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@ -1069,18 +1069,18 @@
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"Communications": {
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"Telephones - fixed lines": {
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"total subscriptions": {
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"text": "4,784,306 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "5,097,095 (2021 est.)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "11 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "12 (2021 est.)"
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}
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},
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"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
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"total subscriptions": {
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"text": "45,555,673 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "47,028,685 (2021 est.)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "104 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "106 (2021 est.)"
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}
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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@ -1088,7 +1088,7 @@
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"text": "Algeria has a steadily developing telecom infrastructure with growth encouraged by supportive regulatory measures and by government policies aimed at delivering serviceable internet connections across the country; mobile broadband is largely based on 3G and LTE, and the data rates are also low in global terms; LTE is available in all provinces, investment is required from the mobile network operators (MNOs) to improve the quality of service; the state has previously been hesitant to commit to 5G, instead encouraging the MNOs to undertake upgrades to LTE infrastructure before investing in commercial 5G services; in March 2022, the state is in the process of freeing up the requisite spectrum to enable the MNOs to launch 5G services sometime this year; fixed internet speeds remain slow (2022)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "a limited network of fixed-lines with a teledensity of slightly less than 11 telephones per 100 persons has been offset by the rapid increase in mobile-cellular subscribership; mobile-cellular teledensity was approximately 104 telephones per 100 persons in 2020 (2020)"
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"text": "a limited network of fixed-lines with a teledensity of slightly less than 12 telephones per 100 persons has been offset by the rapid increase in mobile-cellular subscribership; mobile-cellular teledensity was approximately 106 telephones per 100 persons in 2020 (2021)"
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},
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"international": {
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"text": "country code - 213; ALPAL-2 is a submarine telecommunications cable system in the Mediterranean Sea linking Algeria and the Spanish Balearic island of Majorca; ORVAL is a submarine cable to Spain; landing points for the TE North/TGN-Eurasia/SEACOM/SeaMeWe-4 fiber-optic submarine cable system that provides links to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia; MED cable connecting Algeria with France; microwave radio relay to Italy, France, Spain, Morocco, and Tunisia; Algeria part of the 4,500 Km terrestrial Trans Sahara Backbone network which connects to other fiber networks in the region; Alcomstat-1 satellite offering telemedicine network (2020)"
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@ -1098,18 +1098,18 @@
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"Communications": {
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"Telephones - fixed lines": {
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"total subscriptions": {
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"text": "119,164 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "119,826 (2021 est.)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
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"text": "(2021 est.) less than 1"
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}
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},
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"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
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"total subscriptions": {
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"text": "14,645,050 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "15,327,864 (2021 est.)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "45 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "44 (2021 est.)"
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}
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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@ -1117,7 +1117,7 @@
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"text": "Angola’s telecom sector in recent years has benefited from political stability, which has encouraged foreign investment in the sector; the government and regulator have also set in train mechanisms to open up the telecom sector to new competitors, mobile services were launched in April 2022; the MNOs were slow to develop LTE services, instead relying on their GSM and 3G network capabilities; there has been slow progress in LTE network development, with only a small proportion of the country covered by network infrastructure; the Ministry of Telecommunications in early 2021 set up a 5G hub to assess 5G user cases; the regulator in November 2021 granted licenses to various companies offering 5G services, with spectrum in the 3.3-3.7GHz range having been set aside for such services (2022)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "only about one fixed-line per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity about 45 telephones per 100 persons (2020)"
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"text": "less than one fixed-line per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity about 44 telephones per 100 persons (2021)"
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},
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"international": {
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"text": "country code - 244; landing points for the SAT-3/WASC, WACS, ACE and SACS fiber-optic submarine cable that provides connectivity to other countries in west Africa, Brazil, Europe and Asia; satellite earth stations - 29, Angosat-2 satellite expected by 2021 (2019)"
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@ -1250,6 +1250,9 @@
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"Military service age and obligation": {
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"text": "18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary military service for men and women; no conscription (2022)"
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},
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"Military deployments": {
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"text": "approximately 300 Mozambique (Southern African Development Community force) (2023)"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "Bechuanaland/Botswana did not have a permanent military during colonial times, with the British colonial administrators relying instead on small, lightly armed constabularies such as the Bechuanaland Mounted Police, the Bechuanaland Border Police, and by the early 1960s, the Police Mobile Unit (PMU); after independence in 1966, Botswana militarized the PMU and gave it responsibility for the country’s defense rather than create a conventional military force; however, turmoil in neighboring countries and numerous cross-border incursions by Rhodesian and South African security forces in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated that the PMU was inadequate for defending the country and led to the establishment of the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) in 1977; as of 2022, the BDF’s primary missions included securing territorial integrity/border security and internal duties such as disaster relief and anti-poaching <br><br>Botswana participates in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force, and in 2021-2022 contributed nearly 300 troops to the SADC’s effort to help the Mozambique Government suppress an insurgency (2022)"
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}
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@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
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"text": "Atlantic Ocean drainage: Niger (2,261,741 sq km), Volta (410,991 sq km)"
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},
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"Population distribution": {
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"text": "the population is primarily located in the south, with the highest concentration of people residing in and around the cities on the Atlantic coast; most of the north remains sparsely populated with higher concentrations of residents in the west at shown in this population distribution map"
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"text": "the population is primarily located in the south, with the highest concentration of people residing in and around the cities on the Atlantic coast; most of the north remains sparsely populated with higher concentrations of residents in the west as shown in this population distribution map"
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},
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"Natural hazards": {
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"text": "hot, dry, dusty harmattan wind may affect north from December to March"
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@ -185,7 +185,7 @@
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"text": "0.24 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2022 est.)"
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},
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"Population distribution": {
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"text": "the population is primarily located in the south, with the highest concentration of people residing in and around the cities on the Atlantic coast; most of the north remains sparsely populated with higher concentrations of residents in the west at shown in this population distribution map"
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"text": "the population is primarily located in the south, with the highest concentration of people residing in and around the cities on the Atlantic coast; most of the north remains sparsely populated with higher concentrations of residents in the west as shown in this population distribution map"
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},
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"Urbanization": {
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"urban population": {
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@ -625,13 +625,13 @@
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},
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"Legislative branch": {
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"description": {
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"text": "unicameral National Assembly or Assemblee Nationale (83 seats - current 81; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote; members serve 4-year terms)"
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"text": "unicameral National Assembly or Assemblee Nationale (109 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote; members serve 4-year terms)"
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},
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"elections": {
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"text": "last held on 28 April 2019 (next to be held in April 2023)"
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"text": "last held on 8 January 2023 (next to be held January 2027)"
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},
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"election results": {
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"text": "percent of vote by party - Union Progressiste 56.2%, Bloc Republicain 43.8%; seats by party - Union Progressiste 47, Bloc Republicain 36; composition as of February 2022 - men 75, women 6, percent of women 7.4%"
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"text": "percent of vote by party - Progressive Union for Renewal 37.5%, Bloc Republicain 29.3%, The Democrats 24.6%; seats by party - Progressive Union for Renewal 53, Bloc Republicain 28, The Democrats 28; composition as of January 2023 - men 81, women 28, percent of women 25.6%"
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}
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},
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"Judicial branch": {
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@ -1278,7 +1278,7 @@
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},
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"Trafficking in persons": {
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"tier rating": {
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"text": "Tier 2 Watch List — Chad does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; officials investigated trafficking cases and finalized a National Action Plan (NAP) for 2021-2022 and began implementation of standard operating procedures and a National Referral Mechanism for identifying and referring victims for care; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increased efforts to increase anti-trafficking capacity; government turnover hindered Chad’s ability to maintain consistent anti-trafficking efforts and reporting; authorities did not report prosecuting or convicting any traffickers, identifying victims, or conducting awareness campaigns; nonetheless, because the government has devoted sufficient resources to a written plan that, if implemented, would constitute significant efforts to meet the minimum standards, Chad was granted a waiver per the TVPA from downgrade to Tier 3; therefore, Chad remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the third consecutive year (2022)"
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"text": "Tier 2 Watch List — Chad does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; officials investigated trafficking cases and finalized a National Action Plan for 2021-2022 and began implementation of standard operating procedures and a National Referral Mechanism for identifying and referring victims for care; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increased efforts to increase anti-trafficking capacity; government turnover hindered Chad’s ability to maintain consistent anti-trafficking efforts and reporting; authorities did not report prosecuting or convicting any traffickers, identifying victims, or conducting awareness campaigns; nonetheless, because the government has devoted sufficient resources to a written plan that, if implemented, would constitute significant efforts to meet the minimum standards, Chad was granted a waiver per the TVPA from downgrade to Tier 3; therefore, Chad remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the third consecutive year (2022)"
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},
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"trafficking profile": {
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"text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Chad, and traffickers exploit Chadian victims abroad; most trafficking is internal; some children are sent by their parents to relatives or intermediaries to receive education, an apprenticeship, goods, or money and are then forced to work in domestic service or cattle herding; children are also forced to work in agriculture, gold mines, charcoal vending, and fishing, and those attending Koranic schools are forced into begging and street vending; girls from rural areas who search for work in larger towns are exploited in sex trafficking and domestic servitude; terrorist groups abduct children to serve as soldiers, suicide bombers, brides, and forced laborers (2022)"
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},
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"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
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"refugees (country of origin)": {
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"text": "355,667 (Central African Republic), 132,151 (Nigeria) (2022)"
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"text": "346,689 (Central African Republic), 124,651 (Nigeria) (2022)"
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},
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"IDPs": {
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"text": "983,281 (2022) (includes far north, northwest, and southwest)"
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},
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"Trafficking in persons": {
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"tier rating": {
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"text": "Tier 2 Watch List —<strong> </strong>Cameroon does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; authorities prosecuted and convicted more alleged traffickers; the government extended the 2020-2021 national action plan (NAP) for an additional two years and conducted trafficking awareness activities; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts to improve anti-trafficking capacity; officials investigated fewer trafficking cases and identified fewer victims, and did not investigate allegations of security forces involvement in sexual exploitation of women; officials prosecuted and convicted fewer traffickers; standard operating procedures for the identification and referral of trafficking victims were not widely disseminated; the government did not pass draft anti-trafficking legislation pending since 2012 to address victim and witness protection in conformity with international law; nonetheless, because the government devoted sufficient efforts to meet the minimum standards, Cameroon was granted a waiver per the TVPA from a downgrade to Tier 3, therefore Cameroon remained on Tier 2 Watch List for a third consecutive year (2022)"
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"text": "Tier 2 Watch List —<strong> </strong>Cameroon does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; authorities prosecuted and convicted more alleged traffickers; the government extended the 2020-2021 national action plan for an additional two years and conducted trafficking awareness activities; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts to improve anti-trafficking capacity; officials investigated fewer trafficking cases and identified fewer victims, and did not investigate allegations of security forces involvement in sexual exploitation of women; officials prosecuted and convicted fewer traffickers; standard operating procedures for the identification and referral of trafficking victims were not widely disseminated; the government did not pass draft anti-trafficking legislation pending since 2012 to address victim and witness protection in conformity with international law; nonetheless, because the government devoted sufficient efforts to meet the minimum standards, Cameroon was granted a waiver per the TVPA from a downgrade to Tier 3, therefore Cameroon remained on Tier 2 Watch List for a third consecutive year (2022)"
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},
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"trafficking profile": {
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"text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Cameroon, and traffickers exploit victims from Cameroon abroad; deteriorating economic and education conditions and diminished police and judicial presence caused by conflict in the Northwest and Southwest has left displaced persons vulnerable to trafficking; parents may be lured by promises of education or a better life for their children in urban areas, and then the children are subject to forced labor and sex trafficking; teenagers and adolescents may be lured to cities with promises of employment and then become victims of forced labor and sex trafficking; children from neighboring countries are forced to work in spare parts shops or cattle grazing by business owners and herders; Cameroonians, often from rural areas, are exploited in forced labor and sex trafficking in the Middle East, Europe, the United States, and African countries (2022)"
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"text": "6,613 (Democratic Republic of Congo) (2022)"
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},
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"IDPs": {
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"text": "484,335 (clashes between army and rebel groups since 2005; tensions between ethnic groups) (2022)"
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"text": "518,116 (clashes between army and rebel groups since 2005; tensions between ethnic groups) (2022)"
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}
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}
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}
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},
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"Economy": {
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"Economic overview": {
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"text": "<p>Ethiopia - the second most populous country in Africa - is a one-party state with a planned economy. For more than a decade before 2016, GDP grew at a rate between 8% and 11% annually – one of the fastest growing states among the 188 IMF member countries. This growth was driven by government investment in infrastructure, as well as sustained progress in the agricultural and service sectors. More than 70% of Ethiopia’s population is still employed in the agricultural sector, but services have surpassed agriculture as the principal source of GDP.</p> <p> </p> <p>Ethiopia has the lowest level of income-inequality in Africa and one of the lowest in the world, with a Gini coefficient comparable to that of the Scandinavian countries. Yet despite progress toward eliminating extreme poverty, Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the world, due both to rapid population growth and a low starting base. Changes in rainfall associated with world-wide weather patterns resulted in the worst drought in 30 years in 2015-16, creating food insecurity for millions of Ethiopians.</p> <p> </p> <p>The state is heavily engaged in the economy. Ongoing infrastructure projects include power production and distribution, roads, rails, airports and industrial parks. Key sectors are state-owned, including telecommunications, banking and insurance, and power distribution. Under Ethiopia's constitution, the state owns all land and provides long-term leases to tenants. Title rights in urban areas, particularly Addis Ababa, are poorly regulated, and subject to corruption.</p> <p> </p> <p>Ethiopia’s foreign exchange earnings are led by the services sector - primarily the state-run Ethiopian Airlines - followed by exports of several commodities. While coffee remains the largest foreign exchange earner, Ethiopia is diversifying exports, and commodities such as gold, sesame, khat, livestock and horticulture products are becoming increasingly important. Manufacturing represented less than 8% of total exports in 2016, but manufacturing exports should increase in future years due to a growing international presence.</p> <p> </p> <p>The banking, insurance, telecommunications, and micro-credit industries are restricted to domestic investors, but Ethiopia has attracted roughly $8.5 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI), mostly from China, Turkey, India and the EU; US FDI is $567 million. Investment has been primarily in infrastructure, construction, agriculture/horticulture, agricultural processing, textiles, leather and leather products.</p> <p> </p> <p>To support industrialization in sectors where Ethiopia has a comparative advantage, such as textiles and garments, leather goods, and processed agricultural products, Ethiopia plans to increase installed power generation capacity by 8,320 MW, up from a capacity of 2,000 MW, by building three more major dams and expanding to other sources of renewable energy. In 2017, the government devalued the birr by 15% to increase exports and alleviate a chronic foreign currency shortage in the country.</p>"
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"text": "<p>Ethiopia - the second most populous country in Africa - is a one-party state with a planned economy. For more than a decade before 2016, GDP grew at a rate between 8% and 11% annually – one of the fastest growing states among the 188 IMF member countries. This growth was driven by government investment in infrastructure, as well as sustained progress in the agricultural and service sectors. More than 70% of Ethiopia’s population is still employed in the agricultural sector, but services have surpassed agriculture as the principal source of GDP.</p> <p>Ethiopia has the lowest level of income-inequality in Africa and one of the lowest in the world, with a Gini coefficient comparable to that of the Scandinavian countries. Yet despite progress toward eliminating extreme poverty, Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the world, due both to rapid population growth and a low starting base. Changes in rainfall associated with world-wide weather patterns resulted in the worst drought in 30 years in 2015-16, creating food insecurity for millions of Ethiopians.</p> <p>The state is heavily engaged in the economy. Ongoing infrastructure projects include power production and distribution, roads, rails, airports and industrial parks. Key sectors are state-owned, including telecommunications, banking and insurance, and power distribution. Under Ethiopia's constitution, the state owns all land and provides long-term leases to tenants. Title rights in urban areas, particularly Addis Ababa, are poorly regulated, and subject to corruption.</p> <p>Ethiopia’s foreign exchange earnings are led by the services sector - primarily the state-run Ethiopian Airlines - followed by exports of several commodities. While coffee remains the largest foreign exchange earner, Ethiopia is diversifying exports, and commodities such as gold, sesame, khat, livestock and horticulture products are becoming increasingly important. Manufacturing represented less than 8% of total exports in 2016, but manufacturing exports should increase in future years due to a growing international presence.</p> <p>The banking, insurance, telecommunications, and micro-credit industries are restricted to domestic investors, but Ethiopia has attracted roughly $8.5 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI), mostly from China, Turkey, India and the EU; US FDI is $567 million. Investment has been primarily in infrastructure, construction, agriculture/horticulture, agricultural processing, textiles, leather and leather products.</p> <p>To support industrialization in sectors where Ethiopia has a comparative advantage, such as textiles and garments, leather goods, and processed agricultural products, Ethiopia plans to increase installed power generation capacity by 8,320 MW, up from a capacity of 2,000 MW, by building three more major dams and expanding to other sources of renewable energy. In 2017, the government devalued the birr by 15% to increase exports and alleviate a chronic foreign currency shortage in the country.</p>"
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},
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"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
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"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2021": {
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}
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},
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"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
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"text": "information varies; prior to the 2020-21 Tigray conflict, approximately 150,000 active duty troops, including about 3,000 Air Force personnel (no personnel numbers available for the newly-established Navy) (2022)"
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"text": "information varies; prior to the 2020-2022 Tigray conflict, approximately 150,000 active-duty troops, including about 3,000 Air Force personnel (no personnel numbers available for the re-established Navy) (2022)"
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},
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"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
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"text": "the ENDF's inventory is comprised mostly of Soviet-era equipment from the 1970s; since 2010, the ENDF has received arms from a variety of countries, with China, Russia, and Ukraine as the leading suppliers; Ethiopia has a modest industrial defense base centered on small arms and production of armored vehicles (2021)"
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"text": "the ENDF's inventory is comprised mostly of Soviet-era equipment from the 1970s; since 2010, the ENDF has received arms from a variety of countries, including China, Russia, and Ukraine; Ethiopia has a modest industrial defense base centered on small arms and production of armored vehicles (2021)"
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},
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"Military service age and obligation": {
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"text": "18-22 years of age for voluntary military service (although the military may, when necessary, recruit a person more than 22 years old); no compulsory military service, but the military can conduct callups when necessary and compliance is compulsory (2022)",
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"text": "5-10,000 Somalia (4,500 for ATMIS; the remainder under a bilateral agreement with Somalia; note - bilateral figures are prior to the conflict with Tigray); 250 Sudan (UNISFA); 1,475 South Sudan (UNMISS) (2022)"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "since November 2020, the Government of Ethiopia has been engaged in a protracted military conflict with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the former governing party of the Tigray Region; the government deemed a TPLF attack on Ethiopia military forces as a domestic terrorism incident and launched a military offensive in response; the TPLF asserted that its actions were self-defense in the face of planned Ethiopian Government action to remove it from the provincial government; the Ethiopian Government sent large elements of the ENDF into Tigray to remove the TPLF and invited militia and paramilitary forces from the states of Afar and Amara, as well as the military forces of Eritrea, to assist; the fighting included heavy civilian and military casualties with widespread abuses reported; in March 2022, the Ethiopian Government declared a truce to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid into the Tigray region; the TPLF reciprocated with a truce of its own; however, fighting between the TPLF and the Ethiopian Government resumed in August 2022; the two sides agreed to another cease-fire in November 2022<br><br>the military forces of the Tigray regional government are known as the Tigray Defense Force (TDF); the TDF is comprised of state paramilitary forces, local militia, and troops that defected from the ENDF; it was reported to have up to 250,000 fighters at the start of the conflict<br><br>in 2022, the ENDF was also engaged in counterinsurgency operations against anti-government militants in several other states; the largest was in Oromya (Oromia) against the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA; aka Shene), an insurgent group that claimed to be fighting for greater autonomy for the Oromo, Ethiopia's largest ethnic group; the OLA was a member of a coalition of eight anti-government factions known as the United Front of Ethiopia and Confederalist Forces (UFEFCF); formed in 2021, the UFEFCF included the TPLF, as well as rebel groups of variable sizes from several regions of the country; the OLA has also clashed with ethnic militias (aka Fano) from the neighboring state of Amara<br><br>in July 2022, militants from the Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab launched an incursion into Ethiopia's Somali (Sumale) region, attacking villages and security forces; the Ethiopian Government claimed that regional security forces killed hundreds of Shabaab fighters and subsequently deployed additional ENDF troops into Somalia’s Gedo region to prevent further such incursions (2022)"
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"text": "from November of 2020 until a cease-fire was negotiated in November 2022, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) engaged in a military conflict with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the former governing party of the Tigray Region; the GoE deemed a TPLF attack on an ENDF base as a domestic terrorism incident and launched a military offensive in response; the TPLF asserted that its actions were self-defense in the face of planned GoE action to remove it from the provincial government; the GoE sent large elements of the ENDF into Tigray to remove the TPLF and invited militia and paramilitary forces from the states of Afar and Amara, as well as the military forces of Eritrea, to assist; TPLF military forces were known as the Tigray Defense Force (TDF) and were comprised of state paramilitary forces, local militia, and troops that defected from the ENDF; the fighting included heavy civilian and military casualties with widespread abuses reported<br><br>as of 2023, the ENDF was engaged in counterinsurgency operations against anti-government militants in several other states; the largest was in Oromya (Oromia) against the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA; aka Shene), an insurgent group that claimed to be fighting for greater autonomy for the Oromo, Ethiopia's largest ethnic group; the OLA was a member of a coalition of eight anti-government factions known as the United Front of Ethiopia and Confederalist Forces (UFEFCF); formed in 2021, the UFEFCF included the TPLF, as well as rebel groups of variable sizes from several regions of the country; the OLA has also clashed with ethnic militias (aka Fano) from the neighboring state of Amara<br><br>in July 2022, militants from the Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab launched an incursion into Ethiopia's Somali (Sumale) region, attacking villages and security forces; the GoE claimed that regional security forces killed hundreds of Shabaab fighters and subsequently deployed additional ENDF troops into Somalia’s Gedo region to prevent further incursions (2023)"
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}
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},
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"Terrorism": {
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},
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"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
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"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "408,541 (South Sudan), 251,593 (Somalia), 162,286 (Eritrea), 48,551 (Sudan) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "409,621 (South Sudan), 251,895 (Somalia), 162,286 (Eritrea), 48,551 (Sudan) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "2.72 million (includes conflict- and climate-induced IDPs, excluding unverified estimates from the Amhara region; border war with Eritrea from 1998-2000; ethnic clashes; and ongoing fighting between the Ethiopian military and separatist rebel groups in the Somali and Oromia regions; natural disasters; intercommunal violence; most IDPs live in Sumale state) (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -681,7 +681,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Eric W. KNEEDLER (since 20 January 2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Margaret \"Meg\" WHITMAN (since 5 August 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "P.O. Box 606 Village Market, 00621 Nairobi"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1249,7 +1249,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "72,192 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 48,449 (Burundi) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "72,192 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 48,367 (Burundi) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "9,500 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> implementation of conscription is reportedly uneven"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "Sudan joined the Saudi-led coalition that intervened in Yemen in 2015, reportedly providing as many as 40,000 troops during the peak of the war in 2016-17, mostly from the Rapid Support Forces; by 2021, Sudan had reduced the size of the force to about a brigade (approximately 2-3,000 troops) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "approximately 750 Democratic Republic of the Congo (East African Community stabilization force)<br><br>Sudan joined the Saudi-led coalition that intervened in Yemen in 2015, reportedly providing as many as 40,000 troops during the peak of the war in 2016-17, mostly from the Rapid Support Forces; by 2021, Sudan had reduced the size of the force to about a brigade (approximately 2-3,000 troops) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>the Sudanese military has been a dominant force in the ruling of the country since its independence in 1956; in addition, the Sudanese military and security forces have a large role in the country's economy, reportedly controlling over 200 commercial companies, including businesses involved in gold mining, rubber production, agriculture, and meat exports</p> the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has operated in the disputed Abyei region along the border between Sudan and South Sudan since 2011; UNISFA's mission includes ensuring security, protecting civilians, strengthening the capacity of the Abyei Police Service, de-mining, monitoring/verifying the redeployment of armed forces from the area, and facilitating the flow of humanitarian aid; UNISFA had about 2,000 personnel deployed as of mid-2022<br><br>in addition, the United Nations African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) operated in the war-torn Darfur region between 2007 and the end of its mandate in July 2021; UNAMID was a joint African Union-UN peacekeeping force with the mission of bringing stability to Darfur, including protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, and promoting mediation efforts, while peace talks on a final settlement continued; UNAMID withdrew the last of its personnel in December 2021; note - the October 2020 peace agreement provided for the establishment of a Joint Security Keeping Forces (JSKF) comprised of 12,000 personnel tasked with securing the Darfur region in the place of UNAMID; in June 2021, Sudan's transitional government announced it would increase the size of this force to 20,000 and expand its mission scope to include the capital and other parts of the country suffering from violence; the force would include the SAF, RSF, police, intelligence, and representatives from armed groups involved in peace negotiations; in Sep 2022, the first 2,000 members of the JSKF completed training (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1337,7 +1337,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "126,132 (Burundi), 80,360 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "126,241 (Burundi), 80,360 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1290,7 +1290,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "854,268 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 473,529 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 61,563 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 40,311 (Burundi), 26,671 (Eritrea), 23,251 (Rwanda), 5,317 (Ethiopia) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "854,268 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 473,529 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 61,563 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 40,630 (Burundi), 26,671 (Eritrea), 23,251 (Rwanda), 5,317 (Ethiopia) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -123,7 +123,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Muslim 63.2%, Roman Catholic 24.6%, Protestant 6.9%, traditional/animist 4.2%, none 0.7%, unspecified 0.4% (2017-18 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Demographic profile": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Burkina Faso has a young age structure – the result of declining mortality combined with steady high fertility – and continues to experience rapid population growth, which is putting increasing pressure on the country’s limited arable land. More than 65% of the population is under the age of 25, and the population is growing at 3% annually. Mortality rates, especially those of infants and children, have decreased because of improved health care, hygiene, and sanitation, but women continue to have an average of almost 6 children. Even if fertility were substantially reduced, today’s large cohort entering their reproductive years would sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future. Only about a third of the population is literate and unemployment is widespread, dampening the economic prospects of Burkina Faso’s large working-age population.</p> <p>Migration has traditionally been a way of life for Burkinabe, with seasonal migration being replaced by stints of up to two years abroad. Cote d’Ivoire remains the top destination, although it has experienced periods of internal conflict. Under French colonization, Burkina Faso became a main labor source for agricultural and factory work in Cote d’Ivoire. Burkinabe also migrated to Ghana, Mali, and Senegal for work between the world wars. Burkina Faso attracts migrants from Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Mali, who often share common ethnic backgrounds with the Burkinabe. Despite its food shortages and high poverty rate, Burkina Faso has become a destination for refugees in recent years and hosts about 26,000 Malian refugees as of July 2022.</p> (2018)"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Burkina Faso has a young age structure – the result of declining mortality combined with steady high fertility – and continues to experience rapid population growth, which is putting increasing pressure on the country’s limited arable land. More than 65% of the population is under the age of 25, and the population is growing at 3% annually. Mortality rates, especially those of infants and children, have decreased because of improved health care, hygiene, and sanitation, but women continue to have an average of almost 6 children. Even if fertility were substantially reduced, today’s large cohort entering their reproductive years would sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future. Only about a third of the population is literate and unemployment is widespread, dampening the economic prospects of Burkina Faso’s large working-age population.</p> <p>Migration has traditionally been a way of life for Burkinabe, with seasonal migration being replaced by stints of up to two years abroad. Cote d’Ivoire remains the top destination, although it has experienced periods of internal conflict. Under French colonization, Burkina Faso became a main labor source for agricultural and factory work in Cote d’Ivoire. Burkinabe also migrated to Ghana, Mali, and Senegal for work between the world wars. Burkina Faso attracts migrants from Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Mali, who often share common ethnic backgrounds with the Burkinabe. Despite its food shortages and high poverty rate, Burkina Faso has become a destination for refugees in recent years and hosts about 33,600 Malian refugees as of October 2022.</p> (2018)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Age structure": {
|
||||
"0-14 years": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -651,7 +651,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation in the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Charge d'Affaires Boulmonli Leonard LOMBO (since 15 April 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Charge d'Affaires Hermann Yirigouin TOE (since 27 September 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"chancery": {
|
||||
"text": "2340 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -68,7 +68,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Natural resources": {
|
||||
"text": "diamonds, copper, uranium, gold, silver, lead, tin, lithium, cadmium, tungsten, zinc, salt, hydropower, fish, note, suspected deposits of oil, coal, and iron ore"
|
||||
"text": "diamonds, copper, uranium, gold, silver, lead, tin, lithium, cadmium, tungsten, zinc, salt, hydropower, fish; note - suspected deposits of oil, coal, and iron ore"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Land use": {
|
||||
"agricultural land": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Ethnic groups": {
|
||||
"text": "Ovambo 50%, Kavangos 9%, Herero 7%, Damara 7%, mixed European and African ancestry 6.5%, European 6%, Nama 5%, Caprivian 4%, San 3%, Baster 2%, Tswana .5%"
|
||||
"text": "Ovambo 50%, Kavangos 9%, Herero 7%, Damara 7%, mixed European and African ancestry 6.5%, European 6%, Nama 5%, Caprivian 4%, San 3%, Baster 2%, Tswana 0.5%"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Languages": {
|
||||
"text": "Oshiwambo languages 49.7%, Nama/Damara 11%, Kavango languages 10.4%, Afrikaans 9.4% (also a common language), Herero languages 9.2%, Zambezi languages 4.9%, English (official) 2.3%, other African languages 1.5%, other European languages 0.7%, other 1% (2016 est.)",
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -794,7 +794,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "10,000 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "18 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "22 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -810,7 +810,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "American Samoa Telecommunications Authority, ASTCA, supplies telecommunication services to the residents of the American Samoan islands, a territory of the United States, which are found in a remote area of the Pacific Ocean; the primary system between the islands consists of fiber-optic cables and satellite connections; over Independence Day weekend 2021, the undersea fiber-optic cable linking the Tutuila and Manu’a Islands failed, completely stranding the Manu’a Islands from all telecommunication services; telecommunication services were restored to the people of Manu’a islands through microwave link between Tutuila to the Manu’a Islands; the link is now providing a steady 1Gbps backhaul most of the time of the year with 600Mbps at four 9’s availability, over this extremely long distance (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "nearly 18 per 100 fixed-line teledensity (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "nearly 22 per 100 fixed-line teledensity (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"international": {
|
||||
"text": "country code - 1-684; landing points for the ASH, Southern Cross NEXT and Hawaiki providing connectivity to New Zealand, Australia, American Samoa, Hawaii, California, and SAS connecting American Samoa with Samoa; satellite earth station - 1 (Intelsat-Pacific Ocean) (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -445,10 +445,10 @@
|
|||
"text": "unicameral Territorial Assembly or Assemblee Territoriale (20 seats - Wallis 13, Futuna 7; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by party-list proportional representation vote to serve 5-year terms)<br>Wallis and Futuna indirectly elects 1 senator to the French Senate by an electoral college by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 6-year term, and directly elects 1 deputy to the French National Assembly by absolute majority vote for a 5-year term"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections": {
|
||||
"text": "Territorial Assembly - last held on 20 March 2022 (next to be held in March 2027)<br>French Senate - last held on 24 and 27 September 2020 (next to be held by September 2023)<br>French National Assembly - last held on 11 June 2017 (next to be held in June 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Territorial Assembly - last held on 20 March 2022 (next to be held in March 2027)<br>French Senate - last held on 24 and 27 September 2020 (next to be held by September 2023)<br>French National Assembly - last held on 12 and 19 June 2022 (next to be held in June 2027)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "Territorial Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - 2 members are elected from the list Ofa mo'oni ki tou fenua and 2 members are elected from list Mauli fetokoniaki, 1 seat each from 16 other lists; composition - men NA, women NA, percent of women NA%<br>representation in French Senate - LR 1 (man)<br>representation in French National Assembly - independent 1 (man)"
|
||||
"text": "Territorial Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - 2 members are elected from the list Ofa mo'oni ki tou fenua and 2 members are elected from list Mauli fetokoniaki, 1 seat each from 16 other lists; composition - men NA, women NA, percent of women NA<br>representation in French Senate - LR 1 (man)<br>representation in French National Assembly - independent 1 (man)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -463,7 +463,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Political parties and leaders": {
|
||||
"text": "Left Radical Party or PRG [Guillaume LACROIX] (formerly Radical Socialist Party or PRS and the Left Radical Movement or MRG)<br>Lua Kae Tahi (Giscardians) (leader NA)<br>Rally for Wallis and Futuna-The Republicans (Rassemblement pour Wallis and Futuna) or RPWF-LR [Clovis LOGOLOGOFOLAU]<br>Socialist Party or PS<br>Taumu'a Lelei [Soane Muni UHILA]<br>Union Pour la Democratie Francaise or UDF"
|
||||
"text": "Left Radical Party or PRG [Guillaume LACROIX] (formerly Radical Socialist Party or PRS and the Left Radical Movement or MRG)<br>Lua Kae Tahi (Giscardians)<br>Rally for Wallis and Futuna-The Republicans (Rassemblement pour Wallis and Futuna) or RPWF-LR [Clovis LOGOLOGOFOLAU]<br>Socialist Party or PS<br>Taumu'a Lelei [Soane Muni UHILA]<br>Union Pour la Democratie Francaise or UDF"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"International organization participation": {
|
||||
"text": "PIF (observer), SPC, UPU"
|
||||
|
|
@ -487,7 +487,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Economy": {
|
||||
"Economic overview": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>The economy is limited to traditional subsistence agriculture, with about 80% of labor force earnings coming from agriculture (coconuts and vegetables), livestock (mostly pigs), and fishing. However, roughly 70% of the labor force is employed in the public sector, although only about a third of the population is in salaried employment.</p> <p> </p> <p>Revenues come from French Government subsidies, licensing of fishing rights to Japan and South Korea, import taxes, and remittances from expatriate workers in New Caledonia. France directly finances the public sector and health-care and education services. It also provides funding for key development projects in a range of areas, including infrastructure, economic development, environmental management, and health-care facilities.</p> <p> </p> <p>A key concern for Wallis and Futuna is an aging population with consequent economic development issues. Very few people aged 18-30 live on the islands due to the limited formal employment opportunities. Improving job creation is a current priority for the territorial government.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>The economy is limited to traditional subsistence agriculture, with about 80% of labor force earnings coming from agriculture (coconuts and vegetables), livestock (mostly pigs), and fishing. However, roughly 70% of the labor force is employed in the public sector, although only about a third of the population is in salaried employment.</p> <p>Revenues come from French Government subsidies, licensing of fishing rights to Japan and South Korea, import taxes, and remittances from expatriate workers in New Caledonia. France directly finances the public sector and health-care and education services. It also provides funding for key development projects in a range of areas, including infrastructure, economic development, environmental management, and health-care facilities.</p> <p>A key concern for Wallis and Futuna is an aging population with consequent economic development issues. Very few people aged 18-30 live on the islands due to the limited formal employment opportunities. Improving job creation is a current priority for the territorial government.</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
|
||||
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2004": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -592,7 +592,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> offical data; data cover general government debt and include debt instruments issued (or owned) by government entities other than the treasury; the data include treasury debt held by foreign entities; the data include debt issued by subnational entities, as well as intragovernmental debt; intragovernmental debt consists of treasury borrowings from surpluses in the social funds, such as for retirement, medical care, and unemployment; debt instruments for the social funds are not sold at public auctions"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Taxes and other revenues": {
|
||||
"text": "16.7% (of GDP) (2015 est.) NA"
|
||||
"text": "16.7% (of GDP) (2015 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Fiscal year": {
|
||||
"text": "calendar year"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Tier 2 Watch List — Aruba does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; the government identified more potential victims, investigated more trafficking cases, and produced a new awareness campaign; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts, compared to the previous reporting period, on its anti-trafficking capacity; authorities did not prosecute or convict any traffickers for the third consecutive year and sometimes relied on victims to self-identify; efforts depended on ad hoc funding, limiting key initiatives; officials conflated trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling, hindering the effectiveness of anti-trafficking efforts; because the government has devoted significant resources to a plan that, if implemented, would constitute significant efforts to meet minimum standards, Aruba was granted a waiver per the TVPA and thus remained on the Tier 2 Watch List for a third consecutive year (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"trafficking profile": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims; traffickers exploit Venezuelan women in sex trafficking, and foreign men and women are subject to forced labor in Aruba’s services and construction sectors; Venezuelans overstaying visas are at risk of forced labor in domestic service, construction, and commercial sex; Chinese men and women and Indian men are subject to forced labor in retail businesses and domestic service; Arubans force Caribbean and South American women into domestic servitude; Officials reported increases in forced criminality, where traffickers compel victims to commit unlawful acts, such as robberies and drug-related offenses (2022)</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims; traffickers exploit Venezuelan women in sex trafficking, and foreign men and women are subject to forced labor in Aruba’s services and construction sectors; Venezuelans overstaying visas are at risk of forced labor in domestic service, construction, and commercial sex; Chinese men and women and Indian men are subject to forced labor in retail businesses and domestic service; Arubans force Caribbean and South American women into domestic servitude; officials reported increases in forced criminality, where traffickers compel victims to commit unlawful acts, such as robberies and drug-related offenses (2022)</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Tier 2 Watch list – Antigua and Barbuda does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; more trafficking cases were investigated, Family and Social Services officials were trained for the first time, and funding continued for the National Action Plan; however, the government did not identify any victims for the second consecutive year, nor initiate any prosecutions or convictions of traffickers; therefore Antigua and Barbuda was downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"trafficking profile": {
|
||||
"text": "traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Antigua and Barbuda, and exploit victims from Antigua and Barbuda abroad; individuals from minority communities are at higher risk; documented and undocumented migrants from the Caribbean, notably Jamaica, Guyana, and the Dominican Republic, were victims of sex trafficking and forced labor; traffickers exploited victims in multiple-destination trafficking, arriving in Antigua and Barbuda for a few months before being exploited in other Caribbean countries such as St. Kitts and Nevis and Barbados. Sex trafficking, including girls, occurs in bars, taverns, and brothels; forced labor, including children, occurs in domestic service and retail stores, particularly family-owned businesses; Cuban and PRC nationals working in Antigua and Barbuda may have been forced to work by their own governments (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Antigua and Barbuda, and exploit victims from Antigua and Barbuda abroad; individuals from minority communities are at higher risk; documented and undocumented migrants from the Caribbean, notably Jamaica, Guyana, and the Dominican Republic, were victims of sex trafficking and forced labor; traffickers exploited victims in multiple-destination trafficking, arriving in Antigua and Barbuda for a few months before being exploited in other Caribbean countries such as St. Kitts and Nevis and Barbados; sex trafficking, including girls, occurs in bars, taverns, and brothels; forced labor, including children, occurs in domestic service and retail stores, particularly family-owned businesses; Cuban and PRC nationals working in Antigua and Barbuda may have been forced to work there by their own governments (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1273,7 +1273,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "175 Mali (MINUSMA) (May 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the National Civilian Police (Ministry of Justice and Public Security) is responsible for maintaining public security, while the Ministry of Defense is responsible for maintaining national security; the constitution separates public security and military functions, but allows the president to use the armed forces in exceptional circumstances to maintain internal peace and public security; in November 2019, President BUKELE signed a decree authorizing military involvement in police duties to combat gang violence, organized crime, and narcotics trafficking, as well as assisting with border security; as of 2022, a considerable portion of the Army was deployed in support of the National Police (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "the National Civilian Police (Ministry of Justice and Public Security) is responsible for maintaining public security, while the Ministry of Defense is responsible for maintaining national security; the constitution separates public security and military functions, but allows the president to use the armed forces in exceptional circumstances to maintain internal peace and public security; in November 2019, President BUKELE signed a decree authorizing military involvement in police duties to combat gang violence, organized crime, and narcotics trafficking, as well as assisting with border security; as of 2023, a considerable portion of the Army was deployed in support of the National Police (2023)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -621,7 +621,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation in the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Javier Efrain BU SOTO (since 12 December 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"chancery": {
|
||||
"text": "1220 19th Street NW, Suite #320, Washington, DC 20036"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -633,7 +633,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "<em>2018</em>: WIN MYINT elected president in an indirect by-election held on 28 March 2018 after the resignation of HTIN KYAW; Assembly of the Union vote - WIN MYINT (NLD) 403, MYINT SWE (USDP) 211, HENRY VAN THIO (NLD) 18, 4 votes canceled (636 votes cast); note - WIN MYINT and other key leaders of the ruling NLD party were placed under arrest following the military takeover on 1 February 2021<br><br><em>2016</em>: Assembly of the Union vote - HTIN KYAW elected president; HTIN KYAW (NLD) 360, MYINT SWE (USDP) 213, HENRY VAN THIO (NLD) 79 (652 votes cast)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"state counsellor": {
|
||||
"text": "State Counselor AUNG SAN SUU KYI (since 6 April 2016); note - under arrest since 1 February 2021 (has been sentenced to 26 years in prison as of October 2022); formerly served as minister of foreign affairs and minister for the office of the president"
|
||||
"text": "State Counselor AUNG SAN SUU KYI (since 6 April 2016); note - under arrest since 1 February 2021 (has been sentenced to more than 30 years in prison as of late 2022); formerly served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister for the Office of the President"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> a parliamentary bill creating the position of \"state counsellor\" was signed into law by former President HTIN KYAW on 6 April 2016; a state counsellor serves the equivalent term of the president and is similar to a prime minister in that the holder acts as a link between the parliament and the executive branch"
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "approximately 555,000 active duty personnel (420,000 Army; 70,000 Navy, including about 30,000 Marines; 65,000 Air Force) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the South Korean military is equipped with a mix of domestically-produced and imported weapons systems; South Korea has a robust defense industry and production includes armored fighting vehicles, artillery, aircraft, and naval ships; since 2010, the top foreign weapons supplier has been the US, and some domestically-produced systems are built under US license (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "the South Korean military is equipped with a mix of domestically produced and imported weapons systems; South Korea has a robust defense industry and production includes armored fighting vehicles, artillery, aircraft, and naval ships; since 2010, the top foreign weapons supplier has been the US, and some domestically produced systems are built under US license (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "18-35 years of age for compulsory military service for all men; minimum conscript service obligation varies by service - 18 months (Army, Marines), 20 months (Navy), 21 months (Air Force); 18-26 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women (2022)",
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -589,7 +589,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "President THONGLOUN Sisoulit (since 22 March 2021); Vice Presidents PANI Yathotou and BOUNTHONG Chitmani (since 22 March 2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"head of government": {
|
||||
"text": "Prime Minister PHANKHAM Viphavan (since 22 March 2021); Deputy Prime Ministers CHANSAMON Chan-gnalat, SONXAI Siphandon, KIKEO Khaikhamphithoun (since 22 March 2021); VILAI Lakhamfong, SALEUMXAI Kommasit (since June 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Prime Minister SONXAI Siphandon (since 30 December 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"cabinet": {
|
||||
"text": "Council of Ministers appointed by the president, approved by the National Assembly"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1314,7 +1314,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "280 South Sudan (UNMISS) (May 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "including the most recent in 2014, the military has attempted more than 20 coups since the fall of absolute monarchy in 1932<br><br>since 2004, the military has fought against separatist insurgents in the southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, as well as parts of Songkhla; the insurgency is rooted in ethnic Malay nationalist resistance to Thai rule that followed the extension of Siamese sovereignty over the Patani Sultanate in the 18th century; the insurgency consists of several armed groups, the largest of which is the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (BRN-C): since 2020, the Thai military has been negotiating with BRN, and has parallel talks with an umbrella organization, MARA Pattani, that claims to represent the insurgency groups; since 2004, violence associated with the insurgency has claimed more than 7,300 lives (as of 2022); the Thai Government has had as many as 100,000 military and paramilitary forces deployed in the south to combat the insurgency<br><br>Thailand has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "including the most recent in 2014, the military has attempted more than 20 coups since the fall of absolute monarchy in 1932<br><br>since 2004, the military has fought against separatist insurgents in the southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, as well as parts of Songkhla; the insurgency is rooted in ethnic Malay nationalist resistance to Thai rule that followed the extension of Siamese sovereignty over the Patani Sultanate in the 18th century; the insurgency consists of several armed groups, the largest of which is the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (BRN-C): since 2020, the Thai military has been negotiating with BRN, and has parallel talks with an umbrella organization, MARA Pattani, that claims to represent the insurgency groups; since 2004, violence associated with the insurgency has claimed more than 7,300 lives (as of 2023); the Thai Government has had as many as 100,000 military and paramilitary forces deployed in the south to combat the insurgency<br><br>Thailand has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments (2023)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -587,7 +587,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Executive branch": {
|
||||
"chief of state": {
|
||||
"text": "President Nguyen Xuan PHUC (since 26 July 2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Interim President Vo Thi Anh XUAN (President Nguyen Xuan PHUC resigned on 17 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"head of government": {
|
||||
"text": "Prime Minister Pham Minh CHINH (since 26 July 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -600,7 +600,8 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "<em>2021</em>: Nguyen Xuan PHUC (CPV) elected president; Pham Minh CHINH (CPV) confirmed as prime minister<br><br><em>2018</em>: NGUYEN Phu TRONG (CPV) elected as president<br><br><em>2016</em>: NGUYEN Xuan PHUC (CPV) confirmed as prime minister"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>Nguyen Phu TRONG is the General Secretary of the Vietnam Communist Party"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Legislative branch": {
|
||||
"description": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1088,18 +1088,18 @@
|
|||
"Communications": {
|
||||
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "223,469 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "197,690 (2021 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "8 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "7 (2021 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "2,618,880 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "2,635,466 (2021 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "91 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "92 (2021 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1107,7 +1107,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Albania’s small telecom market has experienced some significant changes in recent years; upgrades were made to the fixed-line infrastructure to support broadband services; fixed-line telephony use and penetration in Albania is declining steadily as subscribers migrate to mobile solutions; the mobile sector is well provided with LTE networks, while operators have invested in 5G; some of these efforts have been made in conjunction with neighboring Kosovo, with the intention of a seamless 5G corridor along the highway connecting the two countries; the country has long sought accession to the European Union (EU) which has benefited its telecoms sector through closer scrutiny of its regulatory regime and through the injection of funding to help modernize infrastructure (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line approximately 8 per 100, teledensity continues to decline due to heavy use of mobile-cellular telephone services; mobile-cellular telephone use is widespread and generally effective, 91 per 100 for mobile-cellular (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line approximately 7 per 100, teledensity continues to decline due to heavy use of mobile-cellular telephone services; mobile-cellular telephone use is widespread and generally effective, 92 per 100 for mobile-cellular (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"international": {
|
||||
"text": "country code - 355; submarine cables for the Adria 1 and Italy-Albania provide connectivity to Italy, Croatia, and Greece; a combination submarine cable and land fiber-optic system, provides additional connectivity to Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Turkey; international traffic carried by fiber-optic cable and, when necessary, by microwave radio relay from the Tirana exchange to Italy and Greece (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"Introduction": {
|
||||
"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "Once the center of power for the large Austro-Hungarian Empire, Austria was reduced to a small republic after its defeat in World War I. Following annexation by Nazi Germany in 1938 and subsequent occupation by the victorious Allies in 1945, Austria's status remained unclear for a decade. A State Treaty signed in 1955 ended the occupation, recognized Austria's independence, and forbade unification with Germany. A constitutional law that same year declared the country's \"perpetual neutrality\" as a condition for Soviet military withdrawal. The Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 and Austria's entry into the EU in 1995 have altered the meaning of this neutrality. A prosperous, democratic country, Austria entered the EU Economic and Monetary Union in 1999."
|
||||
"text": "Once the center of power for the large Austro-Hungarian Empire, Austria was reduced to a small republic after its defeat in World War I. Following annexation by Nazi Germany in 1938 and subsequent occupation by the victorious Allies in 1945, Austria's status remained unclear for a decade. A State Treaty signed in 1955 ended the occupation, recognized Austria's independence, and forbade unification with Germany. A constitutional law that same year declared the country's \"perpetual neutrality\" as a condition for Soviet military withdrawal. The Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 and Austria's entry into the EU in 1995 somewhat altered the meaning of this neutrality. A prosperous, democratic country, Austria entered the EU Economic and Monetary Union in 1999."
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1276,7 +1276,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "67,588 (Syria), 43,725 (Afghanistan), 10,110 (Iraq), 8,684 (Somalia), 7,294 (Iran), 6,124 (Russia) (mid-year 2022); 90,994 (Ukraine) (as of 2 January 2023)"
|
||||
"text": "67,588 (Syria), 43,725 (Afghanistan), 10,110 (Iraq), 8,684 (Somalia), 7,294 (Iran), 6,124 (Russia) (mid-year 2022); 91,232 (Ukraine) (as of 9 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "3,229 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "17,787 (Ukraine) (as of 20 December 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "19,124 (Ukraine) (as of 3 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "6,104 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1278,10 +1278,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
"tier rating": {
|
||||
"text": "Tier 3 — Belarus does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; therefore Belarus was downgraded to Tier 3; despite the lack of significant efforts, the government took some steps to address trafficking, including conducting trafficking-related investigations and prosecutions and identifying and referring to services more trafficking victims; however, the government did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting any traffickers under its trafficking statute and did not provide adequate protection services to trafficking victims nor conduct awareness activities; authorities reportedly returned many third-country migrants and asylum seekers to their countries of origin without screening them for trafficking (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Tier 3 — Belarus does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Belarus was downgraded to Tier 3; nonetheless, the government took some steps to address trafficking, including conducting investigations and prosecutions and identifying and referring victims to services; however, the government did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting traffickers under its trafficking statute nor provide adequate protection to victims; officials reportedly returned many migrants and asylum seekers to their countries of origin without comprehensively screening them for trafficking; the government did not report conducting awareness activities, and its efforts to prevent labor trafficking remained inadequate; for the 5th consecutive year, Belarus did not report investigating or filing charges related to illegal recruitment of migrant workers (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"trafficking profile": {
|
||||
"text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims and exploit Belarusians abroad; the majority of trafficking victims are men subjected to forced labor, primarily in Russia; most Belarusian victims are exploited in Belarus and Russia, but also in Poland, Turkey, and other European, Eurasian and Middle Eastern countries; some Belarusian women seeking foreign employment in the adult entertainment and hotel industries are subjected to sex trafficking; the government has identified Belarusian, Moldovan, Russian, Ukrainian, and Vietnamese victims exploited in Belarus; the majority of traffickers are Belarusian citizens, and they increasingly use online methods to coerce victims into forced labor and sex trafficking (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims and exploit Belarusians abroad; the majority of trafficking victims are men subjected to forced labor, primarily in Russia; most Belarusian victims are trafficked in Belarus and Russia, but also in Poland, Turkey, and other European, Eurasian and Middle Eastern countries; some Belarusian women traveling for foreign employment in the adult entertainment and hotel industries are subjected to sex trafficking; most traffickers are Belarusian citizens, and traffickers increasingly use online methods to coerce victims into forced labor and sex trafficking (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "10,869 (Syria) (mid-year 2022); 14,510 (Ukraine) (as of 18 December 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "10,869 (Syria) (mid-year 2022); 15,158 (Ukraine) (as of 8 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "242,000 (both Turkish and Greek Cypriots; many displaced since 1974) (2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1264,7 +1264,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "19,424 (Syria), 5,885 (Eritrea) (mid-year 2022); 39,032 (Ukraine) (as of 3 January 2023)"
|
||||
"text": "19,424 (Syria), 5,885 (Eritrea) (mid-year 2022); 39,221 (Ukraine) (as of 8 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "11,608 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -825,7 +825,7 @@
|
|||
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
|
||||
"text": "1.35% of GDP (2017)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the European Defense Fund (EDF) has a budget of approximately $8 billion for 2021-2027; about $2.7 billion is devoted to funding collaborative defense research while about $5.3 billion is allocated for collaborative capability development projects that complement national contributions; EDF \"categories for action\" include areas such as information air and missile defense, cyber and information security, digital transformation, force protection, medical services, space, training, and air, ground, and naval combat capabilities (2022)"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the European Defense Fund (EDF) has a budget of approximately $8 billion for 2021-2027; about $2.7 billion is devoted to funding collaborative defense research while about $5.3 billion is allocated for collaborative capability development projects that complement national contributions; EDF \"categories for action\" include areas such as information air and missile defense, cyber and information security, digital transformation, force protection, medical services, space, training, and air, ground, and naval combat capabilities <br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> NATO is resourced through the direct and indirect contributions of its members; NATO’s common funds are direct contributions to collective budgets, capabilities and programs, which equate to only 0.3% of total NATO defense spending (approximately 3.3 billion USD for 2023) to develop capabilities and run NATO, its military commands, capabilities, and infrastructure; NATO's 2014 Defense Investment Pledge calls for NATO members to meet the 2% of GDP guideline for defense spending and the 20% of annual defense expenditure on major new equipment by 2024; since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, a majority of the NATO countries have committed to investing more in defense and at a more rapid pace "
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "the 27 EU countries have a cumulative total of approximately 1.34 million active duty troops; the largest EU country military forces belong to France, Germany, and Italy (2021)",
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1254,7 +1254,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "70,077 (Ukraine) (as of 3 January 2023)"
|
||||
"text": "71,130 (Ukraine) (as of 5 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "107 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -633,7 +633,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Brian RORAFF (since July 2019)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Gabrielle COWAN (since July 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "Kentmanni 20, 15099 Tallinn"
|
||||
|
|
@ -772,7 +772,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Agricultural products": {
|
||||
"text": "wheat, milk, barley, rapeseed, rye, oats, peas, potatoes, pork, triticale"
|
||||
"text": "wheat, milk, barley, rapeseeds, rye, oats, peas, potatoes, pork, triticale"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Industries": {
|
||||
"text": "food, engineering, electronics, wood and wood products, textiles; information technology, telecommunications"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "65,381 (Ukraine) (as of 1 January 2023)"
|
||||
"text": "65,690 (Ukraine) (as of 9 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "71,873 (mid-year 2021); note - following independence in 1991, automatic citizenship was restricted to those who were Estonian citizens prior to the 1940 Soviet occupation and their descendants; thousands of ethnic Russians remained stateless when forced to choose between passing Estonian language and citizenship tests or applying for Russian citizenship; one reason for demurring on Estonian citizenship was to retain the right of visa-free travel to Russia; stateless residents can vote in local elections but not general elections; stateless parents who have been lawful residents of Estonia for at least five years can apply for citizenship for their children before they turn 15 years old"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -570,10 +570,10 @@
|
|||
"text": "Cabinet appointed by the president on the recommendation of the prime minister"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections/appointments": {
|
||||
"text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term (limited to 2 consecutive terms); elections last held on 12-13 January 2018 with a runoff on 26-27 January 2018 (next to be held in January 2023); prime minister appointed by the president for a 4-year term"
|
||||
"text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term (limited to 2 consecutive terms); elections last held on 13-14 January 2023 for the 1st round with a runoff to be held on 27-28 January 2023 between Petr PAVEL, Independeng and Andrej BABIS, ANO; prime minister appointed by the president for a 4-year term"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "<em><br>2018:</em> Milos ZEMAN reelected president in the second round; percent of vote - Milos ZEMAN (SPO) 51.4%, Jiri DRAHOS (independent) 48.6%<br><br><em>2013:</em> Milos ZEMAN elected president; percent of vote - Milos ZEMAN (SPO) 54.8%, Karel SCHWARZENBERG (TOP 09) 45.2%"
|
||||
"text": "<em>2023; </em>1st Round Petr PAVEL 35.4%, Andrej BABIS 35<em>%</em>, Danuse NERUDORA 13.9%, Pavel FISCHER 6.8%<em><br></em>2nd Round of elections to be held on January 27-28, 2023<em><br><br>2018:</em> Milos ZEMAN reelected president in the second round; percent of vote - Milos ZEMAN (SPO) 51.4%, Jiri DRAHOS (independent) 48.6%<br><br><em>2013:</em> Milos ZEMAN elected president; percent of vote - Milos ZEMAN (SPO) 54.8%, Karel SCHWARZENBERG (TOP 09) 45.2%"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Legislative branch": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1210,7 +1210,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2022": {
|
||||
"text": "1.3% of GDP (2022 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "1.5% of GDP (2022 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
"text": "1.4% of GDP (2021)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "476,025 (Ukraine) (as of 1 January 2023)"
|
||||
"text": "478,614 (Ukraine) (as of 8 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "1,498 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "9,175 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 47,138 (Ukraine) (as of 28 December 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "9,175 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 47,067 (Ukraine) (as of 9 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "3,416 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -794,7 +794,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Agricultural products": {
|
||||
"text": "milk, sugar beets, wheat, barley, potatoes, pork, maize, rye, rapeseed, triticale"
|
||||
"text": "milk, sugar beets, wheat, barley, potatoes, pork, maize, rye, rapeseeds, triticale"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Industries": {
|
||||
"text": "among the world's largest and most technologically advanced producers of iron, steel, coal, cement, chemicals, machinery, vehicles, machine tools, electronics, automobiles, food and beverages, shipbuilding, textiles"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Bremen/Bremerhaven (4,856,900), Hamburg (9,274,215) (2019)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"LNG terminal(s) (import)": {
|
||||
"text": "Hamburg; Wilhelmshaven (FSRU)"
|
||||
"text": "Hamburg; Lubmin (FSRU); Wilhelmshaven (FSRU)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"river port(s)": {
|
||||
"text": "Bremen (Weser); Bremerhaven (Geeste); Duisburg, Karlsruhe, Neuss-Dusseldorf (Rhine); Lubeck (Wakenitz); Brunsbuttel, Hamburg (Elbe)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1276,7 +1276,7 @@
|
|||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "5,552 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 1,233,041 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-December 2022)"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 1,233,492 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
"text": "a gateway to Europe for traffickers smuggling cannabis products and heroin from the Middle East and Southwest Asia to the West and precursor chemicals to the East; some South American cocaine transits or is consumed in Greece; money laundering related to drug trafficking and organized crime"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1294,7 +1294,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "19,968 (Ukraine) (as of 25 December 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "20,164 (Ukraine) (as of 6 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "2,910 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1291,7 +1291,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "33,316 (Ukraine) (as of 3 January 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "33,446 (Ukraine) (as of 10 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "130 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1289,12 +1289,12 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "21,441 (Nigeria), 17,706 (Afghanistan), 17,619 (Pakistan), 11,193 (Mali), 8,405 (Somalia), 6,324 (Gambia), 5,768 (Bangladesh), 5,463 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 173,231 (Ukraine) (as of 27 December 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "21,441 (Nigeria), 17,706 (Afghanistan), 17,619 (Pakistan), 11,193 (Mali), 8,405 (Somalia), 6,324 (Gambia), 5,768 (Bangladesh), 5,463 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 167,925 (Ukraine) (as of 30 December 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "3,000 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 696,259 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-December 2022)"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 699,932 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
"text": "important gateway for drug trafficking; organized crime groups allied with Colombian and Spanish groups trafficking cocaine to Europe"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1266,7 +1266,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "34,978 (Ukraine) (as of 3 January 2023)"
|
||||
"text": "35,108 (Ukraine) (as of 9 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "209,168 (mid-year 2021); note - individuals who were Latvian citizens prior to the 1940 Soviet occupation and their descendants were recognized as Latvian citizens when the country's independence was restored in 1991; citizens of the former Soviet Union residing in Latvia who have neither Latvian nor other citizenship are considered non-citizens (officially there is no statelessness in Latvia) and are entitled to non-citizen passports; children born after Latvian independence to stateless parents are entitled to Latvian citizenship upon their parents' request; non-citizens cannot vote or hold certain government jobs and are exempt from military service but can travel visa-free in the EU under the Schengen accord like Latvian citizens; non-citizens can obtain naturalization if they have been permanent residents of Latvia for at least five years, pass tests in Latvian language and history, and know the words of the Latvian national anthem"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1279,7 +1279,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "72,480 (Ukraine) (as of 2 January 2023)"
|
||||
"text": "72,773 (Ukraine) (as of 9 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "2,721 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1236,7 +1236,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "105,205 (Ukraine) (as of 3 January 2023)"
|
||||
"text": "105,732 (Ukraine) (as of 10 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "1,532 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -567,7 +567,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "last held on 14 October 2018 (next to be held by 31 October 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "percent of vote by party - CSV 35%, LSAP 16.7%, DP 20%, Green Party 9%, ADR 6.7%, Pirate Party 3.3%, The Left 3.3%; seats by party - CSV 21, DP 12, LSAP 10, Green Party 9, ADR 4, Pirate Party 2, The Left 2; composition (as of September 2021) - men 40, women 20, percent of women 33.3%"
|
||||
"text": "percent of vote by party - CSV 35%, DP 20%, LSAP 16.7%, Green Party 15%, ADR 6.7%, Pirate Party 3.3%, The Left 3.3%; seats by party - CSV 21, DP 12, LSAP 10, Green Party 9, ADR 4, Pirate Party 2, The Left 2; composition (as of September 2021) - men 40, women 20, percent of women 33.3%"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -582,7 +582,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Political parties and leaders": {
|
||||
"text": "Alternative Democratic Reform Party or ADR [Fred KEUP]<br>Christian Social People's Party or CSV [Claude WISELER]<br>Democratic Party or DP [Corinne CAHEN]<br>Green Party [Djuna BERNARD, Meris SEHOVIC]<br>Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party or LSAP [Yves CRUCHTEN]<br>The Left (dei Lenk/la Gauche) [collective leadership, Central Committee]<br>Pirate Party [Sven CLEMENT, Marc GOERGEN]"
|
||||
"text": "Alternative Democratic Reform Party or ADR [Fred KEUP]<br>Christian Social People's Party or CSV [Claude WISELER]<br>Democratic Party or DP [Corinne CAHEN]<br>Green Party [Djuna BERNARD, Meris SEHOVIC]<br>Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party or LSAP [Yves CRUCHTEN]<br>Pirate Party [Sven CLEMENT, Marc GOERGEN]<br>The Left (dei Lenk/la Gauche) [collective leadership, Central Committee]"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"International organization participation": {
|
||||
"text": "ADB (nonregional member), Australia Group, Benelux, BIS, CD, CE, EAPC, EBRD, ECB, EIB, EMU, ESA, EU, FAO, FATF, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IEA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NATO, NEA, NSG, OAS (observer), OECD, OIF, OPCW, OSCE, PCA, Schengen Convention, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNHRC, UNIDO, UNRWA, UPU, Wassenaar Arrangement, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO, ZC"
|
||||
|
|
@ -601,7 +601,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "[1] (202) 328-8270"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"email address and website": {
|
||||
"text": "<br>washington.amb@mae.etat.lu<br><br>https://washington.mae.lu/en.html"
|
||||
"text": "washington.amb@mae.etat.lu<br>https://washington.mae.lu/en.html"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"consulate(s) general": {
|
||||
"text": "New York, San Francisco"
|
||||
|
|
@ -624,7 +624,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "[352] 46-14-01"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"email address and website": {
|
||||
"text": "<br>Luxembourgconsular@state.gov<br><br>https://lu.usembassy.gov/"
|
||||
"text": "Luxembourgconsular@state.gov<br>https://lu.usembassy.gov/"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Flag description": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -653,7 +653,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Economy": {
|
||||
"Economic overview": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>This small, stable, high-income economy has historically featured solid growth, low inflation, and low unemployment. Luxembourg, the only Grand Duchy in the world, is a landlocked country in northwestern Europe surrounded by Belgium, France, and Germany. Despite its small landmass and small population, Luxembourg is the fifth-wealthiest country in the world when measured on a gross domestic product (PPP) per capita basis. Luxembourg has one of the highest current account surpluses as a share of GDP in the euro zone, and it maintains a healthy budgetary position, with a 2017 surplus of 0.5% of GDP, and the lowest public debt level in the region.</p> <p> </p> <p>Since 2002, Luxembourg’s government has proactively implemented policies and programs to support economic diversification and to attract foreign direct investment. The government focused on key innovative industries that showed promise for supporting economic growth: logistics, information and communications technology (ICT); health technologies, including biotechnology and biomedical research; clean energy technologies, and more recently, space technology and financial services technologies. The economy has evolved and flourished, posting strong GDP growth of 3.4% in 2017, far outpacing the European average of 1.8%.</p> <p> </p> <p>Luxembourg remains a financial powerhouse – the financial sector accounts for more than 35% of GDP - because of the exponential growth of the investment fund sector through the launch and development of cross-border funds (UCITS) in the 1990s. Luxembourg is the world’s second-largest investment fund asset domicile, after the US, with $4 trillion of assets in custody in financial institutions.</p> <p> </p> <p>Luxembourg has lost some of its advantage as a favorable tax location because of OECD and EU pressure, as well as the \"LuxLeaks\" scandal, which revealed advantageous tax treatments offered to foreign corporations. In 2015, the government’s compliance with EU requirements to implement automatic exchange of tax information on savings accounts - thus ending banking secrecy - has constricted banking activity. Likewise, changes to the way EU members collect taxes from e-commerce has cut Luxembourg’s sales tax revenues, requiring the government to raise additional levies and to reduce some direct social benefits as part of the tax reform package of 2017. The tax reform package also included reductions in the corporate tax rate and increases in deductions for families, both intended to increase purchasing power and increase competitiveness.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>This small, stable, high-income economy has historically featured solid growth, low inflation, and low unemployment. Luxembourg, the only Grand Duchy in the world, is a landlocked country in northwestern Europe surrounded by Belgium, France, and Germany. Despite its small landmass and small population, Luxembourg is the fifth-wealthiest country in the world when measured on a gross domestic product (PPP) per capita basis. Luxembourg has one of the highest current account surpluses as a share of GDP in the euro zone, and it maintains a healthy budgetary position, with a 2017 surplus of 0.5% of GDP, and the lowest public debt level in the region.</p> <p>Since 2002, Luxembourg’s government has proactively implemented policies and programs to support economic diversification and to attract foreign direct investment. The government focused on key innovative industries that showed promise for supporting economic growth: logistics, information and communications technology (ICT); health technologies, including biotechnology and biomedical research; clean energy technologies, and more recently, space technology and financial services technologies. The economy has evolved and flourished, posting strong GDP growth of 3.4% in 2017, far outpacing the European average of 1.8%.</p> <p>Luxembourg remains a financial powerhouse – the financial sector accounts for more than 35% of GDP - because of the exponential growth of the investment fund sector through the launch and development of cross-border funds (UCITS) in the 1990s. Luxembourg is the world’s second-largest investment fund asset domicile, after the US, with $4 trillion of assets in custody in financial institutions.</p> <p>Luxembourg has lost some of its advantage as a favorable tax location because of OECD and EU pressure, as well as the \"LuxLeaks\" scandal, which revealed advantageous tax treatments offered to foreign corporations. In 2015, the government’s compliance with EU requirements to implement automatic exchange of tax information on savings accounts - thus ending banking secrecy - has constricted banking activity. Likewise, changes to the way EU members collect taxes from e-commerce has cut Luxembourg’s sales tax revenues, requiring the government to raise additional levies and to reduce some direct social benefits as part of the tax reform package of 2017. The tax reform package also included reductions in the corporate tax rate and increases in deductions for families, both intended to increase purchasing power and increase competitiveness.</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
|
||||
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2021": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1243,7 +1243,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "102,103 (Ukraine) (as of 3 January 2023)"
|
||||
"text": "102,016 (Ukraine) (as of 8 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "3,372 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -648,7 +648,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation in the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Marija STJEPCEVIC (since 4 February 2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Nebojsa TODOROVIC (since 7 December 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"chancery": {
|
||||
"text": "1610 New Hampshire Avenue NW, Washington, DC, 20009"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1275,12 +1275,12 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "31,895 (Ukraine) (as of 26 December 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "32,250 (Ukraine) (as of 9 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "458 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 28,856 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-December 2022)"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 29,155 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>drug trafficking groups are major players in the procurement and transportation of large quantities of cocaine destined for European markets</p>"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1208,7 +1208,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "6,322 (Ukraine) (as of 26 December 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "6,350 (Ukraine) (as of 4 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "553 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -104,7 +104,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "an area known as the Randstad, anchored by the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague, and Utrecht, is the most densely populated region; the north tends to be less dense, though sizeable communities can be found throughout the entire country"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Natural hazards": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>flooding</p><p><strong>volcanism:</strong> Mount Scenery (887 m), located on the island of Saba in the Caribbean, last erupted in 1640;; Round Hill (601 m), a dormant volcano also known as The Quill, is located on the island of St. Eustatius in the Caribbean;; these islands are at the northern end of the volcanic island arc of the Lesser Antilles that extends south to Grenada</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>flooding</p> <p><strong>volcanism:</strong> Mount Scenery (887 m), located on the island of Saba in the Caribbean, last erupted in 1640; Round Hill (601 m), a dormant volcano also known as The Quill, is located on the island of St. Eustatius in the Caribbean; these islands are at the northern end of the volcanic island arc of the Lesser Antilles that extends south to Grenada</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography - note": {
|
||||
"text": "located at mouths of three major European rivers (Rhine, Maas or Meuse, and Scheldt); about a quarter of the country lies below sea level and only about half of the land exceeds one meter above sea level"
|
||||
|
|
@ -539,7 +539,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "23 January 1579 (the northern provinces of the Low Countries conclude the Union of Utrecht breaking with Spain; on 26 July 1581, they formally declared their independence with an Act of Abjuration; however, it was not until 30 January 1648 and the Peace of Westphalia that Spain recognized this independence)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"National holiday": {
|
||||
"text": "King's Day (birthday of King WILLEM-ALEXANDER), 27 April (1967); note - King's or Queen's Day are observed on the ruling monarch's birthday; currently celebrated on 26 April if 27 April is a Sunday"
|
||||
"text": "King's Day (birthday of King WILLEM-ALEXANDER), 27 April (1967); note - King's or Queen's Day is observed on the ruling monarch's birthday; currently celebrated on 26 April if 27 April is a Sunday"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Constitution": {
|
||||
"history": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -591,10 +591,10 @@
|
|||
"text": "bicameral States General or Staten Generaal consists of:<br>Senate or Eerste Kamer (75 seats; members indirectly elected by the country's 12 provincial council members by proportional representation vote; members serve 4-year terms)<br>House of Representatives or Tweede Kamer (150 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by open-list proportional representation vote to serve up to 4-year terms)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections": {
|
||||
"text": "<br>First Chamber - last held on 27 May 2019 (next to be held in May 2023)<br>Second Chamber - last held on 15-17 March 2021 (next to be held on 31 March 2025)"
|
||||
"text": "Senate - last held on 27 May 2019 (next to be held in May 2023)<br>House of Representatives - last held on 15-17 March 2021 (next to be held on 31 March 2025)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "<br>First Chamber - percent of vote by party - VVD 16%, CDA 12%, GL 10.7%, D66 9.3%, PvdA 8%, PVV 6.7%, SP 5.3%, CU 5.3%, PvdD 4%, SGP 2.7%, 50Plus 2.7%, FvD 1.3%, other 16%; seats by party - VVD 12, CDA 9, GL 8, D66 7, PvdA 6, PVV 5, SP 4, CU 4, PvdD 3, SGP 2, 50Plus 2, FvD 1, other 12; composition (as of September 2021) - men 52, women 23, percent of women 30.7%<br>Second Chamber - percent of vote by party - VVD 21.9%, D66 15%, PVV 10.8%, CDA 9.5%, SP 9.1%, PvdA 5.7%, GL 5.2%, FvD 5%, PvdD 3.8%, CU 3.4%, other 13.7%; seats by party - VVD 34, D66 24, PVV 17, CDA 15, GL 8, FvD 8, PvdD 6, PvdA 9, SP 9, CU 5, Denk 3, SGP 3, 50 Plus 1, other 6; composition (as of September 2021) - men 89, women 61, percent of women 40.7%; note - total States General percent of women 37.3%"
|
||||
"text": "<br>Senate - percent of vote by party - VVD 16%, CDA 12%, GL 10.7%, D66 9.3%, PvdA 8%, PVV 6.7%, SP 5.3%, CU 5.3%, PvdD 4%, SGP 2.7%, 50Plus 2.7%, FvD 1.3%, other 16%; seats by party - VVD 12, CDA 9, GL 8, D66 7, PvdA 6, PVV 5, SP 4, CU 4, PvdD 3, SGP 2, 50Plus 2, FvD 1, other 12; composition (as of September 2021) - men 52, women 23, percent of women 30.7%<br>House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - VVD 21.9%, D66 15%, PVV 10.8%, CDA 9.5%, SP 9.1%, PvdA 5.7%, GL 5.2%, FvD 5%, PvdD 3.8%, CU 3.4%, other 13.7%; seats by party - VVD 34, D66 24, PVV 17, CDA 15, GL 8, FvD 8, PvdD 6, PvdA 9, SP 9, CU 5, Denk 3, SGP 3, 50 Plus 1, other 6; composition (as of September 2021) - men 89, women 61, percent of women 40.7%; note - total States General percent of women 37.3%"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -602,14 +602,14 @@
|
|||
"text": "Supreme Court or Hoge Raad (consists of 41 judges: the president, 6 vice presidents, 31 justices or raadsheren, and 3 justices in exceptional service, referred to as buitengewone dienst); the court is divided into criminal, civil, tax, and ombuds chambers"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"judge selection and term of office": {
|
||||
"text": "justices appointed by the monarch from a list provided by the Second Chamber of the States General; justices appointed for life or until mandatory retirement at age 70"
|
||||
"text": "justices appointed by the monarch from a list provided by the House of Representatives of the States General; justices appointed for life or until mandatory retirement at age 70"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subordinate courts": {
|
||||
"text": "courts of appeal; district courts, each with up to 5 subdistrict courts; Netherlands Commercial Court"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Political parties and leaders": {
|
||||
"text": "Christian Democratic Appeal or CDA [Wopke HOEKSTRA]<br>Christian Union or CU [Gert-Jan SEGERS]<br>Democrats 66 or D66 [Sigrid KAAG]<br>Denk [Farid AZARKAN]<br>50Plus [Martin van ROOIJEN]<br>Forum for Democracy or FvD [Thierry BAUDET]<br>Green Left (GroenLinks) or GL [Jesse KLAVER]<br>Labor Party or PvdA (vacant)<br>Party for Freedom or PVV [Geert WILDERS]<br>Party for the Animals or PvdD [Esther OUWENHAND]<br>People's Party for Freedom and Democracy or VVD [Mark RUTTE]<br>Reformed Political Party or SGP [Kees VAN DER STAAIJ]<br>Socialist Party or SP [Lilian MARIJNISSEN]"
|
||||
"text": "Christian Democratic Appeal or CDA [Wopke HOEKSTRA]<br>Christian Union or CU [Gert-Jan SEGERS]<br>Democrats 66 or D66 [Sigrid KAAG]<br>Denk [Farid AZARKAN]<br>50Plus [Martin van ROOIJEN]<br>Forum for Democracy or FvD [Thierry BAUDET]<br>Green Left (GroenLinks) or GL [Jesse KLAVER]<br>Labor Party or PvdA (Attje KUIKEN)<br>Party for Freedom or PVV [Geert WILDERS]<br>Party for the Animals or PvdD [Esther OUWENHAND]<br>People's Party for Freedom and Democracy or VVD [Mark RUTTE]<br>Reformed Political Party or SGP [Kees VAN DER STAAIJ]<br>Socialist Party or SP [Lilian MARIJNISSEN]"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"International organization participation": {
|
||||
"text": "ADB (nonregional member), AfDB (nonregional member), Arctic Council (observer), Australia Group, Benelux, BIS, CBSS (observer), CD, CE, CERN, EAPC, EBRD, ECB, EIB, EITI (implementing country), EMU, ESA, EU, FAO, FATF, G-10, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IEA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IGAD (partners), IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINUSMA, NATO, NEA, NSG, OAS (observer), OECD, OPCW, OSCE, Pacific Alliance (observer), Paris Club, PCA, Schengen Convention, SELEC (observer), UN, UNCTAD, UNDOF, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNHRC, UNIDO, UNMISS, UNRWA, UN Security Council (temporary), UNTSO, UNWTO, UPU, Wassenaar Arrangement, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO, ZC"
|
||||
|
|
@ -636,7 +636,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Marja VERLOOP (since 17 January 2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Shefali RAZDAN DUGEAL (since 19 October 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "John Adams Park 1, 2244 BZ Wassenaar"
|
||||
|
|
@ -651,7 +651,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "[31] (70) 310-2207"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"email address and website": {
|
||||
"text": "<br>AmsterdamUSC@state.gov<br><br>https://nl.usembassy.gov/"
|
||||
"text": "AmsterdamUSC@state.gov<br>https://nl.usembassy.gov/"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"consulate(s) general": {
|
||||
"text": "Amsterdam"
|
||||
|
|
@ -683,7 +683,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Economy": {
|
||||
"Economic overview": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>The Netherlands, the sixth-largest economy in the European Union, plays an important role as a European transportation hub, with a consistently high trade surplus, stable industrial relations, and low unemployment. Industry focuses on food processing, chemicals, petroleum refining, and electrical machinery. A highly mechanized agricultural sector employs only 2% of the labor force but provides large surpluses for food-processing and underpins the country’s status as the world’s second largest agricultural exporter.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Netherlands is part of the euro zone, and as such, its monetary policy is controlled by the European Central Bank. The Dutch financial sector is highly concentrated, with four commercial banks possessing over 80% of banking assets, and is four times the size of Dutch GDP.</p> <p> </p> <p>In 2008, during the financial crisis, the government budget deficit hit 5.3% of GDP. Following a protracted recession from 2009 to 2013, during which unemployment doubled to 7.4% and household consumption contracted for four consecutive years, economic growth began inching forward in 2014. Since 2010, Prime Minister Mark RUTTE’s government has implemented significant austerity measures to improve public finances and has instituted broad structural reforms in key policy areas, including the labor market, the housing sector, the energy market, and the pension system. In 2017, the government budget returned to a surplus of 0.7% of GDP, with economic growth of 3.2%, and GDP per capita finally surpassed pre-crisis levels. The fiscal policy announced by the new government in the 2018-2021 coalition plans for increases in government consumption and public investment, fueling domestic demand and household consumption and investment. The new government’s policy also plans to increase demand for workers in the public and private sector, forecasting a further decline in the unemployment rate, which hit 4.8% in 2017.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>The Netherlands, the sixth-largest economy in the European Union, plays an important role as a European transportation hub, with a consistently high trade surplus, stable industrial relations, and low unemployment. Industry focuses on food processing, chemicals, petroleum refining, and electrical machinery. A highly mechanized agricultural sector employs only 2% of the labor force but provides large surpluses for food-processing and underpins the country’s status as the world’s second largest agricultural exporter.</p> <p>The Netherlands is part of the euro zone, and as such, its monetary policy is controlled by the European Central Bank. The Dutch financial sector is highly concentrated, with four commercial banks possessing over 80% of banking assets, and is four times the size of Dutch GDP.</p> <p>In 2008, during the financial crisis, the government budget deficit hit 5.3% of GDP. Following a protracted recession from 2009 to 2013, during which unemployment doubled to 7.4% and household consumption contracted for four consecutive years, economic growth began inching forward in 2014. Since 2010, Prime Minister Mark RUTTE’s government has implemented significant austerity measures to improve public finances and has instituted broad structural reforms in key policy areas, including the labor market, the housing sector, the energy market, and the pension system. In 2017, the government budget returned to a surplus of 0.7% of GDP, with economic growth of 3.2%, and GDP per capita finally surpassed pre-crisis levels. The fiscal policy announced by the new government in the 2018-2021 coalition plans for increases in government consumption and public investment, fueling domestic demand and household consumption and investment. The new government’s policy also plans to increase demand for workers in the public and private sector, forecasting a further decline in the unemployment rate, which hit 4.8% in 2017.</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
|
||||
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2021": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -778,7 +778,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Agricultural products": {
|
||||
"text": "milk, potatoes, sugar beet, pork, onions, wheat, poultry, tomatoes, carrots/turnips, beef"
|
||||
"text": "milk, potatoes, sugar beets, pork, onions, wheat, poultry, tomatoes, carrots/turnips, beef"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Industries": {
|
||||
"text": "agroindustries, metal and engineering products, electrical machinery and equipment, chemicals, petroleum, construction, microelectronics, fishing"
|
||||
|
|
@ -877,13 +877,13 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Exports": {
|
||||
"Exports 2021": {
|
||||
"text": "$839.646 billion (2021 est.) note: data are in current year dollars"
|
||||
"text": "$839.6 billion (2021 est.) note: data are in current year dollars"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Exports 2020": {
|
||||
"text": "$712.259 billion (2020 est.) note: data are in current year dollars"
|
||||
"text": "$712.3 billion (2020 est.) note: data are in current year dollars"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Exports 2019": {
|
||||
"text": "$751.225 billion (2019 est.) note: data are in current year dollars"
|
||||
"text": "$751.2 billion (2019 est.) note: data are in current year dollars"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Exports - partners": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -894,13 +894,13 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Imports": {
|
||||
"Imports 2021": {
|
||||
"text": "$735.748 billion (2021 est.) note: data are in current year dollars"
|
||||
"text": "$735.7 billion (2021 est.) note: data are in current year dollars"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Imports 2020": {
|
||||
"text": "$620.532 billion (2020 est.) note: data are in current year dollars"
|
||||
"text": "$620.5 billion (2020 est.) note: data are in current year dollars"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Imports 2019": {
|
||||
"text": "$661.973 billion (2019 est.) note: data are in current year dollars"
|
||||
"text": "$662 billion (2019 est.) note: data are in current year dollars"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Imports - partners": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "15,901 (Syria), 10,883 (Eritrea) (mid-year 2022); 36,582 (Ukraine) (as of 31 December 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "15,901 (Syria), 10,883 (Eritrea) (mid-year 2022); 36,925 (Ukraine) (as of 6 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "4,154 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1316,7 +1316,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "1,553,707 (Ukraine) (as of 3 January 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "1,563,386 (Ukraine) (as of 10 January 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "1,389 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "56,236 (Ukraine) (as of 20 December 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "56,904 (Ukraine) (as of 10 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "45 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1286,7 +1286,7 @@
|
|||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "2,113 (includes stateless persons in Kosovo) (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 918,319 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-November 2022); Serbia is predominantly a transit country and hosts an estimated 6,313 migrants and asylum seekers as of June 2022"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 936,329 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-December 2022); Serbia is predominantly a transit country and hosts an estimated 6,313 migrants and asylum seekers as of June 2022"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>drug trafficking groups are major players in the procurement and transportation of large quantities of cocaine destined for European markets</p>"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1277,7 +1277,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "106,786 (Ukraine) (as of 1 January 2023)"
|
||||
"text": "106,987 (Ukraine) (as of 10 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "314 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -601,7 +601,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation in the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Tone KAJZER (since 23 December 2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Andrej MEDICA (since 25 October 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"chancery": {
|
||||
"text": "2410 California Street NW, Washington, DC 20008"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1241,7 +1241,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "8,824 (Ukraine) (as of 3 January 2023)"
|
||||
"text": "9,081 (Ukraine) (as of 10 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "10 (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1299,12 +1299,12 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "14,994 (Syria) (mid-year 2022); 418,200 (Venezuela) (economic and political crisis; includes Venezuelans who have claimed asylum, are recognized as refugees, or have received alternative legal stay) (2021); 164,705 (Ukraine) (as of 28 December 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "14,994 (Syria) (mid-year 2022); 418,200 (Venezuela) (economic and political crisis; includes Venezuelans who have claimed asylum, are recognized as refugees, or have received alternative legal stay) (2021); 161,012(Ukraine) (as of 31 December 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "692 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>278,084 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals, including Canary Islands (January 2015-December 2022)"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>279,680 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals, including Canary Islands (January 2015-January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
"text": "primary transit point in Europe for cocaine from South America and for hashish from Morocco; cocaine is shipped in raw or liquid form with mixed cargo to avoid detection; traffickers ship methamphetamine via express mail; increasing indoor cannabis production; illegal labs cutting, mixing, and reconstituting cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine labs; synthetic drugs, including ketamine and MDMA (ecstasy) transit from Spain to the US"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "113,213 (Syria), 26,857 (Afghanistan), 25,849 (Eritrea), 10,464 (Iraq), 9,315 (Somalia), 7,146 (Iran) (mid-year 2022); 50,357 (Ukraine) (as of 29 December 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "113,213 (Syria), 26,857 (Afghanistan), 25,849 (Eritrea), 10,464 (Iraq), 9,315 (Somalia), 7,146 (Iran) (mid-year 2022); 50,530 (Ukraine) (as of 5 January)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "50,098 (mid-year 2021); note - the majority of stateless people are from the Middle East and Somalia"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -506,7 +506,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "CH"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"etymology": {
|
||||
"text": "name derives from the canton of Schwyz, one of the founding cantons of the Old Swiss Confederacy that formed in the 14th century"
|
||||
"text": "name derives from the canton of Schwyz, one of the founding cantons of the Swiss Confederacy that formed in the 14th century"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Government type": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -660,7 +660,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Flag description": {
|
||||
"text": "red square with a bold, equilateral white cross in the center that does not extend to the edges of the flag; various medieval legends purport to describe the origin of the flag; a white cross used as identification for troops of the Swiss Confederation is first attested at the Battle of Laupen (1339)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> in 1863, a newly formed international relief organization convening in Geneva, Switzerland sought to come up with an identifying flag or logo: they chose the inverse of the Swiss flag - a red cross on a white field - as their symbol; today that organization is known throughout the world as the International Red Cross"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> in 1863, a newly formed international relief organization convening in Geneva, Switzerland sought to come up with an identifying flag or logo; they chose the inverse of the Swiss flag - a red cross on a white field - as their symbol; today that organization is known throughout the world as the International Red Cross"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"National symbol(s)": {
|
||||
"text": "Swiss cross (white cross on red field, arms equal length); national colors: red, white"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "14,726 (Eritrea), 11,441 (Afghanistan), 8,039 (Syria), (mid-year 2022); 77,045 (Ukraine) (as of 3 January 2023)"
|
||||
"text": "14,726 (Eritrea), 11,441 (Afghanistan), 8,039 (Syria), (mid-year 2022); 77,450 (Ukraine) (as of 10 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "684 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
|
|||
"water": {
|
||||
"text": "1,680 sq km"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the percentage area breakdown of the four UK countries is: England 53%, Scotland 32%, Wales 9%, and Northern Ireland 6%<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> includes Rockall and the Shetland Islands, which are part of Scotland"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the percentage area breakdown of the four UK countries is: England 53%, Scotland 32%, Wales 9%, and Northern Ireland 6%<br><strong>note 2:</strong> includes Rockall and the Shetland Islands, which are part of Scotland"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Area - comparative": {
|
||||
"text": "twice the size of Pennsylvania; slightly smaller than Oregon"
|
||||
|
|
@ -313,7 +313,7 @@
|
|||
"respiratory diseases": {
|
||||
"text": "Covid-19 (see note) (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> widespread ongoing transmission of a respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is occurring throughout the UK; as of 9 December 2022, the UK has reported a total of 24,053,576 cases of COVID-19 or 35,432.3 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with a total of 197,723 cumulative deaths or a rate of 291.25 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 10 August 2022, 79.89% of the population has received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine; the US Department of Homeland Security has issued instructions requiring US passengers who have been in the UK to travel through select airports where the US Government has implemented enhanced screening procedures<br><strong>note: </strong>on 18 November 2022, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued an updated Travel Alert for polio in Europe; the United Kingdom is currently considered a high risk to travelers for circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV); vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) is a strain of the weakened poliovirus that was initially included in oral polio vaccine (OPV) and <em>that has changed over time and behaves more like the wild or naturally occurring virus</em>; this means it can be spread more easily to people who are unvaccinated against polio and who come in contact with the stool or respiratory secretions, such as from a sneeze, of an “infected” person who received oral polio vaccine; the CDC recommends that before any international travel, anyone unvaccinated, incompletely vaccinated, or with an unknown polio vaccination status should complete the routine polio vaccine series; before travel to any high-risk destination, the CDC recommends that adults who previously completed the full, routine polio vaccine series receive a single, lifetime booster dose of polio vaccine"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> widespread ongoing transmission of a respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is occurring throughout the UK; as of 9 December 2022, the UK reported a total of 24,053,576 cases of COVID-19 or 35,432.3 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with a total of 197,723 cumulative deaths or a rate of 291.25 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 10 August 2022, 79.89% of the population received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine; the US Department of Homeland Security has issued instructions requiring US passengers who have been in the UK to travel through select airports where the US Government has implemented enhanced screening procedures<br><strong>note: </strong>on 18 November 2022, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued an updated Travel Alert for polio in Europe; the United Kingdom is currently considered a high risk to travelers for circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV); vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) is a strain of the weakened poliovirus that was initially included in oral polio vaccine (OPV) and <em>that has changed over time and behaves more like the wild or naturally occurring virus</em>; this means it can be spread more easily to people who are unvaccinated against polio and who come in contact with the stool or respiratory secretions, such as from a sneeze, of an “infected” person who received oral polio vaccine; the CDC recommends that before any international travel, anyone unvaccinated, incompletely vaccinated, or with an unknown polio vaccination status should complete the routine polio vaccine series; before travel to any high-risk destination, the CDC recommends that adults who previously completed the full, routine polio vaccine series receive a single, lifetime booster dose of polio vaccine"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
|
||||
"text": "27.8% (2016)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -462,7 +462,7 @@
|
|||
"respiratory diseases": {
|
||||
"text": "Covid-19 (see note) (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> widespread ongoing transmission of a respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is occurring throughout the UK; as of 9 December 2022, the UK has reported a total of 24,053,576 cases of COVID-19 or 35,432.3 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with a total of 197,723 cumulative deaths or a rate of 291.25 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 10 August 2022, 79.89% of the population has received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine; the US Department of Homeland Security has issued instructions requiring US passengers who have been in the UK to travel through select airports where the US Government has implemented enhanced screening procedures<br><strong>note: </strong>on 18 November 2022, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued an updated Travel Alert for polio in Europe; the United Kingdom is currently considered a high risk to travelers for circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV); vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) is a strain of the weakened poliovirus that was initially included in oral polio vaccine (OPV) and <em>that has changed over time and behaves more like the wild or naturally occurring virus</em>; this means it can be spread more easily to people who are unvaccinated against polio and who come in contact with the stool or respiratory secretions, such as from a sneeze, of an “infected” person who received oral polio vaccine; the CDC recommends that before any international travel, anyone unvaccinated, incompletely vaccinated, or with an unknown polio vaccination status should complete the routine polio vaccine series; before travel to any high-risk destination, the CDC recommends that adults who previously completed the full, routine polio vaccine series receive a single, lifetime booster dose of polio vaccine"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> widespread ongoing transmission of a respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is occurring throughout the UK; as of 9 December 2022, the UK reported a total of 24,053,576 cases of COVID-19 or 35,432.3 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with a total of 197,723 cumulative deaths or a rate of 291.25 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 10 August 2022, 79.89% of the population received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine; the US Department of Homeland Security has issued instructions requiring US passengers who have been in the UK to travel through select airports where the US Government has implemented enhanced screening procedures<br><strong>note: </strong>on 18 November 2022, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued an updated Travel Alert for polio in Europe; the United Kingdom is currently considered a high risk to travelers for circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV); vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) is a strain of the weakened poliovirus that was initially included in oral polio vaccine (OPV) and <em>that has changed over time and behaves more like the wild or naturally occurring virus</em>; this means it can be spread more easily to people who are unvaccinated against polio and who come in contact with the stool or respiratory secretions, such as from a sneeze, of an “infected” person who received oral polio vaccine; the CDC recommends that before any international travel, anyone unvaccinated, incompletely vaccinated, or with an unknown polio vaccination status should complete the routine polio vaccine series; before travel to any high-risk destination, the CDC recommends that adults who previously completed the full, routine polio vaccine series receive a single, lifetime booster dose of polio vaccine"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
"municipal solid waste generated annually": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -594,7 +594,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "<br>House of Lords - no elections; note - in 1999, as provided by the House of Lords Act, elections were held in the House of Lords to determine the 92 hereditary peers who would remain; elections held only as vacancies in the hereditary peerage arise)<br>House of Commons - last held on 12 December 2019 (next to be held by 2 May 2024)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "<br>House of Lords - composition - men 554, women 222, percent of women 28.6%<br>House of Commons - percent of vote by party - Conservative 54.9%, Labor 30.8%, Lib Dems 2.2%, SNP 6.8%, DUP 1.2%, Sinn Fein 1.1%, Plaid Cymru .6%, other 2.5%; seats by party - Conservative 365, Labor 202, SNP 48, Lib Dems 11, DUP 8, Sinn Fein 7, Plaid Cymru 4, other 9; composition - men 425, women 225, percent of women 34.6%; total Parliament percent of women 31.3%"
|
||||
"text": "<br>House of Lords - composition - men 554, women 222, percent of women 28.6%<br>House of Commons - percent of vote by party - Conservative 54.9%, Labor 30.8%, SNP 6.8%, Lib Dems 2.2%, DUP 1.2%, Sinn Fein 1.1%, Plaid Cymru .6%, other 2.5%; seats by party - Conservative 365, Labor 202, SNP 48, Lib Dems 11, DUP 8, Sinn Fein 7, Plaid Cymru 4, other 5; composition - men 425, women 225, percent of women 34.6%; total Parliament percent of women 31.3%"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -628,7 +628,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "[1] (202) 588-7870"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"email address and website": {
|
||||
"text": "<br>britishembassyenquiries@gmail.com<br><br>https://www.gov.uk/world/organisations/british-embassy-washington"
|
||||
"text": "britishembassyenquiries@gmail.com<br>https://www.gov.uk/world/organisations/british-embassy-washington"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"consulate(s) general": {
|
||||
"text": "Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Francisco"
|
||||
|
|
@ -639,7 +639,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Matthew PALMER"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Jane HARTLEY (since 19 July 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "33 Nine Elms Lane, London, SW11 7US"
|
||||
|
|
@ -654,7 +654,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "[44] (0) 20-7891-3845"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"email address and website": {
|
||||
"text": "<br>SCSLondon@state.gov<br><br>https://uk.usembassy.gov/"
|
||||
"text": "SCSLondon@state.gov<br>https://uk.usembassy.gov/"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"consulate(s) general": {
|
||||
"text": "Belfast, Edinburgh"
|
||||
|
|
@ -781,7 +781,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Agricultural products": {
|
||||
"text": "wheat, milk, barley, sugar beet, potatoes, rapeseed, poultry, oats, pork, beef"
|
||||
"text": "wheat, milk, barley, sugar beets, potatoes, rapeseed, poultry, oats, pork, beef"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Industries": {
|
||||
"text": "machine tools, electric power equipment, automation equipment, railroad equipment, shipbuilding, aircraft, motor vehicles and parts, electronics and communications equipment, metals, chemicals, coal, petroleum, paper and paper products, food processing, textiles, clothing, other consumer goods"
|
||||
|
|
@ -883,17 +883,17 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Exports": {
|
||||
"Exports 2021": {
|
||||
"text": "$874.486 billion (2021 est.) note: data are in current year dollars"
|
||||
"text": "$874.5 billion (2021 est.) note: data are in current year dollars"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Exports 2020": {
|
||||
"text": "$791.733 billion (2020 est.) note: data are in current year dollars"
|
||||
"text": "$791.7 billion (2020 est.) note: data are in current year dollars"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Exports 2019": {
|
||||
"text": "$893.142 billion (2019 est.) note: data are in current year dollars"
|
||||
"text": "$893.1 billion (2019 est.) note: data are in current year dollars"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Exports - partners": {
|
||||
"text": "United States 15%, Germany 10%, China 7%, Netherlands 7%, France 7%, Ireland 6% (2019)"
|
||||
"text": "United States 15%, Germany 10%, China 7%, France 7%, Netherlands 7%, Ireland 6% (2019)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Exports - commodities": {
|
||||
"text": "cars, gas turbines, gold, crude petroleum, packaged medicines (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -928,10 +928,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Debt - external": {
|
||||
"Debt - external 2019": {
|
||||
"text": "$8,721,590,000,000 (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "$8.722 trillion (2019 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Debt - external 2018": {
|
||||
"text": "$8,696,559,000,000 (2018 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "$8.697 trillion (2018 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Exchange rates": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1049,13 +1049,13 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Natural gas": {
|
||||
"production": {
|
||||
"text": "32,482,541,000 cubic meters (2021 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "32.48 billion cubic meters (2021 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"consumption": {
|
||||
"text": "75,696,895,000 cubic meters (2021 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "75.7 billion cubic meters (2021 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"exports": {
|
||||
"text": "6,873,025,000 cubic meters (2021 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "6.873 billion cubic meters (2021 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"imports": {
|
||||
"text": "51,050,178,000 cubic meters (2021 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1297,7 +1297,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "21,904 (Iran), 15,615 (Eritrea), 11,371 (Sudan), 12,155 (Syria), 10,259 (Afghanistan), 8,009 (Pakistan), 7,699 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 152,200 (Ukraine) (as of 19 December 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "21,904 (Iran), 15,615 (Eritrea), 11,371 (Sudan), 12,155 (Syria), 10,259 (Afghanistan), 8,009 (Pakistan), 7,699 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 155,500 (Ukraine) (as of 10 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "3,968 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
|
|
@ -1199,7 +1199,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the BDF hires foreign nationals, Sunni Muslims primarily from Arabic countries and Pakistan, to serve under contract; as of 2020, foreigners were estimated to comprise as much as 80% of the military; the policy has become a controversial issue with the primarily Shia population; during the 2011, the BDF reportedly deployed mostly foreign personnel against protesters"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "Bahrain hosts the US Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT; established 1983), which includes the US 5th Fleet, several subordinate naval task forces, and the Combined Maritime Forces (established 2002), a coalition of more than 30 nations providing maritime security for regional shipping lanes; in 2018, the UK opened a naval support base in Bahrain<br><br>in addition to the US and UK, Bahrain maintains close security ties to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE); both Saudi Arabia and the UAE sent forces to Bahrain to assist with internal security following the 2011 uprising; in 2015, Bahrain joined the Saudi Arabia-led military action to try to restore the Government of Yemen that was ousted by Iranian-backed Huthi rebels, supplying a few hundred troops and combat aircraft<br><br>Bahrain has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Bahrain hosts the US Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT; established 1983), which includes the US 5th Fleet, several subordinate naval task forces, and the Combined Maritime Forces (established 2002), a coalition of more than 30 nations providing maritime security for regional shipping lanes; in 2018, the UK opened a naval support base in Bahrain<br><br>in addition to the US and UK, Bahrain maintains close security ties to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE); both Saudi Arabia and the UAE sent forces to Bahrain to assist with internal security following the 2011 uprising; in 2015, Bahrain joined the Saudi Arabia-led military action to try to restore the Government of Yemen that was ousted by Iranian-backed Huthi rebels, supplying a few hundred troops and combat aircraft<br><br>Bahrain has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments (2023)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -128,7 +128,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Orthodox (official) 83.4%, Muslim 10.7%, Armenian Apostolic 2.9%, other 1.2% (includes Catholic, Jehovah's Witness, Yazidi, Protestant, Jewish), none 0.5%, unspecified/no answer 1.2% (2014 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Demographic profile": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Analyzing population trends in Georgia since independence in 1991 has proven difficult due to a lack of reliable demographic statistics. Censuses were fairly accurately and regularly updated through a vital statistics system during Georgia’s period of Soviet rule, but from independence until about 2010, the system broke down as a result of institutional and economic change, social unrest, and large-scale outmigration. The 2002 census is believed to have significantly overestimated the size of Georgia’s population, in part because respondents continued to include relatives living abroad as part of their household count. The 2014 census indicates that Georgia’s population is decreasing and aging. Census data shows that the median age increased from 34.5 years in 2002 to 37.7 years in 2014. The working-age population (ages 15-65 years) was fairly high in 2002 and rose between 2005 and 2011. Nonetheless, Georgia did not reap economic benefits from this age structure, since the working-age population increase seems to have stimulated labor outmigration to Russia, Ukraine, and other neighboring countries.</p> <p>Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Georgia has seen its economy grow to its highest level in years due to the influx of Russian businesses, information and communications technology specialists, and money transfers. This growth may only be temporary and conditions could still easily change depending on future events. Meanwhile, the Russian inflow is also a source of concern, as some Georgians fear it could prompt Putin to target their country next. In addition, Ukrainian refugees use Georgia not just as a transit country but also a destination. Some 25,000 Ukrainians remain in the country as of November 2022; they pose an additional strain on resources in Georgia, which has a significant population of its own displaced citizens – from the 2008 Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – who continue to need government support.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Analyzing population trends in Georgia since independence in 1991 has proven difficult due to a lack of reliable demographic statistics. Censuses were fairly accurately and regularly updated through a vital statistics system during Georgia’s period of Soviet rule, but from independence until about 2010, the system broke down as a result of institutional and economic change, social unrest, and large-scale outmigration. The 2002 census is believed to have significantly overestimated the size of Georgia’s population, in part because respondents continued to include relatives living abroad as part of their household count. The 2014 census indicates that Georgia’s population is decreasing and aging. Census data shows that the median age increased from 34.5 years in 2002 to 37.7 years in 2014. The working-age population (ages 15-65 years) was fairly high in 2002 and rose between 2005 and 2011. Nonetheless, Georgia did not reap economic benefits from this age structure, since the working-age population increase seems to have stimulated labor outmigration to Russia, Ukraine, and other neighboring countries.</p> <p>Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Georgia has seen its economy grow to its highest level in years due to the influx of Russian businesses, information and communications technology specialists, and money transfers. This growth may only be temporary and conditions could still easily change depending on future events. Meanwhile, the Russian inflow is also a source of concern, as some Georgians fear it could prompt Putin to target their country next. In addition, Ukrainian refugees use Georgia not just as a transit country but also as a destination. Some 25,000 Ukrainians remain in the country as of November 2022; they pose an additional strain on resources in Georgia, which has a significant population of its own displaced citizens – from the 2008 Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – who continue to need government support.</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Age structure": {
|
||||
"0-14 years": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "25,204 (Ukraine) (as of 15 November 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "25,101 (Ukraine) (as of 25 December 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "305,000 (displaced in the 1990s as a result of armed conflict in the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; displaced in 2008 by fighting between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia) (2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1300,7 +1300,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "13,344 (Turkey), 7,864 (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (mid-year 2022); 263,087 (Syria) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "13,344 (Turkey), 7,864 (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (mid-year 2022); 258,541 (Syria) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "1,184,818 (displacement in central and northern Iraq since January 2014) (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -601,7 +601,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Prime Minister Bisher AL-KHASAWNEH (since 7 October 2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"cabinet": {
|
||||
"text": "Cabinet appointed by the monarch prime minister in consultation with the prime minister"
|
||||
"text": "Cabinet appointed by the monarch in consultation with the prime minister"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections/appointments": {
|
||||
"text": "the monarchy is hereditary; prime minister appointed by the monarch"
|
||||
|
|
@ -615,7 +615,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Senate - last appointments on 27 Sep 2020 (next appointments in 2024)<br>Chamber of Deputies - last held on 10 November 2020 (next to be held in November 2024)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "Senate - composition men 58, women 7, percent of women 10.8%<br>Chamber of Deputies - note - tribal, centrist, and pro-government candidates dominated in the 130-seat election; the Islamic Action Front, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, garnered only 10 seats, down from 15 in the previous election; women, who are guaranteed 15 seats by Jordan’s legislative quota system, won 16 seats, down from 20 seats won in the previous election; composition - men 114, women 16, percent of women 12.3%; note - total National Assembly percent of women 11.8%<br> <p> </p>"
|
||||
"text": "Senate - composition men 58, women 7, percent of women 10.8%<br>Chamber of Deputies; note - tribal, centrist, and pro-government candidates dominated in the 130-seat election; the Islamic Action Front, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, garnered only 10 seats, down from 15 in the previous election; women, who are guaranteed 15 seats by Jordan’s legislative quota system, won 16 seats, down from 20 seats won in the previous election; composition - men 114, women 16, percent of women 12.3%; note - total National Assembly percent of women 11.8%<br> <p> </p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -635,7 +635,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation in the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Hasan MURAT MERCAN (since 20 April 2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Hasan Murat MERCAN (since 20 April 2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"chancery": {
|
||||
"text": "2525 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1312,7 +1312,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "10,244 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 3,535,898 (Syria) (2022); 46,739 (Ukraine) (as of 3 January 2023)"
|
||||
"text": "10,244 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 3,522,036 (Syria) (2022); 86,545 (Ukraine) (as of 10 January 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "1.099 million (displaced from 1984-2005 because of fighting between the Kurdish PKK and Turkish military; most IDPs are Kurds from eastern and southeastern provinces; no information available on persons displaced by development projects) (2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1297,7 +1297,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>in 2017, women made up an estimated 3% of the military"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>border conflicts with Peru dominated the military’s focus until the late 1990s; as of 2022, border security remained a priority, but in more recent years, security challenges have shifted towards counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics operations, particularly in the northern border area where violence and other criminal activity related to terrorism, insurgency, and narco-trafficking in Colombia, as well as refugees from Venezuela, has spilled over the border; troop deployments along the border with Colombia were scaled back following the 2016 signing of a peace agreement between the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) terrorist group (see Appendix T), but recent violence associated with FARC dissidents to the agreement have led Ecuador and Colombia to reinforce their shared border; since 2012, the Ecuadorian Government has also expanded the military’s role in general public security and counter-narcotics operations, in part due to rising violence, police corruption, and police ineffectiveness</p> <p>the military has had a large role in Ecuador’s political history; it ruled the country from 1963-1966 and 1972-1979, and supported a dictatorship in 1970-1972; during the 1980s, the military remained loyal to the civilian government, but civilian-military relations were at times tenuous, and the military had considerable autonomy from civilian oversight; it was involved in coup attempts in 2000 and 2010</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>border conflicts with Peru dominated the military’s focus until the late 1990s; as of 2023, border security remained a priority, but in more recent years, security challenges have shifted towards counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics operations, particularly in the northern border area where violence and other criminal activity related to terrorism, insurgency, and narco-trafficking in Colombia, as well as refugees from Venezuela, has spilled over the border; troop deployments along the border with Colombia were scaled back following the 2016 signing of a peace agreement between the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) terrorist group (see Appendix T), but recent violence associated with FARC dissidents to the agreement have led Ecuador and Colombia to reinforce their shared border; since 2012, the Ecuadorian Government has also expanded the military’s role in general public security and counter-narcotics operations, in part due to rising violence, police corruption, and police ineffectiveness</p> <p>the military has had a large role in Ecuador’s political history; it ruled the country from 1963-1966 and 1972-1979, and supported a dictatorship in 1970-1972; during the 1980s, the military remained loyal to the civilian government, but civilian-military relations were at times tenuous, and the military had considerable autonomy from civilian oversight; it was involved in coup attempts in 2000 and 2010</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau continues to report the territorial and offshore waters of Ecuador as at risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; vessels, including commercial shipping and pleasure craft, have been attacked and hijacked both at anchor and while underway; crews have been robbed and stores or cargoes stolen; there has been a slight decrease with four attacks reported in 2021 and five in 2020; one ship was boarded while underway and two ships were fired upon"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -596,7 +596,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "last held on 6 December 2020 (next to be held in December 2025)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "percent of vote by party - GPP (pro-government) 69.32%, Democratic Alliance (opposition coalition) 17.68%, other 13%; seats by party - GPP 253, Democratic Alliance 18, indigenous peoples 3, other 3; composition - NA"
|
||||
"text": "percent of vote by party - GPP (pro-government) 69.3%, Democratic Alliance (opposition coalition) 17.7%, other 13%; seats by party - GPP 253, Democratic Alliance 18, indigenous peoples 3, other 3; composition - NA"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -611,7 +611,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Political parties and leaders": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>A New Era or UNT [Manuel ROSALES]<br>Brave People's Alliance or ABP [Antonio LEDEZMA]<br>Cambiemos Movimiento Ciudadano or CMC [Timoteo ZAMBRANO]<br>Christian Democrats or COPEI [Miguel SALAZAR]<br>Citizens Encounter or EC [Delsa SOLORZANO]<br>Clear Accounts or CC [Enzo SCARENO]<br>Coalition of parties loyal to Nicolas MADURO - Great Patriotic Pole or GPP [Nicolas MADURO]<br>Coalition of opposition parties - Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democratica) (comprised of AD, EL CAMBIO, COPEI, CMC, and AP)<br>Come Venezuela (Vente Venezuela) or VV [Maria Corina MACHADO]<br>Communist Party of Venezuela or PCV [Oscar FIGUERA]<br>Consenso en la Zona or Conenzo [Enzo SCARANO and Leon JURADO]<br>Convergencia [Juan Jose CALDERA]<br>Democratic Action or AD [Jose Bernabe GUTIERREZ Parra]<br>EL CAMBIO (The Change) [Javier Alejandro BERTUCCI Carrero]<br>Fatherland for All (Patria para Todos) or PPT [Ilenia MEDINA] <br>Fuerza Vecinal or FV [leaders include mayors Gustavo DUQUE, Darwin GONZALEZ, Elias SAYEGH, Manuel FERREIRA, Josy FERNANDEZ, and Morel David RODRIGUEZ]; note - national spokesman David UZCATEGUI<br>Justice First (Primero Justicia) or PJ [Julio BORGES]<br>LAPIZ [Antonio Ecarri]<br>Movement to Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo) or MAS [Segundo MELENDEZ] <br>Popular Will (Voluntad Popular) or VP [Leopoldo LOPEZ, Freddy SUPERLANO, and Emilio GRATERON]<br>Progressive Advance (Avanzada Progresista) or AP [two groups, one led by Henri FALCON and Fanny GARCIA, the other led by Luis Augusto ROMERO and Bruno GALLO]<br>The Radical Cause or La Causa R [Andres VELAZQUEZ]<br>United Socialist Party of Venezuela or PSUV [Nicolas MADURO]<br>Venezuela First (Primero Venezuela) or PV [Luis PARRA] <br>Venezuelan Progressive Movement or MPV [Simon CALZADILLA]<br>Venezuela Project or PV [Carlos BERRIZBEITIA]<br>We Are Venezuela (Somos Venezuela) or MSV [Delcy RODRIGUEZ and Vanessa MONTERO]</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>A New Era (Un Nuevo Tiempo) or UNT [Omar Enrique BARBOZA Gutierrez]<br>Brave People's Alliance or ABP [Antonio LEDEZMA]<br>Cambiemos Movimiento Ciudadano or CMC [Timoteo ZAMBRANO]<br>Christian Democrats or COPEI [Juan Carlos ALVARADO Prato, Roberto ENRIQUEZ]<br>Citizens Encounter or EC [Delsa SOLORZANO]<br>Clear Accounts or CC [Enzo SCARANO]<br>Coalition of parties loyal to Nicolas MADURO - Great Patriotic Pole or GPP [Nicolas MADURO]<br>Coalition of opposition parties - Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democratica) (includes AD, EL CAMBIO, COPEI, CMC, and AP)<br>Come Venezuela (Vente Venezuela) or VV [Maria Corina MACHADO]<br>Communist Party of Venezuela or PCV [Oscar FIGUERA]<br>Consenso en la Zona or Conenzo [Enzo SCARANO and Leon JURADO]<br>Convergencia [Juan Jose CALDERA]<br>Democratic Action or AD [Jose Bernabe GUTIERREZ Parra]<br>Fatherland for All (Patria para Todos) or PPT [Ilenia MEDINA] <br>Fuerza Vecinal or FV [leaders include mayors Gustavo DUQUE, Darwin GONZALEZ, Elias SAYEGH, Manuel FERREIRA, Josy FERNANDEZ, and Morel David RODRIGUEZ]; note - national spokesman David UZCATEGUI<br>Hope for Change (Esperanza por el Cambio) or EL CAMBIO [Javier Alejandro BERTUCCI Carrero]<br>Justice First (Primero Justicia) or PJ [Tomas GUANIPA]<br>LAPIZ [Antonio Domingo ECARRI Angola]<br>Movement to Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo) or MAS [Segundo MELENDEZ] <br>Popular Will (Voluntad Popular) or VP [Leopoldo LOPEZ]<br>Progressive Advance (Avanzada Progresista) or AP [Henri FALCON]<br>The Radical Cause or La Causa R [Andres VELAZQUEZ]<br>United Socialist Party of Venezuela or PSUV [Nicolas MADURO]<br>Venezuela First (Primero Venezuela) or PV [Luis PARRA] <br>Venezuelan Progressive Movement or MPV [Simon CALZADILLA]<br>Venezuela Project or PV [Carlos BERRIZBEITIA]<br>We Are Venezuela (Somos Venezuela) or MSV [Delcy RODRIGUEZ and Vanessa MONTERO]</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"International organization participation": {
|
||||
"text": "Caricom (observer), CD, CDB, CELAC, FAO, G-15, G-24, G-77, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt (signatory), ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LAES, LAIA, LAS (observer), MIGA, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, OPCW, OPEC, PCA, Petrocaribe, UN, UNASUR, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNHRC, UNIDO, Union Latina, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1237,7 +1237,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> as of 2017, women made up more than 20% of the active duty military"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "between 2013 and 2017, Venezuela established at least a dozen military-led firms in a variety of economic sectors, such as agriculture, banking, construction, insurance, the media, mining, oil, and tourism; as of 2020, military officers reportedly led at least 60 state-owned companies; as of 2019, 9 of 32 government ministries were controlled by the military, including the ministries of agriculture and energy<br><br>as of 2022, an estimated 1,500- 2,000 members of the terrorist organizations National Liberation Army (ELN) and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia dissidents (FARC-People's Army and Segundo Marquetalia - see Appendix T) operated in Venezuela, mostly in the states of Amazonas, Apure, Bolivar, Guarico, Tachira, and Zulia; ELN was assessed to be present in 12 of Venezuela’s 23 states; the groups were particularly active in Apure state where the Venezuelan military clashed several times with FARC dissidents of the 10th Front in 2020-2021 (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "between 2013 and 2017, Venezuela established at least a dozen military-led firms in a variety of economic sectors, such as agriculture, banking, construction, insurance, the media, mining, oil, and tourism; as of 2020, military officers reportedly led at least 60 state-owned companies; as of 2019, 9 of 32 government ministries were controlled by the military, including the ministries of agriculture and energy<br><br>as of 2023, members of the terrorist organizations National Liberation Army (ELN) and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia dissidents (FARC-People's Army and Segundo Marquetalia - see Appendix T) operated in Venezuela, mostly in the states of Amazonas, Apure, Bolivar, Guarico, Tachira, and Zulia; the ELN was assessed to be present in 12 of Venezuela’s 23 states; the groups were particularly active in Apure state; the Venezuelan military has been deployed to the border region to patrol border crossings and has clashed with both the ELN and the FARC dissident groups (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "The International Maritime Bureau continues to report the territorial and offshore waters in the Caribbean Sea as at risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; numerous vessels, including commercial shipping and pleasure craft, have been attacked and hijacked both at anchor and while underway; crews have been robbed and stores or cargoes stolen; in 2021, no attacks were reported"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1284,7 +1284,7 @@
|
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},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
"tier rating": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Tier 3<strong> —</strong> Afghanistan does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; therefore, Afghanistan remains on Tier 3; substantial personnel turnover and closing of some ministries after the August 15, 2021 Taliban takeover hindered Afghanistan’s ability to maintain consistent anti-trafficking efforts; although the pre-August 15 government took some training and awareness steps to address trafficking, it employed or recruited child soldiers and sexual slaves in government compounds; After August 15, the Taliban continued recruiting or employing child soldiers and did not investigate, prosecute, or convict any traffickers; the Taliban shut down shelters for victims, did not identify or protect victims, and did not make any efforts to prevent trafficking; Taliban undermining the rights of women, minorities, and other vulnerable populations, further exacerbated vulnerabilities to trafficking (2022)</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Tier 3 — Afghanistan does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; therefore, Afghanistan remains on Tier 3; substantial personnel turnover and closing of some ministries after the August 15, 2021 Taliban takeover hindered Afghanistan’s ability to maintain consistent anti-trafficking efforts; although the pre-August 15 government took some training and awareness steps to address trafficking, it employed or recruited child soldiers and sexual slaves in government compounds; after August 15, the Taliban continued recruiting or employing child soldiers and did not investigate, prosecute, or convict any traffickers; the Taliban shut down shelters for victims, did not identify or protect victims, and did not make any efforts to prevent trafficking; Taliban undermining the rights of women, minorities, and other vulnerable populations, further exacerbated vulnerabilities to trafficking (2022)</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"trafficking profile": {
|
||||
"text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Afghanistan and exploit Afghan victims abroad; internal trafficking is more prevalent than transnational trafficking; since the Taliban takeover, vulnerabilities to exploitation have intensified; traffickers exploit men, women, and a large number of children domestically; victims are subjected to forced labor in agriculture, brick kilns, carpet weaving, domestic servitude, commercial sex, begging, poppy cultivation and harvesting, salt mining, transnational drug smuggling, and truck driving; the Taliban and non-state armed groups, such as the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), continue to unlawfully recruit and use child soldiers; sexual exploitation of boys remains pervasive nationwide, and traffickers subject some boys to sexual exploitation abroad; after the Taliban takeover, restrictions on the movement of women and girls, and severely diminished access to employment and education, increased their vulnerability to trafficking; LGBTQI+ individuals are among the most vulnerable groups in Afghanistan under the Taliban (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1064,7 +1064,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Airports": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "2 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "3 (2021)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Airports - with paved runways": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -765,7 +765,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Ports and terminals": {
|
||||
"text": "<strong>top twenty container ports as measured by Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units (TEUs) throughput:</strong> Shanghai (China) - 43,303,000; Singapore (Singapore) - 37,195,636; Ningbo (China) - 27,530,000; Shenzhen (China) - 25,770,000; Guangzhou (China) - 23,236,200; Busan (South Korea) - 21,992,001; Qingdao (China) - 21,010,000; Hong Kong (China) - 18,361,000; Tianjin (China) - 17,264,000; Rotterdam (Netherlands) - 14,810,804; Dubai (UAE) - 14,111,000; Port Kelang (Malaysia) - 13,580,717; Antwerp (Belgium) - 11,860,204; Xiamen (China) - 11,122,200; Kaohsiung (Taiwan) - 10,428,634; Los Angeles (US) - 9,337,632; Hamburg (Germany) - 9,274,215; Tanjung Pelepas (Malaysia) - 9,100,000; Dalian (China) - 8,760,000; Laem Chabang (Thailand) - 8,106,928 (2019)"
|
||||
"text": "<strong>top twenty container ports as measured by Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units (TEUs) throughput:</strong> Shanghai (China) - 47,030,300; Singapore (Singapore) - 37,470,000; Ningbo (China) - 31,070,000; Shenzhen (China) - 28,767,600; Guangzhou (China) - 24,180,000; Qingdao (China) - 23,710,000; Busan (South Korea) - 22,706,130; Tianjin (China) - 20,269,400; Hong Kong (China) - 17,798,000; Rotterdam (Netherlands) - 15,300,000; Dubai (UAE) - 13,742,000; Port Kelang (Malaysia) - 13,724,460; Xiamen (China) - 12,045,700; Antwerp (Belgium) - 12,020,000; Tanjung Pelepas (Malaysia) - 11,200,000; Los Angeles (US) - 10,677,610; Kaohsiung (Taiwan) - 9,864,448; Long Beach (US) - 9,384,368; New York/New Jersey (US) - 8,985,929; Hamburg (Germany) - 8,715,000 (2021)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue