstructions from the military government; prior to the withdrawal, more than 2,000 French troops had provided military assistance and conducted counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency operations<br><br>in December 2021, the Malian military government contracted with a Russian private military company to provide training for local armed forces and security to senior Malian officials; as of mid-2022, there were an estimated 1,000 Russian military contractors in Mali (2022)"
"text": "prior to the coup in August 2020 and military takeover in May 2021, the Malian military had intervened in the political arena at least five times since the country gained independence in 1960; two attempts failed (1976 and 1978), while three succeeded in overturning civilian rule (1968, 1991, and 2012); the military collapsed in 2012 during the fighting against Tuareg rebels and Islamic militants; it has been since rebuilt, but continues to have limited capabilities and is heavily reliant on external assistance <br><br>as of 2023, Malian security forces were actively engaged in operations against several insurgent terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), as well as other rebel groups, communal militias, and criminal bands spread across the central, northern, and southern regions of the country; the government was reportedly in control of only an estimated 10-20% of the country's central and northern territories, and terror attacks were increasing in the more heavily populated south, including around the capital Bamako; the Macina Liberation Front (FLM), part of the Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) coalition of al-Qa'ida-linked terror groups, has played a large role in a surge in violence in Mali’s central and southern regions; in the north, the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) has been able to reassert itself in 2022 <br><br>the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has operated in the country since 2013; the Mission's responsibilities include providing security, rebuilding Malian security forces, protecting civilians, supporting national political dialogue, and assisting in the reestablishment of Malian government authority; as of late 2022, MINUSMA had around 14,000 personnel deployed; in June 2022, the UN extended its mission another 12 months<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM-M) and the French military (under a separate, bi-lateral mission) have also operated in the country since 2013; the EUTM-M provides advice and training to the Malian Armed Forces and military assistance to the G5 Sahel Joint Force; in 2022, the mission included about 700 personnel from more than 20 European countries; in April of 2022, the EU said it would suspend its training program in Mali, citing issues with the ruling military government, including human rights abuses and the presence of Russian private military contractors; in August 2022, France completed withdrawing the last of its forces from Mali, also citing obstructions from the military government; prior to the withdrawal, more than 2,000 French troops had provided military assistance and conducted counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency operations<br><br>in December 2021, the Malian military government contracted with a Russian private military company to provide training for local armed forces and security to senior Malian officials; as of mid-2022, there were an estimated 1,000 Russian military contractors in Mali (2022)"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

6
africa/mo.json
View file

@ -881,10 +881,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "22.81 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$22.81 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "26.75 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$26.75 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -1265,7 +1265,7 @@
"text": "Ad Dakhla, Agadir, Casablanca, Jorf Lasfar, Laayoune (El Aaiun), Mohammedia, Safi, Tangier"
},
"container port(s) (TEUs)": {
"text": "Tangier (4,801,713) (2019)"
"text": "Tangier (7,173,870) (2021)"
},
"LNG terminal(s) (import)": {
"text": "Jorf Lasfar (planned)"

4
africa/mp.json
View file

@ -798,10 +798,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "2.994 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$2.994 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "3.038 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$3.038 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

6
africa/mr.json
View file

@ -142,7 +142,7 @@
"text": "Muslim (official) 100%"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>With a sustained total fertility rate of about 4 children per woman and almost 60% of the population under the age of 25, Mauritania's population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future. Mauritania's large youth cohort is vital to its development prospects, but available schooling does not adequately prepare students for the workplace. Girls continue to be underrepresented in the classroom, educational quality remains poor, and the dropout rate is high. The literacy rate is only about 50%, even though access to primary education has improved since the mid-2000s. Women's restricted access to education and discriminatory laws maintain gender inequality - worsened by early and forced marriages and female genital cutting.</p> <p>The denial of education to black Moors also helps to perpetuate slavery. Although Mauritania abolished slavery in 1981 (the last country in the world to do so) and made it a criminal offense in 2007, the millenniums-old practice persists largely because anti-slavery laws are rarely enforced and the custom is so ingrained.  According to a 2018 nongovernmental organization's report, a little more than 2% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which includes individuals sujbected to forced labor and forced marriage, although many thousands of individuals who are legally free contend with discrimination, poor education, and a lack of identity papers and, therefore, live in de facto slavery.  The UN and international press outlets have claimed that up to 20% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which would be the highest rate worldwide.</p> <p>Drought, poverty, and unemployment have driven outmigration from Mauritania since the 1970s. Early flows were directed toward other West African countries, including Senegal, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gambia. The 1989 Mauritania-Senegal conflict forced thousands of black Mauritanians to take refuge in Senegal and pushed labor migrants toward the Gulf, Libya, and Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mauritania has accepted migrants from neighboring countries to fill labor shortages since its independence in 1960 and more recently has received refugees escaping civil wars, including tens of thousands of Tuaregs who fled Mali in 2012.</p> <p>Mauritania was an important transit point for Sub-Saharan migrants moving illegally to North Africa and Europe. In the mid-2000s, as border patrols increased in the Strait of Gibraltar, security increased around Spain's North African enclaves (Ceuta and Melilla), and Moroccan border controls intensified, illegal migration flows shifted from the Western Mediterranean to Spain's Canary Islands. In 2006, departure points moved southward along the West African coast from Morocco and then Western Sahara to Mauritania's two key ports (Nouadhibou and the capital Nouakchott), and illegal migration to the Canaries peaked at almost 32,000. The numbers fell dramatically in the following years because of joint patrolling off the West African coast by Frontex (the EU's border protection agency), Spain, Mauritania, and Senegal; the expansion of Spain's border surveillance system; and the 2008 European economic downturn.</p>"
"text": "<p>With a sustained total fertility rate of about 3.5 children per woman and almost 60% of the population under the age of 25, as of 2022, Mauritania's population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future. Mauritania's large youth cohort is vital to its development prospects, but available schooling does not adequately prepare students for the workplace. Girls continue to be underrepresented in the classroom, educational quality remains poor, and the dropout rate is high. The literacy rate is only about 50%, even though access to primary education has improved since the mid-2000s. Women's restricted access to education and discriminatory laws maintain gender inequality - worsened by early and forced marriages and female genital cutting.</p> <p>The denial of education to black Moors also helps to perpetuate slavery. Although Mauritania abolished slavery in 1981 (the last country in the world to do so) and made it a criminal offense in 2007, the millenniums-old practice persists largely because anti-slavery laws are rarely enforced and the custom is so ingrained.  According to a 2018 nongovernmental organization's report, a little more than 2% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which includes individuals subjected to forced labor and forced marriage, while many thousands of individuals who are legally free contend with discrimination, poor education, and a lack of identity papers and, therefore, live in de facto slavery.  The UN and international press outlets have claimed that up to 20% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which would be the highest rate worldwide.</p> <p>Drought, poverty, and unemployment have driven outmigration from Mauritania since the 1970s. Early flows were directed toward other West African countries, including Senegal, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gambia. The 1989 Mauritania-Senegal conflict forced thousands of black Mauritanians to take refuge in Senegal and pushed labor migrants toward the Gulf, Libya, and Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mauritania has accepted migrants from neighboring countries to fill labor shortages since its independence in 1960 and more recently has received refugees escaping civil wars, including tens of thousands of Tuaregs who fled Mali in 2012.</p> <p>Mauritania was an important transit point for Sub-Saharan migrants moving illegally to North Africa and Europe. In the mid-2000s, as border patrols increased in the Strait of Gibraltar, security increased around Spain's North African enclaves (Ceuta and Melilla), and Moroccan border controls intensified, illegal migration flows shifted from the Western Mediterranean to Spain's Canary Islands. In 2006, departure points moved southward along the West African coast from Morocco and then Western Sahara to Mauritania's two key ports (Nouadhibou and the capital Nouakchott), and illegal migration to the Canaries peaked at almost 32,000. The numbers fell dramatically in the following years because of joint patrolling off the West African coast by Frontex (the EU's border protection agency), Spain, Mauritania, and Senegal; the expansion of Spain's border surveillance system; and the 2008 European economic downturn.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
@ -869,10 +869,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "1.354 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.354 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "1.396 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.396 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
africa/mz.json
View file

@ -879,10 +879,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "3.356 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$3.356 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "4.054 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$4.054 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

6
africa/ng.json
View file

@ -879,10 +879,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "1.757 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.757 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "2.171 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$2.171 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "187,130 (Nigeria), 65,688 (Mali) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
"text": "188,107 (Nigeria), 65,688 (Mali) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "376,809 (includes the regions of Diffa, Tillaberi, and Tahoua; unknown how many of the 11,000 people displaced by clashes between government forces and the Tuareg militant group, Niger Movement for Justice, in 2007 are still displaced; inter-communal violence; Boko Haram attacks in southern Niger, 2015) (2022)"

6
africa/ni.json
View file

@ -137,7 +137,7 @@
"text": "English (official), Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo (Ibo), Fulani, over 500 additional indigenous languages"
},
"Religions": {
"text": "Muslim 53.5%, Roman Catholic 10.6%, other Christian 35.3%, other .6% (2018 est.)"
"text": "Muslim 53.5%, Roman Catholic 10.6%, other Christian 35.3%, other 0.6% (2018 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Nigeria’s population is projected to grow from more than 186 million people in 2016 to 392 million in 2050, becoming the world’s fourth most populous country. Nigeria’s sustained high population growth rate will continue for the foreseeable future because of population momentum and its high birth rate. Abuja has not successfully implemented family planning programs to reduce and space births because of a lack of political will, government financing, and the availability and affordability of services and products, as well as a cultural preference for large families. Increased educational attainment, especially among women, and improvements in health care are needed to encourage and to better enable parents to opt for smaller families.</p><p>Nigeria needs to harness the potential of its burgeoning youth population in order to boost economic development, reduce widespread poverty, and channel large numbers of unemployed youth into productive activities and away from ongoing religious and ethnic violence. While most movement of Nigerians is internal, significant emigration regionally and to the West provides an outlet for Nigerians looking for economic opportunities, seeking asylum, and increasingly pursuing higher education. Immigration largely of West Africans continues to be insufficient to offset emigration and the loss of highly skilled workers. Nigeria also is a major source, transit, and destination country for forced labor and sex trafficking.</p>"
@ -888,10 +888,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "12.92 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$12.92 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "19.54 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$19.54 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
africa/od.json
View file

@ -728,10 +728,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "259.6 million (FY2017/18 est.)"
"text": "$259.6 million (FY2017/18 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "298.6 million (FY2017/18 est.)"
"text": "$298.6 million (FY2017/18 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
africa/pu.json
View file

@ -802,10 +802,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "246.2 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$246.2 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "263.5 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$263.5 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

6
africa/rw.json
View file

@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
"text": "Protestant 57.7% (includes Adventist 12.6%), Roman Catholic 38.2%, Muslim 2.1%, other 1% (includes traditional, Jehovah's Witness), none 1.1% (2019-20 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Rwanda’s fertility rate declined sharply during the last decade, as a result of the government’s commitment to family planning, the increased use of contraceptives, and a downward trend in ideal family size. Increases in educational attainment, particularly among girls, and exposure to social media also contributed to the reduction in the birth rate. The average number of births per woman decreased from a 5.6 in 2005 to 4.5 in 2016. Despite these significant strides in reducing fertility, Rwanda’s birth rate remains very high and will continue to for an extended period of time because of its large population entering reproductive age. Because Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, its persistent high population growth and increasingly small agricultural landholdings will put additional strain on families’ ability to raise foodstuffs and access potable water. These conditions will also hinder the government’s efforts to reduce poverty and prevent environmental degradation.</p><p>The UNHCR recommended that effective 30 June 2013 countries invoke a cessation of refugee status for those Rwandans who fled their homeland between 1959 and 1998, including the 1994 genocide, on the grounds that the conditions that drove them to seek protection abroad no longer exist. The UNHCR’s decision is controversial because many Rwandan refugees still fear persecution if they return home, concerns that are supported by the number of Rwandans granted asylum since 1998 and by the number exempted from the cessation. Rwandan refugees can still seek an exemption or local integration, but host countries are anxious to send the refugees back to Rwanda and are likely to avoid options that enable them to stay. Conversely, Rwanda itself hosts almost 160,000 refugees as of 2017; virtually all of them fleeing conflict in neighboring Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.</p>"
"text": "<p>Rwanda’s fertility rate declined sharply during the last decade, as a result of the government’s commitment to family planning, the increased use of contraceptives, and a downward trend in ideal family size. Increases in educational attainment, particularly among girls, and exposure to social media also contributed to the reduction in the birth rate. The average number of births per woman decreased from a 5.6 in 2005 to 4.5 in 2016. Despite these significant strides in reducing fertility, Rwanda’s birth rate remains very high and will continue to for an extended period of time because of its large population entering reproductive age. Because Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, its persistent high population growth and increasingly small agricultural landholdings will put additional strain on families’ ability to raise foodstuffs and access potable water. These conditions will also hinder the government’s efforts to reduce poverty and prevent environmental degradation.</p> <p>The UNHCR recommended that effective 30 June 2013 countries invoke a cessation of refugee status for those Rwandans who fled their homeland between 1959 and 1998, including the 1994 genocide, on the grounds that the conditions that drove them to seek protection abroad no longer exist. The UNHCR’s decision is controversial because many Rwandan refugees still fear persecution if they return home, concerns that are supported by the number of Rwandans granted asylum since 1998 and by the number exempted from the cessation. Rwandan refugees can still seek an exemption or local integration, but host countries are anxious to send the refugees back to Rwanda and are likely to avoid options that enable them to stay. Conversely, Rwanda itself hosts approximately 125,000 refugees as of 2022; virtually all of them fleeing conflict in neighboring Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
@ -849,10 +849,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "1.943 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.943 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "2.337 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$2.337 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
africa/se.json
View file

@ -778,10 +778,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "593.4 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$593.4 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "600.7 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$600.7 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

12
africa/sf.json
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6
africa/sg.json
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@ -137,7 +137,7 @@
"text": "Muslim 97.2% (most adhere to one of the four main Sufi brotherhoods), Christian 2.7% (mostly Roman Catholic) (2019 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Senegal has a large and growing youth population but has not been successful in developing its potential human capital. Senegal’s high total fertility rate of almost 4.5 children per woman continues to bolster the country’s large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25. Fertility remains high because of the continued desire for large families, the low use of family planning, and early childbearing. Because of the country’s high illiteracy rate (more than 40%), high unemployment (even among university graduates), and widespread poverty, Senegalese youths face dim prospects; women are especially disadvantaged.</p><p>Senegal historically was a destination country for economic migrants, but in recent years West African migrants more often use Senegal as a transit point to North Africa – and sometimes illegally onward to Europe. The country also has been host to several thousand black Mauritanian refugees since they were expelled from their homeland during its 1989 border conflict with Senegal. The country’s economic crisis in the 1970s stimulated emigration; departures accelerated in the 1990s. Destinations shifted from neighboring countries, which were experiencing economic decline, civil wars, and increasing xenophobia, to Libya and Mauritania because of their booming oil industries and to developed countries (most notably former colonial ruler France, as well as Italy and Spain). The latter became attractive in the 1990s because of job opportunities and their periodic regularization programs (legalizing the status of illegal migrants).</p><p>Additionally, about 16,000 Senegalese refugees still remain in The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau as a result of more than 30 years of fighting between government forces and rebel separatists in southern Senegal’s Casamance region.</p>"
"text": "<p>Senegal has a large and growing youth population but has not been successful in developing its potential human capital. Senegal’s high total fertility rate of almost 4.5 children per woman continues to bolster the country’s large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25. Fertility remains high because of the continued desire for large families, the low use of family planning, and early childbearing. Because of the country’s high illiteracy rate (more than 40%), high unemployment (even among university graduates), and widespread poverty, Senegalese youths face dim prospects; women are especially disadvantaged.</p> <p>Senegal historically was a destination country for economic migrants, but in recent years West African migrants more often use Senegal as a transit point to North Africa – and sometimes illegally onward to Europe. The country also has been host to several thousand black Mauritanian refugees since they were expelled from their homeland during its 1989 border conflict with Senegal. The country’s economic crisis in the 1970s stimulated emigration; departures accelerated in the 1990s. Destinations shifted from neighboring countries, which were experiencing economic decline, civil wars, and increasing xenophobia, to Libya and Mauritania because of their booming oil industries and to developed countries (most notably former colonial ruler France, as well as Italy and Spain). The latter became attractive in the 1990s because of job opportunities and their periodic regularization programs (legalizing the status of illegal migrants).</p> <p> </p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
@ -886,10 +886,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "4.139 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$4.139 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "4.9 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$4.9 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
africa/sh.json
View file

@ -541,10 +541,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "8.427 million (FY06/07 est.)"
"text": "$8.427 million (FY06/07 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "20.7 million (FY06/07 est.)"
"text": "$20.7 million (FY06/07 est.)"
},
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> revenue data reflect only locally raised revenues; the budget deficit is resolved by grant aid from the UK"
},

6
africa/sl.json
View file

@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
"text": "Muslim 77.1%, Christian 22.9% (2019 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Sierra Leone’s youthful and growing population is driven by its high total fertility rate (TFR) of almost 5 children per woman, which has declined little over the last two decades. Its elevated TFR is sustained by the continued desire for large families, the low level of contraceptive use, and the early start of childbearing. Despite its high TFR, Sierra Leone’s population growth is somewhat tempered by high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates that are among the world’s highest and are a result of poverty, a lack of potable water and sanitation, poor nutrition, limited access to quality health care services, and the prevalence of female genital cutting.</p><p>Sierra Leone’s large youth cohort – about 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – continues to struggle with high levels of unemployment, which was one of the major causes of the country’s 1991-2002 civil war and remains a threat to stability today. Its estimated 60% youth unemployment rate is attributed to high levels of illiteracy and unskilled labor, a lack of private sector jobs, and low pay.</p><p>Sierra Leone has been a source of and destination for refugees. Sierra Leone’s civil war internally displaced as many as 2 million people, or almost half the population, and forced almost another half million to seek refuge in neighboring countries (370,000 Sierra Leoneans fled to Guinea and 120,000 to Liberia). The UNHCR has helped almost 180,000 Sierra Leoneans to return home, while more than 90,000 others have repatriated on their own. Of the more than 65,000 Liberians who took refuge in Sierra Leone during their country’s civil war (1989-2003), about 50,000 have been voluntarily repatriated by the UNHCR and others have returned home independently. As of 2015, less than 1,000 Liberians still reside in Sierra Leone.</p>"
"text": "<p>Sierra Leone’s youthful and growing population is driven by its high total fertility rate (TFR) of almost 5 children per woman, which has declined little over the last two decades. Its elevated TFR is sustained by the continued desire for large families, the low level of contraceptive use, and the early start of childbearing. Despite its high TFR, Sierra Leone’s population growth is somewhat tempered by high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates that are among the world’s highest and are a result of poverty, a lack of potable water and sanitation, poor nutrition, limited access to quality health care services, and the prevalence of female genital cutting.</p> <p>Sierra Leone’s large youth cohort – about 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – continues to struggle with high levels of unemployment, which was one of the major causes of the country’s 1991-2002 civil war and remains a threat to stability today. Its estimated 60% youth unemployment rate is attributed to high levels of illiteracy and unskilled labor, a lack of private sector jobs, and low pay.</p> <p>Sierra Leone has been a source of and destination for refugees. Sierra Leone’s civil war internally displaced as many as 2 million people, or almost half the population, and forced almost another half million to seek refuge in neighboring countries (370,000 Sierra Leoneans fled to Guinea and 120,000 to Liberia). The UNHCR has helped almost 180,000 Sierra Leoneans to return home, while more than 90,000 others have repatriated on their own. Of the more than 65,000 Liberians who took refuge in Sierra Leone during their country’s civil war (1989-2003), about 50,000 have been voluntarily repatriated by the UNHCR and others have returned home independently.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
@ -839,10 +839,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "562 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$562 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "846.4 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$846.4 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

16
africa/so.json
View file

@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
"text": "Sunni Muslim (Islam) (official, according to the 2012 Transitional Federal Charter)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Somalia scores very low for most humanitarian indicators, suffering from poor governance, protracted internal conflict, underdevelopment, economic decline, poverty, social and gender inequality, and environmental degradation. Despite civil war and famine raising its mortality rate, Somalia’s high fertility rate and large proportion of people of reproductive age maintain rapid population growth, with each generation being larger than the prior one. More than 60% of Somalia’s population is younger than 25, and the fertility rate is among the world’s highest at almost 6 children per woman – a rate that has decreased little since the 1970s.</p> <p>A lack of educational and job opportunities is a major source of tension for Somalia’s large youth cohort, making them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist and pirate groups. Somalia has one of the world’s lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school – and one of world’s highest youth unemployment rates. Life expectancy is low as a result of high infant and maternal mortality rates, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition, and inadequate health services.</p> <p>During the two decades of conflict that followed the fall of the SIAD regime in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes. Today Somalia is the world’s fourth highest source country for refugees, after Ukraine, Syria and Afghanistan. Insecurity, drought, floods, food shortages, and a lack of economic opportunities are the driving factors.</p> <p>As of 2022, more than 660,000 Somali refugees were hosted in the region, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, while nearly 3 million Somalis were internally displaced. Since the implementation of a tripartite voluntary repatriation agreement among Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR in 2013, many Somali refugees have returned home, some 80,000 between 2014 and 2022.  The Kenyan Government in March 2021 ordered the closure of its two largest refugee camps, Dadaab and Kakuma, which then hosted more than 410,000 mainly Somali refugees.  However, the UN refugee agency presented a road map, including voluntary repatriation, relocation to third countries, and alternative stay options that persuaded the Kenyan Government to delay the closures.  The plan was supposed to lead to both camps being closed by 30 June 2022. Yet, as of May 2022, few Somali refugees had decided to return home because of security concerns and the lack of job prospects, instead waiting in the camps unsure of what the future held for them. Other Somali asylum seekers brave the dangers of crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen – despite its internal conflict – with aspirations to move onward to Saudi Arabia and other locations.</p>"
"text": "<p>Somalia scores very low for most humanitarian indicators, suffering from poor governance, protracted internal conflict, underdevelopment, economic decline, poverty, social and gender inequality, and environmental degradation. Despite civil war and famine raising its mortality rate, Somalia’s high fertility rate and large proportion of people of reproductive age maintain rapid population growth, with each generation being larger than the prior one. More than 60% of Somalia’s population is younger than 25, and the fertility rate is among the world’s highest at almost 6 children per woman – a rate that has decreased little since the 1970s.</p> <p>A lack of educational and job opportunities is a major source of tension for Somalia’s large youth cohort, making them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist and pirate groups. Somalia has one of the world’s lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school – and one of the world’s highest youth unemployment rates. Life expectancy is low as a result of high infant and maternal mortality rates, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition, and inadequate health services.</p> <p>During the two decades of conflict that followed the fall of the SIAD regime in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes. Today Somalia is the world’s fourth highest source country for refugees, after Ukraine, Syria and Afghanistan. Insecurity, drought, floods, food shortages, and a lack of economic opportunities are the driving factors.</p> <p>As of 2022, more than 660,000 Somali refugees were hosted in the region, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, while nearly 3 million Somalis were internally displaced. Since the implementation of a tripartite voluntary repatriation agreement among Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR in 2013, many Somali refugees have returned home, some 80,000 between 2014 and 2022.  The Kenyan Government in March 2021 ordered the closure of its two largest refugee camps, Dadaab and Kakuma, which then hosted more than 410,000 mainly Somali refugees.  However, the UN refugee agency presented a road map, including voluntary repatriation, relocation to third countries, and alternative stay options that persuaded the Kenyan Government to delay the closures.  The plan was supposed to lead to both camps being closed by 30 June 2022. Yet, as of May 2022, few Somali refugees had decided to return home because of security concerns and the lack of job prospects, instead waiting in the camps unsure of what the future held for them. Other Somali asylum seekers brave the dangers of crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen – despite its internal conflict – with aspirations to move onward to Saudi Arabia and other locations.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
@ -806,10 +806,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "145.3 million (2014 est.)"
"text": "$145.3 million (2014 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "151.1 million (2014 est.)"
"text": "$151.1 million (2014 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -1164,19 +1164,19 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
"text": "estimates vary widely due to inconsistent data and ongoing efforts to integrate various militias; up to 20,000 active-duty SNA personnel (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> in 2017, the Somali Government announced a plan for the SNA to eventually number about 18,000 troops; the same plan called for 32,000 federal and regional police<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> as of 2021, there were estimates of up to 50,000 militia forces operating in the country"
"text": "approximately 18-20,000 SNA personnel (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>as of 2022, there were estimates of up to 50,000 militia forces operating in the country"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the SNA is lightly armed with an inventory that includes a variety of older, second-hand equipment largely from Italy, Russia, South Africa, and the UK; since 2015, it has received small quantities of second-hand equipment as aid/donations from a variety of countries (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> in 2022, the UN voted to maintain an arms embargo on Somali in place since 1992; however, the embargo was modified to reflect the the Somali Government’s progress in improving its management of weapons and ammunition; it includes allowing Somalia to import portable surface-to-air missiles, higher-caliber mortars, anti-tank guided weapons, some aircraft and vessels designed or modified for military use, and combat drones for use by its security forces and police — unless the Security Council committee monitoring sanctions objects within five working days of receiving notification from the Somali Government "
"text": "the SNA is lightly armed with an inventory that includes a variety of older, second-hand equipment largely from Italy, Russia, South Africa, and the UK; since 2015, it has received small quantities of second-hand equipment as aid/donations from a variety of countries, including the US (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> in 2022, the UN voted to maintain an arms embargo on Somali in place since 1992; however, the embargo was modified to reflect the Somali Government’s progress in improving its management of weapons and ammunition; it includes allowing Somalia to import portable surface-to-air missiles, higher-caliber mortars, anti-tank guided weapons, some aircraft and vessels designed or modified for military use, and combat drones for use by its security forces and police — unless the Security Council committee monitoring sanctions objects within five working days of receiving notification from the Somali Government"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "18 is the legal minimum age for compulsory and voluntary military service; conscription is authorized but not currently utilized; women may volunteer (2021)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> in 2019, the Federal Government of Somalia renewed its commitment to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers by signing a roadmap detailing measures and practical actions to prevent violations against children, release children associated with armed forces, and reintegrate them into communities; the signing followed a similar accord committed to ending the use of child soldiers signed by both the Somali Transitional Government and the UN in 2012"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "as of 2022, the Somali National Army (SNA) and supporting security and militia forces were actively conducting operations against the al-Shabaab terrorist group (see Appendix T); al-Shabaab controlled large parts of southern and central Somalia <br><br>of the SNA’s approximately 13 brigades, the most effective were assessed to be the US-trained Danab (\"Lightning\") Advanced Infantry Brigade and those of the Turkish-trained Gorgor (\"Eagle\") Special Division; as of 2022, the Danab Brigade numbered about 1,500 troops with an eventual projected strength of 3,000, while the Gorgor Division was estimated to up to 5,000 trained troops; the Somali Government also sent some 5,000 recruits to Eritrea for military training; the troops returned in 2022<br><br>the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operated in the country with the approval of the UN from 2007-2022; its peacekeeping mission included assisting Somali forces in providing security for a stable political process, enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; in April 2022, AMISOM was reconfigured and replaced with the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS); the ATMIS mission is to support the Somalia Federal Government (FGS) in implementing the security objectives of the FGS's security transition plan, a comprehensive strategy developed by the FGS and its international partners in 2018 and updated in 2021 to gradually transfer security responsibilities from ATMIS to Somali security forces; ATMIS is projected to gradually reduce staffing from its 2022 level of about 20,000 personnel (civilians, military, and police) to zero by the end of 2024 <br><br>UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM; established 2013) is mandated by the Security Council to work with the FGS to support national reconciliation, provide advice on peace-building and state-building, monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international community; the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS; established 2015) is responsible for providing logistical field support to ATMIS, UNSOM, and the Somali security forces on joint operations with ATMIS<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM-S) has operated in the country since 2010; the EUTM provides advice and training to the Somali military; the US, UK, and Turkey maintain separate military training missions in Somalia (the US has also supported the SNA with air strikes); the UAE maintains a military presence in Somaliland (2022)"
"text": "as of 2023, the Somali National Army (SNA) and supporting security and militia forces were actively conducting operations against the al-Shabaab terrorist group (see Appendix T); al-Shabaab controlled large parts of southern and central Somalia <br><br>of the SNA’s approximately 13 brigades, the most effective were assessed to be the US-trained Danab (\"Lightning\") Advanced Infantry Brigade and those of the Turkish-trained Gorgor (\"Eagle\") Special Division; as of 2022, the Danab Brigade numbered about 1,500 troops with an eventual projected strength of 3,000, while the Gorgor Division was estimated to up to 5,000 trained troops; the Somali Government also sent some 5,000 recruits to Eritrea for military training; the troops returned in 2022<br><br>the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operated in the country with the approval of the UN from 2007-2022; its peacekeeping mission included assisting Somali forces in providing security for a stable political process, enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; in April 2022, AMISOM was reconfigured and replaced with the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS); the ATMIS mission is to support the Somalia Federal Government (FGS) in implementing the security objectives of the FGS's security transition plan, a comprehensive strategy developed by the FGS and its international partners in 2018 and updated in 2021 to gradually transfer security responsibilities from ATMIS to Somali security forces; ATMIS is projected to gradually reduce staffing from its 2022 level of about 20,000 personnel (civilians, military, and police) to zero by the end of 2024 <br><br>UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM; established 2013) is mandated by the Security Council to work with the FGS to support national reconciliation, provide advice on peace-building and state-building, monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international community; the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS; established 2015) is responsible for providing logistical field support to ATMIS, UNSOM, and the Somali security forces on joint operations with ATMIS<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM-S) has operated in the country since 2010; the EUTM provides advice and training to the Somali military; the US, UK, and Turkey maintain separate military training missions in Somalia (the US has also supported the SNA with air strikes); the UAE maintains a military presence in Somaliland (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) received one incident of piracy and armed robbery in 2021 for the Horn of Africa; while there were no recorded incidents, the IMB PRC warns that Somalia pirates continue to possess the capacity to carry out attacks in the Somali basin and wider Indian Ocean; in particular, the report warns that, \"Masters and crew must remain vigilant and cautious when transiting these waters.\"; the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, contributed to the drop in incidents; the EU naval mission, Operation ATALANTA, continues its operations in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean through 2022; naval units from China, India, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, the US, and other countries also operate in conjunction with EU forces</p>"

6
africa/su.json
View file

@ -849,10 +849,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "8.48 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$8.48 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "13.36 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$13.36 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "790,736 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 134,367 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 93,478 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers), 70,935 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 24,369 (Central African Republic) (2022)"
"text": "796,831 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 134,367 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 93,478 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers), 70,935 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 24,369 (Central African Republic) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "3.71 million (civil war 1983-2005; ongoing conflict in Darfur region; government and rebel fighting along South Sudan border; inter-tribal clashes) (2022)"

7
africa/to.json
View file

@ -871,10 +871,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "1.023 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.023 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "1.203 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.203 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -1244,6 +1244,9 @@
"Ports and terminals": {
"major seaport(s)": {
"text": "Kpeme, Lome"
},
"container port(s) (TEUs)": {
"text": "Lome (1,962,304) (2021)"
}
}
},

4
africa/tp.json
View file

@ -806,10 +806,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "103 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$103 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "112.4 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$112.4 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
africa/ts.json
View file

@ -824,10 +824,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "9.876 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$9.876 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "12.21 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$12.21 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
africa/tz.json
View file

@ -889,10 +889,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "7.873 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$7.873 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "8.818 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$8.818 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
africa/ug.json
View file

@ -861,10 +861,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "3.848 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$3.848 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "4.928 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$4.928 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
africa/uv.json
View file

@ -862,10 +862,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "2.666 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$2.666 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "3.655 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$3.655 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
africa/wa.json
View file

@ -860,10 +860,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "4.268 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$4.268 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "5 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$5 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

6
africa/wz.json
View file

@ -817,10 +817,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "1.263 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.263 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "1.639 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.639 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -1159,7 +1159,7 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Umbutfo Eswatini Defense Force (UEDF): Army (includes a small air wing) (2022)"
"text": "Umbutfo Eswatini Defense Force (UEDF): Army (includes a small air wing); the Royal Eswatini Police Service (REPS) (2023)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {

4
africa/za.json
View file

@ -866,10 +866,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "4.473 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$4.473 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "6.357 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$6.357 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
africa/zi.json
View file

@ -861,10 +861,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "3.8 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$3.8 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "5.5 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$5.5 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
australia-oceania/aq.json
View file

@ -608,10 +608,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "249 million (2016 est.)"
"text": "$249 million (2016 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "262.5 million (2016 est.)"
"text": "$262.5 million (2016 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

16
australia-oceania/as.json
View file

@ -851,10 +851,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "490 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$490 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "496.9 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$496.9 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -1095,18 +1095,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "6.2 million (2020 est.)"
"text": "4.6 million (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "24 (2020 est.)"
"text": "18 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "27.453 million (2020 est.)"
"text": "27.09 million (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "108 (2020 est.)"
"text": "105 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@
"text": "the Australian telecom market since 2020 has been impacted by the pandemic, which forced many people to school and work from home and thus adopt fixed-line broadband services; internet traffic, both fixed and mobile, increased substantially as a result; in the fixed sector, there is an ongoing migration from copper-based platforms to fiber; the extension of fixed wireless access will mean that up to 120,000 premises currently dependent on satellite broadband will be able to access 5G-based fixed services; the fixed-line market has been falling steadily over the past five years; in the Australian fixed broadband market, there is a dynamic shift among customers to fiber networks; the DSL sector is steadily shrinking while subscribers on HFC infrastructure will continue to be provided by existing cable, with a steady migration to full fiber connectivity (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "24 per 100 fixed-line telephone subscriptions and 108 per 100 mobile-cellular; more subscribers to mobile services than there are people; 90% of all mobile device sales are now smartphones, growth in mobile traffic brisk (2020)"
"text": "18 per 100 fixed-line telephone subscriptions and 105 per 100 mobile-cellular; more subscribers to mobile services than there are people; 90% of all mobile device sales are now smartphones, growth in mobile traffic brisk (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 61; landing points for&nbsp;more than&nbsp;20 submarine cables including: the SeaMeWe-3 optical telecommunications submarine cable with links to Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; the INDIGO-Central, INDIGO West and ASC, North West Cable System, Australia-Papua New Guinea cable, CSCS, PPC-1, Gondwana-1, SCCN, Hawaiki, TGA, Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2, JGA-S, with links to other Australian cities, New Zealand&nbsp;and many countries in southeast Asia, US and Europe; the H2 Cable, AJC, Telstra Endeavor, Southern Cross NEXT with links to Japan, Hong Kong, and other Pacific Ocean countries as well as the US; satellite earth stations - 10 Intelsat (4 Indian Ocean and 6 Pacific Ocean), 2 Inmarsat, 2 Globalstar, 5 other (2019)"
@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@
"text": "<em><br>Indian Ocean:</em> Adelaide, Darwin, Fremantle, Geelong, Melbourne<br><em>Pacific Ocean:</em> Brisbane, Cairns, Gladstone, Hobart, Newcastle, Port Port Kembla, Sydney"
},
"container port(s) (TEUs)": {
"text": "Melbourne (2,967,315), Sydney (2,572,714) (2019)"
"text": "Melbourne (2,909,288), Sydney (2,761,648) (2021)"
},
"LNG terminal(s) (export)": {
"text": "Australia Pacific, Barrow Island, Burrup (Pluto), Curtis Island, Darwin, Karratha, Bladin Point (Ichthys), Gladstone,&nbsp;Prelude (offshore FLNG), Wheatstone"

4
australia-oceania/bp.json
View file

@ -782,10 +782,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "532.5 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$532.5 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "570.5 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$570.5 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
australia-oceania/cq.json
View file

@ -613,10 +613,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "389.6 million (2016 est.)"
"text": "$389.6 million (2016 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "344 million (2015 est.)"
"text": "$344 million (2015 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
australia-oceania/cw.json
View file

@ -637,10 +637,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "86.9 million (2010)"
"text": "$86.9 million (2010)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "77.9 million (2010)"
"text": "$77.9 million (2010)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

6
australia-oceania/fj.json
View file

@ -812,10 +812,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "1.454 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.454 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "1.648 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.648 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -1227,7 +1227,7 @@
"text": "170 Egypt (MFO); 165 Iraq (UNAMI); 150 Golan Heights (UNDOF) (2022)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the RFMF was established in 1920; it has a history of intervening in the country’s politics since the late 1980s, including coups in 1987 and 2006, and a mutiny in 2000 <br><br>the RFMF also has a long tradition of participating in UN peacekeeping operations; since its first deployment of troops to South Lebanon in 1978 under the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), it has deployed troops on nearly 20 additional UN missions<br><br>Fiji has a \"shiprider\" agreement with the US, which allows local maritime law enforcement officers to embark on US Coast Guard (USCG) and US Navy (USN) vessels, including to board and search vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations within Fiji's designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas; \"shiprider\" agreements also enable USCG personnel and USN vessels with embarked USCG law enforcement personnel to work with host nations to protect critical regional resources<br> (2022)"
"text": "the RFMF was established in 1920; it has a history of intervening in the country’s politics since the late 1980s, including coups in 1987 and 2006, and a mutiny in 2000 <br><br>the RFMF also has a long tradition of participating in UN peacekeeping operations; since its first deployment of troops to South Lebanon in 1978 under the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), it has deployed troops on nearly 20 additional UN missions<br><br>Fiji has a \"shiprider\" agreement with the US, which allows local maritime law enforcement officers to embark on US Coast Guard (USCG) and US Navy (USN) vessels, including to board and search vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations within Fiji's designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas; \"shiprider\" agreements also enable USCG personnel and USN vessels with embarked USCG law enforcement personnel to work with host nations to protect critical regional resources (2023)"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

4
australia-oceania/fm.json
View file

@ -752,10 +752,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "213.8 million (FY12/13 est.)"
"text": "$213.8 million (FY12/13 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "192.1 million (FY12/13 est.)"
"text": "$192.1 million (FY12/13 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
australia-oceania/fp.json
View file

@ -679,10 +679,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "1.891 billion (2012)"
"text": "$1.891 billion (2012)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "1.833 billion (2011)"
"text": "$1.833 billion (2011)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
australia-oceania/gq.json
View file

@ -647,10 +647,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "1.24 billion (2016 est.)"
"text": "$1.24 billion (2016 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "1.299 billion (2016 est.)"
"text": "$1.299 billion (2016 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
australia-oceania/kr.json
View file

@ -768,10 +768,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "151.2 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$151.2 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "277.5 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$277.5 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
australia-oceania/nc.json
View file

@ -674,10 +674,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "1.995 billion (2015 est.)"
"text": "$1.995 billion (2015 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "1.993 billion (2015 est.)"
"text": "$1.993 billion (2015 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
australia-oceania/ne.json
View file

@ -560,10 +560,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "15.07 million (FY04/05)"
"text": "$15.07 million (FY04/05)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "16.33 million (FY04/05)"
"text": "$16.33 million (FY04/05)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
australia-oceania/nf.json
View file

@ -447,10 +447,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "4.6 million (FY99/00)"
"text": "$4.6 million (FY99/00)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "4.8 million (FY99/00)"
"text": "$4.8 million (FY99/00)"
}
},
"Fiscal year": {

4
australia-oceania/nh.json
View file

@ -783,10 +783,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "236.7 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$236.7 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "244.1 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$244.1 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
australia-oceania/nr.json
View file

@ -705,10 +705,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "103 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$103 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "113.4 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$113.4 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

8
australia-oceania/nz.json
View file

@ -563,7 +563,7 @@
"text": "King CHARLES III (since 8 September 2022); represented by Governor-General Dame Cindy KIRO (since 21 October 2021)"
},
"head of government": {
"text": "Prime Minister Jacinda ARDERN (since 26 October 2017); Deputy Prime Minister Grant ROBERTSON (since 2 November 2020)"
"text": "Prime Minister Chris HIPKINS (since 25 January 2023); Deputy Prime Minister Carmel SEPULONI (since 25 January 2023)<br>note - on 19 January 2023, Prime Minister Jacinda ARDERN announced her resignation as prime minister effective not later than 7 February 2023; Chris HIPKINS elected unanimously by Labor Party caucus as party leader on 22 January 2023, sworn in on 25 January 2023"
},
"cabinet": {
"text": "Executive Council appointed by the governor-general on the recommendation of the prime minister"
@ -577,7 +577,7 @@
"text": "unicameral House of Representatives - commonly called Parliament (120 seats for 2020-23 term); 72 members directly elected in 65 single-seat constituencies and 7 Maori constituencies by simple majority vote and 48 directly elected by closed party-list proportional representation vote; members serve 3-year terms)"
},
"elections": {
"text": "last held on 17 October 2020 (next scheduled for 2023)"
"text": "last held on 17 October 2020 (next scheduled for 14 October 2023)"
},
"election results": {
"text": "percent of vote by party - Labor Party 49.1%, National Party 26.8%, ACT Party 8%, Green Party 6.3%, Maori Party 1%; seats by party - Labor Party 64, National Party 35, Green Party 10, ACT Party 10, Maori Party 1; composition - men 61, women 59, percent of women 49.2%"
@ -826,10 +826,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "74.11 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$74.11 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "70.97 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$70.97 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
australia-oceania/pc.json
View file

@ -440,10 +440,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "746,000 (FY04/05)"
"text": "$746,000 (FY04/05)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "1.028 million (FY04/05)"
"text": "$1.028 million (FY04/05)"
}
},
"Fiscal year": {

4
australia-oceania/ps.json
View file

@ -769,10 +769,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "193 million (2012 est.)"
"text": "$193 million (2012 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "167.3 million (2012 est.)"
"text": "$167.3 million (2012 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
australia-oceania/rm.json
View file

@ -785,10 +785,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "116.7 million (2013 est.)"
"text": "$116.7 million (2013 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "113.9 million (2013 est.)"
"text": "$113.9 million (2013 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
australia-oceania/tl.json
View file

@ -519,10 +519,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "24,324,473 (2017 est.)"
"text": "$24,324,473 (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "11,666,542 (2017 est.)"
"text": "$11,666,542 (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Fiscal year": {

4
australia-oceania/tn.json
View file

@ -794,10 +794,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "181.2 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$181.2 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "181.2 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$181.2 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
australia-oceania/tv.json
View file

@ -713,10 +713,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "42.68 million (2013 est.)"
"text": "$42.68 million (2013 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "32.46 million (2012 est.)"
"text": "$32.46 million (2012 est.)"
},
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> revenue data include Official Development Assistance from Australia"
},

6
australia-oceania/wf.json
View file

@ -576,14 +576,14 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "32.54 million (2015 est.) NA"
"text": "$32.54 million (2015 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "34.18 million (2015 est.) NA"
"text": "$34.18 million (2015 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
"text": "-0.8% (of GDP) (2015 est.) NA"
"text": "-0.8% (of GDP) (2015 est.)"
},
"Public debt": {
"Public debt 2004": {

4
australia-oceania/ws.json
View file

@ -799,10 +799,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "237.3 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$237.3 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "276.8 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$276.8 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json
View file

@ -646,10 +646,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "681.6 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$681.6 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "755.5 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$755.5 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

13
central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json
View file

@ -509,13 +509,13 @@
},
"Legislative branch": {
"description": {
"text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:<br>Senate (17 seats; members appointed by the governor general)<br>House of Representatives (18 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms)"
"text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:<br>Senate (17 seats; members appointed by the governor general)<br>House of Representatives (17 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms)"
},
"elections": {
"text": "<br>Senate - last appointed on 26 March 2018 (next NA)<br>House of Representatives - last held on 21 March 2018 (next to be held in March 2023)"
"text": "<br>Senate - last appointed on 26 March 2018 (next NA)<br>House of Representatives - last held on 18 January 2023 (next to be held in March 2028)"
},
"election results": {
"text": "<br>Senate -  composition - men 8, women 9, percent of women 52.9%<br>House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - ABLP 59.4%, UPP 37.2%, BPM 1.4%, other 1.9% ; seats by party - ABLP 15, UPP 1, BPM 1; composition - men 16, women 2, percent of women 11.1%; note - total Parliament percent of women 31.4%"
"text": "<br>Senate -  composition - men 8, women 9, percent of women 52.9%<br>House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - ABLP 47.1%, UPP 45.2%, BPM 1.5%, independents 5.2% ; seats by party - ABLP 9, UPP 6, BPM 1, independents 1; composition - men 16, women 2, percent of women 11.1%; note - total Parliament percent of women 31.4%"
}
},
"Judicial branch": {
@ -709,10 +709,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "298.2 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$298.2 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "334 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$334 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -1062,6 +1062,9 @@
"Ports and terminals": {
"major seaport(s)": {
"text": "Saint John's"
},
"cruise port(s)": {
"text": "St. John's"
}
}
},

4
central-america-n-caribbean/av.json
View file

@ -582,10 +582,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "81.92 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$81.92 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "80.32 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$80.32 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json
View file

@ -779,10 +779,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "1.466 billion (2017 est.) (2013 est.)"
"text": "$1.466 billion (2017 est.) (2013 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "1.664 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.664 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

8
central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json
View file

@ -733,10 +733,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "2.139 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$2.139 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "2.46 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$2.46 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -1107,10 +1107,10 @@
"text": "Freeport, Nassau, South Riding Point"
},
"cruise port(s)": {
"text": "Nassau"
"text": "Freeport, Half Moon Cay, Nassau"
},
"container port(s) (TEUs)": {
"text": "Freeport (1,396,568) (2019)"
"text": "Freeport (1,642,780) (2021)"
}
}
},

4
central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json
View file

@ -811,10 +811,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "553.5 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$553.5 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "572 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$572 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

7
central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json
View file

@ -638,10 +638,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "874.5 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$874.5 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "766.6 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$766.6 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -967,6 +967,9 @@
"Ports and terminals": {
"major seaport(s)": {
"text": "Cayman Brac, George Town"
},
"cruise port(s)": {
"text": "George Town, Grand Cayman"
}
}
},

7
central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json
View file

@ -855,10 +855,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "8.357 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$8.357 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "11.92 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$11.92 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -1228,6 +1228,9 @@
"major seaport(s)": {
"text": "Atlantic Ocean (Caribbean) - Puerto Limon"
},
"container port(s) (TEUs)": {
"text": "Puerto Limon (1,319,372)"
},
"note": "Pacific Ocean - Caldera"
}
},

4
central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json
View file

@ -846,10 +846,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "54.52 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$54.52 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "64.64 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$64.64 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
central-america-n-caribbean/do.json
View file

@ -677,10 +677,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "227.8 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$227.8 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "260.4 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$260.4 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

10
central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json
View file

@ -860,10 +860,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "11.33 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$11.33 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "13.62 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$13.62 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -1243,6 +1243,12 @@
"oil terminal(s)": {
"text": "Punta Nizao oil terminal"
},
"cruise port(s)": {
"text": "La Romana"
},
"container port(s) (TEUs)": {
"text": "Caucedo (1,265,459); Haina (495,243)"
},
"LNG terminal(s) (import)": {
"text": "Andres LNG terminal (Boca Chica)"
}

4
central-america-n-caribbean/es.json
View file

@ -841,10 +841,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "5.886 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$5.886 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "6.517 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$6.517 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json
View file

@ -717,10 +717,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "288.4 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$288.4 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "252.3 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$252.3 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json
View file

@ -853,10 +853,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "8.164 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$8.164 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "9.156 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$9.156 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json
View file

@ -841,10 +841,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "1.567 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.567 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "1.65 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$1.65 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

4
central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json
View file

@ -844,10 +844,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "4.658 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$4.658 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "5.283 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$5.283 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

9
central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json
View file

@ -805,10 +805,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "4.382 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$4.382 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "4.314 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$4.314 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -1165,8 +1165,11 @@
"major seaport(s)": {
"text": "Discovery Bay (Port Rhoades), Kingston, Montego Bay, Port Antonio, Port Esquivel, Port Kaiser, Rocky Point"
},
"cruise port(s)": {
"text": "Falmouth, Montego Bay, Port Antonio, Ocho Rios,"
},
"container port(s) (TEUs)": {
"text": "Kingston (1,647,609) (2019)"
"text": "Kingston (2,004,302) (2021)"
}
}
},

4
central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json
View file

@ -593,10 +593,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "66.67 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$66.67 million (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "47.04 million (2017 est.)"
"text": "$47.04 million (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Fiscal year": {

4
central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json
View file

@ -826,10 +826,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "3.871 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$3.871 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "4.15 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$4.15 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {

6
central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json
View file

@ -846,10 +846,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "12.43 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$12.43 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "13.44 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$13.44 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -1230,7 +1230,7 @@
"text": "Balboa, Colon, Cristobal"
},
"container port(s) (TEUs)": {
"text": "Balboa (2,894,654), Colon (4,379,477) (2019)"
"text": "Balboa (3,561,432), Colon (4,915,975) (2021)"
}
}
},

6
central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json
View file

@ -699,10 +699,10 @@
},
"Budget": {
"revenues": {
"text": "9.268 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$9.268 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"expenditures": {
"text": "9.974 billion (2017 est.)"
"text": "$9.974 billion (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
@ -1001,7 +1001,7 @@
"text": "Ensenada Honda, Mayaguez, Playa de Guayanilla, Playa de Ponce, San Juan"
},
"container port(s) (TEUs)": {
"text": "San Juan (2,142,662) (2019)"
"text": "San Juan (1,438,218) (2021)"
},
"LNG terminal(s) (import)": {
"text": "Guayanilla Bay"

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