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4
africa/ag.json
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@ -1003,10 +1003,10 @@
"text": "450,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "633,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "633,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "4,100 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "4,100 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "12.2 billion barrels (2021 est.)"

6
africa/ao.json
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@ -1037,10 +1037,10 @@
"text": "133,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "1,367,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "1,367,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "7.783 billion barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1111,7 +1111,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Angola’s telecom sector in recent years has benefited from political stability, which has encouraged foreign investment in the sector; the government and regulator have also set in train mechanisms to open up the telecom sector to new competitors; following an extensive investment program, the company launched mobile services in April 2022; the MNOs were slow to develop LTE services, instead relying on their GSM and 3G network capabilities; there has been slow progress in LTE network development, with only a small proportion of the country covered by network infrastructure; some progress  has been made with 5G; the Ministry of Telecommunications in early 2021 set up a 5G hub to assess 5G user cases; the government has continued to develop telecom infrastructure to help diversify the country’s economy and lessen its dependence on offshore crude oil production; by extending and upgrading telecom networks the government expects businesses to become more efficient and for e-commerce to become a more prominent feature of economic growth; networks will facilitate rural access to education and health care. (2022)"
"text": "Angola’s telecom sector in recent years has benefited from political stability, which has encouraged foreign investment in the sector; the government and regulator have also set in train mechanisms to open up the telecom sector to new competitors, mobile services were launched in April 2022; the MNOs were slow to develop LTE services, instead relying on their GSM and 3G network capabilities; there has been slow progress in LTE network development, with only a small proportion of the country covered by network infrastructure; the Ministry of Telecommunications in early 2021 set up a 5G hub to assess 5G user cases; the regulator in November 2021 granted licenses to various companies offering 5G services, with spectrum in the 3.3-3.7GHz range having been set aside for such services (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "only about one fixed-line per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity about 45 telephones per 100 persons (2020)"

8
africa/bc.json
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@ -1022,10 +1022,10 @@
"text": "21,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1096,10 +1096,10 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "effective regulatory reform has made Botswana’s telecom market one of the most liberalized in the region; there is a service-neutral licensing regime adapted to the convergence of technologies and services, and several operators now compete in all telecom sectors; Botswana has one of the highest mobile subscription rates in Africa, though with this growth in the number of subscribers has slowed sharply in recent years; the popular use of multiple SIM cards from different operators convinced that regulator that there was no need introduce mobile number portability, and although the government pursued the idea for some years, it accepted in April 2021 that it would not be implemented after all; in the fixed-line broadband market they compete with a large number of ISPs, some of which have rolled out their own wireless access infrastructure; the landlocked country depends on satellites for international bandwidth, and on other countries for transit capacity to the landing points of international submarine cables; the landing of additional cables in the region in recent years has improved the competitive situation in this sector, while prices for connectivity have fallen dramatically (2022)"
"text": "effective regulatory reform has made Botswana’s telecom market one of the most liberalized in the region; there is a service-neutral licensing regime adapted to the convergence of technologies and services, and several operators now compete in all telecom sectors;  Botswana has one of the highest mobile penetration rates in Africa; in a bid to generate new revenue streams and secure market share, the three MNOs have entered the underdeveloped broadband sector by adopting of 3G, LTE, and WiMAX technologies; in the fixed-line broadband market they compete with a large number of ISPs, some of which have rolled out their own wireless access infrastructure; the landlocked country depends on satellites for international bandwidth, and on other countries for transit capacity to the landing points of international submarine cables; the landing of additional cables in the region in recent years has improved the competitive situation in this sector, while prices for connectivity have fallen dramatically (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line teledensity has declined in recent years and now stands at roughly 6 telephones per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity is roughly 162 telephones per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line teledensity has declined in recent years and now stands at roughly 6 telephones per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity is roughly 163 telephones per 100 persons (2020)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 267; international calls are made via satellite, using international direct dialing; 2 international exchanges; digital microwave radio relay links to Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Indian Ocean)"

6
africa/bn.json
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@ -1035,10 +1035,10 @@
"text": "46,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "8 million barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1109,7 +1109,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Benin’s telecom market continues to be restricted by the poor condition of the country’s fixed-line infrastructure;  this has hampered the development of fixed-line voice and internet services, and there is negligible revenue derived from these sectors; mobile networks account for almost all internet connections, and also carry most voice traffic; there is promise for considerable change in the mobile sector; slow progress is being made in developing competition in the mobile sector; in May 2021 the government sought foreign companies to bid for a fourth mobile license; improved international internet connectivity has contributed to a reduction in end-user pricing, and provided the potential to transform many areas of the country’s economy, bringing a greater proportion of the population into the orbit of internet commerce and connectivity; a 2,000km fiber project started in 2016 was finally completed in mid-2021, prompting the government to secure a loan to build additional fiber infrastructure connecting four of the country’s 12 departments (2022)"
"text": "Benin’s telecom market continues to be restricted by the poor condition of the country’s fixed-line infrastructure; this has hampered the development of fixed-line voice and internet services, and there is negligible revenue derived from these sectors; mobile networks account for almost all internet connections, and also carry most voice traffic; there is promise for considerable change in the mobile sector; slow progress is being made in developing competition in the mobile sector; in May 2021 the government sought foreign companies to bid for a fourth mobile license; improved international internet connectivity has contributed to a reduction in end-user pricing, and provided the potential to transform many areas of the country’s economy, bringing a greater proportion of the population into the orbit of internet commerce and connectivity; a 2,000km fiber project started in 2016 was finally completed in mid-2021, prompting the government to secure a loan to build additional fiber infrastructure connecting four of the country’s 12 departments (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line teledensity only about 1 per 100 persons; spurred by the presence of multiple mobile-cellular providers, cellular telephone subscribership has increased rapidly, nearing 92 per 100 persons (2020)"

10
africa/by.json
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@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
"text": "230 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Tanganyika (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and Zambia) - 32,000 sq km"
}
},
@ -512,7 +512,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Tanganyika (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and Zambia) - 32,000 sq km"
}
},
@ -1025,10 +1025,10 @@
"text": "5,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1099,7 +1099,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Burundi provides an attractive telecom market given its high population density and existing low subscription rates for all services; one downside for investors is that the country has a very low economic output, disposable income is also very low, and fixed-line infrastructure is poor outside the main urban areas; this is a greater motivation for investors to focus on improving mobile networks than in expanding fixed-line infrastructure; to overcome difficulties associated with the poor telecom infrastructure, the government has supported a number of prominent telcos building a national fiber backbone network; this network offers onward connectivity to submarine cable infrastructure landings in Kenya and Tanzania; the first sections of this network were switched on in early 2014, and additional provinces have since been connected; in addition, the government in early 2018 kick-started the Burundi Broadband project, which aims to deliver national connectivity by 2025; based on this improved infrastructure the government and ITU have developed an ICT strategy to make use of telecoms to promote the country’s socio-economic development through to 2028; progress made by Tanzania with its own national backbone network has benefited Burundi, which has been provided with onward connectivity to most countries in the region; International bandwidth capacity has continued to increase in recent years, including a 38% increase in the nine months to September 2021, resulting in lower retail prices for consumers; two of the mobile operators have launched 3G and LTE services to capitalize on the growing demand for internet access; the number of mobile subscribers increased 7% in the third quarter of 2021, quarter-on-quarter; similar growth is expected for the next two years at least, which will help bring the mobile level closer to the average for the region. (2022)"
"text": "Burundi provides an attractive telecom market given its high population density and existing low subscription rates for all services; one downside for investors is that the country has a very low economic output, disposable income is also very low, and fixed-line infrastructure is poor outside the main urban areas; this is a greater motivation for investors to focus on improving mobile networks than in expanding fixed-line infrastructure; to overcome difficulties associated with the poor telecom infrastructure, the government has supported a number of prominent telcos building a national fiber backbone network; this network offers onward connectivity to submarine cable infrastructure landings in Kenya and Tanzania; the first sections of this network were switched on in early 2014, and additional provinces have since been connected; in addition, the government in early 2018 kick-started the Burundi Broadband project, which aims to deliver national connectivity by 2025; based on this improved infrastructure the government and ITU have developed an ICT strategy to make use of telecoms to promote the country’s socio-economic development through to 2028; progress made by Tanzania with its own national backbone network has benefited Burundi, which has been provided with onward connectivity to most countries in the region; International bandwidth capacity has continued to increase in recent years, including a 38% increase in the nine months to September 2021, resulting in lower retail prices for consumers; two of the mobile operators have launched 3G and LTE services to capitalize on the growing demand for internet access; the number of mobile subscribers increased 7% in the third quarter of 2021, quarter-on-quarter; similar growth is expected for the next two years at least, which will help bring the mobile level closer to the average for the region (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "telephone density one of the lowest in the world; fixed-line connections stand at less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular usage is about 56 per 100 persons (2020)"

8
africa/cd.json
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@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
"text": "300 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Chad (endorheic lake shared with Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon) - 10,360-25,900 sq km<br>note - area varies by season and year to year"
}
},
@ -518,7 +518,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Chad (endorheic lake shared with Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon) - 10,360-25,900 sq km<br>note - area varies by season and year to year"
}
},
@ -1040,10 +1040,10 @@
"text": "12,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "116,000 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "116,000 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "1.5 billion barrels (2021 est.)"

4
africa/cf.json
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@ -1039,10 +1039,10 @@
"text": "12,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "331,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "331,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "2.882 billion barrels (2021 est.)"

10
africa/cg.json
View file

@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
"text": "110 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Tanganyika (shared with Burundi, Tanzania, and Zambia) - 32,000 sq km; Lake Albert (shared with Uganda) - 5,590 sq km; Lake Mweru (shared with Zambia) - 4,350 sq km; Lac Mai-Ndombe - 2,300 sq km; Lake Kivu (shared with Rwanda) - 2,220 sq km; Lake Edward (shared with Uganda) - 2,150 sq km; Lac Tumba - 500 sq km; Lac Upemba - 530 sq km"
}
},
@ -527,7 +527,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Tanganyika (shared with Burundi, Tanzania, and Zambia) - 32,000 sq km; Lake Albert (shared with Uganda) - 5,590 sq km; Lake Mweru (shared with Zambia) - 4,350 sq km; Lac Mai-Ndombe - 2,300 sq km; Lake Kivu (shared with Rwanda) - 2,220 sq km; Lake Edward (shared with Uganda) - 2,150 sq km; Lac Tumba - 500 sq km; Lac Upemba - 530 sq km"
}
},
@ -1074,10 +1074,10 @@
"text": "17,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "21,300 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "21,300 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "180 million barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@
"note": "note: in eastern Congo, fighters from armed groups, and in some cases government security forces, have been accused of forced recruitment of child soldiers"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the modern FARDC was created out of the armed factions of the two Congo wars of 1996-1997 and 1998-2003; as part of the peace accords that ended the last war, the largest rebel groups were incorporated into the FARDC; many armed groups, however, continue to fight and as of 2022, there were over 100 illegal armed groups operating in the country by some estimates; as of 2022, the FARDC was actively engaged in combat operations against numerous armed groups, particularly in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, although there was also violence in Maniema, Kasai, Kasai Central, and Tanganyika provinces; the military is widely assessed as being unable to provide adequate security throughout the country due to insufficient training, poor morale and leadership, ill-discipline and corruption, low equipment readiness, a fractious ethnic makeup, and the sheer size of the country and diversity of armed rebel groups<br><br>as of 2022, one of the primary armed groups the FARDC was conducting operations against was the March 23 Movement (M23, aka Congolese Revolutionary Army), which resumed attacks, largely against civilians, in the DRC province of North Kivu in 2022 after having been defeated in 2013 by FARDC and UN forces; the M23's resurgence has raised tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, as the DRC Government claims Rwanda backs the M23, which it has labeled a terrorist group, charges that the Rwandan Government has denied; M23 attacks and fighting between the FARDC and M23 in 2022 has led to the displacement of more than 200,000 people; UN troops are supporting the FARDC's operations against M23<br><br>the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has operated in the central and eastern parts of the country since 1999; as of mid-2022, MONUSCO had around 15,000 personnel; MONUSCO includes a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB; 3 infantry battalions, plus artillery and special forces), the first ever UN peacekeeping force specifically tasked to carry out targeted offensive operations to neutralize and disarm groups considered a threat to state authority and civilian security (2022)"
"text": "the modern FARDC was created out of the armed factions of the two Congo wars of 1996-1997 and 1998-2003; as part of the peace accords that ended the last war, the largest rebel groups were incorporated into the FARDC; many armed groups, however, continue to fight and as of 2022, there were over 100 illegal armed groups operating in the country by some estimates; as of 2022, the FARDC was actively engaged in combat operations against numerous armed groups, particularly in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, although there was also violence in Maniema, Kasai, Kasai Central, and Tanganyika provinces; the military is widely assessed as being unable to provide adequate security throughout the country due to insufficient training, poor morale and leadership, ill-discipline and corruption, low equipment readiness, a fractious ethnic makeup, and the sheer size of the country and diversity of armed rebel groups<br><br>as of 2022, one of the primary armed groups the FARDC was conducting operations against was the March 23 Movement (M23, aka Congolese Revolutionary Army), which resumed attacks, largely against civilians, in the DRC province of North Kivu in 2022 after having been defeated in 2013 by FARDC and UN forces; the M23's resurgence has raised tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, as the DRC Government claims Rwanda backs the M23, which it has labeled a terrorist group, charges that the Rwandan Government has denied; M23 attacks and fighting between the FARDC and M23 in 2022 has led to the displacement of more than 200,000 people; UN troops were supporting the FARDC's operations against M23<br><br>the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has operated in the central and eastern parts of the country since 1999; as of mid-2022, MONUSCO had around 15,000 personnel; MONUSCO includes a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB; 3 infantry battalions, plus artillery and special forces), the first ever UN peacekeeping force specifically tasked to carry out targeted offensive operations to neutralize and disarm groups considered a threat to state authority and civilian security (2022)"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

12
africa/cm.json
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@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
"text": "290 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Chad (endorheic lake shared with Niger, Nigeria, and Chad) - 10,360-25,900 sq km<br>note - area varies by season and year to year"
}
},
@ -139,7 +139,7 @@
"text": "Roman Catholic 38.3%, Protestant 25.5%, other Christian 6.9%, Muslim 24.4%, animist 2.2%, other 0.5%, none 2.2% (2018 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Cameroon has a large youth population, with more than 60% of the populace under the age of 25. Fertility is falling but remains at a high level, especially among poor, rural, and uneducated women, in part because of inadequate access to contraception. Life expectancy remains low at about 55 years due to the prevalence of HIV and AIDs and an elevated maternal mortality rate, which has remained high since 1990. Cameroon, particularly the northern region, is vulnerable to food insecurity largely because of government mismanagement, corruption, high production costs, inadequate infrastructure, and natural disasters. Despite economic growth in some regions, poverty is on the rise, and is most prevalent in rural areas, which are especially affected by a shortage of jobs, declining incomes, poor school and health care infrastructure, and a lack of clean water and sanitation. Underinvestment in social safety nets and ineffective public financial management also contribute to Cameroon’s high rate of poverty.  The activities of Boko Haram, other armed groups, and counterinsurgency operations have worsened food insecurity in the Far North region.  </p> <p>International migration has been driven by unemployment (including fewer government jobs), poverty, the search for educational opportunities, and corruption. The US and Europe are preferred destinations, but, with tighter immigration restrictions in these countries, young Cameroonians are increasingly turning to neighboring states, such as Gabon and Nigeria, South Africa, other parts of Africa, and the Near and Far East. Cameroon’s limited resources make it dependent on UN support to host more than 420,000 refugees and asylum seekers as of September 2020. These refugees and asylum seekers are primarily from the Central African Republic and Nigeria.  Internal and external displacement have grown dramatically in recent years.  Boko Haram's attacks and counterattacks by government forces in the Far North since 2014 have increased the number of internally displaced people.  Armed conflict between separatists and Cameroon's military in the the Northwest and Southwest since 2016 have displaced hundreds of thousands of the country's Anglophone minority.</p>"
"text": "<p>Cameroon has a large youth population, with more than 60% of the populace under the age of 25. Fertility is falling but remains at a high level, especially among poor, rural, and uneducated women, in part because of inadequate access to contraception. Life expectancy remains low at about 55 years due to the prevalence of HIV and AIDs and an elevated maternal mortality rate, which has remained high since 1990. Cameroon, particularly the northern region, is vulnerable to food insecurity largely because of government mismanagement, corruption, high production costs, inadequate infrastructure, and natural disasters. Despite economic growth in some regions, poverty is on the rise, and is most prevalent in rural areas, which are especially affected by a shortage of jobs, declining incomes, poor school and health care infrastructure, and a lack of clean water and sanitation. Underinvestment in social safety nets and ineffective public financial management also contribute to Cameroon’s high rate of poverty.  The activities of Boko Haram, other armed groups, and counterinsurgency operations have worsened food insecurity in the Far North region.  </p> <p>International migration has been driven by unemployment (including fewer government jobs), poverty, the search for educational opportunities, and corruption. The US and Europe are preferred destinations, but, with tighter immigration restrictions in these countries, young Cameroonians are increasingly turning to neighboring states, such as Gabon and Nigeria, South Africa, other parts of Africa, and the Near and Far East. Cameroon’s limited resources make it dependent on UN support to host more than 490,000 refugees and asylum seekers as of September 2022. These refugees and asylum seekers are primarily from the Central African Republic and Nigeria.  Internal and external displacement have grown dramatically in recent years.  Boko Haram's attacks and counterattacks by government forces in the Far North since 2014 have increased the number of internally displaced people.  Armed conflict between separatists and Cameroon's military in the Northwest and Southwest since 2016 have displaced hundreds of thousands of the country's Anglophone minority.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
@ -533,7 +533,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Chad (endorheic lake shared with Niger, Nigeria, and Chad) - 10,360-25,900 sq km<br>note - area varies by season and year to year"
}
},
@ -1077,10 +1077,10 @@
"text": "37,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "62,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "62,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "20,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "20,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "200 million barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1151,7 +1151,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Cameroon was for many years one of the few countries in Africa with only two competing mobile operators; the investment programs among operators over the next few years will considerably boost mobile broadband services in rural areas of the country, many of which are under served by fixed-line infrastructure; the ICT sector in Cameroon is making steady progress, enabling the country to make better use of the digital economy; the government has also been supportive, having launched its &lsquo;Cameroon Digital 2020&rsquo; program, aimed at improving connectivity nationally. A large number of small ICT projects form part of the overall program; improved submarine and terrestrial cable connectivity has substantially increased international bandwidth, in turn leading to reductions in access prices for consumers; other projects such as Acceleration of the Digital Transformation of Cameroon are aimed at developing the digital economy, and accelerating the use of ICT in areas such as government services, agriculture, and commerce (2022)"
"text": "Cameroon was for many years one of the few countries in Africa with only two competing mobile operators; the investment programs among operators over the next few years will considerably boost mobile broadband services in rural areas of the country, many of which are under served by fixed-line infrastructure; the government has also been supportive, having launched its &lsquo;Cameroon Digital 2020&rsquo; program, aimed at improving connectivity nationally; improved submarine and terrestrial cable connectivity has substantially increased international bandwidth, in turn leading to reductions in access prices for consumers; other projects such as Acceleration of the Digital Transformation of Cameroon are aimed at developing the digital economy (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "only a little above 3 per 100 persons for fixed-line subscriptions; mobile-cellular usage has increased sharply, reaching a subscribership base of roughly 95 per 100 persons (2020)"

6
africa/cn.json
View file

@ -936,10 +936,10 @@
"text": "2,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@
"text": "Qatar launched a special program for the construction of a wireless network to inter connect the 3 islands of the archipelago; telephone service limited to the islands' few towns (2020)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line connections less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular usage about 54 per 100 persons; 2 companies provide domestic and international mobile service and wireless data (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line connections less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular usage about 90 per 100 persons; 2 companies provide domestic and international mobile service and wireless data (2020)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 269; landing point for the EASSy, Comoros Domestic Cable System, Avassa, and FLY-LION3&nbsp;fiber-optic submarine cable system connecting East Africa with Europe; HF radiotelephone communications to Madagascar and Reunion (2019)"

8
africa/ct.json
View file

@ -998,10 +998,10 @@
"text": "2,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1072,10 +1072,10 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "network consists principally of microwave radio relay and at low-capacity; ongoing conflict has&nbsp;obstructed&nbsp;telecommunication and media development,&nbsp;although there are&nbsp;ISP (Internet service providers) and mobile phone carriers,&nbsp;radio is the most-popular communications medium (2018)"
"text": "given the poor fixed-line infrastructure in most countries across Africa, voice and data services across the region are greatly dependent on mobile networks; in the majority of markets, including those with better developed fixed infrastructure such as South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya, up to 98% of all voice and data connections are via mobile networks; during the last two to three years, national governments and telecom regulators have striven to improve fixed infrastructure with the wider aim of developing economic growth based on digital services and connectivity; this work is principally focused on delivering fiber-based connectivity; since the amount of copper infrastructure (DSL or HFC) used for broadband is so negligible, governments and private firms, including telcos are investing in fiber rather than in older technologies; while supporting broadband to premises, health centers, and government buildings, the new fiber infrastructure is mainly being deployed to provide mobile platforms and to support the rapid growth in data traffic (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "very limited telephone service with less than 1 fixed-line connection per 100 persons; with the presence of multiple providers mobile-cellular service has reached nearly 34 per 100 mobile-cellular subscribers; cellular usage is increasing from a low base; most fixed-line and mobile-cellular telephone services are concentrated in Bangui (2019)"
"text": "very limited telephone service with less than 1 fixed-line connection per 100 persons; with the presence of multiple providers mobile-cellular service has reached nearly 38 per 100 mobile-cellular subscribers; cellular usage is increasing from a low base; most fixed-line and mobile-cellular telephone services are concentrated in Bangui (2020)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 236; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean)"

4
africa/cv.json
View file

@ -968,10 +968,10 @@
"text": "6,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

10
africa/dj.json
View file

@ -94,7 +94,7 @@
"text": "10 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Abhe Bad/Abhe Bid Hayk (shared with Ethiopia) - 780 sq km"
}
},
@ -471,7 +471,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Abhe Bad/Abhe Bid Hayk (shared with Ethiopia) - 780 sq km"
}
},
@ -983,10 +983,10 @@
"text": "4,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Djibouti remains one of the last bastions where the national telco has a monopoly on all telecom services, including fixed lines, mobile, internet, and broadband; despite the country benefiting from its location as a hub for international submarine cables, and with Djibouti Telecom being a partner in at least eight of them, prices for telecom services remain relatively high, and out of reach for a number of customers, weighing on market advancement; the Djibouti government is aiming to sell a minority stake in the incumbent telco (retaining some control of decisions) while securing the financial backing and the management acumen of a foreign operator; this is part of a larger plan to modernize the country&rsquo;s economy more generally; the state expects to conduct of a sale of up to 40% of the company to an international investor by end-2022 (2022)"
"text": "Djibouti remains one of the last bastions where the national telco has a monopoly on all telecom services, including fixed lines, mobile, internet, and broadband; despite the country benefiting from its location as a hub for international submarine cables, prices for telecom services remain relatively high, and out of reach for a number of customers, weighing on market advancement; the Djibouti government is aiming to sell a minority stake in the incumbent telco (retaining some control of decisions) while securing the financial backing and the management acumen of a foreign operator; this is part of a larger plan to modernize the country&rsquo;s economy more generally; the state expects to conduct a sale of up to 40% of the company to an international investor by the end 2022 (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "about 4 per 100 fixed-line teledensity and nearly 44 per 100 mobile-cellular; Djibouti Telecom (DT) is the sole provider of telecommunications services and utilizes mostly a microwave radio relay network; fiber-optic cable is installed in the capital; rural areas connected via wireless local loop radio systems; mobile cellular coverage is primarily limited to the area in and around Djibouti city (2020)"

8
africa/eg.json
View file

@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
"text": "36,500 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Manzala - 1,360 sq km<br>note - largest of Nile Delta lakes"
}
},
@ -501,7 +501,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Manzala - 1,360 sq km<br>note - largest of Nile Delta lakes"
}
},
@ -1055,10 +1055,10 @@
"text": "810,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "204,100 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "204,100 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "117,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "117,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "3.3 billion barrels (2021 est.)"

8
africa/ek.json
View file

@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
"text": "Roman Catholic 88%, Protestant 5%, Muslim 2%, other 5% (animist, Baha'i, Jewish) (2015 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Equatorial Guinea is one of the smallest and least populated countries in continental Africa and is the only independent African country where Spanish is an official language. Despite a boom in oil production in the 1990s, authoritarianism, corruption, and resource mismanagement have concentrated the benefits among a small elite. These practices have perpetuated income inequality and unbalanced development, such as low public spending on education and health care. Unemployment remains problematic because the oil-dominated economy employs a small labor force dependent on skilled foreign workers. The agricultural sector, Equatorial Guinea’s main employer, continues to deteriorate because of a lack of investment and the migration of rural workers to urban areas. About three-quarters of the population lives below the poverty line.</p><p>Equatorial Guinea’s large and growing youth population – about 60% are under the age of 25 – is particularly affected because job creation in the non-oil sectors is limited, and young people often do not have the skills needed in the labor market. Equatorial Guinean children frequently enter school late, have poor attendance, and have high dropout rates. Thousands of Equatorial Guineans fled across the border to Gabon in the 1970s to escape the dictatorship of MACIAS NGUEMA; smaller numbers have followed in the decades since. Continued inequitable economic growth and high youth unemployment increases the likelihood of ethnic and regional violence.</p>"
"text": "<p>Equatorial Guinea is one of the smallest and least populated countries in continental Africa and is the only independent African country where Spanish is an official language. Despite a boom in oil production in the 1990s, authoritarianism, corruption, and resource mismanagement have concentrated the benefits among a small elite. These practices have perpetuated income inequality and unbalanced development, such as low public spending on education and health care. Unemployment remains problematic because the oil-dominated economy employs a small labor force dependent on skilled foreign workers. The agricultural sector, Equatorial Guinea’s main employer, continues to deteriorate because of a lack of investment and the migration of rural workers to urban areas. About three-quarters of the population lives below the poverty line.</p> <p>Equatorial Guinea’s large and growing youth population – about 60% are under the age of 25 – is particularly affected because job creation in the non-oil sectors is limited, and young people often do not have the skills needed in the labor market. Equatorial Guinean children frequently enter school late, have poor attendance, and have high dropout rates. Thousands of Equatorial Guineans fled across the border to Gabon in the 1970s to escape the dictatorship of Francisco MACIAS NGUEMA; smaller numbers have followed in the decades since. Continued inequitable economic growth and high youth unemployment increases the likelihood of ethnic and regional violence.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
@ -556,7 +556,7 @@
},
"Legislative branch": {
"description": {
"text": "bicameral National Assembly or Asemblea Nacional consists of:<br>Senate or Senado (70 seats statutory, 72 seats for current term; 55 members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by closed party-list proportional representation vote, 15 appointed by the president, and 2 ex-officio)<br>Chamber of Deputies or Camara de los Diputados (100 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by closed paryt-list proportional representation vote to serve 5-year terms)"
"text": "bicameral National Assembly or Asemblea Nacional consists of:<br>Senate or Senado (70 seats statutory, 72 seats for current term; 55 members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by closed party-list proportional representation vote, 15 appointed by the president, and 2 ex-officio)<br>Chamber of Deputies or Camara de los Diputados (100 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by closed party-list proportional representation vote to serve 5-year terms)"
},
"elections": {
"text": "Senate - last held on 12 November 2017 (next to be held in 2022/2023)<br>Chamber of Deputies - last held on 12 November 2017 (next to be held in 2022/2023)"
@ -934,10 +934,10 @@
"text": "22,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "184,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "184,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "1.1 billion barrels (2021 est.)"

4
africa/er.json
View file

@ -948,10 +948,10 @@
"text": "5,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

24
africa/et.json
View file

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"Introduction": {
"Background": {
"text": "<p>Unique among African countries, the ancient Ethiopian monarchy maintained its freedom from colonial rule with the exception of a short-lived Italian occupation from 1936 to 1941. In 1974, a military junta, the Derg, deposed Emperor Haile SELASSIE (who had ruled since 1930) and established a socialist state. Torn by bloody coups, uprisings, wide-scale drought, and massive refugee problems, the regime was finally toppled in 1991 by a coalition of rebel forces, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). A constitution was adopted in 1994, and Ethiopia's first multiparty elections were held in 1995.</p> A border war with Eritrea in the late 1990s ended with a peace treaty in December 2000. In November 2007, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC) issued specific coordinates as virtually demarcating the border and pronounced its work finished. Alleging that the EEBC acted beyond its mandate in issuing the coordinates, Ethiopia did not accept them and maintained troops in previously contested areas pronounced by the EEBC as belonging to Eritrea. This intransigence resulted in years of heightened tension between the two countries. In August 2012, longtime leader Prime Minister MELES Zenawi died in office and was replaced by his Deputy Prime Minister HAILEMARIAM Desalegn, marking the first peaceful transition of power in decades. Following a wave of popular dissent and anti-government protest that began in 2015, HAILEMARIAM resigned in February 2018 and ABIY Ahmed Ali took office in April 2018 as Ethiopia's first ethnic Oromo prime minister. In June 2018, ABIY announced Ethiopia would accept the border ruling of 2000, prompting rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea that was marked with a peace agreement in July 2018 and a reopening of the border in September 2018. In November 2019, Ethiopia's nearly 30-year ethnic-based ruling coalition - the EPRDF - merged into a single unity party called the Prosperity Party, however, one of the four constituent parties (the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front or TPLF) refused to join.<br><br>In November 2020, a military conflict erupted between forces aligned with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Ethiopia’s national military, the Ethiopian National Defense Force. The conflict, which has continued throughout 2021, has exacerbated ethnic violence and has largely centered in Tigray, Amhara, and Afar regional states."
"text": "<p>Unique among African countries, the ancient Ethiopian monarchy maintained its freedom from colonial rule with the exception of a short-lived Italian occupation from 1936 to 1941. In 1974, a military junta, the Derg, deposed Emperor Haile SELASSIE (who had ruled since 1930) and established a socialist state. Torn by bloody coups, uprisings, wide-scale drought, and massive refugee problems, the regime was finally toppled in 1991 by a coalition of rebel forces, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). A constitution was adopted in 1994, and Ethiopia's first multiparty elections were held in 1995.</p> A border war with Eritrea in the late 1990s ended with a peace treaty in December 2000. In November 2007, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC) issued specific coordinates as virtually demarcating the border and pronounced its work finished. Alleging that the EEBC acted beyond its mandate in issuing the coordinates, Ethiopia did not accept them and maintained troops in previously contested areas pronounced by the EEBC as belonging to Eritrea. This intransigence resulted in years of heightened tension between the two countries. In August 2012, longtime leader Prime Minister MELES Zenawi died in office and was replaced by his Deputy Prime Minister HAILEMARIAM Desalegn, marking the first peaceful transition of power in decades. Following a wave of popular dissent and anti-government protest that began in 2015, HAILEMARIAM resigned in February 2018 and ABIY Ahmed Ali took office in April 2018 as Ethiopia's first ethnic Oromo prime minister. In June 2018, ABIY announced Ethiopia would accept the border ruling of 2000, prompting rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea that was marked with a peace agreement in July 2018 and a reopening of the border in September 2018. In November 2019, Ethiopia's nearly 30-year ethnic-based ruling coalition - the EPRDF - merged into a single unity party called the Prosperity Party, however, one of the four constituent parties (the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front or TPLF) refused to join.<br><br>In November 2020, a military conflict erupted between forces aligned with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Ethiopia’s national military, the Ethiopian National Defense Force. The conflict, which has continued into 2022, has exacerbated ethnic violence and has largely centered in Tigray, Amhara, and Afar regional states."
}
},
"Geography": {
@ -87,10 +87,10 @@
"text": "2,900 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Tana - 3,600 sq km; Abaya Hayk - 1,160 sq km; Ch'amo Hayk - 550 sq km"
},
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Turkana (shared with Kenya) - 6,400 sq km; Abhe Bid Hayk/Abhe Bad (shared with Djibouti) - 780 sq km;&nbsp;"
}
},
@ -141,7 +141,7 @@
"text": "Ethiopian Orthodox 43.8%, Muslim 31.3%, Protestant 22.8%, Catholic 0.7%, traditional 0.6%, other 0.8% (2016 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Ethiopia is a predominantly agricultural country – more than 80% of the population lives in rural areas – that is in the early stages of demographic transition. Infant, child, and maternal mortality have fallen sharply over the past decade, but the total fertility rate has declined more slowly and the population continues to grow. The rising age of marriage and the increasing proportion of women remaining single have contributed to fertility reduction. While the use of modern contraceptive methods among married women has increased significantly from 6 percent in 2000 to 27 percent in 2012, the overall rate is still quite low.</p><p>Ethiopia’s rapid population growth is putting increasing pressure on land resources, expanding environmental degradation, and raising vulnerability to food shortages. With more than 40 percent of the population below the age of 15 and a fertility rate of over 5 children per woman (and even higher in rural areas), Ethiopia will have to make further progress in meeting its family planning needs if it is to achieve the age structure necessary for reaping a demographic dividend in the coming decades.</p><p>Poverty, drought, political repression, and forced government resettlement have driven Ethiopia’s internal and external migration since the 1960s. Before the 1974 revolution, only small numbers of the Ethiopian elite went abroad to study and then returned home, but under the brutal Derg regime thousands fled the country, primarily as refugees. Between 1982 and 1991 there was a new wave of migration to the West for family reunification. Since the defeat of the Derg in 1991, Ethiopians have migrated to escape violence among some of the country’s myriad ethnic groups or to pursue economic opportunities. Internal and international trafficking of women and children for domestic work and prostitution is a growing problem.</p>"
"text": "<p>Ethiopia is a predominantly agricultural country – nearly 80% of the population lives in rural areas – that is in the early stages of demographic transition. Infant, child, and maternal mortality have fallen sharply over the past decade, but the total fertility rate has declined more slowly and the population continues to grow. The rising age of marriage and the increasing proportion of women remaining single have contributed to fertility reduction. While the use of modern contraceptive methods among married women has increased significantly from 6 percent in 2000 to 27 percent in 2012, the overall rate is still quite low.</p> <p>Ethiopia’s rapid population growth is putting increasing pressure on land resources, expanding environmental degradation, and raising vulnerability to food shortages. With about 40 percent of the population below the age of 15 and a fertility rate of 4 children per woman (and even higher in rural areas), Ethiopia will have to make further progress in meeting its family planning needs if it is to achieve the age structure necessary for reaping a demographic dividend in the coming decades.</p> <p>Poverty, drought, political repression, and forced government resettlement have driven Ethiopia’s internal and external migration since the 1960s. Before the 1974 revolution, only small numbers of the Ethiopian elite went abroad to study and then returned home, but under the brutal Derg regime thousands fled the country, primarily as refugees. Between 1982 and 1991 there was a new wave of migration to the West for family reunification. Since the defeat of the Derg in 1991, Ethiopians have migrated to escape violence among some of the country’s myriad ethnic groups or to pursue economic opportunities. Internal and international trafficking of women and children for domestic work and prostitution is a growing problem.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
@ -529,10 +529,10 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Tana - 3,600 sq km; Abaya Hayk - 1,160 sq km; Ch'amo Hayk - 550 sq km"
},
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Turkana (shared with Kenya) - 6,400 sq km; Abhe Bid Hayk/Abhe Bad (shared with Djibouti) - 780 sq km;&nbsp;"
}
},
@ -1091,10 +1091,10 @@
"text": "107,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "400,000 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1165,10 +1165,10 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "the slow process to open up Ethiopia&rsquo;s telecom market was completed with the licensing of the Safaricom-led Global Partnership for Ethiopia consortium; the country had been one of the last in Africa to allow its national telco a monopoly on all telecom services including fixed, mobile, internet and data communications; this has stifled innovation, restricted network expansion, and limited the scope of services on offer; the consortium was in some respects a proxy for the wider influence over Ethiopia&rsquo;s telecom sector between the interests of the US and China; only one of the two licenses on offer was secured, with uncertainty as to the timetable for issuing the second license; the government in mid-2021 began the process of selling a 45% stake in the incumbent telco Ethio Telecom; the World Bank in early 2021 provided a $200 million loan to help develop the country&rsquo;s digital transformation, while the government has embarked on its 2020-2030 program as well as its Digital Ethiopia 2025 strategy, both aimed at making better use of digital technologies to promote socioeconomic development; the country&rsquo;s mobile platform has mostly been provided by ZTE and Huawei, which have offered vendor financing (2021)"
"text": "has been one of the last in Africa to allow its national telco a monopoly on all telecom services including fixed, mobile, internet and data communications; this has stifled innovation, restricted network expansion, and limited the scope of services on offer; the World Bank in early 2021 provided a $200 million loan to help develop the country&rsquo;s digital transformation, while the government has embarked on its 2020-2030 program as well as its Digital Ethiopia 2025 strategy, both aimed at making better use of digital technologies to promote socioeconomic development (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line subscriptions at about 1 per 100 while mobile-cellular stands at a little over 37 per 100; the number of mobile telephones is increasing steadily (2019)"
"text": "fixed-line subscriptions at about 1 per 100 while mobile-cellular stands at a little over 39 per 100; the number of mobile telephones is increasing steadily (2020)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 251; open-wire to Sudan and Djibouti; microwave radio relay to Kenya and Djibouti; 2 domestic satellites provide the national trunk service; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (1 Atlantic Ocean and 2 Pacific Ocean) (2016)"
@ -1284,7 +1284,7 @@
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF): Ground Forces, Ethiopian Air Force (Ye Ityopya Ayer Hayl, ETAF); Ministry of Peace: Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP) (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> in January 2020 the Ethiopian Government announced it had re-established a navy, which was disbanded in 1996; in March 2019, Ethiopia signed a defense cooperation agreement with France which stipulated that France would support the establishment of an Ethiopian navy, which would reportedly be based out of Djibouti<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>in 2018, Ethiopia established a Republican Guard military unit responsible to the Prime Minister for protecting senior officials<br><br><strong>note 3: </strong>each of the states have regional and/or a \"special\" paramilitary security and police forces that report to regional civilian authorities and operate separately from federal forces; local militias operate across the country in loose and varying coordination with these regional security and police forces, the Ethiopian Federal Police, and the Ethiopian military<br><br>"
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> in 2020 the Ethiopian Government announced it had re-established a navy, which had been disbanded in 1996; in March 2019, Ethiopia signed a defense cooperation agreement with France which stipulated that France would support the establishment of an Ethiopian navy, which would reportedly be based out of Djibouti<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>in 2018, Ethiopia established a Republican Guard military unit responsible to the Prime Minister for protecting senior officials<br><br><strong>note 3: </strong>each of the states have regional and/or a \"special\" paramilitary security and police forces that report to regional civilian authorities and operate separately from federal forces; local militias operate across the country in loose and varying coordination with these regional security and police forces, the ENDF, and the EFP; there have been some calls for these regional paramilitary forces to be incorporated into the ENDF and EFP<br><br>"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
@ -1328,7 +1328,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p><em>Ethiopia-Eritrea:</em> Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed to abide by the 2002 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission's (EEBC) delimitation decision, but neither party responded to the revised line detailed in the November 2006 EEBC Demarcation Statement <br><br><em>Ethiopia-Somalia:</em> While border clashes continue in the al-Fashqa (Fashaga) area,  the US views the 1902 boundary treaty between Ethiopia and Sudan as being in force; the undemarcated former British administrative line has little meaning as a political separation to rival clans within Ethiopia's Ogaden and southern Somalia's Oromo region; Ethiopian forces invaded southern Somalia and routed Islamist courts from Mogadishu in January 2007; \"Somaliland\" secessionists provide port facilities in Berbera and trade ties to landlocked Ethiopia; <br><br><em>Ethiopia-Sudan:</em> Ethiopia's construction of a large dam (the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) on the Blue Nile since 2011 has become a focal point of relations with Egypt and Sudan; as of 2020, four years of three-way talks between the three capitals over operating the dam and filling its reservoir had made little progress; Ethiopia began filling the dam in July 2020; civil unrest in eastern Sudan has hampered efforts to demarcate the porous boundary with Ethiopia</p>"
"text": "<p><em>Ethiopia-Eritrea:</em> Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed to abide by the 2002 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission's (EEBC) delimitation decision, but neither party responded to the revised line detailed in the November 2006 EEBC Demarcation Statement <br><br><em>Ethiopia-Somalia:</em> While border clashes continue in the al-Fashqa (Fashaga) area, the US views the 1902 boundary treaty between Ethiopia and Sudan as being in force; the undemarcated former British administrative line has little meaning as a political separation to rival clans within Ethiopia's Ogaden and southern Somalia's Oromo region; Ethiopian forces invaded southern Somalia and routed Islamist courts from Mogadishu in January 2007; \"Somaliland\" secessionists provide port facilities in Berbera and trade ties to landlocked Ethiopia; <br><br><em>Ethiopia-Sudan:</em> Ethiopia's construction of a large dam (the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) on the Blue Nile since 2011 has become a focal point of relations with Egypt and Sudan; as of 2020, four years of three-way talks between the three capitals over operating the dam and filling its reservoir had made little progress; Ethiopia began filling the dam in July 2020; civil unrest in eastern Sudan has hampered efforts to demarcate the porous boundary with Ethiopia</p>"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {

4
africa/ga.json
View file

@ -1018,10 +1018,10 @@
"text": "3,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
africa/gb.json
View file

@ -991,10 +991,10 @@
"text": "14,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "178,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "178,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "2 billion barrels (2021 est.)"

4
africa/gh.json
View file

@ -1051,10 +1051,10 @@
"text": "98,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "176,800 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "176,800 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "3,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "3,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "660 million barrels (2021 est.)"

4
africa/gv.json
View file

@ -1044,10 +1044,10 @@
"text": "19,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

8
africa/iv.json
View file

@ -94,7 +94,7 @@
"text": "730 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lagune Aby - 780 sq km"
}
},
@ -524,7 +524,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lagune Aby - 780 sq km"
}
},
@ -1055,10 +1055,10 @@
"text": "56,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "30,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "30,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "69,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "69,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "100 million barrels (2021 est.)"

24
africa/ke.json
View file

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"Introduction": {
"Background": {
"text": "<p>Trade centers such as Mombasa have existed along the Kenyan and Tanzanian coastlines, known as the Land of Zanj, since at least the 2nd century. These centers traded with the outside world, including China, India, Indonesia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Persia. By around the 9th century, the mix of Africans, Arabs, and Persians who lived and traded there became known as Swahili (\"people of the coast\") with a distinct language (KiSwahili) and culture. The Portuguese arrived in the 1490s and, using Mombasa as a base, sought to monopolize trade in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese were pushed out in the late 1600s by the combined forces of Oman and Pate, an island off the coast. In 1890, Germany and the UK divided up the region, with the UK taking the north and the Germans the south, including present-day Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda. The British established the East Africa Protectorate in 1895, which in 1920 was converted into a colony and named Kenya after its highest mountain. Numerous political disputes between the colony and the UK subsequently led to the violent Mau Mau Uprising, which began in 1952, and the eventual declaration of independence in 1963.</p> Jomo KENYATTA, the founding president and an icon of the liberation struggle, led Kenya from independence in 1963 until his death in 1978, when Vice President Daniel Arap MOI took power in a constitutional succession. The country was a de facto one-party state from 1969 until 1982, after which time the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) changed the constitution to make itself the sole legal political party in Kenya. MOI acceded to internal and external pressure for political liberalization in late 1991. The ethnically fractured opposition failed to dislodge KANU from power in elections in 1992 and 1997, which were marred by violence and fraud. President MOI stepped down in December 2002 following fair and peaceful elections. Mwai KIBAKI, running as the candidate of the multiethnic, united opposition group, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), defeated KANU candidate Uhuru KENYATTA, the son of founding president Jomo KENYATTA, and assumed the presidency following a campaign centered on an anticorruption platform. <br><br>KIBAKI's reelection in 2007 resulted in two months of post-election ethnic violence that caused the death of more than 1,100 people and the dislocation of hundreds of thousands. Opposition candidate, Raila ODINGA, accused the government of widespread vote rigging. African Union-sponsored mediation led by former UN Secretary General Kofi ANNAN resulted in a power-sharing accord that brought ODINGA into the government in the restored position of prime minister. The power sharing accord included a broad reform agenda, the centerpiece of which was constitutional reform. In 2010, Kenyans overwhelmingly adopted a new constitution in a national referendum. The new constitution introduced additional checks and balances to executive power and devolved power and resources to 47 newly created counties. It also eliminated the position of prime minister. Uhuru KENYATTA won the first presidential election under the new constitution in March 2013. KENYATTA won a second and final term in office in November 2017 following a contentious, repeat election. In September 2022, "
"text": "<p>Trade centers such as Mombasa have existed along the Kenyan and Tanzanian coastlines, known as the Land of Zanj, since at least the 2nd century. These centers traded with the outside world, including China, India, Indonesia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Persia. By around the 9th century, the mix of Africans, Arabs, and Persians who lived and traded there became known as Swahili (\"people of the coast\") with a distinct language (KiSwahili) and culture. The Portuguese arrived in the 1490s and, using Mombasa as a base, sought to monopolize trade in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese were pushed out in the late 1600s by the combined forces of Oman and Pate, an island off the coast. In 1890, Germany and the UK divided up the region, with the UK taking the north and the Germans the south, including present-day Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda. The British established the East Africa Protectorate in 1895, which in 1920 was converted into a colony and named Kenya after its highest mountain. Numerous political disputes between the colony and the UK subsequently led to the violent Mau Mau Uprising, which began in 1952, and the eventual declaration of independence in 1963.</p> Jomo KENYATTA, the founding president and an icon of the liberation struggle, led Kenya from independence in 1963 until his death in 1978, when Vice President Daniel Arap MOI took power in a constitutional succession. The country was a de facto one-party state from 1969 until 1982, after which time the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) changed the constitution to make itself the sole legal political party in Kenya. MOI acceded to internal and external pressure for political liberalization in late 1991. The ethnically fractured opposition failed to dislodge KANU from power in elections in 1992 and 1997, which were marred by violence and fraud. President MOI stepped down in December 2002 following fair and peaceful elections. Mwai KIBAKI, running as the candidate of the multiethnic, united opposition group, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), defeated KANU candidate Uhuru KENYATTA, the son of founding president Jomo KENYATTA, and assumed the presidency following a campaign centered on an anticorruption platform. <br><br>KIBAKI's reelection in 2007 resulted in two months of post-election ethnic violence that caused the death of more than 1,100 people and the dislocation of hundreds of thousands. Opposition candidate, Raila ODINGA, accused the government of widespread vote rigging. African Union-sponsored mediation led by former UN Secretary General Kofi ANNAN resulted in a power-sharing accord that brought ODINGA into the government in the restored position of prime minister. The power sharing accord included a broad reform agenda, the centerpiece of which was constitutional reform. In 2010, Kenyans overwhelmingly adopted a new constitution in a national referendum. The new constitution introduced additional checks and balances to executive power and devolved power and resources to 47 newly created counties. It also eliminated the position of prime minister. Uhuru KENYATTA won the first presidential election under the new constitution in March 2013. KENYATTA won a second and final term in office in November 2017 following a contentious, repeat election. In August 2022, William RUTO won a close presidential election; he assumed the office the following month after the Kenyan Supreme Court upheld the victory."
}
},
"Geography": {
@ -94,10 +94,10 @@
"text": "1,030 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Victoria (shared with Tanzania and Uganda) - 62,940 sq km"
},
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Turkana (shared with Ethiopia) - 6,400 sq km"
}
},
@ -145,7 +145,7 @@
"text": "Christian 85.5% (Protestant 33.4%, Catholic 20.6%, Evangelical 20.4%, African Instituted Churches 7%, other Christian 4.1%), Muslim 10.9%, other 1.8%, none 1.6%,&nbsp;don't&nbsp;know/no answer&nbsp;0.2% (2019 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Kenya has experienced dramatic population growth since the mid-20th century as a result of its high birth rate and its declining mortality rate. More than 40% of Kenyans are under the age of 15 because of sustained high fertility, early marriage and childbearing, and an unmet need for family planning. Kenya’s persistent rapid population growth strains the labor market, social services, arable land, and natural resources. Although Kenya in 1967 was the first Sub-Saharan country to launch a nationwide family planning program, progress in reducing the birth rate has largely stalled since the late 1990s, when the government decreased its support for family planning to focus on the HIV epidemic. Government commitment and international technical support spurred Kenyan contraceptive use, decreasing the fertility rate (children per woman) from about 8 in the late 1970s to less than 5 children twenty years later, but it has plateaued at just over 3 children today.</p><p>Kenya is a source of emigrants and a host country for refugees. In the 1960s and 1970s, Kenyans pursued higher education in the UK because of colonial ties, but as British immigration rules tightened, the US, the then Soviet Union, and Canada became attractive study destinations. Kenya’s stagnant economy and political problems during the 1980s and 1990s led to an outpouring of Kenyan students and professionals seeking permanent opportunities in the West and southern Africa. Nevertheless, Kenya’s relative stability since its independence in 1963 has attracted hundreds of thousands of refugees escaping violent conflicts in neighboring countries; Kenya shelters more than 300,000 Somali refugees as of April 2017.</p>"
"text": "<p>Kenya has experienced dramatic population growth since the mid-20th century as a result of its high birth rate and its declining mortality rate. Almost 40% of Kenyans are under the age of 15 as of 2022 because of sustained high fertility, early marriage and childbearing, and an unmet need for family planning. Kenya’s persistent rapid population growth strains the labor market, social services, arable land, and natural resources. Although Kenya in 1967 was the first Sub-Saharan country to launch a nationwide family planning program, progress in reducing the birth rate has largely stalled since the late 1990s, when the government decreased its support for family planning to focus on the HIV epidemic. Government commitment and international technical support spurred Kenyan contraceptive use, decreasing the fertility rate (children per woman) from about 8 in the late 1970s to less than 5 children twenty years later, but it has plateaued at 3 children as of 2022.</p> <p>Kenya is a source of emigrants and a host country for refugees. In the 1960s and 1970s, Kenyans pursued higher education in the UK because of colonial ties, but as British immigration rules tightened, the US, the then Soviet Union, and Canada became attractive study destinations. Kenya’s stagnant economy and political problems during the 1980s and 1990s led to an outpouring of Kenyan students and professionals seeking permanent opportunities in the West and southern Africa. Nevertheless, Kenya’s relative stability since its independence in 1963 has attracted hundreds of thousands of refugees escaping violent conflicts in neighboring countries; Kenya was sheltering nearly 280,000 Somali refugees as of 2022.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
@ -491,7 +491,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies": {
"text": "<em>due to drought conditions -</em> in the March to June 2022 period, about 4.1 million people are estimated to be severely food insecure; this figure is about 40% higher than the same time last year; severe rainfall deficits during the March-May 2022 rainy season have impaired pasture regeneration in several central, northern and eastern pastoral and agro-pastoral areas; as of late July 2022, between 25% and more than 85% of the grassland was affected by severe drought reflecting consecutive poor rainy seasons since late 2020 affecting both crop and livestock production; prices of maize are at high levels across the country due to reduced availability and high fuel prices inflating production and transportation costs; as the June–September 2022 dry season has just started and forecasts point to a poor October–December 2022 “short‑rains” season, food insecurity conditions are expected to further deteriorate (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to drought conditions -</em> in the March to June 2022 period, about 4.1 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure; this figure is about 40% higher than the same time last year; severe rainfall deficits during the March-May 2022 rainy season have impaired pasture regeneration in several central, northern and eastern pastoral and agro-pastoral areas; as of late July 2022, between 25% and more than 85% of the grassland was affected by severe drought reflecting consecutive poor rainy seasons since late 2020 affecting both crop and livestock production; prices of maize are at high levels across the country due to reduced availability and high fuel prices inflating production and transportation costs; as the June–September 2022 dry season has started and forecasts point to a poor October–December 2022 “short‑rains” season, food insecurity conditions are expected to further deteriorate (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -506,10 +506,10 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Victoria (shared with Tanzania and Uganda) - 62,940 sq km"
},
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Turkana (shared with Ethiopia) - 6,400 sq km"
}
},
@ -1064,10 +1064,10 @@
"text": "116,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1138,7 +1138,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Kenya&rsquo;s telecom market continues to undergo considerable changes in the wake of increased competition, improved international connectivity, and rapid developments in the mobile market; the country is directly connected to a number of submarine cables, and with Mombasa as a landing point for LIT&rsquo;s newly completed East and West Africa terrestrial network, the country serves as a key junction for onward connectivity to the Arabian states and the Far East; the additional internet capacity has meant that the cost of internet access has fallen dramatically in recent years, allowing services to be affordable to a far greater proportion of the population; numerous competitors are rolling out national and metropolitan backbone networks and wireless access networks to deliver services to population centers across the country; several fiber infrastructure sharing agreements have been forged, and as a result the number of fiber broadband connections has increased sharply in recent years; much of the progress in the broadband segment is due to the government&rsquo;s revised national broadband strategy, which has been updated with goals through to 2030, and which are largely dependent on mobile broadband platforms based on LTE and 5G (2022)"
"text": "Kenya&rsquo;s telecom market continues to undergo considerable changes in the wake of increased competition, improved international connectivity, and rapid developments in the mobile market; the country is directly connected to a number of submarine cables, and with Mombasa through a terrestrial network, the country serves as a key junction for onward connectivity to the Arabian states and the Far East; numerous competitors are rolling out national and metropolitan backbone networks and wireless access networks to deliver services to population centers across the country; several fiber infrastructure sharing agreements have been forged, and as a result the number of fiber broadband connections has increased sharply in recent years; much of the progress in the broadband segment is due to the government&rsquo;s revised national broadband strategy, which has been updated with goals through to 2030, and which are largely dependent on mobile broadband platforms based on LTE and 5G (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line subscriptions stand at less than 1 per 100 persons; multiple providers in the mobile-cellular segment of the market fostering a boom in mobile-cellular telephone usage with teledensity reaching 114 per 100 persons (2020)"
@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>as of March 2022, Kenya provides shelter to nearly 548,000 refugees and asylum seekers, including Ugandans who flee across the border periodically to seek protection from Lord's Resistance Army rebels</p> <p><em>Kenya-Ethiopia</em>: their border was demarcated in the 1950s and approved in 1970; in 2012, Kenya and Ethiopia agreed to redemarcate their boundary following disputes over beacons and crossborder crime</p> <p><em>Kenya-Somalia</em>: Kenya works hard to prevent the clan and militia fighting in Somalia from spreading across the border, which has long been open to nomadic pastoralists; in 2021, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave Somalia control over a disputed ocean area where the seabeds are believed to hold vasts oil and gas deposits; the ICJ ruling gives Somalia the rights to several offshore oil exploration blocks previously claimed by Kenya; Kenya did not recognize the court’s decision</p> <p><em>Kenya-South Sudan</em>: two thirds of the boundary that separates Kenya and South Sudan's sovereignty known as the Ilemi Triangle has been unclear since British colonial times; Kenya has administered the area since colonial times; officials from Kenya and South Sudan signed a M.o.U. on boundary delimitation and demarcation and agreed to set up a joint committee; as of July 2019, the demarcation process was to begin in 90 days, but was delayed due to a lack of funding</p> <p><em>Kenya-Sudan</em>: Kenya served as an important mediator in brokering Sudan's north-south separation in February 2005</p> <p><em>Kenya-Tanzania</em>: Kenya and Tanzania were conducting a joint reaffirmation process in November 2021 to ensure the border was visibly marked with pillars</p> <p><em>Kenya-Uganda:</em> Kenya and Uganda began a joint demarcation of the boundary in 2021 </p> <p> </p>"
"text": "<p><em>Kenya-Ethiopia</em>: their border was demarcated in the 1950s and approved in 1970; in 2012, Kenya and Ethiopia agreed to redemarcate their boundary following disputes over beacons and cross-border crime</p> <p><em>Kenya-Somalia</em>: Kenya works hard to prevent the clan and militia fighting in Somalia from spreading across the border, which has long been open to nomadic pastoralists; in 2021, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave Somalia control over a disputed ocean area where the seabeds are believed to hold vasts oil and gas deposits; the ICJ ruling gave Somalia the rights to several offshore oil exploration blocks previously claimed by Kenya; Kenya did not recognize the court’s decision</p> <p><em>Kenya-South Sudan</em>: two thirds of the boundary that separates Kenya and South Sudan's sovereignty known as the Ilemi Triangle has been unclear since British colonial times; Kenya has administered the area since colonial times; officials from Kenya and South Sudan signed a memorandum of understanding on boundary delimitation and demarcation and agreed to set up a joint committee; as of July 2019, the demarcation process was to begin in 90 days, but was delayed due to a lack of funding</p> <p><em>Kenya-Sudan</em>: Kenya served as an important mediator in brokering Sudan's north-south separation in February 2005</p> <p><em>Kenya-Tanzania</em>: Kenya and Tanzania were conducting a joint reaffirmation process in November 2021 to ensure the border was visibly marked with pillars</p> <p><em>Kenya-Uganda:</em> Kenya and Uganda began a joint demarcation of the boundary in 2021 </p> <p> </p>"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
@ -1333,7 +1333,7 @@
}
},
"Illicit drugs": {
"text": "<p>a transit country for a variety of illicit drugs, including heroin and cocaine; transit location for precursor chemicals used to produce methamphetamine and other drugs; transshipment country for heroin from Southwest Asia destined for international markets, mainly Europe, and cocaine transits shipped through Ethiopia from South America;  cultivates cannabis and miraa (khat) for both local use and export</p>"
"text": "<p>a transit country for a variety of illicit drugs, including heroin and cocaine; transit location for precursor chemicals used to produce methamphetamine and other drugs; transshipment country for heroin from Southwest Asia destined for international markets, mainly Europe, and cocaine transits shipped through Ethiopia from South America; cultivates cannabis and miraa (khat) for both local use and export</p>"
}
}
}

4
africa/li.json
View file

@ -1010,10 +1010,10 @@
"text": "9,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
africa/lt.json
View file

@ -1014,10 +1014,10 @@
"text": "5,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
africa/ly.json
View file

@ -932,10 +932,10 @@
"text": "219,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "1,067,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "1,067,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "48.363 billion barrels (2021 est.)"

4
africa/ma.json
View file

@ -1027,10 +1027,10 @@
"text": "21,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

12
africa/mi.json
View file

@ -86,10 +86,10 @@
"text": "740 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Malawi (shared with Mozambique and Tanzania) - 22,490"
},
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Chilwa - 1,040 sq km"
}
},
@ -504,10 +504,10 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Malawi (shared with Mozambique and Tanzania) - 22,490"
},
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Chilwa - 1,040 sq km"
}
},
@ -1042,10 +1042,10 @@
"text": "9,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

12
africa/ml.json
View file

@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
"text": "3,780 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lac Faguibine - 590 sq km<br>note - the Niger River is the only source of water for the lake; in recent years the lake is dry"
}
},
@ -518,7 +518,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lac Faguibine - 590 sq km<br>note - the Niger River is the only source of water for the lake; in recent years the lake is dry"
}
},
@ -1053,10 +1053,10 @@
"text": "37,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1232,8 +1232,8 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Malian Armed Forces (FAMA): Army (includes a riverine patrol force), Republic of Mali Air Force; National Gendarmerie; National Guard (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the Gendarmerie and the National Guard are under the authority of the Ministry of Defense and Veterans Affairs (Ministere De La Defense Et Des Anciens Combattants, MDAC), but operational control is shared with the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>the Gendarmerie's primary mission is internal security and public order; its duties also include territorial defense, humanitarian operations, intelligence gathering, and protecting private property, mainly in rural areas; it also has a specialized border security unit<br><br><strong>note 3: </strong>the National Guard is a military force responsible for providing security to government facilities and institutions, prison service, public order, humanitarian operations, some border security, and intelligence gathering; its forces include a camel corps for patrolling the deserts and borders of northern Mali<br><br><strong>note 4: </strong>there are also pro-government militias operating in Mali, such as the Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (GATIA)"
"text": "Malian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Maliennes or FAMA): Army (includes a riverine patrol force), Republic of Mali Air Force; National Gendarmerie; National Guard (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the Gendarmerie and the National Guard are under the authority of the Ministry of Defense and Veterans Affairs (Ministere De La Defense Et Des Anciens Combattants, MDAC), but operational control is shared with the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>the Gendarmerie's primary mission is internal security and public order; its duties also include territorial defense, humanitarian operations, intelligence gathering, and protecting private property, mainly in rural areas; it also has a specialized border security unit<br><br><strong>note 3: </strong>the National Guard is a military force responsible for providing security to government facilities and institutions, prison service, public order, humanitarian operations, some border security, and intelligence gathering; its forces include a camel corps for patrolling the deserts and borders of northern Mali<br><br><strong>note 4: </strong>there are also pro-government militias operating in Mali, such as the Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (GATIA); the leader of GATIA is also a general in the national army"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {

4
africa/mo.json
View file

@ -1058,10 +1058,10 @@
"text": "307,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "700,000 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
africa/mp.json
View file

@ -967,10 +967,10 @@
"text": "36,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
africa/mr.json
View file

@ -1051,10 +1051,10 @@
"text": "27,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "4,800 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "4,800 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "20 million barrels (2021 est.)"

10
africa/mz.json
View file

@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
"text": "1,180 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Malawi (shared with Malawi and Tanzania) - 22,490"
}
},
@ -134,7 +134,7 @@
"text": "Roman Catholic 27.2%, Muslim 18.9%, Zionist Christian 15.6%, Evangelical/Pentecostal 15.3%, Anglican 1.7%, other 4.8%, none 13.9%, unspecified 2.5% (2017 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Mozambique is a poor, sparsely populated country with high fertility and mortality rates and a rapidly growing youthful population – 45% of the population is younger than 15. Mozambique’s high poverty rate is sustained by natural disasters, disease, high population growth, low agricultural productivity, and the unequal distribution of wealth. The country’s birth rate is among the world’s highest, averaging around more than 5 children per woman (and higher in rural areas) for at least the last three decades. The sustained high level of fertility reflects gender inequality, low contraceptive use, early marriages and childbearing, and a lack of education, particularly among women. The high population growth rate is somewhat restrained by the country’s high HIV/AIDS and overall mortality rates. Mozambique ranks among the worst in the world for HIV/AIDS prevalence, HIV/AIDS deaths, and life expectancy at birth.</p><p>Mozambique is predominantly a country of emigration, but internal, rural-urban migration has begun to grow. Mozambicans, primarily from the country’s southern region, have been migrating to South Africa for work for more than a century. Additionally, approximately 1.7 million Mozambicans fled to Malawi, South Africa, and other neighboring countries between 1979 and 1992 to escape from civil war. Labor migrants have usually been men from rural areas whose crops have failed or who are unemployed and have headed to South Africa to work as miners; multiple generations of the same family often become miners. Since the abolition of apartheid in South Africa in 1991, other job opportunities have opened to Mozambicans, including in the informal and manufacturing sectors, but mining remains their main source of employment.</p>"
"text": "<p>Mozambique is a poor, sparsely populated country with high fertility and mortality rates and a rapidly growing youthful population – 45% of the population is younger than 15, as of 2022. Mozambique’s high poverty rate is sustained by natural disasters, disease, high population growth, low agricultural productivity, and the unequal distribution of wealth. The country’s birth rate is among the world’s highest, averaging around more than 5 children per woman (and higher in rural areas) for at least the last three decades. The sustained high level of fertility reflects gender inequality, low contraceptive use, early marriages and childbearing, and a lack of education, particularly among women. The high population growth rate is somewhat restrained by the country’s high HIV/AIDS and overall mortality rates. Mozambique ranks among the worst in the world for HIV/AIDS prevalence, HIV/AIDS deaths, and life expectancy at birth, as of 2022.</p> <p>Mozambique is predominantly a country of emigration, but internal, rural-urban migration has begun to grow. Mozambicans, primarily from the country’s southern region, have been migrating to South Africa for work for more than a century. Additionally, approximately 1.7 million Mozambicans fled to Malawi, South Africa, and other neighboring countries between 1979 and 1992 to escape from civil war. Labor migrants have usually been men from rural areas whose crops have failed or who are unemployed and have headed to South Africa to work as miners; multiple generations of the same family often become miners. Since the abolition of apartheid in South Africa in 1991, other job opportunities have opened to Mozambicans, including in the informal and manufacturing sectors, but mining remains their main source of employment.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
@ -511,7 +511,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Malawi (shared with Malawi and Tanzania) - 22,490"
}
},
@ -1058,10 +1058,10 @@
"text": "35,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

8
africa/ng.json
View file

@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
"text": "1,000 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Chad (endorheic lake shared with Chad, Nigeria, and Cameroon) - 10,360-25,900 sq km<br>note - area varies by season and year to year"
}
},
@ -514,7 +514,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Chad (endorheic lake shared with Chad, Nigeria, and Cameroon) - 10,360-25,900 sq km<br>note - area varies by season and year to year"
}
},
@ -1054,10 +1054,10 @@
"text": "13,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "150 million barrels (2021 est.)"

8
africa/ni.json
View file

@ -94,7 +94,7 @@
"text": "2,930 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Chad (endorheic lake shared with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon) - 10,360-25,900 sq km<br>note - area varies by season and year to year"
}
},
@ -532,7 +532,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Chad (endorheic lake shared with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon) - 10,360-25,900 sq km<br>note - area varies by season and year to year"
}
},
@ -1081,10 +1081,10 @@
"text": "483,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "1,889,100 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "1,889,100 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "36.89 billion barrels (2021 est.)"

6
africa/od.json
View file

@ -873,10 +873,10 @@
"text": "12,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "126,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "126,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
}
},
"Refined petroleum products - production": {
@ -936,7 +936,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Following a referendum, oil-rich South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011 and became an independent nation; having been deprived of investment for decades, it inherited one of the least developed telecom markets in the world; there was once investment activity among mobile network operators who sought to expand their networks in some areas of the country, but by late 2016 both Zain South Sudan and MTN South Sudan had cut back their work forces in a bid to save on operating costs, while their falling subscriber bases have strained revenue; Zain South Sudan in particular recorded considerable financial losses in 2015 and 2016; operators in the telecom sector placed themselves in survival mode and are hoping for a political settlement and a return to some degree of social stability; MTN as reported its financial data on the basis of South Sudan&rsquo;s economy having been hyper inflationary since 2016; although MTN and Zain reported a significant fall in the number of mobile subscribers in 2017, with a consequent severe decline in revenue, both saw subscriber bases increase in 2018 as they absorbed customers which had migrated from VivaCell after that company was closed down for failing to pay back taxes; MTN South Sudan reported a 26.5% increase in the number of mobile subscribers in the year to September 2021; South Sudan has one of the lowest mobile penetration rates in Africa; growth in the sector in coming years is premised on a resolution to the political crisis and a recovery of the country&rsquo;s economy; the virtually untapped internet and broadband market also depends to a large extent on the country gaining access to international fiber cables and on a national backbone network being in place; sophisticated infrastructure solutions are needed to reach the 80% of the population that live outside of the main urban centers; with a negligible rate of bank account ownership, mobile payment and banking solutions also have a strong potential once a reliable mobile infrastructure is built; some improvement has followed from the cable link completed by Liquid Telecom in February 2020 which connects Juba directly to the company&rsquo;s submarine landing station at Mombasa; the cable was South Sudan&rsquo;s first direct international fiber link, and has helped drive down the price of retail internet services for residential and business customers; a second cable linking to the border with Kenya was completed in December 2021. (2022)"
"text": "following a referendum, oil-rich South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011 and became an independent nation; having been deprived of investment for decades, it inherited one of the least developed telecom markets in the world; there was once investment activity among mobile network operators who sought to expand their networks in some areas of the country; operators in the telecom sector placed themselves in survival mode and are hoping for a political settlement and a return to some degree of social stability; South Sudan has one of the lowest mobile penetration rates in Africa; growth in the sector in coming years is premised on a resolution to the political crisis and a recovery of the country&rsquo;s economy; the virtually untapped internet and broadband market also depends to a large extent on the country gaining access to international fiber cables and on a national backbone network being in place; sophisticated infrastructure solutions are needed to reach the 80% of the population that live outside of the main urban centers; some improvement has followed from the cable link in February 2020 which connects Juba directly to the company&rsquo;s submarine landing station at Mombasa; the cable was South Sudan&rsquo;s first direct international fiber link, and has helped drive down the price of retail internet services for residential and business customers; a second cable linking to the border with Kenya was completed in December 2021 (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line less than 1 per 100 subscriptions, mobile-cellular roughly 20 per 100 persons (2019)"

4
africa/pu.json
View file

@ -947,10 +947,10 @@
"text": "2,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

12
africa/rw.json
View file

@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
"text": "96 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Kivu (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo) - 2,220 sq km"
}
},
@ -489,7 +489,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Kivu (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo) - 2,220 sq km"
}
},
@ -1022,10 +1022,10 @@
"text": "8,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1093,7 +1093,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Rwanda was slow to liberalize the mobile sector, allowing MTN a monopoly until 2006 when the fixed-line incumbent, Rwandatel (since acquired by Liquid Intelligence Technologies) became the second mobile operator; there was effective competition among three operators after Tigo launched services in 2009; the acquisition of Tigo by Airtel saw a significant consolidation in the market, and the cancellation of Rwandatel&rsquo;s license in 2011 resulted in the market becoming a duopoly between the dominant operator MTN and Airtel; the fixed broadband sector has suffered from limited fixed-line infrastructure and high prices; operators are rolling out national backbone networks which also allow them to connect to the international submarine cables on Africa&rsquo;s east coast; these cables gave the entire region greater internet bandwidth and ended the dependency on satellites; Liquid Technologies has continued to expand its FttP services across Kigali and a number of other towns, while the country also has a new cable link with Tanzania, and via Tanzania&rsquo;s national broadband backbone it has gained connectivity to the networks of several other countries in the region; the number of subscribers on LTE infrastructure has increased sharply, helped by national LTE coverage achieved in mid-2018; mobile remains the dominant platform for voice and data services; the regulator noted that the number of mobile subscribers increased 2.7% in 2021, year-on-year; there was a slight fall in the beginning of 2022, though this decline was entirely from Airtel. (2022)"
"text": "Rwanda was slow to liberalize the mobile sector; there was effective competition among three operators; the fixed broadband sector has suffered from limited fixed-line infrastructure and high prices; operators are rolling out national backbone networks which also allow them to connect to the international submarine cables on Africa&rsquo;s east coast; these cables gave the entire region greater internet bandwidth and ended the dependency on satellites; while the country also has a new cable link with Tanzania, and via Tanzania&rsquo;s national broadband backbone it has gained connectivity to the networks of several other countries in the region; the number of subscribers on LTE infrastructure has increased sharply, helped by national LTE coverage achieved in mid-2018; mobile remains the dominant platform for voice and data services; the regulator noted that the number of mobile subscribers increased 2.7% in 2021, year-on-year; there was a slight fall in the beginning of 2022 (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "the capital, Kigali, is connected to provincial centers by microwave radio relay, and recently by cellular telephone service; much of the network depends on wire and HF radiotelephone; fixed-line less than 1 per 100 and mobile-cellular telephone density has increased to nearly 82 telephones per 100 persons (2020)"
@ -1225,7 +1225,7 @@
"text": "2,450 (plus about 500 police) Central African Republic (approximately 1,700 for MINUSCA; an additional 750 troops sent separately under a bilateral agreement with CAR in August, 2021); up to 2,000 Mozambique (deployed mid-2021 under a bi-lateral agreement to assist with combating insurgency; includes both military and police forces); 2,600 (plus about 400 police) South Sudan (UNMISS) (2022)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "<p>the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) were established following independence in 1962; after the 1990-1994 civil war and genocide, the victorious Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front's military wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), became the country's military force; the RPA participated in the First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congolese Wars; the RPA was renamed the Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) in 2003, by which time it had assumed a more national character with the inclusion of many former Hutu officers as well as newly recruited soldiers<br><br>the RDF is widely regarded as one of Africa’s best trained and most capable and professional military forces; as of 2022, over 7,000 RDF and police personnel were deployed on missions in Africa</p>"
"text": "since 2021, Rwanda has deployed troops to the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to combat the rebel Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR); it has also been accused by the DRC Government of providing material support to the March 23 Movement (M23, aka Congolese Revolutionary Army) rebel group, which as of 2022 was fighting with DRC troops and UN peacekeeping forces<br><br>the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) were established following independence in 1962; after the 1990-1994 civil war and genocide, the victorious Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front's military wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), became the country's military force; the RPA participated in the First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congolese Wars; the RPA was renamed the Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) in 2003, by which time it had assumed a more national character with the inclusion of many former Hutu officers as well as newly recruited soldiers<br><br>the RDF is widely regarded as one of Africa’s best trained and most capable and professional military forces; as of 2022, over 7,000 RDF and police personnel were deployed on missions in Africa (2022)"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

4
africa/se.json
View file

@ -953,10 +953,10 @@
"text": "7,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

6
africa/sf.json
View file

@ -1055,10 +1055,10 @@
"text": "622,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "9,000 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "9,000 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "397,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "397,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "15 million barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1129,7 +1129,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "South Africa&rsquo;s telecom sector boasts one of the most advanced infrastructures on the continent; there has been considerable investment from Telkom, Liquid Intelligence Technologies, Broadband InfraCo, and municipal providers as well as from mobile network operators, such as MTN and Vodacom, all aimed at improving network capabilities; in mid-2021, Vodacom Group announced plans to set up its own InfraCo, merging its own fiber assets with those belonging to two recent acquisitions; the focus in recent years has been on back haul capacity and on fiber and LTE networks to extend and improve internet service connectivity; with the ongoing migration to fiber, the incumbent telco Telkom expects to close down its copper network in 2024; the mobile sector has developed strongly in recent years, partly due to the poor availability and level of service of fixed-line networks, which meant that many people had no alternative to mobile networks for voice and data services; the multi-spectrum auction was delayed several times due to legal wrangling, and was finally held in March 2022; the delay caused difficulties for network operators, which were forced to reform spectrum for 3G and LTE use, and provide 5G services on temporary licenses; six qualified bidders acquired spectrum, netting the regulator ZAR14.4 billion in revenues; in February 2022, Vumatel also acquired a 45% non-controlling stake in HeroTel, a local FttP player as the telco seeks to strengthen its foothold in the South African fiber market; as of February 2022, HeroTel had passed 150,000 homes and businesses, with its internet services live in over 400 South African towns and cities; the market is shrugging off the impact of the pandemic, which had a significant impact on production and supply chains globally, and saw a slowdown in some network expansions, particularly around 5G; on the consumer side, spending on telecoms services and devices remains slightly under pressure amid ongoing macroeconomic challenges facing the country; the crucial nature of telecom services, both for general communication as well as a tool for home-working, will offset such pressures; in many markets the net effect should be a steady though reduced increase in subscriber growth. (2022)"
"text": "South Africa&rsquo;s telecom sector boasts one of the most advanced infrastructures on the continent; the focus in recent years has been on back haul capacity and on fiber and LTE networks to extend and improve internet service connectivity; with the ongoing migration to fiber, the incumbent telco expects to close down its copper network in 2024; the mobile sector has developed strongly in recent years, partly due to the poor availability and level of service of fixed-line networks, which meant that many people had no alternative to mobile networks for voice and data services; the multi-spectrum auction was delayed several times due to legal wrangling, and was finally held in March 2022; the delay caused difficulties for network operators, which were forced to reform spectrum for 3G and LTE use, and provide 5G services on temporary licenses; six qualified bidders acquired spectrum, netting the regulator ZAR14.4 billion in revenues; the market is shrugging off the impact of the pandemic, which had a significant impact on production and supply chains globally, and saw a slowdown in some network expansions, particularly around 5G; on the consumer side, spending on telecoms services and devices remains slightly under pressure amid ongoing macroeconomic challenges facing the country; the crucial nature of telecom services, both for general communication as well as a tool for home-working, will offset such pressures; in many markets the net effect should be a steady though reduced increase in subscriber growth (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line over 3 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular nearly 162 telephones per 100 persons; consists of carrier-equipped open-wire lines, coaxial cables, microwave radio relay links, fiber-optic cable, radiotelephone communication stations, and wireless local loops; key centers are Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, and Pretoria (2020)"

6
africa/sg.json
View file

@ -1055,10 +1055,10 @@
"text": "57,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "20,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "20,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1129,7 +1129,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Senegal&rsquo;s telecom market continues to show steady growth in all sectors; this has been supported by the particular demands made on consumers during the pandemic, which resulted in a particularly strong increase in the number of subscribers; the mobile subscriber base increased 6.7% in 2020, year-on-year, and by 4.1% in 2021, while the number of fixed broadband subscribers increased 17.5% year-on-year in 2021; mobile internet platforms account for the vast majority of all internet accesses; quality of service issues continue to plague the market, with the regulator periodically issuing fines to the market players; Orange Group&rsquo;s local subsidiary Orange Senegal (Sonatel) remains the dominant player in both the fixed-line and mobile sectors; Free Senegal and Expresso Telecom provide effective competition, and though their relative market shares have been relatively stable since 2013, Free has more recently made some inroads to the share held by Expresso; this can partly be explained by the two-year delay in Expresso launching LTE services, and so losing new subscribers to its competitors; both Sonatel and Free continue to pilot 5G services in the country; Orange Senegal for some years held a near monopoly on the fixed-line, though moderate competition became effective after Expresso launched services as the second national operator in 2009; Expresso stopped investing in the sector, and it stopped providing fixed telephony services in September 2018; in February 2021, the regulator ordered the company to relaunch fixed telephony services, and so adhere to its license terms; By the following September it had signed up several thousand customers. (2022)"
"text": "Senegal&rsquo;s telecom market continues to show steady growth in all sectors; this has been supported by the particular demands made on consumers during the pandemic, which resulted in a particularly strong increase in the number of subscribers; the mobile subscriber base increased 6.7% in 2020, year-on-year, and by 4.1% in 2021, while the number of fixed broadband subscribers increased 17.5% year-on-year in 2021; mobile internet platforms account for the vast majority of all internet accesses; quality of service issues continue to plague the market, with the regulator periodically issuing fines to the market players (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "generally reliable urban system with a fiber-optic network; about two-thirds of all fixed-line connections are in Dakar; mobile-cellular service is steadily displacing fixed-line service, even in urban areas; fixed-line roughly 1 per 100 and mobile-cellular 114 per 100 persons (2020)"

4
africa/sh.json
View file

@ -669,10 +669,10 @@
"text": "100 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

6
africa/sl.json
View file

@ -1015,10 +1015,10 @@
"text": "5,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "the telecom sector has only gradually recovered from the destruction caused during the war years, and only since 2019 has there been an effective terrestrial fiber backbone infrastructure, while the cable link to neighboring Guinea was not completed until February 2020; there is considerable available capacity from the ACE submarine cable and the national fiber network, but this is used inefficiently and so the price of internet connectivity remains one of the highest in the region; the theft of equipment and cabling, compounded by neglect, mismanagement, and under investment, means that telcos continue to operate in difficult conditions; this has led to the demise of some telcos, including Comium and Smart Mobile; the telecom regulator has made efforts to improve the market, including the liberalization of the international gateway and regular checks on QoS; the regulator reduced the price floor for mobile voice calls in early 2020, though consumers objected to the MNOs withdrawing a number of cheap packages as a response; the mobile sector has been the main driver of overall telecom revenue; there continues to be movement in the market, with Orange Group in mid-2016 having completed its acquisition of Bharti Airtel&rsquo;s local unit and the Gambian telco QCell being awarded a license to operate mobile services. (2022)"
"text": "the telecom sector has only gradually recovered from the destruction caused during the war years, and only since 2019 has there been an effective terrestrial fiber backbone infrastructure, while the cable link to neighboring Guinea was not completed until February 2020; there is considerable available capacity from the ACE submarine cable and the national fiber network, but this is used inefficiently and so the price of internet connectivity remains one of the highest in the region; the theft of equipment and cabling, compounded by neglect, mismanagement, and under investment, means that telcos continue to operate in difficult conditions; the telecom regulator has made efforts to improve the market, including the liberalization of the international gateway and regular checks on QoS; the regulator reduced the price floor for mobile voice calls in early 2020, though consumers objected to the MNOs withdrawing a number of cheap packages as a response; the mobile sector has been the main driver of overall telecom revenue (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line 0 per 100 and mobile-cellular just over 86 per 100 (2020)"

12
africa/so.json
View file

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"Introduction": {
"Background": {
"text": "<p>Ancient Egypt trade expeditions along the northeastern coast of Africa - including today's Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia - occurred at various times between the 25th and 12th centuries B.C. Between A.D. 800 and 1100, immigrant Muslim Arabs and Persians set up coastal trading posts along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, solidifying Somalia’s close trading relationship with the Arab Peninsula. In the late 19th century, Britain and Italy established colonies in the Somali Peninsula, where they remained until 1960, when British Somaliland gained independence and joined with Italian Somaliland to form the Republic of Somalia. The country functioned as a parliamentary democracy until 1969, when General Mohamed SIAD Barre took control in a coup, beginning a 22-year authoritarian socialist dictatorship. In an effort to centralize power, SIAD called for the eradication of the clan, the key cultural and social organizing principle in Somali society. Resistance to SIAD’s socialist leadership, which was causing a rapid deterioration of the country, prompted allied clan militias to overthrow SIAD in early 1991, resulting in state collapse. Subsequent fighting between rival clans for resources and territory overwhelmed the country, resulting in a manmade famine and prompting international intervention. Beginning in 1993, the UN spearheaded a humanitarian mission supported by international forces, but the international community largely withdrew by 1995 following Black Hawk Down - an incident in which two American Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down in Mogadishu, killing 21 international forces and wounding 82.<br><br>International peace conferences in the 2000s resulted in a number of transitional governments that operated outside of Somalia. Left largely to themselves, Somalis in the country established alternative governance structures; some areas formed their own administrations, such as Somaliland and Puntland, while others developed localized institutions. Many local populations turned to using sharia courts, an Islamic judicial system that implements religious law. Several of these courts came together in 2006 to form the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU established order in many areas of central and southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, but was forced out when Ethiopia intervened militarily in December 2006 on behalf of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). While the TFG settled in the capital, the ICU fled to rural areas or from Somalia altogether, reemerging less than a year later as the Islamic insurgent and terrorist movement al-Shabaab, which is still active today. In January 2007, the African Union (AU) established the AU Mission in Somalia peacekeeping force, which allowed Ethiopia to withdraw its forces, took over security responsibility for the country, and gave the TFG space to develop Somalia’s new government. By 2012, Somali powerbrokers agreed on a provisional constitution with a loose federal structure and established the central government in Mogadishu. Since then, four interim regional administrations have been established and there have been two presidential elections. However, significant and fundamental governance and security problems remain.<br><br></p>"
"text": "<p>Ancient Egypt trade expeditions along the northeastern coast of Africa - including today's Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia - occurred at various times between the 25th and 12th centuries B.C. Between A.D. 800 and 1100, immigrant Muslim Arabs and Persians set up coastal trading posts along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, solidifying Somalia’s close trading relationship with the Arab Peninsula. In the late 19th century, Britain and Italy established colonies in the Somali Peninsula, where they remained until 1960, when British Somaliland gained independence and joined with Italian Somaliland to form the Republic of Somalia. The country functioned as a parliamentary democracy until 1969, when General Mohamed SIAD Barre took control in a coup, beginning a 22-year authoritarian socialist dictatorship. In an effort to centralize power, SIAD called for the eradication of the clan, the key cultural and social organizing principle in Somali society. Resistance to SIAD’s socialist leadership, which was causing a rapid deterioration of the country, prompted allied clan militias to overthrow SIAD in early 1991, resulting in state collapse. Subsequent fighting between rival clans for resources and territory overwhelmed the country, resulting in a manmade famine and prompting international intervention. Beginning in 1993, the UN spearheaded a humanitarian mission supported by international forces, but the international community largely withdrew by 1995 following an incident that became known as Black Hawk Down in which two American Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down in Mogadishu. The fighting and subsequent siege and rescue resulted in 21 deaths and 82 wounded among the international forces.<br><br>International peace conferences in the 2000s resulted in a number of transitional governments that operated outside of Somalia. Left largely to themselves, Somalis in the country established alternative governance structures; some areas formed their own administrations, such as Somaliland and Puntland, while others developed localized institutions. Many local populations turned to using sharia courts, an Islamic judicial system that implements religious law. Several of these courts came together in 2006 to form the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU established order in many areas of central and southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, but was forced out when Ethiopia intervened militarily in December 2006 on behalf of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). While the TFG settled in the capital, the ICU fled to rural areas or from Somalia altogether, reemerging less than a year later as the Islamic insurgent and terrorist movement al-Shabaab, which is still active today. In January 2007, the African Union (AU) established the AU Mission in Somalia peacekeeping force, which allowed Ethiopia to withdraw its forces, took over security responsibility for the country, and gave the TFG space to develop Somalia’s new government. By 2012, Somali powerbrokers agreed on a provisional constitution with a loose federal structure and established a central government in Mogadishu termed the Somali Federal Government (SFG). Since then, several interim regional administrations have been established and there have been two presidential elections. However, significant and fundamental governance and security problems remain for the SFG since al-Shabaab controls large portions of the country.<br><br></p>"
}
},
"Geography": {
@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
"text": "Sunni Muslim (Islam) (official, according to the 2012 Transitional Federal Charter)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Somalia scores very low for most humanitarian indicators, suffering from poor governance, protracted internal conflict, underdevelopment, economic decline, poverty, social and gender inequality, and environmental degradation. Despite civil war and famine raising its mortality rate, Somalia’s high fertility rate and large proportion of people of reproductive age maintain rapid population growth, with each generation being larger than the prior one. More than 60% of Somalia’s population is younger than 25, and the fertility rate is among the world’s highest at almost 6 children per woman – a rate that has decreased little since the 1970s.</p><p>A lack of educational and job opportunities is a major source of tension for Somalia’s large youth cohort, making them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist and pirate groups. Somalia has one of the world’s lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school – and one of world’s highest youth unemployment rates. Life expectancy is low as a result of high infant and maternal mortality rates, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition, and inadequate health services.</p><p>During the two decades of conflict that followed the fall of the SIAD regime in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes. Today Somalia is the world’s third highest source country for refugees, after Syria and Afghanistan. Insecurity, drought, floods, food shortages, and a lack of economic opportunities are the driving factors.</p><p>As of 2016, more than 1.1 million Somali refugees were hosted in the region, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, while more than 1.1 million Somalis were internally displaced. Since the implementation of a tripartite voluntary repatriation agreement among Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR in 2013, nearly 40,000 Somali refugees have returned home from Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camp – still houses to approximately 260,000 Somalis. The flow sped up rapidly after the Kenyan Government in May 2016 announced its intention to close the camp, worsening security and humanitarian conditions in receiving communities in south-central Somalia. Despite the conflict in Yemen, thousands of Somalis and other refugees and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa risk their lives crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen and beyond (often Saudi Arabia). Bossaso in Puntland overtook Obock, Djibouti, as the primary departure point in mid-2014.</p>"
"text": "<p>Somalia scores very low for most humanitarian indicators, suffering from poor governance, protracted internal conflict, underdevelopment, economic decline, poverty, social and gender inequality, and environmental degradation. Despite civil war and famine raising its mortality rate, Somalia’s high fertility rate and large proportion of people of reproductive age maintain rapid population growth, with each generation being larger than the prior one. More than 60% of Somalia’s population is younger than 25, and the fertility rate is among the world’s highest at almost 6 children per woman – a rate that has decreased little since the 1970s.</p> <p>A lack of educational and job opportunities is a major source of tension for Somalia’s large youth cohort, making them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist and pirate groups. Somalia has one of the world’s lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school – and one of world’s highest youth unemployment rates. Life expectancy is low as a result of high infant and maternal mortality rates, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition, and inadequate health services.</p> <p>During the two decades of conflict that followed the fall of the SIAD regime in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes. Today Somalia is the world’s fourth highest source country for refugees, after Ukraine, Syria and Afghanistan. Insecurity, drought, floods, food shortages, and a lack of economic opportunities are the driving factors.</p> <p>As of 2022, more than 660,000 Somali refugees were hosted in the region, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, while nearly 3 million Somalis were internally displaced. Since the implementation of a tripartite voluntary repatriation agreement among Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR in 2013, nearly 40,000 Somali refugees have returned home from Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camp – still houses to approximately 260,000 Somalis. The flow sped up rapidly after the Kenyan Government in May 2016 announced its intention to close the camp, worsening security and humanitarian conditions in receiving communities in south-central Somalia. Despite the conflict in Yemen, thousands of Somalis and other refugees and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa risk their lives crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen and beyond (often Saudi Arabia). Bossaso in Puntland overtook Obock, Djibouti, as the primary departure point in mid-2014.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
@ -933,10 +933,10 @@
"text": "5,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Somalia&rsquo;s economic difficulties in recent years have made it difficult for telcos and the government to sustain investment in infrastructure; the government has also had to contend with militant groups which continue on occasion to force the closure of internet services in many areas of the country; in recent years, though, the government has addressed the lack of guidance which had prevailed since 1991, when a dictatorial regime was overthrown; the National Communications Law was passed in October 2017, aimed at setting a legal and regulatory framework for the telecoms sector, while provision was made in the following year to set up a regulatory authority to oversee the telecom sector; more recently, three types of licenses were mandated to provide clarity to operators, and to bring the market closer into line with international standards; all operators were given until August 2020 to secure one of the three license types; given the poor condition of fixed-line infrastructure, operators have concentrated on mobile connectivity; their investment plans have involved the development of LTE services to provide mobile data and broadband services; the telecom market has flourished; tariffs are among the lowest in Africa, and new cable systems coming on stream in the next few years (providing additional connectivity to Asia and Europe), as well as planned investments from local operators to bolster the country&rsquo;s national fiber backbone, will lead to downward pressure on retail pricing; on the consumer side, spending on telecoms services and devices are under pressure from the financial effect of large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes as the remnants of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic remain and as global events, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, continue to play out; the market is continuing a positive growth trajectory, supported by a slow economic rebound in the country. (2022)"
"text": "Somalia&rsquo;s economic difficulties in recent years have made it difficult for telcos and the government to sustain investment in infrastructure; the government has also had to contend with militant groups which continue on occasion to force the closure of internet services in many areas of the country; in recent years, though, the government has addressed the lack of guidance which had prevailed since 1991, when a dictatorial regime was overthrown; the National Communications Law was passed in October 2017, aimed at setting a legal and regulatory framework for the telecoms sector, while provision was made in the following year to set up a regulatory authority to oversee the telecom sector; more recently, three types of licenses were mandated to provide clarity to operators, and to bring the market closer into line with international standards; all operators were given until August 2020 to secure one of the three license types; given the poor condition of fixed-line infrastructure, operators have concentrated on mobile connectivity; their investment plans have involved the development of LTE services to provide mobile data and broadband services; the telecom market has flourished; tariffs are among the lowest in Africa, and new cable systems coming on stream in the next few years, as well as planned investments from local operators to bolster the country&rsquo;s national fiber backbone, will lead to downward pressure on retail pricing; on the consumer side, spending on telecoms services and devices are under pressure from the financial effect of large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes as the remnants of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic remain and as global events, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, continue to play out; the market is continuing a positive growth trajectory, supported by a slow economic rebound in the country (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "seven networks compete for customers in the mobile sector; some of these mobile-service providers offer fixed-lines and Internet services; fixed-line is 0 per 100 and mobile-cellular roughly 51 per 100 (2019)"
@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@
"text": "9,208 (Yemen) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "2.968 million (civil war since 1988, clan-based competition for resources; 2011 famine; insecurity because of fighting between al-Shabaab and the Transitional Federal Government's allied forces) (2022)"
"text": "2.968 million (civil war since 1988, clan-based competition for resources; famine; insecurity because of fighting between al-Shabaab and the Transitional Federal Government's allied forces) (2022)"
}
}
}

4
africa/su.json
View file

@ -1022,10 +1022,10 @@
"text": "137,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "12,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "12,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "9,000 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "9,000 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "5 billion barrels (2021 est.)"

4
africa/to.json
View file

@ -1041,10 +1041,10 @@
"text": "10,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
africa/tp.json
View file

@ -988,10 +988,10 @@
"text": "1,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
africa/ts.json
View file

@ -993,10 +993,10 @@
"text": "107,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "29,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "29,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "10,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "10,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "425 million barrels (2021 est.)"

18
africa/tz.json
View file

@ -92,10 +92,10 @@
"text": "1,840 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Victoria (shared with Uganda and Kenya) - 62,940 sq km; Lake Tanganyika (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, and Zambia) - 32,000 sq km; Lake Malawi (shared with Mozambique and Malawi) - 22,490"
},
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Rukwa - 5,760 sq km"
}
},
@ -144,7 +144,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> Zanzibar is almost entirely Muslim"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Tanzania has the largest population in East Africa and the lowest population density; almost a third of the population is urban. Tanzania’s youthful population – about two-thirds of the population is under 25 – is growing rapidly because of the high total fertility rate of 4.8 children per woman. Progress in reducing the birth rate has stalled, sustaining the country’s nearly 3% annual growth. The maternal mortality rate has improved since 2000, yet it remains very high because of early and frequent pregnancies, inadequate maternal health services, and a lack of skilled birth attendants – problems that are worse among poor and rural women. Tanzania has made strides in reducing under-5 and infant mortality rates, but a recent drop in immunization threatens to undermine gains in child health. Malaria is a leading killer of children under 5, while HIV is the main source of adult mortality</p><p>For Tanzania, most migration is internal, rural to urban movement, while some temporary labor migration from towns to plantations takes place seasonally for harvests. Tanzania was Africa’s largest refugee-hosting country for decades, hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Great Lakes region, primarily Burundi, over the last fifty years. However, the assisted repatriation and naturalization of tens of thousands of Burundian refugees between 2002 and 2014 dramatically reduced the refugee population. Tanzania is increasingly a transit country for illegal migrants from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region who are heading to southern Africa for security reasons and/or economic opportunities. Some of these migrants choose to settle in Tanzania.</p>"
"text": "<p>Tanzania has the largest population in East Africa and the lowest population density; almost a third of the population is urban. Tanzania’s youthful population – about two-thirds of the population is under 25 – is growing rapidly because of the high total fertility rate of 4.4 children per woman, as of 2022. Progress in reducing the birth rate has stalled, sustaining the country’s nearly 3% annual growth. The maternal mortality rate has improved since 2000, yet it remains very high because of early and frequent pregnancies, inadequate maternal health services, and a lack of skilled birth attendants – problems that are worse among poor and rural women. Tanzania has made strides in reducing under-5 and infant mortality rates, but a recent drop in immunization threatens to undermine gains in child health. Malaria is a leading killer of children under 5, while HIV is the main source of adult mortality</p> <p>For Tanzania, most migration is internal, rural to urban movement, while some temporary labor migration from towns to plantations takes place seasonally for harvests. Tanzania was Africa’s largest refugee-hosting country for decades, hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Great Lakes region, primarily Burundi, over the last fifty years. However, the assisted repatriation and naturalization of tens of thousands of Burundian refugees between 2002 and 2014 dramatically reduced the refugee population. Tanzania is increasingly a transit country for illegal migrants from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region who are heading to southern Africa for security reasons and/or economic opportunities. Some of these migrants choose to settle in Tanzania.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
@ -524,10 +524,10 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Victoria (shared with Uganda and Kenya) - 62,940 sq km; Lake Tanganyika (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, and Zambia) - 32,000 sq km; Lake Malawi (shared with Mozambique and Malawi) - 22,490"
},
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Rukwa - 5,760 sq km"
}
},
@ -1063,10 +1063,10 @@
"text": "52,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1134,10 +1134,10 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Tanzania&rsquo;s telecom services are being developed to reach parity with more advanced networks from neighboring countries such as Kenya and fierce competition exists amongst Tanzania's 5 major mobile network operators; one fixed-line operator with competition in mobile networks; high tariffs on telecom; mobile use remains popular, with the government subsidizing expansion of mobile networks into rural communities; most mobile networks rely on older 2G and 3G technology with 4G/LTE service available in urban centers; the government is currently testing 5G technology and plans to begin rolling out 5G service in 2024; the government continues to improve rural telecom infrastructure including work on a national fiber backbone network connecting the entire population; in late 2021, the government announced plans to extend the national backbone network from about 8,300km to 15,000km by 2023, and to provide ongoing connectivity to more countries in the region (2022)"
"text": "Tanzania&rsquo;s telecom sector enjoys effective competition, particularly in the mobile segment; the government has encouraged foreign participation to promote economic growth and social development, and policy reforms have led to the country having one of the most liberal telecom sectors in Africa; the government has sought to increase broadband penetration by a range of measures, including the reduction in VAT charged on the sale of smartphones and other devices, and reductions in the cost of data; the MNOs became the leading ISPs following the launch of mobile broadband services based on 3G and LTE technologies; operators are hoping for revenue growth in the mobile data services market, given that the voice market is almost entirely prepaid; the MNOs have invested in network upgrades, which in turn has supported m-mobile data use, as well as m-money transfer services and banking services. Together, these have become a fast-developing source of revenue; the landing of the first international submarine cables in the country some years ago revolutionized the telecom market, which up to that point had entirely depended on expensive satellite connections; the government aims to complete a national fiber backbone network, having signed an agreement; in late 2021, the government announced plans to extend the national backbone network from about 8,300km to 15,000km by 2023, and to provide ongoing connectivity to more countries in the region (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line telephone network inadequate with less than 1 connection per 100 persons; mobile-cellular service, aided by multiple providers, is increasing rapidly and exceeds 82 telephones per 100 persons; trunk service provided by open-wire, microwave radio relay, tropospheric scatter, and fiber-optic cable; some links being made digital (2019)"
"text": "fixed-line telephone network inadequate with less than 1 connection per 100 persons; mobile-cellular service, aided by multiple providers, is increasing rapidly and exceeds 86 telephones per 100 persons; trunk service provided by open-wire, microwave radio relay, tropospheric scatter, and fiber-optic cable; some links being made digital (2020)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 255; landing points for the EASSy, SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia, and SEAS&nbsp;fiber-optic submarine cable system linking East Africa with the Middle East; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (1 Indian Ocean, 1 Atlantic Ocean) (2019)"

11
africa/ug.json
View file

@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
"text": "140 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Victoria (shared with Tanzania and Kenya) - 62,940 sq km; Lake Albert (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo) - 5,590 sq km; Lake Kyoga - 4,430 sq km; Lake Edward (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo) - 2,150 sq km"
}
},
@ -514,7 +514,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Victoria (shared with Tanzania and Kenya) - 62,940 sq km; Lake Albert (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo) - 5,590 sq km; Lake Kyoga - 4,430 sq km; Lake Edward (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo) - 2,150 sq km"
}
},
@ -1055,10 +1055,10 @@
"text": "40,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "2.5 billion barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1273,7 +1273,8 @@
"text": "18-25 years of age for voluntary military duty for men and women; 18-30 for those with degrees/diplomas in specialized fields such as medicine, engineering, chemistry, and education, or possess qualifications in some vocational skills; 9-year service obligation (2022)"
},
"Military deployments": {
"text": "6,800 Somalia (6,200 ATMIS; 625 UNSOM); 250 Equatorial Guinea (training mission) (2022)"
"text": "6,800 Somalia (6,200 ATMIS; 625 UNSOM); 250 Equatorial Guinea (training mission) (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>in December 2021, Uganda sent an undetermined number of troops into the Democratic Republic of the Congo to combat rebels from the Alliance of Democratic Front (ADF) group"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the UPDF, which is constitutionally granted seats in parliament, is widely viewed as a key constituency for MUSEVENI; it has been used by MUSEVENI and his political party to break up rallies, raid opposition offices, and surveil rival candidates<br><br>as of 2022, the UPDF was conducting operations along the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (including cross-border operations) against a Congo-based (and formerly based in western Uganda) Ugandan rebel group, the Allied Democratic Front (ADF), which was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US in March 2021 as the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISIS-DRC; see Appendix T); in addition, elements of the UPDF were deployed in the northeast region of Karamoja against cattle rustlers and criminal gangs<br><br>beginning in 2012, the UPDF led regional efforts to pursue the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a small, violent group of Ugandan origin that conducted widespread attacks against civilians in much of Central Africa; the UPDF withdrew from the mission in 2017 after declaring that the LRA no longer posed a security threat; Uganda intervened in the South Sudan civil war in 2013-2016 and UPDF forces have clashed with South Sudanese forces along the border as recently as 2020<br><br>the military traces its history back to the formation of the Uganda Rifles in 1895 under the British colonial government; the Uganda Rifles were merged with the Central Africa Regiment and the East Africa Rifles to form the King’s African Rifles (KAR) in 1902, which participated in both world wars, as well as the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya (1952-1960); in 1962, the Ugandan battalion of the KAR was transformed into the country's first military force, the Uganda Rifles, which was subsequently renamed the Uganda Army; the Uganda People's Defense Force was established in 1995 from the former rebel National Resistance Army following the enactment of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda (2022)"

6
africa/uv.json
View file

@ -1038,10 +1038,10 @@
"text": "30,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1112,7 +1112,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Burkina Faso&rsquo;s telecom sector in recent years has made some gains in providing the necessary infrastructure and bandwidth to support telecom services; an IXP completed in September 2020 increased international bandwidth capacity by a third, while in mid-2021 the government was able to start the second phase of a national fiber backbone project; this will link the capital city to an addition 145 municipalities, and provide additional connectivity to terrestrial cables in neighboring countries; this new infrastructure is also making it possible for the government to trial tele medicine, and so address the very poor availability of medical services in almost all parts of the country; the activities of the militants in side areas of the country jeopardize overall security, and render it difficult for the telcos to safeguard their networks and equipment; Burkina Faso joins G5 Sahel countries to eliminate roaming fees (2022)"
"text": "Burkina Faso&rsquo;s telecom sector in recent years has made some gains in providing the necessary infrastructure and bandwidth to support telecom services; an IXP completed in September 2020 increased international bandwidth capacity by a third, while in mid-2021 the government was able to start the second phase of a national fiber backbone project; this will link the capital city to an addition 145 municipalities, and provide additional connectivity to terrestrial cables in neighboring countries; the activities of the militants in side areas of the country jeopardize overall security, and render it difficult for the telcos to safeguard their networks and equipment; Burkina Faso joins G5 Sahel countries to eliminate roaming fees (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line connections stand at less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular usage nearly 106 per 100, with multiple providers there is competition and the hope for growth from a low base; Internet penetration is 16% (2020)"

4
africa/wa.json
View file

@ -1042,10 +1042,10 @@
"text": "26,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
africa/wz.json
View file

@ -993,10 +993,10 @@
"text": "6,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

8
africa/za.json
View file

@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
"text": "1,560 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Tanganyika (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and Burundi) - 32,000 sq km; Lake Mweru (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo) - 4,350 sq km; Lake Bangweulu - 4,000-15,000 sq km seasonal variation"
}
},
@ -502,7 +502,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Tanganyika (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and Burundi) - 32,000 sq km; Lake Mweru (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo) - 4,350 sq km; Lake Bangweulu - 4,000-15,000 sq km seasonal variation"
}
},
@ -1048,10 +1048,10 @@
"text": "25,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "12,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "12,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
africa/zi.json
View file

@ -1036,10 +1036,10 @@
"text": "27,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

6
antarctica/ay.json
View file

@ -156,10 +156,10 @@
"text": "100 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -205,7 +205,7 @@
"Communications": {
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "local systems at some research stations (2019)"
"text": "scientists with the United States Antarctic Program at McMurdo Station have now got their hands on a Starlink terminal of their own, where it is said to be improving connectivity as they carry out their research; this was made possible through laser links between the SpaceX satellites in orbit that eliminate the need for ground stations at the poles, and makes Antarctica the seventh and final continent to receive Starlink internet coverage (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "commercial cellular networks operating in a small number of locations (2019)"

8
australia-oceania/aq.json
View file

@ -732,10 +732,10 @@
"text": "2,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -806,10 +806,10 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "good telex, telegraph, facsimile, and cellular telephone services; one of the most complete and modern telecommunications systems in the South Pacific Islands; all inhabited islands have telephone connectivity"
"text": "American Samoa Telecommunications Authority, ASTCA, supplies telecommunication services to the residents of the American Samoan islands, a territory of the United States, which are found in a remote area of the Pacific Ocean; the primary system between the islands consists of fiber-optic cables and satellite connections; over Independence Day weekend 2021, the undersea fiber-optic cable linking the Tutuila and Manu&rsquo;a Islands failed, completely stranding the Manu&rsquo;a Islands from all telecommunication services; telecommunication services were restored to the people of Manu&rsquo;a islands through microwave link between Tutuila to the Manu&rsquo;a Islands; the link is now providing a steady 1Gbps backhaul most of the time of the year with 600Mbps at four 9&rsquo;s availability, over this extremely long distance (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "nearly 18 per 100 fixed-line teledensity, domestic satellite system with 1 Comsat earth station (2018)"
"text": "nearly 18 per 100 fixed-line teledensity (2020)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 1-684; landing points for the ASH, Southern Cross NEXT&nbsp;and Hawaiki&nbsp;&nbsp;providing&nbsp;connectivity to New Zealand, Australia, American Samoa, Hawaii, California, and&nbsp;SAS connecting American Samoa with Samoa; satellite earth station - 1 (Intelsat-Pacific Ocean) (2019)"

14
australia-oceania/as.json
View file

@ -95,10 +95,10 @@
"text": "25,460 sq km (2014)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Alexandrina - 570 sq km"
},
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Eyre - 9,690 sq km; Lake Torrens (ephemeral) - 5,780 sq km; Lake Gairdner - 4,470 sq km; Lake Mackay (ephemeral) - 3,494 sq km; Lake Frome - 2,410 sq km; Lake Amadeus (ephemeral) - 1,032 sq km"
}
},
@ -479,10 +479,10 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Alexandrina - 570 sq km"
},
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Eyre - 9,690 sq km; Lake Torrens (ephemeral) - 5,780 sq km; Lake Gairdner - 4,470 sq km; Lake Mackay (ephemeral) - 3,494 sq km; Lake Frome - 2,410 sq km; Lake Amadeus (ephemeral) - 1,032 sq km"
}
},
@ -1028,10 +1028,10 @@
"text": "1,174,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "197,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "197,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "356,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "356,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "2.446 billion barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1105,7 +1105,7 @@
"text": "the Australian telecom market since 2020 has been impacted by the pandemic, which forced many people to school and work from home and thus adopt fixed-line broadband services; internet traffic, both fixed and mobile, increased substantially as a result; in the fixed sector, there is an ongoing migration from copper-based platforms to fiber; the extension of fixed wireless access will mean that up to 120,000 premises currently dependent on satellite broadband will be able to access 5G-based fixed services; the fixed-line market has been falling steadily over the past five years; in the Australian fixed broadband market, there is a dynamic shift among customers to fiber networks; the DSL sector is steadily shrinking while subscribers on HFC infrastructure will continue to be provided by existing cable, with a steady migration to full fiber connectivity (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "roughly 24 per 100 fixed-line and 108 per 100 mobile-cellular; more subscribers to mobile services than there are people; 90% of all mobile device sales are now smartphones, growth in mobile traffic brisk (2020)"
"text": "24 per 100 fixed-line telephone subscriptions and 108 per 100 mobile-cellular; more subscribers to mobile services than there are people; 90% of all mobile device sales are now smartphones, growth in mobile traffic brisk (2020)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 61; landing points for&nbsp;more than&nbsp;20 submarine cables including: the SeaMeWe-3 optical telecommunications submarine cable with links to Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; the INDIGO-Central, INDIGO West and ASC, North West Cable System, Australia-Papua New Guinea cable, CSCS, PPC-1, Gondwana-1, SCCN, Hawaiki, TGA, Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2, JGA-S, with links to other Australian cities, New Zealand&nbsp;and many countries in southeast Asia, US and Europe; the H2 Cable, AJC, Telstra Endeavor, Southern Cross NEXT with links to Japan, Hong Kong, and other Pacific Ocean countries as well as the US; satellite earth stations - 10 Intelsat (4 Indian Ocean and 6 Pacific Ocean), 2 Inmarsat, 2 Globalstar, 5 other (2019)"

8
australia-oceania/bp.json
View file

@ -951,10 +951,10 @@
"text": "2,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1025,7 +1025,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "mobile services have continually expanded in the Solomon Islands; 3G services became available in 2010, leading to an increase in mobile broadband uptake; Solomon Islands currently host three ISPs: Solomon Telekom, Bmobile and SATSOL; fixed broadband services are largely limited to government, corporations, and educational organizations in the Solomon Islands; telecommunication infrastructure in the Solomon Islands requires significant investment due to the geographical make-up of the islands; this presents a great challenge to rural connectivity in the country; although various international organizations such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have taken a special interest in having communication services improved in both the Solomon Islands and the Pacific region in general, internet and broadband penetration remain low; the provision of broadband infrastructure, particularly to rural areas, is also hindered by land disputes; internet services have, improved with the build-out of the Coral Sea Cable System linking Papua New Guinea to the Solomon Islands, as also with a connecting cable to a landing station at Sydney; the Australian government provided most of the funding for the Coral Sea Cable System, with contributions and support from the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea governments; the launch of the Kacific-1 satellite in late 2019 also improved broadband satellite capacity for the region, though for telcos in Solomon Islands satellite services are now largely used as backup for international traffic; in recent years, the country has stabilized both politically and economically and this, along with improvements to mobile infrastructure, has led to a rise in mobile services and the slow uptake of broadband services; while the first LTE services were launched in late 2017 in the capital Honiara, the main platform for mobile voice and data services remains 3G, while in outlying areas GSM is still an important technology for the provision of services; geopolitical concerns have also come to the fore as the government pursues stronger ties with China; this is a growing source of tension with Australia, which is the Solomon Islands&rsquo; largest aid donor; in April 2022, the country signed a security agreement with China, although the full details of the agreement have not been published. (2022)"
"text": "mobile services have continually expanded in the Solomon Islands; 3G services became available in 2010, leading to an increase in mobile broadband uptake; Solomon Islands currently host three ISPs; fixed broadband services are largely limited to government, corporations, and educational organizations in the Solomon Islands; telecommunication infrastructure in the Solomon Islands requires significant investment due to the geographical make-up of the islands; this presents a great challenge to rural connectivity in the country; although various international organizations such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have taken a special interest in having communication services improved in both the Solomon Islands and the Pacific region in general, internet and broadband penetration remain low; the provision of broadband infrastructure, particularly to rural areas, is also hindered by land disputes; internet services have, improved with the build-out of the Coral Sea Cable System linking Papua New Guinea to the Solomon Islands, as also with a connecting cable to a landing station at Sydney; the Australian government provided most of the funding for the Coral Sea Cable System, with contributions and support from the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea governments; the launch of the Kacific-1 satellite in late 2019 also improved broadband satellite capacity for the region, though for telcos in Solomon Islands satellite services are now largely used as backup for international traffic; in recent years, the country has stabilized both politically and economically and this, along with improvements to mobile infrastructure, has led to a rise in mobile services and the slow uptake of broadband services; while the first LTE services were launched in late 2017 in the capital Honiara, the main platform for mobile voice and data services remains 3G, while in outlying areas GSM is still an important technology for the provision of services (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line is just over 1 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular telephone density is about 71 per 100 persons; domestic cable system to extend to key major islands (2019)"
@ -1137,7 +1137,7 @@
"text": "no regular military forces; the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force is responsible for internal and external security and reports to the Ministry of Police, National Security, and Correctional Services (2022)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the maritime branch of the Police Force operates patrol boats provided by Australia (2022)"
"text": "China and Australia have provided equipment to the Solomons Islands Police Force; the maritime branch operates patrol boats provided by Australia (2022)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "Australia and New Zealand provide material and training assistance to the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (2022)"

2
australia-oceania/ck.json
View file

@ -304,7 +304,7 @@
"text": "King CHARLES III (since 8 September 2022); represented by Governor General of the Commonwealth of Australia General David HURLEY (since 1 July 2019)"
},
"head of government": {
"text": "Administrator Natasha GRIGGS (since 5 October 2017)"
"text": "Acting Administrator Sarah VANDENBROEK (since 4 October 2022)"
},
"cabinet": {
"text": "NA"

4
australia-oceania/cq.json
View file

@ -699,10 +699,10 @@
"text": "2,100 bbl/day (2019 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands"

4
australia-oceania/cw.json
View file

@ -780,10 +780,10 @@
"text": "800 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
australia-oceania/fj.json
View file

@ -987,10 +987,10 @@
"text": "11,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
australia-oceania/fp.json
View file

@ -825,10 +825,10 @@
"text": "6,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
australia-oceania/gq.json
View file

@ -776,10 +776,10 @@
"text": "2,100 bbl/day (2019 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands"

4
australia-oceania/kr.json
View file

@ -931,10 +931,10 @@
"text": "500 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

6
australia-oceania/kt.json
View file

@ -300,7 +300,7 @@
"text": "King CHARLES III (since 8 September 2022); represented by Governor General of the Commonwealth of Australia General David HURLEY (since 1 July 2019)"
},
"head of government": {
"text": "Administrator Natasha GRIGGS (since 5 October 2017)"
"text": "Acting Administrator Sarah VANDENBROEK (since 4 October 2022)"
},
"cabinet": {
"text": "NA"
@ -419,10 +419,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "service provided by the Australian network"
"text": "internet access on Christmas Island is provided by satellite; improvements through the Regional Connectivity Program to the macro and small cell mobile sites will provide new and improved mobile, voice and data connectivity for residents and visitors; the upgrade will also support local businesses and community facilities, enabling increased residential access to essential services such as telehealth and education (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "local area code - 08; GSM mobile-cellular telephone service is provided by Telstra as part of the Australian network"
"text": "improvements to Christmas Island include an upgrade to the macro cell base stations and deploy a new macro cell base station at the airport (2022)"
},
"international": {
"text": "international code - 61 8; ASC submarine cable to Singapore and Australia; satellite earth station - 1 (Intelsat provides telephone and telex service) (2019)"

4
australia-oceania/nc.json
View file

@ -828,10 +828,10 @@
"text": "19,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
australia-oceania/ne.json
View file

@ -695,10 +695,10 @@
"text": "100 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

12
australia-oceania/nh.json
View file

@ -547,7 +547,7 @@
"text": "President Nikenike VUROBARAVU (since 23 July 2022)"
},
"head of government": {
"text": "Prime Minister Bob LOUGHMAN (since 20 April 2020)"
"text": "Prime Minister Ishmael KALSAKAU (since 4 November 2022)"
},
"cabinet": {
"text": "Council of Ministers appointed by the prime minister, responsible to Parliament"
@ -556,7 +556,7 @@
"text": "president indirectly elected by an electoral college consisting of Parliament and presidents of the 6 provinces; Vanuatu president serves a 5-year term; election last held on 23 July 2022 (next to be held in 2027); following legislative elections, the leader of the majority party or majority coalition usually elected prime minister by Parliament from among its members; election for prime minister last held on 20 April 2020 (next to be held following general elections in 2024)"
},
"election results": {
"text": "Nikenike VUROBARAVU elected president in the eighth round on 23 July 2022 with 48 votes;<br>Bob LOUGHMAN elected prime minister on 20 April 2020; Bob LOUGHMAN (VP) 31 votes, Ralph REGENVANU (GJP) 21 votes"
"text": "Nikenike VUROBARAVU elected president in the eighth round on 23 July 2022 with 48 votes;<br>Ishmael KALSAKAU (UMP) elected prime minister on 4 November 2022 with 50 votes"
}
},
"Legislative branch": {
@ -564,10 +564,10 @@
"text": "unicameral Parliament (52 seats; members directly elected in 8 single-seat and 9 multi-seat constituencies by single non-transferable vote to serve 4-year terms (candidates in multi-seat constituencies can be elected with only 4% of the vote)"
},
"elections": {
"text": "last held on 19&ndash;20 March 2020 (next to be held in 2024)"
"text": "last held on 13 October 2022 (next to be held in 2026)"
},
"election results": {
"text": "percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - GJP 9, RMC 7, VP 7, LPV 5, UMP 5, NUP 4, other 15; composition - men 52, women 0; percent of women 0%; note - political party associations are fluid"
"text": "percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - UMP 7, VP 7, LPV 5, RMC 5, GJP 4, NUP 4, RDP 4, IG 3, PPP 2, VNDP 2, NAG 1, VLM 1, other 6, independent 1; composition - men 51, women 1; percent of women 2%; note - political party associations are fluid"
},
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the National Council of Chiefs advises on matters of culture and language"
},
@ -950,10 +950,10 @@
"text": "1,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
australia-oceania/nr.json
View file

@ -870,10 +870,10 @@
"text": "400 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

8
australia-oceania/nz.json
View file

@ -95,7 +95,7 @@
"text": "7,210 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Taupo - 610 sq km"
}
},
@ -460,7 +460,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lake Taupo - 610 sq km"
}
},
@ -1001,10 +1001,10 @@
"text": "184,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "21,600 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "21,600 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "99,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "99,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "41 million barrels (2021 est.)"

4
australia-oceania/tn.json
View file

@ -970,10 +970,10 @@
"text": "1,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

6
australia-oceania/wq.json
View file

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"Introduction": {
"Background": {
"text": "<p>Wake Island was probably visited by Micronesian and Polynesian settlers, and oral legends tell of periodic voyages to the islands by people from the Marshall Islands. Wake Island was uninhabited when Spanish explorer Alvaro de Mendana de NEYRA became the first European to see it in 1568 and still had no human inhabitants when English captain Samuel WAKE sailed by it in 1796. The United States Exploring Expedition visited the island in 1841 and the US annexed it in 1899 to use as a cable and refueling station between its newly acquired Pacific territories of Hawaii and the Philippines and Guam. In the 1930s, Pan American Airways built facilities on Wake Island so that it could be used as a stopover for flights from the US to China. In January 1941, the US began to install military assets on Wake Island and in early December of that year, Japan attacked Wake Island, capturing it by the end of the month after a heroic resistance. Japan held Wake Island until the end of World War II, and in 1946, commercial airlines once again used Wake Island as a refueling stop.<br><br>In 1973, the Marshall Islands claimed Wake Island based on the oral legends, although the US has not recognized these claims. In 1974, the US military took exclusive control of the island’s airstrip and restricted visitors. In 1978, Bikini Islanders from the Marshall Islands, who were evacuated in the 1950s and 1960s because of US nuclear tests, considered rehoming on Wake Island, but the US military rejected that plan. Since the 1970s, the island has been important for missile defense testing. In 2009, Wake Island was included in the Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument.</p>"
"text": "<p>Wake Island was probably visited by Micronesian and Polynesian settlers, and oral legends tell of periodic voyages to the islands by people from the Marshall Islands. Wake Island was uninhabited when Spanish explorer Alvaro de Mendana de NEYRA became the first European to see it in 1568 and still had no human inhabitants when English captain Samuel WAKE sailed by it in 1796. The United States Exploring Expedition visited the island in 1841 and the US annexed it in 1899 to use as a cable and refueling station between its newly acquired Pacific territories of Hawaii, the Philippines, and Guam. In the 1930s, Pan American Airways built facilities on Wake Island so that it could be used as a stopover for flights from the US to China. In January 1941, the US began to install military assets on Wake Island and in early December of that year, Japan attacked Wake Island, capturing it by the end of the month after a heroic resistance. Japan held Wake Island until the end of World War II, and in 1946, commercial airlines once again used Wake Island as a refueling stop.<br><br>In 1973, the Marshall Islands claimed Wake Island based on the oral legends, although the US has not recognized these claims. In 1974, the US military took exclusive control of the island’s airstrip and restricted visitors. In 1978, Bikini Islanders from the Marshall Islands, who were evacuated in the 1950s and 1960s because of US nuclear tests, considered rehoming on Wake Island, but the US military rejected that plan. Since the 1970s, the island has been important for missile defense testing. In 2009, Wake Island was included in the Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument.</p>"
}
},
"Geography": {
@ -260,10 +260,10 @@
"text": "9,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
australia-oceania/ws.json
View file

@ -957,10 +957,10 @@
"text": "2,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

8
central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json
View file

@ -812,10 +812,10 @@
"text": "8,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -886,10 +886,10 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage. (2021)"
"text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "ongoing changes in regulations and competition improving teledensity; approximately 34 per 100 fixed-line and 135 per 100 mobile-cellular (2018)"
"text": "33 per 100 fixed-line telephone subscriptions and 132 per 100 mobile-cellular (2020)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 297; landing&nbsp;points for the PAN-AM, PCCS, Deep Blue Cable, and Alonso de Ojeda&nbsp;submarine telecommunications cable system that extends from Trinidad and Tobago, Florida,&nbsp;Puerto Ricco,&nbsp;Jamaica, Guyana, Sint Eustatius &amp; Saba, Suriname, Dominican Republic, BVI, USVI, Haiti, Cayman Islands, the Netherlands Antilles,&nbsp; through Aruba to Panama, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Chile; extensive interisland microwave radio relay links (2019)"

8
central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json
View file

@ -868,10 +868,10 @@
"text": "5,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -942,10 +942,10 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage. (2021)"
"text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line teledensity roughly 25 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity is about 193 per 100 persons (2019)"
"text": "fixed-line teledensity roughly 28 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity is about 188 per 100 persons (2020)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 1-268; landing points for the ECFS and&nbsp;Southern Caribbean Fiber&nbsp;submarine cable systems with links to other islands in the eastern Caribbean; satellite earth stations&nbsp;- 1 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean) (2019)"

2
central-america-n-caribbean/av.json
View file

@ -691,7 +691,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage. (2021)"
"text": "in the telecom sector, with declines seen in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services &mdash; the mainstay of short-term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis to a small extent as employees and students have resorted to working from home, but their contribution to the sector has been insufficient to offset steep falls in other areas of the market; one area of the telecom market that does not yet appear poised for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have little appetite for investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage; until the economies and markets stabilize, and overseas visitors return there is unlikely to be much momentum towards implementing 5G capabilities anywhere in the region (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line teledensity is about 42 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity is roughly 182 per 100 persons (2018)"

8
central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json
View file

@ -954,10 +954,10 @@
"text": "10,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "700 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "700 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "2 million barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1028,10 +1028,10 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage. (2021)"
"text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line teledensity of roughly 45 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular telephone density about 115 per 100 persons (2019)"
"text": "fixed-line teledensity of roughly 45 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular telephone density about 103 per 100 persons (2020)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 1-246; landing points for the ECFS and Southern Caribbean Fiber submarine cable with links to 15 other islands in the eastern Caribbean extending from the British Virgin Islands to Trinidad and Puerto Ricco; satellite earth stations - 1 (Intelsat - Atlantic Ocean); tropospheric scatter to Trinidad and Saint Lucia (2019)"

6
central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json
View file

@ -903,10 +903,10 @@
"text": "25,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -980,7 +980,7 @@
"text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "23 per 100 fixed-line, 109 per 100 mobile-cellular (2019)"
"text": "23 per 100 fixed-line, 119 per 100 mobile-cellular (2020)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 1-242; landing points for the ARCOS-1, BICS, Bahamas 2-US, and BDSN fiber-optic submarine cables that provide links to South and Central America, parts of the Caribbean, and the US; satellite earth stations - 2; the Bahamas Domestic Submarine Network links all of the major islands; (2019)"

8
central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json
View file

@ -986,10 +986,10 @@
"text": "3,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "1,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "1,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "6.7 million barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1060,10 +1060,10 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Belize&rsquo;s fixed-line teledensity and mobile subscriptions remain lower than average for the region, a legacy of insufficient market competition and low investment in telecoms services; the telecom market was liberalized in 2003; the government has undertaken some measures to improve competition and open its networks to VoIP services (2021)"
"text": "Belize&rsquo;s fixed-line teledensity and mobile penetration remain lower than average for the region, a legacy of insufficient market competition and under investment in telecoms services; a significant investment in infrastructure, launching an LTE-A service at the end of 2016 and in mid-2017 completing a submarine cable to Ambergris Caye, enabling it to launch an FttP service in San Pedro; the nfrastructure has been updated from the legacy copper to fiber; investments have been made to provide high speed broadband to 80% of residences across Belize. (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "roughly 5 per 100 fixed-line and mobile-cellular teledensity of 65 per 100 persons; mobile sector accounting for over 90% of all phone subscriptions (2019)"
"text": "roughly 5 per 100 fixed-line and mobile-cellular teledensity of 66 per 100 persons; mobile sector accounting for over 90% of all phone subscriptions (2020)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 501; landing points for the&nbsp;ARCOS and SEUL&nbsp;fiber-optic telecommunications submarine cable that provides links to South and Central America, parts of the Caribbean, and the US; satellite earth station - 8 (Intelsat - 2, unknown - 6) (2019)"

6
central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json
View file

@ -783,10 +783,10 @@
"text": "5,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -860,7 +860,7 @@
"text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "introduction of competition in the mobile-cellular market in 2004 boosted subscriptions; nearly 55 per 100 fixed-line and 153 per 100 mobile-cellular (2019)"
"text": "introduction of competition in the mobile-cellular market in 2004 boosted subscriptions; nearly 55 per 100 fixed-line and 152 per 100 mobile-cellular (2020)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 1-345; landing points for the Maya-1, Deep Blue Cable, and the Cayman-Jamaica Fiber System submarine cables that provide links to the US and parts of Central and South America; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean) (2019)"

4
central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json
View file

@ -1024,10 +1024,10 @@
"text": "63,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json
View file

@ -990,10 +990,10 @@
"text": "164,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "48,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "48,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "124 million barrels (2021 est.)"

4
central-america-n-caribbean/do.json
View file

@ -844,10 +844,10 @@
"text": "1,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

8
central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json
View file

@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
"text": "3,070 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lago de Enriquillo - 500 sq km"
}
},
@ -495,7 +495,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lago de Enriquillo - 500 sq km"
}
},
@ -1035,10 +1035,10 @@
"text": "148,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "24,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "24,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
central-america-n-caribbean/es.json
View file

@ -1011,10 +1011,10 @@
"text": "59,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json
View file

@ -886,10 +886,10 @@
"text": "2,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

8
central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json
View file

@ -94,7 +94,7 @@
"text": "3,375 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lago de Izabal - 590 sq km"
}
},
@ -487,7 +487,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lago de Izabal - 590 sq km"
}
},
@ -1034,10 +1034,10 @@
"text": "112,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "6,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "6,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "86.1 million barrels (2021 est.)"

4
central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json
View file

@ -990,10 +990,10 @@
"text": "21,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

8
central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json
View file

@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
"text": "900 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Laguna de Caratasca - 1,110 sq km"
}
},
@ -480,7 +480,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Laguna de Caratasca - 1,110 sq km"
}
},
@ -1020,10 +1020,10 @@
"text": "66,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json
View file

@ -980,10 +980,10 @@
"text": "61,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "20,100 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "20,100 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json
View file

@ -740,10 +740,10 @@
"text": "200 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

8
central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json
View file

@ -94,7 +94,7 @@
"text": "1,990 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lago de Nicaragua - 8,150 sq km; Lago de Managua - 1,040 sq km"
}
},
@ -465,7 +465,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Fresh water lake(s)": {
"fresh water lake(s)": {
"text": "Lago de Nicaragua - 8,150 sq km; Lago de Managua - 1,040 sq km"
}
},
@ -1008,10 +1008,10 @@
"text": "35,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "13,000 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "13,000 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

10
central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json
View file

@ -94,7 +94,7 @@
"text": "321 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Laguna de Chiriqui - 900 sq km"
}
},
@ -485,7 +485,7 @@
}
},
"Major lakes (area sq km)": {
"Salt water lake(s)": {
"salt water lake(s)": {
"text": "Laguna de Chiriqui - 900 sq km"
}
},
@ -1028,10 +1028,10 @@
"text": "143,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Panama has seen a steady increase in revenue from the telecom sector in recent years; mobile services and broadband remain the key growth sectors, with mobile connections accounting for 90% of all connections, and over half of telecom sector revenue; the mobile sector has flourished since the arrival of Digicel Panam&aacute; in 2008 and of Am&eacute;rica M&oacute;vil in 2009, which ended the duopoly long enjoyed by Cable &amp; Wireless Panam&aacute; and Telef&oacute;nica&rsquo;s Movistar. Millicom International Cellular (trading as Tigo) acquired Telef&oacute;nica&rsquo;s telecom assets in Panama in 2019; the mobile market has effective competition among these players; internet services have grown in recent years as consumers responded to government fixed-line projects, improved mobile broadband connectivity and a plethora of mobile applications. (2021)"
"text": "Panama has seen a steady increase in revenue from the telecom sector in recent years; mobile services and broadband remain the key growth sectors, with mobile connections accounting for 90% of all connections, and over half of telecom sector revenue; the mobile market has effective competition; internet services have grown in recent years as consumers responded to government fixed-line projects, improved mobile broadband connectivity and mobile applications (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line about 14 per 100 and rapid subscribership of mobile-cellular telephone roughly 132 per 100 (2020)"

6
central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json
View file

@ -840,10 +840,10 @@
"text": "79,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"
@ -914,7 +914,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Puerto Rico has a small telecom market which in recent years has been deeply affected by a combination of economic mismanagement and natural disasters, including two hurricanes which landed in late 2017 and an earthquake which struck in January 2020; these disasters caused considerable destruction of telecom infrastructure, which in turn led to a marked decline in the number of subscribers for all services; compounding these difficulties have been a long-term economic downturn which encouraged many people not to resume telecom services after these were restored; after some delay, the FCC in late 2019 issued an order relating to the release of funds to help rebuild telecom infrastructure; although Puerto Rico is a US territory it lags well behind the mainland US states in terms of fixed-line and broadband services; this is partly due to high unemployment rates (and consequently low disposable income) and poor telecoms investment in a market largely dominated by the incumbent Puerto Rico Telephone Company; this dominance was augmented after the company was acquired by the largest wireless operator in Latin America, Am&eacute;rica M&oacute;vil, in 2007; the acquisition by Liberty Global of the remaining cable TV operator Choice Cable, completed in mid-2015, created a monopoly player in this sector; Liberty Cablevisi&oacute;n (renamed Liberty Communications of Puerto Rico in 2020), now wholly-owned by Liberty Global&rsquo;s LLA division, is in a stronger position to capitalize on scale, and so provide improved services based on greater investment and on the use of technology based on the DOCSIS3.1 standard; Liberty Communications has also become better placed in the bundled service market following LLA&rsquo;s acquisition of AT&amp;T&rsquo;s wireless and wire line units in Puerto Rico; the mobile market has been impacted by several mergers and acquisitions over the last few years; in early 2017 Sprint and Open Wireless agreed to merge their networks in a bid to offer better market competition by increasing their scale and combining spectrum holdings; the T-Mobile US acquisition of Sprint Communications was approved in April 2020, and LLA&rsquo;s acquisition of AT&amp;T&rsquo;s Puerto Rican and US Virgin Islands operations was finalized in October 2020; the activities of large multinational telcos such as Am&eacute;rica M&oacute;vil, T-Mobile US, and LLA, continue to impact the Puerto Rican market; operators have secured spectrum in the 600MHz and 3.5GHz bands, thus enabling them to expand the reach of LTE services and launch services based on 5G;&nbsp; the growing number of submarine cables landing in Puerto Rico is helping to drive down the cost of telecom services, creating a demand for streaming content from abroad; the uptake of cloud-based applications for both business and individuals is also creating a heightened demand for affordable services. (2021)"
"text": "Puerto Rico has a small telecom market which in recent years has been deeply affected by a combination of economic mismanagement and natural disasters, including two hurricanes which landed in late 2017 and an earthquake which struck in January 2020; these disasters caused considerable destruction of telecom infrastructure, which in turn led to a marked decline in the number of subscribers for all services; compounding these difficulties have been a long-term economic downturn which encouraged many people not to resume telecom services after these were restored; after some delay, the FCC in late 2019 issued an order relating to the release of funds to help rebuild telecom infrastructure; although Puerto Rico is a US territory it lags well behind the mainland US states in terms of fixed-line and broadband services; this is partly due to high unemployment rates (and consequently low disposable income) and poor telecoms investment in a market; the mobile market has been impacted by several mergers and acquisitions over the last few years; the activities of large multinational telcos continue to impact the Puerto Rican market; operators have secured spectrum in the 600MHz and 3.5GHz bands, thus enabling them to expand the reach of LTE services and launch services based on 5G;&nbsp; the growing number of submarine cables landing in Puerto Rico is helping to drive down the cost of telecom services, creating a demand for streaming content from abroad; the uptake of cloud-based applications for both business and individuals is also creating a heightened demand for affordable services (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "digital telephone system; mobile-cellular services; fixed-line nearly 25 per 100 and mobile-cellular nearly 122 per 100 persons (2020)"

4
central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json
View file

@ -876,10 +876,10 @@
"text": "1,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
central-america-n-caribbean/st.json
View file

@ -920,10 +920,10 @@
"text": "4,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

4
central-america-n-caribbean/td.json
View file

@ -929,10 +929,10 @@
"text": "35,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "22,100 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "22,100 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "64,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "64,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "243 million barrels (2021 est.)"

4
central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json
View file

@ -713,10 +713,10 @@
"text": "1,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate exports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil and lease condensate imports": {
"text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)"
"text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)"
},
"crude oil estimated reserves": {
"text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)"

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