diff --git a/africa/ag.json b/africa/ag.json index 85327d81..9702b12f 100644 --- a/africa/ag.json +++ b/africa/ag.json @@ -821,10 +821,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "54.15 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$54.15 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "70.2 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$70.2 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/ao.json b/africa/ao.json index 2b815894..a7af8ae3 100644 --- a/africa/ao.json +++ b/africa/ao.json @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ "text": "Roman Catholic 41.1%, Protestant 38.1%, other 8.6%, none 12.3% (2014 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "

More than two decades after the end of Angola's 27-year civil war, the country still faces a variety of socioeconomic problems, including poverty, high maternal and child mortality, and illiteracy. Despite the country's rapid post-war economic growth based on oil production, about 40 percent of Angolans live below the poverty line and unemployment is widespread, especially among the large young-adult population. Only about 70% of the population is literate, and the rate drops to around 60% for women. The youthful population - about 45% are under the age of 15 - is expected to continue growing rapidly with a fertility rate of more than 5 children per woman and a low rate of contraceptive use. Fewer than half of women deliver their babies with the assistance of trained health care personnel, which contributes to Angola's high maternal mortality rate.

Of the estimated 550,000 Angolans who fled their homeland during its civil war, most have returned home since 2002. In 2012, the UN assessed that conditions in Angola had been stable for several years and invoked a cessation of refugee status for Angolans. Following the cessation clause, some of those still in exile returned home voluntarily through UN repatriation programs, and others integrated into host countries.

" + "text": "

More than two decades after the end of Angola's 27-year civil war, the country still faces a variety of socioeconomic problems, including poverty, high maternal and child mortality, and illiteracy. Despite the country's rapid post-war economic growth based on oil production, about 30 percent of Angolans live below the poverty line and unemployment is widespread, especially among the large young-adult population. Only about 70% of the population is literate, and the rate drops to around 60% for women. The youthful population - about 45% are under the age of 15 - is expected to continue growing rapidly with a fertility rate of more than 5 children per woman and a low rate of contraceptive use. Fewer than half of women deliver their babies with the assistance of trained health care personnel, which contributes to Angola's high maternal mortality rate.

Of the estimated 550,000 Angolans who fled their homeland during its civil war, most have returned home since 2002. In 2012, the UN assessed that conditions in Angola had been stable for several years and invoked a cessation of refugee status for Angolans. Following the cessation clause, some of those still in exile returned home voluntarily through UN repatriation programs, and others integrated into host countries.

" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -851,10 +851,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "37.02 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$37.02 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "45.44 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$45.44 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/bc.json b/africa/bc.json index dea24384..462e7d7f 100644 --- a/africa/bc.json +++ b/africa/bc.json @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ "text": "Christian 79.1%, Badimo 4.1%, other 1.4% (includes Baha'i, Hindu, Muslim, Rastafarian), none 15.2%, unspecified 0.3% (2011 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "

Botswana has experienced one of the most rapid declines in fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa. The total fertility rate has fallen from more than 5 children per woman in the mid 1980s to approximately 2.4 in 2013. The fertility reduction has been attributed to a host of factors, including higher educational attainment among women, greater participation of women in the workforce, increased contraceptive use, later first births, and a strong national family planning program. Botswana was making significant progress in several health indicators, including life expectancy and infant and child mortality rates, until being devastated by the HIV/AIDs epidemic in the 1990s.

Today Botswana has the third highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in the world at approximately 22%, however comprehensive and effective treatment programs have reduced HIV/AIDS-related deaths. The combination of declining fertility and increasing mortality rates because of HIV/AIDS is slowing the population aging process, with a narrowing of the youngest age groups and little expansion of the oldest age groups. Nevertheless, having the bulk of its population (about 60%) of working age will only yield economic benefits if the labor force is healthy, educated, and productively employed.

Batswana have been working as contract miners in South Africa since the 19th century. Although Botswana’s economy improved shortly after independence in 1966 with the discovery of diamonds and other minerals, its lingering high poverty rate and lack of job opportunities continued to push workers to seek mining work in southern African countries. In the early 1970s, about a third of Botswana’s male labor force worked in South Africa (lesser numbers went to Namibia and Zimbabwe). Not until the 1980s and 1990s, when South African mining companies had reduced their recruitment of foreign workers and Botswana’s economic prospects had improved, were Batswana increasingly able to find job opportunities at home.

Most Batswana prefer life in their home country and choose cross-border migration on a temporary basis only for work, shopping, visiting family, or tourism. Since the 1970s, Botswana has pursued an open migration policy enabling it to recruit thousands of foreign workers to fill skilled labor shortages. In the late 1990s, Botswana’s prosperity and political stability attracted not only skilled workers but small numbers of refugees from neighboring Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.

" + "text": "

Botswana has experienced one of the most rapid declines in fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa. The total fertility rate fell from more than 5 children per woman in the mid 1980s to approximately 2.4 in 2013, and remains at that level in 2022. The fertility reduction has been attributed to a host of factors, including higher educational attainment among women, greater participation of women in the workforce, increased contraceptive use, later first births, and a strong national family planning program. Botswana was making significant progress in several health indicators, including life expectancy and infant and child mortality rates, until being devastated by the HIV/AIDs epidemic in the 1990s.

In 2021,  Botswana had one of the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the world at approximately 22%, however comprehensive and effective treatment programs have reduced HIV/AIDS-related deaths. The combination of declining fertility and increasing mortality rates because of HIV/AIDS is slowing the population aging process, with a narrowing of the youngest age groups and little expansion of the oldest age groups. Nevertheless, having the bulk of its population (about 60%) of working age will only yield economic benefits if the labor force is healthy, educated, and productively employed.

Batswana have been working as contract miners in South Africa since the 19th century. Although Botswana’s economy improved shortly after independence in 1966 with the discovery of diamonds and other minerals, its lingering high poverty rate and lack of job opportunities continued to push workers to seek mining work in southern African countries. In the early 1970s, about a third of Botswana’s male labor force worked in South Africa (lesser numbers went to Namibia and Zimbabwe). Not until the 1980s and 1990s, when South African mining companies had reduced their recruitment of foreign workers and Botswana’s economic prospects had improved, were Batswana increasingly able to find job opportunities at home.

Most Batswana prefer life in their home country and choose cross-border migration on a temporary basis only for work, shopping, visiting family, or tourism. Since the 1970s, Botswana has pursued an open migration policy enabling it to recruit thousands of foreign workers to fill skilled labor shortages. In the late 1990s, Botswana’s prosperity and political stability attracted not only skilled workers but small numbers of refugees from neighboring Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.

" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -846,10 +846,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "5.305 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$5.305 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "5.478 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$5.478 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/bn.json b/africa/bn.json index 19679a2a..f5b668f2 100644 --- a/africa/bn.json +++ b/africa/bn.json @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "African Movement for Development and Progress or MADEP [Sefou FAGBOHOUN]
Alliance for a Triumphant Benin or ABT [Abdoulaye BIO TCHANE]
Benin Renaissance or RB [Lehady SOGLO]
Cowrie Force for an Emerging Benin or FCBE [Yayi BONI]
Democratic Renewal Party or PRD [Adrien HOUNGBEDJI]
National Alliance for Development and Democracy or AND [Valentin Aditi HOUDE]
New Consciousness Rally or NC [Pascal KOUPAKI]
Patriotic Awakening or RP [Janvier YAHOUEDEOU]
Social Democrat Party or PSD [Emmanuel GOLOU]
Sun Alliance or AS [Sacca LAFIA]
Union Makes the Nation or UN [Adrien HOUNGBEDJI] (includes PRD, MADEP)
United Democratic Forces or FDU [Mathurin NAGO]", + "text": "African Movement for Development and Progress or MADEP [Sefou FAGBOHOUN]
Benin Renaissance or RB [Lehady SOGLO]
Cowrie Force for an Emerging Benin or FCBE [Yayi BONI]
Democratic Renewal Party or PRD [Adrien HOUNGBEDJI]
National Alliance for Development and Democracy or AND [Valentin Aditi HOUDE]
New Consciousness Rally or NC [Pascal KOUPAKI]
Patriotic Awakening or RP [Janvier YAHOUEDEOU]
Progressive Union for Renewal [Joseph DJOGBENOU]
Republican Bloc [Abdoulaye BIO TCHANE]
Social Democrat Party or PSD [Emmanuel GOLOU]
Sun Alliance or AS [Sacca LAFIA]
The Democrats [Eric HOUNDETE]
Union Makes the Nation or UN [Adrien HOUNGBEDJI] (includes PRD, MADEP)
United Democratic Forces or FDU [Mathurin NAGO]", "note": "note: approximately 20 additional minor parties" }, "International organization participation": { @@ -862,10 +862,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.578 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.578 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "2.152 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.152 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/by.json b/africa/by.json index 201455fe..6bf58e07 100644 --- a/africa/by.json +++ b/africa/by.json @@ -857,10 +857,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "536.7 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$536.7 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "729.6 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$729.6 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/cd.json b/africa/cd.json index 5ea3a46b..9a2951d3 100644 --- a/africa/cd.json +++ b/africa/cd.json @@ -873,10 +873,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.337 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.337 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.481 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.481 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/cf.json b/africa/cf.json index d1772057..e7184034 100644 --- a/africa/cf.json +++ b/africa/cf.json @@ -891,10 +891,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.965 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.965 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "2.578 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.578 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/cg.json b/africa/cg.json index 38702f98..30074957 100644 --- a/africa/cg.json +++ b/africa/cg.json @@ -901,10 +901,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "4.634 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$4.634 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "5.009 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$5.009 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/cm.json b/africa/cm.json index 6f206c23..7633faff 100644 --- a/africa/cm.json +++ b/africa/cm.json @@ -904,10 +904,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "5.363 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$5.363 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "6.556 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$6.556 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@ "note": "note: Cameroon has committed approximately 2,000-2,500 troops to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups operating in the general area of the Lake Chad Basin and along Nigeria's northeast border; national MNJTF troop contingents are deployed within their own country territories, although cross‐border operations occur occasionally" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "as of 2022, the FAC was largely focused on the threat from the terrorist group Boko Haram along its frontiers with Nigeria and Chad (Far North region) and an insurgency from armed Anglophone separatist groups in the North-West and South-West regions (as of late 2022, this internal conflict has left an estimated 4,000 civilians dead and over 700,000 people displaced since fighting started in 2016); in addition, the FAC often deployed units to the border region with the Central African Republic to counter intrusions from armed militias and bandits" + "text": "as of 2023, the FAC was largely focused on the threat from the terrorist group Boko Haram along its frontiers with Nigeria and Chad (Far North region) and an insurgency from armed Anglophone separatist groups in the North-West and South-West regions (as of 2023, this internal conflict has left more than 3,500 civilians dead and over 500,000 people displaced since fighting started in 2016); in addition, the FAC often deployed units to the border region with the Central African Republic to counter intrusions from armed militias and bandits" }, "Maritime threats": { "text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of maritime kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"" diff --git a/africa/cn.json b/africa/cn.json index 24635a58..2d67d71a 100644 --- a/africa/cn.json +++ b/africa/cn.json @@ -766,10 +766,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "165.2 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$165.2 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "207.3 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$207.3 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/ct.json b/africa/ct.json index f10b1130..109f027c 100644 --- a/africa/ct.json +++ b/africa/ct.json @@ -846,10 +846,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "282.9 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$282.9 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "300.1 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$300.1 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/cv.json b/africa/cv.json index 36d102be..24adcb8e 100644 --- a/africa/cv.json +++ b/africa/cv.json @@ -790,10 +790,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "493.5 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$493.5 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "546.7 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$546.7 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/dj.json b/africa/dj.json index 28eff2c4..508234c6 100644 --- a/africa/dj.json +++ b/africa/dj.json @@ -813,10 +813,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "717 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$717 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "899.2 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$899.2 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/eg.json b/africa/eg.json index fe0eb092..108ca6f9 100644 --- a/africa/eg.json +++ b/africa/eg.json @@ -879,10 +879,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "42.32 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$42.32 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "62.61 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$62.61 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1273,7 +1273,7 @@ "text": "Ain Sukhna terminal, Sidi Kerir terminal" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Port Said (East) (3,816,084) (2019)" + "text": "Port Said (East) (4,764,583) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (export)": { "text": "Damietta, Idku (Abu Qir Bay), Sumed" diff --git a/africa/ek.json b/africa/ek.json index ec069b67..26fdd79b 100644 --- a/africa/ek.json +++ b/africa/ek.json @@ -777,10 +777,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "2.114 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.114 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "2.523 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.523 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/er.json b/africa/er.json index 661cb5f0..a56314d9 100644 --- a/africa/er.json +++ b/africa/er.json @@ -797,10 +797,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "2.029 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.029 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "2.601 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.601 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/et.json b/africa/et.json index 325aa218..86be63da 100644 --- a/africa/et.json +++ b/africa/et.json @@ -915,10 +915,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "11.24 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$11.24 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "13.79 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$13.79 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/ga.json b/africa/ga.json index 88ef448b..f6ea6add 100644 --- a/africa/ga.json +++ b/africa/ga.json @@ -850,10 +850,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "300.4 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$300.4 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "339 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$339 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/gb.json b/africa/gb.json index c013ed83..64a79a62 100644 --- a/africa/gb.json +++ b/africa/gb.json @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ } }, "Ethnic groups": { - "text": "Gabonese-born 80.1% (includes Fang 23.2%, Shira-Punu/Vili 18.9%, Nzabi-Duma 11.3%, Mbede-Teke 6.9%, Myene 5%, Kota-Kele 4.9%, Okande-Tsogo 2.1%, Pygmy .3%, other 7.5%), Cameroonian 4.6%, Malian 2.4%, Beninese 2.1%, acquired Gabonese nationality 1.6%, Togolese 1.6%, Senegalese 1.1%, Congolese (Brazzaville) 1%, other 5.5% (includes Congolese (Kinshasa), Equatorial Guinean, Nigerian) (2012 est.)" + "text": "Gabonese-born 80.1% (includes Fang 23.2%, Shira-Punu/Vili 18.9%, Nzabi-Duma 11.3%, Mbede-Teke 6.9%, Myene 5%, Kota-Kele 4.9%, Okande-Tsogo 2.1%, Pygmy 0.3%, other 7.5%), Cameroonian 4.6%, Malian 2.4%, Beninese 2.1%, acquired Gabonese nationality 1.6%, Togolese 1.6%, Senegalese 1.1%, Congolese (Brazzaville) 1%, other 5.5% (includes Congolese (Kinshasa), Equatorial Guinean, Nigerian) (2012 est.)" }, "Languages": { "text": "French (official), Fang, Myene, Nzebi, Bapounou/Eschira, Bandjabi" @@ -834,10 +834,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "2.634 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.634 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "2.914 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.914 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/gh.json b/africa/gh.json index d3baff26..2ad5309c 100644 --- a/africa/gh.json +++ b/africa/gh.json @@ -877,10 +877,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "9.544 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$9.544 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "12.36 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$12.36 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/gv.json b/africa/gv.json index a8e4346e..6fcc9ce8 100644 --- a/africa/gv.json +++ b/africa/gv.json @@ -862,10 +862,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.7 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.7 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.748 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.748 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/iv.json b/africa/iv.json index 5286a8db..91fb34c2 100644 --- a/africa/iv.json +++ b/africa/iv.json @@ -882,10 +882,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "7.749 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$7.749 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "9.464 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$9.464 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/ke.json b/africa/ke.json index 09f798b6..a066e8c8 100644 --- a/africa/ke.json +++ b/africa/ke.json @@ -882,10 +882,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "13.95 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$13.95 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "19.24 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$19.24 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/li.json b/africa/li.json index 24a02f52..d1f6a9fe 100644 --- a/africa/li.json +++ b/africa/li.json @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ } }, "Ethnic groups": { - "text": "Kpelle 20.3%, Bassa 13.4%, Grebo 10%, Gio 8%, Mano 7.9%, Kru 6%, Lorma 5.1%, Kissi 4.8%, Gola 4.4%, Krahn 4%, Vai 4%, Mandingo 3.2%, Gbandi 3%, Mende 1.3%, Sapo 1.3%, other Liberian 1.7%, other African 1.4%, non-African .1% (2008 est.)" + "text": "Kpelle 20.3%, Bassa 13.4%, Grebo 10%, Gio 8%, Mano 7.9%, Kru 6%, Lorma 5.1%, Kissi 4.8%, Gola 4.4%, Krahn 4%, Vai 4%, Mandingo 3.2%, Gbandi 3%, Mende 1.3%, Sapo 1.3%, other Liberian 1.7%, other African 1.4%, non-African 0.1% (2008 est.)" }, "Languages": { "text": "English 20% (official), some 20 ethnic group languages few of which can be written or used in correspondence" @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ "text": "Christian 85.6%, Muslim 12.2%, Traditional 0.6%, other 0.2%, none 1.5% (2008 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "

Liberia’s high fertility rate of nearly 5 children per woman and large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – will sustain a high dependency ratio for many years to come. Significant progress has been made in preventing child deaths, despite a lack of health care workers and infrastructure. Infant and child mortality have dropped nearly 70% since 1990; the annual reduction rate of about 5.4% is the highest in Africa.

Nevertheless, Liberia’s high maternal mortality rate remains among the world’s worst; it reflects a high unmet need for family planning services, frequency of early childbearing, lack of quality obstetric care, high adolescent fertility, and a low proportion of births attended by a medical professional. Female mortality is also increased by the prevalence of female genital cutting (FGC), which is practiced by 10 of Liberia’s 16 tribes and affects more than two-thirds of women and girls. FGC is an initiation ritual performed in rural bush schools, which teach traditional beliefs on marriage and motherhood and are an obstacle to formal classroom education for Liberian girls.

Liberia has been both a source and a destination for refugees. During Liberia’s 14-year civil war (1989-2003), more than 250,000 people became refugees and another half million were internally displaced. Between 2004 and the cessation of refugee status for Liberians in June 2012, the UNHCR helped more than 155,000 Liberians to voluntarily repatriate, while others returned home on their own. Some Liberian refugees spent more than two decades living in other West African countries. Liberia hosted more than 125,000 Ivoirian refugees escaping post-election violence in 2010-11; as of mid-2017, about 12,000 Ivoirian refugees were still living in Liberia as of October 2017 because of instability.

" + "text": "

Liberia’s high fertility rate of nearly 5 children per woman and large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – will sustain a high dependency ratio for many years to come. Significant progress has been made in preventing child deaths, despite a lack of health care workers and infrastructure. Infant and child mortality have dropped nearly 70% since 1990; the annual reduction rate of about 5.4% is the highest in Africa.

Nevertheless, Liberia’s high maternal mortality rate remains among the world’s worst; it reflects a high unmet need for family planning services, frequency of early childbearing, lack of quality obstetric care, high adolescent fertility, and a low proportion of births attended by a medical professional. Female mortality is also increased by the prevalence of female genital cutting (FGC), which is practiced by 10 of Liberia’s 16 tribes and affects more than two-thirds of women and girls. FGC is an initiation ritual performed in rural bush schools, which teach traditional beliefs on marriage and motherhood and are an obstacle to formal classroom education for Liberian girls.

Liberia has been both a source and a destination for refugees. During Liberia’s 14-year civil war (1989-2003), more than 250,000 people became refugees and another half million were internally displaced. Between 2004 and the cessation of refugee status for Liberians in June 2012, the UNHCR helped more than 155,000 Liberians to voluntarily repatriate, while others returned home on their own. Some Liberian refugees spent more than two decades living in other West African countries. Between 2011 and 2022, more than 300,000 Ivoirian refugees in Liberia have been repatriated; as of mid-2023, less than 2,300 Ivoirian refugees were still living in Liberia.

" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -831,10 +831,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "553.6 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$553.6 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "693.8 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$693.8 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/lt.json b/africa/lt.json index 80448ec6..9b0eabfc 100644 --- a/africa/lt.json +++ b/africa/lt.json @@ -835,10 +835,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.09 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.09 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.255 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.255 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/ly.json b/africa/ly.json index 7432a23a..706f3b95 100644 --- a/africa/ly.json +++ b/africa/ly.json @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ "note": "note: non-Sunni Muslims include native Ibadhi Muslims (<1% of the population) and foreign Muslims" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "

Despite continuing unrest, Libya remains a destination country for economic migrants. It is also a hub for transit migration to Europe because of its proximity to southern Europe and its lax border controls. Labor migrants have been drawn to Libya since the development of its oil sector in the 1960s. Until the latter part of the 1990s, most migrants to Libya were Arab (primarily Egyptians and Sudanese). However, international isolation stemming from Libya’s involvement in international terrorism and a perceived lack of support from Arab countries led QADHAFI in 1998 to adopt a decade-long pan-African policy that enabled large numbers of Sub-Saharan migrants to enter Libya without visas to work in the construction and agricultural industries. Although Sub-Saharan Africans provided a cheap labor source, they were poorly treated and were subjected to periodic mass expulsions.

By the mid-2000s, domestic animosity toward African migrants and a desire to reintegrate into the international community motivated QADHAFI to impose entry visas on Arab and African immigrants and to agree to joint maritime patrols and migrant repatriations with Italy, the main recipient of illegal migrants departing Libya. As his regime neared collapse in 2011, QADHAFI reversed his policy of cooperating with Italy to curb illegal migration and sent boats loaded with migrants and asylum seekers to strain European resources. Libya’s 2011 revolution decreased immigration drastically and prompted nearly 800,000 migrants to flee to third countries, mainly Tunisia and Egypt, or to their countries of origin. The inflow of migrants declined in 2012 but returned to normal levels by 2013, despite continued hostility toward Sub-Saharan Africans and a less-inviting job market.

While Libya is not an appealing destination for migrants, since 2014, transiting migrants – primarily from East and West Africa – continue to exploit its political instability and weak border controls and use it as a primary departure area to migrate across the central Mediterranean to Europe in growing numbers. In addition, more than 200,000 people were displaced internally as of August 2017 by fighting between armed groups in eastern and western Libya and, to a lesser extent, by inter-tribal clashes in the country’s south.

" + "text": "

Despite continuing unrest, Libya remains a destination country for economic migrants. It is also a hub for transit migration to Europe because of its proximity to southern Europe and its lax border controls. Labor migrants have been drawn to Libya since the development of its oil sector in the 1960s. Until the latter part of the 1990s, most migrants to Libya were Arab (primarily Egyptians and Sudanese). However, international isolation stemming from Libya’s involvement in international terrorism and a perceived lack of support from Arab countries led QADHAFI in 1998 to adopt a decade-long pan-African policy that enabled large numbers of Sub-Saharan migrants to enter Libya without visas to work in the construction and agricultural industries. Although Sub-Saharan Africans provided a cheap labor source, they were poorly treated and were subjected to periodic mass expulsions.

By the mid-2000s, domestic animosity toward African migrants and a desire to reintegrate into the international community motivated QADHAFI to impose entry visas on Arab and African immigrants and to agree to joint maritime patrols and migrant repatriations with Italy, the main recipient of illegal migrants departing Libya. As his regime neared collapse in 2011, QADHAFI reversed his policy of cooperating with Italy to curb illegal migration and sent boats loaded with migrants and asylum seekers to strain European resources. Libya’s 2011 revolution decreased immigration drastically and prompted nearly 800,000 migrants to flee to third countries, mainly Tunisia and Egypt, or to their countries of origin. The inflow of migrants declined in 2012 but returned to normal levels by 2013, despite continued hostility toward Sub-Saharan Africans and a less-inviting job market.

While Libya is not an appealing destination for migrants, since 2014, transiting migrants – primarily from East and West Africa – continue to exploit its political instability and weak border controls and use it as a primary departure area to migrate across the central Mediterranean to Europe in growing numbers. In addition, approximately 135,000 people were displaced internally as of  August 2022 by fighting between armed groups in eastern and western Libya and, to a lesser extent, by inter-tribal clashes in the country’s south.

" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -768,10 +768,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "15.78 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$15.78 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "23.46 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$23.46 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@ "text": "18,831 (Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 14,356 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers), 5,318 (Eritrea) (2022)" }, "IDPs": { - "text": "159,996 (conflict between pro-QADHAFI and anti-QADHAFI forces in 2011; post-QADHAFI tribal clashes 2014) (2022)" + "text": "134,787 (conflict between pro-QADHAFI and anti-QADHAFI forces in 2011; post-QADHAFI tribal clashes 2014) (2022)" } } } diff --git a/africa/ma.json b/africa/ma.json index dc9b251f..0e005881 100644 --- a/africa/ma.json +++ b/africa/ma.json @@ -845,10 +845,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.828 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.828 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "2.136 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.136 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/mi.json b/africa/mi.json index 49f1ea31..802fac15 100644 --- a/africa/mi.json +++ b/africa/mi.json @@ -862,10 +862,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.356 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.356 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.567 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.567 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/ml.json b/africa/ml.json index dee12878..dcba771a 100644 --- a/africa/ml.json +++ b/africa/ml.json @@ -881,10 +881,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "3.075 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.075 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "3.513 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.513 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ "text": "information varies; approximately 20,000 active FAMA personnel (includes up to 2,000 Air Force); approximately 5,000 Gendarmerie; approximately 10,000 National Guard (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the FAMA's inventory consists primarily of Soviet-era equipment, although in recent years it has received limited quantities of mostly second-hand armaments from more than a dozen countries, including Russia (2022)" + "text": "the FAMA's inventory consists primarily of Soviet-era equipment, although in recent years it has received limited quantities of mostly second-hand armaments from more than a dozen countries, including Russia (2023)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18 years of age for men and women for selective compulsory and voluntary military service; 2-year conscript service obligation (2022)" @@ -1278,7 +1278,7 @@ "text": "note: until announcing its withdrawal in May of 2022, Mali was part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger; Mali had committed 1,100 troops and 200 gendarmes to the force" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "prior to the coup in August 2020 and military takeover in May 2021, the Malian military had intervened in the political arena at least five times since the country gained independence in 1960; two attempts failed (1976 and 1978), while three succeeded in overturning civilian rule (1968, 1991, and 2012); the military collapsed in 2012 during the fighting against Tuareg rebels and Islamic militants; it has been since rebuilt, but continues to have limited capabilities and is heavily reliant on external assistance

as of 2022, Malian security forces were actively engaged in operations against several insurgent terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), as well as other rebel groups, communal militias, and criminal bands spread across the central, northern, and southern regions of the country; the government was reportedly in control of only an estimated 10-20% of the country's central and northern territories, and terror attacks were increasing in the more heavily populated south, including around the capital Bamako; the Macina Liberation Front (FLM), part of the Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) coalition of al-Qa'ida-linked terror groups, has played a large role in a surge in violence in Mali’s central and southern regions; in the north, the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) has been able to reassert itself in 2022

the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has operated in the country since 2013; the Mission's responsibilities include providing security, rebuilding Malian security forces, protecting civilians, supporting national political dialogue, and assisting in the reestablishment of Malian government authority; as of mid-2022, MINUSMA had around 15,000 personnel deployed; in June 2022, the UN extended its mission another 12 months

the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM-M) and the French military (under a separate, bi-lateral mission) have also operated in the country since 2013; the EUTM-M provides advice and training to the Malian Armed Forces and military assistance to the G5 Sahel Joint Force; as of May 2022, the mission included about 1,100 personnel from more than 20 European countries; in April of 2022, the EU said it would suspend its training program in Mali, citing issues with the ruling military government, including human rights abuses and the presence of Russian private military contractors; in August 2022, France completed withdrawing the last of its forces from Mali, also citing obstructions from the military government; prior to the withdrawal, more than 2,000 French troops had provided military assistance and conducted counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency operations

in December 2021, the Malian military government contracted with a Russian private military company to provide training for local armed forces and security to senior Malian officials; as of mid-2022, there were an estimated 1,000 Russian military contractors in Mali (2022)" + "text": "prior to the coup in August 2020 and military takeover in May 2021, the Malian military had intervened in the political arena at least five times since the country gained independence in 1960; two attempts failed (1976 and 1978), while three succeeded in overturning civilian rule (1968, 1991, and 2012); the military collapsed in 2012 during the fighting against Tuareg rebels and Islamic militants; it has been since rebuilt, but continues to have limited capabilities and is heavily reliant on external assistance

as of 2023, Malian security forces were actively engaged in operations against several insurgent terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), as well as other rebel groups, communal militias, and criminal bands spread across the central, northern, and southern regions of the country; the government was reportedly in control of only an estimated 10-20% of the country's central and northern territories, and terror attacks were increasing in the more heavily populated south, including around the capital Bamako; the Macina Liberation Front (FLM), part of the Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) coalition of al-Qa'ida-linked terror groups, has played a large role in a surge in violence in Mali’s central and southern regions; in the north, the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) has been able to reassert itself in 2022

the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has operated in the country since 2013; the Mission's responsibilities include providing security, rebuilding Malian security forces, protecting civilians, supporting national political dialogue, and assisting in the reestablishment of Malian government authority; as of late 2022, MINUSMA had around 14,000 personnel deployed; in June 2022, the UN extended its mission another 12 months

the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM-M) and the French military (under a separate, bi-lateral mission) have also operated in the country since 2013; the EUTM-M provides advice and training to the Malian Armed Forces and military assistance to the G5 Sahel Joint Force; in 2022, the mission included about 700 personnel from more than 20 European countries; in April of 2022, the EU said it would suspend its training program in Mali, citing issues with the ruling military government, including human rights abuses and the presence of Russian private military contractors; in August 2022, France completed withdrawing the last of its forces from Mali, also citing obstructions from the military government; prior to the withdrawal, more than 2,000 French troops had provided military assistance and conducted counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency operations

in December 2021, the Malian military government contracted with a Russian private military company to provide training for local armed forces and security to senior Malian officials; as of mid-2022, there were an estimated 1,000 Russian military contractors in Mali (2022)" } }, "Terrorism": { diff --git a/africa/mo.json b/africa/mo.json index 99559315..b1bb887c 100644 --- a/africa/mo.json +++ b/africa/mo.json @@ -881,10 +881,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "22.81 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$22.81 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "26.75 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$26.75 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1265,7 +1265,7 @@ "text": "Ad Dakhla, Agadir, Casablanca, Jorf Lasfar, Laayoune (El Aaiun), Mohammedia, Safi, Tangier" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Tangier (4,801,713) (2019)" + "text": "Tangier (7,173,870) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Jorf Lasfar (planned)" diff --git a/africa/mp.json b/africa/mp.json index 6dac4c03..9a616db4 100644 --- a/africa/mp.json +++ b/africa/mp.json @@ -798,10 +798,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "2.994 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.994 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "3.038 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.038 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/mr.json b/africa/mr.json index 9af0b473..a548ec02 100644 --- a/africa/mr.json +++ b/africa/mr.json @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ "text": "Muslim (official) 100%" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "

With a sustained total fertility rate of about 4 children per woman and almost 60% of the population under the age of 25, Mauritania's population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future. Mauritania's large youth cohort is vital to its development prospects, but available schooling does not adequately prepare students for the workplace. Girls continue to be underrepresented in the classroom, educational quality remains poor, and the dropout rate is high. The literacy rate is only about 50%, even though access to primary education has improved since the mid-2000s. Women's restricted access to education and discriminatory laws maintain gender inequality - worsened by early and forced marriages and female genital cutting.

The denial of education to black Moors also helps to perpetuate slavery. Although Mauritania abolished slavery in 1981 (the last country in the world to do so) and made it a criminal offense in 2007, the millenniums-old practice persists largely because anti-slavery laws are rarely enforced and the custom is so ingrained.  According to a 2018 nongovernmental organization's report, a little more than 2% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which includes individuals sujbected to forced labor and forced marriage, although many thousands of individuals who are legally free contend with discrimination, poor education, and a lack of identity papers and, therefore, live in de facto slavery.  The UN and international press outlets have claimed that up to 20% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which would be the highest rate worldwide.

Drought, poverty, and unemployment have driven outmigration from Mauritania since the 1970s. Early flows were directed toward other West African countries, including Senegal, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gambia. The 1989 Mauritania-Senegal conflict forced thousands of black Mauritanians to take refuge in Senegal and pushed labor migrants toward the Gulf, Libya, and Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mauritania has accepted migrants from neighboring countries to fill labor shortages since its independence in 1960 and more recently has received refugees escaping civil wars, including tens of thousands of Tuaregs who fled Mali in 2012.

Mauritania was an important transit point for Sub-Saharan migrants moving illegally to North Africa and Europe. In the mid-2000s, as border patrols increased in the Strait of Gibraltar, security increased around Spain's North African enclaves (Ceuta and Melilla), and Moroccan border controls intensified, illegal migration flows shifted from the Western Mediterranean to Spain's Canary Islands. In 2006, departure points moved southward along the West African coast from Morocco and then Western Sahara to Mauritania's two key ports (Nouadhibou and the capital Nouakchott), and illegal migration to the Canaries peaked at almost 32,000. The numbers fell dramatically in the following years because of joint patrolling off the West African coast by Frontex (the EU's border protection agency), Spain, Mauritania, and Senegal; the expansion of Spain's border surveillance system; and the 2008 European economic downturn.

" + "text": "

With a sustained total fertility rate of about 3.5 children per woman and almost 60% of the population under the age of 25, as of 2022, Mauritania's population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future. Mauritania's large youth cohort is vital to its development prospects, but available schooling does not adequately prepare students for the workplace. Girls continue to be underrepresented in the classroom, educational quality remains poor, and the dropout rate is high. The literacy rate is only about 50%, even though access to primary education has improved since the mid-2000s. Women's restricted access to education and discriminatory laws maintain gender inequality - worsened by early and forced marriages and female genital cutting.

The denial of education to black Moors also helps to perpetuate slavery. Although Mauritania abolished slavery in 1981 (the last country in the world to do so) and made it a criminal offense in 2007, the millenniums-old practice persists largely because anti-slavery laws are rarely enforced and the custom is so ingrained.  According to a 2018 nongovernmental organization's report, a little more than 2% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which includes individuals subjected to forced labor and forced marriage, while many thousands of individuals who are legally free contend with discrimination, poor education, and a lack of identity papers and, therefore, live in de facto slavery.  The UN and international press outlets have claimed that up to 20% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which would be the highest rate worldwide.

Drought, poverty, and unemployment have driven outmigration from Mauritania since the 1970s. Early flows were directed toward other West African countries, including Senegal, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gambia. The 1989 Mauritania-Senegal conflict forced thousands of black Mauritanians to take refuge in Senegal and pushed labor migrants toward the Gulf, Libya, and Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mauritania has accepted migrants from neighboring countries to fill labor shortages since its independence in 1960 and more recently has received refugees escaping civil wars, including tens of thousands of Tuaregs who fled Mali in 2012.

Mauritania was an important transit point for Sub-Saharan migrants moving illegally to North Africa and Europe. In the mid-2000s, as border patrols increased in the Strait of Gibraltar, security increased around Spain's North African enclaves (Ceuta and Melilla), and Moroccan border controls intensified, illegal migration flows shifted from the Western Mediterranean to Spain's Canary Islands. In 2006, departure points moved southward along the West African coast from Morocco and then Western Sahara to Mauritania's two key ports (Nouadhibou and the capital Nouakchott), and illegal migration to the Canaries peaked at almost 32,000. The numbers fell dramatically in the following years because of joint patrolling off the West African coast by Frontex (the EU's border protection agency), Spain, Mauritania, and Senegal; the expansion of Spain's border surveillance system; and the 2008 European economic downturn.

" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -869,10 +869,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.354 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.354 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.396 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.396 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/mz.json b/africa/mz.json index 6ea939fe..5553f0e5 100644 --- a/africa/mz.json +++ b/africa/mz.json @@ -879,10 +879,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "3.356 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.356 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "4.054 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$4.054 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/ng.json b/africa/ng.json index 762baeca..1e5f12e0 100644 --- a/africa/ng.json +++ b/africa/ng.json @@ -879,10 +879,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.757 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.757 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "2.171 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.171 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "187,130 (Nigeria), 65,688 (Mali) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)" + "text": "188,107 (Nigeria), 65,688 (Mali) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "376,809 (includes the regions of Diffa, Tillaberi, and Tahoua; unknown how many of the 11,000 people displaced by clashes between government forces and the Tuareg militant group, Niger Movement for Justice, in 2007 are still displaced; inter-communal violence; Boko Haram attacks in southern Niger, 2015) (2022)" diff --git a/africa/ni.json b/africa/ni.json index 915ea71e..4b97a730 100644 --- a/africa/ni.json +++ b/africa/ni.json @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ "text": "English (official), Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo (Ibo), Fulani, over 500 additional indigenous languages" }, "Religions": { - "text": "Muslim 53.5%, Roman Catholic 10.6%, other Christian 35.3%, other .6% (2018 est.)" + "text": "Muslim 53.5%, Roman Catholic 10.6%, other Christian 35.3%, other 0.6% (2018 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { "text": "

Nigeria’s population is projected to grow from more than 186 million people in 2016 to 392 million in 2050, becoming the world’s fourth most populous country. Nigeria’s sustained high population growth rate will continue for the foreseeable future because of population momentum and its high birth rate. Abuja has not successfully implemented family planning programs to reduce and space births because of a lack of political will, government financing, and the availability and affordability of services and products, as well as a cultural preference for large families. Increased educational attainment, especially among women, and improvements in health care are needed to encourage and to better enable parents to opt for smaller families.

Nigeria needs to harness the potential of its burgeoning youth population in order to boost economic development, reduce widespread poverty, and channel large numbers of unemployed youth into productive activities and away from ongoing religious and ethnic violence. While most movement of Nigerians is internal, significant emigration regionally and to the West provides an outlet for Nigerians looking for economic opportunities, seeking asylum, and increasingly pursuing higher education. Immigration largely of West Africans continues to be insufficient to offset emigration and the loss of highly skilled workers. Nigeria also is a major source, transit, and destination country for forced labor and sex trafficking.

" @@ -888,10 +888,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "12.92 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$12.92 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "19.54 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$19.54 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/od.json b/africa/od.json index 6fcc3ea8..0b49b73b 100644 --- a/africa/od.json +++ b/africa/od.json @@ -728,10 +728,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "259.6 million (FY2017/18 est.)" + "text": "$259.6 million (FY2017/18 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "298.6 million (FY2017/18 est.)" + "text": "$298.6 million (FY2017/18 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/pu.json b/africa/pu.json index f2d96b27..56a0224a 100644 --- a/africa/pu.json +++ b/africa/pu.json @@ -802,10 +802,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "246.2 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$246.2 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "263.5 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$263.5 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/rw.json b/africa/rw.json index c81486a8..f239c71b 100644 --- a/africa/rw.json +++ b/africa/rw.json @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ "text": "Protestant 57.7% (includes Adventist 12.6%), Roman Catholic 38.2%, Muslim 2.1%, other 1% (includes traditional, Jehovah's Witness), none 1.1% (2019-20 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "

Rwanda’s fertility rate declined sharply during the last decade, as a result of the government’s commitment to family planning, the increased use of contraceptives, and a downward trend in ideal family size. Increases in educational attainment, particularly among girls, and exposure to social media also contributed to the reduction in the birth rate. The average number of births per woman decreased from a 5.6 in 2005 to 4.5 in 2016. Despite these significant strides in reducing fertility, Rwanda’s birth rate remains very high and will continue to for an extended period of time because of its large population entering reproductive age. Because Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, its persistent high population growth and increasingly small agricultural landholdings will put additional strain on families’ ability to raise foodstuffs and access potable water. These conditions will also hinder the government’s efforts to reduce poverty and prevent environmental degradation.

The UNHCR recommended that effective 30 June 2013 countries invoke a cessation of refugee status for those Rwandans who fled their homeland between 1959 and 1998, including the 1994 genocide, on the grounds that the conditions that drove them to seek protection abroad no longer exist. The UNHCR’s decision is controversial because many Rwandan refugees still fear persecution if they return home, concerns that are supported by the number of Rwandans granted asylum since 1998 and by the number exempted from the cessation. Rwandan refugees can still seek an exemption or local integration, but host countries are anxious to send the refugees back to Rwanda and are likely to avoid options that enable them to stay. Conversely, Rwanda itself hosts almost 160,000 refugees as of 2017; virtually all of them fleeing conflict in neighboring Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

" + "text": "

Rwanda’s fertility rate declined sharply during the last decade, as a result of the government’s commitment to family planning, the increased use of contraceptives, and a downward trend in ideal family size. Increases in educational attainment, particularly among girls, and exposure to social media also contributed to the reduction in the birth rate. The average number of births per woman decreased from a 5.6 in 2005 to 4.5 in 2016. Despite these significant strides in reducing fertility, Rwanda’s birth rate remains very high and will continue to for an extended period of time because of its large population entering reproductive age. Because Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, its persistent high population growth and increasingly small agricultural landholdings will put additional strain on families’ ability to raise foodstuffs and access potable water. These conditions will also hinder the government’s efforts to reduce poverty and prevent environmental degradation.

The UNHCR recommended that effective 30 June 2013 countries invoke a cessation of refugee status for those Rwandans who fled their homeland between 1959 and 1998, including the 1994 genocide, on the grounds that the conditions that drove them to seek protection abroad no longer exist. The UNHCR’s decision is controversial because many Rwandan refugees still fear persecution if they return home, concerns that are supported by the number of Rwandans granted asylum since 1998 and by the number exempted from the cessation. Rwandan refugees can still seek an exemption or local integration, but host countries are anxious to send the refugees back to Rwanda and are likely to avoid options that enable them to stay. Conversely, Rwanda itself hosts approximately 125,000 refugees as of 2022; virtually all of them fleeing conflict in neighboring Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -849,10 +849,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.943 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.943 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "2.337 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.337 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/se.json b/africa/se.json index b80fb4f5..7ea4a42f 100644 --- a/africa/se.json +++ b/africa/se.json @@ -778,10 +778,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "593.4 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$593.4 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "600.7 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$600.7 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/sf.json b/africa/sf.json index e2504121..565237b6 100644 --- a/africa/sf.json +++ b/africa/sf.json @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ "text": "Karoo Basin, Lower Kalahari-Stampriet Basin" }, "Population distribution": { - "text": "the population concentrated along the southern and southeastern coast, and inland around Pretoria; the eastern half of the country is more densly populated than the west as shown in this population distribution map" + "text": "the population concentrated along the southern and southeastern coast, and inland around Pretoria; the eastern half of the country is more densely populated than the west as shown in this population distribution map" }, "Natural hazards": { "text": "

prolonged droughts

volcanism: the volcano forming Marion Island in the Prince Edward Islands, which last erupted in 2004, is South Africa's only active volcano

" @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ "text": "Christian 86%, ancestral, tribal, animist, or other traditional African religions 5.4%, Muslim 1.9%, other 1.5%, nothing in particular 5.2% (2015 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "

South Africa’s youthful population is gradually aging, as the country’s total fertility rate (TFR) has declined dramatically from about 6 children per woman in the 1960s to roughly 2.2 in 2014. This pattern is similar to fertility trends in South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, and sets South Africa apart from the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, where the average TFR remains higher than other regions of the world. Today, South Africa’s decreasing number of reproductive age women is having fewer children, as women increase their educational attainment, workforce participation, and use of family planning methods; delay marriage; and opt for smaller families.

As the proportion of working-age South Africans has grown relative to children and the elderly, South Africa has been unable to achieve a demographic dividend because persistent high unemployment and the prevalence of HIV/AIDs have created a larger-than-normal dependent population. HIV/AIDS was also responsible for South Africa’s average life expectancy plunging to less than 43 years in 2008; it has rebounded to 63 years as of 2017. HIV/AIDS continues to be a serious public health threat, although awareness-raising campaigns and the wider availability of anti-retroviral drugs is stabilizing the number of new cases, enabling infected individuals to live longer, healthier lives, and reducing mother-child transmissions.

Migration to South Africa began in the second half of the 17th century when traders from the Dutch East India Company settled in the Cape and started using slaves from South and southeast Asia (mainly from India but also from present-day Indonesia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia) and southeast Africa (Madagascar and Mozambique) as farm laborers and, to a lesser extent, as domestic servants. The Indian subcontinent remained the Cape Colony’s main source of slaves in the early 18th century, while slaves were increasingly obtained from southeast Africa in the latter part of the 18th century and into the 19th century under British rule.

After slavery was completely abolished in the British Empire in 1838, South Africa’s colonists turned to temporary African migrants and indentured labor through agreements with India and later China, countries that were anxious to export workers to alleviate domestic poverty and overpopulation. Of the more than 150,000 indentured Indian laborers hired to work in Natal’s sugar plantations between 1860 and 1911, most exercised the right as British subjects to remain permanently (a small number of Indian immigrants came freely as merchants). Because of growing resentment toward Indian workers, the 63,000 indentured Chinese workers who mined gold in Transvaal between 1904 and 1911 were under more restrictive contracts and generally were forced to return to their homeland.

In the late 19th century and nearly the entire 20th century, South Africa’s then British colonies’ and Dutch states’ enforced selective immigration policies that welcomed \"assimilable\" white Europeans as permanent residents but excluded or restricted other immigrants. Following the Union of South Africa’s passage of a law in 1913 prohibiting Asian and other non-white immigrants and its elimination of the indenture system in 1917, temporary African contract laborers from neighboring countries became the dominant source of labor in the burgeoning mining industries. Others worked in agriculture and smaller numbers in manufacturing, domestic service, transportation, and construction. Throughout the 20th century, at least 40% of South Africa’s miners were foreigners; the numbers peaked at over 80% in the late 1960s. Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana, and Eswatini were the primary sources of miners, and Malawi and Zimbabwe were periodic suppliers.

Under apartheid, a \"two gates\" migration policy focused on policing and deporting illegal migrants rather than on managing migration to meet South Africa’s development needs. The exclusionary 1991 Aliens Control Act limited labor recruitment to the highly skilled as defined by the ruling white minority, while bilateral labor agreements provided exemptions that enabled the influential mining industry and, to a lesser extent, commercial farms, to hire temporary, low-paid workers from neighboring states. Illegal African migrants were often tacitly allowed to work for low pay in other sectors but were always under threat of deportation.

The abolishment of apartheid in 1994 led to the development of a new inclusive national identity and the strengthening of the country’s restrictive immigration policy. Despite South Africa’s protectionist approach to immigration, the downsizing and closing of mines, and rising unemployment, migrants from across the continent believed that the country held work opportunities. Fewer African labor migrants were issued temporary work permits and, instead, increasingly entered South Africa with visitors’ permits or came illegally, which drove growth in cross-border trade and the informal job market. A new wave of Asian immigrants has also arrived over the last two decades, many operating small retail businesses.

In the post-apartheid period, increasing numbers of highly skilled white workers emigrated, citing dissatisfaction with the political situation, crime, poor services, and a reduced quality of life. The 2002 Immigration Act and later amendments were intended to facilitate the temporary migration of skilled foreign labor to fill labor shortages, but instead the legislation continues to create regulatory obstacles. Although the education system has improved and brain drain has slowed in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, South Africa continues to face skills shortages in several key sectors, such as health care and technology.

South Africa’s stability and economic growth has acted as a magnet for refugees and asylum seekers from nearby countries, despite the prevalence of discrimination and xenophobic violence. Refugees have included an estimated 350,000 Mozambicans during its 1980s civil war and, more recently, several thousand Somalis, Congolese, and Ethiopians. Nearly all of the tens of thousands of Zimbabweans who have applied for asylum in South Africa have been categorized as economic migrants and denied refuge.

" + "text": "

South Africa’s youthful population is gradually aging, as the country’s total fertility rate (TFR) has declined dramatically from about 6 children per woman in the 1960s to roughly 2.2 in 2014, and has remained at this level as of 2022. This pattern is similar to fertility trends in South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, and sets South Africa apart from the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, where the average TFR remains higher than other regions of the world. Today, South Africa’s decreasing number of reproductive age women is having fewer children, as women increase their educational attainment, workforce participation, and use of family planning methods; delay marriage; and opt for smaller families.

As the proportion of working-age South Africans has grown relative to children and the elderly, South Africa has been unable to achieve a demographic dividend because persistent high unemployment and the prevalence of HIV/AIDs have created a larger-than-normal dependent population. HIV/AIDS was also responsible for South Africa’s average life expectancy plunging to less than 43 years in 2008; it has rebounded to 65 years as of 2022. HIV/AIDS continues to be a serious public health threat, although awareness-raising campaigns and the wider availability of anti-retroviral drugs is stabilizing the number of new cases, enabling infected individuals to live longer, healthier lives, and reducing mother-child transmissions.

Migration to South Africa began in the second half of the 17th century when traders from the Dutch East India Company settled in the Cape and started using slaves from South and southeast Asia (mainly from India but also from present-day Indonesia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia) and southeast Africa (Madagascar and Mozambique) as farm laborers and, to a lesser extent, as domestic servants. The Indian subcontinent remained the Cape Colony’s main source of slaves in the early 18th century, while slaves were increasingly obtained from southeast Africa in the latter part of the 18th century and into the 19th century under British rule.

After slavery was completely abolished in the British Empire in 1838, South Africa’s colonists turned to temporary African migrants and indentured labor through agreements with India and later China, countries that were anxious to export workers to alleviate domestic poverty and overpopulation. Of the more than 150,000 indentured Indian laborers hired to work in Natal’s sugar plantations between 1860 and 1911, most exercised the right as British subjects to remain permanently (a small number of Indian immigrants came freely as merchants). Because of growing resentment toward Indian workers, the 63,000 indentured Chinese workers who mined gold in Transvaal between 1904 and 1911 were under more restrictive contracts and generally were forced to return to their homeland.

In the late 19th century and nearly the entire 20th century, South Africa’s then British colonies’ and Dutch states’ enforced selective immigration policies that welcomed \"assimilable\" white Europeans as permanent residents but excluded or restricted other immigrants. Following the Union of South Africa’s passage of a law in 1913 prohibiting Asian and other non-white immigrants and its elimination of the indenture system in 1917, temporary African contract laborers from neighboring countries became the dominant source of labor in the burgeoning mining industries. Others worked in agriculture and smaller numbers in manufacturing, domestic service, transportation, and construction. Throughout the 20th century, at least 40% of South Africa’s miners were foreigners; the numbers peaked at over 80% in the late 1960s. Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana, and Eswatini were the primary sources of miners, and Malawi and Zimbabwe were periodic suppliers.

Under apartheid, a \"two gates\" migration policy focused on policing and deporting illegal migrants rather than on managing migration to meet South Africa’s development needs. The exclusionary 1991 Aliens Control Act limited labor recruitment to the highly skilled as defined by the ruling white minority, while bilateral labor agreements provided exemptions that enabled the influential mining industry and, to a lesser extent, commercial farms, to hire temporary, low-paid workers from neighboring states. Illegal African migrants were often tacitly allowed to work for low pay in other sectors but were always under threat of deportation.

The abolishment of apartheid in 1994 led to the development of a new inclusive national identity and the strengthening of the country’s restrictive immigration policy. Despite South Africa’s protectionist approach to immigration, the downsizing and closing of mines, and rising unemployment, migrants from across the continent believed that the country held work opportunities. Fewer African labor migrants were issued temporary work permits and, instead, increasingly entered South Africa with visitors’ permits or came illegally, which drove growth in cross-border trade and the informal job market. A new wave of Asian immigrants has also arrived over the last two decades, many operating small retail businesses.

In the post-apartheid period, increasing numbers of highly skilled white workers emigrated, citing dissatisfaction with the political situation, crime, poor services, and a reduced quality of life. The 2002 Immigration Act and later amendments were intended to facilitate the temporary migration of skilled foreign labor to fill labor shortages, but instead the legislation continues to create regulatory obstacles. Although the education system has improved and brain drain has slowed in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, South Africa continues to face skills shortages in several key sectors, such as health care and technology.

South Africa’s stability and economic growth has acted as a magnet for refugees and asylum seekers from nearby countries, despite the prevalence of discrimination and xenophobic violence. Refugees have included an estimated 350,000 Mozambicans during its 1980s civil war and, more recently, several thousand Somalis, Congolese, and Ethiopians. Nearly all of the tens of thousands of Zimbabweans who have applied for asylum in South Africa have been categorized as economic migrants and denied refuge.

" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ "text": "0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2022 est.)" }, "Population distribution": { - "text": "the population concentrated along the southern and southeastern coast, and inland around Pretoria; the eastern half of the country is more densly populated than the west as shown in this population distribution map" + "text": "the population concentrated along the southern and southeastern coast, and inland around Pretoria; the eastern half of the country is more densely populated than the west as shown in this population distribution map" }, "Urbanization": { "urban population": { @@ -873,10 +873,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "92.86 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$92.86 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "108.3 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$108.3 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ "text": "Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Richards Bay, Saldanha Bay" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Durban (2,769,869) (2019)" + "text": "Durban (2,430,295) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Mossel Bay" diff --git a/africa/sg.json b/africa/sg.json index e315c524..ebae845c 100644 --- a/africa/sg.json +++ b/africa/sg.json @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ "text": "Muslim 97.2% (most adhere to one of the four main Sufi brotherhoods), Christian 2.7% (mostly Roman Catholic) (2019 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "

Senegal has a large and growing youth population but has not been successful in developing its potential human capital. Senegal’s high total fertility rate of almost 4.5 children per woman continues to bolster the country’s large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25. Fertility remains high because of the continued desire for large families, the low use of family planning, and early childbearing. Because of the country’s high illiteracy rate (more than 40%), high unemployment (even among university graduates), and widespread poverty, Senegalese youths face dim prospects; women are especially disadvantaged.

Senegal historically was a destination country for economic migrants, but in recent years West African migrants more often use Senegal as a transit point to North Africa – and sometimes illegally onward to Europe. The country also has been host to several thousand black Mauritanian refugees since they were expelled from their homeland during its 1989 border conflict with Senegal. The country’s economic crisis in the 1970s stimulated emigration; departures accelerated in the 1990s. Destinations shifted from neighboring countries, which were experiencing economic decline, civil wars, and increasing xenophobia, to Libya and Mauritania because of their booming oil industries and to developed countries (most notably former colonial ruler France, as well as Italy and Spain). The latter became attractive in the 1990s because of job opportunities and their periodic regularization programs (legalizing the status of illegal migrants).

Additionally, about 16,000 Senegalese refugees still remain in The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau as a result of more than 30 years of fighting between government forces and rebel separatists in southern Senegal’s Casamance region.

" + "text": "

Senegal has a large and growing youth population but has not been successful in developing its potential human capital. Senegal’s high total fertility rate of almost 4.5 children per woman continues to bolster the country’s large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25. Fertility remains high because of the continued desire for large families, the low use of family planning, and early childbearing. Because of the country’s high illiteracy rate (more than 40%), high unemployment (even among university graduates), and widespread poverty, Senegalese youths face dim prospects; women are especially disadvantaged.

Senegal historically was a destination country for economic migrants, but in recent years West African migrants more often use Senegal as a transit point to North Africa – and sometimes illegally onward to Europe. The country also has been host to several thousand black Mauritanian refugees since they were expelled from their homeland during its 1989 border conflict with Senegal. The country’s economic crisis in the 1970s stimulated emigration; departures accelerated in the 1990s. Destinations shifted from neighboring countries, which were experiencing economic decline, civil wars, and increasing xenophobia, to Libya and Mauritania because of their booming oil industries and to developed countries (most notably former colonial ruler France, as well as Italy and Spain). The latter became attractive in the 1990s because of job opportunities and their periodic regularization programs (legalizing the status of illegal migrants).

 

" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -886,10 +886,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "4.139 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$4.139 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "4.9 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$4.9 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/sh.json b/africa/sh.json index 47ac8b52..da6fabed 100644 --- a/africa/sh.json +++ b/africa/sh.json @@ -541,10 +541,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "8.427 million (FY06/07 est.)" + "text": "$8.427 million (FY06/07 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "20.7 million (FY06/07 est.)" + "text": "$20.7 million (FY06/07 est.)" }, "note": "note: revenue data reflect only locally raised revenues; the budget deficit is resolved by grant aid from the UK" }, diff --git a/africa/sl.json b/africa/sl.json index be4854fb..0e3832d7 100644 --- a/africa/sl.json +++ b/africa/sl.json @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ "text": "Muslim 77.1%, Christian 22.9% (2019 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "

Sierra Leone’s youthful and growing population is driven by its high total fertility rate (TFR) of almost 5 children per woman, which has declined little over the last two decades. Its elevated TFR is sustained by the continued desire for large families, the low level of contraceptive use, and the early start of childbearing. Despite its high TFR, Sierra Leone’s population growth is somewhat tempered by high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates that are among the world’s highest and are a result of poverty, a lack of potable water and sanitation, poor nutrition, limited access to quality health care services, and the prevalence of female genital cutting.

Sierra Leone’s large youth cohort – about 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – continues to struggle with high levels of unemployment, which was one of the major causes of the country’s 1991-2002 civil war and remains a threat to stability today. Its estimated 60% youth unemployment rate is attributed to high levels of illiteracy and unskilled labor, a lack of private sector jobs, and low pay.

Sierra Leone has been a source of and destination for refugees. Sierra Leone’s civil war internally displaced as many as 2 million people, or almost half the population, and forced almost another half million to seek refuge in neighboring countries (370,000 Sierra Leoneans fled to Guinea and 120,000 to Liberia). The UNHCR has helped almost 180,000 Sierra Leoneans to return home, while more than 90,000 others have repatriated on their own. Of the more than 65,000 Liberians who took refuge in Sierra Leone during their country’s civil war (1989-2003), about 50,000 have been voluntarily repatriated by the UNHCR and others have returned home independently. As of 2015, less than 1,000 Liberians still reside in Sierra Leone.

" + "text": "

Sierra Leone’s youthful and growing population is driven by its high total fertility rate (TFR) of almost 5 children per woman, which has declined little over the last two decades. Its elevated TFR is sustained by the continued desire for large families, the low level of contraceptive use, and the early start of childbearing. Despite its high TFR, Sierra Leone’s population growth is somewhat tempered by high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates that are among the world’s highest and are a result of poverty, a lack of potable water and sanitation, poor nutrition, limited access to quality health care services, and the prevalence of female genital cutting.

Sierra Leone’s large youth cohort – about 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – continues to struggle with high levels of unemployment, which was one of the major causes of the country’s 1991-2002 civil war and remains a threat to stability today. Its estimated 60% youth unemployment rate is attributed to high levels of illiteracy and unskilled labor, a lack of private sector jobs, and low pay.

Sierra Leone has been a source of and destination for refugees. Sierra Leone’s civil war internally displaced as many as 2 million people, or almost half the population, and forced almost another half million to seek refuge in neighboring countries (370,000 Sierra Leoneans fled to Guinea and 120,000 to Liberia). The UNHCR has helped almost 180,000 Sierra Leoneans to return home, while more than 90,000 others have repatriated on their own. Of the more than 65,000 Liberians who took refuge in Sierra Leone during their country’s civil war (1989-2003), about 50,000 have been voluntarily repatriated by the UNHCR and others have returned home independently.

" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -839,10 +839,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "562 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$562 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "846.4 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$846.4 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/so.json b/africa/so.json index 05b5e766..732a438d 100644 --- a/africa/so.json +++ b/africa/so.json @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ "text": "Sunni Muslim (Islam) (official, according to the 2012 Transitional Federal Charter)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "

Somalia scores very low for most humanitarian indicators, suffering from poor governance, protracted internal conflict, underdevelopment, economic decline, poverty, social and gender inequality, and environmental degradation. Despite civil war and famine raising its mortality rate, Somalia’s high fertility rate and large proportion of people of reproductive age maintain rapid population growth, with each generation being larger than the prior one. More than 60% of Somalia’s population is younger than 25, and the fertility rate is among the world’s highest at almost 6 children per woman – a rate that has decreased little since the 1970s.

A lack of educational and job opportunities is a major source of tension for Somalia’s large youth cohort, making them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist and pirate groups. Somalia has one of the world’s lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school – and one of world’s highest youth unemployment rates. Life expectancy is low as a result of high infant and maternal mortality rates, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition, and inadequate health services.

During the two decades of conflict that followed the fall of the SIAD regime in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes. Today Somalia is the world’s fourth highest source country for refugees, after Ukraine, Syria and Afghanistan. Insecurity, drought, floods, food shortages, and a lack of economic opportunities are the driving factors.

As of 2022, more than 660,000 Somali refugees were hosted in the region, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, while nearly 3 million Somalis were internally displaced. Since the implementation of a tripartite voluntary repatriation agreement among Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR in 2013, many Somali refugees have returned home, some 80,000 between 2014 and 2022.  The Kenyan Government in March 2021 ordered the closure of its two largest refugee camps, Dadaab and Kakuma, which then hosted more than 410,000 mainly Somali refugees.  However, the UN refugee agency presented a road map, including voluntary repatriation, relocation to third countries, and alternative stay options that persuaded the Kenyan Government to delay the closures.  The plan was supposed to lead to both camps being closed by 30 June 2022. Yet, as of May 2022, few Somali refugees had decided to return home because of security concerns and the lack of job prospects, instead waiting in the camps unsure of what the future held for them. Other Somali asylum seekers brave the dangers of crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen – despite its internal conflict – with aspirations to move onward to Saudi Arabia and other locations.

" + "text": "

Somalia scores very low for most humanitarian indicators, suffering from poor governance, protracted internal conflict, underdevelopment, economic decline, poverty, social and gender inequality, and environmental degradation. Despite civil war and famine raising its mortality rate, Somalia’s high fertility rate and large proportion of people of reproductive age maintain rapid population growth, with each generation being larger than the prior one. More than 60% of Somalia’s population is younger than 25, and the fertility rate is among the world’s highest at almost 6 children per woman – a rate that has decreased little since the 1970s.

A lack of educational and job opportunities is a major source of tension for Somalia’s large youth cohort, making them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist and pirate groups. Somalia has one of the world’s lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school – and one of the world’s highest youth unemployment rates. Life expectancy is low as a result of high infant and maternal mortality rates, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition, and inadequate health services.

During the two decades of conflict that followed the fall of the SIAD regime in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes. Today Somalia is the world’s fourth highest source country for refugees, after Ukraine, Syria and Afghanistan. Insecurity, drought, floods, food shortages, and a lack of economic opportunities are the driving factors.

As of 2022, more than 660,000 Somali refugees were hosted in the region, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, while nearly 3 million Somalis were internally displaced. Since the implementation of a tripartite voluntary repatriation agreement among Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR in 2013, many Somali refugees have returned home, some 80,000 between 2014 and 2022.  The Kenyan Government in March 2021 ordered the closure of its two largest refugee camps, Dadaab and Kakuma, which then hosted more than 410,000 mainly Somali refugees.  However, the UN refugee agency presented a road map, including voluntary repatriation, relocation to third countries, and alternative stay options that persuaded the Kenyan Government to delay the closures.  The plan was supposed to lead to both camps being closed by 30 June 2022. Yet, as of May 2022, few Somali refugees had decided to return home because of security concerns and the lack of job prospects, instead waiting in the camps unsure of what the future held for them. Other Somali asylum seekers brave the dangers of crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen – despite its internal conflict – with aspirations to move onward to Saudi Arabia and other locations.

" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -806,10 +806,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "145.3 million (2014 est.)" + "text": "$145.3 million (2014 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "151.1 million (2014 est.)" + "text": "$151.1 million (2014 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1164,19 +1164,19 @@ } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { - "text": "estimates vary widely due to inconsistent data and ongoing efforts to integrate various militias; up to 20,000 active-duty SNA personnel (2022)", - "note": "note 1: in 2017, the Somali Government announced a plan for the SNA to eventually number about 18,000 troops; the same plan called for 32,000 federal and regional police

note 2: as of 2021, there were estimates of up to 50,000 militia forces operating in the country" + "text": "approximately 18-20,000 SNA personnel (2022)", + "note": "note: as of 2022, there were estimates of up to 50,000 militia forces operating in the country" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the SNA is lightly armed with an inventory that includes a variety of older, second-hand equipment largely from Italy, Russia, South Africa, and the UK; since 2015, it has received small quantities of second-hand equipment as aid/donations from a variety of countries (2022)", - "note": "note: in 2022, the UN voted to maintain an arms embargo on Somali in place since 1992; however, the embargo was modified to reflect the the Somali Government’s progress in improving its management of weapons and ammunition; it includes allowing Somalia to import portable surface-to-air missiles, higher-caliber mortars, anti-tank guided weapons, some aircraft and vessels designed or modified for military use, and combat drones for use by its security forces and police — unless the Security Council committee monitoring sanctions objects within five working days of receiving notification from the Somali Government " + "text": "the SNA is lightly armed with an inventory that includes a variety of older, second-hand equipment largely from Italy, Russia, South Africa, and the UK; since 2015, it has received small quantities of second-hand equipment as aid/donations from a variety of countries, including the US (2022)", + "note": "note: in 2022, the UN voted to maintain an arms embargo on Somali in place since 1992; however, the embargo was modified to reflect the Somali Government’s progress in improving its management of weapons and ammunition; it includes allowing Somalia to import portable surface-to-air missiles, higher-caliber mortars, anti-tank guided weapons, some aircraft and vessels designed or modified for military use, and combat drones for use by its security forces and police — unless the Security Council committee monitoring sanctions objects within five working days of receiving notification from the Somali Government" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18 is the legal minimum age for compulsory and voluntary military service; conscription is authorized but not currently utilized; women may volunteer (2021)", "note": "note: in 2019, the Federal Government of Somalia renewed its commitment to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers by signing a roadmap detailing measures and practical actions to prevent violations against children, release children associated with armed forces, and reintegrate them into communities; the signing followed a similar accord committed to ending the use of child soldiers signed by both the Somali Transitional Government and the UN in 2012" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "as of 2022, the Somali National Army (SNA) and supporting security and militia forces were actively conducting operations against the al-Shabaab terrorist group (see Appendix T); al-Shabaab controlled large parts of southern and central Somalia 

of the SNA’s approximately 13 brigades, the most effective were assessed to be the US-trained Danab (\"Lightning\") Advanced Infantry Brigade and those of the Turkish-trained Gorgor (\"Eagle\") Special Division; as of 2022, the Danab Brigade numbered about 1,500 troops with an eventual projected strength of 3,000, while the Gorgor Division was estimated to up to 5,000 trained troops; the Somali Government also sent some 5,000 recruits to Eritrea for military training; the troops returned in 2022

the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operated in the country with the approval of the UN from 2007-2022; its peacekeeping mission included assisting Somali forces in providing security for a stable political process, enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; in April 2022, AMISOM was reconfigured and replaced with the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS); the ATMIS mission is to support the Somalia Federal Government (FGS) in implementing the security objectives of the FGS's security transition plan, a comprehensive strategy developed by the FGS and its international partners in 2018 and updated in 2021 to gradually transfer security responsibilities from ATMIS to Somali security forces; ATMIS is projected to gradually reduce staffing from its 2022 level of about 20,000 personnel (civilians, military, and police) to zero by the end of 2024

UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM; established 2013) is mandated by the Security Council to work with the FGS to support national reconciliation, provide advice on peace-building and state-building, monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international community; the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS; established 2015) is responsible for providing logistical field support to ATMIS, UNSOM, and the Somali security forces on joint operations with ATMIS

the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM-S) has operated in the country since 2010; the EUTM provides advice and training to the Somali military; the US, UK, and Turkey maintain separate military training missions in Somalia (the US has also supported the SNA with air strikes); the UAE maintains a military presence in Somaliland (2022)" + "text": "as of 2023, the Somali National Army (SNA) and supporting security and militia forces were actively conducting operations against the al-Shabaab terrorist group (see Appendix T); al-Shabaab controlled large parts of southern and central Somalia 

of the SNA’s approximately 13 brigades, the most effective were assessed to be the US-trained Danab (\"Lightning\") Advanced Infantry Brigade and those of the Turkish-trained Gorgor (\"Eagle\") Special Division; as of 2022, the Danab Brigade numbered about 1,500 troops with an eventual projected strength of 3,000, while the Gorgor Division was estimated to up to 5,000 trained troops; the Somali Government also sent some 5,000 recruits to Eritrea for military training; the troops returned in 2022

the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operated in the country with the approval of the UN from 2007-2022; its peacekeeping mission included assisting Somali forces in providing security for a stable political process, enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; in April 2022, AMISOM was reconfigured and replaced with the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS); the ATMIS mission is to support the Somalia Federal Government (FGS) in implementing the security objectives of the FGS's security transition plan, a comprehensive strategy developed by the FGS and its international partners in 2018 and updated in 2021 to gradually transfer security responsibilities from ATMIS to Somali security forces; ATMIS is projected to gradually reduce staffing from its 2022 level of about 20,000 personnel (civilians, military, and police) to zero by the end of 2024

UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM; established 2013) is mandated by the Security Council to work with the FGS to support national reconciliation, provide advice on peace-building and state-building, monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international community; the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS; established 2015) is responsible for providing logistical field support to ATMIS, UNSOM, and the Somali security forces on joint operations with ATMIS

the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM-S) has operated in the country since 2010; the EUTM provides advice and training to the Somali military; the US, UK, and Turkey maintain separate military training missions in Somalia (the US has also supported the SNA with air strikes); the UAE maintains a military presence in Somaliland (2023)" }, "Maritime threats": { "text": "

the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) received one incident of piracy and armed robbery in 2021 for the Horn of Africa; while there were no recorded incidents, the IMB PRC warns that Somalia pirates continue to possess the capacity to carry out attacks in the Somali basin and wider Indian Ocean; in particular, the report warns that, \"Masters and crew must remain vigilant and cautious when transiting these waters.\"; the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, contributed to the drop in incidents; the EU naval mission, Operation ATALANTA, continues its operations in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean through 2022; naval units from China, India, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, the US, and other countries also operate in conjunction with EU forces

" diff --git a/africa/su.json b/africa/su.json index 116f007a..91605ed8 100644 --- a/africa/su.json +++ b/africa/su.json @@ -849,10 +849,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "8.48 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$8.48 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "13.36 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$13.36 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "790,736 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 134,367 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 93,478 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers), 70,935 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 24,369 (Central African Republic) (2022)" + "text": "796,831 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 134,367 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 93,478 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers), 70,935 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 24,369 (Central African Republic) (2022)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "3.71 million (civil war 1983-2005; ongoing conflict in Darfur region; government and rebel fighting along South Sudan border; inter-tribal clashes) (2022)" diff --git a/africa/to.json b/africa/to.json index d51a60ff..e009e6dd 100644 --- a/africa/to.json +++ b/africa/to.json @@ -871,10 +871,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.023 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.023 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.203 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.203 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1244,6 +1244,9 @@ "Ports and terminals": { "major seaport(s)": { "text": "Kpeme, Lome" + }, + "container port(s) (TEUs)": { + "text": "Lome (1,962,304) (2021)" } } }, diff --git a/africa/tp.json b/africa/tp.json index e1b053a0..f23bd51f 100644 --- a/africa/tp.json +++ b/africa/tp.json @@ -806,10 +806,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "103 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$103 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "112.4 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$112.4 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/ts.json b/africa/ts.json index 575adb86..c502440c 100644 --- a/africa/ts.json +++ b/africa/ts.json @@ -824,10 +824,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "9.876 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$9.876 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "12.21 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$12.21 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/tz.json b/africa/tz.json index eca42e7a..1e4997ca 100644 --- a/africa/tz.json +++ b/africa/tz.json @@ -889,10 +889,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "7.873 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$7.873 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "8.818 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$8.818 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/ug.json b/africa/ug.json index 5fc83d99..6014dfc2 100644 --- a/africa/ug.json +++ b/africa/ug.json @@ -861,10 +861,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "3.848 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.848 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "4.928 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$4.928 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/uv.json b/africa/uv.json index fafa37ab..228c38c4 100644 --- a/africa/uv.json +++ b/africa/uv.json @@ -862,10 +862,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "2.666 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.666 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "3.655 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.655 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/wa.json b/africa/wa.json index 3609cb59..5469bb34 100644 --- a/africa/wa.json +++ b/africa/wa.json @@ -860,10 +860,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "4.268 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$4.268 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "5 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$5 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/wz.json b/africa/wz.json index 7e72ae62..ff8f45ac 100644 --- a/africa/wz.json +++ b/africa/wz.json @@ -817,10 +817,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.263 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.263 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.639 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.639 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1159,7 +1159,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Umbutfo Eswatini Defense Force (UEDF): Army (includes a small air wing) (2022)" + "text": "Umbutfo Eswatini Defense Force (UEDF): Army (includes a small air wing); the Royal Eswatini Police Service (REPS) (2023)" }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2021": { diff --git a/africa/za.json b/africa/za.json index fab609c8..875e0cba 100644 --- a/africa/za.json +++ b/africa/za.json @@ -866,10 +866,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "4.473 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$4.473 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "6.357 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$6.357 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/africa/zi.json b/africa/zi.json index 76184f89..b7ba8325 100644 --- a/africa/zi.json +++ b/africa/zi.json @@ -861,10 +861,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "3.8 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.8 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "5.5 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$5.5 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/aq.json b/australia-oceania/aq.json index e8f09296..02678ce9 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/aq.json +++ b/australia-oceania/aq.json @@ -608,10 +608,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "249 million (2016 est.)" + "text": "$249 million (2016 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "262.5 million (2016 est.)" + "text": "$262.5 million (2016 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/as.json b/australia-oceania/as.json index 03f693c5..006b54c7 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/as.json +++ b/australia-oceania/as.json @@ -851,10 +851,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "490 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$490 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "496.9 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$496.9 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1095,18 +1095,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "6.2 million (2020 est.)" + "text": "4.6 million (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "24 (2020 est.)" + "text": "18 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "27.453 million (2020 est.)" + "text": "27.09 million (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "108 (2020 est.)" + "text": "105 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@ "text": "the Australian telecom market since 2020 has been impacted by the pandemic, which forced many people to school and work from home and thus adopt fixed-line broadband services; internet traffic, both fixed and mobile, increased substantially as a result; in the fixed sector, there is an ongoing migration from copper-based platforms to fiber; the extension of fixed wireless access will mean that up to 120,000 premises currently dependent on satellite broadband will be able to access 5G-based fixed services; the fixed-line market has been falling steadily over the past five years; in the Australian fixed broadband market, there is a dynamic shift among customers to fiber networks; the DSL sector is steadily shrinking while subscribers on HFC infrastructure will continue to be provided by existing cable, with a steady migration to full fiber connectivity (2022)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "24 per 100 fixed-line telephone subscriptions and 108 per 100 mobile-cellular; more subscribers to mobile services than there are people; 90% of all mobile device sales are now smartphones, growth in mobile traffic brisk (2020)" + "text": "18 per 100 fixed-line telephone subscriptions and 105 per 100 mobile-cellular; more subscribers to mobile services than there are people; 90% of all mobile device sales are now smartphones, growth in mobile traffic brisk (2021)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 61; landing points for more than 20 submarine cables including: the SeaMeWe-3 optical telecommunications submarine cable with links to Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; the INDIGO-Central, INDIGO West and ASC, North West Cable System, Australia-Papua New Guinea cable, CSCS, PPC-1, Gondwana-1, SCCN, Hawaiki, TGA, Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2, JGA-S, with links to other Australian cities, New Zealand and many countries in southeast Asia, US and Europe; the H2 Cable, AJC, Telstra Endeavor, Southern Cross NEXT with links to Japan, Hong Kong, and other Pacific Ocean countries as well as the US; satellite earth stations - 10 Intelsat (4 Indian Ocean and 6 Pacific Ocean), 2 Inmarsat, 2 Globalstar, 5 other (2019)" @@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@ "text": "
Indian Ocean: Adelaide, Darwin, Fremantle, Geelong, Melbourne
Pacific Ocean: Brisbane, Cairns, Gladstone, Hobart, Newcastle, Port Port Kembla, Sydney" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Melbourne (2,967,315), Sydney (2,572,714) (2019)" + "text": "Melbourne (2,909,288), Sydney (2,761,648) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (export)": { "text": "Australia Pacific, Barrow Island, Burrup (Pluto), Curtis Island, Darwin, Karratha, Bladin Point (Ichthys), Gladstone, Prelude (offshore FLNG), Wheatstone" diff --git a/australia-oceania/bp.json b/australia-oceania/bp.json index 69724744..76318cdb 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/bp.json +++ b/australia-oceania/bp.json @@ -782,10 +782,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "532.5 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$532.5 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "570.5 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$570.5 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/cq.json b/australia-oceania/cq.json index 1dbb73e2..b49507be 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/cq.json +++ b/australia-oceania/cq.json @@ -613,10 +613,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "389.6 million (2016 est.)" + "text": "$389.6 million (2016 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "344 million (2015 est.)" + "text": "$344 million (2015 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/cw.json b/australia-oceania/cw.json index 92e6d154..7621d3b8 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/cw.json +++ b/australia-oceania/cw.json @@ -637,10 +637,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "86.9 million (2010)" + "text": "$86.9 million (2010)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "77.9 million (2010)" + "text": "$77.9 million (2010)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/fj.json b/australia-oceania/fj.json index a207f8ae..c450243f 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/fj.json +++ b/australia-oceania/fj.json @@ -812,10 +812,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.454 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.454 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.648 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.648 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1227,7 +1227,7 @@ "text": "170 Egypt (MFO); 165 Iraq (UNAMI); 150 Golan Heights (UNDOF) (2022)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the RFMF was established in 1920; it has a history of intervening in the country’s politics since the late 1980s, including coups in 1987 and 2006, and a mutiny in 2000

the RFMF also has a long tradition of participating in UN peacekeeping operations; since its first deployment of troops to South Lebanon in 1978 under the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), it has deployed troops on nearly 20 additional UN missions

Fiji has a \"shiprider\" agreement with the US, which allows local maritime law enforcement officers to embark on US Coast Guard (USCG) and US Navy (USN) vessels, including to board and search vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations within Fiji's designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas; \"shiprider\" agreements also enable USCG personnel and USN vessels with embarked USCG law enforcement personnel to work with host nations to protect critical regional resources
(2022)" + "text": "the RFMF was established in 1920; it has a history of intervening in the country’s politics since the late 1980s, including coups in 1987 and 2006, and a mutiny in 2000

the RFMF also has a long tradition of participating in UN peacekeeping operations; since its first deployment of troops to South Lebanon in 1978 under the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), it has deployed troops on nearly 20 additional UN missions

Fiji has a \"shiprider\" agreement with the US, which allows local maritime law enforcement officers to embark on US Coast Guard (USCG) and US Navy (USN) vessels, including to board and search vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations within Fiji's designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas; \"shiprider\" agreements also enable USCG personnel and USN vessels with embarked USCG law enforcement personnel to work with host nations to protect critical regional resources (2023)" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/fm.json b/australia-oceania/fm.json index a5db6ab8..bb81e6c4 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/fm.json +++ b/australia-oceania/fm.json @@ -752,10 +752,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "213.8 million (FY12/13 est.)" + "text": "$213.8 million (FY12/13 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "192.1 million (FY12/13 est.)" + "text": "$192.1 million (FY12/13 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/fp.json b/australia-oceania/fp.json index 253cfd20..8339f482 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/fp.json +++ b/australia-oceania/fp.json @@ -679,10 +679,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.891 billion (2012)" + "text": "$1.891 billion (2012)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.833 billion (2011)" + "text": "$1.833 billion (2011)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/gq.json b/australia-oceania/gq.json index 9e2c2e9d..e4860a74 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/gq.json +++ b/australia-oceania/gq.json @@ -647,10 +647,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.24 billion (2016 est.)" + "text": "$1.24 billion (2016 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.299 billion (2016 est.)" + "text": "$1.299 billion (2016 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/kr.json b/australia-oceania/kr.json index 978a4de0..2adbe12c 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/kr.json +++ b/australia-oceania/kr.json @@ -768,10 +768,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "151.2 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$151.2 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "277.5 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$277.5 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/nc.json b/australia-oceania/nc.json index a24b6339..91d14366 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nc.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nc.json @@ -674,10 +674,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.995 billion (2015 est.)" + "text": "$1.995 billion (2015 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.993 billion (2015 est.)" + "text": "$1.993 billion (2015 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/ne.json b/australia-oceania/ne.json index 0d339462..7996a814 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ne.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ne.json @@ -560,10 +560,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "15.07 million (FY04/05)" + "text": "$15.07 million (FY04/05)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "16.33 million (FY04/05)" + "text": "$16.33 million (FY04/05)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/nf.json b/australia-oceania/nf.json index 809be2e2..fd82bb44 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nf.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nf.json @@ -447,10 +447,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "4.6 million (FY99/00)" + "text": "$4.6 million (FY99/00)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "4.8 million (FY99/00)" + "text": "$4.8 million (FY99/00)" } }, "Fiscal year": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/nh.json b/australia-oceania/nh.json index 29438d0f..83a6b314 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nh.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nh.json @@ -783,10 +783,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "236.7 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$236.7 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "244.1 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$244.1 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/nr.json b/australia-oceania/nr.json index 16d482e3..1d493b72 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nr.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nr.json @@ -705,10 +705,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "103 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$103 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "113.4 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$113.4 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/nz.json b/australia-oceania/nz.json index 7a016752..e4d77c9a 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nz.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nz.json @@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ "text": "King CHARLES III (since 8 September 2022); represented by Governor-General Dame Cindy KIRO (since 21 October 2021)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Prime Minister Jacinda ARDERN (since 26 October 2017); Deputy Prime Minister Grant ROBERTSON (since 2 November 2020)" + "text": "Prime Minister Chris HIPKINS (since 25 January 2023); Deputy Prime Minister Carmel SEPULONI (since 25 January 2023)
note - on 19 January 2023, Prime Minister Jacinda ARDERN announced her resignation as prime minister effective not later than 7 February 2023; Chris HIPKINS elected unanimously by Labor Party caucus as party leader on 22 January 2023, sworn in on 25 January 2023" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Executive Council appointed by the governor-general on the recommendation of the prime minister" @@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ "text": "unicameral House of Representatives - commonly called Parliament (120 seats for 2020-23 term); 72 members directly elected in 65 single-seat constituencies and 7 Maori constituencies by simple majority vote and 48 directly elected by closed party-list proportional representation vote; members serve 3-year terms)" }, "elections": { - "text": "last held on 17 October 2020 (next scheduled for 2023)" + "text": "last held on 17 October 2020 (next scheduled for 14 October 2023)" }, "election results": { "text": "percent of vote by party - Labor Party 49.1%, National Party 26.8%, ACT Party 8%, Green Party 6.3%, Maori Party 1%; seats by party - Labor Party 64, National Party 35, Green Party 10, ACT Party 10, Maori Party 1; composition - men 61, women 59, percent of women 49.2%" @@ -826,10 +826,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "74.11 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$74.11 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "70.97 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$70.97 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/pc.json b/australia-oceania/pc.json index 5736553a..820c379e 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/pc.json +++ b/australia-oceania/pc.json @@ -440,10 +440,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "746,000 (FY04/05)" + "text": "$746,000 (FY04/05)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.028 million (FY04/05)" + "text": "$1.028 million (FY04/05)" } }, "Fiscal year": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/ps.json b/australia-oceania/ps.json index ec190e39..8128e8ac 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ps.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ps.json @@ -769,10 +769,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "193 million (2012 est.)" + "text": "$193 million (2012 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "167.3 million (2012 est.)" + "text": "$167.3 million (2012 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/rm.json b/australia-oceania/rm.json index 91c29c4d..96165e56 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/rm.json +++ b/australia-oceania/rm.json @@ -785,10 +785,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "116.7 million (2013 est.)" + "text": "$116.7 million (2013 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "113.9 million (2013 est.)" + "text": "$113.9 million (2013 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/tl.json b/australia-oceania/tl.json index 03afcdbd..8e52a22e 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/tl.json +++ b/australia-oceania/tl.json @@ -519,10 +519,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "24,324,473 (2017 est.)" + "text": "$24,324,473 (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "11,666,542 (2017 est.)" + "text": "$11,666,542 (2017 est.)" } }, "Fiscal year": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/tn.json b/australia-oceania/tn.json index 7932185f..0a24a4f1 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/tn.json +++ b/australia-oceania/tn.json @@ -794,10 +794,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "181.2 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$181.2 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "181.2 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$181.2 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/tv.json b/australia-oceania/tv.json index b2db6b5a..0cddffde 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/tv.json +++ b/australia-oceania/tv.json @@ -713,10 +713,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "42.68 million (2013 est.)" + "text": "$42.68 million (2013 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "32.46 million (2012 est.)" + "text": "$32.46 million (2012 est.)" }, "note": "note: revenue data include Official Development Assistance from Australia" }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/wf.json b/australia-oceania/wf.json index dbb3daae..4c09fd2f 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/wf.json +++ b/australia-oceania/wf.json @@ -576,14 +576,14 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "32.54 million (2015 est.) NA" + "text": "$32.54 million (2015 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "34.18 million (2015 est.) NA" + "text": "$34.18 million (2015 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { - "text": "-0.8% (of GDP) (2015 est.) NA" + "text": "-0.8% (of GDP) (2015 est.)" }, "Public debt": { "Public debt 2004": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/ws.json b/australia-oceania/ws.json index d0cf9e9a..9e4e640a 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ws.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ws.json @@ -799,10 +799,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "237.3 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$237.3 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "276.8 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$276.8 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json index 6fe7571a..d1941527 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json @@ -646,10 +646,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "681.6 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$681.6 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "755.5 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$755.5 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json index 04de7c4c..f0b72bda 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json @@ -509,13 +509,13 @@ }, "Legislative branch": { "description": { - "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:
Senate (17 seats; members appointed by the governor general)
House of Representatives (18 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms)" + "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:
Senate (17 seats; members appointed by the governor general)
House of Representatives (17 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms)" }, "elections": { - "text": "
Senate - last appointed on 26 March 2018 (next NA)
House of Representatives - last held on 21 March 2018 (next to be held in March 2023)" + "text": "
Senate - last appointed on 26 March 2018 (next NA)
House of Representatives - last held on 18 January 2023 (next to be held in March 2028)" }, "election results": { - "text": "
Senate -  composition - men 8, women 9, percent of women 52.9%
House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - ABLP 59.4%, UPP 37.2%, BPM 1.4%, other 1.9% ; seats by party - ABLP 15, UPP 1, BPM 1; composition - men 16, women 2, percent of women 11.1%; note - total Parliament percent of women 31.4%" + "text": "
Senate -  composition - men 8, women 9, percent of women 52.9%
House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - ABLP 47.1%, UPP 45.2%, BPM 1.5%, independents 5.2% ; seats by party - ABLP 9, UPP 6, BPM 1, independents 1; composition - men 16, women 2, percent of women 11.1%; note - total Parliament percent of women 31.4%" } }, "Judicial branch": { @@ -709,10 +709,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "298.2 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$298.2 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "334 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$334 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1062,6 +1062,9 @@ "Ports and terminals": { "major seaport(s)": { "text": "Saint John's" + }, + "cruise port(s)": { + "text": "St. John's" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json index 0e07bae8..e8a7f424 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json @@ -582,10 +582,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "81.92 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$81.92 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "80.32 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$80.32 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json index 75ab3ce5..2d53ef5d 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json @@ -779,10 +779,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.466 billion (2017 est.) (2013 est.)" + "text": "$1.466 billion (2017 est.) (2013 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.664 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.664 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json index ea5c5396..5a5ca940 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json @@ -733,10 +733,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "2.139 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.139 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "2.46 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.46 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1107,10 +1107,10 @@ "text": "Freeport, Nassau, South Riding Point" }, "cruise port(s)": { - "text": "Nassau" + "text": "Freeport, Half Moon Cay, Nassau" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Freeport (1,396,568) (2019)" + "text": "Freeport (1,642,780) (2021)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json index c45b96ac..cd1f2258 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json @@ -811,10 +811,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "553.5 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$553.5 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "572 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$572 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json index b2940b9c..7f915d0b 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json @@ -638,10 +638,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "874.5 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$874.5 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "766.6 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$766.6 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -967,6 +967,9 @@ "Ports and terminals": { "major seaport(s)": { "text": "Cayman Brac, George Town" + }, + "cruise port(s)": { + "text": "George Town, Grand Cayman" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json index a291a457..3bc8cde9 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json @@ -855,10 +855,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "8.357 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$8.357 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "11.92 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$11.92 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1228,6 +1228,9 @@ "major seaport(s)": { "text": "Atlantic Ocean (Caribbean) - Puerto Limon" }, + "container port(s) (TEUs)": { + "text": "Puerto Limon (1,319,372)" + }, "note": "Pacific Ocean - Caldera" } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json index ce23f3d9..7a6567dd 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json @@ -846,10 +846,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "54.52 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$54.52 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "64.64 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$64.64 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json index e951b98c..0bf4e18a 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json @@ -677,10 +677,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "227.8 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$227.8 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "260.4 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$260.4 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json index c9c0982b..e4e55d2a 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json @@ -860,10 +860,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "11.33 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$11.33 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "13.62 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$13.62 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1243,6 +1243,12 @@ "oil terminal(s)": { "text": "Punta Nizao oil terminal" }, + "cruise port(s)": { + "text": "La Romana" + }, + "container port(s) (TEUs)": { + "text": "Caucedo (1,265,459); Haina (495,243)" + }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Andres LNG terminal (Boca Chica)" } diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json index d2a97048..82fa5813 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json @@ -841,10 +841,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "5.886 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$5.886 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "6.517 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$6.517 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json index aa046fdb..b18b17c9 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json @@ -717,10 +717,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "288.4 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$288.4 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "252.3 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$252.3 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json index 718d368b..b89ce12c 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json @@ -853,10 +853,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "8.164 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$8.164 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "9.156 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$9.156 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json index c832235b..a38da987 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json @@ -841,10 +841,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.567 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.567 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.65 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.65 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json index 387c16e9..7e35d929 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json @@ -844,10 +844,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "4.658 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$4.658 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "5.283 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$5.283 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json index 39939dfe..040d9b1f 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json @@ -805,10 +805,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "4.382 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$4.382 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "4.314 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$4.314 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1165,8 +1165,11 @@ "major seaport(s)": { "text": "Discovery Bay (Port Rhoades), Kingston, Montego Bay, Port Antonio, Port Esquivel, Port Kaiser, Rocky Point" }, + "cruise port(s)": { + "text": "Falmouth, Montego Bay, Port Antonio, Ocho Rios," + }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Kingston (1,647,609) (2019)" + "text": "Kingston (2,004,302) (2021)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json index 24e4ccda..8746428a 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json @@ -593,10 +593,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "66.67 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$66.67 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "47.04 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$47.04 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Fiscal year": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json index 180f548c..1b9c19c4 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json @@ -826,10 +826,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "3.871 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.871 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "4.15 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$4.15 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json index fcc90dfc..03b316c5 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json @@ -846,10 +846,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "12.43 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$12.43 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "13.44 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$13.44 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1230,7 +1230,7 @@ "text": "Balboa, Colon, Cristobal" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Balboa (2,894,654), Colon (4,379,477) (2019)" + "text": "Balboa (3,561,432), Colon (4,915,975) (2021)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json index d41bd556..8cab59f2 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json @@ -699,10 +699,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "9.268 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$9.268 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "9.974 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$9.974 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1001,7 +1001,7 @@ "text": "Ensenada Honda, Mayaguez, Playa de Guayanilla, Playa de Ponce, San Juan" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "San Juan (2,142,662) (2019)" + "text": "San Juan (1,438,218) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Guayanilla Bay" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json index 9ac7a500..4055bb7c 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json @@ -709,10 +709,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "307 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$307 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "291.1 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$291.1 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json index 3b626322..601d803d 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json @@ -753,10 +753,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "398.2 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$398.2 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "392.8 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$392.8 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json index ae937866..e72585b3 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json @@ -522,10 +522,10 @@ "text": "Cabinet appointed from among members of Parliament" }, "elections/appointments": { - "text": "president indirectly elected by an electoral college of selected Senate and House of Representatives members for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 19 January 2018 (next to be held by February 2023); the president usually appoints the leader of the majority party in the House of Representatives as prime minister" + "text": "president indirectly elected by an electoral college of selected Senate and House of Representatives members for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 20 January 2023 (next to be held by February 2028); the president usually appoints the leader of the majority party in the House of Representatives as prime minister" }, "election results": { - "text": "Paula-Mae WEEKES (independent) elected president; ran unopposed and was elected without a vote; she is Trinidad and Tobago's first female head of state" + "text": "Christine KANGALOO (PNM) elected president by the electoral college on 20 January 2023; Christine KANGALOO received 48 votes against 22 votes for opposition candidate Israel KHAN (UNC); the new president takes office on 21 March 2023" } }, "Legislative branch": { @@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ }, "Diplomatic representation from the US": { "chief of mission": { - "text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Shante MOORE (since 20 January 2021)" + "text": "Ambassador Candace A. BOND (since 8 December 2022)" }, "embassy": { "text": "15 Queen's Park West, Port of Spain" @@ -764,10 +764,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "5.581 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$5.581 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "7.446 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$7.446 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json index 79a979ac..742d68a7 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json @@ -601,10 +601,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "247.3 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$247.3 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "224.3 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$224.3 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Fiscal year": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json index bfa760bc..ebd33a2f 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json @@ -817,6 +817,9 @@ "oil terminal(s)": { "text": "Bullen Baai (Curacao Terminal)" }, + "cruise port(s)": { + "text": "Willemstad" + }, "bulk cargo port(s)": { "text": "Fuik Bay (phosphate rock)" } diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json index 3a4312d9..725e8835 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json @@ -733,10 +733,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "225.2 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$225.2 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "230 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$230 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json index e32b8861..a00cc85f 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json @@ -589,10 +589,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "400 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$400 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "400 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$400 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -878,6 +878,9 @@ "Ports and terminals": { "major seaport(s)": { "text": "Road Harbor" + }, + "cruise port(s)": { + "text": "Tortola" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json index 36bdacc4..3143f62c 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json @@ -632,10 +632,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.496 billion (2016 est.)" + "text": "$1.496 billion (2016 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.518 billion (2016 est.)" + "text": "$1.518 billion (2016 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-asia/kg.json b/central-asia/kg.json index cf9025ba..a39f7da7 100644 --- a/central-asia/kg.json +++ b/central-asia/kg.json @@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ } }, "Agricultural products": { - "text": "milk, potatoes, sugar beet, maize, wheat, barley, tomatoes, watermelons, onions, carrots/turnips" + "text": "milk, potatoes, sugar beets, maize, wheat, barley, tomatoes, watermelons, onions, carrots/turnips" }, "Industries": { "text": "small machinery, textiles, food processing, cement, shoes, lumber, refrigerators, furniture, electric motors, gold, rare earth metals" @@ -837,10 +837,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "2.169 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.169 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "2.409 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.409 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-asia/kz.json b/central-asia/kz.json index 25b4a604..de948b41 100644 --- a/central-asia/kz.json +++ b/central-asia/kz.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Ethnic Kazakhs derive from a mix of Turkic nomadic tribes that migrated to the region in the 15th century. The Kazakh steppe was conquered by the Russian Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries, and Kazakhstan became a Soviet Republic in 1925. Repression and starvation caused by forced agricultural collectivization led to more than a million deaths in the early 1930s. During the 1950s and 1960s, the agricultural \"Virgin Lands\" program led to an influx of settlers (mostly ethnic Russians, but also other nationalities) and at the time of Kazakhstan’s independence in 1991, ethnic Kazakhs were a minority. Non-Muslim ethnic minorities departed Kazakhstan in large numbers from the mid-1990s through the mid-2000s and a national program has repatriated about a million ethnic Kazakhs (from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Mongolia, and the Xinjiang region of China) back to Kazakhstan. As a result of this shift, the ethnic Kazakh share of the population now exceeds two thirds.

Kazakhstan's economy is the largest in Central Asia, mainly due to the country's vast natural resources. Current issues include: diversifying the economy, attracting foreign direct investment, enhancing Kazakhstan's economic competitiveness, and strengthening economic relations with neighboring states and foreign powers.

 

" + "text": "

Ethnic Kazakhs derive from a mix of Turkic nomadic tribes that migrated to the region in the 15th century. The Kazakh steppe was conquered by the Russian Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries, and Kazakhstan became a Soviet Republic in 1925. Repression and starvation caused by forced agricultural collectivization led to more than a million deaths in the early 1930s. During the 1950s and 1960s, the agricultural \"Virgin Lands\" program led to an influx of settlers (mostly ethnic Russians, but also other nationalities) and at the time of Kazakhstan’s independence in 1991, ethnic Kazakhs were a minority. Non-Muslim ethnic minorities departed Kazakhstan in large numbers from the mid-1990s through the mid-2000s and a national program has repatriated about a million ethnic Kazakhs (from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Mongolia, and the Xinjiang region of China) back to Kazakhstan. As a result of this shift, the ethnic Kazakh share of the population now exceeds two-thirds.

Kazakhstan's economy is the largest in Central Asia, mainly due to the country's vast natural resources. Current issues include: diversifying the economy, attracting foreign direct investment, enhancing Kazakhstan's economic competitiveness, and strengthening economic relations with neighboring states and foreign powers.

 

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -854,10 +854,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "35.48 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$35.48 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "38.3 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$38.3 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1059,19 +1059,19 @@ }, "Natural gas": { "production": { - "text": "25,785,505,000 cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "25.786 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" }, "consumption": { - "text": "14,557,101,000 cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "14.557 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" }, "exports": { - "text": "16,418,081,000 cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "16.418 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" }, "imports": { - "text": "7,713,978,000 cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "7.714 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" }, "proven reserves": { - "text": "2,406,928,000,000 cubic meters (2021 est.)" + "text": "2.407 trillion cubic meters (2021 est.)" } }, "Carbon dioxide emissions": { diff --git a/central-asia/rs.json b/central-asia/rs.json index cdf8ad2a..809a93ee 100644 --- a/central-asia/rs.json +++ b/central-asia/rs.json @@ -900,10 +900,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "258.6 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$258.6 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "281.4 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$281.4 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1300,7 +1300,7 @@ "text": "Kavkaz oil terminal, Primorsk" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Saint Petersburg (2,221,724) (2019)" + "text": "Saint Petersburg (2,042,358) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (export)": { "text": "Sabetta, Sakhalin Island" @@ -1336,8 +1336,8 @@ } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { - "text": "prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, approximately 850,000 active-duty troops (300,000 Ground Troops; 40,000 Airborne Troops; 150,000 Navy; 160,000 Aerospace Forces; 70,000 Strategic Rocket Forces; approximately 20,000 special operations forces; approximately 100,000 other uniformed personnel (command and control, cyber, support, logistics, security, etc.); estimated 200-250,000 Federal National Guard Troops (2022)", - "note": "note 1: in September 2022, the Russian Government called up 300,000 reservists to active military duty to support the war in Ukraine, and in August 2022 ordered the military to increase the total number of armed forces personnel by 137,000

note 2: as of late 2022, Russia was estimated to have as many as 50,000 private military contractors fighting in Ukraine" + "text": "prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, approximately 850,000 active-duty troops (300,000 Ground Troops; 40,000 Airborne Troops; 150,000 Navy; 160,000 Aerospace Forces; 70,000 Strategic Rocket Forces; approximately 20,000 special operations forces; approximately 100,000 other uniformed personnel (command and control, cyber, support, logistics, security, etc.); estimated 200-250,000 Federal National Guard Troops (2023)", + "note": "note 1: in December 2022, the Russian Government announced a target level of 1.15 million total troops; in early 2023, it announced further plans to expand the size of the armed forces to 1.5 million but did not provide a timeline

note 2: Russia was estimated to have as many as 50,000 private military contractors fighting in Ukraine as of early 2023 " }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { "text": "the Russian Federation's military and paramilitary services are equipped with domestically produced weapons systems, although since 2010 Russia has imported limited amounts of military hardware from several countries, including Czechia, France, Iran, Israel, Italy, Turkey, and Ukraine; the Russian defense industry is capable of designing, developing, and producing a full range of advanced air, land, missile, and naval systems; Russia is the world's second largest exporter of military hardware (2022)" diff --git a/central-asia/ti.json b/central-asia/ti.json index fc428389..08c1b9b2 100644 --- a/central-asia/ti.json +++ b/central-asia/ti.json @@ -841,10 +841,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "2.269 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.269 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "2.374 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.374 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/central-asia/tx.json b/central-asia/tx.json index cdffda0f..3c2477cf 100644 --- a/central-asia/tx.json +++ b/central-asia/tx.json @@ -826,10 +826,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "5.657 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$5.657 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "6.714 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$6.714 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1227,7 +1227,7 @@ "text": "18-30 years of age for compulsory male military service; 24-month conscript service obligation (30 months for the Navy); 20 years of age for voluntary service (including females); males may enroll in military schools from age 15 (2022)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "

as of 2022, Turkmenistan continued to pursue a nationalist and isolationist security policy and has declined to participate in post-Soviet military groupings such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization military alliance (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); however, in September 2020, it participated in a Russian-led multinational military exercise held in southern Russia’s Astrakhan region alongside Russian, Chinese, Pakistani, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Uzbek, Mongolian, Syrian, Iranian, Egyptian, Belarusian, Turkish, Armenian, and Azerbaijani contingents

as of 2022, Turkmenistan continued efforts to improve its naval capabilities on the Caspian Sea, including expanding ship building capabilities and adding larger vessels to the Navy’s inventory; in 2018, it opened its first naval shipyard and in August 2021, the Navy commissioned its largest warship, a corvette that was jointly constructed with Turkey

" + "text": "Turkmenistan has a policy of permanent neutrality and has declined to participate in post-Soviet military groupings such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization military alliance (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); however, in September 2020, it participated in a Russian-led multinational military exercise held in southern Russia’s Astrakhan region alongside the forces of more than a dozen other countries; Turkmenistan joined NATO's Partnership for Peace program in 1994 and officials from Turkmenistan participate in a range of courses provided by NATO and NATO member states, but it does not offer any armed forces units to NATO-led operations

in recent years, Turkmenistan has made efforts to improve its naval capabilities on the Caspian Sea, including expanding ship building capabilities and adding larger vessels to the Navy’s inventory; in 2018, it opened its first naval shipyard and in August 2021, the Navy commissioned its largest warship, a corvette that was jointly constructed with Turkey (2023)" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/central-asia/uz.json b/central-asia/uz.json index f8342fd5..d10caf8c 100644 --- a/central-asia/uz.json +++ b/central-asia/uz.json @@ -832,10 +832,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "15.22 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$15.22 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "15.08 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$15.08 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json index 96d56450..ffccb2d4 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json @@ -876,10 +876,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "9.108 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$9.108 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "11.23 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$11.23 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ "text": "estimates vary widely, from approximately 300,000 to as many as 400,000 active duty personnel (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the Burmese military inventory is comprised mostly of older Chinese and Russian/Soviet-era equipment with a smaller mix of more modern acquisitions; since 2010, China and Russia have been the leading suppliers of military hardware; Burma has a limited defense industry, including a growing shipbuilding capability (2022)" + "text": "the Burmese military inventory is comprised mostly of older Chinese and Russian/Soviet-era equipment with a smaller mix of more modern acquisitions; since 2010, China and Russia have been the leading suppliers of military hardware; Burma has a limited defense industry, including a growing shipbuilding capability and some production of ground force equipment that is largely based on Chinese and Russian designs (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-35 years of age (men) and 18-27 years of age (women) for voluntary military service; no conscription (a 2010 law reintroducing conscription has not yet entered into force); 2-year service obligation; male (ages 18-45) and female (ages 18-35) professionals (including doctors, engineers, mechanics) serve up to 3 years; service terms may be stretched to 5 years in an officially declared emergency (2021)" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json index 8f540f13..46d1613d 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json @@ -776,10 +776,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "2.245 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.245 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "4.345 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$4.345 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json index ee7b2acd..077327b0 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json @@ -850,10 +850,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "3.947 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.947 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "4.354 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$4.354 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json index 7452ef0f..69b43c22 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json @@ -904,10 +904,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "2.553 trillion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.553 trillion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "3.008 trillion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.008 trillion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1293,10 +1293,10 @@ }, "Ports and terminals": { "major seaport(s)": { - "text": "Dalian, Ningbo, Qingdao, Qinhuangdao, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin" + "text": "Dalian, Ningbo, Qingdao, Qinhuangdao, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Xiamen" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Dalian (8,760,000), Guangzhou (23,236,200), Ningbo (27,530,000), Qingdao (21,010,000), Shanghai (43,303,000), Shenzhen (25,770,000), Tianjin (17,264,000) (2019)" + "text": "Dalian (3,672,000), Guangzhou (24,180,000), Ningbo (31,070,000), Qingdao (23,710,000), Shanghai (47,030,300), Shenzhen (28,767,600), Tianjin (20,269,400), Xiamen (12,045,700) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai, Tangshan, Zhejiang" @@ -1346,7 +1346,7 @@ "text": "425 Mali (MINUSMA); 225 Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO); 420 Lebanon (UNIFIL); 1,050 South Sudan (UNMISS); up to 2,000 Djibouti (May 2022)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "

established in 1927, the PLA is the military arm of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which oversees the PLA through its Central Military Commission; the Central Military Commission is China’s top military decision making body

the PRC's internal security forces consist primarily of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the People’s Armed Police (PAP), and the militia; the PLA support the internal security forces as necessary:

the MPS controls the civilian national police, which serves as the first-line force for public order; its primary mission is domestic law enforcement and maintaining order, including anti-rioting and anti-terrorism

the MSS is the PRC’s main civilian intelligence and counterintelligence service

the PAP is a paramilitary component (or adjunct) of the PLA; its primary missions include internal security, maintaining public order, maritime security, and assisting the PLA in times of war; it is under the command of the Central Military Commission (CMC); the China Coast Guard (CCG) administratively falls under the PAP; the CCG has a variety of missions, such as maritime sovereignty enforcement, surveillance, resource protection, anti-smuggling, and general law enforcement; as of 2022, it was the largest maritime law enforcement fleet in the world

the militia is an armed reserve of civilians which serves as an auxiliary and reserve force for the PLA upon mobilization; it is distinct from the PLA’s reserve forces; militia units are organized around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises, and vary widely in composition and mission; they have dual civilian-military command structures; a key component of the militia are the local maritime forces, commonly referred to as the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM); the PAFMM consists of mariners (and their vessels) who receive training, equipment, and other forms of support from the Navy and CCG (although the PAFMM remains separate from both) to perform tasks such as maritime patrolling, surveillance and reconnaissance, emergency/disaster response, transportation, search and rescue, and auxiliary tasks in support of naval operations in wartime; the PAFMM’s tasks are often conducted in conjunction or coordination with the Navy and the CCG; it has been used to assert Beijing's maritime claims in the Sea of Japan and South China Sea

(2022)" + "text": "established in 1927, the PLA is the military arm of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which oversees the PLA through its Central Military Commission; the Central Military Commission is China’s top military decision making body

the PRC's internal security forces consist primarily of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the People’s Armed Police (PAP), and the militia; the PLA support the internal security forces as necessary:

the MPS controls the civilian national police, which serves as the first-line force for public order; its primary mission is domestic law enforcement and maintaining order, including anti-rioting and anti-terrorism

the MSS is the PRC’s main civilian intelligence and counterintelligence service

the PAP is a paramilitary component (or adjunct) of the PLA; its primary missions include internal security, maintaining public order, maritime security, and assisting the PLA in times of war; it is under the command of the Central Military Commission (CMC); the China Coast Guard (CCG) administratively falls under the PAP; the CCG has a variety of missions, such as maritime sovereignty enforcement, surveillance, resource protection, anti-smuggling, and general law enforcement; as of 2023, it was the largest maritime law enforcement fleet in the world

the militia is an armed reserve of civilians which serves as an auxiliary and reserve force for the PLA upon mobilization, although it is distinct from the PLA’s reserve forces; militia units are organized around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises, and vary widely in composition and mission; they have dual civilian-military command structures; a key component of the militia are the local maritime forces, commonly referred to as the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM); the PAFMM consists of mariners (and their vessels) who receive training, equipment, and other forms of support from the Navy and CCG (although the PAFMM remains separate from both) to perform tasks such as maritime patrolling, surveillance and reconnaissance, emergency/disaster response, transportation, search and rescue, and auxiliary tasks in support of naval operations in wartime; the PAFMM’s tasks are often conducted in conjunction or coordination with the Navy and the CCG; it has been used to assert Beijing's maritime claims in the Sea of Japan and South China Sea (2023)" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json index e02f3c8c..2b189bd0 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json @@ -710,10 +710,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "79.34 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$79.34 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "61.64 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$61.64 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ "text": "Hong Kong" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Hong Kong (18,361,000) (2019)" + "text": "Hong Kong (17,798,000) (2021)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/id.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/id.json index 4bd9602a..4b151029 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/id.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/id.json @@ -886,10 +886,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "131.7 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$131.7 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "159.6 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$159.6 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1283,7 +1283,7 @@ "text": "Banjarmasin, Belawan, Kotabaru, Krueg Geukueh, Palembang, Panjang, Sungai Pakning, Tanjung Perak, Tanjung Priok" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Tanjung Perak (3,900,000), Tanjung Priok (7,600,000) (2019)" + "text": "Tanjung Perak (3,901,215), Tanjung Priok (6,849,227) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (export)": { "text": "Bontang, Tangguh" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json index cccf05b3..62e91116 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json @@ -844,10 +844,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.714 trillion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.714 trillion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.885 trillion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.885 trillion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@ "text": "Chiba, Kawasaki, Kobe, Mizushima, Moji, Nagoya, Osaka, Tokyo, Tomakomai, Yokohama" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Kobe (2,871,642), Nagoya (2,844,004), Osaka (2,456,028), Tokyo (4,510,000), Yokohama (2,990,000) (2019)" + "text": "Kobe (2,823,774), Nagoya (2,725,597), Osaka (2,425,638), Tokyo (4,325,956), Yokohama (2,861,197) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Chita, Fukwoke, Futtsu, Hachinone, Hakodate, Hatsukaichi, Higashi Ohgishima, Higashi Niigata, Himeiji, Joetsu, Kagoshima, Kawagoe, Kita Kyushu, Mizushima, Nagasaki, Naoetsu, Negishi, Ohgishima, Oita, Sakai, Sakaide, Senboku, Shimizu, Shin Minato, Sodegaura, Tobata, Yanai, Yokkaichi" @@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2022": { - "text": "1% of GDP (2022 est.)" + "text": "1% of GDP (2022)" }, "Military Expenditures 2021": { "text": "1% of GDP (2021)" @@ -1264,12 +1264,12 @@ "text": "1% of GDP (2020)" }, "Military Expenditures 2019": { - "text": "0.9% of GDP (2019) (approximately $53.4 billion)" + "text": "0.9% of GDP (2019)" }, "Military Expenditures 2018": { - "text": "0.9% of GDP (2018) (approximately $53.5 billion)" + "text": "0.9% of GDP (2018)" }, - "note": "note: the Japanese Government in 2022 pledged to \"substantially\" increase defense spending in the next few years to counter what Tokyo sees as a growing security threat posed by China" + "note": "note: the Japanese Government in 2022 pledged to increase defense expenditures to 2% of GDP in line with NATO standards; if the planned increase occurs, Japan would have one of the world's largest defense budgets" }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { "text": "approximately 240,000 active personnel (150,000 Ground; 45,000 Maritime; 45,000 Air); 14,000 Coast Guard (2022)" @@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ "text": "approximately 180 Djibouti (2022)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "Japan was disarmed after its defeat in World War II; shortly after the Korean War began in 1950, US occupation forces in Japan created a 75,000-member lightly armed force called the National Police Reserve; the current Self Defense Force was founded in 1954

in addition to having one of the region’s largest and best equipped militaries, Japan’s alliance with the US (signed in 1951) is one of the cornerstones of the country’s security, as well as a large part of the US security role in Asia; as of 2022, approximately 55,000 US troops and other military assets, including aircraft and naval ships, were stationed in Japan and had exclusive use of more than 80 bases and facilities; in exchange for their use, the US guarantees Japan’s security; the Japanese Government provides about $2 billion per year to offset the cost of stationing US forces in Japan; in addition, it pays compensation to localities hosting US troops, rent for bases, and costs for new facilities to support the US presence

Japan has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments (2022)" + "text": "Japan was disarmed after its defeat in World War II; shortly after the Korean War began in 1950, US occupation forces in Japan created a 75,000-member lightly armed force called the National Police Reserve; the current Self Defense Force was founded in 1954

in addition to having one of the region’s largest and best equipped militaries, Japan’s alliance with the US (signed in 1951) is one of the cornerstones of the country’s security, as well as a large part of the US security role in Asia; as of 2023, approximately 55,000 US troops and other military assets, including aircraft and naval ships, were stationed in Japan and had exclusive use of more than 80 bases and facilities; in exchange for their use, the US guarantees Japan’s security; the Japanese Government provides about $2 billion per year to offset the cost of stationing US forces in Japan; in addition, it pays compensation to localities hosting US troops, rent for bases, and costs for new facilities to support the US presence

Japan has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments (2023)" } }, "Terrorism": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json index d44b0dba..d2c02504 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json @@ -747,10 +747,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "3.2 billion (2007 est.)" + "text": "$3.2 billion (2007 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "3.3 billion (2007 est.)" + "text": "$3.3 billion (2007 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json index c134121d..891854d1 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json @@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ "text": "last held on 15 April 2020 (next to be held on 10 April 2024)" }, "election results": { - "text": "percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - DP/Together Citizens Party 180, United Future Party (now PPP) 103, JP 6, ODP 3, PP 3, independent 5; composition as of April 2022 - men 240, women 55, percent of women 18.6%" + "text": "percent of vote by party/coalition - DPK/Platform Party 49.9%, United Future Party 41.5%, JP 1.7%; seats by party - DPK/Platform Party 180, United Future Party (now PPP) 103, JP 6, ODP 3, PP 3, independent 5; composition as of April 2022 - men 240, women 55, percent of women 18.6%" } }, "Judicial branch": { @@ -840,10 +840,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "357.1 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$357.1 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "335.8 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$335.8 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1224,7 +1224,7 @@ "text": "Busan, Incheon, Gunsan, Kwangyang, Mokpo, Pohang, Ulsan, Yeosu" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Busan (21,992,001), Incheon (3,091,955), Kwangyang (2,378,337) (2019)" + "text": "Busan (22,706,130), Incheon (3,353,781), Kwangyang (2,122,903) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Incheon, Kwangyang, Pyeongtaek, Samcheok, Tongyeong, Yeosu" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/la.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/la.json index e64cad88..0bf9c27a 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/la.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/la.json @@ -850,10 +850,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "3.099 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.099 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "4.038 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$4.038 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json index b9cb01a7..1ae8f105 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json @@ -641,10 +641,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "14.71 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$14.71 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "9.684 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$9.684 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json index c62d2b08..2317ddea 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json @@ -850,10 +850,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "2.967 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.967 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "3.681 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.681 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json index 9630c7a9..46c3f053 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json @@ -851,10 +851,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "51.25 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$51.25 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "60.63 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$60.63 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1242,7 +1242,7 @@ "text": "Bintulu, Johor Bahru, George Town (Penang), Pelabuhan Klang (Port Klang), Tanjung Pelepas" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Port Kelang (Port Klang) (13,580,717), Tanjung Pelepas (9,100,000) (2019)" + "text": "Port Kelang (Port Klang) (13,724,460), Tanjung Pelepas (11,200,000) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (export)": { "text": "Bintulu (Sarawak)" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json index 6d15cde1..b17d56d3 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json @@ -843,10 +843,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "3.638 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.638 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "4.591 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$4.591 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json index 2ab20736..e8ccf326 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json @@ -870,10 +870,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "49.07 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$49.07 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "56.02 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$56.02 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1266,7 +1266,7 @@ "text": "Batangas, Cagayan de Oro, Cebu, Davao, Liman, Manila" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Manila (5,315,500) (2019)" + "text": "Manila (4,976,014) (2021)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json index 7c2b0330..19e02ad2 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json @@ -821,10 +821,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "50.85 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$50.85 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "51.87 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$51.87 billion (2017 est.)" }, "note": "note: expenditures include both operational and development expenditures" }, @@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@ "text": "Singapore" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Singapore (37,195,636) (2019)" + "text": "Singapore (37,470,000) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Singapore" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json index 56583fdb..f693819d 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json @@ -880,10 +880,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "69.23 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$69.23 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "85.12 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$85.12 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@ "text": "Bangkok, Laem Chabang, Map Ta Phut, Prachuap Port, Si Racha" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Laem Chabang (8,106,928) (2019)" + "text": "Laem Chabang (8,335,384) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Map Ta Phut" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json index 826b6f2b..cde3e159 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json @@ -813,10 +813,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "300 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$300 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "2.4 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.4 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json index 1d1a7dc7..5f0201e6 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json @@ -667,10 +667,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "91.62 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$91.62 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "92.03 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$92.03 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1036,7 +1036,7 @@ "text": "Keelung (Chi-lung), Kaohsiung, Hualian, Taichung" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Kaohsiung (10,428,634), Taichung (1,793,966), Taipei (1,620,392) (2019)" + "text": "Kaohsiung (9,864,448), Taichung (1,979,222), Taipei (2,091,132) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Yung An (Kaohsiung), Taichung" @@ -1069,7 +1069,7 @@ "note": "note: Taiwan trains about 120,000 reservists annually, but in 2022 announced intentions to increase that figure to 260,000" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the Taiwan military is armed mostly with second-hand weapons and equipment provided by the US; since 2010, the US has continued to be the largest provider of arms; Taiwan also has a domestic defense industry capable of building and upgrading a range of weapons systems, including surface ships and submarines (2022)" + "text": "the Taiwan military is armed mostly with second-hand weapons and equipment provided by the US; since 2010, the US has continued to be the largest provider of arms; Taiwan also has a domestic defense industry capable of building and upgrading a range of weapons systems, including surface ships and submarines (2023)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "starting with those born in 1994, men 18-36 years of age may volunteer or must complete 4 months of compulsory military service; civil service can be substituted for military service in some cases; men born before December 1993 are required to complete compulsory service for 12 months (military or civil); men are subject to training recalls up to four times for periods not to exceed 20 days for 8 years after discharge; women may enlist but are restricted to noncombat roles in most cases; as part of its transition to an all-volunteer military, the last cohort of 12-month military conscripts completed their service obligations in December 2018 (2022)", diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json index 4595cc58..fdfac716 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json @@ -861,10 +861,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "54.59 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$54.59 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "69.37 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$69.37 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1249,7 +1249,7 @@ "text": "Cam Pha Port, Da Nang, Haiphong, Phu My, Quy Nhon" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Saigon (7,220,377), Cai Mep (3,742,384), Haiphong (5,133,150) (2019)" + "text": "Saigon (7,956,133), Cai Mep (5,385,289), Haiphong (5,695,839) (2021)" }, "river port(s)": { "text": "Ho Chi Minh (Mekong)" @@ -1279,7 +1279,7 @@ } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { - "text": "information is limited and varied; estimated 470,000 active duty troops (400,000 ground; 40,000 naval; 30,000 air); estimated 40,000 Border Defense Force and Coast Guard (2022)" + "text": "information is limited and varied; estimated 450,000 active-duty troops (390,000 ground; 30,000 naval; 30,000 air); estimated 40,000 Border Defense Force and Coast Guard (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { "text": "the PAVN is armed largely with weapons and equipment from Russia and the former Soviet Union; since 2010, Russia has remained the main supplier of newer PAVN military equipment, although in recent years Vietnam has purchased arms from more than a dozen other countries including Belarus, Israel, South Korea, Ukraine, and the US; Vietnam has a limited defense industry (2021)" diff --git a/europe/al.json b/europe/al.json index c43d9f7e..4ac05313 100644 --- a/europe/al.json +++ b/europe/al.json @@ -844,10 +844,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "3.614 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.614 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "3.874 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.874 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/europe/an.json b/europe/an.json index 9df24b4f..7484b93f 100644 --- a/europe/an.json +++ b/europe/an.json @@ -696,10 +696,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.872 billion (2016)" + "text": "$1.872 billion (2016)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "2.06 billion (2016)" + "text": "$2.06 billion (2016)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/europe/au.json b/europe/au.json index a9614c8c..aa77c67a 100644 --- a/europe/au.json +++ b/europe/au.json @@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ }, "Diplomatic representation in the US": { "chief of mission": { - "text": "Ambassador Martin WEISS (since 6 January 2020)" + "text": "Charge d'Affaires Guenther SALZMANN (since 1 August 2022)" }, "chancery": { "text": "3524 International Court NW, Washington, DC 20008-3035" @@ -836,10 +836,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "201.7 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$201.7 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "204.6 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$204.6 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1081,18 +1081,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "3,786,725 (2020 est.)" + "text": "3,808,709 (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "42 (2020 est.)" + "text": "43 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "10,717,445 (2020 est.)" + "text": "10,882,217 (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "119 (2020 est.)" + "text": "122 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@ "text": "mature telecom market; the mobile market benefits from a growing number of Mobile Virtual Network Operators; the telcos as well as the government and regulator have been focused on delivering improved telecom infrastructure; the government has a program to provide a national gigabit service by 2030, delivered by private enterprise though with some state funding; this is based on fiber networks supported by 5G, with the Mobile Network Operators able to expand the reach of their 5G services following auctions held in March 2019 and September 2020; the fixed-line broadband market is still dominated by the DSL sector, while the cable broadband sector has held a steady share of connections in recent years; the fiber sector was slow to develop, and although fiber remains low there are plans to build out the network infrastructure (2021)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "developed and efficient; 42 per 100 fixed-line for households, 174 per 100 for companies; roughly 119 per 100 mobile-cellular; broadband: 138 per 100 on smartphones; roughly 29 per 100 fixed broadband and 107 per 100 mobile broadband (2020)" + "text": "developed and efficient; 43 per 100 fixed telephone subscriptions; 122 per 100 mobile-cellular subscriptions (2021)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 43; earth stations available in the Astra, Intelsat, Eutelsat satellite systems (2019)" @@ -1276,7 +1276,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "67,588 (Syria), 43,725 (Afghanistan), 10,110 (Iraq), 8,684 (Somalia), 7,294 (Iran), 6,124 (Russia) (mid-year 2022); 91,232 (Ukraine) (as of 9 January 2023)" + "text": "67,588 (Syria), 43,725 (Afghanistan), 10,110 (Iraq), 8,684 (Somalia), 7,294 (Iran), 6,124 (Russia) (mid-year 2022); 91,631 (Ukraine) (as of 17 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "3,229 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/be.json b/europe/be.json index 1261d493..d515790a 100644 --- a/europe/be.json +++ b/europe/be.json @@ -827,10 +827,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "253.5 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$253.5 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "258.6 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$258.6 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1072,18 +1072,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "3,634,639 (2020 est.)" + "text": "3,293,420 (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "31 (2020 est.)" + "text": "28 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "11,529,728 (2020 est.)" + "text": "11,740,118 (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "99 (2020 est.)" + "text": "101 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1091,7 +1091,7 @@ "text": "mobile networks have been upgraded to support growing mobile data use among subscribers, with near-comprehensive LTE coverage; operators have also trialed 5G in preparation for launching services; the auction of 5G-suitable spectrum has been delayed to the beginning of 2022, while the onerous restrictions on radiation have meant that some 5G trials have been suspended; there is effective competition in Belgium between the DSL and cable platforms, while in recent years government support has also encouraged investment in fiber networks; in a bid to encourage investment in under served areas, the regulator in 2018 amended the conditions by which market players grant wholesale access to copper and fiber infrastructure; in May 2019 it opened a further consultation on cost models for access to the networks of cablecos and fiber infrastructure (2021)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "about 31 per 100 fixed-line and 99 per 100 mobile-cellular; nationwide mobile-cellular telephone system; extensive cable network; limited microwave radio relay network (2020)" + "text": "about 28 per 100 fixed-line and 101 per 100 mobile-cellular; nationwide mobile-cellular telephone system; extensive cable network; limited microwave radio relay network (2021)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 32; landing points for Concerto, UK-Belgium, Tangerine, and SeaMeWe-3, submarine cables that provide links to Europe, the Middle East, Australia, and Asia; satellite earth stations - 7 (Intelsat - 3) (2019)" @@ -1099,7 +1099,7 @@ "note": "note: the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress toward 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services" }, "Broadcast media": { - "text": "a segmented market with the three major communities (Flemish-, French-, and German-speaking) each having responsibility for their own broadcast media; multiple TV channels exist for each community; additionally, in excess of 90% of households are connected to cable and can access broadcasts of TV stations from neighboring countries; each community has a public radio network coexisting with private broadcasters" + "text": "a segmented market with the three major communities (Flemish, French, and German speaking) each having responsibility for their own broadcast media; multiple TV channels exist for each community; additionally, in excess of 90% of households are connected to cable and can access broadcasts of TV stations from neighboring countries; each community has a public radio network coexisting with private broadcasters" }, "Internet country code": { "text": ".be" @@ -1207,7 +1207,7 @@ "text": "Oostende, Zeebrugge" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Antwerp (11,860,204) (2019)" + "text": "Antwerp (12,020,000) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Zeebrugge" @@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "20,086 (Syria), 7,049 (Afghanistan), 5,769 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 65,658 (Ukraine) (as of 3 January 2023)" + "text": "20,086 (Syria), 7,049 (Afghanistan), 5,769 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 66,416 (Ukraine) (as of 16 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "1,159 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/bk.json b/europe/bk.json index f947593f..f91ee45b 100644 --- a/europe/bk.json +++ b/europe/bk.json @@ -829,10 +829,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "7.993 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$7.993 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "7.607 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$7.607 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "149 (mid-year 2021)" }, - "note": "note: 112,773 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-December 2022)" + "note": "note: 113,599 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-January 2023)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "

drug trafficking groups are major players in the procurement and transportation of large quantities of cocaine  destined for  European markets

" diff --git a/europe/bo.json b/europe/bo.json index 0d694077..5fcf15f2 100644 --- a/europe/bo.json +++ b/europe/bo.json @@ -837,10 +837,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "22.15 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$22.15 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "20.57 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$20.57 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "19,124 (Ukraine) (as of 3 January 2023)" + "text": "19,329 (Ukraine) (as of 10 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "6,104 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/bu.json b/europe/bu.json index f6a08855..663900cd 100644 --- a/europe/bu.json +++ b/europe/bu.json @@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ "text": "President Rumen RADEV (since 22 January 2017); Vice President Iliana IOTOVA (since 22 January 2017)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Prime Minister Gulub DONEV (since 2 August 2022); note - Prime Minister DONEV leads a caretaker government until snap elections are held on 2 October 2022" + "text": "Prime Minister Galab DONEV (since 2 August 2022)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Council of Ministers nominated by the prime minister, elected by the National Assembly" @@ -840,10 +840,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "20.35 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$20.35 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "19.35 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$19.35 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "22,226 (Syria) (mid-year 2022); 51,140 (Ukraine) (as of 13 December 2022)" + "text": "22,226 (Syria) (mid-year 2022); 50,325 (Ukraine) (as of 16 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "1,143 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/cy.json b/europe/cy.json index 4158df1a..079d8720 100644 --- a/europe/cy.json +++ b/europe/cy.json @@ -837,10 +837,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "8.663 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$8.663 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "8.275 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$8.275 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "10,869 (Syria) (mid-year 2022); 15,158 (Ukraine) (as of 8 January 2023)" + "text": "10,869 (Syria) (mid-year 2022); 15,158 (Ukraine) (as of 17 January 2023)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "242,000 (both Turkish and Greek Cypriots; many displaced since 1974) (2021)" diff --git a/europe/da.json b/europe/da.json index c0f0ffa6..99427796 100644 --- a/europe/da.json +++ b/europe/da.json @@ -822,10 +822,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "172.5 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$172.5 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "168.9 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$168.9 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1063,29 +1063,29 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "734,436 (2020 est.)" + "text": "706,604 (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "13 (2020 est.)" + "text": "12 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "7,252,675 (2020 est.)" + "text": "7,287,875 (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "125 (2020 est.)" + "text": "124 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Denmark has one of the highest broadband subscription rates globally, with a near universal availability of super-fast connections; extensive cable and DSL infrastructure has been supported by a progressive regulatory regime which has encouraged operator access to both copper and fiber networks; fiber networks have a fast-growing footprint, while a number of community and metropolitan schemes have supplemented TDC NET’s own commitments to build out fiber nationally; a number of wholesale fiber schemes have also added to the wider availability of fiber broadband; the reach of LTE infrastructure is comprehensive, while the Mobile Network Operators by mid-2021 had also provided about 90% population coverage with 5G; services based on 5G were initially launched using trial 3.5GHz licenses; the multi-spectrum auction held in April 2021 has enabled them to improve the resilience and capacity of 5G; all MNOs are engaged in closing down their 3G networks and repurposing spectrum for LTE and 5G use (2021)" + "text": "Denmark has one of the highest broadband subscription rates globally, with a near universal availability of super-fast connections; extensive cable and DSL infrastructure has been supported by a progressive regulatory regime which has encouraged operator access to both copper and fiber networks; fiber networks have a fast-growing footprint, while a number of community and metropolitan schemes have supplemented their own commitments to build out fiber nationally; a number of wholesale fiber schemes have also added to the wider availability of fiber broadband; the reach of LTE infrastructure is comprehensive, while the Mobile Network Operators by mid-2021 had also provided about 90% population coverage with 5G; services based on 5G were initially launched using trial 3.5GHz licenses; the multi-spectrum auction held in April 2021 has enabled them to improve the resilience and capacity of 5G; all MNOs are engaged in closing down their 3G networks and repurposing spectrum for LTE and 5G use (2021)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "fixed-line roughly 16 per 100 and about 123 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2020)" + "text": "fixed-line roughly 12 per 100 and about 124 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2021)" }, "international": { - "text": "country code - 45; landing points for the NSC, COBRAcable, CANTAT-3, DANICE, Havfrue/AEC-2, TAT-14m Denmark-Norway-5 & 6, Skagenfiber West & East, GC1, GC2, GC3, GC-KPN, Kattegat 1 & 2 & 3, Energinet Lyngsa-Laeso, Energinet Laeso-Varberg, Fehmarn Balt, Baltica, German-Denmark 2 & 3, Ronne-Rodvig, Denmark-Sweden 15 & 16 & 17 & 18, IP-Only Denmark-Sweden, Scandinavian South, Scandinavian Ring North, Danica North, 34 series of fiber-optic submarine cables link Denmark with Canada, Faroe Islands, Germany, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, US, and, UK; satellite earth stations - 18 (6 Intelsat, 10 Eutelsat, 1 Orion, 1 Inmarsat (Blaavand-Atlantic-East)); note - the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) share the Danish earth station and the Eik, Norway, station for worldwide Inmarsat access (2019)" + "text": "country code - 45; landing points for the NSC, COBRAcable, CANTAT-3, DANICE, Havfrue/AEC-2, TAT-14m Denmark-Norway-5 & 6, Skagenfiber West & East, GC1, GC2, GC3, GC-KPN, Kattegat 1 & 2 & 3, Energinet Lyngsa-Laeso, Energinet Laeso-Varberg, Fehmarn Balt, Baltica, German-Denmark 2 & 3, Ronne-Rodvig, Denmark-Sweden 15 & 16 & 17 & 18, IP-Only Denmark-Sweden, Scandinavian South, Scandinavian Ring North, Danica North, 34 series of fiber-optic submarine cables link Denmark with Canada, Faroe Islands, Germany, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, US, and UK; satellite earth stations - 18 (6 Intelsat, 10 Eutelsat, 1 Orion, 1 Inmarsat (Blaavand-Atlantic-East)); note - the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) share the Danish earth station and the Eik, Norway, station for worldwide Inmarsat access (2019)" }, "note": "note: the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress toward 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services" }, @@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@ "text": "582,011 (2015)" }, "annual freight traffic on registered air carriers": { - "text": "0 (2015) mt-km" + "text": "mt-km" } }, "Civil aircraft registration country code prefix": { @@ -1264,7 +1264,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "19,424 (Syria), 5,885 (Eritrea) (mid-year 2022); 39,221 (Ukraine) (as of 8 January 2023)" + "text": "19,424 (Syria), 5,885 (Eritrea) (mid-year 2022); 39,395 (Ukraine) (as of 15 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "11,608 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/ei.json b/europe/ei.json index 37bc9a8b..74673888 100644 --- a/europe/ei.json +++ b/europe/ei.json @@ -812,10 +812,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "86.04 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$86.04 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "87.19 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$87.19 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1254,7 +1254,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "71,130 (Ukraine) (as of 5 January 2023)" + "text": "71,597 (Ukraine) (as of 12 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "107 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/en.json b/europe/en.json index 7f2dc9a5..00683596 100644 --- a/europe/en.json +++ b/europe/en.json @@ -834,10 +834,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "10.37 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$10.37 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "10.44 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$10.44 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "65,690 (Ukraine) (as of 9 January 2023)" + "text": "66,074 (Ukraine) (as of 16 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "71,873 (mid-year 2021); note - following independence in 1991, automatic citizenship was restricted to those who were Estonian citizens prior to the 1940 Soviet occupation and their descendants; thousands of ethnic Russians remained stateless when forced to choose between passing Estonian language and citizenship tests or applying for Russian citizenship; one reason for demurring on Estonian citizenship was to retain the right of visa-free travel to Russia; stateless residents can vote in local elections but not general elections; stateless parents who have been lawful residents of Estonia for at least five years can apply for citizenship for their children before they turn 15 years old" diff --git a/europe/ez.json b/europe/ez.json index 46e09ab9..d11068a3 100644 --- a/europe/ez.json +++ b/europe/ez.json @@ -828,10 +828,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "87.37 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$87.37 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "83.92 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$83.92 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "478,614 (Ukraine) (as of 8 January 2023)" + "text": "482,049 (Ukraine) (as of 16 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "1,498 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/fi.json b/europe/fi.json index 35f6ada1..042824e1 100644 --- a/europe/fi.json +++ b/europe/fi.json @@ -839,10 +839,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "134.2 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$134.2 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "135.6 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$135.6 billion (2017 est.)" }, "note": "note: Central Government Budget data; these numbers represent a significant reduction from previous official reporting" }, @@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "9,175 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 47,067 (Ukraine) (as of 9 January 2023)" + "text": "9,175 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 47,067 (Ukraine) (as of 16 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "3,416 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/fo.json b/europe/fo.json index 07bd4fc1..b74afe6a 100644 --- a/europe/fo.json +++ b/europe/fo.json @@ -619,10 +619,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "835.6 million (2014 est.)" + "text": "$835.6 million (2014 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "883.8 million (2014)" + "text": "$883.8 million (2014)" }, "note": "note: Denmark supplies the Faroe Islands with almost one-third of its public funds" }, diff --git a/europe/fr.json b/europe/fr.json index c3634441..eb423fb1 100644 --- a/europe/fr.json +++ b/europe/fr.json @@ -882,10 +882,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.392 trillion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.392 trillion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.459 trillion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.459 trillion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1277,7 +1277,7 @@ "text": "
Atlantic Ocean: Brest, Calais, Dunkerque, Le Havre, Nantes
Mediterranean Sea: Marseille" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Le Havre (2,822,910) (2019)" + "text": "Le Havre (3,018,550) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Dunkerque, Fos Cavaou, Fos Tonkin, Montoir de Bretagne" @@ -1295,8 +1295,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "French Armed Forces (Forces Armées Françaises): Army (l'Armee de Terre; includes Foreign Legion), Navy (Marine Nationale), Air and Space Force (l'Armee de l’Air et de l’Espace); includes Air Defense), National Guard (Reserves), National Gendarmerie (2022)", - "note": "note: the National Gendarmerie is a paramilitary police force that is a branch of the Armed Forces and therefore part of the Ministry of Defense but under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior; it also has additional duties to the Ministry of Justice" + "text": "French Armed Forces (Forces Armées Françaises): Army (l'Armee de Terre; includes Foreign Legion), Navy (Marine Nationale), Air and Space Force (l'Armee de l’Air et de l’Espace); includes Air Defense), National Guard (Reserves), National Gendarmerie (2023)", + "note": "note: the National Gendarmerie is a paramilitary police force that is a branch of the Armed Forces and therefore part of the Ministry of Defense but under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior; it also has additional duties to the Ministry of Justice; the Gendarmerie includes the National Gendarmerie Intervention Group (Groupe d'intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale or GIGN), an elite national-level tactical police unit set up in 1973 in response to the 1972 Munich massacre" }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2022": { diff --git a/europe/gi.json b/europe/gi.json index 4eb3e26b..7af7e938 100644 --- a/europe/gi.json +++ b/europe/gi.json @@ -541,10 +541,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "475.8 million (2008 est.)" + "text": "$475.8 million (2008 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "452.3 million (2008 est.)" + "text": "$452.3 million (2008 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/europe/gk.json b/europe/gk.json index a8e87cb9..144d4f50 100644 --- a/europe/gk.json +++ b/europe/gk.json @@ -541,10 +541,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "563.6 million (2005)" + "text": "$563.6 million (2005)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "530.9 million (2005 est.)" + "text": "$530.9 million (2005 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/europe/gm.json b/europe/gm.json index 69f00296..d410ef80 100644 --- a/europe/gm.json +++ b/europe/gm.json @@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ } }, "Agricultural products": { - "text": "milk, sugar beets, wheat, barley, potatoes, pork, maize, rye, rapeseeds, triticale" + "text": "milk, sugar beets, wheat, barley, potatoes, pork, maize, rye, rapeseed, triticale" }, "Industries": { "text": "among the world's largest and most technologically advanced producers of iron, steel, coal, cement, chemicals, machinery, vehicles, machine tools, electronics, automobiles, food and beverages, shipbuilding, textiles" @@ -856,10 +856,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.665 trillion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.665 trillion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.619 trillion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.619 trillion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1243,7 +1243,7 @@ "text": "Brunsbuttel Canal terminals" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Bremen/Bremerhaven (4,856,900), Hamburg (9,274,215) (2019)" + "text": "Bremen/Bremerhaven (5,018,900), Hamburg (8,715,000) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Hamburg; Lubmin (FSRU); Wilhelmshaven (FSRU)" diff --git a/europe/gr.json b/europe/gr.json index 0e0e5dc8..81b6d9f7 100644 --- a/europe/gr.json +++ b/europe/gr.json @@ -831,10 +831,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "97.99 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$97.99 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "96.35 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$96.35 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1212,7 +1212,7 @@ "text": "Agioi Theodoroi" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Piraeus (5,648,000) (2019)" + "text": "Piraeus (5,311,810) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Revithoussa" @@ -1276,7 +1276,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "5,552 (mid-year 2021)" }, - "note": "note: 1,233,492 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-January 2023)" + "note": "note: 1,233,715 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-January 2023)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "a gateway to Europe for traffickers smuggling cannabis products and heroin from the Middle East and Southwest Asia to the West and precursor chemicals to the East; some South American cocaine transits or is consumed in Greece; money laundering related to drug trafficking and organized crime" diff --git a/europe/hr.json b/europe/hr.json index d426ac1f..49d69e53 100644 --- a/europe/hr.json +++ b/europe/hr.json @@ -856,10 +856,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "25.24 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$25.24 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "24.83 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$24.83 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/europe/hu.json b/europe/hu.json index 696624ad..22484e97 100644 --- a/europe/hu.json +++ b/europe/hu.json @@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ } }, "Agricultural products": { - "text": "maize, wheat, milk, sunflower seed, barley, rapeseed, sugar beet, apples, pork, grapes" + "text": "maize, wheat, milk, sunflower seed, barley, rapeseed, sugar beets, apples, pork, grapes" }, "Industries": { "text": "mining, metallurgy, construction materials, processed foods, textiles, chemicals (especially pharmaceuticals), motor vehicles" @@ -853,15 +853,14 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "61.98 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$61.98 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "64.7 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$64.7 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { - "text": "-2% (of GDP) (2017 est.)", - "note": "note: Hungary has been under the EU Excessive Deficit Procedure since it joined the EU in 2004; in March 2012, the EU elevated its Excessive Deficit Procedure against Hungary and proposed freezing 30% of the country's Cohesion Funds because 2011 deficit reductions were not achieved in a sustainable manner; in June 2012, the EU lifted the freeze, recognizing that steps had been taken to reduce the deficit; the Hungarian deficit increased above 3% both in 2013 and in 2014 due to sluggish growth and the government's fiscal tightening" + "text": "-2% (of GDP) (2017 est.)" }, "Public debt": { "Public debt 2020": { @@ -1060,16 +1059,16 @@ }, "Natural gas": { "production": { - "text": "1,685,020,000 cubic meters (2020 est.)" + "text": "1.685 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "consumption": { - "text": "10,545,459,000 cubic meters (2020 est.)" + "text": "10.545 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "exports": { - "text": "3,757,583,000 cubic meters (2020 est.)" + "text": "3.758 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "imports": { - "text": "11,677,990,000 cubic meters (2020 est.)" + "text": "11.678 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "proven reserves": { "text": "3.738 billion cubic meters (2021 est.)" @@ -1262,8 +1261,8 @@ } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { - "text": "approximately 21,000 active duty troops (16,000 Army; 5,000 Air Force) (2022)", - "note": "note: in 2017, Hungary announced plans to increase the number of active soldiers to around 37,000, but did not give a timeline" + "text": "approximately 21,000 active-duty troops (16,000 Army; 5,000 Air Force) (2022)", + "note": "note: in 2017, Hungary announced plans to increase the number of active soldiers to around 37,000 but did not give a timeline" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { "text": "the military's inventory consists largely of Soviet-era weapons, with a smaller mix of more modern European and US equipment; since 2010, Hungary has received limited quantities of equipment from several European countries and the US (2021)" @@ -1291,7 +1290,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "33,446 (Ukraine) (as of 10 January 2023)" + "text": "33,603 (Ukraine) (as of 17 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "130 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/ic.json b/europe/ic.json index 57228c15..5a193f2a 100644 --- a/europe/ic.json +++ b/europe/ic.json @@ -809,10 +809,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "10.39 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$10.39 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "10.02 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$10.02 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/europe/im.json b/europe/im.json index ad5024ca..3864f4b8 100644 --- a/europe/im.json +++ b/europe/im.json @@ -653,10 +653,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "965 million (FY05/06 est.)" + "text": "$965 million (FY05/06 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "943 million (FY05/06 est.)" + "text": "$943 million (FY05/06 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/europe/it.json b/europe/it.json index 9e9e2b66..9fc3b036 100644 --- a/europe/it.json +++ b/europe/it.json @@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ }, "Diplomatic representation from the US": { "chief of mission": { - "text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Thomas D. SMITHAM (since 4 January 2021); note - also accredited to San Marino" + "text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Shawn CROWLEY (since July 2022); note - also accredited to San Marino" }, "embassy": { "text": "via Vittorio Veneto 121, 00187 Roma" @@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ } }, "Agricultural products": { - "text": "milk, grapes, wheat, maize, tomatoes, apples, olives, sugar beet, oranges, rice" + "text": "milk, grapes, wheat, maize, tomatoes, apples, olives, sugar beets, oranges, rice" }, "Industries": { "text": "tourism, machinery, iron and steel, chemicals, food processing, textiles, motor vehicles, clothing, footwear, ceramics" @@ -841,10 +841,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "903.3 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$903.3 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "948.1 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$948.1 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1227,7 +1227,7 @@ "text": "Melilli (Santa Panagia) oil terminal, Sarroch oil terminal" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Genoa (2,621,472), Gioia Tauro (2,523,000) (2019)" + "text": "Genoa (2,557,847), Gioia Tauro (3,146,553) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Panigaglia (La Spezia), Adriatic (Porto Levante), Oristano (Sardinia), Ravenna, Toscana (Livorno)" @@ -1289,12 +1289,12 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "21,441 (Nigeria), 17,706 (Afghanistan), 17,619 (Pakistan), 11,193 (Mali), 8,405 (Somalia), 6,324 (Gambia), 5,768 (Bangladesh), 5,463 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 167,925 (Ukraine) (as of 30 December 2022)" + "text": "21,441 (Nigeria), 17,706 (Afghanistan), 17,619 (Pakistan), 11,193 (Mali), 8,405 (Somalia), 6,324 (Gambia), 5,768 (Bangladesh), 5,463 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 167,925 (Ukraine) (as of 17 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "3,000 (mid-year 2021)" }, - "note": "note: 699,932 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-January 2023)" + "note": "note: 700,074 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-January 2023)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "important gateway for drug trafficking; organized crime groups allied with Colombian and Spanish groups trafficking cocaine to Europe" diff --git a/europe/je.json b/europe/je.json index 2bf72e9e..e02f5638 100644 --- a/europe/je.json +++ b/europe/je.json @@ -603,10 +603,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "829 million (2005)" + "text": "$829 million (2005)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "851 million (2005)" + "text": "$851 million (2005)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/europe/kv.json b/europe/kv.json index c0e4e235..7bf631fc 100644 --- a/europe/kv.json +++ b/europe/kv.json @@ -696,10 +696,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "2.054 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.054 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "2.203 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.203 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/europe/lg.json b/europe/lg.json index c22e4a83..9c03d277 100644 --- a/europe/lg.json +++ b/europe/lg.json @@ -839,10 +839,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "11.39 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$11.39 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "11.53 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$11.53 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1266,7 +1266,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "35,108 (Ukraine) (as of 9 January 2023)" + "text": "35,212 (Ukraine) (as of 16 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "209,168 (mid-year 2021); note - individuals who were Latvian citizens prior to the 1940 Soviet occupation and their descendants were recognized as Latvian citizens when the country's independence was restored in 1991; citizens of the former Soviet Union residing in Latvia who have neither Latvian nor other citizenship are considered non-citizens (officially there is no statelessness in Latvia) and are entitled to non-citizen passports; children born after Latvian independence to stateless parents are entitled to Latvian citizenship upon their parents' request; non-citizens cannot vote or hold certain government jobs and are exempt from military service but can travel visa-free in the EU under the Schengen accord like Latvian citizens; non-citizens can obtain naturalization if they have been permanent residents of Latvia for at least five years, pass tests in Latvian language and history, and know the words of the Latvian national anthem" diff --git a/europe/lh.json b/europe/lh.json index d0036413..beb8faf1 100644 --- a/europe/lh.json +++ b/europe/lh.json @@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ "text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 12 and 26 May 2019 (next to be held in May 2024); prime minister appointed by the president, approved by Parliament" }, "election results": { - "text": "2019: Gitanas NAUSEDA elected president in second round; percent of vote - Gitanas NAUSEDA (independent) 66.7%, Ingrida SIMONYTE (independent) 33.3%; Saulius SKVERNELIS (LVZS) approved as prime minister by Parliament vote - 62 to 10



   
" + "text": "2019: Gitanas NAUSEDA elected president in second round; percent of vote - Gitanas NAUSEDA (independent) 66.7%, Ingrida SIMONYTE (independent) 33.3%



   
" } }, "Legislative branch": { @@ -845,10 +845,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "15.92 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$15.92 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "15.7 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$15.7 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1236,7 +1236,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Lithuanian Armed Forces (Lietuvos Ginkluotosios Pajegos): Land Forces (Sausumos Pajegos), Naval Forces (Karines Juru Pajegos), Air Forces (Karines Oro Pajegos), Special Operations Forces (Specialiuju Operaciju Pajegos); National Defense Volunteer Forces (Savanoriu Pajegos); National Riflemen's Union (2022)", + "text": "Lithuanian Armed Forces (Lietuvos Ginkluotosios Pajegos): Land Forces (Sausumos Pajegos), Naval Forces (Karines Juru Pajegos), Air Forces (Karines Oro Pajegos), Special Operations Forces (Specialiuju Operaciju Pajegos); National Defense Volunteer Forces (Krašto Apsaugos Savanorių Pajegos or KASP); National Riflemen's Union (2023)", "note": "note: the National Rifleman's Union is a paramilitary force that acts as an additional reserve force" }, "Military expenditures": { @@ -1279,7 +1279,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "72,773 (Ukraine) (as of 9 January 2023)" + "text": "73,040 (Ukraine) (as of 16 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "2,721 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/lo.json b/europe/lo.json index f8346026..7908f6b0 100644 --- a/europe/lo.json +++ b/europe/lo.json @@ -763,7 +763,7 @@ } }, "Agricultural products": { - "text": "wheat, maize, sugar beets, milk, barley, rapeseeds, potatoes, sunflower seeds, soybeans, pork" + "text": "wheat, maize, sugar beets, milk, barley, rapeseed, potatoes, sunflower seeds, soybeans, pork" }, "Industries": { "text": "automobiles; metal and metal products; electricity, gas, coke, oil, nuclear fuel; chemicals, synthetic fibers, wood and paper products; machinery; earthenware and ceramics; textiles; electrical and optical apparatus; rubber products; food and beverages; pharmaceutical" @@ -825,10 +825,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "37.79 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$37.79 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "38.79 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$38.79 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1236,7 +1236,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "105,732 (Ukraine) (as of 10 January 2023)" + "text": "107,476 (Ukraine) (as of 17 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "1,532 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/ls.json b/europe/ls.json index 0ab82637..98fb1785 100644 --- a/europe/ls.json +++ b/europe/ls.json @@ -676,10 +676,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "995.3 million (2012 est.)" + "text": "$995.3 million (2012 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "890.4 million (2011 est.)" + "text": "$890.4 million (2011 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/europe/lu.json b/europe/lu.json index 3b5a4b3c..e0d7f40a 100644 --- a/europe/lu.json +++ b/europe/lu.json @@ -811,10 +811,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "27.75 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$27.75 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "26.8 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$26.8 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/europe/md.json b/europe/md.json index e3c3a8e3..76c50019 100644 --- a/europe/md.json +++ b/europe/md.json @@ -823,10 +823,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "2.886 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.886 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "2.947 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.947 billion (2017 est.)" }, "note": "note: National Public Budget" }, @@ -1243,7 +1243,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "102,016 (Ukraine) (as of 8 January 2023)" + "text": "102,283 (Ukraine) (as of 17 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "3,372 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/mj.json b/europe/mj.json index 88146042..3c92ee30 100644 --- a/europe/mj.json +++ b/europe/mj.json @@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ "text": "Ministers act as cabinet" }, "elections/appointments": { - "text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 15 April 2018 (next to be held in 2023); prime minister nominated by the president, approved by the Assembly" + "text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 15 April 2018 (next to be held on 19 March 2023); prime minister nominated by the president, approved by the Assembly" }, "election results": { "text": "2018: Milo DJUKANOVIC elected president in the first round; percent of vote - Milo DJUKANOVIC (DPS) 53.9%, Mladen BOJANIC (independent) 33.4%, Draginja VUKSANOVIC (SDP) 8.2%, Marko MILACIC (PRAVA) 2.8%, other 1.7%

2013: Filip VUJANOVIC reelected president; percent of vote Filip VUJANOVIC (DPS) 51.2%, Miodrag LEKIC (independent) 48.8%" @@ -866,10 +866,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.78 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.78 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "2.05 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.05 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1275,12 +1275,12 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "32,250 (Ukraine) (as of 9 January 2023)" + "text": "32,880 (Ukraine) (as of 17 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "458 (mid-year 2021)" }, - "note": "note: 29,155 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-January 2023)" + "note": "note: 29,324 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-January 2023)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "

drug trafficking groups are major players in the procurement and transportation of large quantities of cocaine  destined for  European markets

" diff --git a/europe/mk.json b/europe/mk.json index c6bc800d..7581bc00 100644 --- a/europe/mk.json +++ b/europe/mk.json @@ -819,10 +819,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "3.295 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.295 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "3.605 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.605 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1208,7 +1208,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "6,350 (Ukraine) (as of 4 January 2023)" + "text": "6,404 (Ukraine) (as of 15 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "553 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/mn.json b/europe/mn.json index 6526f24d..d09584c9 100644 --- a/europe/mn.json +++ b/europe/mn.json @@ -679,10 +679,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "896.3 million (2011 est.)" + "text": "$896.3 million (2011 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "953.6 million (2011 est.)" + "text": "$953.6 million (2011 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/europe/mt.json b/europe/mt.json index ae597b25..93912658 100644 --- a/europe/mt.json +++ b/europe/mt.json @@ -809,10 +809,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "5.076 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$5.076 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "4.583 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$4.583 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1163,7 +1163,7 @@ "text": "Marsaxlokk (Malta Freeport), Valletta" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Marsaxlokk (2,722,889) (2019)" + "text": "Marsaxlokk (2,967,765) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Delimara" diff --git a/europe/nl.json b/europe/nl.json index f9c406f6..03f4c92b 100644 --- a/europe/nl.json +++ b/europe/nl.json @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ "text": "

flooding

volcanism: Mount Scenery (887 m), located on the island of Saba in the Caribbean, last erupted in 1640; Round Hill (601 m), a dormant volcano also known as The Quill, is located on the island of St. Eustatius in the Caribbean; these islands are at the northern end of the volcanic island arc of the Lesser Antilles that extends south to Grenada

" }, "Geography - note": { - "text": "located at mouths of three major European rivers (Rhine, Maas or Meuse, and Scheldt); about a quarter of the country lies below sea level and only about half of the land exceeds one meter above sea level" + "text": "located at mouths of three major European rivers (Rhine (Rijn), Meuse (Maas), and Scheldt (Schelde)); about a quarter of the country lies below sea level and only about half of the land exceeds one meter above sea level" } }, "People and Society": { @@ -840,10 +840,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "361.4 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$361.4 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "352.4 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$352.4 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1043,16 +1043,16 @@ }, "Natural gas": { "production": { - "text": "32,857,597,000 cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "32.858 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" }, "consumption": { - "text": "44,752,918,000 cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "44.753 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" }, "exports": { - "text": "42,827,461,000 cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "42.827 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" }, "imports": { - "text": "55,767,276,000 cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "55.767 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" }, "proven reserves": { "text": "132.608 billion cubic meters (2021 est.)" @@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@ "text": "IJmuiden, Vlissingen" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Rotterdam (14,810,804) (2019)" + "text": "Rotterdam (15,300,000) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Gate (Rotterdam)" diff --git a/europe/no.json b/europe/no.json index e6a8b323..dd6e9420 100644 --- a/europe/no.json +++ b/europe/no.json @@ -826,10 +826,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "217.1 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$217.1 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "199.5 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$199.5 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "15,901 (Syria), 10,883 (Eritrea) (mid-year 2022); 36,925 (Ukraine) (as of 6 January 2023)" + "text": "15,901 (Syria), 10,883 (Eritrea) (mid-year 2022); 37,394 (Ukraine) (as of 16 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "4,154 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/pl.json b/europe/pl.json index 99090a1d..7c1d73d5 100644 --- a/europe/pl.json +++ b/europe/pl.json @@ -598,24 +598,24 @@ "text": "President Andrzej DUDA (since 6 August 2015)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Prime Minister Mateusz MORAWIECKI (since 11 December 2017); Deputy Prime Ministers Piotr GLINSKI (since 16 November 2015), Jacek SASIN (since 15 November 2019), Jaroslaw KACZYNSKI (6 October 2020) and Henryk KOWALCZYK (26 October 2021)" + "text": "Prime Minister Mateusz MORAWIECKI (since 11 December 2017); Deputy Prime Ministers Piotr GLINSKI (since 16 November 2015), Jacek SASIN (since 15 November 2019), Henryk KOWALCZYK (26 October 2021), and Mariusz BLASZCZAK (since 22 June 2022)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Council of Ministers proposed by the prime minister, appointed by the president, and approved by the Sejm" }, "elections/appointments": { - "text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 28 June 2020 with a second round on 12 July 2020 (next to be held in 2025); prime minister, deputy prime ministers, and Council of Ministers appointed by the president and confirmed by the Sejm" + "text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 28 June 2020 with a second round on 12 July 2020 (next to be held in 2025); prime minister, deputy prime ministers, and Council of Ministers appointed by the president and confirmed by the Sejm; all presidential candidates resign their party affiliation" }, "election results": { - "text": "2020: Andrzej DUDA reelected president in second round; percent of vote - Andrzej DUDA (independent) 51%, Rafal TRZASKOWSKI (KO) 49%

2015: Andrzej DUDA elected president in second round; percent of vote - Andrzej DUDA (independent) 51.5%, Bronislaw KOMOROWSKI (independent) 48.5%" + "text": "2020: Andrzej DUDA reelected president in second round; percent of vote - Andrzej DUDA 51%, Rafal TRZASKOWSKI (KO) 49%

2015: Andrzej DUDA elected president in second round; percent of vote - Andrzej DUDA 51.5%, Bronislaw KOMOROWSKI (independent) 48.5%" } }, "Legislative branch": { "description": { - "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:
Senate or Senat (100 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 4-year terms)
Sejm (460 seats; members elected in multi-seat constituencies by party-list proportional representation vote with 5% threshold of total votes needed for parties and 8% for coalitions to gain seats; minorities exempt from threshold; members serve 4-year terms)" + "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:
Senate or Senat (100 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 4-year terms)
Sejm (460 seats; members elected in multi-seat constituencies by party-list proportional representation vote with 5% threshold of total votes needed for parties and 8% for coalitions to gain seats; minority parties exempt from threshold; members serve 4-year terms)" }, "elections": { - "text": "
Senate - last held on 13 October 2019 (next to be held in October 2023)
Sejm - last held on 13 October 2019 (next to be held in October 2023)" + "text": "Senate - last held on 13 October 2019 (next to be held in October 2023)
Sejm - last held on 13 October 2019 (next to be held in October 2023)" }, "election results": { "text": "
Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PiS 48, KO 43, PSL 3, SLD 2, independent 4; composition (as of October 2021) - men 76, women 24, percent of women 24%
Sejm - percent of vote by party - PiS 43.6%, KO 27.4%, SLD 12.6%, PSL 8.5% Confederation 6.8%, other 1.1%; seats by party - PiS 235, KO 134, SLD 49, PSL 30, KWiN 11, MN 1; men 330, women 130, percent of women 28.3%; note - total Parliament percent of women 27.5%" @@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Civic Coalition or KO [collective leadership]
Confederation Liberty and Independence or KORWiN [Janusz KORWIN-MIKKE, Robert WINNICKI, Grzegorz BRAUN]
Law and Justice or PiS [Jaroslaw KACZYNSKI]
Polish Coalition or PSL [Wladyslaw KOSINIAK-KAMYSZ]
The Left [Wlodzimierz CZARZASTY]" + "text": "Agreement [Jaroslaw GOWIN]
Civic Coalition or KO [collective leadership]
Civic Platform or PO [Donald Tusk]
Confederation Liberty and Independence or KORWiN [Janusz KORWIN-MIKKE, Robert WINNICKI, Grzegorz BRAUN]
Confederation of the Polish Crown or KKP [Grzegorz BRAUN]
Kukiz 15 [Pawel KUKIZ]
Law and Justice or PiS [Jaroslaw KACZYNSKI]
Left Together or LR [Adrian ZANBERG and Magdalena BIEJAT]
Modern or .N [Adam SZLAPKA]
National Movement or RN [Robert WINNICKI]
New Hope or NN [Slawomir MENTZEN]
New Left or NL [Wlodzimierz CZARZASTY and Robert Biedron]
Poland 2050 [Szymon HOLOWNIA]
Polish People's Party or PSL [Wladyslaw KOSINIAK-KAMYSZ]
Polish Initiative or iPL [Barbara NOWACKA]
Polish Socialist Party or PPS [Wojciech KONIECZNY]
Regional. Minority with Majority or MN [Ryszard GALLA]
Republican Party or R [Adam BIELAN]
The Greens or PZ [Wojciech KUBALEWSKI and Malgorzata TRACZ]
Union of European Democrats or UED [Elzbieta BINCZYCKA]
United Poland or SP [Zbigniew ZIOBRO]
Wolnosciowcy [Arthur DZIAMBOR]" }, "International organization participation": { "text": "Arctic Council (observer), Australia Group, BIS, BSEC (observer), CBSS, CD, CE, CEI, CERN, EAPC, EBRD, ECB, EIB, ESA, EU, FAO, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IEA, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MONUSCO, NATO, NEA, NSG, OAS (observer), OECD, OIF (observer), OPCW, OSCE, PCA, Schengen Convention, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNHRC, UNIDO, UNMIL, UNMISS, UNOCI, UN Security Council (temporary), UNWTO, UPU, Wassenaar Arrangement, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO, ZC" @@ -866,10 +866,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "207.5 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$207.5 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "216.2 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$216.2 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1251,7 +1251,7 @@ "text": "Gdansk, Gdynia, Swinoujscie" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Gdansk (2,073,215) (2019)" + "text": "Gdansk (2,117,829) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Swinoujscie" @@ -1316,7 +1316,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "1,563,386 (Ukraine) (as of 10 January 2022)" + "text": "1,563,386 (Ukraine) (as of 17 January 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "1,389 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/po.json b/europe/po.json index f258dc16..0214e3cd 100644 --- a/europe/po.json +++ b/europe/po.json @@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ }, "Diplomatic representation in the US": { "chief of mission": { - "text": "Ambassador Francisco Antonio Duarte LOPES (since 7 June 2022)" + "text": "Ambassador Francisco Antonio DUARTE LOPES (since 7 June 2022)" }, "chancery": { "text": "2012 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036" @@ -832,10 +832,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "93.55 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$93.55 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "100 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$100 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "56,904 (Ukraine) (as of 10 January 2023)" + "text": "57,109 (Ukraine) (as of 17 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "45 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/ri.json b/europe/ri.json index 12e6e5ac..3e16d494 100644 --- a/europe/ri.json +++ b/europe/ri.json @@ -864,10 +864,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "17.69 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$17.69 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "17.59 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$17.59 billion (2017 est.)" }, "note": "note: data include both central government and local goverment budgets" }, diff --git a/europe/ro.json b/europe/ro.json index 2e595468..c4b91a3c 100644 --- a/europe/ro.json +++ b/europe/ro.json @@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ "text": "President Klaus Werner IOHANNIS (since 21 December 2014)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Prime Minister Nicolae CIUCA (since 25 November 2021); Deputy Prime Ministers Sorin GRINDEANU (since 25 November 2021) and Kelemen HUNOR (since 23 December 2020)" + "text": "Prime Minister Nicolae CIUCA (since 25 November 2021); Deputy Prime Ministers Sorin GRINDEANU (since 25 November 2021) and Hunor KELEMEN (since 23 December 2020)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Council of Ministers appointed by the prime minister" @@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ "text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 10 November 2019 with a runoff on 24 November 2019 (next to be held in November 2024); prime minister appointed by the president with consent of Parliament" }, "election results": { - "text": "2019: Klaus IOHANNIS reelected president in second round; percent of vote - Klaus IOHANNIS (PNL) 66.1%, Viorica DANCILA (PSD) 33.9%; Nicolae CIUCA approved as prime minister with 318 votes

2014: Klaus IOHANNIS elected president in the second round; percent of vote - Klaus IOHANNIS (PNL) 54.4%, Victor PONTA (PSD) 45.6%" + "text": "2021: Nicolae CIUCA approved as prime minister with 318 votes

2019: Klaus IOHANNIS reelected president in second round; percent of vote - Klaus IOHANNIS (PNL) 66.1%, Viorica DANCILA (PSD) 33.9%

2014: Klaus IOHANNIS elected president in the second round; percent of vote - Klaus IOHANNIS (PNL) 54.4%, Victor PONTA (PSD) 45.6%" } }, "Legislative branch": { @@ -620,7 +620,7 @@ }, "Diplomatic representation in the US": { "chief of mission": { - "text": "Ambassador Andrei MURARU (since 15 September 2021)" + "text": "Ambassador Dan Andrei MURARU (since 15 September 2021)" }, "chancery": { "text": "1607 23rd Street NW, Washington, DC 20008" @@ -842,10 +842,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "62.14 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$62.14 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "68.13 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$68.13 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1277,7 +1277,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "106,987 (Ukraine) (as of 10 January 2023)" + "text": "106,644 (Ukraine) (as of 17 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "314 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/si.json b/europe/si.json index 7d58481a..afc2ed7c 100644 --- a/europe/si.json +++ b/europe/si.json @@ -552,14 +552,14 @@ } }, "Suffrage": { - "text": "18 years of age, 16 if employed; universal" + "text": "18 years of age; universal" }, "Executive branch": { "chief of state": { - "text": "President Borut PAHOR (since 22 December 2012)" + "text": "President Natasa PIRC MUSAR (since 23 December 2022); note - PIRC MUSAR is Slovenia's first female president" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Prime Minister Natasa PIRC MUSAR (since 23 December 2022); note - PIRC MUSAR is Slovenia's first female prime minister" + "text": "Prime Minister Robert GOLOB (since 1 June 2022)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Council of Ministers nominated by the prime minister, elected by the National Assembly" @@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ "text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term (eligible for a second consecutive term); election last held on 23 October with a runoff on 13 November 2022 (next election to be held in 2027); following National Assembly elections, the leader of the majority party or majority coalition usually nominated prime minister by the president and elected by the National Assembly" }, "election results": { - "text": "2022: Natasa PIRC MUSAR elected in second round: percent of vote in first round - Natasa PIRC MUSAR (independent) 26.9%, Anze LOGAR (SDS) 34%, Milan BRGLEZ (SD) 15.5%, Vladimir PREBILIC (independent) 10.6%, Sabina SENCAR (Resni.ca) 5.9%, Janez CIGLER KRALJ (NSi) 4.4%, Miha KORDIS (The Left) 2.8%; percent of vote in second round - Natasa PIRC MUSAR 53.9%, Anze LOGAR 46.1%

2017: Borut PAHOR is reelected president in second round; percent of vote in first round - Borut PAHOR (independent) 47.1%, Marjan SAREC (Marjan Sarec List) 25%, Romana TOMC (SDS) 13.7%, Ljudmila NOVAK (NSi) 7.2%, other 7%; percent of vote in second round - Borut PAHOR 52.9%, Marjan SAREC 47.1%; Robert GOLOB (GS) elected prime minister on 25 May 2022, National Assembly vote - 54-30

2012: Borut PAHOR elected president; percent of vote in second round - Borut PAHOR (SD) 67.4%, Danilo TURK (independent) 32.6%; note - a snap election was held on 13 July 2014 following the resignation of Prime Minister Alenka BRATUSEK on 5 May 2014; Miro CERAR (SMC) elected prime minister; National Assembly vote - 57 to 11" + "text": "2022: Natasa PIRC MUSAR elected in second round: percent of vote in first round - Natasa PIRC MUSAR (independent) 26.9%, Anze LOGAR (SDS) 34%, Milan BRGLEZ (SD) 15.5%, Vladimir PREBILIC (independent) 10.6%, Sabina SENCAR (Resni.ca) 5.9%, Janez CIGLER KRALJ (NSi) 4.4%, Miha KORDIS (The Left) 2.8%; percent of vote in second round - Natasa PIRC MUSAR 53.9%, Anze LOGAR 46.1%; Robert GOLOB (GS) elected prime minister on 25 May 2022, National Assembly vote - 54-30

2017: Borut PAHOR is reelected president in second round; percent of vote in first round - Borut PAHOR (independent) 47.1%, Marjan SAREC (Marjan Sarec List) 25%, Romana TOMC (SDS) 13.7%, Ljudmila NOVAK (NSi) 7.2%, other 7%; percent of vote in second round - Borut PAHOR 52.9%, Marjan SAREC 47.1%

2012: Borut PAHOR elected president; percent of vote in second round - Borut PAHOR (SD) 67.4%, Danilo TURK (independent) 32.6%; note - a snap election was held on 13 July 2014 following the resignation of Prime Minister Alenka BRATUSEK on 5 May 2014; Miro CERAR (SMC) elected prime minister; National Assembly vote - 57 to 11" } }, "Legislative branch": { @@ -822,10 +822,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "21.07 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$21.07 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "21.06 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$21.06 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/europe/sm.json b/europe/sm.json index 3cdbe470..39c19291 100644 --- a/europe/sm.json +++ b/europe/sm.json @@ -711,10 +711,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "667.7 million (2011 est.)" + "text": "$667.7 million (2011 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "715.3 million (2011 est.)" + "text": "$715.3 million (2011 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/europe/sp.json b/europe/sp.json index a69c407f..0a6ef0e8 100644 --- a/europe/sp.json +++ b/europe/sp.json @@ -855,10 +855,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "498.1 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$498.1 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "539 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$539 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1236,7 +1236,7 @@ "text": "
Atlantic Ocean: Bilbao, Huelva; Las Palmas, Santa Cruz de Tenerife (in the Canary Islands)
Mediterranean Sea: Algeciras, Barcelona, Cartagena, Tarragona, Valencia" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Algeciras (5,125,385), Barcelona (3,324,650), Valencia (5,439,827) (2019)" + "text": "Algeciras (4,799,497), Barcelona (3,531,762), Valencia (5,604,478) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Barcelona, Bilbao, Cartagena, El Musel, Huelva, Mugardos, Sagunto" @@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Spanish Armed Forces: Army (Ejercito de Tierra), Spanish Navy (Armada Espanola, AE; includes Marine Corps), Spanish Air Force (Ejercito del Aire Espanola, EdA); Civil Guard (Guardia Civil) (2022)", + "text": "Spanish Armed Forces: Army (Ejército de Tierra), Spanish Navy (Armada Espanola; includes Marine Corps), Air and Space Force (Ejército del Aire y del Espacio); Civil Guard (Guardia Civil) (2022)", "note": "note: the Civil Guard is a military force with police duties (including coast guard) under both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior; it also responds to the needs of the Ministry of Finance" }, "Military expenditures": { @@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { - "text": "approximately 120,000 active-duty troops (75,000 Army; 25,000 Navy, including about 5,000 marines; 20,000 Air Force); 80,000 Guardia Civil (2022)", + "text": "approximately 120,000 active-duty troops (72,000 Army; 25,000 Navy, including about 5,000 marines; 23,000 Air and Space Force); 80,000 Guardia Civil (2022)", "note": "note:  a 2007 law established a maximum strength of 130,000 military personnel" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { @@ -1299,12 +1299,12 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "14,994 (Syria) (mid-year 2022); 418,200 (Venezuela) (economic and political crisis; includes Venezuelans who have claimed asylum, are recognized as refugees, or have received alternative legal stay) (2021); 161,012(Ukraine) (as of 31 December 2022)" + "text": "14,994 (Syria) (mid-year 2022); 418,200 (Venezuela) (economic and political crisis; includes Venezuelans who have claimed asylum, are recognized as refugees, or have received alternative legal stay) (2021); 161,012 (Ukraine) (as of 17 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "692 (mid-year 2021)" }, - "note": "note: 279,680 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals, including Canary Islands (January 2015-January 2023)" + "note": "note: 279,926 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals, including Canary Islands (January 2015-January 2023)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "primary transit point in Europe for cocaine from South America and for hashish from Morocco; cocaine is shipped in raw or liquid form with mixed cargo to avoid detection; traffickers ship methamphetamine via express mail; increasing indoor cannabis production; illegal labs cutting, mixing, and reconstituting cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine labs; synthetic drugs, including ketamine and MDMA (ecstasy) transit from Spain to the US" diff --git a/europe/sw.json b/europe/sw.json index 1f18148d..33b0017e 100644 --- a/europe/sw.json +++ b/europe/sw.json @@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ } }, "Agricultural products": { - "text": "wheat, milk, sugar beet, barley, potatoes, oats, rapeseed, pork, rye, triticale" + "text": "wheat, milk, sugar beets, barley, potatoes, oats, rapeseed, pork, rye, triticale" }, "Industries": { "text": "iron and steel, precision equipment (bearings, radio and telephone parts, armaments), wood pulp and paper products, processed foods, motor vehicles" @@ -830,10 +830,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "271.2 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$271.2 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "264.4 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$264.4 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1242,15 +1242,15 @@ } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { - "text": "approximately 15,000 continuous service/full-time troops (7,000 Army; 3,000 Navy; 3,000 Air Force; 2,000 other, including staff, logistics, support, medical, cyber, intelligence, etc); approximately 21,000 Home Guard; approximately 12,000 temporary service personnel (2022)", - "note": "note: Swedish Armed Forces' (SAF) personnel are divided into continuously serving (full-time) and temporary service troops (part-timers who serve periodically and have another main employer or attend school); additional personnel have signed service agreements with the SAF and mostly serve in the Home Guard; the SAF also has about 9,000 civilian employees" + "text": "the SAF has about 46,000 military personnel: approximately 14,000 continuous service/full-time; approximately 11,000 temporary service; approximately 21,000 Home Guard (some on active duty) (2022)", + "note": "note 1: SAF personnel are divided into continuously serving (full-time) and temporary service troops (part-timers who serve periodically and have another main employer or attend school); additional personnel have signed service agreements with the SAF and mostly serve in the Home Guard; the SAF also has about 9,000 civilian employees

note 2: in 2021, Sweden announced plans that increase the total size of the armed forces to about 100,000 personnel by 2030" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { "text": "the inventory of the SAF is comprised of domestically-produced and imported Western weapons systems; since 2010, the US is the leading supplier of military hardware to Sweden; Sweden's defense industry produces a range of air, land, and naval systems (2021)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-47 years of age for male and female voluntary military service; service obligation: 7.5 months (Army), 7-15 months (Navy), 8-12 months (Air Force); after completing initial service, soldiers have a reserve commitment until age 47; compulsory military service, abolished in 2010, was reinstated in January 2018; conscription is selective, includes both men and women (age 18), and requires 9-12 months of service (2022)", - "note": "note 1: Sweden conscripts about 5,500 men and women each year

note 2: as of 2021, women made up about 11% of the military's full-time personnel" + "note": "note 1: Sweden conscripts about 5,500 men and women each year; it plans to increase this number to 8,000 by 2025

note 2: as of 2021, women made up about 11% of the military's full-time personnel" }, "Military deployments": { "text": "approximately 200 Mali (MINUSMA) (2022)" @@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "113,213 (Syria), 26,857 (Afghanistan), 25,849 (Eritrea), 10,464 (Iraq), 9,315 (Somalia), 7,146 (Iran) (mid-year 2022); 50,530 (Ukraine) (as of 5 January)" + "text": "113,213 (Syria), 26,857 (Afghanistan), 25,849 (Eritrea), 10,464 (Iraq), 9,315 (Somalia), 7,146 (Iran) (mid-year 2022); 50,795 (Ukraine) (as of 12 January)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "50,098 (mid-year 2021); note - the majority of stateless people are from the Middle East and Somalia" diff --git a/europe/sz.json b/europe/sz.json index 0d598969..599b1570 100644 --- a/europe/sz.json +++ b/europe/sz.json @@ -842,10 +842,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "242.1 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$242.1 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "234.4 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$234.4 billion (2017 est.)" }, "note": "note: includes federal, cantonal, and municipal budgets" }, diff --git a/europe/uk.json b/europe/uk.json index e091fb7e..7ec5ef49 100644 --- a/europe/uk.json +++ b/europe/uk.json @@ -843,10 +843,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.028 trillion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.028 trillion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.079 trillion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.079 trillion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1234,7 +1234,7 @@ "text": "Fawley Marine terminal, Liverpool Bay terminal (England); Braefoot Bay terminal, Finnart oil terminal, Hound Point terminal (Scotland)" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Felixstowe (3,584,000), London (2,790,000), Southampton (1,924,847) (2019)" + "text": "Felixstowe (3,700,000), London (3,111,000), Southampton (1,871,081) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Dragon, Isle of Grain, South Hook, Teesside" diff --git a/europe/up.json b/europe/up.json index a052ee6f..8fe8e5df 100644 --- a/europe/up.json +++ b/europe/up.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Ukraine was the center of the first eastern Slavic state, Kyivan Rus, which during the 10th and 11th centuries was the largest and most powerful state in Europe. Weakened by internecine quarrels and Mongol invasions, Kyivan Rus was incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and eventually into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The cultural and religious legacy of Kyivan Rus laid the foundation for Ukrainian nationalism through subsequent centuries. A new Ukrainian state, the Cossack Hetmanate, was established during the mid-17th century after an uprising against the Poles. Despite continuous Muscovite pressure, the Hetmanate managed to remain autonomous for well over 100 years. During the latter part of the 18th century, most Ukrainian ethnographic territory was absorbed by the Russian Empire. Following the collapse of czarist Russia in 1917, Ukraine achieved a short-lived period of independence (1917-20) but was reconquered and endured a brutal Soviet rule that engineered two forced famines (1921-22 and 1932-33) in which over 8 million died. In World War II, German and Soviet armies were responsible for 7 to 8 million more deaths. Although Ukraine achieved independence in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR, democracy and prosperity remained elusive as the legacy of state control and endemic corruption stalled efforts at economic reform, privatization, and civil liberties.

A peaceful mass protest referred to as the \"Orange Revolution\" in the closing months of 2004 forced the authorities to overturn a rigged presidential election and to allow a new internationally monitored vote that swept into power a reformist slate under Viktor YUSHCHENKO. Subsequent internal squabbles in the YUSHCHENKO camp allowed his rival Viktor YANUKOVYCH to stage a comeback in parliamentary (Rada) elections, become prime minister in August 2006, and be elected president in February 2010. In October 2012, Ukraine held Rada elections, widely criticized by Western observers as flawed due to use of government resources to favor ruling party candidates, interference with media access, and harassment of opposition candidates. President YANUKOVYCH's backtracking on a trade and cooperation agreement with the EU in November 2013 - in favor of closer economic ties with Russia - and subsequent use of force against students, civil society activists, and other civilians in favor of the agreement led to a three-month protest occupation of Kyiv's central square. The government's use of violence to break up the protest camp in February 2014 led to all out pitched battles, scores of deaths, international condemnation, a failed political deal, and the president's abrupt departure for Russia. New elections in the spring allowed pro-West president Petro POROSHENKO to assume office in June 2014; he was succeeded by Volodymyr ZELENSKY in May 2019.

Shortly after YANUKOVYCH's departure in late February 2014, Russian President PUTIN ordered the invasion of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula falsely claiming the action was to protect ethnic Russians living there. Two weeks later, a \"referendum\" was held regarding the integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation. The \"referendum\" was condemned as illegitimate by the Ukrainian Government, the EU, the US, and the UN General Assembly (UNGA). In response to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, 100 members of the UN passed UNGA resolution 68/262, rejecting the \"referendum\" as baseless and invalid and confirming the sovereignty, political independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. In mid-2014, Russia began supplying proxies in two of Ukraine's eastern provinces with manpower, funding, and materiel driving an armed conflict with the Ukrainian Government that continues to this day. Representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and the unrecognized Russian proxy republics signed the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum in September 2014 to end the conflict. However, this agreement failed to stop the fighting or find a political solution. In a renewed attempt to alleviate ongoing clashes, leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany negotiated a follow-on Package of Measures in February 2015 to implement the Minsk agreements. Representatives from Ukraine, Russia, the unrecognized Russian proxy republics, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe also meet regularly to facilitate implementation of the peace deal. By early 2022, more than 14,000 civilians were killed or wounded as a result of the Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine.

On 24 February 2022, Russia escalated its conflict with Ukraine by invading the country on several fronts in what has become the largest conventional military attack on a sovereign state in Europe since World War II. The invasion has received near universal international condemnation, and many countries have imposed sanctions on Russia and supplied humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. Russia made substantial gains in the early weeks of the invasion but underestimated Ukrainian resolve and combat capabilities. By the end of 2022, Ukrainian forces had regained all territories in the north and northeast and made some advances in the east and south. Nonetheless, Russia in late September 2022 unilaterally declared its annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts - Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia - even though none was fully under Russian control. The annexations remain unrecognized by the international community.

The invasion has also created Europe's largest refugee crisis since World War II. As of 10 January, 2023, approximately 17.41 million people had fled Ukraine, and 5.91 million people were internally displaced as of 5 December 2022.  Almost 18,000 civilian casualties had been reported, as of 2 January 2023. The invasion of Ukraine remains one of the two largest displacement crises worldwide (the other is the conflict in Syria).

 

" + "text": "

Ukraine was the center of the first eastern Slavic state, Kyivan Rus, which during the 10th and 11th centuries was the largest and most powerful state in Europe. Weakened by internecine quarrels and Mongol invasions, Kyivan Rus was incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and eventually into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The cultural and religious legacy of Kyivan Rus laid the foundation for Ukrainian nationalism through subsequent centuries. A new Ukrainian state, the Cossack Hetmanate, was established during the mid-17th century after an uprising against the Poles. Despite continuous Muscovite pressure, the Hetmanate managed to remain autonomous for well over 100 years. During the latter part of the 18th century, most Ukrainian ethnographic territory was absorbed by the Russian Empire. Following the collapse of czarist Russia in 1917, Ukraine achieved a short-lived period of independence (1917-20) but was reconquered and endured a brutal Soviet rule that engineered two forced famines (1921-22 and 1932-33) in which over 8 million died. In World War II, German and Soviet armies were responsible for 7 to 8 million more deaths. Although Ukraine achieved independence in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR, democracy and prosperity remained elusive as the legacy of state control and endemic corruption stalled efforts at economic reform, privatization, and civil liberties.

A peaceful mass protest referred to as the \"Orange Revolution\" in the closing months of 2004 forced the authorities to overturn a rigged presidential election and to allow a new internationally monitored vote that swept into power a reformist slate under Viktor YUSHCHENKO. Subsequent internal squabbles in the YUSHCHENKO camp allowed his rival Viktor YANUKOVYCH to stage a comeback in parliamentary (Rada) elections, become prime minister in August 2006, and be elected president in February 2010. In October 2012, Ukraine held Rada elections, widely criticized by Western observers as flawed due to use of government resources to favor ruling party candidates, interference with media access, and harassment of opposition candidates. President YANUKOVYCH's backtracking on a trade and cooperation agreement with the EU in November 2013 - in favor of closer economic ties with Russia - and subsequent use of force against students, civil society activists, and other civilians in favor of the agreement led to a three-month protest occupation of Kyiv's central square. The government's use of violence to break up the protest camp in February 2014 led to all out pitched battles, scores of deaths, international condemnation, a failed political deal, and the president's abrupt departure for Russia. New elections in the spring allowed pro-West president Petro POROSHENKO to assume office in June 2014; he was succeeded by Volodymyr ZELENSKY in May 2019.

Shortly after YANUKOVYCH's departure in late February 2014, Russian President PUTIN ordered the invasion of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula falsely claiming the action was to protect ethnic Russians living there. Two weeks later, a \"referendum\" was held regarding the integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation. The \"referendum\" was condemned as illegitimate by the Ukrainian Government, the EU, the US, and the UN General Assembly (UNGA). In response to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, 100 members of the UN passed UNGA resolution 68/262, rejecting the \"referendum\" as baseless and invalid and confirming the sovereignty, political independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. In mid-2014, Russia began supplying proxies in two of Ukraine's eastern provinces with manpower, funding, and materiel driving an armed conflict with the Ukrainian Government that continues to this day. Representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and the unrecognized Russian proxy republics signed the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum in September 2014 to end the conflict. However, this agreement failed to stop the fighting or find a political solution. In a renewed attempt to alleviate ongoing clashes, leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany negotiated a follow-on Package of Measures in February 2015 to implement the Minsk agreements. Representatives from Ukraine, Russia, the unrecognized Russian proxy republics, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe also meet regularly to facilitate implementation of the peace deal. By early 2022, more than 14,000 civilians were killed or wounded as a result of the Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine.

On 24 February 2022, Russia escalated its conflict with Ukraine by invading the country on several fronts in what has become the largest conventional military attack on a sovereign state in Europe since World War II. The invasion has received near universal international condemnation, and many countries have imposed sanctions on Russia and supplied humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. Russia made substantial gains in the early weeks of the invasion but underestimated Ukrainian resolve and combat capabilities. By the end of 2022, Ukrainian forces had regained all territories in the north and northeast and made some advances in the east and south. Nonetheless, Russia in late September 2022 unilaterally declared its annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts - Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia - even though none was fully under Russian control. The annexations remain unrecognized by the international community.

The invasion has also created Europe's largest refugee crisis since World War II. As of 17 January, 2023, approximately 17.69 million people had fled Ukraine, and 5.91 million people were internally displaced as of 5 December 2022.  Over 18,000 civilian casualties had been reported, as of 9 January 2023. The invasion of Ukraine remains one of the two largest displacement crises worldwide (the other is the conflict in Syria).

 

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -858,10 +858,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "29.82 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$29.82 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "31.55 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$31.55 billion (2017 est.)" }, "note": "note: this is the planned, consolidated budget" }, diff --git a/europe/vt.json b/europe/vt.json index 12fed100..664a6829 100644 --- a/europe/vt.json +++ b/europe/vt.json @@ -452,10 +452,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "315 million (2013)" + "text": "$315 million (2013)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "348 million (2013)" + "text": "$348 million (2013)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/middle-east/ae.json b/middle-east/ae.json index fbf33151..41ceb413 100644 --- a/middle-east/ae.json +++ b/middle-east/ae.json @@ -827,10 +827,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "110.2 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$110.2 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "111.1 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$111.1 billion (2017 est.)" }, "note": "note: the UAE federal budget does not account for emirate-level spending in Abu Dhabi and Dubai" }, @@ -1198,7 +1198,7 @@ "text": "Al Fujayrah, Mina' Jabal 'Ali (Dubai), Khor Fakkan (Khawr Fakkan) (Sharjah), Mubarraz Island (Abu Dhabi), Mina' Rashid (Dubai), Mina' Saqr (Ra's al Khaymah)" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Dubai Port (14,111,000) (2019)" + "text": "Dubai Port (13,742,000) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (export)": { "text": "Das Island" diff --git a/middle-east/aj.json b/middle-east/aj.json index fcef9b50..033454ef 100644 --- a/middle-east/aj.json +++ b/middle-east/aj.json @@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "34.675 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "34.68 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -832,10 +832,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "9.556 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$9.556 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "10.22 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$10.22 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1073,18 +1073,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1,652,688 (2020 est.)" + "text": "1,644,300 (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "16 (2020 est.)" + "text": "16 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "10,344,300 (2020 est.)" + "text": "10,817,071 (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "102 (2020 est.)" + "text": "105 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1092,10 +1092,10 @@ "text": "in spite of the telecom sector being one of the major contributors to Azerbaijan’s non-oil GDP, overall development, growth, and investment in the sector has been held back by years of political and civil unrest coupled with endemic corruption; mobile penetration rates reached 100% as far back as 2011 but have largely stagnated since then; the Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) are slowly extending the reach of their LTE networks around the country, and this increased coverage (along with access to faster data-based services) is expected to produce a moderate resurgence for both mobile and mobile broadband over the next few years as customers migrate from 3G to 4G. 5G services are still some ways off, as the demand for high-speed data and fast broadband can easily be met by existing capacity on LTE networks; fixed-line teledensity continues to drop down each year as customers consolidate their telecommunications services around the mobile platform; the rate of decline is comparatively slower than other countries, since Azerbaijan has a relatively high proportion of (87%) of fixed-line broadband customers still on DSL; fiber is gradually being rolled out in urban areas, and this makes up the bulk of the growth being seen in the overall fixed broadband market; DSL’s predominance, however, will serve to keep Azerbaijan’s average access speeds in the sub-10Mbps range for the foreseeable future (2020)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "teledensity of some 16 fixed-lines per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity of 102 telephones per 100 persons; satellite service connects Baku to a modern switch in its exclave of Naxcivan (Nakhchivan) (2020)" + "text": "16 fixed-lines subsciptions per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscriptions of 105 telephones per 100 persons (2021)" }, "international": { - "text": "country code - 994; the TAE fiber-optic link transits Azerbaijan providing international connectivity to neighboring countries; the old Soviet system of cable and microwave is still serviceable; satellite earth stations - 2 (2019)" + "text": "country code - 994; Azerbaijan’s largest mobile network operator (MNO)  launched trial 5G mobile services in Baku on 27 December 2022 (2023)" }, "note": "note: the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress toward 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services" }, @@ -1239,7 +1239,7 @@ "note": "note: as of 2018, women made up an estimated 3% of the active duty military" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "since November 2020, Russia has deployed about 2,000 peacekeeping troops to the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh as part of a cease-fire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan; fighting erupted between the two countries over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in September of 2020; Nagorno-Karabakh lies within Azerbaijan but has been under control of ethnic Armenian forces (the \"Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army\") backed by Armenia since a separatist war there ended in 1994; six weeks of fighting resulted in about 6,500 deaths and ended after Armenia ceded swaths of Nagorno-Karabakh territory; tensions remained high in 2022, and both sides have accused the other of provocations since the fighting ended; Armenia has accused Azerbaijani forces of a series of border intrusions and of seizing pockets of territory" + "text": "since November 2020, Russia has deployed about 2,000 peacekeeping troops to the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh as part of a cease-fire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan; fighting erupted between the two countries over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in September of 2020; Nagorno-Karabakh lies within Azerbaijan but has been under control of ethnic Armenian forces (the \"Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army\") backed by Armenia since a separatist war there ended in 1994; six weeks of fighting resulted in about 6,500 deaths and ended after Armenia ceded swaths of Nagorno-Karabakh territory; tensions remained high in 2022, and both sides have accused the other of provocations since the fighting ended; Armenia has accused Azerbaijani forces of a series of border intrusions and of seizing pockets of territory (2023)" } }, "Terrorism": { diff --git a/middle-east/am.json b/middle-east/am.json index 8662052b..0d602591 100644 --- a/middle-east/am.json +++ b/middle-east/am.json @@ -830,10 +830,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "2.644 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.644 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "3.192 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.192 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1071,18 +1071,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "427,539 (2020 est.)" + "text": "418,122 (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "14 (2020 est.)" + "text": "15 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "3,488,797 (2020 est.)" + "text": "3,599,278 (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "118 (2020 est.)" + "text": "129 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1090,7 +1090,7 @@ "text": "Armenia’s telecom sector was able to post in the mobile and broadband segments; its fixed-line penetration continues to slide downwards, with the rollout of fiber networks which have encouraged the increase in bundled services; the fixed broadband market remains undeveloped due to the lack of underlying infrastructure outside the main cities (2021)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "roughly 14 per 100 fixed-line and 118 per 100 mobile-cellular; reliable fixed-line and mobile-cellular services are available across Yerevan and in major cities and towns; mobile-cellular coverage available in most rural areas (2020)" + "text": "roughly 15 per 100 fixed-line and 129 per 100 mobile-cellular; reliable fixed-line and mobile-cellular services are available across Yerevan and in major cities and towns; mobile-cellular coverage available in most rural areas (2021)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 374; Yerevan is connected to the Caucasus Cable System fiber-optic cable through Georgia and Iran to Europe; additional international service is available by microwave radio relay and landline connections to the other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, through the Moscow international switch, and by satellite to the rest of the world; satellite earth stations - 3 (2019)" @@ -1214,7 +1214,7 @@ "note": "note: as of 2021, conscripts comprised about half of the military's active personnel; as of 2018, women made up about 13% of the active duty military" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "since November 2020, Russia has deployed about 2,000 peacekeeping troops to the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh as part of a cease-fire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan; fighting erupted between the two countries over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in September of 2020; Nagorno-Karabakh lies within Azerbaijan but has been under control of ethnic Armenian forces (the \"Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army\") backed by Armenia since a separatist war there ended in 1994; six weeks of fighting resulted in about 6,500 deaths and ended after Armenia ceded swaths of Nagorno-Karabakh territory; tensions remained high into 2022, and both sides have accused the other of provocations since the fighting ended; Armenia has accused Azerbaijani forces of a series of border intrusions and of seizing pockets of territory 

Armenia has been a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) since 1994 and contributes troops to CSTO's rapid reaction force" + "text": "since November 2020, Russia has deployed about 2,000 peacekeeping troops to the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh as part of a cease-fire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan; fighting erupted between the two countries over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in September of 2020; Nagorno-Karabakh lies within Azerbaijan but has been under control of ethnic Armenian forces (the \"Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army\") backed by Armenia since a separatist war there ended in 1994; six weeks of fighting resulted in about 6,500 deaths and ended after Armenia ceded swaths of Nagorno-Karabakh territory; tensions remained high into 2023, and both sides have accused the other of provocations since the fighting ended; Armenia has accused Azerbaijani forces of a series of border intrusions and of seizing pockets of territory 

Armenia has been a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) since 1994 and contributes troops to CSTO's rapid reaction force (2023)" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/middle-east/ba.json b/middle-east/ba.json index 39cbe5c6..3be8c5f5 100644 --- a/middle-east/ba.json +++ b/middle-east/ba.json @@ -817,10 +817,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "5.854 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$5.854 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "9.407 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$9.407 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1052,18 +1052,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "274,106 (2020 est.)" + "text": "266,741 (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "16 (2020 est.)" + "text": "18 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1,748,672 (2020 est.)" + "text": "1,923,443 (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "103 (2020 est.)" + "text": "131 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1071,10 +1071,10 @@ "text": "Bahrain continues to develop its telecoms sector in a bid to develop its long-term Economic Vision 2030 strategy; this is a multi-faceted strategy aimed at developing a digital transformation across numerous sectors, including e-government, e-health, e-commerce, and e-banking; 5G services have become widely available since they were launched in 2020; Bahrain’s telecom sector by the Fourth National Telecommunications Plan (initiated in 2016) which focuses on fiber optic infrastructure deployment and establishing affordable prices for high-speed access (2022)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "approximately 16 per 100 fixed-line and 103 per 100 mobile-cellular; modern fiber-optic integrated services; digital network with rapidly expanding mobile-cellular telephones (2020)" + "text": "approximately 18 per 100 fixed-line and 131 per 100 mobile-cellular; modern fiber-optic integrated services; digital network with rapidly expanding mobile-cellular telephones (2021)" }, "international": { - "text": "country code - 973; landing points for the FALCON, Tata TGN-Gulf, GBICS/MENA, and FOG submarine cable network that provides links to Asia, the Middle East, and Africa; tropospheric scatter to Qatar and UAE; microwave radio relay to Saudi Arabia; satellite earth station - 1 (2019)" + "text": "country code - 973; Bahrain’s Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) has made part of the C-band spectrum available for 5G private networks, in line with the goals outlined in its Workplan for the 2022-23 period (2023)" }, "note": "note: the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress toward 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services" }, diff --git a/middle-east/gg.json b/middle-east/gg.json index 58aa1499..a690e066 100644 --- a/middle-east/gg.json +++ b/middle-east/gg.json @@ -832,10 +832,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "4.352 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$4.352 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "4.925 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$4.925 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "25,101 (Ukraine) (as of 25 December 2022)" + "text": "25,101 (Ukraine) (as of 17 January 2023)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "305,000 (displaced in the 1990s as a result of armed conflict in the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; displaced in 2008 by fighting between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia) (2021)" diff --git a/middle-east/ir.json b/middle-east/ir.json index 0f81df0d..3aab8f38 100644 --- a/middle-east/ir.json +++ b/middle-east/ir.json @@ -833,10 +833,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "74.4 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$74.4 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "84.45 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$84.45 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/middle-east/is.json b/middle-east/is.json index 5b64f3b4..50943e67 100644 --- a/middle-east/is.json +++ b/middle-east/is.json @@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ "text": "President Isaac HERZOG (since 7 July 2021)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Benjamin NETANYAHU (since 29 December 2022)" + "text": "Prime Minister Benjamin NETANYAHU (since 29 December 2022)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Cabinet selected by prime minister and approved by the Knesset" @@ -843,10 +843,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "93.11 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$93.11 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "100.2 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$100.2 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/middle-east/iz.json b/middle-east/iz.json index 43213def..92b6f688 100644 --- a/middle-east/iz.json +++ b/middle-east/iz.json @@ -859,10 +859,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "68.71 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$68.71 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "76.82 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$76.82 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -981,7 +981,7 @@ "text": "28.369 million kW (2020 est.)" }, "consumption": { - "text": "46,492,540,000 kWh (2019 est.)" + "text": "46.493 billion kWh (2019 est.)" }, "exports": { "text": "0 kWh (2019 est.)" @@ -1038,13 +1038,13 @@ }, "Petroleum": { "total petroleum production": { - "text": "4,161,500 bbl/day (2021 est.)" + "text": "4.162 million bbl/day (2021 est.)" }, "refined petroleum consumption": { "text": "863,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "3,975,800 bbl/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "3.976 million bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" @@ -1064,19 +1064,19 @@ }, "Natural gas": { "production": { - "text": "10,710,773,000 cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "10.711 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" }, "consumption": { - "text": "18,014,129,000 cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "18.014 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" }, "exports": { "text": "0 cubic meters (2021 est.)" }, "imports": { - "text": "7,303,356,000 cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "7.303 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" }, "proven reserves": { - "text": "3,728,926,000,000 cubic meters (2021 est.)" + "text": "3.729 trillion cubic meters (2021 est.)" } }, "Carbon dioxide emissions": { diff --git a/middle-east/jo.json b/middle-east/jo.json index 75184039..f32d3604 100644 --- a/middle-east/jo.json +++ b/middle-east/jo.json @@ -856,10 +856,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "9.462 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$9.462 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "11.51 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$11.51 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -976,7 +976,7 @@ "text": "5.644 million kW (2020 est.)" }, "consumption": { - "text": "17,366,400,000 kWh (2019 est.)" + "text": "17.366 billion kWh (2019 est.)" }, "exports": { "text": "98 million kWh (2019 est.)" @@ -1062,13 +1062,13 @@ "text": "115.872 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" }, "consumption": { - "text": "4,650,978,000 cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "4.651 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" }, "exports": { "text": "375.849 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" }, "imports": { - "text": "4,910,954,000 cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "4.911 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" }, "proven reserves": { "text": "6.031 billion cubic meters (2021 est.)" diff --git a/middle-east/ku.json b/middle-east/ku.json index 50f937b5..2ddbbe51 100644 --- a/middle-east/ku.json +++ b/middle-east/ku.json @@ -802,10 +802,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "50.5 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$50.5 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "62.6 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$62.6 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/middle-east/le.json b/middle-east/le.json index 6d87d385..86211a7c 100644 --- a/middle-east/le.json +++ b/middle-east/le.json @@ -839,10 +839,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "11.62 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$11.62 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "15.38 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$15.38 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/middle-east/mu.json b/middle-east/mu.json index 25883f22..7095886f 100644 --- a/middle-east/mu.json +++ b/middle-east/mu.json @@ -808,10 +808,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "22.14 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$22.14 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "31.92 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$31.92 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ "text": "Mina' Qabus, Salalah, Suhar" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Salalah (4,109,000) (2019)" + "text": "Salalah (4,510,000) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (export)": { "text": "Qalhat" diff --git a/middle-east/qa.json b/middle-east/qa.json index a687e3ab..81e06c71 100644 --- a/middle-east/qa.json +++ b/middle-east/qa.json @@ -810,10 +810,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "44.1 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$44.1 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "53.82 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$53.82 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/middle-east/sa.json b/middle-east/sa.json index 45988197..7c1cecb5 100644 --- a/middle-east/sa.json +++ b/middle-east/sa.json @@ -828,10 +828,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "181 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$181 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "241.8 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$241.8 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1218,7 +1218,7 @@ "text": "Ad Dammam, Al Jubayl, Jeddah, King Abdulla, Yanbu'" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Ad Dammam (1,822,642), Jeddah (4,433,991), King Abdulla (2,020,683) (2019)" + "text": "Ad Dammam (1,770,000), Jeddah (4,882,342), King Abdulla (2,813,920) (2021)" } } }, diff --git a/middle-east/sy.json b/middle-east/sy.json index 5322019d..89d6975a 100644 --- a/middle-east/sy.json +++ b/middle-east/sy.json @@ -787,10 +787,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.162 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.162 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "3.211 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.211 billion (2017 est.)" }, "note": "note: government projections for FY2016" }, diff --git a/middle-east/tu.json b/middle-east/tu.json index e70d91d5..a56cd895 100644 --- a/middle-east/tu.json +++ b/middle-east/tu.json @@ -863,10 +863,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "172.8 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$172.8 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "185.8 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$185.8 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@ "text": "Aliaga, Ambarli, Diliskelesi, Eregli, Izmir, Kocaeli (Izmit), Mersin (Icel), Limani, Yarimca" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Ambarli (3,104,882), Mersin (Icel) (1,854,312), Izmet (1,715,193) (2019)" + "text": "Ambarli (2,942,550), Mersin (Icel) (2,106,937), Izmet (1,967,946) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Aliaga, Dortyol, Ekti (Izmir), Marmara Ereglisi" @@ -1312,7 +1312,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "10,244 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 3,522,036 (Syria) (2022); 86,545 (Ukraine) (as of 10 January 2023)" + "text": "10,244 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 3,513,776 (Syria) (2022); 86,545 (Ukraine) (as of 10 January 2023)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "1.099 million (displaced from 1984-2005 because of fighting between the Kurdish PKK and Turkish military; most IDPs are Kurds from eastern and southeastern provinces; no information available on persons displaced by development projects) (2021)" diff --git a/middle-east/we.json b/middle-east/we.json index 5941bf31..81ef12b7 100644 --- a/middle-east/we.json +++ b/middle-east/we.json @@ -627,10 +627,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.314 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.314 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.278 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.278 billion (2017 est.)" }, "note": "note: includes Palestinian Authority expenditures in the Gaza Strip" }, diff --git a/middle-east/ym.json b/middle-east/ym.json index d7222435..49757c0a 100644 --- a/middle-east/ym.json +++ b/middle-east/ym.json @@ -827,10 +827,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "2.821 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.821 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "4.458 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$4.458 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/north-america/bd.json b/north-america/bd.json index e74ea47f..d2023c17 100644 --- a/north-america/bd.json +++ b/north-america/bd.json @@ -701,10 +701,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "999.2 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$999.2 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.176 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.176 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/north-america/ca.json b/north-america/ca.json index fb32ba5e..95273cc2 100644 --- a/north-america/ca.json +++ b/north-america/ca.json @@ -864,10 +864,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "649.6 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$649.6 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "665.7 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$665.7 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1259,7 +1259,7 @@ "text": "Lower Lakes terminal" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Montreal (1,745,244), Vancouver (3,398,860) (2019)" + "text": "Montreal (1,585,465), Vancouver (3,678,952) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Saint John" diff --git a/north-america/gl.json b/north-america/gl.json index 4e7b47f3..cff81df3 100644 --- a/north-america/gl.json +++ b/north-america/gl.json @@ -667,10 +667,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.719 billion (2016 est.)" + "text": "$1.719 billion (2016 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.594 billion (2016 est.)" + "text": "$1.594 billion (2016 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/north-america/mx.json b/north-america/mx.json index 36337d6c..7f0b909d 100644 --- a/north-america/mx.json +++ b/north-america/mx.json @@ -910,10 +910,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "261.4 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$261.4 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "273.8 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$273.8 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1310,7 +1310,7 @@ "text": "Cancun, Cozumel, Ensenada" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Lazaro Cardenas (1,318,732), Manzanillo (3,069,189), Veracruz (1,144,156) (2019)" + "text": "Lazaro Cardenas (1,686,076), Manzanillo (3,371,400), Veracruz (1,165,043) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Altamira, Ensenada" diff --git a/north-america/sb.json b/north-america/sb.json index 44bb7ea5..aaf512ff 100644 --- a/north-america/sb.json +++ b/north-america/sb.json @@ -570,10 +570,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "70 million (1996 est.)" + "text": "$70 million (1996 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "60 million (1996 est.)" + "text": "$60 million (1996 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/north-america/us.json b/north-america/us.json index 2fa019d5..2542c693 100644 --- a/north-america/us.json +++ b/north-america/us.json @@ -850,10 +850,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "3.315 trillion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.315 trillion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "3.981 trillion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$3.981 trillion (2017 est.)" }, "note": "note: revenues exclude social contributions of approximately $1.0 trillion; expenditures exclude social benefits of approximately $2.3 trillion" }, @@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@ "text": "LOOP terminal, Haymark terminal" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Charleston (2,436,185), Hampton Roads (2,937,962), Houston (2,987,291), Long Beach (7,632,032), Los Angeles (9,337,632), New York/New Jersey (7,471,131), Oakland (2,500,431), Savannah (4,599,177), Seattle/Tacoma (3,775,303) (2019)" + "text": "Charleston (2,751,442), Hampton Roads (3,522,834), Houston (3,453,220), Long Beach (9,384,368), Los Angeles (10,677,610), New York/New Jersey (8,985,929), Oakland (2,448,243), Savannah (5,613,163), Seattle/Tacoma (3,736,206) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (export)": { "text": "Calcasieu Pass (LA), Cameron (LA), Corpus Christi (TX), Cove Point (MD), Elba Island (GA), Freeport (TX), Sabine Pass (LA)
note - two additional export facilities are under construction and expected to begin commercial operations in 2023-2024" @@ -1311,7 +1311,7 @@ "note": "note: in 2020, women comprised 17.2 % of the total US military (16.9% of enlisted; 18.9% officers; highest was Air Force with women comprising 21.1% of its total personnel); a small number of American women were involved in combat during the Revolutionary (1775-1783), Mexican (1846-1848), and Civil (1861-1865) Wars, but they had to disguise themselves as men and enlist under aliases; the first official US military organization for women was the US Army Nurse Corps, established in 1901; during World War I, the US Navy and Marine Corps allowed women to enlist; nearly 350,000 women served in the US military during World War II; the 1991 Gulf War was the first war where women served with men in integrated units within a war zone; in 2015, women were allowed to serve in direct combat roles

note 2: non-citizens living permanently and legally in the US may join as enlisted personnel; must have permission to work in the US, a high school diploma, and speak, read, and write English fluently; minimum age of 17 with parental consent or 18 without; maximum age 29-39, depending on the service; under the US Nationality Act, honorable service in the military may qualify individuals to obtain expedited citizenship; under the Compact of Free Association, citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands may volunteer; under the Jay Treaty, signed in 1794 between Great Britain and the US, and corresponding legislation, Native Americans/First Nations born in Canada are entitled to freely enter the US and join the US military" }, "Military deployments": { - "text": "5,000 Africa (mostly in Djibouti, with approximately 700-1,000 in other countries of East Africa and about 700 in West Africa); 1,700 Australia; 250 Diego Garcia; 150 Canada; 650 Cuba (Guatanamo Bay); 290 Egypt (MFO); approximately 100,000 Europe (Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Kosovo, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, UK); 150 Greenland; 6,200 Guam; 370 Honduras; 56,000 Japan; approximately 15,000 Middle East (Bahrain, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates); 125 Philippines; 28,000 South Korea; 200 Singapore; 100 Thailand (2022)", + "text": "5,000 Africa (mostly in Djibouti, with approximately 700-1,000 in other countries of East Africa and about 700 in West Africa); 1,700 Australia; 250 Diego Garcia; 150 Canada; 650 Cuba (Guantanamo Bay); 290 Egypt (MFO); approximately 100,000 Europe (Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Kosovo, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, UK); 150 Greenland; 6,200 Guam; 370 Honduras; 56,000 Japan; approximately 15,000 Middle East (Bahrain, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates); 125 Philippines; 28,000 South Korea; 200 Singapore; 100 Thailand (2022)", "note": "note: US military rotational policies affect deployment numbers; the US deploys ground and air units to select countries for 6-12 month rotational assignments on a continuous basis; in South Korea, for example, the US continuously rotates combat brigades (approximately 3,000 personnel) for 9 months at a time; contingencies also affect US troop deployments; in 2019-2020, the US deployed more than 15,000 additional military personnel to the Middle East for an extended period of time and in 2022, it sent more than 30,000 reinforcements to Europe in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine; in addition, some overseas US naval bases, such as the headquarters of US Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT) in Manama, Bahrain, are frequented by the crews of US ships on 6-9 month deployments; a US carrier strike group with an air wing and supporting ships typically includes over 6,000 personnel" }, "Military - note": { diff --git a/south-america/ar.json b/south-america/ar.json index 0c8ff694..b0a0187b 100644 --- a/south-america/ar.json +++ b/south-america/ar.json @@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "876.24 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "876.2 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -860,10 +860,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "120.6 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$120.6 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "158.6 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$158.6 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1107,18 +1107,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "7,356,165 (2020 est.)" + "text": "6,903,068 (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "16 (2020 est.)" + "text": "15 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "54,763,900 (2020 est.)" + "text": "59,065,827 (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "121 (2020 est.)" + "text": "130 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1126,7 +1126,7 @@ "text": "Argentina’s ongoing problem with hyperinflation continues to distort the telecom market’s performance, which shows strong growth in revenue but only modest gains in subscriber numbers each year; the fixed broadband segment has penetration levels only slightly higher than the fixed-line teledensity; nearly a quarter of the country’s broadband connections are via DSL, although fiber is starting claim an increasing share of that market as networks expand across most of the main cities; mobile broadband continues to be the preferred platform for internet access, supported by high mobile penetration levels and nationwide LTE coverage; the first 5G service was launched in February 2021 using refarmed LTE frequencies; the anticipated 5G spectrum auctions should drive even stronger uptake in mobile broadband services; while the various fixed, mobile, and cable operators push to expand and enhance their services, the government is also making an active contribution towards boosting broadband connectivity around the country; its national connectivity plan ‘Plan Conectar’, launched in September 2020, provides funding for a range of programs to increase coverage; in August 2021, the telecom regulator announced the release funding to help operators accelerate the rollout of their broadband infrastructure and services (2021)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "roughly 16 per 100 fixed-line and 121 per 100 mobile-cellular; microwave radio relay, fiber-optic cable, and a domestic satellite system with 40 earth stations serve the trunk network (2020)" + "text": "roughly 15 per 100 fixed-line and 130 per 100 mobile-cellular; microwave radio relay, fiber-optic cable, and a domestic satellite system with 40 earth stations serve the trunk network (2021)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 54; landing points for the UNISUR, Bicentenario, Atlantis-2, SAm-1, and SAC, Tannat, Malbec and ARBR submarine cable systems that provide links to Europe, Africa, South and Central America, and US; satellite earth stations - 112 (2019)" @@ -1141,10 +1141,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "39,024,016 (2020 est.)" + "text": "39,853,610 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "86% (2020 est.)" + "text": "87% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1257,7 +1257,7 @@ "text": "Bahia Blanca, Buenos Aires, La Plata, Punta Colorada, Ushuaia" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Buenos Aires (1,485,328) (2019)" + "text": "Buenos Aires (1,446,452) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Bahia Blanca" diff --git a/south-america/bl.json b/south-america/bl.json index 4d29b8a0..135bde85 100644 --- a/south-america/bl.json +++ b/south-america/bl.json @@ -871,10 +871,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "15.09 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$15.09 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "18.02 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$18.02 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/south-america/br.json b/south-america/br.json index 304c80e2..b5206be3 100644 --- a/south-america/br.json +++ b/south-america/br.json @@ -898,10 +898,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "733.7 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$733.7 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "756.3 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$756.3 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ "text": "DTSE/Gegua oil terminal, Ilha Grande (Gebig), Guaiba Island terminal, Guamare oil terminal" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Itajai (1,223,262), Paranagua (865,110), Santos (4,165,248) (2019)" + "text": "Itajai (1,610,092), Paranagua (1,044,157), Santos (4,442,876) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Pecem, Rio de Janiero" diff --git a/south-america/ci.json b/south-america/ci.json index 87701946..8d90322f 100644 --- a/south-america/ci.json +++ b/south-america/ci.json @@ -841,10 +841,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "57.75 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$57.75 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "65.38 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$65.38 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1226,7 +1226,7 @@ "text": "Coronel, Huasco, Lirquen, Puerto Ventanas, San Antonio, San Vicente, Valparaiso" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "San Antonio (1,709,635), Valparaiso (898,715) (2019)" + "text": "San Antonio (1,840,458), Valparaiso (793,118) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Mejillones, Quintero" diff --git a/south-america/co.json b/south-america/co.json index 18886a0e..1778b6d0 100644 --- a/south-america/co.json +++ b/south-america/co.json @@ -871,10 +871,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "83.35 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$83.35 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "91.73 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$91.73 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ "text": "Covenas offshore terminal" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Buenaventura (1,121,267), Cartagena (2,995,031) (2019)" + "text": "Buenaventura (1,082,746), Cartagena (3,343,810) (2021)" }, "river port(s)": { "text": "Barranquilla (Rio Magdalena)" diff --git a/south-america/ec.json b/south-america/ec.json index 9b1a56b2..76844060 100644 --- a/south-america/ec.json +++ b/south-america/ec.json @@ -867,10 +867,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "33.43 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$33.43 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "38.08 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$38.08 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1257,7 +1257,7 @@ "text": "Esmeraldas, Manta, Puerto Bolivar" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Guayaquil (1,680,751) (2019)" + "text": "Guayaquil (2,163,151) (2021)" }, "river port(s)": { "text": "Guayaquil (Guayas)" diff --git a/south-america/fk.json b/south-america/fk.json index c755cbd6..edacddcc 100644 --- a/south-america/fk.json +++ b/south-america/fk.json @@ -538,10 +538,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "67.1 million (FY09/10)" + "text": "$67.1 million (FY09/10)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "75.3 million (FY09/10)" + "text": "$75.3 million (FY09/10)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/south-america/gy.json b/south-america/gy.json index f7fc0b6c..64d149c7 100644 --- a/south-america/gy.json +++ b/south-america/gy.json @@ -823,10 +823,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.002 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.002 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.164 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$1.164 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/south-america/ns.json b/south-america/ns.json index e0fc9aaf..d1229071 100644 --- a/south-america/ns.json +++ b/south-america/ns.json @@ -825,10 +825,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "560.7 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$560.7 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "827.8 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$827.8 million (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/south-america/pa.json b/south-america/pa.json index ed1839b8..90d52891 100644 --- a/south-america/pa.json +++ b/south-america/pa.json @@ -850,10 +850,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "5.524 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$5.524 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "5.968 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$5.968 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/south-america/pe.json b/south-america/pe.json index c8ab9793..4ae0cd49 100644 --- a/south-america/pe.json +++ b/south-america/pe.json @@ -888,10 +888,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "58.06 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$58.06 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "64.81 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$64.81 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1292,7 +1292,7 @@ "text": "Conchan oil terminal, La Pampilla oil terminal" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Callao (2,313,907) (2019)" + "text": "Balboa (3,563,432); Callao (2,486,425) (2021)" }, "river port(s)": { "text": "Iquitos, Pucallpa, Yurimaguas (Amazon)" @@ -1348,7 +1348,7 @@ }, "Transnational Issues": { "Disputes - international": { - "text": "

Peru-Bolivia: Peru rejects Bolivia's claim to restore maritime access through a sovereign corridor through Chile along the Peruvian border

Peru-Brazil: none identified

Peru-Chile: Bolivia continues to press for a sovereign corridor to the Pacific Ocean; any concession Chile makes to Bolivia to grant them a sovereign corridor requires approval by Peru under the terms of their treaty; in January 2018, the International Court of Justice ruled that Chile is not legally obligated to negotiate a sovereign corridor to the Pacific Ocean with Bolivia

Peru-Chile-Ecuador: Chile and Ecuador rejected Peru's November 2005 unilateral legislation to shift the axis of their joint treaty-defined maritime boundaries along the parallels of latitude to equidistance lines out to 200 nautical miles, which would give Peru 37,900 square kilometers of water

Peru-Colombia: organized illegal narcotics operations in Colombia have penetrated Peru's shared border; problems also include crossborder illegal migration, human trafficking, and contraband smuggling

Peru-Ecuador: in 1999, Tiwinza memorial park wasvcreated on lands that remains sovereign Peruvian territory, but Ecuador has the right to maintain and administer it in perpetuity

" + "text": "

Peru-Bolivia: Peru rejects Bolivia's claim to restore maritime access through a sovereign corridor through Chile along the Peruvian border

Peru-Brazil: none identified

Peru-Chile: Bolivia continues to press for a sovereign corridor to the Pacific Ocean; any concession Chile makes to Bolivia to grant them a sovereign corridor requires approval by Peru under the terms of their treaty; in January 2018, the International Court of Justice ruled that Chile is not legally obligated to negotiate a sovereign corridor to the Pacific Ocean with Bolivia

Peru-Chile-Ecuador: Chile and Ecuador rejected Peru's November 2005 unilateral legislation to shift the axis of their joint treaty-defined maritime boundaries along the parallels of latitude to equidistance lines out to 200 nautical miles, which would give Peru 37,900 square kilometers of water

Peru-Colombia: organized illegal narcotics operations in Colombia have penetrated Peru's shared border; problems also include cross border illegal migration, human trafficking, and contraband smuggling

Peru-Ecuador: in 1999, Tiwinza memorial park was created on lands that remains sovereign Peruvian territory, but Ecuador has the right to maintain and administer it in perpetuity

" }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { diff --git a/south-america/uy.json b/south-america/uy.json index 7289da46..e52f55db 100644 --- a/south-america/uy.json +++ b/south-america/uy.json @@ -850,10 +850,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "17.66 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$17.66 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "19.72 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$19.72 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/south-america/ve.json b/south-america/ve.json index feebe403..6c17f31f 100644 --- a/south-america/ve.json +++ b/south-america/ve.json @@ -824,10 +824,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "92.8 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$92.8 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "189.7 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$189.7 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1206,8 +1206,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Bolivarian National Armed Forces (Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana, FANB): Bolivarian Army (Ejercito Bolivariano, EB), Bolivarian Navy (Armada Bolivariana, AB; includes marines, Coast Guard), Bolivarian Military Aviation (Aviacion Militar Bolivariana, AMB; includes a joint-service Aerospace Defense Command (Comando de Defensa Aeroespacial Integral, CODAI), Bolivarian Militia (Milicia Bolivariana), Bolivarian National Guard (Guardia Nacional Bolivaria, GNB) 

Bolivarian National Police: Special Action Forces (Fuerzas de Acciones Especiales, FAES) (2022)", - "note": "note 1: the Bolivarian Militia was added as a \"special component\" to the FANB in 2020; it is comprised of armed civilians who receive periodic training in exchange for a small stipend

note 2: the National Guard is responsible for maintaining public order, guarding the exterior of key government installations and prisons, conducting counter-narcotics operations, monitoring borders, and providing law enforcement in remote areas; it reports to both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, Justice, and Peace

note 3: the FAES police paramilitary unit was created by President MADURO after the 2017 anti-government protests to bolster internal security; it has been accused of multiple human rights abuses " + "text": "Bolivarian National Armed Forces (Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana, FANB): Bolivarian Army (Ejercito Bolivariano, EB), Bolivarian Navy (Armada Bolivariana, AB; includes marines, Coast Guard), Bolivarian Military Aviation (Aviacion Militar Bolivariana, AMB; includes a joint-service Aerospace Defense Command (Comando de Defensa Aeroespacial Integral, CODAI), Bolivarian Militia (Milicia Bolivariana), Bolivarian National Guard (Guardia Nacional Bolivaria, GNB) 

Bolivarian National Police (Policía Nacional Bolivariana, PNB) includes the Special Action Forces (Fuerzas de Acciones Especiales, FAES) (2022)", + "note": "note 1: the Bolivarian Militia was added as a \"special component\" to the FANB in 2020; it is comprised of armed civilians who receive periodic training in exchange for a small stipend

note 2: the National Guard is responsible for maintaining public order, guarding the exterior of key government installations and prisons, conducting counter-narcotics operations, monitoring borders, and providing law enforcement in remote areas; it reports to both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, Justice, and Peace

note 3: the PNB's FAES paramilitary unit was created by President MADURO after the 2017 anti-government protests to bolster internal security; it has been accused of multiple human rights abuses " }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2019": { @@ -1227,7 +1227,8 @@ } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { - "text": "information varies; approximately 125-150,000 active personnel, including about 25-30,000 National Guard; approximately 200-225,000 Bolivarian Militia (2022)" + "text": "information varies; approximately 125-150,000 active personnel, including about 25-30,000 National Guard; approximately 200-225,000 Bolivarian Militia; approximately 45,000 National Police (2022)", + "note": "note: in December 2022, President Nicolas MADURO announced that the National Police would be increased to 100,000 in 2024 " }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { "text": "the FANB inventory is mainly of Chinese and Russian origin with a smaller mix of equipment from Western countries, including the US; since 2010, Russia has been the top supplier of military hardware to Venezuela (2022)" diff --git a/south-asia/af.json b/south-asia/af.json index 92fe68d1..16118256 100644 --- a/south-asia/af.json +++ b/south-asia/af.json @@ -849,10 +849,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "2.276 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$2.276 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "5.328 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$5.328 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/south-asia/bg.json b/south-asia/bg.json index ea5a1811..de6595db 100644 --- a/south-asia/bg.json +++ b/south-asia/bg.json @@ -884,10 +884,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "25.1 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$25.1 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "33.5 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$33.5 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1131,18 +1131,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1,390,048 (2020 est.)" + "text": "587,476 (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1 (2020 est.)" + "text": "0 (2021 est.) less than 1" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "176,279,465 (2020 est.)" + "text": "181,021,227 (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "107 (2020 est.)" + "text": "107 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1150,7 +1150,7 @@ "text": "Bangladesh’s economic resurgence over the last decade took a battering in 2020 and 2021 as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic; the country had been on track to move off the United Nation’s Least Developed Countries list by 2026, however the crisis may have pushed that back a few years; the telecommunications sector experienced a set of challenges, with mobile data usage exploding at the same time as many consumers were being forced to curb their spending in other areas; the demand on data grew so large and so rapidly that Bangladesh came close to running out of bandwidth; at the start of 2020, Bangladesh was consuming around 900Gb/s on average, well below the 2,642GB/s capacity of its submarine cables; this ballooned to over 2,300Gb/s during the pandemic; Bangladesh was looking forward to adding 7,200Gb/s capacity when the SEA-ME-WE-6 submarine cable goes into service in mid-2024, but the sudden upsurge in downloads is forcing state-run company Bangladesh Submarine Cable Company Limited (BSCCL) to scramble to find alternatives before the country’s internet supply is maxed out; the increased demand during the Covid-19 crisis also put pressure on the country’s existing mobile networks, already under strain as a result of strong growth in the mobile broadband market coupled with significant untapped potential for mobile services in general across the country; this led to premium prices being paid at auction for spectrum in the 1800MHz and 2100MHz bands, most of which will be used to enhance and expand LTE services; a 5G spectrum auction had been anticipated for 2020, but low interest from the MNOs in going down that path when there are still so many areas waiting for LTE access means that 5G  will likely be deferred until 2023 (2021)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "fixed-line teledensity remains less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular telephone subscribership has been increasing rapidly and now exceeds 107 per 100 persons; mobile subscriber growth is anticipated over the next five years to 2023 (2020)" + "text": "fixed-line teledensity remains less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular telephone subscribership has been increasing rapidly and now exceeds 107 per 100 persons; mobile subscriber growth is anticipated over the next five years to 2023 (2021)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 880; landing points for the SeaMeWe-4 and SeaMeWe-5 fiber-optic submarine cable system that provides links to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia; satellite earth stations - 6; international radiotelephone communications and landline service to neighboring countries (2019)" @@ -1278,7 +1278,7 @@ "text": "Chattogram (Chittagong)" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Chattogram (Chittagong) (3,088,187) (2019)" + "text": "Chattogram (Chittagong) (3,214,548) (2021)" }, "river port(s)": { "text": "Mongla Port (Sela River)" diff --git a/south-asia/bt.json b/south-asia/bt.json index 0dd290da..f8750974 100644 --- a/south-asia/bt.json +++ b/south-asia/bt.json @@ -750,10 +750,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "655.3 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$655.3 million (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "737.4 million (2017 est.)" + "text": "$737.4 million (2017 est.)" }, "note": "note: the Government of India finances nearly one-quarter of Bhutan's budget expenditures" }, @@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ "text": "2.334 million kW (2020 est.)" }, "consumption": { - "text": "4,314,890,000 kWh (2019 est.)" + "text": "4.315 billion kWh (2019 est.)" }, "exports": { "text": "4.6 billion kWh (2019 est.)" diff --git a/south-asia/ce.json b/south-asia/ce.json index bebe3dfe..235048e2 100644 --- a/south-asia/ce.json +++ b/south-asia/ce.json @@ -861,10 +861,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "12.07 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$12.07 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "16.88 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$16.88 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1243,7 +1243,7 @@ "text": "Colombo" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Colombo (7,228,337) (2019)" + "text": "Colombo (7,250,000) (2021)" } } }, @@ -1270,7 +1270,8 @@ } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { - "text": "approximately 240,000 total personnel (170,000 Army; 40,000 Navy; 30,000 Air Force); approximately 11,000 Special Task Force personnel (2022)" + "text": "approximately 260,000 total personnel (200,000 Army; 30,000 Navy; 30,000 Air Force); approximately 11,000 Special Task Force personnel (2023)", + "note": "note: in January 2023, Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Defense announced plans to decrease the size of the Army to 135,000 by 2024 and 100,000 by 2030" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { "text": "the military's inventory consists mostly of Chinese and Russian-origin equipment with a smaller mix of material from countries such as India and the US; since 2010, China, India, and the US have been the leading suppliers of arms to Sri Lanka (2022)" diff --git a/south-asia/in.json b/south-asia/in.json index 6e0322e3..8c07a98d 100644 --- a/south-asia/in.json +++ b/south-asia/in.json @@ -905,10 +905,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "238.2 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$238.2 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "329 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$329 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { @@ -1306,7 +1306,7 @@ "text": "Chennai, Jawaharal Nehru Port, Kandla, Kolkata (Calcutta), Mumbai (Bombay), Sikka, Vishakhapatnam" }, "container port(s) (TEUs)": { - "text": "Jawaharal Nehru Port (5,100,891), Mundra (4,732,699) (2019)" + "text": "Jawaharal Nehru Port (5,630,000), Mundra (6,660,000) (2021)" }, "LNG terminal(s) (import)": { "text": "Dabhol, Dahej, Hazira, Kochi" @@ -1319,6 +1319,9 @@ "note": "note 1: the Defense Security Corps provides security for Ministry of Defense sites

note 2: the Border Security Force (BSF) is responsible for the Indo-Pakistan and Indo-Bangladesh borders; the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB or Armed Border Force) guards the Indo-Nepal and Indo-Bhutan borders

note 3: the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) includes a Rapid Reaction Force (RAF) for riot control and the Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (COBRA) for counter-insurgency operations 

note 4: the Assam Rifles are under the administrative control of the Ministry of Home Affairs, while operational control falls under the Ministry of Defense (specifically the Indian Army)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2022": { + "text": "2.1% of GDP (2022 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2021": { "text": "2.2% of GDP (2021 est.)" }, @@ -1326,13 +1329,10 @@ "text": "2.6% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2019": { - "text": "2.4% of GDP (2019) (approximately $93.9 billion)" + "text": "2.4% of GDP (2019 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2018": { - "text": "2.4% of GDP (2018) (approximately $88.2 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2017": { - "text": "2.4% of GDP (2017) (approximately $83.8 billion)" + "text": "2.4% of GDP (2018 est.)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { @@ -1343,7 +1343,7 @@ }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "ages vary by service, but generally 16.5-27 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; no conscription (2022)", - "note": "note 1: in 2022, the Indian Government announced that it would begin recruiting 46,000 men aged 17.5-21 annually to serve on 4-year contracts under a process called the Agnipath scheme; at the end of their tenure, 25% would be retained for longer terms of service, while the remainder would be forced to leave the military, although some of those leaving would be eligible to serve in the Coast Guard, the Merchant Navy, civilian positions in the Ministry of Defense, and in the paramilitary forces of the Ministry of Home Affairs, such as the Central Armed Police Forces and Assam Rifles

note 2: as of 2022, women made up about .59% of the Army, 1.1% of the Air Force, and 6% of the Navy

note 3: the Indian military accepts citizens of Nepal and Bhutan; descendants of refugees from Tibet who arrived before 1962 and have resided permanently in India; peoples of Indian origin from nations such as Burma, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, and Vietnam with the intention of permanently settling in India; eligible candidates from “friendly foreign nations” may apply to the Armed Forces Medical Services 

note 4: the British began to recruit Nepalese citizens (Gurkhas) into the East India Company Army during the Anglo-Nepalese War (1814-1816), and the Gurkhas subsequently were brought into the British Indian Army; following the partition of India in 1947, an agreement between Nepal, India, and Great Britain allowed for the transfer of the 10 regiments from the British Indian Army to the separate British and Indian armies; six regiments of Gurkhas (aka Gorkhas in India) regiments went to the new Indian Army; a seventh regiment was later added " + "note": "note 1: in 2022, the Indian Government announced that it would begin recruiting 46,000 men aged 17.5-21 annually to serve on 4-year contracts under a process called the Agnipath scheme; at the end of their tenure, 25% would be retained for longer terms of service, while the remainder would be forced to leave the military, although some of those leaving would be eligible to serve in the Coast Guard, the Merchant Navy, civilian positions in the Ministry of Defense, and in the paramilitary forces of the Ministry of Home Affairs, such as the Central Armed Police Forces and Assam Rifles

note 2: as of 2022, women made up about .59% of the Army, 1.1% of the Air Force, and 6% of the Navy; women in the Army were not allowed to serve in combat arms; the Air Force has allowed women to serve as fighter pilots since 2016; in 2022, the Navy announced it would allow women to serve in every branch of the service, including submarines and aviation

note 3: the Indian military accepts citizens of Nepal and Bhutan; descendants of refugees from Tibet who arrived before 1962 and have resided permanently in India; peoples of Indian origin from nations such as Burma, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, and Vietnam with the intention of permanently settling in India; eligible candidates from “friendly foreign nations” may apply to the Armed Forces Medical Services 

note 4: the British began to recruit Nepalese citizens (Gurkhas) into the East India Company Army during the Anglo-Nepalese War (1814-1816), and the Gurkhas subsequently were brought into the British Indian Army; following the partition of India in 1947, an agreement between Nepal, India, and Great Britain allowed for the transfer of the 10 regiments from the British Indian Army to the separate British and Indian armies; six regiments of Gurkhas (aka Gorkhas in India) regiments went to the new Indian Army; a seventh regiment was later added" }, "Military deployments": { "text": "1,900 Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO); 110 Golan Heights (UNDOF); 900 Lebanon (UNIFIL); 2,350 South Sudan (UNMISS); 310 Sudan (UNISFA) (May 2022)" diff --git a/south-asia/mv.json b/south-asia/mv.json index 4d27a032..a45d1971 100644 --- a/south-asia/mv.json +++ b/south-asia/mv.json @@ -789,10 +789,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "1.19 billion (2016 est.)" + "text": "$1.19 billion (2016 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "1.643 billion (2016 est.)" + "text": "$1.643 billion (2016 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/south-asia/np.json b/south-asia/np.json index e759f3d4..8739fb6d 100644 --- a/south-asia/np.json +++ b/south-asia/np.json @@ -842,10 +842,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "5.925 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$5.925 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "5.945 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$5.945 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { diff --git a/south-asia/pk.json b/south-asia/pk.json index 9d4ffdad..0a3ba2f3 100644 --- a/south-asia/pk.json +++ b/south-asia/pk.json @@ -898,10 +898,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "46.81 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$46.81 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "64.49 billion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$64.49 billion (2017 est.)" }, "note": "note: data are for fiscal years" }, diff --git a/world/xx.json b/world/xx.json index f409e481..96b55740 100644 --- a/world/xx.json +++ b/world/xx.json @@ -571,10 +571,10 @@ }, "Budget": { "revenues": { - "text": "21.68 trillion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$21.68 trillion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { - "text": "23.81 trillion (2017 est.)" + "text": "$23.81 trillion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {