From d8cfbba438aac0adf5e8c8f98496716a90b6dbb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yo Robot Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2022 22:10:39 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] auto-update week 45 --- africa/ag.json | 4 ++-- africa/ao.json | 6 +++--- africa/bc.json | 8 ++++---- africa/bn.json | 6 +++--- africa/by.json | 10 +++++----- africa/cd.json | 8 ++++---- africa/cf.json | 4 ++-- africa/cg.json | 10 +++++----- africa/cm.json | 12 ++++++------ africa/cn.json | 6 +++--- africa/ct.json | 8 ++++---- africa/cv.json | 4 ++-- africa/dj.json | 10 +++++----- africa/eg.json | 8 ++++---- africa/ek.json | 8 ++++---- africa/er.json | 4 ++-- africa/et.json | 24 ++++++++++++------------ africa/ga.json | 4 ++-- africa/gb.json | 4 ++-- africa/gh.json | 4 ++-- africa/gv.json | 4 ++-- africa/iv.json | 8 ++++---- africa/ke.json | 24 ++++++++++++------------ africa/li.json | 4 ++-- africa/lt.json | 4 ++-- africa/ly.json | 4 ++-- africa/ma.json | 4 ++-- africa/mi.json | 12 ++++++------ africa/ml.json | 12 ++++++------ africa/mo.json | 4 ++-- africa/mp.json | 4 ++-- africa/mr.json | 4 ++-- africa/mz.json | 10 +++++----- africa/ng.json | 8 ++++---- africa/ni.json | 8 ++++---- africa/od.json | 6 +++--- africa/pu.json | 4 ++-- africa/rw.json | 12 ++++++------ africa/se.json | 4 ++-- africa/sf.json | 6 +++--- africa/sg.json | 6 +++--- africa/sh.json | 4 ++-- africa/sl.json | 6 +++--- africa/so.json | 12 ++++++------ africa/su.json | 4 ++-- africa/to.json | 4 ++-- africa/tp.json | 4 ++-- africa/ts.json | 4 ++-- africa/tz.json | 18 +++++++++--------- africa/ug.json | 11 ++++++----- africa/uv.json | 6 +++--- africa/wa.json | 4 ++-- africa/wz.json | 4 ++-- africa/za.json | 8 ++++---- africa/zi.json | 4 ++-- antarctica/ay.json | 6 +++--- australia-oceania/aq.json | 8 ++++---- australia-oceania/as.json | 14 +++++++------- australia-oceania/bp.json | 8 ++++---- australia-oceania/ck.json | 2 +- australia-oceania/cq.json | 4 ++-- australia-oceania/cw.json | 4 ++-- australia-oceania/fj.json | 4 ++-- australia-oceania/fp.json | 4 ++-- australia-oceania/gq.json | 4 ++-- australia-oceania/kr.json | 4 ++-- australia-oceania/kt.json | 6 +++--- australia-oceania/nc.json | 4 ++-- australia-oceania/ne.json | 4 ++-- australia-oceania/nh.json | 12 ++++++------ australia-oceania/nr.json | 4 ++-- australia-oceania/nz.json | 8 ++++---- australia-oceania/tn.json | 4 ++-- australia-oceania/wq.json | 6 +++--- australia-oceania/ws.json | 4 ++-- central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json | 8 ++++---- central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json | 8 ++++---- central-america-n-caribbean/av.json | 2 +- central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json | 8 ++++---- central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json | 6 +++--- central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json | 8 ++++---- central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json | 6 +++--- central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json | 4 ++-- central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json | 4 ++-- central-america-n-caribbean/do.json | 4 ++-- central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json | 8 ++++---- central-america-n-caribbean/es.json | 4 ++-- central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json | 4 ++-- central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json | 8 ++++---- central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json | 4 ++-- central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json | 8 ++++---- central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json | 4 ++-- central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json | 4 ++-- central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json | 8 ++++---- central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json | 10 +++++----- central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json | 6 +++--- central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json | 4 ++-- central-america-n-caribbean/st.json | 4 ++-- central-america-n-caribbean/td.json | 4 ++-- central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json | 4 ++-- central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json | 4 ++-- central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json | 6 +++--- central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json | 4 ++-- central-asia/kg.json | 8 ++++---- central-asia/kz.json | 12 ++++++------ central-asia/rs.json | 14 +++++++------- central-asia/ti.json | 4 ++-- central-asia/tx.json | 8 ++++---- central-asia/uz.json | 8 ++++---- east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json | 10 +++++----- east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json | 6 +++--- east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json | 10 +++++----- east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json | 12 ++++++------ east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json | 4 ++-- east-n-southeast-asia/id.json | 8 ++++---- east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json | 8 ++++---- east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json | 8 ++++---- east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json | 4 ++-- east-n-southeast-asia/la.json | 4 ++-- east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json | 4 ++-- east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json | 12 ++++++------ east-n-southeast-asia/my.json | 4 ++-- east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json | 6 +++--- east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json | 12 ++++++------ east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json | 6 +++--- east-n-southeast-asia/th.json | 14 +++++++------- east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json | 6 +++--- east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json | 6 +++--- east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json | 4 ++-- europe/al.json | 10 +++++----- europe/an.json | 4 ++-- europe/au.json | 10 +++++----- europe/be.json | 6 +++--- europe/bk.json | 6 +++--- europe/bo.json | 8 ++++---- europe/bu.json | 6 +++--- europe/cy.json | 6 +++--- europe/da.json | 6 +++--- europe/ei.json | 6 +++--- europe/en.json | 8 ++++---- europe/ez.json | 4 ++-- europe/fi.json | 10 +++++----- europe/fo.json | 4 ++-- europe/fr.json | 10 +++++----- europe/gi.json | 4 ++-- europe/gm.json | 14 +++++++------- europe/gr.json | 6 +++--- europe/hr.json | 6 +++--- europe/hu.json | 8 ++++---- europe/ic.json | 4 ++-- europe/it.json | 8 ++++---- europe/kv.json | 4 ++-- europe/lg.json | 6 +++--- europe/lh.json | 10 +++++----- europe/lo.json | 6 +++--- europe/lu.json | 4 ++-- europe/md.json | 4 ++-- europe/mj.json | 10 +++++----- europe/mk.json | 6 +++--- europe/mt.json | 4 ++-- europe/nl.json | 4 ++-- europe/no.json | 6 +++--- europe/pl.json | 10 +++++----- europe/po.json | 6 +++--- europe/ri.json | 8 ++++---- europe/ro.json | 6 +++--- europe/si.json | 8 ++++---- europe/sp.json | 11 ++++++----- europe/sw.json | 10 +++++----- europe/sz.json | 10 +++++----- europe/uk.json | 6 +++--- europe/up.json | 4 ++-- middle-east/ae.json | 4 ++-- middle-east/aj.json | 14 +++++++------- middle-east/am.json | 10 +++++----- middle-east/ba.json | 4 ++-- middle-east/gg.json | 4 ++-- middle-east/gz.json | 4 ++-- middle-east/ir.json | 10 +++++----- middle-east/is.json | 8 ++++---- middle-east/iz.json | 12 ++++++------ middle-east/jo.json | 8 ++++---- middle-east/ku.json | 4 ++-- middle-east/le.json | 4 ++-- middle-east/mu.json | 6 +++--- middle-east/qa.json | 6 +++--- middle-east/sa.json | 6 +++--- middle-east/sy.json | 4 ++-- middle-east/tu.json | 12 ++++++------ middle-east/we.json | 8 ++++---- middle-east/ym.json | 4 ++-- north-america/bd.json | 8 ++++---- north-america/ca.json | 10 +++++----- north-america/gl.json | 4 ++-- north-america/mx.json | 12 ++++++------ north-america/sb.json | 4 ++-- north-america/us.json | 12 ++++++------ south-america/ar.json | 14 +++++++------- south-america/bl.json | 14 +++++++------- south-america/br.json | 16 ++++++++-------- south-america/ci.json | 10 +++++----- south-america/co.json | 6 +++--- south-america/ec.json | 4 ++-- south-america/fk.json | 4 ++-- south-america/gy.json | 4 ++-- south-america/ns.json | 4 ++-- south-america/pa.json | 6 +++--- south-america/pe.json | 10 +++++----- south-america/uy.json | 8 ++++---- south-america/ve.json | 8 ++++---- south-asia/af.json | 10 +++++----- south-asia/bg.json | 10 +++++----- south-asia/bt.json | 4 ++-- south-asia/ce.json | 4 ++-- south-asia/in.json | 8 ++++---- south-asia/mv.json | 4 ++-- south-asia/np.json | 4 ++-- south-asia/pk.json | 6 +++--- world/xx.json | 16 ++++++++-------- 219 files changed, 762 insertions(+), 760 deletions(-) diff --git a/africa/ag.json b/africa/ag.json index 6ae6bc46..f34808a2 100644 --- a/africa/ag.json +++ b/africa/ag.json @@ -1003,10 +1003,10 @@ "text": "450,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "633,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "633,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "4,100 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "4,100 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "12.2 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/ao.json b/africa/ao.json index a810ceb6..193f11ec 100644 --- a/africa/ao.json +++ b/africa/ao.json @@ -1037,10 +1037,10 @@ "text": "133,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "1,367,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "1,367,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "7.783 billion barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1111,7 +1111,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Angola’s telecom sector in recent years has benefited from political stability, which has encouraged foreign investment in the sector; the government and regulator have also set in train mechanisms to open up the telecom sector to new competitors; following an extensive investment program, the company launched mobile services in April 2022; the MNOs were slow to develop LTE services, instead relying on their GSM and 3G network capabilities; there has been slow progress in LTE network development, with only a small proportion of the country covered by network infrastructure; some progress  has been made with 5G; the Ministry of Telecommunications in early 2021 set up a 5G hub to assess 5G user cases; the government has continued to develop telecom infrastructure to help diversify the country’s economy and lessen its dependence on offshore crude oil production; by extending and upgrading telecom networks the government expects businesses to become more efficient and for e-commerce to become a more prominent feature of economic growth; networks will facilitate rural access to education and health care. (2022)" + "text": "Angola’s telecom sector in recent years has benefited from political stability, which has encouraged foreign investment in the sector; the government and regulator have also set in train mechanisms to open up the telecom sector to new competitors, mobile services were launched in April 2022; the MNOs were slow to develop LTE services, instead relying on their GSM and 3G network capabilities; there has been slow progress in LTE network development, with only a small proportion of the country covered by network infrastructure; the Ministry of Telecommunications in early 2021 set up a 5G hub to assess 5G user cases; the regulator in November 2021 granted licenses to various companies offering 5G services, with spectrum in the 3.3-3.7GHz range having been set aside for such services (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "only about one fixed-line per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity about 45 telephones per 100 persons (2020)" diff --git a/africa/bc.json b/africa/bc.json index c8136b03..8a53daa0 100644 --- a/africa/bc.json +++ b/africa/bc.json @@ -1022,10 +1022,10 @@ "text": "21,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1096,10 +1096,10 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "effective regulatory reform has made Botswana’s telecom market one of the most liberalized in the region; there is a service-neutral licensing regime adapted to the convergence of technologies and services, and several operators now compete in all telecom sectors; Botswana has one of the highest mobile subscription rates in Africa, though with this growth in the number of subscribers has slowed sharply in recent years; the popular use of multiple SIM cards from different operators convinced that regulator that there was no need introduce mobile number portability, and although the government pursued the idea for some years, it accepted in April 2021 that it would not be implemented after all; in the fixed-line broadband market they compete with a large number of ISPs, some of which have rolled out their own wireless access infrastructure; the landlocked country depends on satellites for international bandwidth, and on other countries for transit capacity to the landing points of international submarine cables; the landing of additional cables in the region in recent years has improved the competitive situation in this sector, while prices for connectivity have fallen dramatically (2022)" + "text": "effective regulatory reform has made Botswana’s telecom market one of the most liberalized in the region; there is a service-neutral licensing regime adapted to the convergence of technologies and services, and several operators now compete in all telecom sectors;  Botswana has one of the highest mobile penetration rates in Africa; in a bid to generate new revenue streams and secure market share, the three MNOs have entered the underdeveloped broadband sector by adopting of 3G, LTE, and WiMAX technologies; in the fixed-line broadband market they compete with a large number of ISPs, some of which have rolled out their own wireless access infrastructure; the landlocked country depends on satellites for international bandwidth, and on other countries for transit capacity to the landing points of international submarine cables; the landing of additional cables in the region in recent years has improved the competitive situation in this sector, while prices for connectivity have fallen dramatically (2022)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "fixed-line teledensity has declined in recent years and now stands at roughly 6 telephones per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity is roughly 162 telephones per 100 persons (2020)" + "text": "fixed-line teledensity has declined in recent years and now stands at roughly 6 telephones per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity is roughly 163 telephones per 100 persons (2020)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 267; international calls are made via satellite, using international direct dialing; 2 international exchanges; digital microwave radio relay links to Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Indian Ocean)" diff --git a/africa/bn.json b/africa/bn.json index 4ff99178..06e7f285 100644 --- a/africa/bn.json +++ b/africa/bn.json @@ -1035,10 +1035,10 @@ "text": "46,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "8 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1109,7 +1109,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Benin’s telecom market continues to be restricted by the poor condition of the country’s fixed-line infrastructure;  this has hampered the development of fixed-line voice and internet services, and there is negligible revenue derived from these sectors; mobile networks account for almost all internet connections, and also carry most voice traffic; there is promise for considerable change in the mobile sector; slow progress is being made in developing competition in the mobile sector; in May 2021 the government sought foreign companies to bid for a fourth mobile license; improved international internet connectivity has contributed to a reduction in end-user pricing, and provided the potential to transform many areas of the country’s economy, bringing a greater proportion of the population into the orbit of internet commerce and connectivity; a 2,000km fiber project started in 2016 was finally completed in mid-2021, prompting the government to secure a loan to build additional fiber infrastructure connecting four of the country’s 12 departments (2022)" + "text": "Benin’s telecom market continues to be restricted by the poor condition of the country’s fixed-line infrastructure; this has hampered the development of fixed-line voice and internet services, and there is negligible revenue derived from these sectors; mobile networks account for almost all internet connections, and also carry most voice traffic; there is promise for considerable change in the mobile sector; slow progress is being made in developing competition in the mobile sector; in May 2021 the government sought foreign companies to bid for a fourth mobile license; improved international internet connectivity has contributed to a reduction in end-user pricing, and provided the potential to transform many areas of the country’s economy, bringing a greater proportion of the population into the orbit of internet commerce and connectivity; a 2,000km fiber project started in 2016 was finally completed in mid-2021, prompting the government to secure a loan to build additional fiber infrastructure connecting four of the country’s 12 departments (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line teledensity only about 1 per 100 persons; spurred by the presence of multiple mobile-cellular providers, cellular telephone subscribership has increased rapidly, nearing 92 per 100 persons (2020)" diff --git a/africa/by.json b/africa/by.json index 40f58638..bd97e601 100644 --- a/africa/by.json +++ b/africa/by.json @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ "text": "230 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Tanganyika (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and Zambia) - 32,000 sq km" } }, @@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Tanganyika (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and Zambia) - 32,000 sq km" } }, @@ -1025,10 +1025,10 @@ "text": "5,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1099,7 +1099,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Burundi provides an attractive telecom market given its high population density and existing low subscription rates for all services; one downside for investors is that the country has a very low economic output, disposable income is also very low, and fixed-line infrastructure is poor outside the main urban areas; this is a greater motivation for investors to focus on improving mobile networks than in expanding fixed-line infrastructure; to overcome difficulties associated with the poor telecom infrastructure, the government has supported a number of prominent telcos building a national fiber backbone network; this network offers onward connectivity to submarine cable infrastructure landings in Kenya and Tanzania; the first sections of this network were switched on in early 2014, and additional provinces have since been connected; in addition, the government in early 2018 kick-started the Burundi Broadband project, which aims to deliver national connectivity by 2025; based on this improved infrastructure the government and ITU have developed an ICT strategy to make use of telecoms to promote the country’s socio-economic development through to 2028; progress made by Tanzania with its own national backbone network has benefited Burundi, which has been provided with onward connectivity to most countries in the region; International bandwidth capacity has continued to increase in recent years, including a 38% increase in the nine months to September 2021, resulting in lower retail prices for consumers; two of the mobile operators have launched 3G and LTE services to capitalize on the growing demand for internet access; the number of mobile subscribers increased 7% in the third quarter of 2021, quarter-on-quarter; similar growth is expected for the next two years at least, which will help bring the mobile level closer to the average for the region. (2022)" + "text": "Burundi provides an attractive telecom market given its high population density and existing low subscription rates for all services; one downside for investors is that the country has a very low economic output, disposable income is also very low, and fixed-line infrastructure is poor outside the main urban areas; this is a greater motivation for investors to focus on improving mobile networks than in expanding fixed-line infrastructure; to overcome difficulties associated with the poor telecom infrastructure, the government has supported a number of prominent telcos building a national fiber backbone network; this network offers onward connectivity to submarine cable infrastructure landings in Kenya and Tanzania; the first sections of this network were switched on in early 2014, and additional provinces have since been connected; in addition, the government in early 2018 kick-started the Burundi Broadband project, which aims to deliver national connectivity by 2025; based on this improved infrastructure the government and ITU have developed an ICT strategy to make use of telecoms to promote the country’s socio-economic development through to 2028; progress made by Tanzania with its own national backbone network has benefited Burundi, which has been provided with onward connectivity to most countries in the region; International bandwidth capacity has continued to increase in recent years, including a 38% increase in the nine months to September 2021, resulting in lower retail prices for consumers; two of the mobile operators have launched 3G and LTE services to capitalize on the growing demand for internet access; the number of mobile subscribers increased 7% in the third quarter of 2021, quarter-on-quarter; similar growth is expected for the next two years at least, which will help bring the mobile level closer to the average for the region (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "telephone density one of the lowest in the world; fixed-line connections stand at less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular usage is about 56 per 100 persons (2020)" diff --git a/africa/cd.json b/africa/cd.json index ddf14754..23ed7d00 100644 --- a/africa/cd.json +++ b/africa/cd.json @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ "text": "300 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Chad (endorheic lake shared with Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon) - 10,360-25,900 sq km
note - area varies by season and year to year" } }, @@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Chad (endorheic lake shared with Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon) - 10,360-25,900 sq km
note - area varies by season and year to year" } }, @@ -1040,10 +1040,10 @@ "text": "12,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "116,000 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "116,000 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "1.5 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/cf.json b/africa/cf.json index 8bdca3dc..f1d28b0a 100644 --- a/africa/cf.json +++ b/africa/cf.json @@ -1039,10 +1039,10 @@ "text": "12,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "331,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "331,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "2.882 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/cg.json b/africa/cg.json index 213a4d3c..585c6009 100644 --- a/africa/cg.json +++ b/africa/cg.json @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ "text": "110 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Tanganyika (shared with Burundi, Tanzania, and Zambia) - 32,000 sq km; Lake Albert (shared with Uganda) - 5,590 sq km; Lake Mweru (shared with Zambia) - 4,350 sq km; Lac Mai-Ndombe - 2,300 sq km; Lake Kivu (shared with Rwanda) - 2,220 sq km; Lake Edward (shared with Uganda) - 2,150 sq km; Lac Tumba - 500 sq km; Lac Upemba - 530 sq km" } }, @@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Tanganyika (shared with Burundi, Tanzania, and Zambia) - 32,000 sq km; Lake Albert (shared with Uganda) - 5,590 sq km; Lake Mweru (shared with Zambia) - 4,350 sq km; Lac Mai-Ndombe - 2,300 sq km; Lake Kivu (shared with Rwanda) - 2,220 sq km; Lake Edward (shared with Uganda) - 2,150 sq km; Lac Tumba - 500 sq km; Lac Upemba - 530 sq km" } }, @@ -1074,10 +1074,10 @@ "text": "17,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "21,300 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "21,300 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "180 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@ "note": "note: in eastern Congo, fighters from armed groups, and in some cases government security forces, have been accused of forced recruitment of child soldiers" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the modern FARDC was created out of the armed factions of the two Congo wars of 1996-1997 and 1998-2003; as part of the peace accords that ended the last war, the largest rebel groups were incorporated into the FARDC; many armed groups, however, continue to fight and as of 2022, there were over 100 illegal armed groups operating in the country by some estimates; as of 2022, the FARDC was actively engaged in combat operations against numerous armed groups, particularly in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, although there was also violence in Maniema, Kasai, Kasai Central, and Tanganyika provinces; the military is widely assessed as being unable to provide adequate security throughout the country due to insufficient training, poor morale and leadership, ill-discipline and corruption, low equipment readiness, a fractious ethnic makeup, and the sheer size of the country and diversity of armed rebel groups

as of 2022, one of the primary armed groups the FARDC was conducting operations against was the March 23 Movement (M23, aka Congolese Revolutionary Army), which resumed attacks, largely against civilians, in the DRC province of North Kivu in 2022 after having been defeated in 2013 by FARDC and UN forces; the M23's resurgence has raised tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, as the DRC Government claims Rwanda backs the M23, which it has labeled a terrorist group, charges that the Rwandan Government has denied; M23 attacks and fighting between the FARDC and M23 in 2022 has led to the displacement of more than 200,000 people; UN troops are supporting the FARDC's operations against M23

the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has operated in the central and eastern parts of the country since 1999; as of mid-2022, MONUSCO had around 15,000 personnel; MONUSCO includes a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB; 3 infantry battalions, plus artillery and special forces), the first ever UN peacekeeping force specifically tasked to carry out targeted offensive operations to neutralize and disarm groups considered a threat to state authority and civilian security (2022)" + "text": "the modern FARDC was created out of the armed factions of the two Congo wars of 1996-1997 and 1998-2003; as part of the peace accords that ended the last war, the largest rebel groups were incorporated into the FARDC; many armed groups, however, continue to fight and as of 2022, there were over 100 illegal armed groups operating in the country by some estimates; as of 2022, the FARDC was actively engaged in combat operations against numerous armed groups, particularly in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, although there was also violence in Maniema, Kasai, Kasai Central, and Tanganyika provinces; the military is widely assessed as being unable to provide adequate security throughout the country due to insufficient training, poor morale and leadership, ill-discipline and corruption, low equipment readiness, a fractious ethnic makeup, and the sheer size of the country and diversity of armed rebel groups

as of 2022, one of the primary armed groups the FARDC was conducting operations against was the March 23 Movement (M23, aka Congolese Revolutionary Army), which resumed attacks, largely against civilians, in the DRC province of North Kivu in 2022 after having been defeated in 2013 by FARDC and UN forces; the M23's resurgence has raised tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, as the DRC Government claims Rwanda backs the M23, which it has labeled a terrorist group, charges that the Rwandan Government has denied; M23 attacks and fighting between the FARDC and M23 in 2022 has led to the displacement of more than 200,000 people; UN troops were supporting the FARDC's operations against M23

the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has operated in the central and eastern parts of the country since 1999; as of mid-2022, MONUSCO had around 15,000 personnel; MONUSCO includes a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB; 3 infantry battalions, plus artillery and special forces), the first ever UN peacekeeping force specifically tasked to carry out targeted offensive operations to neutralize and disarm groups considered a threat to state authority and civilian security (2022)" } }, "Terrorism": { diff --git a/africa/cm.json b/africa/cm.json index ef281849..66311d5a 100644 --- a/africa/cm.json +++ b/africa/cm.json @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ "text": "290 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Chad (endorheic lake shared with Niger, Nigeria, and Chad) - 10,360-25,900 sq km
note - area varies by season and year to year" } }, @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ "text": "Roman Catholic 38.3%, Protestant 25.5%, other Christian 6.9%, Muslim 24.4%, animist 2.2%, other 0.5%, none 2.2% (2018 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "

Cameroon has a large youth population, with more than 60% of the populace under the age of 25. Fertility is falling but remains at a high level, especially among poor, rural, and uneducated women, in part because of inadequate access to contraception. Life expectancy remains low at about 55 years due to the prevalence of HIV and AIDs and an elevated maternal mortality rate, which has remained high since 1990. Cameroon, particularly the northern region, is vulnerable to food insecurity largely because of government mismanagement, corruption, high production costs, inadequate infrastructure, and natural disasters. Despite economic growth in some regions, poverty is on the rise, and is most prevalent in rural areas, which are especially affected by a shortage of jobs, declining incomes, poor school and health care infrastructure, and a lack of clean water and sanitation. Underinvestment in social safety nets and ineffective public financial management also contribute to Cameroon’s high rate of poverty.  The activities of Boko Haram, other armed groups, and counterinsurgency operations have worsened food insecurity in the Far North region.  

International migration has been driven by unemployment (including fewer government jobs), poverty, the search for educational opportunities, and corruption. The US and Europe are preferred destinations, but, with tighter immigration restrictions in these countries, young Cameroonians are increasingly turning to neighboring states, such as Gabon and Nigeria, South Africa, other parts of Africa, and the Near and Far East. Cameroon’s limited resources make it dependent on UN support to host more than 420,000 refugees and asylum seekers as of September 2020. These refugees and asylum seekers are primarily from the Central African Republic and Nigeria.  Internal and external displacement have grown dramatically in recent years.  Boko Haram's attacks and counterattacks by government forces in the Far North since 2014 have increased the number of internally displaced people.  Armed conflict between separatists and Cameroon's military in the the Northwest and Southwest since 2016 have displaced hundreds of thousands of the country's Anglophone minority.

" + "text": "

Cameroon has a large youth population, with more than 60% of the populace under the age of 25. Fertility is falling but remains at a high level, especially among poor, rural, and uneducated women, in part because of inadequate access to contraception. Life expectancy remains low at about 55 years due to the prevalence of HIV and AIDs and an elevated maternal mortality rate, which has remained high since 1990. Cameroon, particularly the northern region, is vulnerable to food insecurity largely because of government mismanagement, corruption, high production costs, inadequate infrastructure, and natural disasters. Despite economic growth in some regions, poverty is on the rise, and is most prevalent in rural areas, which are especially affected by a shortage of jobs, declining incomes, poor school and health care infrastructure, and a lack of clean water and sanitation. Underinvestment in social safety nets and ineffective public financial management also contribute to Cameroon’s high rate of poverty.  The activities of Boko Haram, other armed groups, and counterinsurgency operations have worsened food insecurity in the Far North region.  

International migration has been driven by unemployment (including fewer government jobs), poverty, the search for educational opportunities, and corruption. The US and Europe are preferred destinations, but, with tighter immigration restrictions in these countries, young Cameroonians are increasingly turning to neighboring states, such as Gabon and Nigeria, South Africa, other parts of Africa, and the Near and Far East. Cameroon’s limited resources make it dependent on UN support to host more than 490,000 refugees and asylum seekers as of September 2022. These refugees and asylum seekers are primarily from the Central African Republic and Nigeria.  Internal and external displacement have grown dramatically in recent years.  Boko Haram's attacks and counterattacks by government forces in the Far North since 2014 have increased the number of internally displaced people.  Armed conflict between separatists and Cameroon's military in the Northwest and Southwest since 2016 have displaced hundreds of thousands of the country's Anglophone minority.

" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Chad (endorheic lake shared with Niger, Nigeria, and Chad) - 10,360-25,900 sq km
note - area varies by season and year to year" } }, @@ -1077,10 +1077,10 @@ "text": "37,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "62,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "62,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "20,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "20,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "200 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1151,7 +1151,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Cameroon was for many years one of the few countries in Africa with only two competing mobile operators; the investment programs among operators over the next few years will considerably boost mobile broadband services in rural areas of the country, many of which are under served by fixed-line infrastructure; the ICT sector in Cameroon is making steady progress, enabling the country to make better use of the digital economy; the government has also been supportive, having launched its ‘Cameroon Digital 2020’ program, aimed at improving connectivity nationally. A large number of small ICT projects form part of the overall program; improved submarine and terrestrial cable connectivity has substantially increased international bandwidth, in turn leading to reductions in access prices for consumers; other projects such as Acceleration of the Digital Transformation of Cameroon are aimed at developing the digital economy, and accelerating the use of ICT in areas such as government services, agriculture, and commerce (2022)" + "text": "Cameroon was for many years one of the few countries in Africa with only two competing mobile operators; the investment programs among operators over the next few years will considerably boost mobile broadband services in rural areas of the country, many of which are under served by fixed-line infrastructure; the government has also been supportive, having launched its ‘Cameroon Digital 2020’ program, aimed at improving connectivity nationally; improved submarine and terrestrial cable connectivity has substantially increased international bandwidth, in turn leading to reductions in access prices for consumers; other projects such as Acceleration of the Digital Transformation of Cameroon are aimed at developing the digital economy (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "only a little above 3 per 100 persons for fixed-line subscriptions; mobile-cellular usage has increased sharply, reaching a subscribership base of roughly 95 per 100 persons (2020)" diff --git a/africa/cn.json b/africa/cn.json index a3cb5b6a..6e58fcf0 100644 --- a/africa/cn.json +++ b/africa/cn.json @@ -936,10 +936,10 @@ "text": "2,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@ "text": "Qatar launched a special program for the construction of a wireless network to inter connect the 3 islands of the archipelago; telephone service limited to the islands' few towns (2020)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "fixed-line connections less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular usage about 54 per 100 persons; 2 companies provide domestic and international mobile service and wireless data (2020)" + "text": "fixed-line connections less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular usage about 90 per 100 persons; 2 companies provide domestic and international mobile service and wireless data (2020)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 269; landing point for the EASSy, Comoros Domestic Cable System, Avassa, and FLY-LION3 fiber-optic submarine cable system connecting East Africa with Europe; HF radiotelephone communications to Madagascar and Reunion (2019)" diff --git a/africa/ct.json b/africa/ct.json index e71ed3aa..6b54cf24 100644 --- a/africa/ct.json +++ b/africa/ct.json @@ -998,10 +998,10 @@ "text": "2,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1072,10 +1072,10 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "network consists principally of microwave radio relay and at low-capacity; ongoing conflict has obstructed telecommunication and media development, although there are ISP (Internet service providers) and mobile phone carriers, radio is the most-popular communications medium (2018)" + "text": "given the poor fixed-line infrastructure in most countries across Africa, voice and data services across the region are greatly dependent on mobile networks; in the majority of markets, including those with better developed fixed infrastructure such as South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya, up to 98% of all voice and data connections are via mobile networks; during the last two to three years, national governments and telecom regulators have striven to improve fixed infrastructure with the wider aim of developing economic growth based on digital services and connectivity; this work is principally focused on delivering fiber-based connectivity; since the amount of copper infrastructure (DSL or HFC) used for broadband is so negligible, governments and private firms, including telcos are investing in fiber rather than in older technologies; while supporting broadband to premises, health centers, and government buildings, the new fiber infrastructure is mainly being deployed to provide mobile platforms and to support the rapid growth in data traffic (2022)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "very limited telephone service with less than 1 fixed-line connection per 100 persons; with the presence of multiple providers mobile-cellular service has reached nearly 34 per 100 mobile-cellular subscribers; cellular usage is increasing from a low base; most fixed-line and mobile-cellular telephone services are concentrated in Bangui (2019)" + "text": "very limited telephone service with less than 1 fixed-line connection per 100 persons; with the presence of multiple providers mobile-cellular service has reached nearly 38 per 100 mobile-cellular subscribers; cellular usage is increasing from a low base; most fixed-line and mobile-cellular telephone services are concentrated in Bangui (2020)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 236; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean)" diff --git a/africa/cv.json b/africa/cv.json index 6bbe496d..0afe741a 100644 --- a/africa/cv.json +++ b/africa/cv.json @@ -968,10 +968,10 @@ "text": "6,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/dj.json b/africa/dj.json index 11038826..c4d0b068 100644 --- a/africa/dj.json +++ b/africa/dj.json @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ "text": "10 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Abhe Bad/Abhe Bid Hayk (shared with Ethiopia) - 780 sq km" } }, @@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Abhe Bad/Abhe Bid Hayk (shared with Ethiopia) - 780 sq km" } }, @@ -983,10 +983,10 @@ "text": "4,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Djibouti remains one of the last bastions where the national telco has a monopoly on all telecom services, including fixed lines, mobile, internet, and broadband; despite the country benefiting from its location as a hub for international submarine cables, and with Djibouti Telecom being a partner in at least eight of them, prices for telecom services remain relatively high, and out of reach for a number of customers, weighing on market advancement; the Djibouti government is aiming to sell a minority stake in the incumbent telco (retaining some control of decisions) while securing the financial backing and the management acumen of a foreign operator; this is part of a larger plan to modernize the country’s economy more generally; the state expects to conduct of a sale of up to 40% of the company to an international investor by end-2022 (2022)" + "text": "Djibouti remains one of the last bastions where the national telco has a monopoly on all telecom services, including fixed lines, mobile, internet, and broadband; despite the country benefiting from its location as a hub for international submarine cables, prices for telecom services remain relatively high, and out of reach for a number of customers, weighing on market advancement; the Djibouti government is aiming to sell a minority stake in the incumbent telco (retaining some control of decisions) while securing the financial backing and the management acumen of a foreign operator; this is part of a larger plan to modernize the country’s economy more generally; the state expects to conduct a sale of up to 40% of the company to an international investor by the end 2022 (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "about 4 per 100 fixed-line teledensity and nearly 44 per 100 mobile-cellular; Djibouti Telecom (DT) is the sole provider of telecommunications services and utilizes mostly a microwave radio relay network; fiber-optic cable is installed in the capital; rural areas connected via wireless local loop radio systems; mobile cellular coverage is primarily limited to the area in and around Djibouti city (2020)" diff --git a/africa/eg.json b/africa/eg.json index bc291bc8..0513798f 100644 --- a/africa/eg.json +++ b/africa/eg.json @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ "text": "36,500 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Manzala - 1,360 sq km
note - largest of Nile Delta lakes" } }, @@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Manzala - 1,360 sq km
note - largest of Nile Delta lakes" } }, @@ -1055,10 +1055,10 @@ "text": "810,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "204,100 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "204,100 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "117,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "117,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "3.3 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/ek.json b/africa/ek.json index 30031272..f0cd8639 100644 --- a/africa/ek.json +++ b/africa/ek.json @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ "text": "Roman Catholic 88%, Protestant 5%, Muslim 2%, other 5% (animist, Baha'i, Jewish) (2015 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "

Equatorial Guinea is one of the smallest and least populated countries in continental Africa and is the only independent African country where Spanish is an official language. Despite a boom in oil production in the 1990s, authoritarianism, corruption, and resource mismanagement have concentrated the benefits among a small elite. These practices have perpetuated income inequality and unbalanced development, such as low public spending on education and health care. Unemployment remains problematic because the oil-dominated economy employs a small labor force dependent on skilled foreign workers. The agricultural sector, Equatorial Guinea’s main employer, continues to deteriorate because of a lack of investment and the migration of rural workers to urban areas. About three-quarters of the population lives below the poverty line.

Equatorial Guinea’s large and growing youth population – about 60% are under the age of 25 – is particularly affected because job creation in the non-oil sectors is limited, and young people often do not have the skills needed in the labor market. Equatorial Guinean children frequently enter school late, have poor attendance, and have high dropout rates. Thousands of Equatorial Guineans fled across the border to Gabon in the 1970s to escape the dictatorship of MACIAS NGUEMA; smaller numbers have followed in the decades since. Continued inequitable economic growth and high youth unemployment increases the likelihood of ethnic and regional violence.

" + "text": "

Equatorial Guinea is one of the smallest and least populated countries in continental Africa and is the only independent African country where Spanish is an official language. Despite a boom in oil production in the 1990s, authoritarianism, corruption, and resource mismanagement have concentrated the benefits among a small elite. These practices have perpetuated income inequality and unbalanced development, such as low public spending on education and health care. Unemployment remains problematic because the oil-dominated economy employs a small labor force dependent on skilled foreign workers. The agricultural sector, Equatorial Guinea’s main employer, continues to deteriorate because of a lack of investment and the migration of rural workers to urban areas. About three-quarters of the population lives below the poverty line.

Equatorial Guinea’s large and growing youth population – about 60% are under the age of 25 – is particularly affected because job creation in the non-oil sectors is limited, and young people often do not have the skills needed in the labor market. Equatorial Guinean children frequently enter school late, have poor attendance, and have high dropout rates. Thousands of Equatorial Guineans fled across the border to Gabon in the 1970s to escape the dictatorship of Francisco MACIAS NGUEMA; smaller numbers have followed in the decades since. Continued inequitable economic growth and high youth unemployment increases the likelihood of ethnic and regional violence.

" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ }, "Legislative branch": { "description": { - "text": "bicameral National Assembly or Asemblea Nacional consists of:
Senate or Senado (70 seats statutory, 72 seats for current term; 55 members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by closed party-list proportional representation vote, 15 appointed by the president, and 2 ex-officio)
Chamber of Deputies or Camara de los Diputados (100 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by closed paryt-list proportional representation vote to serve 5-year terms)" + "text": "bicameral National Assembly or Asemblea Nacional consists of:
Senate or Senado (70 seats statutory, 72 seats for current term; 55 members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by closed party-list proportional representation vote, 15 appointed by the president, and 2 ex-officio)
Chamber of Deputies or Camara de los Diputados (100 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by closed party-list proportional representation vote to serve 5-year terms)" }, "elections": { "text": "Senate - last held on 12 November 2017 (next to be held in 2022/2023)
Chamber of Deputies - last held on 12 November 2017 (next to be held in 2022/2023)" @@ -934,10 +934,10 @@ "text": "22,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "184,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "184,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "1.1 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/er.json b/africa/er.json index 65aca944..1fb51bb7 100644 --- a/africa/er.json +++ b/africa/er.json @@ -948,10 +948,10 @@ "text": "5,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/et.json b/africa/et.json index 07392978..56e81043 100644 --- a/africa/et.json +++ b/africa/et.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Unique among African countries, the ancient Ethiopian monarchy maintained its freedom from colonial rule with the exception of a short-lived Italian occupation from 1936 to 1941. In 1974, a military junta, the Derg, deposed Emperor Haile SELASSIE (who had ruled since 1930) and established a socialist state. Torn by bloody coups, uprisings, wide-scale drought, and massive refugee problems, the regime was finally toppled in 1991 by a coalition of rebel forces, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). A constitution was adopted in 1994, and Ethiopia's first multiparty elections were held in 1995.

A border war with Eritrea in the late 1990s ended with a peace treaty in December 2000. In November 2007, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC) issued specific coordinates as virtually demarcating the border and pronounced its work finished. Alleging that the EEBC acted beyond its mandate in issuing the coordinates, Ethiopia did not accept them and maintained troops in previously contested areas pronounced by the EEBC as belonging to Eritrea. This intransigence resulted in years of heightened tension between the two countries. In August 2012, longtime leader Prime Minister MELES Zenawi died in office and was replaced by his Deputy Prime Minister HAILEMARIAM Desalegn, marking the first peaceful transition of power in decades. Following a wave of popular dissent and anti-government protest that began in 2015, HAILEMARIAM resigned in February 2018 and ABIY Ahmed Ali took office in April 2018 as Ethiopia's first ethnic Oromo prime minister. In June 2018, ABIY announced Ethiopia would accept the border ruling of 2000, prompting rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea that was marked with a peace agreement in July 2018 and a reopening of the border in September 2018. In November 2019, Ethiopia's nearly 30-year ethnic-based ruling coalition - the EPRDF - merged into a single unity party called the Prosperity Party, however, one of the four constituent parties (the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front or TPLF) refused to join.

In November 2020, a military conflict erupted between forces aligned with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Ethiopia’s national military, the Ethiopian National Defense Force. The conflict, which has continued throughout 2021, has exacerbated ethnic violence and has largely centered in Tigray, Amhara, and Afar regional states." + "text": "

Unique among African countries, the ancient Ethiopian monarchy maintained its freedom from colonial rule with the exception of a short-lived Italian occupation from 1936 to 1941. In 1974, a military junta, the Derg, deposed Emperor Haile SELASSIE (who had ruled since 1930) and established a socialist state. Torn by bloody coups, uprisings, wide-scale drought, and massive refugee problems, the regime was finally toppled in 1991 by a coalition of rebel forces, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). A constitution was adopted in 1994, and Ethiopia's first multiparty elections were held in 1995.

A border war with Eritrea in the late 1990s ended with a peace treaty in December 2000. In November 2007, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC) issued specific coordinates as virtually demarcating the border and pronounced its work finished. Alleging that the EEBC acted beyond its mandate in issuing the coordinates, Ethiopia did not accept them and maintained troops in previously contested areas pronounced by the EEBC as belonging to Eritrea. This intransigence resulted in years of heightened tension between the two countries. In August 2012, longtime leader Prime Minister MELES Zenawi died in office and was replaced by his Deputy Prime Minister HAILEMARIAM Desalegn, marking the first peaceful transition of power in decades. Following a wave of popular dissent and anti-government protest that began in 2015, HAILEMARIAM resigned in February 2018 and ABIY Ahmed Ali took office in April 2018 as Ethiopia's first ethnic Oromo prime minister. In June 2018, ABIY announced Ethiopia would accept the border ruling of 2000, prompting rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea that was marked with a peace agreement in July 2018 and a reopening of the border in September 2018. In November 2019, Ethiopia's nearly 30-year ethnic-based ruling coalition - the EPRDF - merged into a single unity party called the Prosperity Party, however, one of the four constituent parties (the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front or TPLF) refused to join.

In November 2020, a military conflict erupted between forces aligned with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Ethiopia’s national military, the Ethiopian National Defense Force. The conflict, which has continued into 2022, has exacerbated ethnic violence and has largely centered in Tigray, Amhara, and Afar regional states." } }, "Geography": { @@ -87,10 +87,10 @@ "text": "2,900 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Tana - 3,600 sq km; Abaya Hayk - 1,160 sq km; Ch'amo Hayk - 550 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Turkana (shared with Kenya) - 6,400 sq km; Abhe Bid Hayk/Abhe Bad (shared with Djibouti) - 780 sq km; " } }, @@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ "text": "Ethiopian Orthodox 43.8%, Muslim 31.3%, Protestant 22.8%, Catholic 0.7%, traditional 0.6%, other 0.8% (2016 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "

Ethiopia is a predominantly agricultural country – more than 80% of the population lives in rural areas – that is in the early stages of demographic transition. Infant, child, and maternal mortality have fallen sharply over the past decade, but the total fertility rate has declined more slowly and the population continues to grow. The rising age of marriage and the increasing proportion of women remaining single have contributed to fertility reduction. While the use of modern contraceptive methods among married women has increased significantly from 6 percent in 2000 to 27 percent in 2012, the overall rate is still quite low.

Ethiopia’s rapid population growth is putting increasing pressure on land resources, expanding environmental degradation, and raising vulnerability to food shortages. With more than 40 percent of the population below the age of 15 and a fertility rate of over 5 children per woman (and even higher in rural areas), Ethiopia will have to make further progress in meeting its family planning needs if it is to achieve the age structure necessary for reaping a demographic dividend in the coming decades.

Poverty, drought, political repression, and forced government resettlement have driven Ethiopia’s internal and external migration since the 1960s. Before the 1974 revolution, only small numbers of the Ethiopian elite went abroad to study and then returned home, but under the brutal Derg regime thousands fled the country, primarily as refugees. Between 1982 and 1991 there was a new wave of migration to the West for family reunification. Since the defeat of the Derg in 1991, Ethiopians have migrated to escape violence among some of the country’s myriad ethnic groups or to pursue economic opportunities. Internal and international trafficking of women and children for domestic work and prostitution is a growing problem.

" + "text": "

Ethiopia is a predominantly agricultural country – nearly 80% of the population lives in rural areas – that is in the early stages of demographic transition. Infant, child, and maternal mortality have fallen sharply over the past decade, but the total fertility rate has declined more slowly and the population continues to grow. The rising age of marriage and the increasing proportion of women remaining single have contributed to fertility reduction. While the use of modern contraceptive methods among married women has increased significantly from 6 percent in 2000 to 27 percent in 2012, the overall rate is still quite low.

Ethiopia’s rapid population growth is putting increasing pressure on land resources, expanding environmental degradation, and raising vulnerability to food shortages. With about 40 percent of the population below the age of 15 and a fertility rate of 4 children per woman (and even higher in rural areas), Ethiopia will have to make further progress in meeting its family planning needs if it is to achieve the age structure necessary for reaping a demographic dividend in the coming decades.

Poverty, drought, political repression, and forced government resettlement have driven Ethiopia’s internal and external migration since the 1960s. Before the 1974 revolution, only small numbers of the Ethiopian elite went abroad to study and then returned home, but under the brutal Derg regime thousands fled the country, primarily as refugees. Between 1982 and 1991 there was a new wave of migration to the West for family reunification. Since the defeat of the Derg in 1991, Ethiopians have migrated to escape violence among some of the country’s myriad ethnic groups or to pursue economic opportunities. Internal and international trafficking of women and children for domestic work and prostitution is a growing problem.

" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -529,10 +529,10 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Tana - 3,600 sq km; Abaya Hayk - 1,160 sq km; Ch'amo Hayk - 550 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Turkana (shared with Kenya) - 6,400 sq km; Abhe Bid Hayk/Abhe Bad (shared with Djibouti) - 780 sq km; " } }, @@ -1091,10 +1091,10 @@ "text": "107,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "400,000 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1165,10 +1165,10 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "the slow process to open up Ethiopia’s telecom market was completed with the licensing of the Safaricom-led Global Partnership for Ethiopia consortium; the country had been one of the last in Africa to allow its national telco a monopoly on all telecom services including fixed, mobile, internet and data communications; this has stifled innovation, restricted network expansion, and limited the scope of services on offer; the consortium was in some respects a proxy for the wider influence over Ethiopia’s telecom sector between the interests of the US and China; only one of the two licenses on offer was secured, with uncertainty as to the timetable for issuing the second license; the government in mid-2021 began the process of selling a 45% stake in the incumbent telco Ethio Telecom; the World Bank in early 2021 provided a $200 million loan to help develop the country’s digital transformation, while the government has embarked on its 2020-2030 program as well as its Digital Ethiopia 2025 strategy, both aimed at making better use of digital technologies to promote socioeconomic development; the country’s mobile platform has mostly been provided by ZTE and Huawei, which have offered vendor financing (2021)" + "text": "has been one of the last in Africa to allow its national telco a monopoly on all telecom services including fixed, mobile, internet and data communications; this has stifled innovation, restricted network expansion, and limited the scope of services on offer; the World Bank in early 2021 provided a $200 million loan to help develop the country’s digital transformation, while the government has embarked on its 2020-2030 program as well as its Digital Ethiopia 2025 strategy, both aimed at making better use of digital technologies to promote socioeconomic development (2021)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "fixed-line subscriptions at about 1 per 100 while mobile-cellular stands at a little over 37 per 100; the number of mobile telephones is increasing steadily (2019)" + "text": "fixed-line subscriptions at about 1 per 100 while mobile-cellular stands at a little over 39 per 100; the number of mobile telephones is increasing steadily (2020)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 251; open-wire to Sudan and Djibouti; microwave radio relay to Kenya and Djibouti; 2 domestic satellites provide the national trunk service; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (1 Atlantic Ocean and 2 Pacific Ocean) (2016)" @@ -1284,7 +1284,7 @@ "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { "text": "Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF): Ground Forces, Ethiopian Air Force (Ye Ityopya Ayer Hayl, ETAF); Ministry of Peace: Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP) (2022)", - "note": "note 1: in January 2020 the Ethiopian Government announced it had re-established a navy, which was disbanded in 1996; in March 2019, Ethiopia signed a defense cooperation agreement with France which stipulated that France would support the establishment of an Ethiopian navy, which would reportedly be based out of Djibouti

note 2: in 2018, Ethiopia established a Republican Guard military unit responsible to the Prime Minister for protecting senior officials

note 3: each of the states have regional and/or a \"special\" paramilitary security and police forces that report to regional civilian authorities and operate separately from federal forces; local militias operate across the country in loose and varying coordination with these regional security and police forces, the Ethiopian Federal Police, and the Ethiopian military

" + "note": "note 1: in 2020 the Ethiopian Government announced it had re-established a navy, which had been disbanded in 1996; in March 2019, Ethiopia signed a defense cooperation agreement with France which stipulated that France would support the establishment of an Ethiopian navy, which would reportedly be based out of Djibouti

note 2: in 2018, Ethiopia established a Republican Guard military unit responsible to the Prime Minister for protecting senior officials

note 3: each of the states have regional and/or a \"special\" paramilitary security and police forces that report to regional civilian authorities and operate separately from federal forces; local militias operate across the country in loose and varying coordination with these regional security and police forces, the ENDF, and the EFP; there have been some calls for these regional paramilitary forces to be incorporated into the ENDF and EFP

" }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2021": { @@ -1328,7 +1328,7 @@ }, "Transnational Issues": { "Disputes - international": { - "text": "

Ethiopia-Eritrea: Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed to abide by the 2002 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission's (EEBC) delimitation decision, but neither party responded to the revised line detailed in the November 2006 EEBC Demarcation Statement

Ethiopia-Somalia: While border clashes continue in the al-Fashqa (Fashaga) area,  the US views the 1902 boundary treaty between Ethiopia and Sudan as being in force; the undemarcated former British administrative line has little meaning as a political separation to rival clans within Ethiopia's Ogaden and southern Somalia's Oromo region; Ethiopian forces invaded southern Somalia and routed Islamist courts from Mogadishu in January 2007; \"Somaliland\" secessionists provide port facilities in Berbera and trade ties to landlocked Ethiopia; 

Ethiopia-Sudan: Ethiopia's construction of a large dam (the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) on the Blue Nile since 2011 has become a focal point of relations with Egypt and Sudan; as of 2020, four years of three-way talks between the three capitals over operating the dam and filling its reservoir had made little progress; Ethiopia began filling the dam in July 2020; civil unrest in eastern Sudan has hampered efforts to demarcate the porous boundary with Ethiopia

" + "text": "

Ethiopia-Eritrea: Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed to abide by the 2002 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission's (EEBC) delimitation decision, but neither party responded to the revised line detailed in the November 2006 EEBC Demarcation Statement

Ethiopia-Somalia: While border clashes continue in the al-Fashqa (Fashaga) area, the US views the 1902 boundary treaty between Ethiopia and Sudan as being in force; the undemarcated former British administrative line has little meaning as a political separation to rival clans within Ethiopia's Ogaden and southern Somalia's Oromo region; Ethiopian forces invaded southern Somalia and routed Islamist courts from Mogadishu in January 2007; \"Somaliland\" secessionists provide port facilities in Berbera and trade ties to landlocked Ethiopia; 

Ethiopia-Sudan: Ethiopia's construction of a large dam (the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) on the Blue Nile since 2011 has become a focal point of relations with Egypt and Sudan; as of 2020, four years of three-way talks between the three capitals over operating the dam and filling its reservoir had made little progress; Ethiopia began filling the dam in July 2020; civil unrest in eastern Sudan has hampered efforts to demarcate the porous boundary with Ethiopia

" }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { diff --git a/africa/ga.json b/africa/ga.json index 43c5a677..d637f10b 100644 --- a/africa/ga.json +++ b/africa/ga.json @@ -1018,10 +1018,10 @@ "text": "3,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/gb.json b/africa/gb.json index bbd3a8c1..abb1f0d1 100644 --- a/africa/gb.json +++ b/africa/gb.json @@ -991,10 +991,10 @@ "text": "14,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "178,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "178,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "2 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/gh.json b/africa/gh.json index 65d9fc4c..f88887f3 100644 --- a/africa/gh.json +++ b/africa/gh.json @@ -1051,10 +1051,10 @@ "text": "98,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "176,800 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "176,800 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "3,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "3,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "660 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/gv.json b/africa/gv.json index 0f6dbcd3..f7b29a82 100644 --- a/africa/gv.json +++ b/africa/gv.json @@ -1044,10 +1044,10 @@ "text": "19,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/iv.json b/africa/iv.json index ecf58230..55e55d58 100644 --- a/africa/iv.json +++ b/africa/iv.json @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ "text": "730 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lagune Aby - 780 sq km" } }, @@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lagune Aby - 780 sq km" } }, @@ -1055,10 +1055,10 @@ "text": "56,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "30,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "30,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "69,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "69,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "100 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/ke.json b/africa/ke.json index 9d04f0ea..e900accf 100644 --- a/africa/ke.json +++ b/africa/ke.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Trade centers such as Mombasa have existed along the Kenyan and Tanzanian coastlines, known as the Land of Zanj, since at least the 2nd century. These centers traded with the outside world, including China, India, Indonesia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Persia. By around the 9th century, the mix of Africans, Arabs, and Persians who lived and traded there became known as Swahili (\"people of the coast\") with a distinct language (KiSwahili) and culture. The Portuguese arrived in the 1490s and, using Mombasa as a base, sought to monopolize trade in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese were pushed out in the late 1600s by the combined forces of Oman and Pate, an island off the coast. In 1890, Germany and the UK divided up the region, with the UK taking the north and the Germans the south, including present-day Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda. The British established the East Africa Protectorate in 1895, which in 1920 was converted into a colony and named Kenya after its highest mountain. Numerous political disputes between the colony and the UK subsequently led to the violent Mau Mau Uprising, which began in 1952, and the eventual declaration of independence in 1963.

Jomo KENYATTA, the founding president and an icon of the liberation struggle, led Kenya from independence in 1963 until his death in 1978, when Vice President Daniel Arap MOI took power in a constitutional succession. The country was a de facto one-party state from 1969 until 1982, after which time the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) changed the constitution to make itself the sole legal political party in Kenya. MOI acceded to internal and external pressure for political liberalization in late 1991. The ethnically fractured opposition failed to dislodge KANU from power in elections in 1992 and 1997, which were marred by violence and fraud. President MOI stepped down in December 2002 following fair and peaceful elections. Mwai KIBAKI, running as the candidate of the multiethnic, united opposition group, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), defeated KANU candidate Uhuru KENYATTA, the son of founding president Jomo KENYATTA, and assumed the presidency following a campaign centered on an anticorruption platform. 

KIBAKI's reelection in 2007 resulted in two months of post-election ethnic violence that caused the death of more than 1,100 people and the dislocation of hundreds of thousands. Opposition candidate, Raila ODINGA, accused the government of widespread vote rigging. African Union-sponsored mediation led by former UN Secretary General Kofi ANNAN resulted in a power-sharing accord that brought ODINGA into the government in the restored position of prime minister. The power sharing accord included a broad reform agenda, the centerpiece of which was constitutional reform. In 2010, Kenyans overwhelmingly adopted a new constitution in a national referendum. The new constitution introduced additional checks and balances to executive power and devolved power and resources to 47 newly created counties. It also eliminated the position of prime minister. Uhuru KENYATTA won the first presidential election under the new constitution in March 2013. KENYATTA won a second and final term in office in November 2017 following a contentious, repeat election. In September 2022, " + "text": "

Trade centers such as Mombasa have existed along the Kenyan and Tanzanian coastlines, known as the Land of Zanj, since at least the 2nd century. These centers traded with the outside world, including China, India, Indonesia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Persia. By around the 9th century, the mix of Africans, Arabs, and Persians who lived and traded there became known as Swahili (\"people of the coast\") with a distinct language (KiSwahili) and culture. The Portuguese arrived in the 1490s and, using Mombasa as a base, sought to monopolize trade in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese were pushed out in the late 1600s by the combined forces of Oman and Pate, an island off the coast. In 1890, Germany and the UK divided up the region, with the UK taking the north and the Germans the south, including present-day Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda. The British established the East Africa Protectorate in 1895, which in 1920 was converted into a colony and named Kenya after its highest mountain. Numerous political disputes between the colony and the UK subsequently led to the violent Mau Mau Uprising, which began in 1952, and the eventual declaration of independence in 1963.

Jomo KENYATTA, the founding president and an icon of the liberation struggle, led Kenya from independence in 1963 until his death in 1978, when Vice President Daniel Arap MOI took power in a constitutional succession. The country was a de facto one-party state from 1969 until 1982, after which time the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) changed the constitution to make itself the sole legal political party in Kenya. MOI acceded to internal and external pressure for political liberalization in late 1991. The ethnically fractured opposition failed to dislodge KANU from power in elections in 1992 and 1997, which were marred by violence and fraud. President MOI stepped down in December 2002 following fair and peaceful elections. Mwai KIBAKI, running as the candidate of the multiethnic, united opposition group, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), defeated KANU candidate Uhuru KENYATTA, the son of founding president Jomo KENYATTA, and assumed the presidency following a campaign centered on an anticorruption platform. 

KIBAKI's reelection in 2007 resulted in two months of post-election ethnic violence that caused the death of more than 1,100 people and the dislocation of hundreds of thousands. Opposition candidate, Raila ODINGA, accused the government of widespread vote rigging. African Union-sponsored mediation led by former UN Secretary General Kofi ANNAN resulted in a power-sharing accord that brought ODINGA into the government in the restored position of prime minister. The power sharing accord included a broad reform agenda, the centerpiece of which was constitutional reform. In 2010, Kenyans overwhelmingly adopted a new constitution in a national referendum. The new constitution introduced additional checks and balances to executive power and devolved power and resources to 47 newly created counties. It also eliminated the position of prime minister. Uhuru KENYATTA won the first presidential election under the new constitution in March 2013. KENYATTA won a second and final term in office in November 2017 following a contentious, repeat election. In August 2022, William RUTO won a close presidential election; he assumed the office the following month after the Kenyan Supreme Court upheld the victory." } }, "Geography": { @@ -94,10 +94,10 @@ "text": "1,030 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Victoria (shared with Tanzania and Uganda) - 62,940 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Turkana (shared with Ethiopia) - 6,400 sq km" } }, @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ "text": "Christian 85.5% (Protestant 33.4%, Catholic 20.6%, Evangelical 20.4%, African Instituted Churches 7%, other Christian 4.1%), Muslim 10.9%, other 1.8%, none 1.6%, don't know/no answer 0.2% (2019 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "

Kenya has experienced dramatic population growth since the mid-20th century as a result of its high birth rate and its declining mortality rate. More than 40% of Kenyans are under the age of 15 because of sustained high fertility, early marriage and childbearing, and an unmet need for family planning. Kenya’s persistent rapid population growth strains the labor market, social services, arable land, and natural resources. Although Kenya in 1967 was the first Sub-Saharan country to launch a nationwide family planning program, progress in reducing the birth rate has largely stalled since the late 1990s, when the government decreased its support for family planning to focus on the HIV epidemic. Government commitment and international technical support spurred Kenyan contraceptive use, decreasing the fertility rate (children per woman) from about 8 in the late 1970s to less than 5 children twenty years later, but it has plateaued at just over 3 children today.

Kenya is a source of emigrants and a host country for refugees. In the 1960s and 1970s, Kenyans pursued higher education in the UK because of colonial ties, but as British immigration rules tightened, the US, the then Soviet Union, and Canada became attractive study destinations. Kenya’s stagnant economy and political problems during the 1980s and 1990s led to an outpouring of Kenyan students and professionals seeking permanent opportunities in the West and southern Africa. Nevertheless, Kenya’s relative stability since its independence in 1963 has attracted hundreds of thousands of refugees escaping violent conflicts in neighboring countries; Kenya shelters more than 300,000 Somali refugees as of April 2017.

" + "text": "

Kenya has experienced dramatic population growth since the mid-20th century as a result of its high birth rate and its declining mortality rate. Almost 40% of Kenyans are under the age of 15 as of 2022 because of sustained high fertility, early marriage and childbearing, and an unmet need for family planning. Kenya’s persistent rapid population growth strains the labor market, social services, arable land, and natural resources. Although Kenya in 1967 was the first Sub-Saharan country to launch a nationwide family planning program, progress in reducing the birth rate has largely stalled since the late 1990s, when the government decreased its support for family planning to focus on the HIV epidemic. Government commitment and international technical support spurred Kenyan contraceptive use, decreasing the fertility rate (children per woman) from about 8 in the late 1970s to less than 5 children twenty years later, but it has plateaued at 3 children as of 2022.

Kenya is a source of emigrants and a host country for refugees. In the 1960s and 1970s, Kenyans pursued higher education in the UK because of colonial ties, but as British immigration rules tightened, the US, the then Soviet Union, and Canada became attractive study destinations. Kenya’s stagnant economy and political problems during the 1980s and 1990s led to an outpouring of Kenyan students and professionals seeking permanent opportunities in the West and southern Africa. Nevertheless, Kenya’s relative stability since its independence in 1963 has attracted hundreds of thousands of refugees escaping violent conflicts in neighboring countries; Kenya was sheltering nearly 280,000 Somali refugees as of 2022.

" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ }, "Food insecurity": { "exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies": { - "text": "due to drought conditions - in the March to June 2022 period, about 4.1 million people are estimated to be severely food insecure; this figure is about 40% higher than the same time last year; severe rainfall deficits during the March-May 2022 rainy season have impaired pasture regeneration in several central, northern and eastern pastoral and agro-pastoral areas; as of late July 2022, between 25% and more than 85% of the grassland was affected by severe drought reflecting consecutive poor rainy seasons since late 2020 affecting both crop and livestock production; prices of maize are at high levels across the country due to reduced availability and high fuel prices inflating production and transportation costs; as the June–September 2022 dry season has just started and forecasts point to a poor October–December 2022 “short‑rains” season, food insecurity conditions are expected to further deteriorate (2022)" + "text": "due to drought conditions - in the March to June 2022 period, about 4.1 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure; this figure is about 40% higher than the same time last year; severe rainfall deficits during the March-May 2022 rainy season have impaired pasture regeneration in several central, northern and eastern pastoral and agro-pastoral areas; as of late July 2022, between 25% and more than 85% of the grassland was affected by severe drought reflecting consecutive poor rainy seasons since late 2020 affecting both crop and livestock production; prices of maize are at high levels across the country due to reduced availability and high fuel prices inflating production and transportation costs; as the June–September 2022 dry season has started and forecasts point to a poor October–December 2022 “short‑rains” season, food insecurity conditions are expected to further deteriorate (2022)" } }, "Waste and recycling": { @@ -506,10 +506,10 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Victoria (shared with Tanzania and Uganda) - 62,940 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Turkana (shared with Ethiopia) - 6,400 sq km" } }, @@ -1064,10 +1064,10 @@ "text": "116,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1138,7 +1138,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Kenya’s telecom market continues to undergo considerable changes in the wake of increased competition, improved international connectivity, and rapid developments in the mobile market; the country is directly connected to a number of submarine cables, and with Mombasa as a landing point for LIT’s newly completed East and West Africa terrestrial network, the country serves as a key junction for onward connectivity to the Arabian states and the Far East; the additional internet capacity has meant that the cost of internet access has fallen dramatically in recent years, allowing services to be affordable to a far greater proportion of the population; numerous competitors are rolling out national and metropolitan backbone networks and wireless access networks to deliver services to population centers across the country; several fiber infrastructure sharing agreements have been forged, and as a result the number of fiber broadband connections has increased sharply in recent years; much of the progress in the broadband segment is due to the government’s revised national broadband strategy, which has been updated with goals through to 2030, and which are largely dependent on mobile broadband platforms based on LTE and 5G (2022)" + "text": "Kenya’s telecom market continues to undergo considerable changes in the wake of increased competition, improved international connectivity, and rapid developments in the mobile market; the country is directly connected to a number of submarine cables, and with Mombasa through a terrestrial network, the country serves as a key junction for onward connectivity to the Arabian states and the Far East; numerous competitors are rolling out national and metropolitan backbone networks and wireless access networks to deliver services to population centers across the country; several fiber infrastructure sharing agreements have been forged, and as a result the number of fiber broadband connections has increased sharply in recent years; much of the progress in the broadband segment is due to the government’s revised national broadband strategy, which has been updated with goals through to 2030, and which are largely dependent on mobile broadband platforms based on LTE and 5G (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line subscriptions stand at less than 1 per 100 persons; multiple providers in the mobile-cellular segment of the market fostering a boom in mobile-cellular telephone usage with teledensity reaching 114 per 100 persons (2020)" @@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@ }, "Transnational Issues": { "Disputes - international": { - "text": "

as of March 2022, Kenya provides shelter to nearly 548,000 refugees and asylum seekers, including Ugandans who flee across the border periodically to seek protection from Lord's Resistance Army rebels

Kenya-Ethiopia: their border was demarcated in the 1950s and approved in 1970; in 2012, Kenya and Ethiopia agreed to redemarcate their boundary following disputes over beacons and crossborder crime

Kenya-Somalia: Kenya works hard to prevent the clan and militia fighting in Somalia from spreading across the border, which has long been open to nomadic pastoralists; in 2021, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave Somalia control over a disputed ocean area where the seabeds are believed to hold vasts oil and gas deposits; the ICJ ruling gives Somalia the rights to several offshore oil exploration blocks previously claimed by Kenya; Kenya did not recognize the court’s decision

Kenya-South Sudan: two thirds of the boundary that separates Kenya and South Sudan's sovereignty known as the Ilemi Triangle has been unclear since British colonial times; Kenya has administered the area since colonial times; officials from Kenya and South Sudan signed a M.o.U. on boundary delimitation and demarcation and agreed to set up a joint committee; as of July 2019, the demarcation process was to begin in 90 days, but was delayed due to a lack of funding

Kenya-Sudan: Kenya served as an important mediator in brokering Sudan's north-south separation in February 2005

Kenya-Tanzania: Kenya and Tanzania were conducting a joint reaffirmation process in November 2021 to ensure the border was visibly marked with pillars

Kenya-Uganda: Kenya and Uganda began a joint demarcation of the boundary in 2021 

 

" + "text": "

Kenya-Ethiopia: their border was demarcated in the 1950s and approved in 1970; in 2012, Kenya and Ethiopia agreed to redemarcate their boundary following disputes over beacons and cross-border crime

Kenya-Somalia: Kenya works hard to prevent the clan and militia fighting in Somalia from spreading across the border, which has long been open to nomadic pastoralists; in 2021, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave Somalia control over a disputed ocean area where the seabeds are believed to hold vasts oil and gas deposits; the ICJ ruling gave Somalia the rights to several offshore oil exploration blocks previously claimed by Kenya; Kenya did not recognize the court’s decision

Kenya-South Sudan: two thirds of the boundary that separates Kenya and South Sudan's sovereignty known as the Ilemi Triangle has been unclear since British colonial times; Kenya has administered the area since colonial times; officials from Kenya and South Sudan signed a memorandum of understanding on boundary delimitation and demarcation and agreed to set up a joint committee; as of July 2019, the demarcation process was to begin in 90 days, but was delayed due to a lack of funding

Kenya-Sudan: Kenya served as an important mediator in brokering Sudan's north-south separation in February 2005

Kenya-Tanzania: Kenya and Tanzania were conducting a joint reaffirmation process in November 2021 to ensure the border was visibly marked with pillars

Kenya-Uganda: Kenya and Uganda began a joint demarcation of the boundary in 2021 

 

" }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { @@ -1333,7 +1333,7 @@ } }, "Illicit drugs": { - "text": "

a transit country for a variety of illicit drugs, including heroin and cocaine; transit location for precursor chemicals used to produce methamphetamine and other drugs; transshipment country for heroin from Southwest Asia destined for international markets, mainly Europe, and cocaine transits shipped through Ethiopia from South America;  cultivates cannabis and miraa (khat) for both local use and export

" + "text": "

a transit country for a variety of illicit drugs, including heroin and cocaine; transit location for precursor chemicals used to produce methamphetamine and other drugs; transshipment country for heroin from Southwest Asia destined for international markets, mainly Europe, and cocaine transits shipped through Ethiopia from South America; cultivates cannabis and miraa (khat) for both local use and export

" } } } \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/africa/li.json b/africa/li.json index d31b09e7..0f11046d 100644 --- a/africa/li.json +++ b/africa/li.json @@ -1010,10 +1010,10 @@ "text": "9,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/lt.json b/africa/lt.json index 303a31ff..0e8a35be 100644 --- a/africa/lt.json +++ b/africa/lt.json @@ -1014,10 +1014,10 @@ "text": "5,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/ly.json b/africa/ly.json index 9bbff4d1..350099dc 100644 --- a/africa/ly.json +++ b/africa/ly.json @@ -932,10 +932,10 @@ "text": "219,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "1,067,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "1,067,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "48.363 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/ma.json b/africa/ma.json index 7bae606a..83416fef 100644 --- a/africa/ma.json +++ b/africa/ma.json @@ -1027,10 +1027,10 @@ "text": "21,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/mi.json b/africa/mi.json index 69825bb3..0399e06c 100644 --- a/africa/mi.json +++ b/africa/mi.json @@ -86,10 +86,10 @@ "text": "740 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Malawi (shared with Mozambique and Tanzania) - 22,490" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Chilwa - 1,040 sq km" } }, @@ -504,10 +504,10 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Malawi (shared with Mozambique and Tanzania) - 22,490" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Chilwa - 1,040 sq km" } }, @@ -1042,10 +1042,10 @@ "text": "9,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/ml.json b/africa/ml.json index cde4e6d7..7d14c6e7 100644 --- a/africa/ml.json +++ b/africa/ml.json @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ "text": "3,780 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lac Faguibine - 590 sq km
note - the Niger River is the only source of water for the lake; in recent years the lake is dry" } }, @@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lac Faguibine - 590 sq km
note - the Niger River is the only source of water for the lake; in recent years the lake is dry" } }, @@ -1053,10 +1053,10 @@ "text": "37,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1232,8 +1232,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Malian Armed Forces (FAMA): Army (includes a riverine patrol force), Republic of Mali Air Force; National Gendarmerie; National Guard (2022)", - "note": "note 1: the Gendarmerie and the National Guard are under the authority of the Ministry of Defense and Veterans Affairs (Ministere De La Defense Et Des Anciens Combattants, MDAC), but operational control is shared with the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection

note 2: the Gendarmerie's primary mission is internal security and public order; its duties also include territorial defense, humanitarian operations, intelligence gathering, and protecting private property, mainly in rural areas; it also has a specialized border security unit

note 3: the National Guard is a military force responsible for providing security to government facilities and institutions, prison service, public order, humanitarian operations, some border security, and intelligence gathering; its forces include a camel corps for patrolling the deserts and borders of northern Mali

note 4: there are also pro-government militias operating in Mali, such as the Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (GATIA)" + "text": "Malian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Maliennes or FAMA): Army (includes a riverine patrol force), Republic of Mali Air Force; National Gendarmerie; National Guard (2022)", + "note": "note 1: the Gendarmerie and the National Guard are under the authority of the Ministry of Defense and Veterans Affairs (Ministere De La Defense Et Des Anciens Combattants, MDAC), but operational control is shared with the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection

note 2: the Gendarmerie's primary mission is internal security and public order; its duties also include territorial defense, humanitarian operations, intelligence gathering, and protecting private property, mainly in rural areas; it also has a specialized border security unit

note 3: the National Guard is a military force responsible for providing security to government facilities and institutions, prison service, public order, humanitarian operations, some border security, and intelligence gathering; its forces include a camel corps for patrolling the deserts and borders of northern Mali

note 4: there are also pro-government militias operating in Mali, such as the Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (GATIA); the leader of GATIA is also a general in the national army" }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2021": { diff --git a/africa/mo.json b/africa/mo.json index 97fe9f5f..ac7a84b3 100644 --- a/africa/mo.json +++ b/africa/mo.json @@ -1058,10 +1058,10 @@ "text": "307,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "700,000 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/mp.json b/africa/mp.json index 5f53c24b..438f85ad 100644 --- a/africa/mp.json +++ b/africa/mp.json @@ -967,10 +967,10 @@ "text": "36,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/mr.json b/africa/mr.json index 5ca983a0..c2475822 100644 --- a/africa/mr.json +++ b/africa/mr.json @@ -1051,10 +1051,10 @@ "text": "27,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "4,800 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "4,800 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "20 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/mz.json b/africa/mz.json index ad48b01e..055504c4 100644 --- a/africa/mz.json +++ b/africa/mz.json @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ "text": "1,180 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Malawi (shared with Malawi and Tanzania) - 22,490" } }, @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ "text": "Roman Catholic 27.2%, Muslim 18.9%, Zionist Christian 15.6%, Evangelical/Pentecostal 15.3%, Anglican 1.7%, other 4.8%, none 13.9%, unspecified 2.5% (2017 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "

Mozambique is a poor, sparsely populated country with high fertility and mortality rates and a rapidly growing youthful population – 45% of the population is younger than 15. Mozambique’s high poverty rate is sustained by natural disasters, disease, high population growth, low agricultural productivity, and the unequal distribution of wealth. The country’s birth rate is among the world’s highest, averaging around more than 5 children per woman (and higher in rural areas) for at least the last three decades. The sustained high level of fertility reflects gender inequality, low contraceptive use, early marriages and childbearing, and a lack of education, particularly among women. The high population growth rate is somewhat restrained by the country’s high HIV/AIDS and overall mortality rates. Mozambique ranks among the worst in the world for HIV/AIDS prevalence, HIV/AIDS deaths, and life expectancy at birth.

Mozambique is predominantly a country of emigration, but internal, rural-urban migration has begun to grow. Mozambicans, primarily from the country’s southern region, have been migrating to South Africa for work for more than a century. Additionally, approximately 1.7 million Mozambicans fled to Malawi, South Africa, and other neighboring countries between 1979 and 1992 to escape from civil war. Labor migrants have usually been men from rural areas whose crops have failed or who are unemployed and have headed to South Africa to work as miners; multiple generations of the same family often become miners. Since the abolition of apartheid in South Africa in 1991, other job opportunities have opened to Mozambicans, including in the informal and manufacturing sectors, but mining remains their main source of employment.

" + "text": "

Mozambique is a poor, sparsely populated country with high fertility and mortality rates and a rapidly growing youthful population – 45% of the population is younger than 15, as of 2022. Mozambique’s high poverty rate is sustained by natural disasters, disease, high population growth, low agricultural productivity, and the unequal distribution of wealth. The country’s birth rate is among the world’s highest, averaging around more than 5 children per woman (and higher in rural areas) for at least the last three decades. The sustained high level of fertility reflects gender inequality, low contraceptive use, early marriages and childbearing, and a lack of education, particularly among women. The high population growth rate is somewhat restrained by the country’s high HIV/AIDS and overall mortality rates. Mozambique ranks among the worst in the world for HIV/AIDS prevalence, HIV/AIDS deaths, and life expectancy at birth, as of 2022.

Mozambique is predominantly a country of emigration, but internal, rural-urban migration has begun to grow. Mozambicans, primarily from the country’s southern region, have been migrating to South Africa for work for more than a century. Additionally, approximately 1.7 million Mozambicans fled to Malawi, South Africa, and other neighboring countries between 1979 and 1992 to escape from civil war. Labor migrants have usually been men from rural areas whose crops have failed or who are unemployed and have headed to South Africa to work as miners; multiple generations of the same family often become miners. Since the abolition of apartheid in South Africa in 1991, other job opportunities have opened to Mozambicans, including in the informal and manufacturing sectors, but mining remains their main source of employment.

" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Malawi (shared with Malawi and Tanzania) - 22,490" } }, @@ -1058,10 +1058,10 @@ "text": "35,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/ng.json b/africa/ng.json index aad88a4c..00bb25cd 100644 --- a/africa/ng.json +++ b/africa/ng.json @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ "text": "1,000 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Chad (endorheic lake shared with Chad, Nigeria, and Cameroon) - 10,360-25,900 sq km
note - area varies by season and year to year" } }, @@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Chad (endorheic lake shared with Chad, Nigeria, and Cameroon) - 10,360-25,900 sq km
note - area varies by season and year to year" } }, @@ -1054,10 +1054,10 @@ "text": "13,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "150 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/ni.json b/africa/ni.json index e8e28414..ee005367 100644 --- a/africa/ni.json +++ b/africa/ni.json @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ "text": "2,930 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Chad (endorheic lake shared with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon) - 10,360-25,900 sq km
note - area varies by season and year to year" } }, @@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Chad (endorheic lake shared with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon) - 10,360-25,900 sq km
note - area varies by season and year to year" } }, @@ -1081,10 +1081,10 @@ "text": "483,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "1,889,100 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "1,889,100 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "36.89 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/od.json b/africa/od.json index 9a080a7f..4f75a314 100644 --- a/africa/od.json +++ b/africa/od.json @@ -873,10 +873,10 @@ "text": "12,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "126,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "126,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" } }, "Refined petroleum products - production": { @@ -936,7 +936,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Following a referendum, oil-rich South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011 and became an independent nation; having been deprived of investment for decades, it inherited one of the least developed telecom markets in the world; there was once investment activity among mobile network operators who sought to expand their networks in some areas of the country, but by late 2016 both Zain South Sudan and MTN South Sudan had cut back their work forces in a bid to save on operating costs, while their falling subscriber bases have strained revenue; Zain South Sudan in particular recorded considerable financial losses in 2015 and 2016; operators in the telecom sector placed themselves in survival mode and are hoping for a political settlement and a return to some degree of social stability; MTN as reported its financial data on the basis of South Sudan’s economy having been hyper inflationary since 2016; although MTN and Zain reported a significant fall in the number of mobile subscribers in 2017, with a consequent severe decline in revenue, both saw subscriber bases increase in 2018 as they absorbed customers which had migrated from VivaCell after that company was closed down for failing to pay back taxes; MTN South Sudan reported a 26.5% increase in the number of mobile subscribers in the year to September 2021; South Sudan has one of the lowest mobile penetration rates in Africa; growth in the sector in coming years is premised on a resolution to the political crisis and a recovery of the country’s economy; the virtually untapped internet and broadband market also depends to a large extent on the country gaining access to international fiber cables and on a national backbone network being in place; sophisticated infrastructure solutions are needed to reach the 80% of the population that live outside of the main urban centers; with a negligible rate of bank account ownership, mobile payment and banking solutions also have a strong potential once a reliable mobile infrastructure is built; some improvement has followed from the cable link completed by Liquid Telecom in February 2020 which connects Juba directly to the company’s submarine landing station at Mombasa; the cable was South Sudan’s first direct international fiber link, and has helped drive down the price of retail internet services for residential and business customers; a second cable linking to the border with Kenya was completed in December 2021. (2022)" + "text": "following a referendum, oil-rich South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011 and became an independent nation; having been deprived of investment for decades, it inherited one of the least developed telecom markets in the world; there was once investment activity among mobile network operators who sought to expand their networks in some areas of the country; operators in the telecom sector placed themselves in survival mode and are hoping for a political settlement and a return to some degree of social stability; South Sudan has one of the lowest mobile penetration rates in Africa; growth in the sector in coming years is premised on a resolution to the political crisis and a recovery of the country’s economy; the virtually untapped internet and broadband market also depends to a large extent on the country gaining access to international fiber cables and on a national backbone network being in place; sophisticated infrastructure solutions are needed to reach the 80% of the population that live outside of the main urban centers; some improvement has followed from the cable link in February 2020 which connects Juba directly to the company’s submarine landing station at Mombasa; the cable was South Sudan’s first direct international fiber link, and has helped drive down the price of retail internet services for residential and business customers; a second cable linking to the border with Kenya was completed in December 2021 (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line less than 1 per 100 subscriptions, mobile-cellular roughly 20 per 100 persons (2019)" diff --git a/africa/pu.json b/africa/pu.json index d4096a9c..579d70ac 100644 --- a/africa/pu.json +++ b/africa/pu.json @@ -947,10 +947,10 @@ "text": "2,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/rw.json b/africa/rw.json index 1441c480..767f8ed3 100644 --- a/africa/rw.json +++ b/africa/rw.json @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ "text": "96 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Kivu (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo) - 2,220 sq km" } }, @@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Kivu (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo) - 2,220 sq km" } }, @@ -1022,10 +1022,10 @@ "text": "8,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1093,7 +1093,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Rwanda was slow to liberalize the mobile sector, allowing MTN a monopoly until 2006 when the fixed-line incumbent, Rwandatel (since acquired by Liquid Intelligence Technologies) became the second mobile operator; there was effective competition among three operators after Tigo launched services in 2009; the acquisition of Tigo by Airtel saw a significant consolidation in the market, and the cancellation of Rwandatel’s license in 2011 resulted in the market becoming a duopoly between the dominant operator MTN and Airtel; the fixed broadband sector has suffered from limited fixed-line infrastructure and high prices; operators are rolling out national backbone networks which also allow them to connect to the international submarine cables on Africa’s east coast; these cables gave the entire region greater internet bandwidth and ended the dependency on satellites; Liquid Technologies has continued to expand its FttP services across Kigali and a number of other towns, while the country also has a new cable link with Tanzania, and via Tanzania’s national broadband backbone it has gained connectivity to the networks of several other countries in the region; the number of subscribers on LTE infrastructure has increased sharply, helped by national LTE coverage achieved in mid-2018; mobile remains the dominant platform for voice and data services; the regulator noted that the number of mobile subscribers increased 2.7% in 2021, year-on-year; there was a slight fall in the beginning of 2022, though this decline was entirely from Airtel. (2022)" + "text": "Rwanda was slow to liberalize the mobile sector; there was effective competition among three operators; the fixed broadband sector has suffered from limited fixed-line infrastructure and high prices; operators are rolling out national backbone networks which also allow them to connect to the international submarine cables on Africa’s east coast; these cables gave the entire region greater internet bandwidth and ended the dependency on satellites; while the country also has a new cable link with Tanzania, and via Tanzania’s national broadband backbone it has gained connectivity to the networks of several other countries in the region; the number of subscribers on LTE infrastructure has increased sharply, helped by national LTE coverage achieved in mid-2018; mobile remains the dominant platform for voice and data services; the regulator noted that the number of mobile subscribers increased 2.7% in 2021, year-on-year; there was a slight fall in the beginning of 2022 (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "the capital, Kigali, is connected to provincial centers by microwave radio relay, and recently by cellular telephone service; much of the network depends on wire and HF radiotelephone; fixed-line less than 1 per 100 and mobile-cellular telephone density has increased to nearly 82 telephones per 100 persons (2020)" @@ -1225,7 +1225,7 @@ "text": "2,450 (plus about 500 police) Central African Republic (approximately 1,700 for MINUSCA; an additional 750 troops sent separately under a bilateral agreement with CAR in August, 2021); up to 2,000 Mozambique (deployed mid-2021 under a bi-lateral agreement to assist with combating insurgency; includes both military and police forces); 2,600 (plus about 400 police) South Sudan (UNMISS) (2022)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "

the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) were established following independence in 1962; after the 1990-1994 civil war and genocide, the victorious Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front's military wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), became the country's military force; the RPA participated in the First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congolese Wars; the RPA was renamed the Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) in 2003, by which time it had assumed a more national character with the inclusion of many former Hutu officers as well as newly recruited soldiers

the RDF is widely regarded as one of Africa’s best trained and most capable and professional military forces; as of 2022, over 7,000 RDF and police personnel were deployed on missions in Africa

" + "text": "since 2021, Rwanda has deployed troops to the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to combat the rebel Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR); it has also been accused by the DRC Government of providing material support to the March 23 Movement (M23, aka Congolese Revolutionary Army) rebel group, which as of 2022 was fighting with DRC troops and UN peacekeeping forces

the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) were established following independence in 1962; after the 1990-1994 civil war and genocide, the victorious Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front's military wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), became the country's military force; the RPA participated in the First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congolese Wars; the RPA was renamed the Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) in 2003, by which time it had assumed a more national character with the inclusion of many former Hutu officers as well as newly recruited soldiers

the RDF is widely regarded as one of Africa’s best trained and most capable and professional military forces; as of 2022, over 7,000 RDF and police personnel were deployed on missions in Africa (2022)" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/africa/se.json b/africa/se.json index b5ad2298..ea2c5f6e 100644 --- a/africa/se.json +++ b/africa/se.json @@ -953,10 +953,10 @@ "text": "7,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/sf.json b/africa/sf.json index 3d958b8b..6eec76de 100644 --- a/africa/sf.json +++ b/africa/sf.json @@ -1055,10 +1055,10 @@ "text": "622,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "9,000 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "9,000 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "397,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "397,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "15 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1129,7 +1129,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "South Africa’s telecom sector boasts one of the most advanced infrastructures on the continent; there has been considerable investment from Telkom, Liquid Intelligence Technologies, Broadband InfraCo, and municipal providers as well as from mobile network operators, such as MTN and Vodacom, all aimed at improving network capabilities; in mid-2021, Vodacom Group announced plans to set up its own InfraCo, merging its own fiber assets with those belonging to two recent acquisitions; the focus in recent years has been on back haul capacity and on fiber and LTE networks to extend and improve internet service connectivity; with the ongoing migration to fiber, the incumbent telco Telkom expects to close down its copper network in 2024; the mobile sector has developed strongly in recent years, partly due to the poor availability and level of service of fixed-line networks, which meant that many people had no alternative to mobile networks for voice and data services; the multi-spectrum auction was delayed several times due to legal wrangling, and was finally held in March 2022; the delay caused difficulties for network operators, which were forced to reform spectrum for 3G and LTE use, and provide 5G services on temporary licenses; six qualified bidders acquired spectrum, netting the regulator ZAR14.4 billion in revenues; in February 2022, Vumatel also acquired a 45% non-controlling stake in HeroTel, a local FttP player as the telco seeks to strengthen its foothold in the South African fiber market; as of February 2022, HeroTel had passed 150,000 homes and businesses, with its internet services live in over 400 South African towns and cities; the market is shrugging off the impact of the pandemic, which had a significant impact on production and supply chains globally, and saw a slowdown in some network expansions, particularly around 5G; on the consumer side, spending on telecoms services and devices remains slightly under pressure amid ongoing macroeconomic challenges facing the country; the crucial nature of telecom services, both for general communication as well as a tool for home-working, will offset such pressures; in many markets the net effect should be a steady though reduced increase in subscriber growth. (2022)" + "text": "South Africa’s telecom sector boasts one of the most advanced infrastructures on the continent; the focus in recent years has been on back haul capacity and on fiber and LTE networks to extend and improve internet service connectivity; with the ongoing migration to fiber, the incumbent telco expects to close down its copper network in 2024; the mobile sector has developed strongly in recent years, partly due to the poor availability and level of service of fixed-line networks, which meant that many people had no alternative to mobile networks for voice and data services; the multi-spectrum auction was delayed several times due to legal wrangling, and was finally held in March 2022; the delay caused difficulties for network operators, which were forced to reform spectrum for 3G and LTE use, and provide 5G services on temporary licenses; six qualified bidders acquired spectrum, netting the regulator ZAR14.4 billion in revenues; the market is shrugging off the impact of the pandemic, which had a significant impact on production and supply chains globally, and saw a slowdown in some network expansions, particularly around 5G; on the consumer side, spending on telecoms services and devices remains slightly under pressure amid ongoing macroeconomic challenges facing the country; the crucial nature of telecom services, both for general communication as well as a tool for home-working, will offset such pressures; in many markets the net effect should be a steady though reduced increase in subscriber growth (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line over 3 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular nearly 162 telephones per 100 persons; consists of carrier-equipped open-wire lines, coaxial cables, microwave radio relay links, fiber-optic cable, radiotelephone communication stations, and wireless local loops; key centers are Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, and Pretoria (2020)" diff --git a/africa/sg.json b/africa/sg.json index c3ed87f3..5e09b605 100644 --- a/africa/sg.json +++ b/africa/sg.json @@ -1055,10 +1055,10 @@ "text": "57,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "20,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "20,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1129,7 +1129,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Senegal’s telecom market continues to show steady growth in all sectors; this has been supported by the particular demands made on consumers during the pandemic, which resulted in a particularly strong increase in the number of subscribers; the mobile subscriber base increased 6.7% in 2020, year-on-year, and by 4.1% in 2021, while the number of fixed broadband subscribers increased 17.5% year-on-year in 2021; mobile internet platforms account for the vast majority of all internet accesses; quality of service issues continue to plague the market, with the regulator periodically issuing fines to the market players; Orange Group’s local subsidiary Orange Senegal (Sonatel) remains the dominant player in both the fixed-line and mobile sectors; Free Senegal and Expresso Telecom provide effective competition, and though their relative market shares have been relatively stable since 2013, Free has more recently made some inroads to the share held by Expresso; this can partly be explained by the two-year delay in Expresso launching LTE services, and so losing new subscribers to its competitors; both Sonatel and Free continue to pilot 5G services in the country; Orange Senegal for some years held a near monopoly on the fixed-line, though moderate competition became effective after Expresso launched services as the second national operator in 2009; Expresso stopped investing in the sector, and it stopped providing fixed telephony services in September 2018; in February 2021, the regulator ordered the company to relaunch fixed telephony services, and so adhere to its license terms; By the following September it had signed up several thousand customers. (2022)" + "text": "Senegal’s telecom market continues to show steady growth in all sectors; this has been supported by the particular demands made on consumers during the pandemic, which resulted in a particularly strong increase in the number of subscribers; the mobile subscriber base increased 6.7% in 2020, year-on-year, and by 4.1% in 2021, while the number of fixed broadband subscribers increased 17.5% year-on-year in 2021; mobile internet platforms account for the vast majority of all internet accesses; quality of service issues continue to plague the market, with the regulator periodically issuing fines to the market players (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "generally reliable urban system with a fiber-optic network; about two-thirds of all fixed-line connections are in Dakar; mobile-cellular service is steadily displacing fixed-line service, even in urban areas; fixed-line roughly 1 per 100 and mobile-cellular 114 per 100 persons (2020)" diff --git a/africa/sh.json b/africa/sh.json index dd7f69ec..1d8c798a 100644 --- a/africa/sh.json +++ b/africa/sh.json @@ -669,10 +669,10 @@ "text": "100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/sl.json b/africa/sl.json index 8906a3a5..6b500b82 100644 --- a/africa/sl.json +++ b/africa/sl.json @@ -1015,10 +1015,10 @@ "text": "5,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "the telecom sector has only gradually recovered from the destruction caused during the war years, and only since 2019 has there been an effective terrestrial fiber backbone infrastructure, while the cable link to neighboring Guinea was not completed until February 2020; there is considerable available capacity from the ACE submarine cable and the national fiber network, but this is used inefficiently and so the price of internet connectivity remains one of the highest in the region; the theft of equipment and cabling, compounded by neglect, mismanagement, and under investment, means that telcos continue to operate in difficult conditions; this has led to the demise of some telcos, including Comium and Smart Mobile; the telecom regulator has made efforts to improve the market, including the liberalization of the international gateway and regular checks on QoS; the regulator reduced the price floor for mobile voice calls in early 2020, though consumers objected to the MNOs withdrawing a number of cheap packages as a response; the mobile sector has been the main driver of overall telecom revenue; there continues to be movement in the market, with Orange Group in mid-2016 having completed its acquisition of Bharti Airtel’s local unit and the Gambian telco QCell being awarded a license to operate mobile services. (2022)" + "text": "the telecom sector has only gradually recovered from the destruction caused during the war years, and only since 2019 has there been an effective terrestrial fiber backbone infrastructure, while the cable link to neighboring Guinea was not completed until February 2020; there is considerable available capacity from the ACE submarine cable and the national fiber network, but this is used inefficiently and so the price of internet connectivity remains one of the highest in the region; the theft of equipment and cabling, compounded by neglect, mismanagement, and under investment, means that telcos continue to operate in difficult conditions; the telecom regulator has made efforts to improve the market, including the liberalization of the international gateway and regular checks on QoS; the regulator reduced the price floor for mobile voice calls in early 2020, though consumers objected to the MNOs withdrawing a number of cheap packages as a response; the mobile sector has been the main driver of overall telecom revenue (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line 0 per 100 and mobile-cellular just over 86 per 100 (2020)" diff --git a/africa/so.json b/africa/so.json index cd483ffc..82995ba3 100644 --- a/africa/so.json +++ b/africa/so.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Ancient Egypt trade expeditions along the northeastern coast of Africa - including today's Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia - occurred at various times between the 25th and 12th centuries B.C. Between A.D. 800 and 1100, immigrant Muslim Arabs and Persians set up coastal trading posts along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, solidifying Somalia’s close trading relationship with the Arab Peninsula. In the late 19th century, Britain and Italy established colonies in the Somali Peninsula, where they remained until 1960, when British Somaliland gained independence and joined with Italian Somaliland to form the Republic of Somalia. The country functioned as a parliamentary democracy until 1969, when General Mohamed SIAD Barre took control in a coup, beginning a 22-year authoritarian socialist dictatorship. In an effort to centralize power, SIAD called for the eradication of the clan, the key cultural and social organizing principle in Somali society. Resistance to SIAD’s socialist leadership, which was causing a rapid deterioration of the country, prompted allied clan militias to overthrow SIAD in early 1991, resulting in state collapse. Subsequent fighting between rival clans for resources and territory overwhelmed the country, resulting in a manmade famine and prompting international intervention. Beginning in 1993, the UN spearheaded a humanitarian mission supported by international forces, but the international community largely withdrew by 1995 following Black Hawk Down - an incident in which two American Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down in Mogadishu, killing 21 international forces and wounding 82.

International peace conferences in the 2000s resulted in a number of transitional governments that operated outside of Somalia. Left largely to themselves, Somalis in the country established alternative governance structures; some areas formed their own administrations, such as Somaliland and Puntland, while others developed localized institutions. Many local populations turned to using sharia courts, an Islamic judicial system that implements religious law. Several of these courts came together in 2006 to form the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU established order in many areas of central and southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, but was forced out when Ethiopia intervened militarily in December 2006 on behalf of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). While the TFG settled in the capital, the ICU fled to rural areas or from Somalia altogether, reemerging less than a year later as the Islamic insurgent and terrorist movement al-Shabaab, which is still active today. In January 2007, the African Union (AU) established the AU Mission in Somalia peacekeeping force, which allowed Ethiopia to withdraw its forces, took over security responsibility for the country, and gave the TFG space to develop Somalia’s new government. By 2012, Somali powerbrokers agreed on a provisional constitution with a loose federal structure and established the central government in Mogadishu. Since then, four interim regional administrations have been established and there have been two presidential elections. However, significant and fundamental governance and security problems remain.

" + "text": "

Ancient Egypt trade expeditions along the northeastern coast of Africa - including today's Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia - occurred at various times between the 25th and 12th centuries B.C. Between A.D. 800 and 1100, immigrant Muslim Arabs and Persians set up coastal trading posts along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, solidifying Somalia’s close trading relationship with the Arab Peninsula. In the late 19th century, Britain and Italy established colonies in the Somali Peninsula, where they remained until 1960, when British Somaliland gained independence and joined with Italian Somaliland to form the Republic of Somalia. The country functioned as a parliamentary democracy until 1969, when General Mohamed SIAD Barre took control in a coup, beginning a 22-year authoritarian socialist dictatorship. In an effort to centralize power, SIAD called for the eradication of the clan, the key cultural and social organizing principle in Somali society. Resistance to SIAD’s socialist leadership, which was causing a rapid deterioration of the country, prompted allied clan militias to overthrow SIAD in early 1991, resulting in state collapse. Subsequent fighting between rival clans for resources and territory overwhelmed the country, resulting in a manmade famine and prompting international intervention. Beginning in 1993, the UN spearheaded a humanitarian mission supported by international forces, but the international community largely withdrew by 1995 following an incident that became known as Black Hawk Down in which two American Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down in Mogadishu. The fighting and subsequent siege and rescue resulted in 21 deaths and 82 wounded among the international forces.

International peace conferences in the 2000s resulted in a number of transitional governments that operated outside of Somalia. Left largely to themselves, Somalis in the country established alternative governance structures; some areas formed their own administrations, such as Somaliland and Puntland, while others developed localized institutions. Many local populations turned to using sharia courts, an Islamic judicial system that implements religious law. Several of these courts came together in 2006 to form the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU established order in many areas of central and southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, but was forced out when Ethiopia intervened militarily in December 2006 on behalf of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). While the TFG settled in the capital, the ICU fled to rural areas or from Somalia altogether, reemerging less than a year later as the Islamic insurgent and terrorist movement al-Shabaab, which is still active today. In January 2007, the African Union (AU) established the AU Mission in Somalia peacekeeping force, which allowed Ethiopia to withdraw its forces, took over security responsibility for the country, and gave the TFG space to develop Somalia’s new government. By 2012, Somali powerbrokers agreed on a provisional constitution with a loose federal structure and established a central government in Mogadishu termed the Somali Federal Government (SFG). Since then, several interim regional administrations have been established and there have been two presidential elections. However, significant and fundamental governance and security problems remain for the SFG since al-Shabaab controls large portions of the country.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ "text": "Sunni Muslim (Islam) (official, according to the 2012 Transitional Federal Charter)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "

Somalia scores very low for most humanitarian indicators, suffering from poor governance, protracted internal conflict, underdevelopment, economic decline, poverty, social and gender inequality, and environmental degradation. Despite civil war and famine raising its mortality rate, Somalia’s high fertility rate and large proportion of people of reproductive age maintain rapid population growth, with each generation being larger than the prior one. More than 60% of Somalia’s population is younger than 25, and the fertility rate is among the world’s highest at almost 6 children per woman – a rate that has decreased little since the 1970s.

A lack of educational and job opportunities is a major source of tension for Somalia’s large youth cohort, making them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist and pirate groups. Somalia has one of the world’s lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school – and one of world’s highest youth unemployment rates. Life expectancy is low as a result of high infant and maternal mortality rates, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition, and inadequate health services.

During the two decades of conflict that followed the fall of the SIAD regime in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes. Today Somalia is the world’s third highest source country for refugees, after Syria and Afghanistan. Insecurity, drought, floods, food shortages, and a lack of economic opportunities are the driving factors.

As of 2016, more than 1.1 million Somali refugees were hosted in the region, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, while more than 1.1 million Somalis were internally displaced. Since the implementation of a tripartite voluntary repatriation agreement among Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR in 2013, nearly 40,000 Somali refugees have returned home from Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camp – still houses to approximately 260,000 Somalis. The flow sped up rapidly after the Kenyan Government in May 2016 announced its intention to close the camp, worsening security and humanitarian conditions in receiving communities in south-central Somalia. Despite the conflict in Yemen, thousands of Somalis and other refugees and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa risk their lives crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen and beyond (often Saudi Arabia). Bossaso in Puntland overtook Obock, Djibouti, as the primary departure point in mid-2014.

" + "text": "

Somalia scores very low for most humanitarian indicators, suffering from poor governance, protracted internal conflict, underdevelopment, economic decline, poverty, social and gender inequality, and environmental degradation. Despite civil war and famine raising its mortality rate, Somalia’s high fertility rate and large proportion of people of reproductive age maintain rapid population growth, with each generation being larger than the prior one. More than 60% of Somalia’s population is younger than 25, and the fertility rate is among the world’s highest at almost 6 children per woman – a rate that has decreased little since the 1970s.

A lack of educational and job opportunities is a major source of tension for Somalia’s large youth cohort, making them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist and pirate groups. Somalia has one of the world’s lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school – and one of world’s highest youth unemployment rates. Life expectancy is low as a result of high infant and maternal mortality rates, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition, and inadequate health services.

During the two decades of conflict that followed the fall of the SIAD regime in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes. Today Somalia is the world’s fourth highest source country for refugees, after Ukraine, Syria and Afghanistan. Insecurity, drought, floods, food shortages, and a lack of economic opportunities are the driving factors.

As of 2022, more than 660,000 Somali refugees were hosted in the region, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, while nearly 3 million Somalis were internally displaced. Since the implementation of a tripartite voluntary repatriation agreement among Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR in 2013, nearly 40,000 Somali refugees have returned home from Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camp – still houses to approximately 260,000 Somalis. The flow sped up rapidly after the Kenyan Government in May 2016 announced its intention to close the camp, worsening security and humanitarian conditions in receiving communities in south-central Somalia. Despite the conflict in Yemen, thousands of Somalis and other refugees and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa risk their lives crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen and beyond (often Saudi Arabia). Bossaso in Puntland overtook Obock, Djibouti, as the primary departure point in mid-2014.

" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -933,10 +933,10 @@ "text": "5,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Somalia’s economic difficulties in recent years have made it difficult for telcos and the government to sustain investment in infrastructure; the government has also had to contend with militant groups which continue on occasion to force the closure of internet services in many areas of the country; in recent years, though, the government has addressed the lack of guidance which had prevailed since 1991, when a dictatorial regime was overthrown; the National Communications Law was passed in October 2017, aimed at setting a legal and regulatory framework for the telecoms sector, while provision was made in the following year to set up a regulatory authority to oversee the telecom sector; more recently, three types of licenses were mandated to provide clarity to operators, and to bring the market closer into line with international standards; all operators were given until August 2020 to secure one of the three license types; given the poor condition of fixed-line infrastructure, operators have concentrated on mobile connectivity; their investment plans have involved the development of LTE services to provide mobile data and broadband services; the telecom market has flourished; tariffs are among the lowest in Africa, and new cable systems coming on stream in the next few years (providing additional connectivity to Asia and Europe), as well as planned investments from local operators to bolster the country’s national fiber backbone, will lead to downward pressure on retail pricing; on the consumer side, spending on telecoms services and devices are under pressure from the financial effect of large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes as the remnants of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic remain and as global events, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, continue to play out; the market is continuing a positive growth trajectory, supported by a slow economic rebound in the country. (2022)" + "text": "Somalia’s economic difficulties in recent years have made it difficult for telcos and the government to sustain investment in infrastructure; the government has also had to contend with militant groups which continue on occasion to force the closure of internet services in many areas of the country; in recent years, though, the government has addressed the lack of guidance which had prevailed since 1991, when a dictatorial regime was overthrown; the National Communications Law was passed in October 2017, aimed at setting a legal and regulatory framework for the telecoms sector, while provision was made in the following year to set up a regulatory authority to oversee the telecom sector; more recently, three types of licenses were mandated to provide clarity to operators, and to bring the market closer into line with international standards; all operators were given until August 2020 to secure one of the three license types; given the poor condition of fixed-line infrastructure, operators have concentrated on mobile connectivity; their investment plans have involved the development of LTE services to provide mobile data and broadband services; the telecom market has flourished; tariffs are among the lowest in Africa, and new cable systems coming on stream in the next few years, as well as planned investments from local operators to bolster the country’s national fiber backbone, will lead to downward pressure on retail pricing; on the consumer side, spending on telecoms services and devices are under pressure from the financial effect of large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes as the remnants of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic remain and as global events, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, continue to play out; the market is continuing a positive growth trajectory, supported by a slow economic rebound in the country (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "seven networks compete for customers in the mobile sector; some of these mobile-service providers offer fixed-lines and Internet services; fixed-line is 0 per 100 and mobile-cellular roughly 51 per 100 (2019)" @@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ "text": "9,208 (Yemen) (2022)" }, "IDPs": { - "text": "2.968 million (civil war since 1988, clan-based competition for resources; 2011 famine; insecurity because of fighting between al-Shabaab and the Transitional Federal Government's allied forces) (2022)" + "text": "2.968 million (civil war since 1988, clan-based competition for resources; famine; insecurity because of fighting between al-Shabaab and the Transitional Federal Government's allied forces) (2022)" } } } diff --git a/africa/su.json b/africa/su.json index a6628091..ba6502d6 100644 --- a/africa/su.json +++ b/africa/su.json @@ -1022,10 +1022,10 @@ "text": "137,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "12,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "12,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "9,000 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "9,000 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "5 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/to.json b/africa/to.json index 156da215..d1ead9f2 100644 --- a/africa/to.json +++ b/africa/to.json @@ -1041,10 +1041,10 @@ "text": "10,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/tp.json b/africa/tp.json index 1daf6ae1..465be7f0 100644 --- a/africa/tp.json +++ b/africa/tp.json @@ -988,10 +988,10 @@ "text": "1,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/ts.json b/africa/ts.json index 1ebce120..152c3653 100644 --- a/africa/ts.json +++ b/africa/ts.json @@ -993,10 +993,10 @@ "text": "107,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "29,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "29,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "10,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "10,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "425 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/tz.json b/africa/tz.json index bdb9371a..b27fa8ec 100644 --- a/africa/tz.json +++ b/africa/tz.json @@ -92,10 +92,10 @@ "text": "1,840 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Victoria (shared with Uganda and Kenya) - 62,940 sq km; Lake Tanganyika (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, and Zambia) - 32,000 sq km; Lake Malawi (shared with Mozambique and Malawi) - 22,490" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Rukwa - 5,760 sq km" } }, @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ "note": "note: Zanzibar is almost entirely Muslim" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "

Tanzania has the largest population in East Africa and the lowest population density; almost a third of the population is urban. Tanzania’s youthful population – about two-thirds of the population is under 25 – is growing rapidly because of the high total fertility rate of 4.8 children per woman. Progress in reducing the birth rate has stalled, sustaining the country’s nearly 3% annual growth. The maternal mortality rate has improved since 2000, yet it remains very high because of early and frequent pregnancies, inadequate maternal health services, and a lack of skilled birth attendants – problems that are worse among poor and rural women. Tanzania has made strides in reducing under-5 and infant mortality rates, but a recent drop in immunization threatens to undermine gains in child health. Malaria is a leading killer of children under 5, while HIV is the main source of adult mortality

For Tanzania, most migration is internal, rural to urban movement, while some temporary labor migration from towns to plantations takes place seasonally for harvests. Tanzania was Africa’s largest refugee-hosting country for decades, hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Great Lakes region, primarily Burundi, over the last fifty years. However, the assisted repatriation and naturalization of tens of thousands of Burundian refugees between 2002 and 2014 dramatically reduced the refugee population. Tanzania is increasingly a transit country for illegal migrants from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region who are heading to southern Africa for security reasons and/or economic opportunities. Some of these migrants choose to settle in Tanzania.

" + "text": "

Tanzania has the largest population in East Africa and the lowest population density; almost a third of the population is urban. Tanzania’s youthful population – about two-thirds of the population is under 25 – is growing rapidly because of the high total fertility rate of 4.4 children per woman, as of 2022. Progress in reducing the birth rate has stalled, sustaining the country’s nearly 3% annual growth. The maternal mortality rate has improved since 2000, yet it remains very high because of early and frequent pregnancies, inadequate maternal health services, and a lack of skilled birth attendants – problems that are worse among poor and rural women. Tanzania has made strides in reducing under-5 and infant mortality rates, but a recent drop in immunization threatens to undermine gains in child health. Malaria is a leading killer of children under 5, while HIV is the main source of adult mortality

For Tanzania, most migration is internal, rural to urban movement, while some temporary labor migration from towns to plantations takes place seasonally for harvests. Tanzania was Africa’s largest refugee-hosting country for decades, hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Great Lakes region, primarily Burundi, over the last fifty years. However, the assisted repatriation and naturalization of tens of thousands of Burundian refugees between 2002 and 2014 dramatically reduced the refugee population. Tanzania is increasingly a transit country for illegal migrants from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region who are heading to southern Africa for security reasons and/or economic opportunities. Some of these migrants choose to settle in Tanzania.

" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -524,10 +524,10 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Victoria (shared with Uganda and Kenya) - 62,940 sq km; Lake Tanganyika (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, and Zambia) - 32,000 sq km; Lake Malawi (shared with Mozambique and Malawi) - 22,490" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Rukwa - 5,760 sq km" } }, @@ -1063,10 +1063,10 @@ "text": "52,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1134,10 +1134,10 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Tanzania’s telecom services are being developed to reach parity with more advanced networks from neighboring countries such as Kenya and fierce competition exists amongst Tanzania's 5 major mobile network operators; one fixed-line operator with competition in mobile networks; high tariffs on telecom; mobile use remains popular, with the government subsidizing expansion of mobile networks into rural communities; most mobile networks rely on older 2G and 3G technology with 4G/LTE service available in urban centers; the government is currently testing 5G technology and plans to begin rolling out 5G service in 2024; the government continues to improve rural telecom infrastructure including work on a national fiber backbone network connecting the entire population; in late 2021, the government announced plans to extend the national backbone network from about 8,300km to 15,000km by 2023, and to provide ongoing connectivity to more countries in the region (2022)" + "text": "Tanzania’s telecom sector enjoys effective competition, particularly in the mobile segment; the government has encouraged foreign participation to promote economic growth and social development, and policy reforms have led to the country having one of the most liberal telecom sectors in Africa; the government has sought to increase broadband penetration by a range of measures, including the reduction in VAT charged on the sale of smartphones and other devices, and reductions in the cost of data; the MNOs became the leading ISPs following the launch of mobile broadband services based on 3G and LTE technologies; operators are hoping for revenue growth in the mobile data services market, given that the voice market is almost entirely prepaid; the MNOs have invested in network upgrades, which in turn has supported m-mobile data use, as well as m-money transfer services and banking services. Together, these have become a fast-developing source of revenue; the landing of the first international submarine cables in the country some years ago revolutionized the telecom market, which up to that point had entirely depended on expensive satellite connections; the government aims to complete a national fiber backbone network, having signed an agreement; in late 2021, the government announced plans to extend the national backbone network from about 8,300km to 15,000km by 2023, and to provide ongoing connectivity to more countries in the region (2022)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "fixed-line telephone network inadequate with less than 1 connection per 100 persons; mobile-cellular service, aided by multiple providers, is increasing rapidly and exceeds 82 telephones per 100 persons; trunk service provided by open-wire, microwave radio relay, tropospheric scatter, and fiber-optic cable; some links being made digital (2019)" + "text": "fixed-line telephone network inadequate with less than 1 connection per 100 persons; mobile-cellular service, aided by multiple providers, is increasing rapidly and exceeds 86 telephones per 100 persons; trunk service provided by open-wire, microwave radio relay, tropospheric scatter, and fiber-optic cable; some links being made digital (2020)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 255; landing points for the EASSy, SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia, and SEAS fiber-optic submarine cable system linking East Africa with the Middle East; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (1 Indian Ocean, 1 Atlantic Ocean) (2019)" diff --git a/africa/ug.json b/africa/ug.json index 7017b01e..3a36952c 100644 --- a/africa/ug.json +++ b/africa/ug.json @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ "text": "140 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Victoria (shared with Tanzania and Kenya) - 62,940 sq km; Lake Albert (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo) - 5,590 sq km; Lake Kyoga - 4,430 sq km; Lake Edward (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo) - 2,150 sq km" } }, @@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Victoria (shared with Tanzania and Kenya) - 62,940 sq km; Lake Albert (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo) - 5,590 sq km; Lake Kyoga - 4,430 sq km; Lake Edward (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo) - 2,150 sq km" } }, @@ -1055,10 +1055,10 @@ "text": "40,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "2.5 billion barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1273,7 +1273,8 @@ "text": "18-25 years of age for voluntary military duty for men and women; 18-30 for those with degrees/diplomas in specialized fields such as medicine, engineering, chemistry, and education, or possess qualifications in some vocational skills; 9-year service obligation (2022)" }, "Military deployments": { - "text": "6,800 Somalia (6,200 ATMIS; 625 UNSOM); 250 Equatorial Guinea (training mission) (2022)" + "text": "6,800 Somalia (6,200 ATMIS; 625 UNSOM); 250 Equatorial Guinea (training mission) (2022)", + "note": "note: in December 2021, Uganda sent an undetermined number of troops into the Democratic Republic of the Congo to combat rebels from the Alliance of Democratic Front (ADF) group" }, "Military - note": { "text": "the UPDF, which is constitutionally granted seats in parliament, is widely viewed as a key constituency for MUSEVENI; it has been used by MUSEVENI and his political party to break up rallies, raid opposition offices, and surveil rival candidates

as of 2022, the UPDF was conducting operations along the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (including cross-border operations) against a Congo-based (and formerly based in western Uganda) Ugandan rebel group, the Allied Democratic Front (ADF), which was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US in March 2021 as the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISIS-DRC; see Appendix T); in addition, elements of the UPDF were deployed in the northeast region of Karamoja against cattle rustlers and criminal gangs

beginning in 2012, the UPDF led regional efforts to pursue the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a small, violent group of Ugandan origin that conducted widespread attacks against civilians in much of Central Africa; the UPDF withdrew from the mission in 2017 after declaring that the LRA no longer posed a security threat; Uganda intervened in the South Sudan civil war in 2013-2016 and UPDF forces have clashed with South Sudanese forces along the border as recently as 2020

the military traces its history back to the formation of the Uganda Rifles in 1895 under the British colonial government; the Uganda Rifles were merged with the Central Africa Regiment and the East Africa Rifles to form the King’s African Rifles (KAR) in 1902, which participated in both world wars, as well as the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya (1952-1960); in 1962, the Ugandan battalion of the KAR was transformed into the country's first military force, the Uganda Rifles, which was subsequently renamed the Uganda Army; the Uganda People's Defense Force was established in 1995 from the former rebel National Resistance Army following the enactment of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda (2022)" diff --git a/africa/uv.json b/africa/uv.json index 4bfcd173..c19192bc 100644 --- a/africa/uv.json +++ b/africa/uv.json @@ -1038,10 +1038,10 @@ "text": "30,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1112,7 +1112,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Burkina Faso’s telecom sector in recent years has made some gains in providing the necessary infrastructure and bandwidth to support telecom services; an IXP completed in September 2020 increased international bandwidth capacity by a third, while in mid-2021 the government was able to start the second phase of a national fiber backbone project; this will link the capital city to an addition 145 municipalities, and provide additional connectivity to terrestrial cables in neighboring countries; this new infrastructure is also making it possible for the government to trial tele medicine, and so address the very poor availability of medical services in almost all parts of the country; the activities of the militants in side areas of the country jeopardize overall security, and render it difficult for the telcos to safeguard their networks and equipment; Burkina Faso joins G5 Sahel countries to eliminate roaming fees (2022)" + "text": "Burkina Faso’s telecom sector in recent years has made some gains in providing the necessary infrastructure and bandwidth to support telecom services; an IXP completed in September 2020 increased international bandwidth capacity by a third, while in mid-2021 the government was able to start the second phase of a national fiber backbone project; this will link the capital city to an addition 145 municipalities, and provide additional connectivity to terrestrial cables in neighboring countries; the activities of the militants in side areas of the country jeopardize overall security, and render it difficult for the telcos to safeguard their networks and equipment; Burkina Faso joins G5 Sahel countries to eliminate roaming fees (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line connections stand at less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular usage nearly 106 per 100, with multiple providers there is competition and the hope for growth from a low base; Internet penetration is 16% (2020)" diff --git a/africa/wa.json b/africa/wa.json index 22cc9160..86d8d4d1 100644 --- a/africa/wa.json +++ b/africa/wa.json @@ -1042,10 +1042,10 @@ "text": "26,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/wz.json b/africa/wz.json index 09112396..f576e971 100644 --- a/africa/wz.json +++ b/africa/wz.json @@ -993,10 +993,10 @@ "text": "6,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/za.json b/africa/za.json index d47d525c..837b3928 100644 --- a/africa/za.json +++ b/africa/za.json @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ "text": "1,560 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Tanganyika (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and Burundi) - 32,000 sq km; Lake Mweru (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo) - 4,350 sq km; Lake Bangweulu - 4,000-15,000 sq km seasonal variation" } }, @@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Tanganyika (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and Burundi) - 32,000 sq km; Lake Mweru (shared with Democratic Republic of Congo) - 4,350 sq km; Lake Bangweulu - 4,000-15,000 sq km seasonal variation" } }, @@ -1048,10 +1048,10 @@ "text": "25,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "12,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "12,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/africa/zi.json b/africa/zi.json index ad02af92..f008e436 100644 --- a/africa/zi.json +++ b/africa/zi.json @@ -1036,10 +1036,10 @@ "text": "27,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/antarctica/ay.json b/antarctica/ay.json index aaf10197..dabb989a 100644 --- a/antarctica/ay.json +++ b/antarctica/ay.json @@ -156,10 +156,10 @@ "text": "100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "local systems at some research stations (2019)" + "text": "scientists with the United States Antarctic Program at McMurdo Station have now got their hands on a Starlink terminal of their own, where it is said to be improving connectivity as they carry out their research; this was made possible through laser links between the SpaceX satellites in orbit that eliminate the need for ground stations at the poles, and makes Antarctica the seventh and final continent to receive Starlink internet coverage (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "commercial cellular networks operating in a small number of locations (2019)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/aq.json b/australia-oceania/aq.json index 9002a360..eeb443af 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/aq.json +++ b/australia-oceania/aq.json @@ -732,10 +732,10 @@ "text": "2,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -806,10 +806,10 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "good telex, telegraph, facsimile, and cellular telephone services; one of the most complete and modern telecommunications systems in the South Pacific Islands; all inhabited islands have telephone connectivity" + "text": "American Samoa Telecommunications Authority, ASTCA, supplies telecommunication services to the residents of the American Samoan islands, a territory of the United States, which are found in a remote area of the Pacific Ocean; the primary system between the islands consists of fiber-optic cables and satellite connections; over Independence Day weekend 2021, the undersea fiber-optic cable linking the Tutuila and Manu’a Islands failed, completely stranding the Manu’a Islands from all telecommunication services; telecommunication services were restored to the people of Manu’a islands through microwave link between Tutuila to the Manu’a Islands; the link is now providing a steady 1Gbps backhaul most of the time of the year with 600Mbps at four 9’s availability, over this extremely long distance (2022)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "nearly 18 per 100 fixed-line teledensity, domestic satellite system with 1 Comsat earth station (2018)" + "text": "nearly 18 per 100 fixed-line teledensity (2020)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 1-684; landing points for the ASH, Southern Cross NEXT and Hawaiki  providing connectivity to New Zealand, Australia, American Samoa, Hawaii, California, and SAS connecting American Samoa with Samoa; satellite earth station - 1 (Intelsat-Pacific Ocean) (2019)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/as.json b/australia-oceania/as.json index cb7ba0ce..245c71ec 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/as.json +++ b/australia-oceania/as.json @@ -95,10 +95,10 @@ "text": "25,460 sq km (2014)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Alexandrina - 570 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Eyre - 9,690 sq km; Lake Torrens (ephemeral) - 5,780 sq km; Lake Gairdner - 4,470 sq km; Lake Mackay (ephemeral) - 3,494 sq km; Lake Frome - 2,410 sq km; Lake Amadeus (ephemeral) - 1,032 sq km" } }, @@ -479,10 +479,10 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Alexandrina - 570 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Eyre - 9,690 sq km; Lake Torrens (ephemeral) - 5,780 sq km; Lake Gairdner - 4,470 sq km; Lake Mackay (ephemeral) - 3,494 sq km; Lake Frome - 2,410 sq km; Lake Amadeus (ephemeral) - 1,032 sq km" } }, @@ -1028,10 +1028,10 @@ "text": "1,174,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "197,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "197,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "356,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "356,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "2.446 billion barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1105,7 +1105,7 @@ "text": "the Australian telecom market since 2020 has been impacted by the pandemic, which forced many people to school and work from home and thus adopt fixed-line broadband services; internet traffic, both fixed and mobile, increased substantially as a result; in the fixed sector, there is an ongoing migration from copper-based platforms to fiber; the extension of fixed wireless access will mean that up to 120,000 premises currently dependent on satellite broadband will be able to access 5G-based fixed services; the fixed-line market has been falling steadily over the past five years; in the Australian fixed broadband market, there is a dynamic shift among customers to fiber networks; the DSL sector is steadily shrinking while subscribers on HFC infrastructure will continue to be provided by existing cable, with a steady migration to full fiber connectivity (2022)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "roughly 24 per 100 fixed-line and 108 per 100 mobile-cellular; more subscribers to mobile services than there are people; 90% of all mobile device sales are now smartphones, growth in mobile traffic brisk (2020)" + "text": "24 per 100 fixed-line telephone subscriptions and 108 per 100 mobile-cellular; more subscribers to mobile services than there are people; 90% of all mobile device sales are now smartphones, growth in mobile traffic brisk (2020)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 61; landing points for more than 20 submarine cables including: the SeaMeWe-3 optical telecommunications submarine cable with links to Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; the INDIGO-Central, INDIGO West and ASC, North West Cable System, Australia-Papua New Guinea cable, CSCS, PPC-1, Gondwana-1, SCCN, Hawaiki, TGA, Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2, JGA-S, with links to other Australian cities, New Zealand and many countries in southeast Asia, US and Europe; the H2 Cable, AJC, Telstra Endeavor, Southern Cross NEXT with links to Japan, Hong Kong, and other Pacific Ocean countries as well as the US; satellite earth stations - 10 Intelsat (4 Indian Ocean and 6 Pacific Ocean), 2 Inmarsat, 2 Globalstar, 5 other (2019)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/bp.json b/australia-oceania/bp.json index fbc66a81..197c1263 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/bp.json +++ b/australia-oceania/bp.json @@ -951,10 +951,10 @@ "text": "2,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1025,7 +1025,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "mobile services have continually expanded in the Solomon Islands; 3G services became available in 2010, leading to an increase in mobile broadband uptake; Solomon Islands currently host three ISPs: Solomon Telekom, Bmobile and SATSOL; fixed broadband services are largely limited to government, corporations, and educational organizations in the Solomon Islands; telecommunication infrastructure in the Solomon Islands requires significant investment due to the geographical make-up of the islands; this presents a great challenge to rural connectivity in the country; although various international organizations such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have taken a special interest in having communication services improved in both the Solomon Islands and the Pacific region in general, internet and broadband penetration remain low; the provision of broadband infrastructure, particularly to rural areas, is also hindered by land disputes; internet services have, improved with the build-out of the Coral Sea Cable System linking Papua New Guinea to the Solomon Islands, as also with a connecting cable to a landing station at Sydney; the Australian government provided most of the funding for the Coral Sea Cable System, with contributions and support from the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea governments; the launch of the Kacific-1 satellite in late 2019 also improved broadband satellite capacity for the region, though for telcos in Solomon Islands satellite services are now largely used as backup for international traffic; in recent years, the country has stabilized both politically and economically and this, along with improvements to mobile infrastructure, has led to a rise in mobile services and the slow uptake of broadband services; while the first LTE services were launched in late 2017 in the capital Honiara, the main platform for mobile voice and data services remains 3G, while in outlying areas GSM is still an important technology for the provision of services; geopolitical concerns have also come to the fore as the government pursues stronger ties with China; this is a growing source of tension with Australia, which is the Solomon Islands’ largest aid donor; in April 2022, the country signed a security agreement with China, although the full details of the agreement have not been published. (2022)" + "text": "mobile services have continually expanded in the Solomon Islands; 3G services became available in 2010, leading to an increase in mobile broadband uptake; Solomon Islands currently host three ISPs; fixed broadband services are largely limited to government, corporations, and educational organizations in the Solomon Islands; telecommunication infrastructure in the Solomon Islands requires significant investment due to the geographical make-up of the islands; this presents a great challenge to rural connectivity in the country; although various international organizations such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have taken a special interest in having communication services improved in both the Solomon Islands and the Pacific region in general, internet and broadband penetration remain low; the provision of broadband infrastructure, particularly to rural areas, is also hindered by land disputes; internet services have, improved with the build-out of the Coral Sea Cable System linking Papua New Guinea to the Solomon Islands, as also with a connecting cable to a landing station at Sydney; the Australian government provided most of the funding for the Coral Sea Cable System, with contributions and support from the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea governments; the launch of the Kacific-1 satellite in late 2019 also improved broadband satellite capacity for the region, though for telcos in Solomon Islands satellite services are now largely used as backup for international traffic; in recent years, the country has stabilized both politically and economically and this, along with improvements to mobile infrastructure, has led to a rise in mobile services and the slow uptake of broadband services; while the first LTE services were launched in late 2017 in the capital Honiara, the main platform for mobile voice and data services remains 3G, while in outlying areas GSM is still an important technology for the provision of services (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line is just over 1 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular telephone density is about 71 per 100 persons; domestic cable system to extend to key major islands (2019)" @@ -1137,7 +1137,7 @@ "text": "no regular military forces; the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force is responsible for internal and external security and reports to the Ministry of Police, National Security, and Correctional Services (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the maritime branch of the Police Force operates patrol boats provided by Australia (2022)" + "text": "China and Australia have provided equipment to the Solomons Islands Police Force; the maritime branch operates patrol boats provided by Australia (2022)" }, "Military - note": { "text": "Australia and New Zealand provide material and training assistance to the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (2022)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/ck.json b/australia-oceania/ck.json index 8f11bc60..a48c29c5 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ck.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ck.json @@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ "text": "King CHARLES III (since 8 September 2022); represented by Governor General of the Commonwealth of Australia General David HURLEY (since 1 July 2019)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Administrator Natasha GRIGGS (since 5 October 2017)" + "text": "Acting Administrator Sarah VANDENBROEK (since 4 October 2022)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "NA" diff --git a/australia-oceania/cq.json b/australia-oceania/cq.json index 1ea82b02..14564354 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/cq.json +++ b/australia-oceania/cq.json @@ -699,10 +699,10 @@ "text": "2,100 bbl/day (2019 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands" diff --git a/australia-oceania/cw.json b/australia-oceania/cw.json index aaee2919..8fccc37a 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/cw.json +++ b/australia-oceania/cw.json @@ -780,10 +780,10 @@ "text": "800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/fj.json b/australia-oceania/fj.json index 535fb2c5..006d1404 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/fj.json +++ b/australia-oceania/fj.json @@ -987,10 +987,10 @@ "text": "11,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/fp.json b/australia-oceania/fp.json index 23e4681e..df5044f1 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/fp.json +++ b/australia-oceania/fp.json @@ -825,10 +825,10 @@ "text": "6,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/gq.json b/australia-oceania/gq.json index b2b1c2b5..5d7f0ca6 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/gq.json +++ b/australia-oceania/gq.json @@ -776,10 +776,10 @@ "text": "2,100 bbl/day (2019 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.) Data represented includes both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands" diff --git a/australia-oceania/kr.json b/australia-oceania/kr.json index e015ce8c..fd8f0b4f 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/kr.json +++ b/australia-oceania/kr.json @@ -931,10 +931,10 @@ "text": "500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/kt.json b/australia-oceania/kt.json index 9014f62d..485883d4 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/kt.json +++ b/australia-oceania/kt.json @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ "text": "King CHARLES III (since 8 September 2022); represented by Governor General of the Commonwealth of Australia General David HURLEY (since 1 July 2019)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Administrator Natasha GRIGGS (since 5 October 2017)" + "text": "Acting Administrator Sarah VANDENBROEK (since 4 October 2022)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "NA" @@ -419,10 +419,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "service provided by the Australian network" + "text": "internet access on Christmas Island is provided by satellite; improvements through the Regional Connectivity Program to the macro and small cell mobile sites will provide new and improved mobile, voice and data connectivity for residents and visitors; the upgrade will also support local businesses and community facilities, enabling increased residential access to essential services such as telehealth and education (2022)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "local area code - 08; GSM mobile-cellular telephone service is provided by Telstra as part of the Australian network" + "text": "improvements to Christmas Island include an upgrade to the macro cell base stations and deploy a new macro cell base station at the airport (2022)" }, "international": { "text": "international code - 61 8; ASC submarine cable to Singapore and Australia; satellite earth station - 1 (Intelsat provides telephone and telex service) (2019)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/nc.json b/australia-oceania/nc.json index c3a374cc..1910043b 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nc.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nc.json @@ -828,10 +828,10 @@ "text": "19,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/ne.json b/australia-oceania/ne.json index 620bb3da..4bff353a 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ne.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ne.json @@ -695,10 +695,10 @@ "text": "100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/nh.json b/australia-oceania/nh.json index 0a1e2089..4c00200f 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nh.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nh.json @@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ "text": "President Nikenike VUROBARAVU (since 23 July 2022)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Prime Minister Bob LOUGHMAN (since 20 April 2020)" + "text": "Prime Minister Ishmael KALSAKAU (since 4 November 2022)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Council of Ministers appointed by the prime minister, responsible to Parliament" @@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ "text": "president indirectly elected by an electoral college consisting of Parliament and presidents of the 6 provinces; Vanuatu president serves a 5-year term; election last held on 23 July 2022 (next to be held in 2027); following legislative elections, the leader of the majority party or majority coalition usually elected prime minister by Parliament from among its members; election for prime minister last held on 20 April 2020 (next to be held following general elections in 2024)" }, "election results": { - "text": "Nikenike VUROBARAVU elected president in the eighth round on 23 July 2022 with 48 votes;
Bob LOUGHMAN elected prime minister on 20 April 2020; Bob LOUGHMAN (VP) 31 votes, Ralph REGENVANU (GJP) 21 votes" + "text": "Nikenike VUROBARAVU elected president in the eighth round on 23 July 2022 with 48 votes;
Ishmael KALSAKAU (UMP) elected prime minister on 4 November 2022 with 50 votes" } }, "Legislative branch": { @@ -564,10 +564,10 @@ "text": "unicameral Parliament (52 seats; members directly elected in 8 single-seat and 9 multi-seat constituencies by single non-transferable vote to serve 4-year terms (candidates in multi-seat constituencies can be elected with only 4% of the vote)" }, "elections": { - "text": "last held on 19–20 March 2020 (next to be held in 2024)" + "text": "last held on 13 October 2022 (next to be held in 2026)" }, "election results": { - "text": "percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - GJP 9, RMC 7, VP 7, LPV 5, UMP 5, NUP 4, other 15; composition - men 52, women 0; percent of women 0%; note - political party associations are fluid" + "text": "percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - UMP 7, VP 7, LPV 5, RMC 5, GJP 4, NUP 4, RDP 4, IG 3, PPP 2, VNDP 2, NAG 1, VLM 1, other 6, independent 1; composition - men 51, women 1; percent of women 2%; note - political party associations are fluid" }, "note": "note: the National Council of Chiefs advises on matters of culture and language" }, @@ -950,10 +950,10 @@ "text": "1,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/nr.json b/australia-oceania/nr.json index 30813c53..03eaf11c 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nr.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nr.json @@ -870,10 +870,10 @@ "text": "400 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/nz.json b/australia-oceania/nz.json index 3c9e8a73..ee8fbbc7 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nz.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nz.json @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ "text": "7,210 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Taupo - 610 sq km" } }, @@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Taupo - 610 sq km" } }, @@ -1001,10 +1001,10 @@ "text": "184,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "21,600 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "21,600 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "99,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "99,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "41 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/tn.json b/australia-oceania/tn.json index e385109a..70253600 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/tn.json +++ b/australia-oceania/tn.json @@ -970,10 +970,10 @@ "text": "1,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/wq.json b/australia-oceania/wq.json index 0c818f75..259d6603 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/wq.json +++ b/australia-oceania/wq.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Wake Island was probably visited by Micronesian and Polynesian settlers, and oral legends tell of periodic voyages to the islands by people from the Marshall Islands. Wake Island was uninhabited when Spanish explorer Alvaro de Mendana de NEYRA became the first European to see it in 1568 and still had no human inhabitants when English captain Samuel WAKE sailed by it in 1796. The United States Exploring Expedition visited the island in 1841 and the US annexed it in 1899 to use as a cable and refueling station between its newly acquired Pacific territories of Hawaii and the Philippines and Guam. In the 1930s, Pan American Airways built facilities on Wake Island so that it could be used as a stopover for flights from the US to China. In January 1941, the US began to install military assets on Wake Island and in early December of that year, Japan attacked Wake Island, capturing it by the end of the month after a heroic resistance. Japan held Wake Island until the end of World War II, and in 1946, commercial airlines once again used Wake Island as a refueling stop.

In 1973, the Marshall Islands claimed Wake Island based on the oral legends, although the US has not recognized these claims. In 1974, the US military took exclusive control of the island’s airstrip and restricted visitors. In 1978, Bikini Islanders from the Marshall Islands, who were evacuated in the 1950s and 1960s because of US nuclear tests, considered rehoming on Wake Island, but the US military rejected that plan. Since the 1970s, the island has been important for missile defense testing. In 2009, Wake Island was included in the Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument.

" + "text": "

Wake Island was probably visited by Micronesian and Polynesian settlers, and oral legends tell of periodic voyages to the islands by people from the Marshall Islands. Wake Island was uninhabited when Spanish explorer Alvaro de Mendana de NEYRA became the first European to see it in 1568 and still had no human inhabitants when English captain Samuel WAKE sailed by it in 1796. The United States Exploring Expedition visited the island in 1841 and the US annexed it in 1899 to use as a cable and refueling station between its newly acquired Pacific territories of Hawaii, the Philippines, and Guam. In the 1930s, Pan American Airways built facilities on Wake Island so that it could be used as a stopover for flights from the US to China. In January 1941, the US began to install military assets on Wake Island and in early December of that year, Japan attacked Wake Island, capturing it by the end of the month after a heroic resistance. Japan held Wake Island until the end of World War II, and in 1946, commercial airlines once again used Wake Island as a refueling stop.

In 1973, the Marshall Islands claimed Wake Island based on the oral legends, although the US has not recognized these claims. In 1974, the US military took exclusive control of the island’s airstrip and restricted visitors. In 1978, Bikini Islanders from the Marshall Islands, who were evacuated in the 1950s and 1960s because of US nuclear tests, considered rehoming on Wake Island, but the US military rejected that plan. Since the 1970s, the island has been important for missile defense testing. In 2009, Wake Island was included in the Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -260,10 +260,10 @@ "text": "9,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/ws.json b/australia-oceania/ws.json index 57b142c3..1f2ca05f 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ws.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ws.json @@ -957,10 +957,10 @@ "text": "2,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json index 656c26b9..3e097f81 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json @@ -812,10 +812,10 @@ "text": "8,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -886,10 +886,10 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage. (2021)" + "text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage (2021)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "ongoing changes in regulations and competition improving teledensity; approximately 34 per 100 fixed-line and 135 per 100 mobile-cellular (2018)" + "text": "33 per 100 fixed-line telephone subscriptions and 132 per 100 mobile-cellular (2020)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 297; landing points for the PAN-AM, PCCS, Deep Blue Cable, and Alonso de Ojeda submarine telecommunications cable system that extends from Trinidad and Tobago, Florida, Puerto Ricco, Jamaica, Guyana, Sint Eustatius & Saba, Suriname, Dominican Republic, BVI, USVI, Haiti, Cayman Islands, the Netherlands Antilles,  through Aruba to Panama, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Chile; extensive interisland microwave radio relay links (2019)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json index 59ee1861..1df0cd3b 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json @@ -868,10 +868,10 @@ "text": "5,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -942,10 +942,10 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage. (2021)" + "text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage (2021)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "fixed-line teledensity roughly 25 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity is about 193 per 100 persons (2019)" + "text": "fixed-line teledensity roughly 28 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity is about 188 per 100 persons (2020)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 1-268; landing points for the ECFS and Southern Caribbean Fiber submarine cable systems with links to other islands in the eastern Caribbean; satellite earth stations - 1 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean) (2019)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json index 3b542a70..f1e43176 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json @@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage. (2021)" + "text": "in the telecom sector, with declines seen in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services — the mainstay of short-term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis to a small extent as employees and students have resorted to working from home, but their contribution to the sector has been insufficient to offset steep falls in other areas of the market; one area of the telecom market that does not yet appear poised for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have little appetite for investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage; until the economies and markets stabilize, and overseas visitors return there is unlikely to be much momentum towards implementing 5G capabilities anywhere in the region (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line teledensity is about 42 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity is roughly 182 per 100 persons (2018)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json index 7a348427..2d5652a1 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json @@ -954,10 +954,10 @@ "text": "10,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "700 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "700 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "2 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1028,10 +1028,10 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage. (2021)" + "text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage (2021)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "fixed-line teledensity of roughly 45 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular telephone density about 115 per 100 persons (2019)" + "text": "fixed-line teledensity of roughly 45 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular telephone density about 103 per 100 persons (2020)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 1-246; landing points for the ECFS and Southern Caribbean Fiber submarine cable with links to 15 other islands in the eastern Caribbean extending from the British Virgin Islands to Trinidad and Puerto Ricco; satellite earth stations - 1 (Intelsat - Atlantic Ocean); tropospheric scatter to Trinidad and Saint Lucia (2019)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json index 6e8828f9..09e2ab18 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json @@ -903,10 +903,10 @@ "text": "25,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ "text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home (2021)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "23 per 100 fixed-line, 109 per 100 mobile-cellular (2019)" + "text": "23 per 100 fixed-line, 119 per 100 mobile-cellular (2020)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 1-242; landing points for the ARCOS-1, BICS, Bahamas 2-US, and BDSN fiber-optic submarine cables that provide links to South and Central America, parts of the Caribbean, and the US; satellite earth stations - 2; the Bahamas Domestic Submarine Network links all of the major islands; (2019)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json index dc0f9983..85ebf00f 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json @@ -986,10 +986,10 @@ "text": "3,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "1,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "1,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "6.7 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1060,10 +1060,10 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Belize’s fixed-line teledensity and mobile subscriptions remain lower than average for the region, a legacy of insufficient market competition and low investment in telecoms services; the telecom market was liberalized in 2003; the government has undertaken some measures to improve competition and open its networks to VoIP services (2021)" + "text": "Belize’s fixed-line teledensity and mobile penetration remain lower than average for the region, a legacy of insufficient market competition and under investment in telecoms services; a significant investment in infrastructure, launching an LTE-A service at the end of 2016 and in mid-2017 completing a submarine cable to Ambergris Caye, enabling it to launch an FttP service in San Pedro; the nfrastructure has been updated from the legacy copper to fiber; investments have been made to provide high speed broadband to 80% of residences across Belize. (2021)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "roughly 5 per 100 fixed-line and mobile-cellular teledensity of 65 per 100 persons; mobile sector accounting for over 90% of all phone subscriptions (2019)" + "text": "roughly 5 per 100 fixed-line and mobile-cellular teledensity of 66 per 100 persons; mobile sector accounting for over 90% of all phone subscriptions (2020)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 501; landing points for the ARCOS and SEUL fiber-optic telecommunications submarine cable that provides links to South and Central America, parts of the Caribbean, and the US; satellite earth station - 8 (Intelsat - 2, unknown - 6) (2019)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json index f56e3d3d..7c977c96 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json @@ -783,10 +783,10 @@ "text": "5,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ "text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage (2021)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "introduction of competition in the mobile-cellular market in 2004 boosted subscriptions; nearly 55 per 100 fixed-line and 153 per 100 mobile-cellular (2019)" + "text": "introduction of competition in the mobile-cellular market in 2004 boosted subscriptions; nearly 55 per 100 fixed-line and 152 per 100 mobile-cellular (2020)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 1-345; landing points for the Maya-1, Deep Blue Cable, and the Cayman-Jamaica Fiber System submarine cables that provide links to the US and parts of Central and South America; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean) (2019)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json index eb5c73bf..2b602949 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json @@ -1024,10 +1024,10 @@ "text": "63,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json index ec15d930..7709d8a9 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json @@ -990,10 +990,10 @@ "text": "164,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "48,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "48,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "124 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json index 6ef34936..70796b72 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json @@ -844,10 +844,10 @@ "text": "1,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json index 1f54d562..57a253ad 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ "text": "3,070 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lago de Enriquillo - 500 sq km" } }, @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lago de Enriquillo - 500 sq km" } }, @@ -1035,10 +1035,10 @@ "text": "148,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "24,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "24,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json index 126effd8..57975c51 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json @@ -1011,10 +1011,10 @@ "text": "59,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json index e1526e97..f6e1d3af 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json @@ -886,10 +886,10 @@ "text": "2,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json index 7742ea01..3af97b34 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ "text": "3,375 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lago de Izabal - 590 sq km" } }, @@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lago de Izabal - 590 sq km" } }, @@ -1034,10 +1034,10 @@ "text": "112,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "6,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "6,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "86.1 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json index 14e92322..dc0b042f 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json @@ -990,10 +990,10 @@ "text": "21,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json index 2071be5f..e0c862a8 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ "text": "900 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Laguna de Caratasca - 1,110 sq km" } }, @@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Laguna de Caratasca - 1,110 sq km" } }, @@ -1020,10 +1020,10 @@ "text": "66,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json index 3dc069e1..dbea4822 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json @@ -980,10 +980,10 @@ "text": "61,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "20,100 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "20,100 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json index 68b183fa..e9cd0d74 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json @@ -740,10 +740,10 @@ "text": "200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json index 1e384d80..05a997a9 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ "text": "1,990 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lago de Nicaragua - 8,150 sq km; Lago de Managua - 1,040 sq km" } }, @@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lago de Nicaragua - 8,150 sq km; Lago de Managua - 1,040 sq km" } }, @@ -1008,10 +1008,10 @@ "text": "35,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "13,000 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "13,000 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json index 61d241a9..cf86f399 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ "text": "321 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Laguna de Chiriqui - 900 sq km" } }, @@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Laguna de Chiriqui - 900 sq km" } }, @@ -1028,10 +1028,10 @@ "text": "143,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Panama has seen a steady increase in revenue from the telecom sector in recent years; mobile services and broadband remain the key growth sectors, with mobile connections accounting for 90% of all connections, and over half of telecom sector revenue; the mobile sector has flourished since the arrival of Digicel Panamá in 2008 and of América Móvil in 2009, which ended the duopoly long enjoyed by Cable & Wireless Panamá and Telefónica’s Movistar. Millicom International Cellular (trading as Tigo) acquired Telefónica’s telecom assets in Panama in 2019; the mobile market has effective competition among these players; internet services have grown in recent years as consumers responded to government fixed-line projects, improved mobile broadband connectivity and a plethora of mobile applications. (2021)" + "text": "Panama has seen a steady increase in revenue from the telecom sector in recent years; mobile services and broadband remain the key growth sectors, with mobile connections accounting for 90% of all connections, and over half of telecom sector revenue; the mobile market has effective competition; internet services have grown in recent years as consumers responded to government fixed-line projects, improved mobile broadband connectivity and mobile applications (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line about 14 per 100 and rapid subscribership of mobile-cellular telephone roughly 132 per 100 (2020)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json index 6782fc92..5a01f96f 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json @@ -840,10 +840,10 @@ "text": "79,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -914,7 +914,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Puerto Rico has a small telecom market which in recent years has been deeply affected by a combination of economic mismanagement and natural disasters, including two hurricanes which landed in late 2017 and an earthquake which struck in January 2020; these disasters caused considerable destruction of telecom infrastructure, which in turn led to a marked decline in the number of subscribers for all services; compounding these difficulties have been a long-term economic downturn which encouraged many people not to resume telecom services after these were restored; after some delay, the FCC in late 2019 issued an order relating to the release of funds to help rebuild telecom infrastructure; although Puerto Rico is a US territory it lags well behind the mainland US states in terms of fixed-line and broadband services; this is partly due to high unemployment rates (and consequently low disposable income) and poor telecoms investment in a market largely dominated by the incumbent Puerto Rico Telephone Company; this dominance was augmented after the company was acquired by the largest wireless operator in Latin America, América Móvil, in 2007; the acquisition by Liberty Global of the remaining cable TV operator Choice Cable, completed in mid-2015, created a monopoly player in this sector; Liberty Cablevisión (renamed Liberty Communications of Puerto Rico in 2020), now wholly-owned by Liberty Global’s LLA division, is in a stronger position to capitalize on scale, and so provide improved services based on greater investment and on the use of technology based on the DOCSIS3.1 standard; Liberty Communications has also become better placed in the bundled service market following LLA’s acquisition of AT&T’s wireless and wire line units in Puerto Rico; the mobile market has been impacted by several mergers and acquisitions over the last few years; in early 2017 Sprint and Open Wireless agreed to merge their networks in a bid to offer better market competition by increasing their scale and combining spectrum holdings; the T-Mobile US acquisition of Sprint Communications was approved in April 2020, and LLA’s acquisition of AT&T’s Puerto Rican and US Virgin Islands operations was finalized in October 2020; the activities of large multinational telcos such as América Móvil, T-Mobile US, and LLA, continue to impact the Puerto Rican market; operators have secured spectrum in the 600MHz and 3.5GHz bands, thus enabling them to expand the reach of LTE services and launch services based on 5G;  the growing number of submarine cables landing in Puerto Rico is helping to drive down the cost of telecom services, creating a demand for streaming content from abroad; the uptake of cloud-based applications for both business and individuals is also creating a heightened demand for affordable services. (2021)" + "text": "Puerto Rico has a small telecom market which in recent years has been deeply affected by a combination of economic mismanagement and natural disasters, including two hurricanes which landed in late 2017 and an earthquake which struck in January 2020; these disasters caused considerable destruction of telecom infrastructure, which in turn led to a marked decline in the number of subscribers for all services; compounding these difficulties have been a long-term economic downturn which encouraged many people not to resume telecom services after these were restored; after some delay, the FCC in late 2019 issued an order relating to the release of funds to help rebuild telecom infrastructure; although Puerto Rico is a US territory it lags well behind the mainland US states in terms of fixed-line and broadband services; this is partly due to high unemployment rates (and consequently low disposable income) and poor telecoms investment in a market; the mobile market has been impacted by several mergers and acquisitions over the last few years; the activities of large multinational telcos continue to impact the Puerto Rican market; operators have secured spectrum in the 600MHz and 3.5GHz bands, thus enabling them to expand the reach of LTE services and launch services based on 5G;  the growing number of submarine cables landing in Puerto Rico is helping to drive down the cost of telecom services, creating a demand for streaming content from abroad; the uptake of cloud-based applications for both business and individuals is also creating a heightened demand for affordable services (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "digital telephone system; mobile-cellular services; fixed-line nearly 25 per 100 and mobile-cellular nearly 122 per 100 persons (2020)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json index e1c03096..1262c839 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json @@ -876,10 +876,10 @@ "text": "1,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json index a5066da7..69f1bf55 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json @@ -920,10 +920,10 @@ "text": "4,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json index 50a0bc49..11be8b1c 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json @@ -929,10 +929,10 @@ "text": "35,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "22,100 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "22,100 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "64,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "64,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "243 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json index f2c52069..3ff2584b 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json @@ -713,10 +713,10 @@ "text": "1,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json index ab715bcd..150ead3d 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json @@ -871,10 +871,10 @@ "text": "1,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json index 0e626af1..0892883b 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json @@ -723,10 +723,10 @@ "text": "1,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ "text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one major casualty may be the region’s second largest telco operator, Digicel; the company filed for bankruptcy in the US in April 2020; it continues to operate in all of its Caribbean markets as it seeks to refinance billions of dollars of debt; the other major telco, regional incumbent Cable & Wireless Communications (CWC), is experiencing similar drops in subscriber numbers and revenue; CWC is expanding and enhancing its fixed and mobile networks in many of the countries it serves around the Caribbean, despite many locations being small islands with very small populations; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage. (2021)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "fixed-line connections exceed 24 per 100 persons and mobile cellular subscribership is roughly 116 per 100 persons (2020)" + "text": "fixed-line connections exceed 23 per 100 persons and mobile cellular subscribership is roughly 116 per 100 persons (2020)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 1-284; landing points for PCCS, ECFS, CBUS, Deep Blue Cable, East-West, PAN-AM, Americas-1, Southern Caribbean Fiber, Columbus- IIb, St Thomas - St Croix System, Taino-Carib, and Americas I- North via submarine cable to Caribbean, Central and South America, and US (2019)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json index 47c27d4c..68eae151 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json @@ -722,10 +722,10 @@ "text": "16,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-asia/kg.json b/central-asia/kg.json index 7914e0eb..b87424b8 100644 --- a/central-asia/kg.json +++ b/central-asia/kg.json @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ "text": "10,233 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Ozero Issyk-Kul 6,240 sq km
note - second largest saline lake after the Caspian Sea; second highest mountain lake after Lake Titicaca; it is an endorheic mountain basin; although surrounded by snow capped mountains it never freezes" } }, @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Ozero Issyk-Kul 6,240 sq km
note - second largest saline lake after the Caspian Sea; second highest mountain lake after Lake Titicaca; it is an endorheic mountain basin; although surrounded by snow capped mountains it never freezes" } }, @@ -1012,10 +1012,10 @@ "text": "32,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "1,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "1,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "8,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "8,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "40 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-asia/kz.json b/central-asia/kz.json index 72c3fb5c..caf9a92a 100644 --- a/central-asia/kz.json +++ b/central-asia/kz.json @@ -86,10 +86,10 @@ "text": "20,660 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Ozero Balkhash - 22,000 sq km; Ozero Zaysan - 1,800 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Caspian Sea (shared with Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Russia) - 374,000 sq km; Aral Sea (north) - 3,300 sq km; Ozero Alakol - 2,650 sq km; Ozero Teniz 1,590 sq km; Ozero Seletytenzi - 780 sq km; Ozero Sasykkol - 740 sq km" } }, @@ -472,10 +472,10 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Ozero Balkhash - 22,000 sq km; Ozero Zaysan - 1,800 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Caspian Sea (shared with Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Russia) - 374,000 sq km; Aral Sea (north) - 3,300 sq km; Ozero Alakol - 2,650 sq km; Ozero Teniz 1,590 sq km; Ozero Seletytenzi - 780 sq km; Ozero Sasykkol - 740 sq km" } }, @@ -1029,10 +1029,10 @@ "text": "320,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "1,531,600 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "1,531,600 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "500 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "500 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "30 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-asia/rs.json b/central-asia/rs.json index c6cf1f5e..fe65f262 100644 --- a/central-asia/rs.json +++ b/central-asia/rs.json @@ -97,10 +97,10 @@ "text": "43,000 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Baikal - 31,500 sq km; Lake Ladoga - 18,130 sq km; Lake Onega - 9,720 sq km; Lake Khanka (shared with China) - 5,010 sq km; Lake Peipus - 4,300 sq km; Ozero Vygozero - 1,250 sq km; Ozero Beloye - 1,120 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Caspian Sea (shared with Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan) - 374,000 sq km; Ozero Malyye Chany - 2,500 sq km; Curonian Lagoon (shared with Lithuania) - 1,620 sq km
note - the Caspian Sea is the World's largest lake" } }, @@ -509,10 +509,10 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Baikal - 31,500 sq km; Lake Ladoga - 18,130 sq km; Lake Onega - 9,720 sq km; Lake Khanka (shared with China) - 5,010 sq km; Lake Peipus - 4,300 sq km; Ozero Vygozero - 1,250 sq km; Ozero Beloye - 1,120 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Caspian Sea (shared with Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan) - 374,000 sq km; Ozero Malyye Chany - 2,500 sq km; Curonian Lagoon (shared with Lithuania) - 1,620 sq km
note - the Caspian Sea is the World's largest lake" } }, @@ -1076,10 +1076,10 @@ "text": "3.699 million bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "5.196 million barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "5.196 million bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "14,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "14,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "80 billion barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1150,7 +1150,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "the telecom market is the largest in Europe, supported by a population approaching 147 million; the overall market is dominated by the western regions, particularly Moscow and St Petersburg which are the main cities and economic centers; all sectors of the market have been liberalized, with competition most prevalent in the two largest regional markets; the incumbent telco Rostelecom, which absorbed most of the regional players, in late 2019 acquired the remaining 55% of Tele2 Russia which it did not already own; the deal strengthened the company’s ability to compete in the offering a full range of bundled services; Telcos continue to deploy and modernize fixed-line network infrastructure to offer improved broadband services as well as a range of IP-delivered content; the fiber broadband sector has shown considerable growth, supported by the government’s program to extend the reach of broadband to outlying regions; the development of 5G services has been stymied by the lack of spectrum; although MNOs have licenses to use 700MHz spectrum for 5G, this spectrum will not be released until at least August 2023; progress is being made by MNOs to develop a joint strategy to deploy 5G using shared network and spectrum assets; mobile penetration is high, though this is partly due to the popularity of multiple SIM card use; there is pressure on operator revenue from the poor economic climate, lower pricing resulting from intense competition, regulatory measures introduced in 2018 which saw the end of roaming charges, and the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. (2022)" + "text": "the telecom market is the largest in Europe, supported by a population approaching 147 million; the overall market is dominated by the western regions, particularly Moscow and St Petersburg which are the main cities and economic centers; all sectors of the market have been liberalized, with competition most prevalent in the two largest regional markets; the fiber broadband sector has shown considerable growth, supported by the government’s program to extend the reach of broadband to outlying regions; the development of 5G services has been stymied by the lack of spectrum; although MNOs have licenses to use 700MHz spectrum for 5G, this spectrum will not be released until at least August 2023; progress is being made by MNOs to develop a joint strategy to deploy 5G using shared network and spectrum assets; mobile penetration is high, though this is partly due to the popularity of multiple SIM card use; there is pressure on operator revenue from the poor economic climate, lower pricing resulting from intense competition, regulatory measures introduced in 2018 which saw the end of roaming charges, and the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "cross-country digital trunk lines run from Saint Petersburg to Khabarovsk, and from Moscow to Novorossiysk; the telephone systems in 60 regional capitals have modern digital infrastructures; cellular services, both analog and digital, are available in many areas; in rural areas, telephone services are still outdated, inadequate, and low-density; nearly 19 per 100 for fixed-line and mobile-cellular a bit over 164 per 100 persons (2020)" diff --git a/central-asia/ti.json b/central-asia/ti.json index c6043cd7..371db059 100644 --- a/central-asia/ti.json +++ b/central-asia/ti.json @@ -994,10 +994,10 @@ "text": "26,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "12 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-asia/tx.json b/central-asia/tx.json index cc32926b..70c2da5c 100644 --- a/central-asia/tx.json +++ b/central-asia/tx.json @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ "text": "19,950 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Caspian Sea (shared with Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Kazakhstan) - 374,000 sq km" } }, @@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Caspian Sea (shared with Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Kazakhstan) - 374,000 sq km" } }, @@ -971,10 +971,10 @@ "text": "153,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "59,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "59,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "600 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-asia/uz.json b/central-asia/uz.json index 340931a6..fd05ca69 100644 --- a/central-asia/uz.json +++ b/central-asia/uz.json @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ "text": "42,150 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Aral Sea (shared with Kazakhstan) - largely dried up" } }, @@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Aral Sea (shared with Kazakhstan) - largely dried up" } }, @@ -982,10 +982,10 @@ "text": "98,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "24,000 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "24,000 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "594 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json index 3dbcfb1d..2df15504 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json @@ -1051,10 +1051,10 @@ "text": "146,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "4,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "4,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "139 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1125,10 +1125,10 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Burma, one of the least developed telecom markets in Asia, saw growth in mobile and broadband services through foreign competition and roll out of 4G and 5G networks; infrastructure development challenged by flooding, unreliable electricity, inefficient bureaucracy, and corruption; digital divide affects rural areas; fixed broadband remains low due to number of fixed-lines and near saturation of the mobile platform; healthy m-banking platform; tests for NB-IoT; benefit from launch of regional satellite; government utilizes intermittent censorship and shut-down of Internet in political crisis; top importer of broadcasting equipment from China (2021) (2020)" + "text": "Burma, one of the least developed telecom markets in Asia, saw growth in mobile and broadband services through foreign competition and roll out of 4G and 5G networks; infrastructure development challenged by flooding, unreliable electricity, inefficient bureaucracy, and corruption; digital divide affects rural areas; fixed broadband remains low due to number of fixed-lines and near saturation of the mobile platform; healthy m-banking platform; tests for NB-IoT; benefit from launch of regional satellite; government utilizes intermittent censorship and shut-down of Internet in political crisis (2020)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "fixed-line is just under 1 per 100, while mobile-cellular is roughly 90 per 100 (2019)" + "text": "fixed-line is just under 1 per 100, while mobile-cellular is roughly 144 per 100 (2020)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 95; landing points for the SeaMeWe-3, SeaMeWe-5, AAE-1 and Singapore-Myanmar optical telecommunications submarine cable that provides links to Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia, Australia and Europe; satellite earth stations - 2, Intelsat (Indian Ocean) and ShinSat (2019)" @@ -1292,7 +1292,7 @@ "text": "18-35 years of age (men) and 18-27 years of age (women) for voluntary military service; no conscription (a 2010 law reintroducing conscription has not yet entered into force); 2-year service obligation; male (ages 18-45) and female (ages 18-35) professionals (including doctors, engineers, mechanics) serve up to 3 years; service terms may be stretched to 5 years in an officially declared emergency (2021)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "

since the country's founding, the armed forces have been heavily involved in domestic politics, running the country for five decades following a military coup in 1962; prior to the 2021 coup, the military already controlled three key security ministries (Defense, Border, and Home Affairs), one of two vice presidential appointments, 25% of the parliamentary seats, and had a proxy political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)

as of 2022, the military owned and operated two business conglomerates that had over 100 subsidiaries and close ties to other companies; the business activities of these conglomerates included banking and insurance, hotels, tourism, jade and ruby mining, timber, construction, real estate, and the production of palm oil, sugar, soap, cement, beverages, drinking water, coal, and gas; some of the companies supplied goods and services to the military, such as food, clothing, insurance, and cellphone service; the military also managed a film industry, publishing houses, and television stations

as of 2022, the military's primary operational focus was internal security, particularly attempts to quell a growing armed insurgency against the 2021 coup and operations against ethnic-based separatist groups; these operations have resulted in numerous civilian casualties, human rights abuses, and internal displacement

ethnic-based armed groups have been fighting for self-rule against the Burmese Government since the country’s 1948 independence; as of 2022, there were approximately 20 such groups operating in Burma with strengths of a few hundred up to more than 20,000 estimated fighters; they reportedly controlled an estimated one-third of the country’s territory, primarily in the border regions; key groups included the United Wa State Army, Karen National Union, Kachin Independence Army, Arakan Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army

as of 2022, Burma also had a large number of armed militias which took many different forms and varied in allegiances and size; most were pro-military junta and associated with the Burmese military (Tatmadaw); some were integrated within the Tatmadaw’s command structure as Border Guard Forces (BGF); the BGF were organized as 325-man battalions, which included a mix of militia forces, ethnic armed groups, and government soldiers; they were armed, supplied, and paid by the Tatmadaw; other pro-military government militias were not integrated within the Tatmadaw command structure but received direction from the military and were recognized as government militias; the amount of support they received from the Tatmadaw varied depending on local security conditions; the third type of pro-government militias were small community-based units that were armed, coordinated, and trained by local Tatmadaw forces and activated as needed; as of 2022, the military junta government was raising new militia units to help combat the popular uprising

in mid-2022, the National Unity Government claimed its armed wing, the People's Defense Force (PDF), had more than 60,000 fighters organized into battalions; in addition, several armed ethnic groups have added their support to anti-junta resistance groups or joined forces with local units of the PDF



" + "text": "

since the country's founding, the armed forces have been heavily involved in domestic politics, running the country for five decades following a military coup in 1962; prior to the 2021 coup, the military already controlled three key security ministries (Defense, Border, and Home Affairs), one of two vice presidential appointments, 25% of the parliamentary seats, and had a proxy political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)

as of 2022, the military owned and operated two business conglomerates that had over 100 subsidiaries and close ties to other companies; the business activities of these conglomerates included banking and insurance, hotels, tourism, jade and ruby mining, timber, construction, real estate, and the production of palm oil, sugar, soap, cement, beverages, drinking water, coal, and gas; some of the companies supplied goods and services to the military, such as food, clothing, insurance, and cellphone service; the military also managed a film industry, publishing houses, and television stations

as of 2022, the military's primary operational focus was internal security, particularly attempts to quell a growing armed insurgency against the 2021 coup and operations against ethnic-based separatist groups; these operations have resulted in numerous civilian casualties, human rights abuses, and internal displacement

ethnic-based armed groups have been fighting for self-rule against the Burmese Government since the country’s 1948 independence; as of 2022, there were approximately 20 such groups operating in Burma with strengths of a few hundred up to more than 20,000 estimated fighters; they reportedly controlled an estimated one-third of the country’s territory, primarily in the border regions; key groups included the United Wa State Army, Karen National Union, Kachin Independence Army, Arakan Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army

as of 2022, Burma also had a large number of armed militias which took many different forms and varied in allegiances and size; most were pro-military junta and associated with the Burmese military (Tatmadaw); some were integrated within the Tatmadaw’s command structure as Border Guard Forces (BGF); the BGF were organized as 325-man battalions, which included a mix of militia forces, ethnic armed groups, and government soldiers; they were armed, supplied, and paid by the Tatmadaw; other pro-military government militias were not integrated within the Tatmadaw command structure but received direction from the military and were recognized as government militias; the amount of support they received from the Tatmadaw varied depending on local security conditions; the third type of pro-government militias were small community-based units that were armed, coordinated, and trained by local Tatmadaw forces and activated as needed; as of 2022, the military junta government was raising new militia units to help combat the popular uprising

in mid-2022, the National Unity Government claimed its armed wing, the People's Defense Force (PDF), had more than 60,000 fighters organized into battalions; in addition, several armed ethnic groups have added their support to anti-junta resistance groups or joined forces with local units of the PDF

" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json index 761f9d64..ef40a9ab 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json @@ -941,10 +941,10 @@ "text": "18,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "103,100 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "103,100 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "1.1 billion barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Brunei Darussalam seemed poised to start its economic recovery from the double blow it received to its GDP in 2020 from the Covid-19 crisis and a global slump in oil prices; Brunei’s mobile market experienced a sharp a sharp drop-off in subscriber numbers in 2020; in 2022 there was a concerted effort to build out the fixed-line infrastructure while progressing towards introducing 5G mobile services; Brunei’s fixed-line market is one of the few countries in the world to have displayed significant growth rather than a decline in teledensity in the last few years; this upward trend is set to continue as the new Unified National Network (UNN) works diligently to expand and enhance the fixed-line infrastructure around the country; strong growth was also seen in the fixed broadband space, on the back of those same infrastructure developments that are part of the Brunei Vision 2035 initiative; fixed broadband is starting from a relatively low base by international standards and is still only at 18%, leaving lots of room for growth; mobile and mobile broadband, on the other hand, are still suffering from the market contractions first felt in 2020; rates for both segments were already extremely high so the decline may simply be a reflection of those users with services that were purely discretionary; Brunei’s 2G GSM network is shut down, with the spectrum to be reallocated to 3G, 4G, and potentially 5G use. (2021)" + "text": "Brunei’s mobile market experienced drop-off in subscriber numbers in 2020; in 2022 there was a concerted effort to build out the fixed-line infrastructure while progressing towards introducing 5G mobile services; Brunei’s fixed-line market is one of the few countries in the world to have displayed significant growth rather than a decline in teledensity in the last few years; this upward trend is set to continue as the new Unified National Network (UNN) works diligently to expand and enhance the fixed-line infrastructure around the country; strong growth was also seen in the fixed broadband space, on the back of those same infrastructure developments that are part of the Brunei Vision 2035 initiative; fixed broadband is starting from a relatively low base by international standards and is still only at 18%, leaving lots of room for growth; mobile and mobile broadband, on the other hand, are still suffering from the market contractions first felt in 2020; Brunei’s 2G GSM network is shut down, with the spectrum to be reallocated to 3G, 4G, and potentially 5G use (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "every service available; nearly 24 per 100 fixed-line, 120 per 100 mobile-cellular (2020)" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json index 09b367a5..44b8ad08 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ "text": "3,540 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Tonle Sap - 2,700-16,000 sq km" } }, @@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Tonle Sap - 2,700-16,000 sq km" } }, @@ -1039,10 +1039,10 @@ "text": "64,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1262,7 +1262,7 @@ } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { - "text": "information varies; approximately 110,000 total active troops including about 3,000 Navy and 1,000 Air Force; approximately 10,000 Gendarmerie (2022)" + "text": "information varies; approximately 100,000 total active troops including less than 5,000 Navy and Air Force personnel; approximately 10,000 Gendarmerie (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { "text": "the RCAF is armed largely with older Chinese and Russian-origin equipment; since 2010, it has received limited amounts of more modern equipment from a variety of suppliers, particularly China (2022)", diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json index 710ac815..03cbc6b6 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json @@ -97,10 +97,10 @@ "text": "690,070 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Dongting Hu - 3,100 sq km; Poyang Hu - 3,350 sq km; Hongze Hu - 2,700 sq km; Tai Hu - 2,210 sq km; Hulun Nur - 1,590" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Quinghai Hu - 4,460 sq km; Nam Co - 2,500 sq km; Siling Co - 1,860 sq km; Tangra Yumco - 1,400 sq km; Bosten Hu 1,380 sq km" } }, @@ -500,10 +500,10 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Dongting Hu - 3,100 sq km; Poyang Hu - 3,350 sq km; Hongze Hu - 2,700 sq km; Tai Hu - 2,210 sq km; Hulun Nur - 1,590" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Quinghai Hu - 4,460 sq km; Nam Co - 2,500 sq km; Siling Co - 1,860 sq km; Tangra Yumco - 1,400 sq km; Bosten Hu 1,380 sq km" } }, @@ -1058,10 +1058,10 @@ "text": "14,007,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "52,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "52,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "9,238,100 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "9,238,100 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "26,022,600,000 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json index 55f788a9..614a0a68 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json @@ -885,10 +885,10 @@ "text": "404,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/id.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/id.json index d3199929..d6ba6d46 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/id.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/id.json @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ "text": "67,220 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Danau Toba - 1,150 sq km
note - located in the caldera of a super volcano that erupted more than 70,000 years ago; it is the largest volcanic lake in the World" } }, @@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Danau Toba - 1,150 sq km
note - located in the caldera of a super volcano that erupted more than 70,000 years ago; it is the largest volcanic lake in the World" } }, @@ -1064,10 +1064,10 @@ "text": "1.649 million bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "204,000 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "204,000 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "309,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "309,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "2.48 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json index 2f334ffe..79138f45 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ "text": "24,690 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Biwa-ko 688 sq km" } }, @@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Biwa-ko 688 sq km" } }, @@ -1021,10 +1021,10 @@ "text": "3,739,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "3,012,800 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "3,012,800 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "44.1 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json index 7d8ebf09..e7050251 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json @@ -875,10 +875,10 @@ "text": "20,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "10,600 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "10,600 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1075,7 +1075,7 @@ "note": "note 1: the Security Guard Command protects the Kim family, other senior leadership figures, and government facilities

note 2: the North also has a large paramilitary/militia force organized into the Worker Peasant Red Guard and Red Youth Guard; these organizations are present at all levels of government (province, county, ward) and are under the control of the Korean Workers' Party in peacetime, but revert to KPA control in crisis or war; they are often mobilized for domestic projects, such as road building and agricultural support" }, "Military expenditures": { - "text": "between 2010 and 2019, military expenditures accounted for an estimated 20-25% of North Korea's GDP annually" + "text": "between 2010 and 2019, military expenditures accounted for an estimated 20-25% of North Korea's GDP annually; North Korea in the 2010s and 2020s has increasingly relied on illicit activities — including cybercrime — to generate revenue for its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs to evade US and UN sanctions" }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { "text": "information varies widely; estimated 1.15 million active troops (950,000 Army; 120,000 Air Force; 60,000 Navy; 10,000 Strategic Missile Forces); estimated 200,000 internal security forces (2022)" @@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ "note": "note: the bulk of the KPA is made up of conscripts; as many as 20% of North Korean males between the ages of 16 and 54 are in the military at a given time and possibly up to 30 percent of males between the ages of 18 and 27, not counting the reserves or paramilitary units" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "

in addition to the invasion of South Korea and the subsequent Korean War (1950-53), North Korea from the 1960s to the 1980s launched a considerable number of limited military and subversive actions against South Korea using special forces and terrorist tactics; including aggressive skirmishes along the DMZ, overt attempts to assassinate South Korean leaders, kidnappings, the bombing of an airliner, and a failed effort in 1968 to foment an insurrection and conduct a guerrilla war in the South with more than 100 seaborne commandos; from the 1990s until 2010, the North lost two submarines and a semi-submersible boat attempting to insert infiltrators into the South (1996, 1998) and provoked several engagements in the Northwest Islands area along the disputed Northern Limit Line (NLL), including naval skirmishes between patrol boats in 1999 and 2002, the torpedoing and sinking of a South Korean Navy corvette in 2010, and the bombardment of a South Korean Marine Corps installation on Yeonpyeong Island, also in 2010; since 2010, further minor incidents continue to occur periodically along the DMZ, where both the KPA and the South Korean military maintain large numbers of troops

in 2018, North Korea and South Korea signed a tension reduction agreement known as the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA), which established land, sea, and air buffer zones along the DMZ and the NLL; implementation of the CMA required the removal of some land mines and guard posts; the efforts led to a reduction of tension in the DMZ, but as of 2022 North Korea had failed to uphold much of its side of the agreement

the KPA was founded in 1948; Kim Jong Un is the KPA supreme commander, while operational control of the armed forces resides in the General Staff Department (GSD), which reports directly to Kim; the GSD maintains overall control of all military forces and is charged with turning Kim’s directives into operational military orders; the Ministry of National Defense (MND) is responsible for administrative control of the military and external relations with foreign militaries

as of 2022, North Korea’s growing ballistic missile program included close- (CRBM), short- (SRBM), medium- (MRBM), intermediate- (IRBM), and intercontinental- (ICBM) range ballistic missiles; the North received its first ballistic missiles, short-range FROGs (free rocket over ground), from the Soviet Union in the 1960s, but its modern ballistic missile program is generally thought to date back to the mid-1970s when it received a Soviet Scud-class missile, likely from Egypt; the North reverse-engineered the missile and developed an indigenously built version in 1984; it flight-tested its first Scud-based medium-range Nodong missile in 1990, and probably began development of the multi-stage Taepodong missiles around this time as well; the North revealed its first road-mobile ICBM in 2012 and conducted the first test of an ICBM-class system in 2017; it conducted additional ICBM tests in 2022

North Korea in the 2010s and 2020s has increasingly relied on illicit activities — including cybercrime — to generate revenue for its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs to evade US and UN sanctions


 

" + "text": "

in addition to the invasion of South Korea and the subsequent Korean War (1950-53), North Korea from the 1960s to the 1980s launched a considerable number of limited military and subversive actions against South Korea using special forces and terrorist tactics; including aggressive skirmishes along the DMZ, overt attempts to assassinate South Korean leaders, kidnappings, the bombing of an airliner, and a failed effort in 1968 to foment an insurrection and conduct a guerrilla war in the South with more than 100 seaborne commandos; from the 1990s until 2010, the North lost two submarines and a semi-submersible boat attempting to insert infiltrators into the South (1996, 1998) and provoked several engagements in the Northwest Islands area along the disputed Northern Limit Line (NLL), including naval skirmishes between patrol boats in 1999 and 2002, the torpedoing and sinking of a South Korean Navy corvette in 2010, and the bombardment of a South Korean Marine Corps installation on Yeonpyeong Island, also in 2010; since 2010, further minor incidents continue to occur periodically along the DMZ, where both the KPA and the South Korean military maintain large numbers of troops

in 2018, North Korea and South Korea signed a tension reduction agreement known as the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA), which established land, sea, and air buffer zones along the DMZ and the NLL; implementation of the CMA required the removal of some land mines and guard posts; the efforts led to a reduction of tension in the DMZ, but as of 2022 North Korea had failed to uphold much of its side of the agreement

the KPA was founded in 1948; Kim Jong Un is the KPA supreme commander, while operational control of the armed forces resides in the General Staff Department (GSD), which reports directly to Kim; the GSD maintains overall control of all military forces and is charged with turning Kim’s directives into operational military orders; the Ministry of National Defense (MND) is responsible for administrative control of the military and external relations with foreign militaries

as of 2022, North Korea’s growing ballistic missile program included close- (CRBM), short- (SRBM), medium- (MRBM), intermediate- (IRBM), and intercontinental- (ICBM) range ballistic missiles; the North received its first ballistic missiles, short-range FROGs (free rocket over ground), from the Soviet Union in the 1960s, but its modern ballistic missile program is generally thought to date back to the mid-1970s when it received a Soviet Scud-class missile, likely from Egypt; the North reverse-engineered the missile and developed an indigenously built version in 1984; it flight-tested its first Scud-based medium-range Nodong missile in 1990, and probably began development of the multi-stage Taepodong missiles around this time as well; the North revealed its first road-mobile ICBM in 2012 and conducted the first test of an ICBM-class system in 2017; it conducted additional ICBM tests in 2022

" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json index b17870b2..441fa07b 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json @@ -1015,10 +1015,10 @@ "text": "2,598,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "3,034,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "3,034,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)" } }, "Refined petroleum products - production": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/la.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/la.json index a5a21158..8b9cf955 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/la.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/la.json @@ -1022,10 +1022,10 @@ "text": "19,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json index f98fbbe0..e8526045 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json @@ -812,10 +812,10 @@ "text": "14,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json index 78fd6ad2..1697556d 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json @@ -86,10 +86,10 @@ "text": "840 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Hovsgol Nuur - 2,620 sq km; Har Us Nuur - 1,760 sq km; " }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Uvs Nuur - 3,350 sq km; Hyargas Nuur - 1,360 sq km" } }, @@ -472,10 +472,10 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Hovsgol Nuur - 2,620 sq km; Har Us Nuur - 1,760 sq km; " }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Uvs Nuur - 3,350 sq km; Hyargas Nuur - 1,360 sq km" } }, @@ -1028,10 +1028,10 @@ "text": "35,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "14,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "14,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" } }, "Refined petroleum products - production": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json index c894cef8..671c2c48 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json @@ -1027,10 +1027,10 @@ "text": "718,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "303,600 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "303,600 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "182,300 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "182,300 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "3.6 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json index 9feac759..53862c01 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json @@ -992,10 +992,10 @@ "text": "38,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "60,300 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "60,300 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "27,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "27,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "159.7 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "fixed-line teledensity in Papua New Guinea has seen little change over the past two decades; progress in the country’s telecom sector has come primarily from mobile networks, where accessibility has expanded considerably in recent years, with population coverage increasing from less than 3% in 2006 to more than 90% by early 2021; Digitec Communications ,operating under the Vodafone PNG banner, launched services in April 2022, becoming the country’s third mobile network operator (MNO), and joining Digicel and Bmobile; the three MNOs operate networks offering services based on GSM, 3G, and LTE, depending on location; GSM is prevalent in many rural and remote areas, while 3G and LTE are centred more on urban areas. MNOs’ investments in 4G are growing, though GSM still represents the bulk of all mobile connections owing to the low penetration of smartphones and the concentration of high-speed data networks predominantly in high value urban areas; a lack of sufficient competition and investment in the wire line segment has driven up prices and hampered network coverage and quality; infrastructure deployment costs are high, partly due to the relatively low subscriber base, the difficult terrain, and the high proportion of the population living in rural areas; fixed telecom infrastructure is almost non-existent outside urban centers, leaving most of the population unserved; PNG is the Pacific region’s largest poorly developed telecom market, with only around 22% of its people connected to the internet; this falls far behind the recommended targets set in the country’s National Broadband Policy drafted in 2013, which aimed to provide broadband access to 90% of the total population by 2018; the existing submarine cable infrastructure is insufficient to serve the country’s needs; low international capacity has meant that internet services are expensive and slow; internet access has improved, however, with the Coral Sea Cable System which came online in 2019; the cable links PNG to the Solomon Islands and Australia (landing at Sydney); despite the improvement in recent years, the country is still impacted by a connectivity infrastructure deficit, making it reliant on more expensive alternatives such as satellites, also weighing on the affordability of services for end-users; after Chinese investors expressed their interest in acquiring the financially troubled Digicel Pacific, the Australian government decided to back Telstra’s purchase of the operator, in a bid to limit Chinese expansion and influence in the region; the transaction will include Digicel’s units in Fiji, Nauru, PNG (its largest market), Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu; as part of its efforts to promote itself in the region, and to counter the growing influence of China’s telcos, the Australian government provided the bulk of the funds to complete the deal; in June 2021, the National Executive Council voted to abolish Kumul Telikom Holdings, and in September 2021 the government announced its decision to merge the state-owned telcos Bmobile and Telikom, creating a more efficient vertically integrated operator. (2022)" + "text": "fixed-line teledensity in Papua New Guinea has seen little change over the past two decades; progress in the country’s telecom sector has come primarily from mobile networks, where accessibility has expanded considerably in recent years, with population coverage increasing from less than 3% in 2006 to more than 90% by early 2021; the MNOs operate networks offering services based on GSM, 3G, and LTE, depending on location; GSM is prevalent in many rural and remote areas, while 3G and LTE are centered more on urban areas; MNOs’ investments in 4G are growing, though GSM still represents the bulk of all mobile connections owing to the low penetration of smartphones and the concentration of high-speed data networks predominantly in high value urban areas; a lack of sufficient competition and investment in the wire line segment has driven up prices and hampered network coverage and quality; infrastructure deployment costs are high, partly due to the relatively low subscriber base, the difficult terrain, and the high proportion of the population living in rural areas; fixed telecom infrastructure is almost non-existent outside urban centers, leaving most of the population under served; PNG is the Pacific region’s largest poorly developed telecom market, with only around 22% of its people connected to the internet; this falls far behind the recommended targets set in the country’s National Broadband Policy drafted in 2013, which aimed to provide broadband access to 90% of the total population by 2018; the existing submarine cable infrastructure is insufficient to serve the country’s needs; low international capacity has meant that internet services are expensive and slow; the cable links PNG to the Solomon Islands and Australia (landing at Sydney); despite the improvement in recent years, the country is still impacted by a connectivity infrastructure deficit, making it reliant on more expensive alternatives such as satellites, also weighing on the affordability of services for end-users (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "access to telephone services is not widely available; fixed-line nearly 2 per 100 and mobile-cellular nearly 48 per 100 persons (2019)" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json index 308c8872..3dc73a37 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ "text": "16,270 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Laguna de Bay - 890 sq km" } }, @@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Laguna de Bay - 890 sq km" } }, @@ -1051,10 +1051,10 @@ "text": "527,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "12,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "12,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "232,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "232,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "138.5 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1125,7 +1125,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "the Covid-19 pandemic had a relatively minor impact on the Philippine’s telecom sector in 2020; subscriber numbers fell in some areas, but this was offset by strong growth in mobile data and broadband usage since a significant proportion of the population transitioned to working or studying from home; major investment programs covering LTE, 5G, and fiber broadband networks suffered slight delays due to holdups in supply chains, but activity has since ramped up in an attempt to complete the roll outs as per the original schedule; the major telecom operators had mixed financial results for the past year; PLDT reported record revenues, whereas Globe Telecom’s performance dropped below 2019 levels; the pandemic was partly the cause in both cases: shifts in customer behavior during the enforced lock down bolstered mobile data and broadband, whereas Globe Telecom’s leadership of the mobile market saw it suffer to a greater extent overall, as the total number of mobile subscribers fell in the first quarter of 2021; in spite of the setback, both companies predict a positive outlook for growth through the rest of 2021 and into 2022; overall, the number of mobile subscribers is expected to grow to 153 million by the end of 2021, with the penetration rate approaching 144%; PLDT and Globe Telecom have maintained their dominance of the Philippines telecom market, despite having their duopoly status removed by the government as far back as 2017; two new entrants – DITO Telecommunity and NOW Telecom – have since become the third and fourth operators, but delays in their respective launch programs have caused minimal impact to the leaders’ market share; the government remains keen, and committed, to seeing strong competition, growth, and service excellence in the telecom sector, so there is likely to be continued support (financially as well as through legislation such as enabling mobile tower sharing and number portability) to ensure that the sector remains viable for emerging players; the mobile sector will remain the Philippines’ primary market for telecommunications well into the future; the unique terrain and resulting challenges associated with accessing remote parts of the archipelago means that in many areas fixed networks are neither cost-effective nor logistically viable; both PLDT and Globe Telecom continue to roll out fixed networks in some urban areas where it remains feasible to do so (primarily to support fixed broadband or — in Globe Telecom’s case — fixed wireless services); the bulk of telecoms investment over the coming years will continue to be in 5G and 5G-enabled LTE networks; coverage of LTE and 5G networks extends to over 95% of the population, and for the vast majority of people mobile will likely remain their only platform for telecom services. (2021)" + "text": "the Covid-19 pandemic had a relatively minor impact on the Philippine’s telecom sector in 2020; subscriber numbers fell in some areas, but this was offset by strong growth in mobile data and broadband usage since a significant proportion of the population transitioned to working or studying from home; major investment programs covering LTE, 5G, and fiber broadband networks suffered slight delays due to holdups in supply chains, but activity has since ramped up in an attempt to complete the roll outs as per the original schedule; the major telecom operators had mixed financial results for the past year; overall, the number of mobile subscribers is expected to grow to 153 million by the end of 2021, with the penetration rate approaching 144%; the government remains keen, and committed, to seeing strong competition, growth, and service excellence in the telecom sector, so there is likely to be continued support (financially as well as through legislation such as enabling mobile tower sharing and number portability) to ensure that the sector remains viable for emerging players; the mobile sector will remain the Philippines’ primary market for telecommunications well into the future; the unique terrain and resulting challenges associated with accessing remote parts of the archipelago means that in many areas fixed networks are neither cost-effective nor logistically viable; the bulk of telecoms investment over the coming years will continue to be in 5G and 5G-enabled LTE networks; coverage of LTE and 5G networks extends to over 95% of the population, and for the vast majority of people mobile will likely remain their only platform for telecom services (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "telecommunications infrastructure includes the following platforms: fixed line, mobile cellular, cable TV, over-the-air TV, radio and (very small aperture terminal) VSAT, fiber-optic cable, and satellite for redundant international connectivity; fixed-line nearly 4 per 100 and mobile-cellular nearly 155 per 100 (2019)" @@ -1296,7 +1296,7 @@ "note": "note: as of 2020, women made up about 6% of the active military; women were allowed to enter the Philippine Military Academy and train as combat soldiers in 1993" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were formally organized during the American colonial period as the Philippine Army; they were established by the National Defense Act of 1935 and were composed of both Filipinos and Americans; the US and Philippines agreed to a mutual defense treaty in 1951; in 2014, both governments signed an Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) that established new parameters for military cooperation; under the EDCA, the Philippine Government can invite US forces to use designated facilities but stops short of a permanent US military presence; the Philippines has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments

as of 2022, the AFP's primary air and ground operational focus was on internal security duties, particularly in the south, where several separatist insurgent and terrorist groups operated and up to 60% of the armed forces were deployed; additional combat operations were being conducted against the Communist Peoples Party/New People’s Army, which was active mostly on Luzon, the Visayas, and areas of Mindanao

in addition to its typical roles of patrolling and defending the country's maritime claims, the Navy conducts interdiction operations against terrorist, insurgent, and criminal groups around the southern islands; in 2017, the Philippines began conducting joint maritime patrols with Indonesia and Malaysia to counter regional terrorist activities, particularly in the Sulu Sea; the Philippine Marine Corps assists the Army in counterinsurgency operations

the Philippines National Police (PNP) also has an active role in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations alongside the AFP, particularly the Special Action Force, a PNP commando unit that specializes in urban counter-terrorism operations (2022)" + "text": "the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were formally organized during the American colonial period as the Philippine Army; they were established by the National Defense Act of 1935 and were comprised of both Filipinos and Americans

the US and Philippines agreed to a mutual defense treaty in 1951; in 2014, the two governments signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) that established new parameters for military cooperation; under the EDCA, the Philippine Government may grant US troops access to Philippine military bases on a rotational basis “for security cooperation exercises, joint and combined military training activities, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities”; the Philippines has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments

as of 2022, the AFP's primary air and ground operational focus was on internal security duties, particularly in the south, where several separatist insurgent and terrorist groups operated and up to 60% of the armed forces were deployed; additional combat operations were being conducted against the Communist Peoples Party/New People’s Army, which was active mostly on Luzon, the Visayas, and areas of Mindanao

in addition to its typical roles of patrolling and defending the country's maritime claims, the Navy conducts interdiction operations against terrorist, insurgent, and criminal groups around the southern islands; in 2017, the Philippines began conducting joint maritime patrols with Indonesia and Malaysia to counter regional terrorist activities, particularly in the Sulu Sea; the Philippine Marine Corps assists the Army in counterinsurgency operations

the Philippines National Police (PNP) also has an active role in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations alongside the AFP, particularly the Special Action Force, a PNP commando unit that specializes in urban counter-terrorism operations (2022)" }, "Maritime threats": { "text": "

the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of littoral states and offshore waters in the South China Sea as high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; an emerging threat area lies in the Celebes and Sulu Seas between the Philippines and Malaysia where 11 ships were attacked in 2021; numerous commercial vessels have been attacked and hijacked both at anchor and while underway; hijacked vessels are often disguised and cargoes stolen

" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json index 9cf5750d..11c7652c 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json @@ -1000,10 +1000,10 @@ "text": "1.448 million bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "13,000 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "13,000 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "1,121,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "1,121,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1074,7 +1074,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "a wealthy city-state, Singapore has a highly developed ICT infrastructure; government supported near universal home broadband penetration and free public access to wireless network; the government's telecommunication regulator, Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA), issued awards in mid-2020 to telecom operators with the goal of having at least 50% of the city-state covered with a standalone 5G network by the end of 2022; government actively promoting Smart Nation initiative supporting digital innovation; government oversees service providers and controls Internet content; well served by submarine cable and satellite connections; major importer of integrated circuits and broadcasting equipment from China and exporter of same to SE Asian neighboring countries (2021)" + "text": "a wealthy city-state, Singapore has a highly developed ICT infrastructure; government supported near universal home broadband penetration and free public access to wireless network; the government's telecommunication regulator, Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA), issued awards in mid-2020 to telecom operators with the goal of having at least 50% of the city-state covered with a standalone 5G network by the end of 2022; government actively promoting Smart Nation initiative supporting digital innovation; government oversees service providers and controls Internet content; well served by submarine cable and satellite connections (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "excellent domestic facilities; fixed-line roughly 32 per 100 and mobile-cellular 144 per 100 teledensity; multiple providers of high-speed Internet connectivity (2020)" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json index 15a20902..84cf3d4c 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ "text": "64,150 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Thalesap Songkhla - 1,290 sq km" } }, @@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Thalesap Songkhla - 1,290 sq km" } }, @@ -1056,10 +1056,10 @@ "text": "1,284,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "28,600 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "28,600 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "979,800 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "979,800 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "252.8 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1294,11 +1294,11 @@ "text": "estimated 300,000 active duty personnel (200,000 Army; 70,000 Navy; 30,000 Air Force); approximately 230,000 Royal Thai Police (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the RTARF has a diverse array of foreign-supplied weapons systems, including a large amount of obsolescent or second-hand US equipment; since 2010, Thailand has received military equipment from nearly 20 countries, including China, South Korea, Sweden, Ukraine, and the US (2022)" + "text": "the RTARF has a diverse array of foreign-supplied weapons systems, including a large amount of obsolescent or second-hand US equipment; since 2010, Thailand has received military equipment from nearly 20 countries, including China, South Korea, Sweden, Ukraine, and the US; as of 2022, Thailand was making efforts to increase its domestic defense production capabilities in such areas as armored vehicles, unmanned aerial systems, and military technologies (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { - "text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; 21 years of age for compulsory military service (men only); men register at 18 years of age; 2-year conscript service obligation varies by educational qualifications (2022)", - "note": "note 1: serving in the armed forces is a national duty of all Thai citizens; conscription was introduced in 1905; it includes women, however, only men over the age of 21 who have not gone through reserve training are conscripted; conscripts are chosen by lottery (on draft day, eligible draftees can request volunteer service, or they may choose to stay for the conscription lottery); there are reductions or deferments of service obligation for those with higher educational qualifications, but most conscripts serve for 24 months; approximately 75-100,000 men are drafted for military service each year and conscripts reportedly comprise as much as 50% of the armed forces

note 2: as of 2020, women comprised about 8% of active duty military personnel" + "text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; 21 years of age for compulsory military service for men; men register at 18 years of age; volunteer service obligation may be as short as 6 or 12 months, depending on educational qualifications; conscript service obligation also varies by educational qualifications, but is typically 24 months (2022)", + "note": "note 1: serving in the armed forces is a national duty of all Thai citizens; conscription was introduced in 1905; it includes women, however, only men over the age of 21 who have not gone through reserve training are conscripted; conscripts are chosen by lottery (on draft day, eligible draftees can request volunteer service, or they may choose to stay for the conscription lottery); approximately 75-100,000 men are drafted for military service each year and conscripts reportedly comprise as much as 50% of the armed forces

note 2: as of 2020, women comprised about 8% of active-duty military personnel" }, "Military deployments": { "text": "280 South Sudan (UNMISS) (May 2022)" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json index 09ada0e5..0002ba56 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json @@ -976,10 +976,10 @@ "text": "3,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "32,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "32,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1175,7 +1175,7 @@ "text": "approximately 2,000 personnel (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the military is lightly armed and has a limited inventory consisting of equipment donated by other countries; since 2010 it has received naval patrol craft from China and South Korea (2022)" + "text": "the military is lightly armed and has a limited inventory consisting of equipment donated by other countries; since 2010 it has received small amounts of material from China, South Korea, and the US (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service; compulsory service was  authorized in 2020 for men and women aged 18-30 for 18 months of service, but the level of implementation is unclear  (2021)" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json index 3da7ef1e..1f73616d 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json @@ -840,10 +840,10 @@ "text": "998,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "886,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "886,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "2.4 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@ "note": "note: Taiwan trains about 120,000 reservists annually, but in 2022 announced intentions to increase that figure to 260,000" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the Taiwan military is armed mostly with second-hand weapons and equipment provided by the US; since 2010, the US continued to be the largest provider of arms; Taiwan also has a domestic defense industry capable of building and upgrading a range of weapons systems, including surface ships and submarines (2022)" + "text": "the Taiwan military is armed mostly with second-hand weapons and equipment provided by the US; since 2010, the US has continued to be the largest provider of arms; Taiwan also has a domestic defense industry capable of building and upgrading a range of weapons systems, including surface ships and submarines (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "starting with those born in 1994, men 18-36 years of age may volunteer for military service or must complete 4 months of compulsory military training (5 weeks of basic training followed by 11 weeks of specialized training with field units); civil service can be substituted for military service in some cases; men born before December 1993 are required to complete compulsory service for 12 months (military or civil); men are subject to training recalls up to four times for periods not to exceed 20 days for 8 years after discharge; women may enlist but are restricted to noncombat roles in most cases; as part of its transition to an all-volunteer military, the last cohort of 12-month military conscripts completed their service obligations in December 2018 (2022)", diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json index 0e769dd3..1126f85e 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json @@ -1033,10 +1033,10 @@ "text": "495,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "66,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "66,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "103,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "103,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "4.4 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/europe/al.json b/europe/al.json index 748dc9e4..5e126d85 100644 --- a/europe/al.json +++ b/europe/al.json @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ "text": "3,537 sq km (2014)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Scutari (shared with Montenegro) - 400 sq km
note - largest lake in the Balkans" } }, @@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Scutari (shared with Montenegro) - 400 sq km
note - largest lake in the Balkans" } }, @@ -1020,10 +1020,10 @@ "text": "26,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "10,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "10,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "150 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Albania’s small telecom market has improved through signatory status of EU accession plan; EU financial aid will build infrastructure and enhance cooperation; operator committed €100 million to upgrade fixed-line infrastructure, supporting broadband services nationally; consistent with the region, fixed-line telephony use and penetration is declining as subscribers prefer mobile solutions; mobile sector is supported through LTE networks; operators have invested in 5G, including the intention to create a corridor with Kosovo; importer of broadcasting equipment from EU neighbors (2021)" + "text": "Albania’s small telecom market has experienced some significant changes in recent years;  upgrades were made to the fixed-line infrastructure to support broadband services; fixed-line telephony use and penetration in Albania is declining steadily as subscribers migrate to mobile solutions; the mobile sector is well provided with LTE networks, while operators have invested in 5G; some of these efforts have been made in conjunction with neighboring Kosovo, with the intention of a seamless 5G corridor along the highway connecting the two countries; the country has long sought accession to the European Union (EU) which has benefited its telecoms sector through closer scrutiny of its regulatory regime and through the injection of funding to help modernize infrastructure (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line approximately 8 per 100, teledensity continues to decline due to heavy use of mobile-cellular telephone services; mobile-cellular telephone use is widespread and generally effective, 91 per 100 for mobile-cellular (2020)" diff --git a/europe/an.json b/europe/an.json index 0f0ce8be..7d999c9f 100644 --- a/europe/an.json +++ b/europe/an.json @@ -803,10 +803,10 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "modern automatic telephone system; broadband Internet and LTE mobile lines for both consumer and enterprise customers available (2019)" + "text": "Andorra has a modern telecommunications system with microwave radio relay connections between the exchanges and land line circuits to France and Spain (2020)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "about 51 per 100 fixed-line, 114 per 100 mobile-cellular (2019)" + "text": "about 52 per 100 fixed-line, 122 per 100 mobile-cellular (2020)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 376; landline circuits to France and Spain; modern system with microwave radio relay connections between exchanges (2019)" diff --git a/europe/au.json b/europe/au.json index 6acb6b0d..f89bb8a4 100644 --- a/europe/au.json +++ b/europe/au.json @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ "text": "1,170 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Constance (shared with Switzerland and Germany) - 540 sq km" } }, @@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Constance (shared with Switzerland and Germany) - 540 sq km" } }, @@ -1015,10 +1015,10 @@ "text": "278,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "168,300 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "168,300 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "35.2 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "57,887 (Syria), 41,037 (Afghanistan), 9,661 (Iraq), 8,212 (Somalia), 7,046 (Iran), 7,003 (Russia) (mid-year 2021); 84,756 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)" + "text": "57,887 (Syria), 41,037 (Afghanistan), 9,661 (Iraq), 8,212 (Somalia), 7,046 (Iran), 7,003 (Russia) (mid-year 2021); 85,415 (Ukraine) (as of 1 November 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "3,229 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/be.json b/europe/be.json index 3a47c2b6..b7e6248a 100644 --- a/europe/be.json +++ b/europe/be.json @@ -1003,10 +1003,10 @@ "text": "642,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "666,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "666,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1077,7 +1077,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "mobile networks have been upgraded to support growing mobile data use among subscribers, with near-comprehensive LTE coverage; operators have also trialed 5G in preparation for launching services; the auction of 5G-suitable spectrum has been delayed to the beginning of 2022, while the onerous restrictions on radiation have meant that some 5G trials have been suspended; there is effective competition in Belgium between the DSL and cable platforms, while in recent years government support has also encouraged investment in fiber networks; in a bid to encourage investment in under served areas, the regulator in 2018 amended the conditions by which market players grant wholesale access to copper and fiber infrastructure; in May 2019 it opened a further consultation on cost models for access to the networks of cablecos and those of Proximus’s fiber infrastructure. (2021)" + "text": "mobile networks have been upgraded to support growing mobile data use among subscribers, with near-comprehensive LTE coverage; operators have also trialed 5G in preparation for launching services; the auction of 5G-suitable spectrum has been delayed to the beginning of 2022, while the onerous restrictions on radiation have meant that some 5G trials have been suspended; there is effective competition in Belgium between the DSL and cable platforms, while in recent years government support has also encouraged investment in fiber networks; in a bid to encourage investment in under served areas, the regulator in 2018 amended the conditions by which market players grant wholesale access to copper and fiber infrastructure; in May 2019 it opened a further consultation on cost models for access to the networks of cablecos and fiber infrastructure (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "about 31 per 100 fixed-line and 99 per 100 mobile-cellular; nationwide mobile-cellular telephone system; extensive cable network; limited microwave radio relay network (2020)" diff --git a/europe/bk.json b/europe/bk.json index b56d2519..e0e21e5f 100644 --- a/europe/bk.json +++ b/europe/bk.json @@ -1001,10 +1001,10 @@ "text": "34,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "13,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "13,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1075,7 +1075,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "the telecom market has been liberalized and a regulatory framework created based on the EU’s regulatory framework for communications; although Bosnia-Herzegovina remains an EU candidate country, in July 2017 it applied amended mobile roaming charges to fit in with changes introduced across the Union; further roaming agreements were made in 2019 with other western Balkan countries; the fixed-line broadband network is comparatively underdeveloped, with the result that investments made in mobile upgrades to facilitate broadband connectivity in the country to a greater extent than is common elsewhere in Europe; internet services are available; DSL and cable are the main platforms for fixed-line connectivity, while fiber broadband as yet has only a small market presence; the three MNOs, each affiliated with one of the incumbent fixed-line operators, provide national coverage with 3G, though LTE coverage is only about 89%; their upgraded networks are helping to support broadband in rural areas where fixed-line infrastructure is insufficient; mobile data and mobile broadband offers will provide future revenue growth given the limited potential of mobile voice services; the MNOs tested LTE services under trial licenses from 2013, commercial launches were delayed until the award of spectrum in early 2019; the regulator stipulated that licenses must provide national coverage within five years; trials of 5G technology have been undertaken, though there are no plans to launch services commercially in the short term, given that the MNOs can continue to exploit the capacity of their existing LTE networks. (2021)" + "text": "the telecom market has been liberalized and a regulatory framework created based on the EU’s regulatory framework for communications; although Bosnia-Herzegovina remains an EU candidate country, in July 2017 it applied amended mobile roaming charges to fit in with changes introduced across the Union; further roaming agreements were made in 2019 with other western Balkan countries; the fixed-line broadband network is comparatively underdeveloped, with the result that investments made in mobile upgrades to facilitate broadband connectivity in the country to a greater extent than is common elsewhere in Europe; internet services are available; DSL and cable are the main platforms for fixed-line connectivity, while fiber broadband as yet has only a small market presence; the three MNOs, each affiliated with one of the incumbent fixed-line operators, provide national coverage with 3G, though LTE coverage is only about 89%; their upgraded networks are helping to support broadband in rural areas where fixed-line infrastructure is insufficient; mobile data and mobile broadband offers will provide future revenue growth given the limited potential of mobile voice services; the MNOs tested LTE services under trial licenses from 2013, commercial launches were delayed until the award of spectrum in early 2019; the regulator stipulated that licenses must provide national coverage within five years; trials of 5G technology have been undertaken, though there are no plans to launch services commercially in the short term, given that the MNOs can continue to exploit the capacity of their existing LTE networks (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line teledensity roughly 22 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular subscribership stands at 107 telephones per 100 persons (2020)" diff --git a/europe/bo.json b/europe/bo.json index 00e2bdea..19439437 100644 --- a/europe/bo.json +++ b/europe/bo.json @@ -1015,10 +1015,10 @@ "text": "134,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "32,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "32,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "383,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "383,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "198 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "the government of Belarus has successfully promoted the migration to an all-IP platform as part of a wider effort towards a digital transformation for the economy; the state-supported infrastructure operator beCloud has built an extensive fiber network which reaches all but the smallest settlements in the country; Belarus has the second highest fiber subscription rate in Europe, behind only Iceland; LTE coverage is almost universal, while considerable progress has also been made in developing 5G services. (2021)" + "text": "the government of Belarus has successfully promoted the migration to an all-IP platform as part of a wider effort towards a digital transformation for the economy; the state-supported infrastructure operator beCloud has built an extensive fiber network which reaches all but the smallest settlements in the country; Belarus has the second highest fiber subscription rate in Europe, behind only Iceland; LTE coverage is almost universal, while considerable progress has also been made in developing 5G services (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line teledensity is improving although rural areas continue to be underserved, approximately 47 per 100 fixed-line; mobile-cellular teledensity now roughly 124 telephones per 100 persons (2020)" @@ -1262,7 +1262,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "15,932 (Ukraine) (as of 24 October 2022)" + "text": "16,195 (Ukraine) (as of 31 October 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "6,104 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/bu.json b/europe/bu.json index 9a2e9981..c5507d12 100644 --- a/europe/bu.json +++ b/europe/bu.json @@ -1016,10 +1016,10 @@ "text": "97,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "119,800 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "119,800 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "15 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1093,7 +1093,7 @@ "text": "

Bulgaria’s telecom market was for some years affected by the difficult macroeconomic climate, as well as by relatively high unemployment and a shrinking population; these factors continue to slow investments in the sector, though revenue growth has returned since 2019; there still remains pressure on revenue growth, with consumers migrating from fixed-line voice telephony to mobile and VoIP alternatives, while the volume of SMS and MMS traffic has been affected by the growing use of alternative OTT messaging services; investing in network upgrades and its development of services based on 5G have stimulated other market players to invest in their own service provision; by the end of 2022 about 70% of the population is expected to be covered by 5G; the broadband market in Bulgaria enjoys excellent cross-platform competition; the share of the market held by DSL has fallen steadily as a result of customers being migrated to fiber networks; by early 2021 about 65% of fixed-line broadband subscribers were on fiber infrastructure; Bulgaria joins the U.S. State Department’s Clean Network initiative in a bid to protect its 5G communications networks

(2022)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "fixed-line over 12 per 100 persons, mobile-cellular teledensity, fostered by multiple service providers, is over 114 telephones per 100 persons (2020)" + "text": "fixed-line over 13 per 100 persons, mobile-cellular teledensity, fostered by multiple service providers, is over 114 telephones per 100 persons (2020)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 359; Caucasus Cable System via submarine cable provides connectivity to Ukraine, Georgia and Russia; a combination submarine cable and land fiber-optic system provides connectivity to Italy, Albania, and Macedonia; satellite earth stations - 3 (1 Intersputnik in the Atlantic Ocean region, 2 Intelsat in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean regions) (2019)" diff --git a/europe/cy.json b/europe/cy.json index 64a57e50..1fec8f51 100644 --- a/europe/cy.json +++ b/europe/cy.json @@ -1016,10 +1016,10 @@ "text": "54,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "9,820 (Syria) (mid-year 2021); 14,404 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)" + "text": "9,820 (Syria) (mid-year 2021); 14,523 (Ukraine) (as of 30 October 2022)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "242,000 (both Turkish and Greek Cypriots; many displaced since 1974) (2021)" diff --git a/europe/da.json b/europe/da.json index f423a243..d581b0e5 100644 --- a/europe/da.json +++ b/europe/da.json @@ -1000,10 +1000,10 @@ "text": "165,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "56,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "56,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "95,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "95,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "441 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1259,7 +1259,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "19,833 (Syria), 5,634 (Eritrea) (mid-year 2021); 36,449 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)" + "text": "19,833 (Syria), 5,634 (Eritrea) (mid-year 2021); 36,736 (Ukraine) (as of 30 October 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "11,608 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/ei.json b/europe/ei.json index 31f31846..f30be9bd 100644 --- a/europe/ei.json +++ b/europe/ei.json @@ -990,10 +990,10 @@ "text": "159,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "60,300 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "60,300 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1252,7 +1252,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "55,144 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)" + "text": "56,333 (Ukraine) (as of 31 October 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "107 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/en.json b/europe/en.json index 8afa9ef0..71aac3af 100644 --- a/europe/en.json +++ b/europe/en.json @@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ "text": "

president indirectly elected by Parliament for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); if a candidate does not secure two thirds of the votes after 3 rounds of balloting, then an electoral college consisting of Parliament members and local council members elects the president, choosing between the 2 candidates with the highest number of votes; election last held on 30-31 August 2021 (next to be held in 2026); in a first round of voting on 30 August, parliament failed to elect a president; in a second round on 31 August, the sole candidate, Alar KARIS, received 72 votes of 101 votes (there were 8 blank votes and 21 electors not present); prime minister nominated by the president and approved by Parliament

" }, "election results": { - "text": "

2021: Alar KARIS elected president; parliamentary vote Alar KARIS (independent) 72 of 101 votes;  KALLAS is Estonia's first female prime minister

2016: Kersti KALJULAID is indirectly elected president with 81 of 98 votes in parliament (17 ballots blank). She is sworn in on October 10 as the first female head of state of Estonia.

" + "text": "

2021: Alar KARIS elected president; parliamentary vote Alar KARIS (independent) 72 of 101 votes;  KALLAS is Estonia's first female prime minister

2016: Kersti KALJULAID is indirectly elected president with 81 of 98 votes in parliament (17 ballots blank). She is sworn in on October 10 as the first female head of state of Estonia.

" } }, "Legislative branch": { @@ -1012,10 +1012,10 @@ "text": "27,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1254,7 +1254,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "60,980 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)" + "text": "61,276 (Ukraine) (as of 28 October 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "71,873 (mid-year 2021); note - following independence in 1991, automatic citizenship was restricted to those who were Estonian citizens prior to the 1940 Soviet occupation and their descendants; thousands of ethnic Russians remained stateless when forced to choose between passing Estonian language and citizenship tests or applying for Russian citizenship; one reason for demurring on Estonian citizenship was to retain the right of visa-free travel to Russia; stateless residents can vote in local elections but not general elections; stateless parents who have been lawful residents of Estonia for at least five years can apply for citizenship for their children before they turn 15 years old" diff --git a/europe/ez.json b/europe/ez.json index e271c154..041568c1 100644 --- a/europe/ez.json +++ b/europe/ez.json @@ -1004,10 +1004,10 @@ "text": "219,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "400 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "400 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "150,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "150,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "15 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/europe/fi.json b/europe/fi.json index e7d68d0a..ce697186 100644 --- a/europe/fi.json +++ b/europe/fi.json @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ "text": "690 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Saimaa - 1,760 sq km; Paijanne - 1,090 sq km; Inarijarvi - 1,000 sq km; Oulujarvi - 900 sq km; Pielinen - 850 sq km" } }, @@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Saimaa - 1,760 sq km; Paijanne - 1,090 sq km; Inarijarvi - 1,000 sq km; Oulujarvi - 900 sq km; Pielinen - 850 sq km" } }, @@ -1016,10 +1016,10 @@ "text": "207,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "232,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "232,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1268,7 +1268,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "9,053 (Iraq) (mid-year 2021); 38,588 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)" + "text": "9,053 (Iraq) (mid-year 2021); 38,588 (Ukraine) (as of 26 October 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "3,416 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/fo.json b/europe/fo.json index 4a66f697..06f98027 100644 --- a/europe/fo.json +++ b/europe/fo.json @@ -774,10 +774,10 @@ "text": "5,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/europe/fr.json b/europe/fr.json index 3d22cab7..de4067af 100644 --- a/europe/fr.json +++ b/europe/fr.json @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ "note": "metropolitan France: 26,000 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Geneva (shared with Switzerland) - 580 sq km" } }, @@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Geneva (shared with Switzerland) - 580 sq km" } }, @@ -1059,10 +1059,10 @@ "text": "1,688,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "1,064,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "1,064,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "61.7 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1339,7 +1339,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "37,744 (Afghanistan), 23,980 (Sri Lanka), 23,510 (Syria), 21,070 (Sudan), 19,007 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 16,995 (Russia), 15,090 (Guinea), 14,296 (Serbia and Kosovo), 13,180 (Turkey), 10,849 (Cambodia), 9,328 (Iraq) 8,519 (China), 8,338 (Cote d'Ivoire), 8,218 (Eritrea), 7,628 (Vietnam), 6,947 (Bangladesh), 6,649 (Somalia), 6,642 (Albania), 6,371 (Laos), 6,074 (Mauritania), 5,908 (Mali) (mid-year 2021); 105,000 (Ukraine) (as of 26 September 2022)" + "text": "37,744 (Afghanistan), 23,980 (Sri Lanka), 23,510 (Syria), 21,070 (Sudan), 19,007 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 16,995 (Russia), 15,090 (Guinea), 14,296 (Serbia and Kosovo), 13,180 (Turkey), 10,849 (Cambodia), 9,328 (Iraq) 8,519 (China), 8,338 (Cote d'Ivoire), 8,218 (Eritrea), 7,628 (Vietnam), 6,947 (Bangladesh), 6,649 (Somalia), 6,642 (Albania), 6,371 (Laos), 6,074 (Mauritania), 5,908 (Mali) (mid-year 2021); 118,994 (Ukraine) (as of 31 October 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "2,094 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/gi.json b/europe/gi.json index 9920c4ed..20045df9 100644 --- a/europe/gi.json +++ b/europe/gi.json @@ -687,10 +687,10 @@ "text": "83,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/europe/gm.json b/europe/gm.json index c1ea4478..9752fd73 100644 --- a/europe/gm.json +++ b/europe/gm.json @@ -94,10 +94,10 @@ "text": "6,500 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Constance (shared with Switzerland and Austria) - 540 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Stettiner Haff/Zalew Szczecinski (shared with Poland) - 900 sq km" } }, @@ -477,10 +477,10 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Constance (shared with Switzerland and Austria) - 540 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Stettiner Haff/Zalew Szczecinski (shared with Poland) - 900 sq km" } }, @@ -1035,10 +1035,10 @@ "text": "2,346,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "1,720,600 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "1,720,600 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "115.2 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "616,325 (Syria), 152,677 (Afghanistan), 147,400 (Iraq), 62,152 (Eritrea), 45,704 (Iran), 34,465 (Turkey), 29,137 (Somalia), 9,329 (Russia), 9,323 (Nigeria), 8,600 (Pakistan), 7,503 (Serbia and Kosovo), 6,057 (Ethiopia) (mid-year 2021); 1,002,668 (Ukraine) (as of 8 October 2022)" + "text": "616,325 (Syria), 152,677 (Afghanistan), 147,400 (Iraq), 62,152 (Eritrea), 45,704 (Iran), 34,465 (Turkey), 29,137 (Somalia), 9,329 (Russia), 9,323 (Nigeria), 8,600 (Pakistan), 7,503 (Serbia and Kosovo), 6,057 (Ethiopia) (mid-year 2021); 1,008,935 (Ukraine) (as of 1 November 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "26,980 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/gr.json b/europe/gr.json index 43cbb5f6..4f3fb426 100644 --- a/europe/gr.json +++ b/europe/gr.json @@ -1008,10 +1008,10 @@ "text": "309,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "4,100 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "4,100 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "491,300 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "491,300 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "10 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "38,496 (Syria), 25,188 (Afghanistan), 12,657 (Iraq), 5,002 (West Bank and Gaza) (mid-year 2021); 19,997 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)" + "text": "38,496 (Syria), 25,188 (Afghanistan), 12,657 (Iraq), 5,002 (West Bank and Gaza) (mid-year 2021); 19,997 (Ukraine) (as of 1 November 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "5,552 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/hr.json b/europe/hr.json index 42cc7817..17168c2f 100644 --- a/europe/hr.json +++ b/europe/hr.json @@ -1033,10 +1033,10 @@ "text": "71,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "65,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "65,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "71 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "18,931 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)" + "text": "18,990 (Ukraine) (as of 1 November 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "2,910 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/hu.json b/europe/hu.json index 92a0f290..2cb199c2 100644 --- a/europe/hu.json +++ b/europe/hu.json @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ "text": "1,721 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Balaton - 590 sq km" } }, @@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Balaton - 590 sq km" } }, @@ -1030,10 +1030,10 @@ "text": "180,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "8,000 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "8,000 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "134,800 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "134,800 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "12.1 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/europe/ic.json b/europe/ic.json index 210f209c..60affec2 100644 --- a/europe/ic.json +++ b/europe/ic.json @@ -986,10 +986,10 @@ "text": "19,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/europe/it.json b/europe/it.json index 5e06001d..bfedcad1 100644 --- a/europe/it.json +++ b/europe/it.json @@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ "text": "
Senate - last held on 25 September 2022
Chamber of Deputies - last held on 25 September 2022; note - snap elections were called when Prime Minister DRAGHI resigned and the parliament was dissolved on 21 July 2022 (next to be held 30 September 2027)" }, "election results": { - "text": "
Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - center-right coalition (FdI 65, Lega 30, FI 18), center-left coalition (PD 40, AVS 3), M5S 28, Action-Italia Viva 9, SVP 2, MAIE 1, ScN 1; composition (as of March 2022) - men 208, women 112, percent of women 35%
Chamber of Deputies - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - center-right coalition (FdI 119, Lega 66, FI 45), center-left coalition (PD 69, AVS 12), M5S 52, Action-Italia Viva 21, SVP 3, MAIE 1, ScN 1; composition (as of September 2021) - men 401, women 229, percent of women 36.4%; note - total Parliament percent of women 35.9%" + "text": "
Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - center-right coalition (FdI 65, Lega 30, FI 18), center-left coalition (PD 40, AVS 3), M5S 28, Action-Italia Viva 9, SVP 2, MAIE 1, ScN 1; composition (as of September 2022) - men 131, women 69, percent of women 34.5%
Chamber of Deputies - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - center-right coalition (FdI 119, Lega 66, FI 45), center-left coalition (PD 69, AVS 12), M5S 52, Action-Italia Viva 21, SVP 3, MAIE 1, ScN 1; composition (as of September 2022) - men 271, women 129, percent of women 32.3%; note - total Parliament percent of women 33%" }, "note": "note: in October 2019, Italy's Parliament voted to reduce the number of Senate seats from 315 to 200 and the number of Chamber of Deputies seats from 630 to 400; a referendum to reduce the membership of Parliament held on 20-21 September 2020 was approved, effective for the September 2022 snap election" }, @@ -1018,10 +1018,10 @@ "text": "1,255,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "10,100 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "10,100 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "1.253 million barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "1.253 million bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "497.9 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1286,7 +1286,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "19,441 (Nigeria), 15,337 (Pakistan), 12,962 (Afghanistan), 10,609 (Mali), 7,901 (Somalia), 5,845 (Gambia), 5,079 (Iraq) (mid-year 2021); 171,546 (Ukraine) (as of 19 October 2022)" + "text": "19,441 (Nigeria), 15,337 (Pakistan), 12,962 (Afghanistan), 10,609 (Mali), 7,901 (Somalia), 5,845 (Gambia), 5,079 (Iraq) (mid-year 2021); 171,546 (Ukraine) (as of 31 October 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "3,000 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/kv.json b/europe/kv.json index 4a4c8e44..4c5f6349 100644 --- a/europe/kv.json +++ b/europe/kv.json @@ -872,10 +872,10 @@ "text": "12,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/europe/lg.json b/europe/lg.json index 2025df0b..1a38a3da 100644 --- a/europe/lg.json +++ b/europe/lg.json @@ -1015,10 +1015,10 @@ "text": "39,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1262,7 +1262,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "40,163 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)" + "text": "40,442 (Ukraine) (as of 28 October 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "209,168 (mid-year 2021); note - individuals who were Latvian citizens prior to the 1940 Soviet occupation and their descendants were recognized as Latvian citizens when the country's independence was restored in 1991; citizens of the former Soviet Union residing in Latvia who have neither Latvian nor other citizenship are considered non-citizens (officially there is no statelessness in Latvia) and are entitled to non-citizen passports; children born after Latvian independence to stateless parents are entitled to Latvian citizenship upon their parents' request; non-citizens cannot vote or hold certain government jobs and are exempt from military service but can travel visa-free in the EU under the Schengen accord like Latvian citizens; non-citizens can obtain naturalization if they have been permanent residents of Latvia for at least five years, pass tests in Latvian language and history, and know the words of the Latvian national anthem" diff --git a/europe/lh.json b/europe/lh.json index 6829d569..5909f4be 100644 --- a/europe/lh.json +++ b/europe/lh.json @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ "text": "44 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Curonian Lagoon (shared with Russia) - 1,620 sq km" } }, @@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Curonian Lagoon (shared with Russia) - 1,620 sq km" } }, @@ -1021,10 +1021,10 @@ "text": "68,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "194,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "194,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "12 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "68,925 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)" + "text": "69,317 (Ukraine) (as of 27 October 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "2,721 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/lo.json b/europe/lo.json index 6e160d08..093a5e13 100644 --- a/europe/lo.json +++ b/europe/lo.json @@ -1001,10 +1001,10 @@ "text": "85,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "100 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "100 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "109,800 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "109,800 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "9 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1075,7 +1075,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Slovakia’s incumbent telco Slovak Telekom retains its dominance of the fixed-line voice and broadband sector, though there is effective competition in the mobile market, where most investment is being channeled; the main operators including O2 Slovakia and Orange Slovakia have expanded into offering bundled fixed and mobile services; the broadband market has shown steady growth in recent years; DSL remains the principal technology though in early 2020 it was eclipsed by the fast-developing fiber sector, which has been supported by sympathetic regulatory measures and considerable investment among operators; the cable sector is a distant third in terms of subscribers, though cable is particularly strong in urban areas; the main telco UPC Slovakia has gained customers steadily in recent years (reaching 144,000 by the end of 2020) on the back of its widely available 1Gb/s service offering; Slovakia’s mobile market is served by four MNOs, two of which are the local units of operators with a pan-European reach (Deutsche Telekom and Orange Group), O2 Slovakia was once the local unit of Telefónica Group before being sold to an investment concern; mobile broadband access and content services are developing rapidly in line with operators having upgraded their networks; the regulator prepared the groundwork for 5G services in line with European Union requirements, with concessions in the 3.5GHz range followed by those in the 700MHz, 900MHz and 1800MHz bands; commercial services by the first quarter of 2021 were limited, licensees have invested in 5G infrastructure and also have considerable coverage obligations. (2021)" + "text": "the broadband market has shown steady growth in recent years; DSL remains the principal technology though in early 2020 it was eclipsed by the fast-developing fiber sector, which has been supported by sympathetic regulatory measures and considerable investment among operators; the cable sector is a distant third in terms of subscribers, though cable is particularly strong in urban areas; Slovakia’s mobile market is served by four MNOs; mobile broadband access and content services are developing rapidly in line with operators having upgraded their networks; the regulator prepared the groundwork for 5G services in line with European Union requirements, with concessions in the 3.5GHz range followed by those in the 700MHz, 900MHz and 1800MHz bands; commercial services by the first quarter of 2021 were limited, licensees have invested in 5G infrastructure and also have considerable coverage obligations (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "four companies have a license to operate cellular networks and provide nationwide cellular services; a few other companies provide services but do not have their own networks; fixed-line roughly 11 per 100 and mobile-cellular over 133 per 100 teledensity (2020)" diff --git a/europe/lu.json b/europe/lu.json index 0c67ae75..5149ac90 100644 --- a/europe/lu.json +++ b/europe/lu.json @@ -987,10 +987,10 @@ "text": "63,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/europe/md.json b/europe/md.json index a241d793..acf5dd0d 100644 --- a/europe/md.json +++ b/europe/md.json @@ -998,10 +998,10 @@ "text": "22,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/europe/mj.json b/europe/mj.json index 27a164f0..fa631913 100644 --- a/europe/mj.json +++ b/europe/mj.json @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ "text": "24 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Scutari (shared with Albania) - 400 sq km
note - largest lake in the Balkans" } }, @@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Scutari (shared with Albania) - 400 sq km
note - largest lake in the Balkans" } }, @@ -1043,10 +1043,10 @@ "text": "7,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "27,576 (Ukraine) (as of 4 October 2022)" + "text": "28,639 (Ukraine) (as of 1 November 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "458 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/mk.json b/europe/mk.json index 4869eff3..87cd1335 100644 --- a/europe/mk.json +++ b/europe/mk.json @@ -994,10 +994,10 @@ "text": "22,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1203,7 +1203,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "6,160 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)" + "text": "6,200 (Ukraine) (as of 1 November 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "553 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/mt.json b/europe/mt.json index 52c124fa..39099ef8 100644 --- a/europe/mt.json +++ b/europe/mt.json @@ -985,10 +985,10 @@ "text": "54,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/europe/nl.json b/europe/nl.json index 1eea6a86..e5382c99 100644 --- a/europe/nl.json +++ b/europe/nl.json @@ -1018,10 +1018,10 @@ "text": "915,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "8,800 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "8,800 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "1,096,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "1,096,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "137.7 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/europe/no.json b/europe/no.json index 9258e4dd..ba85e15f 100644 --- a/europe/no.json +++ b/europe/no.json @@ -1004,10 +1004,10 @@ "text": "215,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "1,242,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "1,242,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "66,300 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "66,300 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "8,122,200,000 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1244,7 +1244,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "15,542 (Syria), 11,965 (Eritrea) (mid-year 2021); 30,570 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)" + "text": "15,542 (Syria), 11,965 (Eritrea) (mid-year 2021); 30,989 (Ukraine) (as of 28 October 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "4,154 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/pl.json b/europe/pl.json index 7e222988..978d4610 100644 --- a/europe/pl.json +++ b/europe/pl.json @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ "text": "970 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Zalew Szczecinski/Stettiner Haff (shared with Germany) - 900 sq km" } }, @@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Zalew Szczecinski/Stettiner Haff (shared with Germany) - 900 sq km" } }, @@ -1042,10 +1042,10 @@ "text": "697,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "6,000 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "6,000 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "542,100 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "542,100 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "113 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1116,7 +1116,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "the liberalized telecom market has seen considerable development in the broadband and mobile sectors; the incumbent telco, Orange Poland, dominates the broadband market and has invested in fiber infrastructure to support the growing adoption of bundled services among customers; the regulatory environment has encouraged market competition, partly by encouraging operators to secure spectrum and also by ensuring access to cable and fiber infrastructure; the mobile market in recent years has been characterized by the rapid extension of LTE networks and the development of mobile data services based on newly released and re-farmed spectrum; the regulator’s attempts to auction spectrum in a range of bands has been delayed, with spectrum in the 5G-suitable 3.4-3.8GHz range having been suspended to later in 2021 as a result of the Covid-19 outbreak and legislative changes. (2021)" + "text": "the liberalized telecom market has seen considerable development in the broadband and mobile sectors; the regulatory environment has encouraged market competition, partly by encouraging operators to secure spectrum and also by ensuring access to cable and fiber infrastructure; the mobile market in recent years has been characterized by the rapid extension of LTE networks and the development of mobile data services based on newly released and re-farmed spectrum; the regulator’s attempts to auction spectrum in a range of bands has been delayed, with spectrum in the 5G-suitable 3.4-3.8GHz range having been suspended to later in 2021 as a result of the Covid-19 outbreak and legislative changes (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "several nation-wide networks provide mobile-cellular service; fixed-line roughly 15 per 100 (service lags in rural areas), mobile-cellular over 130 per 100 persons (2020)" diff --git a/europe/po.json b/europe/po.json index ac693604..aa10d319 100644 --- a/europe/po.json +++ b/europe/po.json @@ -1008,10 +1008,10 @@ "text": "249,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "255,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "255,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1082,7 +1082,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Portugal has a medium-sized telecom market with a strong mobile sector and a growing broadband customer base; before the pandemic, the country had seen improving economic growth, following several years of austerity measures; revenue among some operators remains under pressure, though investments in network upgrades are continuing in an effort to attract customers to high-end services; Portugal’s broadband services have grown steadily in recent years, largely the result of joint efforts between the regulator and the key market operators which have invested in significant infrastructure upgrades; these operators are focused on fiber-based services, resulting in a migration of subscribers from DSL infrastructure; under the ownership of the Altice Group, Altice Portugal is focused on FttP, aiming to have covered 5.3 million premises by the end of 2020, and providing national coverage; the cable sector has also shifted towards fiber, with the principal cable company NOS investing in fiber rather than DOCSIS upgrades; in addition, Vodafone Portugal provides fiber to about two-thirds of premises; the growth in the fiber segment has resulted from shared infrastructure deals, including that between Vodafone and NOS; the government has also supported two open-access wholesale networks being built by dstelecom and Fibroglobal; the mobile market is dominated by the incumbent Altice Portugal, though it is seeing increasing competition from the other network operators, Vodafone Portugal, and NOS; the MVNO market remains largely undeveloped, partly because network operators have their own low-cost brands, in July 2020, for example, NOS launched its sub-brand WOO; collectively, MVNOs have about 2.9% share of the market; in October 2021 Dixarobil and Nowo secured spectrum in the final stage of a protracted 5G auction; population coverage by 3G infrastructure is universal, and most investment in the sector is being directed to LTE and 5G technologies; the MNOs have trialed 5G and are looking to launch commercial services. (2021)" + "text": "Portugal has a medium-sized telecom market with a strong mobile sector and a growing broadband customer base; before the pandemic, the country had seen improving economic growth, following several years of austerity measures; revenue among some operators remains under pressure, though investments in network upgrades are continuing in an effort to attract customers to high-end services; Portugal’s broadband services have grown steadily in recent years, largely the result of joint efforts between the regulator and the key market operators which have invested in significant infrastructure upgrades; these operators are focused on fiber-based services, resulting in a migration of subscribers from DSL infrastructure; the government has also supported open-access wholesale networks; the MVNO market remains largely undeveloped, partly because network operators have their own low-cost brands; collectively, MVNOs have about 2.9% share of the market; population coverage by 3G infrastructure is universal, and most investment in the sector is being directed to LTE and 5G technologies; the MNOs have trialed 5G and are looking to launch commercial services (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "integrated network of coaxial cables, open-wire, microwave radio relay, and domestic satellite earth stations; fixed-line roughly 51 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular 116 per 100 persons (2020)" diff --git a/europe/ri.json b/europe/ri.json index 59b3413c..be1df076 100644 --- a/europe/ri.json +++ b/europe/ri.json @@ -1038,10 +1038,10 @@ "text": "79,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "53,800 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "53,800 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "77.5 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1112,7 +1112,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Serbia’s telecom industry has been liberalized in line with the principles of the EU’s regulatory framework for communications, focused on encouraging competition in telecom products and services, and ensuring universal access; considerable network investment has been undertaken in Serbia by incumbent and alternative operators in recent years, despite economic difficulties; this has helped to stimulate internet usage, which has also been bolstered by improved affordability as prices are reduced through competition; the pandemic has stimulated consumer take up of services, particularly mobile data; the government’s various initiatives to improve rural broadband availability have also been supported by European development loans; Serbia’s high mobile services, partly the result of multiple SIM card use, has weighed on revenue growth in recent years, placing further pressure on operators to develop business models which encourage consumer use of mobile data services also in response to the continued substitution of fixed-line for mobile voice calls; the regulator has yet to auction 5G-suitable frequencies, though operators are already investing in their networks in preparation for this next growth frontier; during 2021 the regulator resumed the process towards a 5G spectrum auction, which had been delayed owing to the onset of the covid-19 pandemic; in early 2021 Telekom Srbija agreed to provide Telenor Serbia with access to its fiber network; Telenor (now operating as Yettel, and owned by the PPF Group), joined the fixed market in November 2021, launching fiber-based fixed broadband, fixed voice, and digital TV services; the operator is looking to bolster its returns by focusing more strongly on the uptake of converged services in the market; these developments could lead to a significant shift in the telecom market landscape. (2022)" + "text": "Serbia’s telecom industry has been liberalized in line with the principles of the EU’s regulatory framework for communications, focused on encouraging competition in telecom products and services, and ensuring universal access; considerable network investment has been undertaken in Serbia by incumbent and alternative operators in recent years, despite economic difficulties; this has helped to stimulate internet usage, which has also been bolstered by improved affordability as prices are reduced through competition; the pandemic has stimulated consumer take up of services, particularly mobile data; the government’s various initiatives to improve rural broadband availability have also been supported by European development loans; Serbia’s high mobile services, partly the result of multiple SIM card use, has weighed on revenue growth in recent years, placing further pressure on operators to develop business models which encourage consumer use of mobile data services also in response to the continued substitution of fixed-line for mobile voice calls; the regulator has yet to auction 5G-suitable frequencies, though operators are already investing in their networks in preparation for this next growth frontier; during 2021 the regulator resumed the process towards a 5G spectrum auction, which had been delayed owing to the onset of the covid-19 pandemic (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line over 37 per 100 and mobile-cellular over 120 per 100 persons (2020)" @@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "17,336 (Croatia), 7,997 (Bosnia and Herzegovina) (mid-year 2021); 21,330 (Ukraine) (includes Ukrainian refugees in Kosovo; as of 25 October 2022)" + "text": "17,336 (Croatia), 7,997 (Bosnia and Herzegovina) (mid-year 2021); 21,706 (Ukraine) (includes Ukrainian refugees in Kosovo; as of 1 November 2022)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "196,995 (most are Kosovar Serbs, some are Roma, Ashkalis, and Egyptian (RAE); some RAE IDPs are unregistered) (2021)" diff --git a/europe/ro.json b/europe/ro.json index 05120824..1b964f18 100644 --- a/europe/ro.json +++ b/europe/ro.json @@ -1020,10 +1020,10 @@ "text": "222,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "1,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "1,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "161,600 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "161,600 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "600 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Romania’s telecom market has undergone several significant changes in recent years; Vodafone Group in July 2019 acquired Liberty Global’s local unit UPC Romania, thus enabling Vodafone Romania to compete more effectively in offering bundled services; Orange Romania more recently acquired the fixed-line assets of Telekom Romania from Deutsche Telekom’s subsidiary OTE; the deal, which requires regulatory clearances and could be completed by the end of 2021, was prompted by competition in the fixed-line segment, particularly from Digi, which would have compelled Telekom Romania to invest more heavily in fixed-line infrastructure; the mobile market is served by network operators supported by pan-European players, including Vodafone Group and Orange Group. All have extensive LTE networks in place, while services based on 5G have been offered under their existing spectrum concessions since 2019; the delayed multi-spectrum auction, expected to be completed later in 2021, will enable the operators to expand 5G network capacity and enable consumers to make far greater use of the technology’s potential; in line with legislation passed in July 2021 the MNOs will have to replace equipment provided by vendors deemed to be a security risk, essentially meaning that they will have up to seven years to replace core and non-core kit provided by Huawei; this report provides an overview of Romania’s fast-developing telecommunications market, covering regulatory developments, major players and fixed-line infrastructure, and offering a variety of operational and financial statistics as well as a range of subscriber forecasts; the report also covers the mobile voice and data markets, including profiles of the major operators, updates on spectrum auctions and regulatory developments; in addition, the report provides insights into the growing broadband market, covering technologies, the major players and market developments. (2021)" + "text": "Romania’s telecom market has undergone several significant changes in recent years; the mobile market is served by network operators that have extensive LTE networks in place, while services based on 5G have been offered under their existing spectrum concessions since 2019; the delayed multi-spectrum auction, expected to be completed later in 2021, will enable the operators to expand 5G network capacity and enable consumers to make far greater use of the technology’s potential; in line with legislation passed in July 2021 the MNOs will have to replace equipment provided by vendors deemed to be a security risk (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line teledensity is about 16 telephones per 100 persons; mobile market served by four mobile network operators; mobile-cellular teledensity over 117 telephones per 100 persons (2020)" diff --git a/europe/si.json b/europe/si.json index 3041535b..a2c03726 100644 --- a/europe/si.json +++ b/europe/si.json @@ -999,10 +999,10 @@ "text": "54,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1073,7 +1073,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Slovenia’s telecom sector is dominated by four operators; the incumbent telco Telekom Slovenije has faced increasing pressure in all sectors; to address this, the company had diversified its business interests to reduce its reliance on telecom services; the mobile market has four MNOs and a small number of MVNOs, operating in a country with a potential market of just over two million people; the regulator in recent years has addressed the need for mobile operators to have more spectrum, so enabling them to improve the quality and range of services; a multi-spectrum auction was concluded in mid-2021, aimed at supporting 5G services; the broadband market continues to be dominated by a small number of players; DSL lost its dominance some years ago, being taken over by fiber as subscribers are migrated to new fiber-based networks; fiber accounted for almost half of all fixed broadband connections by March 2022. (2022)" + "text": "Slovenia’s telecom sector is dominated by four operators; the mobile market has four MNOs and a small number of MVNOs, operating in a country with a potential market of just over two million people; the regulator in recent years has addressed the need for mobile operators to have more spectrum, so enabling them to improve the quality and range of services; a multi-spectrum auction was concluded in mid-2021, aimed at supporting 5G services; the broadband market continues to be dominated by a small number of players; DSL lost its dominance some years ago, being taken over by fiber as subscribers are migrated to new fiber-based networks; fiber accounted for almost half of all fixed broadband connections by March 2022 (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line nearly 34 per 100 and mobile-cellular over 122 per 100 teledensity (2020)" @@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "8,308 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)" + "text": "8,404 (Ukraine) (as of 1 November 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "10 (2020)" diff --git a/europe/sp.json b/europe/sp.json index 21778cfd..4e40d515 100644 --- a/europe/sp.json +++ b/europe/sp.json @@ -1032,10 +1032,10 @@ "text": "1.328 million bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "1,364,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "1,364,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "150 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Spain’s telecom sector has tracked the performance of the overall economy, which has been one of the most heavily impacted by the pandemic in all Europe; GDP dropped by 10.8% in 2020, while telecom revenue reversed the previous five years’ positive results by falling 5.3%; fixed-line services were the hardest hit, with revenue falling 13.7%; mobile voice services did not fare much better, falling 4.7%; this is despite relatively small shifts in the number of subscribers, though the harsh lock down conditions resulted in a significant drop in usage; it had appeared that a return to growth might be possible in 2021 following the lifting of the state of emergency in May, but the most recent surge in cases and the continued restrictions on travel may once again put the brakes on growth until at least 2022; Spain’s fixed-line broadband market managed to extend its decade-long pattern of steady growth into 2020, with a slight increase in demand caused by the need for fast internet access to support working and learning from home; while most of Spain’s larger telcos delivered negative revenue and profit in 2020 — much in line with the overall sector — the up-and-comer Másmóvil has signaled that it wants to play in the big league; in March 2021, it launched a friendly takeover bid (valued at around €2 billion) for Basque’s fixed-line operator and MVNO Euskaltel; the deal was approved by Euskaltel’s board as well as the competition regulator; if successful, the deal will place the company in a better position to challenge the dominance of the main telcos Telefónica, Orange, and Vodafone. (2021)" + "text": "Spain’s telecom sector has tracked the performance of the overall economy, which has been one of the most heavily impacted by the pandemic in all Europe; GDP dropped by 10.8% in 2020, while telecom revenue reversed the previous five years’ positive results by falling 5.3%; fixed-line services were the hardest hit, with revenue falling 13.7%; mobile voice services did not fare much better, falling 4.7%; this is despite relatively small shifts in the number of subscribers, though the harsh lock down conditions resulted in a significant drop in usage; it had appeared that a return to growth might be possible in 2021 following the lifting of the state of emergency in May, but the most recent surge in cases and the continued restrictions on travel may once again put the brakes on growth until at least 2022; Spain’s fixed-line broadband market managed to extend its decade-long pattern of steady growth into 2020, with a slight increase in demand caused by the need for fast internet access to support working and learning from home; while most of Spain’s larger telcos delivered negative revenue and profit in 2020 (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line nearly 42 per 100 and mobile-cellular 119 telephones per 100 persons (2020)" @@ -1271,7 +1271,8 @@ } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { - "text": "approximately 120,000 active duty troops (75,000 Army; 25,000 Navy, including about 5,000 marines; 20,000 Air Force); 80,000 Guardia Civil (2022)" + "text": "approximately 120,000 active-duty troops (75,000 Army; 25,000 Navy, including about 5,000 marines; 20,000 Air Force); 80,000 Guardia Civil (2022)", + "note": "note:  a 2007 law established a maximum strength of 130,000 military personnel" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { "text": "the inventory of the Spanish military is comprised of domestically-produced and imported Western weapons systems; France, Germany, and the US have been the leading suppliers of military hardware since 2010; Spain's defense industry manufactures land, air, and sea weapons systems and is integrated within the European defense-industrial sector (2021)" @@ -1300,7 +1301,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "14,823 (Syria) (mid-year 2021); 418,200 (Venezuela) (economic and political crisis; includes Venezuelans who have claimed asylum, are recognized as refugees, or have received alternative legal stay) (2021); 149,213 (Ukraine) (as of 24 October 2022)" + "text": "14,823 (Syria) (mid-year 2021); 418,200 (Venezuela) (economic and political crisis; includes Venezuelans who have claimed asylum, are recognized as refugees, or have received alternative legal stay) (2021); 150,460 (Ukraine) (as of 31 October 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "692 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/sw.json b/europe/sw.json index 13550233..39a0533f 100644 --- a/europe/sw.json +++ b/europe/sw.json @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ "text": "1,640 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Vanern - 5,580 sq km; Vattern - 1,910 sq km; Malaren - 1,140 sq km" } }, @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Vanern - 5,580 sq km; Vattern - 1,910 sq km; Malaren - 1,140 sq km" } }, @@ -1006,10 +1006,10 @@ "text": "295,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "403,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "403,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "114,995 (Syria), 28,744 (Afghanistan), 26,911 (Eritrea), 11,574 (Somalia), 11,153 (Iraq), 7,516 (Iran) (2020); 47,376 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)" + "text": "114,995 (Syria), 28,744 (Afghanistan), 26,911 (Eritrea), 11,574 (Somalia), 11,153 (Iraq), 7,516 (Iran) (2020); 47,690 (Ukraine) (as of 28 October 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "50,098 (mid-year 2021); note - the majority of stateless people are from the Middle East and Somalia" diff --git a/europe/sz.json b/europe/sz.json index dec068be..3ca4a0df 100644 --- a/europe/sz.json +++ b/europe/sz.json @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ "text": "630 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Constance (shared with Germany and Austria) - 540 sq km; Lake Geneva (shared with France) - 580 sq km" } }, @@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Constance (shared with Germany and Austria) - 540 sq km; Lake Geneva (shared with France) - 580 sq km" } }, @@ -1022,10 +1022,10 @@ "text": "220,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "60,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "60,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "38,219 (Eritrea), 20,043 (Syria), 14,649 (Afghanistan), 6,069 (Sri Lanka), 6,197 (Turkey) (mid-year 2021); 66,812 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)" + "text": "38,219 (Eritrea), 20,043 (Syria), 14,649 (Afghanistan), 6,069 (Sri Lanka), 6,197 (Turkey) (mid-year 2021); 68,086 (Ukraine) (as of 30 October 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "684 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/uk.json b/europe/uk.json index 0288d91a..e5bbdef5 100644 --- a/europe/uk.json +++ b/europe/uk.json @@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Alliance Party (Northern Ireland) [Naomi LONG] 
Conservative and Unionist Party [Liz TRUSS]
Democratic Unionist Party or DUP (Northern Ireland) [Jeffrey DONALDSON]
Green Party of England and Wales or Greens [Carla DENYER and Adrian RAMSAY]
Labor (Labour) Party [Sir Keir STARMER]
Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems) [Sir Ed DAVEY]
Party of Wales (Plaid Cymru) [Adam PRICE]
Scottish National Party or SNP [Nicola STURGEON]
Sinn Fein (Northern Ireland) [Mary Lou MCDONALD]
Social Democratic and Labor Party or SDLP (Northern Ireland) [Colum EASTWOOD]
UK Independence Party or UKIP [Neil HAMILTON]
Ulster Unionist Party or UUP (Northern Ireland) [Doug BEATTIE]" + "text": "Alliance Party (Northern Ireland) [Naomi LONG] 
Conservative and Unionist Party [Rishi SUNAK]
Democratic Unionist Party or DUP (Northern Ireland) [Jeffrey DONALDSON]
Green Party of England and Wales or Greens [Carla DENYER and Adrian RAMSAY]
Labor (Labour) Party [Sir Keir STARMER]
Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems) [Sir Ed DAVEY]
Party of Wales (Plaid Cymru) [Adam PRICE]
Scottish National Party or SNP [Nicola STURGEON]
Sinn Fein (Northern Ireland) [Mary Lou MCDONALD]
Social Democratic and Labor Party or SDLP (Northern Ireland) [Colum EASTWOOD]
UK Independence Party or UKIP [Neil HAMILTON]
Ulster Unionist Party or UUP (Northern Ireland) [Doug BEATTIE]" }, "International organization participation": { "text": "ADB (nonregional member), AfDB (nonregional member), Arctic Council (observer), Australia Group, BIS, C, CBSS (observer), CD, CDB, CE, CERN, EAPC, EBRD, ECB, EIB, EITI (implementing country), ESA, EU, FAO, FATF, G-5, G-7, G-8, G-10, G-20, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IEA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IGAD (partners), IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, NATO, NEA, NSG, OAS (observer), OECD, OPCW, OSCE, Pacific Alliance (observer), Paris Club, PCA, PIF (partner), SELEC (observer), SICA (observer), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNFICYP, UNHCR, UNHRC, UNMISS, UNRWA, UN Security Council (permanent), UNSOM, UPU, Wassenaar Arrangement, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO, ZC" @@ -1019,10 +1019,10 @@ "text": "1,578,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "818,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "818,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "891,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "891,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "2.5 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/europe/up.json b/europe/up.json index 2bc912a0..7c49459d 100644 --- a/europe/up.json +++ b/europe/up.json @@ -1034,10 +1034,10 @@ "text": "248,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "700 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "700 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "6,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "6,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "395 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/middle-east/ae.json b/middle-east/ae.json index bcba9c37..dfbff298 100644 --- a/middle-east/ae.json +++ b/middle-east/ae.json @@ -994,10 +994,10 @@ "text": "863,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "2,427,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "2,427,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "172,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "172,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "97.8 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/middle-east/aj.json b/middle-east/aj.json index 59a1ead0..f4589f20 100644 --- a/middle-east/aj.json +++ b/middle-east/aj.json @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ "text": "14,277 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Caspian Sea (shared with Iran, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan) - 374,000 sq km" } }, @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ "note": "note: religious affiliation for the majority of Azerbaijanis is largely nominal, percentages for actual practicing adherents are probably much lower" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "

Azerbaijan’s citizenry has over 80 ethnic groups. The far eastern part of the country has the highest population density, particularly in and around Baku. Apart from smaller urbanized areas, the rest of the country has a fairly light and evenly distributed population. Approximately 57% of the country’s inhabitants lives in urban areas.  While the population is continuing to grow but is in the early stages of aging. The declining fertility rate – which has decreased from about 5.5 children per woman in the 1950s to less than the 2.1 replacement level in 2022 – combined with increasing life expectancy has resulted in the elderly making up a larger share of Azerbaijan’s populace. The percentage of elderly residents and the slowed growth and eventual shrinkage of the working-age population could put pressure on the country’s pension and healthcare systems. 

" + "text": "

Azerbaijan’s citizenry has over 80 ethnic groups. The far eastern part of the country has the highest population density, particularly in and around Baku. Apart from smaller urbanized areas, the rest of the country has a fairly light and evenly distributed population. Approximately 57% of the country’s inhabitants lives in urban areas.  While the population is continuing to grow, it is in the early stages of aging. The declining fertility rate – which has decreased from about 5.5 children per woman in the 1950s to less than the 2.1 replacement level in 2022 – combined with increasing life expectancy has resulted in the elderly making up a larger share of Azerbaijan’s populace. The percentage of elderly residents and the slowed growth and eventual shrinkage of the working-age population could put pressure on the country’s pension and healthcare systems. 

" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Caspian Sea (shared with Iran, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan) - 374,000 sq km" } }, @@ -1007,10 +1007,10 @@ "text": "107,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "679,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "679,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "7 billion barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1081,7 +1081,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "in spite of the telecom sector being one of the major contributors to Azerbaijan’s non-oil GDP, overall development, growth, and investment in the sector has been held back by years of political and civil unrest coupled with endemic corruption; mobile subscription rates reached 100% as far back as 2011, but have largely stagnated since then; the MNOs are slowly extending the reach of their LTE networks around the country, and this increased coverage (along with access to faster data-based services) is expected to produce a moderate resurgence for both mobile and mobile broadband over the next few years as customers migrate from 3G to 4G; 5G services are still some ways off, as the demand for high-speed data and fast broadband can easily be met by existing capacity on LTE networks; fixed-line teledensity continues to drop down each year as customers consolidate their telecommunications services around the mobile platform; the rate of decline is comparatively slow to other countries, since Azerbaijan has a relatively high proportion of (87%) of fixed-line broadband customers still on DSL; fibre (12% of fixed broadband connections) is gradually being rolled out in urban areas, and this makes up the bulk of the (limited) growth being seen in the overall fixed broadband market. DSL’s predominance, however, will serve to keep Azerbaijan’s average access speeds in the sub-10Mbps range for the future. (2022)" + "text": "in spite of the telecom sector being one of the major contributors to Azerbaijan’s non-oil GDP, overall development, growth, and investment in the sector has been held back by years of political and civil unrest coupled with endemic corruption; mobile penetration rates reached 100% as far back as 2011, but have largely stagnated since then; the MNOs are slowly extending the reach of their LTE networks around the country, and this increased coverage (along with access to faster data-based services) is expected to produce a moderate resurgence for both mobile and mobile broadband over the next few years as customers migrate from 3G to 4G. 5G services are still some ways off, as the demand for high-speed data and fast broadband can easily be met by existing capacity on LTE networks; fixed-line teledensity continues to drop down each year as customers consolidate their telecommunications services around the mobile platform; the rate of decline is comparatively slow to other countries, since Azerbaijan has a relatively high proportion of (87%) of fixed-line broadband customers still on DSL; fiber is gradually being rolled out in urban areas, and this makes up the bulk of the growth being seen in the overall fixed broadband market; DSL’s predominance, however, will serve to keep Azerbaijan’s average access speeds in the sub-10Mbps range for the foreseeable future (2020)" }, "domestic": { "text": "teledensity of some 16 fixed-lines per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity of 102 telephones per 100 persons; satellite service connects Baku to a modern switch in its exclave of Naxcivan (Nakhchivan) (2020)" @@ -1242,7 +1242,7 @@ }, "Transnational Issues": { "Disputes - international": { - "text": "

Local border forces struggle to control the illegal transit of goods and people across the porous, undemarcated Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian borders.

Armenia-Azerbaijan: The dispute over the break-away Nagorno-Karabakh region and the Armenian military occupation of surrounding lands in Azerbaijan remains the primary focus of regional instability. Residents have evacuated the former Soviet-era small ethnic enclaves in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan-Georgia: A joint boundary commission agrees on most of the alignment, leaving only small areas at certain crossing points in dispute.  Consequently, the two states have yet to agree on a delimitation or demarcation of their common boundary. One area of contention is where the international boundary should run through the 6th-13th Century David-Gareja monastery complex.

Azerbaijan-Iran: None identified

Azerbaijan-Russia: Russia complains of cross-border smuggling.

Azerbaijan-Turkey: None identified

Caspian Sea (Maritime Boundary): Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia ratified the Caspian seabed delimitation treaties based on equidistance, while Iran continues to insist on a one-fifth slice of the sea. Bilateral talks continue with Turkmenistan on dividing the seabed and contested oilfields in the middle of the Caspian.

" + "text": "

Local border forces struggle to control the illegal transit of goods and people across the porous, undemarcated Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian borders.

Armenia-Azerbaijan: The dispute over the break-away Nagorno-Karabakh region and the Armenian military occupation of surrounding lands in Azerbaijan remains the primary focus of regional instability. Residents have evacuated the former Soviet-era small ethnic enclaves in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan-Georgia: A joint boundary commission agrees on most of the alignment, leaving only small areas at certain crossing points in dispute.  Consequently, the two states have yet to agree on a delimitation or demarcation of their common boundary. One area of contention is where the international boundary should run through the 6th-13th Century David-Gareja monastery complex.

Azerbaijan-Iran: none identified

Azerbaijan-Russia: Russia complains of cross-border smuggling.

Azerbaijan-Turkey: none identified

Caspian Sea (Maritime Boundary): Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia ratified the Caspian seabed delimitation treaties based on equidistance, while Iran continues to insist on a one-fifth slice of the sea. Bilateral talks continue with Turkmenistan on dividing the seabed and contested oilfields in the middle of the Caspian.

" }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "IDPs": { diff --git a/middle-east/am.json b/middle-east/am.json index 25cc7241..2fd80745 100644 --- a/middle-east/am.json +++ b/middle-east/am.json @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ "text": "2,740 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Sevan - 1,360 sq km" } }, @@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Sevan - 1,360 sq km" } }, @@ -1005,10 +1005,10 @@ "text": "10,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1079,7 +1079,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "the telecom sector was still able to post modest gains at least in the mobile and broadband segments; the fixed-line penetration continues to slide downwards, only buttressed by the rollout of fiber networks which have encouraged the take up of bundled services; the fixed broadband market remains undeveloped, being somewhat hamstrung by the lack of underlying infrastructure outside the main cities; the one bright spot for the sector is mobile broadband, which is expected reach 130% subscriptions rate by 2026, at a CAGR of more than 8.6%, this is subject to the country managing to avoid conflict. (2021)" + "text": "Armenia’s telecom sector was able to post in the mobile and broadband segments; its fixed-line penetration continues to slide downwards, with the rollout of fiber networks which have encouraged the increase in bundled services; the fixed broadband market remains undeveloped due to the lack of underlying infrastructure outside the main cities (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "roughly 14 per 100 fixed-line and 118 per 100 mobile-cellular; reliable fixed-line and mobile-cellular services are available across Yerevan and in major cities and towns; mobile-cellular coverage available in most rural areas (2020)" diff --git a/middle-east/ba.json b/middle-east/ba.json index ddecd2b2..9a822a79 100644 --- a/middle-east/ba.json +++ b/middle-east/ba.json @@ -980,10 +980,10 @@ "text": "73,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "228,800 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "228,800 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "186.5 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/middle-east/gg.json b/middle-east/gg.json index 25051efb..f660eaed 100644 --- a/middle-east/gg.json +++ b/middle-east/gg.json @@ -1002,10 +1002,10 @@ "text": "32,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "100 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "100 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "35 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/middle-east/gz.json b/middle-east/gz.json index 90a71004..2b53c297 100644 --- a/middle-east/gz.json +++ b/middle-east/gz.json @@ -667,10 +667,10 @@ "text": "24,600 bbl/day (2019 est.) Data represented includes both the Gaza Strip and West Bank" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both the Gaza Strip and West Bank" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both the Gaza Strip and West Bank" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both the Gaza Strip and West Bank" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both the Gaza Strip and West Bank" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.) Data represented includes both the Gaza Strip and West Bank" diff --git a/middle-east/ir.json b/middle-east/ir.json index d447bdda..8f8b48b9 100644 --- a/middle-east/ir.json +++ b/middle-east/ir.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Known as Persia until 1935, Iran became an Islamic republic in 1979 after the ruling monarchy was overthrown and Shah Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI was forced into exile. Conservative clerical forces led by Ayatollah Ruhollah KHOMEINI established a theocratic system of government with ultimate political authority vested in a learned religious scholar referred to commonly as the Supreme Leader who, according to the constitution, is accountable only to the Assembly of Experts - a popularly elected 88-member body of clerics. US-Iranian relations became strained when a group of Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and held embassy personnel hostages until mid-January 1981. The US cut off diplomatic relations with Iran in April 1980. During the period 1980-88, Iran fought a bloody, indecisive war with Iraq that eventually expanded into the Persian Gulf and led to clashes between US Navy and Iranian military forces. Iran has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism and was subject to US, UN, and EU economic sanctions and export controls because of its continued involvement in terrorism and concerns over possible military dimensions of its nuclear program until Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Implementation Day in 2016. The US began gradually re-imposing sanctions on Iran after the US withdrawal from JCPOA in May 2018.

Following the election of reformer Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad KHATAMI as president in 1997 and a reformist Majles (legislature) in 2000, a campaign to foster political reform in response to popular dissatisfaction was initiated. The movement floundered as conservative politicians, supported by the Supreme Leader, unelected institutions of authority like the Council of Guardians, and the security services reversed and blocked reform measures while increasing security repression. Starting with nationwide municipal elections in 2003 and continuing through Majles elections in 2004, conservatives reestablished control over Iran's elected government institutions, which culminated with the August 2005 inauguration of hardliner Mahmud AHMADI-NEJAD as president. His controversial reelection in June 2009 sparked nationwide protests over allegations of electoral fraud, but the protests were quickly suppressed. Deteriorating economic conditions due primarily to government mismanagement and international sanctions prompted at least two major economically based protests in July and October 2012, but Iran's internal security situation remained stable. President AHMADI-NEJAD's independent streak angered regime establishment figures, including the Supreme Leader, leading to conservative opposition to his agenda for the last year of his presidency, and an alienation of his political supporters. In June 2013, Iranians elected a centrist cleric Dr. Hasan Fereidun RUHANI to the presidency. A longtime senior member in the regime, he made promises of reforming society and Iran's foreign policy. In July 2015, Iran and the five permanent members, plus Germany (P5+1) signed the JCPOA under which Iran agreed to restrictions on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief; however, the US reimposed sanctions in 2018 dealing a blow to RUHANI's legacy and the Iranian economy. Negotiations to restore the deal started in 2021 and are ongoing. Iran held elections in February 2020 for the Majles and the president in June 2021, resulting in a hardline and conservative monopoly across the regime's elected and unelected institutions. President Ebrahim RAISI is a hardline cleric with a decades-long career in Iran's judiciary and has had limited foreign policy and economic experience.

" + "text": "

Known as Persia until 1935, Iran became an Islamic republic in 1979 after the ruling monarchy was overthrown and Shah Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI was forced into exile. Conservative clerical forces led by Ayatollah Ruhollah KHOMEINI established a theocratic system of government with ultimate political authority vested in a learned religious scholar referred to commonly as the Supreme Leader who, according to the constitution, is accountable only to the Assembly of Experts - a popularly elected 88-member body of clerics. US-Iranian relations became strained when a group of Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and held embassy personnel hostage until mid-January 1981. The US cut off diplomatic relations with Iran in April 1980. During the period 1980-88, Iran fought a bloody, indecisive war with Iraq that eventually expanded into the Persian Gulf and led to clashes between US Navy and Iranian military forces. Iran has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism and was subject to US, UN, and EU economic sanctions and export controls because of its continued involvement in terrorism and concerns over possible military dimensions of its nuclear program until Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Implementation Day in 2016. The US began gradually re-imposing sanctions on Iran after the US withdrawal from JCPOA in May 2018.

Following the election of reformer Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad KHATAMI as president in 1997 and a reformist Majles (legislature) in 2000, a campaign to foster political reform in response to popular dissatisfaction was initiated. The movement floundered as conservative politicians, supported by the Supreme Leader, unelected institutions of authority like the Council of Guardians, and the security services reversed and blocked reform measures while increasing security repression. Starting with nationwide municipal elections in 2003 and continuing through Majles elections in 2004, conservatives reestablished control over Iran's elected government institutions, which culminated with the August 2005 inauguration of hardliner Mahmud AHMADI-NEJAD as president. His controversial reelection in June 2009 sparked nationwide protests over allegations of electoral fraud, but the protests were quickly suppressed. Deteriorating economic conditions due primarily to government mismanagement and international sanctions prompted at least two major economically based protests in July and October 2012, but Iran's internal security situation remained stable. President AHMADI-NEJAD's independent streak angered regime establishment figures, including the Supreme Leader, leading to conservative opposition to his agenda for the last year of his presidency, and an alienation of his political supporters. In June 2013, Iranians elected a centrist cleric Dr. Hasan Fereidun RUHANI to the presidency. A longtime senior member in the regime, he made promises of reforming society and Iran's foreign policy. In July 2015, Iran and the five permanent members, plus Germany (P5+1) signed the JCPOA under which Iran agreed to restrictions on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief; however, the US reimposed sanctions in 2018 dealing a blow to RUHANI's legacy and the Iranian economy. Negotiations to restore the deal started in 2021 and are ongoing. Iran held elections in February 2020 for the Majles and the president in June 2021, resulting in a hardline and conservative monopoly across the regime's elected and unelected institutions. President Ebrahim RAISI is a hardline cleric with a decades-long career in Iran's judiciary and has had limited foreign policy and economic experience.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ "text": "95,530 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Caspian Sea (shared with Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan) - 374,000 sq km; Lake Urmia - 5,200 sq km; Lake Namak - 750 sq km" } }, @@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Caspian Sea (shared with Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan) - 374,000 sq km; Lake Urmia - 5,200 sq km; Lake Namak - 750 sq km" } }, @@ -998,10 +998,10 @@ "text": "1.934 million bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "2,230,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "2,230,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "33,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "33,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "208.6 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/middle-east/is.json b/middle-east/is.json index 967701a7..fdbae0c2 100644 --- a/middle-east/is.json +++ b/middle-east/is.json @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ "text": "2,250 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Dead Sea (shared with Jordan and West Bank) - 1,020 sq km
note - endorheic hypersaline lake; 9.6 times saltier than the ocean; lake shore is 431 meters below sea level" } }, @@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Dead Sea (shared with Jordan and West Bank) - 1,020 sq km
note - endorheic hypersaline lake; 9.6 times saltier than the ocean; lake shore is 431 meters below sea level" } }, @@ -1040,10 +1040,10 @@ "text": "232,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "232,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "232,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "12.7 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/middle-east/iz.json b/middle-east/iz.json index 41dc9478..80d72a17 100644 --- a/middle-east/iz.json +++ b/middle-east/iz.json @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ "text": "35,250 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Hammar - 1,940 sq km" } }, @@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Hammar - 1,940 sq km" } }, @@ -1031,10 +1031,10 @@ "text": "863,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "3,975,800 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "3,975,800 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "145.019 billion barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1268,8 +1268,8 @@ "text": "the Iraqi military's inventory includes a mix of equipment from a wide variety of sources, including Europe, South Africa, South Korea, Russia, and the US; since 2010, Russia and the US have been the leading suppliers of military hardware to Iraq (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { - "text": "18-40 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription (abolished 2003) (2022)", - "note": "note: in late 2021, the Iraqi Government approved a draft conscription law for the Council of Representatives to debate" + "text": "18-40 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription (2022)", + "note": "note: service in the armed forces was mandatory in Iraq from 1935 up until 2003" }, "Military - note": { "text": "as of 2022, Iraqi security forces (ISF) continued to conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) terrorist group, particularly in northern and western Iraq; Kurdish Security Forces (KSF, aka Peshmerga) also conducted operations against ISIS 

the KSF were formally recognized as a legitimate Iraqi military force under the country’s constitution and have operated jointly with the Iraqi military against ISIS militants, but they also operate outside of Iraqi military command structure; since 2021, the ISF and the KSF have conducted joint counter-ISIS operations in an area known as the Kurdish Coordination Line (KCL), a swath of disputed territory in northern Iraq claimed by both the Kurdistan Regional Government and the central Iraqi Government; the KSF/Peshmerga report to the Kurdistan Regional Government or Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties instead of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense

Popular Mobilization Commission and Affiliated Forces (PMF or PMC), also known as Popular Mobilization Units (PMU, or al-Hashd al-Sha’abi in Arabic), tribal militia units have fought alongside the Iraqi military against ISIS since 2014, but the majority of these forces continue to largely ignore the 2016 Law of the Popular Mobilization Authority, which mandated that armed militias must be regulated in a fashion similar to Iraq’s other security forces and act under the Iraqi Government’s direct control; the Iraqi Government funds the PMF, and the prime minister legally commands it, but many of the militia units take orders from associated political parties and/or other government officials, including some with ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and some that have been designated as terrorist organizations by the US; the PMF/PMU is an umbrella organization comprised of many different militias, the majority of which are Shia:

--Shia militias backed by Iran; they are considered the most active and capable, and include such groups as the Badr Organization (Saraya al-Sala), Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kataib Hizballah

--Shia militias affiliated with Shia political parties, but not aligned with Iran, such as the Peace Brigades (Saray al-Salam)

--Shia militias not connected with political parties, but affiliated with the Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Ali al-SISTANI (Iraq’s supreme Shia cleric), such as the Hawza militias

--other PMF/PMU militias include Sunni Tribal Mobilization militias, or Hashd al-Asha’iri; some of these militias take orders from the ISF and local authorities while others respond to orders from the larger Shia PMU militias; still other militias include Yazidi and Christian militias and the Turkmen brigades; the links of these forces to the PMU is not always clear-cut and may be loosely based on financial, legal, or political incentives

at the request of the Iraqi government, NATO agreed to establish an advisory, training and capacity-building mission for the Iraqi military in October 2018; as of 2022, the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) had about 500 troops; in December 2021, the task force that leads the defeat ISIS mission in Iraq, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), transitioned from a combat role to an advise, assist, and enable role (2022)" diff --git a/middle-east/jo.json b/middle-east/jo.json index 4134b3e5..9d5d6f6a 100644 --- a/middle-east/jo.json +++ b/middle-east/jo.json @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ "text": "964 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Dead Sea (shared with Israel and West Bank) - 1,020 sq km
note - endorheic hypersaline lake; 9.6 times saltier than the ocean; lake shore is 431 meters below sea level" } }, @@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Dead Sea (shared with Israel and West Bank) - 1,020 sq km
note - endorheic hypersaline lake; 9.6 times saltier than the ocean; lake shore is 431 meters below sea level" } }, @@ -1026,10 +1026,10 @@ "text": "114,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "47,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "47,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "1 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/middle-east/ku.json b/middle-east/ku.json index bb52b283..20510a17 100644 --- a/middle-east/ku.json +++ b/middle-east/ku.json @@ -965,10 +965,10 @@ "text": "342,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "1,837,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "1,837,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "101.5 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/middle-east/le.json b/middle-east/le.json index cd5aedde..ad942e54 100644 --- a/middle-east/le.json +++ b/middle-east/le.json @@ -1003,10 +1003,10 @@ "text": "168,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/middle-east/mu.json b/middle-east/mu.json index 6d1a608a..f922863b 100644 --- a/middle-east/mu.json +++ b/middle-east/mu.json @@ -975,10 +975,10 @@ "text": "234,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "779,000 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "779,000 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "5.373 billion barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1049,7 +1049,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "for many years Oman’s mobile market was a duopoly between the incumbent telco Omantel and its challenger Ooredoo Oman; in February 2021, Vodafone Group and Oman Future Telecommunications consortium secured a license to operate the Sultanate’s third network, with services being under the Vodafone Oman brand; the new operator has been able to extend its reach based on a tower leasing arrangement signed in 2020 with Oman Tower Company; Oman has a modern mobile sector which comprises substantial coverage of both 3G and LTE networks; in February 2021 Omantel launched commercial 5G services, while Ooredoo Group has a five-year framework agreement with Ericsson to develop its 5G platform across the Group’s ten markets, including Oman; the Covid-19 pandemic has caused a spike in mobile data traffic, which prompted Omantel to upgrade a number of sites from 3G to LTE, as well as build a number of additional 5G sites; while Oman’s fixed broadband infrastructure penetration is considered low, it is being improved with the building of fiber-based networks as part of Oman’s Vision 2040 program; Oman has also established itself as an important communications hub in the Middle East, with access to numerous submarine cables including the 2Africa submarine cable, which should become available during 2023-2024; the 9,800km Oman Australia Cable running from Muscat to Perth, with the potential for a branch line to Djibouti, is making progress and is expected to be completed in December 2021; this additional infrastructure will provide considerable additional bandwidth. (2021)" + "text": "Oman has a modern mobile sector which comprises substantial coverage of both 3G and LTE networks; in February 2021 commercial 5G services were launched; the Covid-19 pandemic has caused a spike in mobile data traffic; while Oman’s fixed broadband infrastructure penetration is considered low, it is being improved with the building of fiber-based networks as part of Oman’s Vision 2040 program; Oman has also established itself as an important communications hub in the Middle East, with access to numerous submarine cables including the 2Africa submarine cable, which should become available during 2023-2024; the 9,800km Oman Australia Cable running from Muscat to Perth, with the potential for a branch line to Djibouti, is making progress and is expected to be completed in December 2021; this additional infrastructure will provide considerable additional bandwidth (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line nearly 13 per 100 and mobile-cellular nearly 134 per 100; fixed-line phone service gradually being introduced to remote villages using wireless local loop systems (2020)" diff --git a/middle-east/qa.json b/middle-east/qa.json index 33f110a7..88c477fc 100644 --- a/middle-east/qa.json +++ b/middle-east/qa.json @@ -982,10 +982,10 @@ "text": "293,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "1,264,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "1,264,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "25.244 billion barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1056,7 +1056,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Qatar had developed a mature telecom sector which has been able to absorb the additional data demands made on it during the pandemic; mobile services based on LTE are universally available, and this has helped the two operators Ooredoo Qatar and Vodafone Qatar to migrate to 5G; in combination with a strong fiber rollout, the country is aiming to provide gigabit services nationally; 5G services are largely based on 3.5GHz spectrum made available following an auction in early 2019. (2022)" + "text": "Qatar had developed a mature telecom sector which has been able to absorb the additional data demands made on it during the pandemic; mobile services based on LTE are universally available to migrate to 5G; in combination with a strong fiber rollout, the country is aiming to provide gigabit services nationally; 5G services are largely based on 3.5GHz spectrum made available following an auction in early 2019 (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line nearly 16 per 100 and mobile-cellular telephone subscribership nearly 132 telephones per 100 persons (2020)" diff --git a/middle-east/sa.json b/middle-east/sa.json index 769a2146..31623993 100644 --- a/middle-east/sa.json +++ b/middle-east/sa.json @@ -1000,10 +1000,10 @@ "text": "3,182,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "7,340,800 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "7,340,800 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "258.6 billion barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1074,7 +1074,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Saudi Arabia’s telecom and ICT sectors continue to benefit from the range of programs aimed at diversifying the economy away from a dependence on oil, and establishing a wider digital transformation over the next decade; an essential element of this has been the widening reach of 5G networks, which by mid-2021 reached about half of the population and the majority of cities; the competitive mobile sector is serviced by Saudi Telecom Company (stc), Mobily, and Zain KSA, as also four licensed MVNOs; the MNOs have focused investment on upgrading LTE infrastructure and further developing 5G; this in part is aimed at generating additional revenue from mobile data services, and also to their contribution to the Vision 2030 program; the ongoing pandemic has resulted in more people working and schooling from home during periods of restricted travel; this has stimulated growth in mobile data traffic, while the government has encouraged non-cash transactions and so helped develop the vast e-commerce market; while Saudi Arabia’s fixed broadband penetration remains relatively low, there has been a concentration of fiber infrastructure and the Kingdom has developed one of the fastest services in the region. (2022)" + "text": "Saudi Arabia’s telecom and ICT sectors continue to benefit from the range of programs aimed at diversifying the economy away from a dependence on oil, and establishing a wider digital transformation over the next decade; an essential element of this has been the widening reach of 5G networks, which by mid-2021 reached about half of the population and the majority of cities; the MNOs have focused investment on upgrading LTE infrastructure and further developing 5G; this in part is aimed at generating additional revenue from mobile data services, and also to their contribution to the Vision 2030 program; the ongoing pandemic has resulted in more people working and schooling from home during periods of restricted travel; this has stimulated growth in mobile data traffic, while the government has encouraged non-cash transactions and so helped develop the vast e-commerce market; while Saudi Arabia’s fixed broadband penetration remains relatively low, there has been a concentration of fiber infrastructure and the Kingdom has developed one of the fastest services in the region (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line over 16 per 100 and mobile-cellular subscribership has been increasing rapidly to roughly 124 per 100 persons (2020)" diff --git a/middle-east/sy.json b/middle-east/sy.json index b51befe6..921f1b8d 100644 --- a/middle-east/sy.json +++ b/middle-east/sy.json @@ -958,10 +958,10 @@ "text": "137,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "129,100 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "129,100 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "2.5 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/middle-east/tu.json b/middle-east/tu.json index d87cfb9c..aa5c4214 100644 --- a/middle-east/tu.json +++ b/middle-east/tu.json @@ -92,10 +92,10 @@ "text": "52,150 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Beysehir - 650 sq km; Lake Egridir - 520 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Van - 3,740 sq km; Lake Tuz - 1,640 sq km;" } }, @@ -482,10 +482,10 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Beysehir - 650 sq km; Lake Egridir - 520 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lake Van - 3,740 sq km; Lake Tuz - 1,640 sq km;" } }, @@ -1037,10 +1037,10 @@ "text": "987,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "423,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "423,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "366 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/middle-east/we.json b/middle-east/we.json index 3b99d421..a4994519 100644 --- a/middle-east/we.json +++ b/middle-east/we.json @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ "text": "(2012) 240 sq km; note - includes Gaza Strip" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Dead Sea (shared with Jordan and Israel) - 1,020 sq km
note - endorheic hypersaline lake; 9.6 times saltier than the ocean; lake shore is 431 meters below sea level" } }, @@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ "note": "note: data represent combined total from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank." }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Dead Sea (shared with Jordan and Israel) - 1,020 sq km
note - endorheic hypersaline lake; 9.6 times saltier than the ocean; lake shore is 431 meters below sea level" } }, @@ -775,10 +775,10 @@ "text": "24,600 bbl/day (2019 est.) Data represented includes both the Gaza Strip and West Bank" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both the Gaza Strip and West Bank" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both the Gaza Strip and West Bank" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both the Gaza Strip and West Bank" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.) Data represented includes both the Gaza Strip and West Bank" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.) Data represented includes both the Gaza Strip and West Bank" diff --git a/middle-east/ym.json b/middle-east/ym.json index 90b6e78e..745183f4 100644 --- a/middle-east/ym.json +++ b/middle-east/ym.json @@ -1017,10 +1017,10 @@ "text": "75,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "3 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/north-america/bd.json b/north-america/bd.json index c76c7465..60800b32 100644 --- a/north-america/bd.json +++ b/north-america/bd.json @@ -859,10 +859,10 @@ "text": "5,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -933,10 +933,10 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage. (2021)" + "text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage (2021)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "the system has a high fixed-line teledensity nearing 35 per 100, coupled with a mobile-cellular teledensity of roughly 103 per 100 persons (2019)" + "text": "the system has a high fixed-line teledensity nearing 40 per 100, coupled with a mobile-cellular teledensity of roughly 109 per 100 persons (2020)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 1-441; landing points for the GlobeNet, Gemini Bermuda, CBUS, and the CB-1 submarine cables to the Caribbean, South America and the US; satellite earth stations - 3 (2019)" diff --git a/north-america/ca.json b/north-america/ca.json index b0f3acfc..b19c1c06 100644 --- a/north-america/ca.json +++ b/north-america/ca.json @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ "text": "8,700 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Huron* - 35,972 sq km; Great Bear Lake - 31,328 sq km; Superior* - 28,754 sq km; Great Slave Lake - 28,568 sq km; Lake Winnipeg - 24,387 sq km; Erie* - 12,776 sq km; Ontario* - 9,790 sq km; Lake Athabasca - 7,935 sq km; Reindeer Lake - 6,650 sq km; Nettilling Lake - 5,542 sq km
note - Great Lakes* area shown as Canadian waters" } }, @@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Huron* - 35,972 sq km; Great Bear Lake - 31,328 sq km; Superior* - 28,754 sq km; Great Slave Lake - 28,568 sq km; Lake Winnipeg - 24,387 sq km; Erie* - 12,776 sq km; Ontario* - 9,790 sq km; Lake Athabasca - 7,935 sq km; Reindeer Lake - 6,650 sq km; Nettilling Lake - 5,542 sq km
note - Great Lakes* area shown as Canadian waters" } }, @@ -1040,10 +1040,10 @@ "text": "2,629,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "3.177 million barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "3.177 million bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "793,800 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "793,800 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "170.3 billion barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "the Canadian telecom market continues to show steady development as operators invest in network upgrades; much of the investment among telcos has been channelled into LTE infrastructure to capitalize on consumer demand for mobile data services, while there has also been further investment in 5G; investment programs have also been supported by regulatory efforts to ensure that operators have spectrum available to develop 5G services; spectrum in the 600MGz and 3.5GHz ranges has already been auctioned, while other auctions are planned through to 2024; in the 3.5GHz range the regulator set aside 50MHz for new entrants to encourage competition in the wireless segment; an investment in fixed-line infrastructure, focused on FttP and, among cable broadband providers, upgrades to the DOCSIS3.1 standard; the DSL segment is losing market share as customers are migrated to fiber; government policy has encouraged the extension of broadband to rural and regional areas, with the result that services are almost universally available and the emphasis now is on improving service speeds to enable the entire population to benefit from the digital economy and society; cable broadband is the principal access platform, followed by DSL; the main cablecos are upgrading their networks to the DOCSIS3.1 standard, which can deliver data at 1Gb/s and above; fiber deployments are also gaining momentum, with a growing number of Gigabit towns now connected; the mobile rate remains comparatively low by international standards, and so the market offers further room for growth; Canadians have provided for LTE and LTE-A infrastructure; despite topographical challenges and the remoteness of many areas, the major players effectively offer 99% population coverage with LTE; operators now provide up to 70% population coverage with 5G (2022)" + "text": "the Canadian telecom market continues to show steady development as operators invest in network upgrades; much of the investment among telcos has been channelled into LTE infrastructure to capitalize on consumer demand for mobile data services, while there has also been further investment in 5G; investment programs have also been supported by regulatory efforts to ensure that operators have spectrum available to develop 5G services; an investment in fixed-line infrastructure, focused on FttP and, among cable broadband providers; government policy has encouraged the extension of broadband to rural and regional areas, with the result that services are almost universally available and the emphasis now is on improving service speeds to enable the entire population to benefit from the digital economy and society; cable broadband is the principal access platform, followed by DSL; the mobile rate remains comparatively low by international standards; Canadians have provided for LTE and LTE-A infrastructure; despite topographical challenges and the remoteness of many areas, the major players effectively offer 99% population coverage with LTE; operators now provide up to 70% population coverage with 5G (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "Nearly 37 per 100 fixed-line and 96 per 100 mobile-cellular teledensity; domestic satellite system with about 300 earth stations (2020)" diff --git a/north-america/gl.json b/north-america/gl.json index e38be3a6..7b2a02d5 100644 --- a/north-america/gl.json +++ b/north-america/gl.json @@ -821,10 +821,10 @@ "text": "4,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/north-america/mx.json b/north-america/mx.json index 7f4c7643..7ac4e25a 100644 --- a/north-america/mx.json +++ b/north-america/mx.json @@ -97,10 +97,10 @@ "text": "65,000 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Laguna de Chapala - 1,140 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Laguna de Terminos - 1,550 sq km" } }, @@ -516,10 +516,10 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Laguna de Chapala - 1,140 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Laguna de Terminos - 1,550 sq km" } }, @@ -1086,10 +1086,10 @@ "text": "1,928,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "1,283,300 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "1,283,300 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "3,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "3,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "5,786,100,000 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/north-america/sb.json b/north-america/sb.json index 85e838f0..6ae06a68 100644 --- a/north-america/sb.json +++ b/north-america/sb.json @@ -706,10 +706,10 @@ "text": "600 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/north-america/us.json b/north-america/us.json index b2f1f5e4..67737e67 100644 --- a/north-america/us.json +++ b/north-america/us.json @@ -102,10 +102,10 @@ "text": "264,000 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Michigan – 57,750 sq km; Superior* – 53,348 sq km; Huron* – 23,597 sq km; Erie* – 12,890 sq km; Ontario* – 9,220 sq km; Lake of the Woods – 4,350 sq km; Iliamna – 2,590 sq km; Okeechobee – 1,810 sq km; Belcharof – 1,190 sq km; Red – 1,170 sq km; Saint Clair – 1,113 sq km; Champlain – 1,100 sq km
note - Great Lakes* area shown as US waters" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Great Salt – 4,360 sq km; Pontchartrain – 1,620 sq km;  Selawik – 1,400 sq km; Salton Sea – 950 sq km" } }, @@ -483,10 +483,10 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Michigan – 57,750 sq km; Superior* – 53,348 sq km; Huron* – 23,597 sq km; Erie* – 12,890 sq km; Ontario* – 9,220 sq km; Lake of the Woods – 4,350 sq km; Iliamna – 2,590 sq km; Okeechobee – 1,810 sq km; Belcharof – 1,190 sq km; Red – 1,170 sq km; Saint Clair – 1,113 sq km; Champlain – 1,100 sq km
note - Great Lakes* area shown as US waters" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Great Salt – 4,360 sq km; Pontchartrain – 1,620 sq km;  Selawik – 1,400 sq km; Salton Sea – 950 sq km" } }, @@ -1012,10 +1012,10 @@ "text": "20,542,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "2,048,100 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "2,048,100 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "7,768,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "7,768,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "47.107 billion barrels (2020 est.)" diff --git a/south-america/ar.json b/south-america/ar.json index 813f5fa6..48473122 100644 --- a/south-america/ar.json +++ b/south-america/ar.json @@ -97,10 +97,10 @@ "text": "23,600 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lago Buenos Aires (shared with Chile) - 2,240 sq km; Lago Argentino - 1,410 sq km; Lago Viedma - 1,090 sq km; Lago San Martin (shared with Chile) - 1,010 sq km; Lago Colhue Huapi - 800 sq km; Lago Fagnano (shared with Chile) - 590 sq km; Lago Nahuel Huapi - 550 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Laguna Mar Chiquita - 1,850 sq km;" } }, @@ -486,10 +486,10 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lago Buenos Aires (shared with Chile) - 2,240 sq km; Lago Argentino - 1,410 sq km; Lago Viedma - 1,090 sq km; Lago San Martin (shared with Chile) - 1,010 sq km; Lago Colhue Huapi - 800 sq km; Lago Fagnano (shared with Chile) - 590 sq km; Lago Nahuel Huapi - 550 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Laguna Mar Chiquita - 1,850 sq km;" } }, @@ -1042,10 +1042,10 @@ "text": "680,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "59,100 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "59,100 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "11,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "11,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "2,482,700,000 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1116,7 +1116,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Argentina’s ongoing hyperinflation continues to distort the telecom market’s performance, which shows strong growth in revenue but only modest gains in subscriber numbers each year; fixed-line teledensity continues on its slow, gradual decline year upon year, the fixed broadband segment has increased levels only slightly higher than the fixed-line teledensity; nearly a quarter of the country’s broadband connections are via DSL, although fiber is   increasing it's share of that market as networks expand across most of the main cities; mobile broadband continues to be the preferred platform for internet access, supported by high mobile levels and nationwide LTE coverage; the first 5G service was launched in February 2021 using re-farmed LTE frequencies; the various fixed, mobile, and cable operators are expanding and enhancing their services, the government is also making an active contribution towards boosting broadband connectivity around the country; its national connectivity plan ‘Plan Conectar’, launched in September 2020, provides funding for a range of programs to increase coverage (2021)" + "text": "Argentina’s ongoing problem with hyperinflation continues to distort the telecom market’s performance, which shows strong growth in revenue but only modest gains in subscriber numbers each year; the fixed broadband segment has penetration levels only slightly higher than the fixed-line teledensity; nearly a quarter of the country’s broadband connections are via DSL, although fiber is starting claim an increasing share of that market as networks expand across most of the main cities; mobile broadband continues to be the preferred platform for internet access, supported by high mobile penetration levels and nationwide LTE coverage; the first 5G service was launched in February 2021 using refarmed LTE frequencies; the anticipated 5G spectrum auctions should drive even stronger uptake in mobile broadband services; while the various fixed, mobile, and cable operators push to expand and enhance their services, the government is also making an active contribution towards boosting broadband connectivity around the country; its national connectivity plan ‘Plan Conectar’, launched in September 2020, provides funding for a range of programs to increase coverage; in August 2021, the telecom regulator announced the release funding to help operators accelerate the rollout of their broadband infrastructure and services (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "roughly 16 per 100 fixed-line and 121 per 100 mobile-cellular; microwave radio relay, fiber-optic cable, and a domestic satellite system with 40 earth stations serve the trunk network (2020)" diff --git a/south-america/bl.json b/south-america/bl.json index d646a537..68dc6475 100644 --- a/south-america/bl.json +++ b/south-america/bl.json @@ -86,10 +86,10 @@ "text": "3,000 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lago Titicaca (shared with Peru) - 8,030 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lago Poopo - 1,340 sq km" } }, @@ -495,10 +495,10 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lago Titicaca (shared with Peru) - 8,030 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lago Poopo - 1,340 sq km" } }, @@ -1053,10 +1053,10 @@ "text": "87,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "240.9 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1127,7 +1127,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "the structure of Bolivia’s fixed telecom market is different from most other countries; local services are primarily provided by 15 telecom cooperatives; these are non-profit-making companies privately owned and controlled by their users; since the market was liberalized, the cooperatives have also provided long-distance telephony, while several also offer broadband and pay TV service; they have invested in network upgrades in a bid to improve services for customers, and to expand their footprints; Bolivia has a multi-carrier system wherein consumers can choose a long-distance carrier for each call by dialing the carrier’s prefix; several operators have also adopted fixed-wireless technologies, and some rent fiber-optic capacity; the fixed broadband services remain expensive, though the cost of bandwidth is only a fraction of what it was only a few years ago; services are still unavailable in many rural and remote areas, and even in some of the major urban areas; being a landlocked country, Bolivia had no direct access to submarine cable networks, and relies on satellite services or terrestrial links across neighboring countries; in September 2020 a new cable running via Peru, has increased capacity and contributed to a dramatic fall in end-user prices; fixed broadband services are fast migrating from DSL to fiber, while there are also cable broadband services available in some major cities; in 2007 the focus was on providing telecom services in rural areas under a project known as ‘Territory with Total Coverage’; this project aims to increase telecom coverage through mobile rather than through fixed networks;
Bolivia has almost twenty times as many mobile phone subscribers as fixed line connections, and the trend towards fixed-mobile substitution continues; all the mobile companies offer 3G and LTE services; due to the poor quality, high cost, and poor reach of DSL, mobile networks have become the principal platform for voice services and data access; by early 2021 companies’ networks reached more than 95% of the population; about 92% of all internet accesses are via smartphones (2021)" + "text": "the structure of Bolivia’s fixed telecom market is different from most other countries; local services are primarily provided by 15 telecom cooperatives; these are non-profit-making companies privately owned and controlled by their users; since the market was liberalized, the cooperatives have also provided long-distance telephony, while several also offer broadband and pay TV service; they have invested in network upgrades in a bid to improve services for customers, and to expand their footprints; Bolivia has a multi-carrier system wherein consumers can choose a long-distance carrier for each call by dialing the carrier’s prefix; several operators have also adopted fixed-wireless technologies, and some rent fiber-optic capacity; the fixed broadband services remain expensive, though the cost of bandwidth is only a fraction of what it was only a few years ago; services are still unavailable in many rural and remote areas, and even in some of the major urban areas; being a landlocked country, Bolivia had no direct access to submarine cable networks, and relies on satellite services or terrestrial links across neighboring countries; in September 2020 a new cable running via Peru, has increased capacity and contributed to a dramatic fall in end-user prices; fixed broadband services are fast migrating from DSL to fiber, while there are also cable broadband services available in some major cities; in 2007 the focus was on providing telecom services in rural areas under a project known as ‘Territory with Total Coverage’; this project aims to increase telecom coverage through mobile rather than through fixed networks; Bolivia has almost twenty times as many mobile phone subscribers as fixed line connections, and the trend towards fixed-mobile substitution continues; all the mobile companies offer 3G and LTE services; due to the poor quality, high cost, and poor reach of DSL, mobile networks have become the principal platform for voice services and data access; by early 2021 companies’ networks reached more than 95% of the population; about 92% of all internet accesses are via smartphones (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "5 per 100 fixed-line, mobile-cellular telephone use expanding rapidly and teledensity stands at 101 per 100 persons; most telephones are concentrated in La Paz, Santa Cruz, and other capital cities (2020)" diff --git a/south-america/br.json b/south-america/br.json index 8699dec0..ba73645d 100644 --- a/south-america/br.json +++ b/south-america/br.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Following more than three centuries under Portuguese rule, Brazil gained its independence in 1822, maintaining a monarchical system of government until the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the subsequent proclamation of a republic by the military in 1889. Brazilian coffee exporters politically dominated the country until populist leader Getulio VARGAS rose to power in 1930. VARGAS governed over various versions of democratic and authoritarian regimes from 1930 to 1945. Democratic rule returned (including a democratically elected VARGAS administration from 1951 to 1955) and lasted until 1964, when the military overthrew President Joao GOULART. The military regime censored journalists and repressed and tortured dissidents in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The dictatorship lasted until 1985, when the military regime peacefully ceded power to civilian rulers, and the Brazilian Congress passed its current constitution in 1989. 

By far the largest and most populous country in South America, Brazil continues to pursue industrial and agricultural growth and development of its interior. Having successfully weathered a period of global financial difficulty in the late 20th century, under President Luiz Inacio LULA da Silva (2003-2010) Brazil was seen as one of the world's strongest emerging markets and a contributor to global growth. The awarding of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympic Games, the first ever to be held in South America, was symbolic of the country's rise. However, from about 2013 to 2016, Brazil was plagued by a sagging economy, high unemployment, and high inflation, only emerging from recession in 2017. Former President Dilma ROUSSEFF (2011-2016) was removed from office in 2016 by Congress for having committed impeachable acts against Brazil's budgetary laws, and her vice president, Michel TEMER, served the remainder of her second term. A money-laundering investigation, Operation Lava Jato, uncovered a vast corruption scheme and prosecutors charged several high-profile Brazilian politicians with crimes. Former-President LULA was convicted of accepting bribes and served jail time (2018-19), although his conviction was overturned in early 2021. In October 2018, Jair BOLSONARO won the presidency with 55% of the second-round vote and assumed office on 1 January 2019. The next national elections are scheduled for October 2022.

" + "text": "

Following more than three centuries under Portuguese rule, Brazil gained its independence in 1822, maintaining a monarchical system of government until the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the subsequent proclamation of a republic by the military in 1889. Brazilian coffee exporters politically dominated the country until populist leader Getulio VARGAS rose to power in 1930. VARGAS governed over various versions of democratic and authoritarian regimes from 1930 to 1945. Democratic rule returned (including a democratically elected VARGAS administration from 1951 to 1955) and lasted until 1964, when the military overthrew President Joao GOULART. The military regime censored journalists and repressed and tortured dissidents in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The dictatorship lasted until 1985, when the military regime peacefully ceded power to civilian rulers, and the Brazilian Congress passed its current constitution in 1989. 

By far the largest and most populous country in South America, Brazil continues to pursue industrial and agricultural growth and development of its interior. Having successfully weathered a period of global financial difficulty in the late 20th century, under President Luiz Inacio LULA da Silva (2003-2010) Brazil was seen as one of the world's strongest emerging markets and a contributor to global growth. The awarding of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympic Games, the first ever to be held in South America, was symbolic of the country's rise. However, from about 2013 to 2016, Brazil was plagued by a sagging economy, high unemployment, and high inflation, only emerging from recession in 2017. Former President Dilma ROUSSEFF (2011-2016) was removed from office in 2016 by Congress for having committed impeachable acts against Brazil's budgetary laws, and her vice president, Michel TEMER, served the remainder of her second term. A money-laundering investigation, Operation Lava Jato, uncovered a vast corruption scheme and prosecutors charged several high-profile Brazilian politicians with crimes. Former-President LULA was convicted of accepting bribes and served jail time (2018-19), although his conviction was overturned in early 2021. LULA's revival became complete in October 2022 when he narrowly defeated incumbent Jair BOLSONARO (2019-2022) in the presidential election. LULA will assume the office on 1 January 2023.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -98,10 +98,10 @@ "text": "54,000 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lagoa dos Patos - 10,140 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lagoa Mirim (shared with Uruguay) - 2,970 sq km" } }, @@ -514,10 +514,10 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lagoa dos Patos - 10,140 sq km" }, - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lagoa Mirim (shared with Uruguay) - 2,970 sq km" } }, @@ -1074,10 +1074,10 @@ "text": "3,142,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "1,123,300 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "1,123,300 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "186,200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "186,200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "12,714,600,000 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1148,7 +1148,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Brazil is one of the largest mobile and broadband markets in Latin America with healthy competition and pricing; the development of 5G, was scheduled for March 2020 but was delayed due to interference issues with satellite TV broadcasts and the pandemic; the auction was completed November 2021; the licenses are obliged to provide 5G services to all capital cities by July 2022, as well as about 35,500km of the national highway network; the country also has one of the largest fixed line broadband markets in Latin America, though broadband subscriptions is only slightly above the regional average, trailing behind Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay; amendments to the licensing regime adopted in October 2019 also require that ISPs which have switched to authorizations invest money saved from lighter regulations in the expansion of broadband services; the fixed line broadband market has seen rapid growth for a number of years, with a growing focus on fiber broadband; in 2019 the number of fiber accesses overtook DSL connections; the country is a key landing point for a number of important submarine cables connecting to the US, Central and South America, the Caribbean, Europe, and Africa; several new cable systems are due to come into service through to 2022, which will increase bandwidth and push down broadband prices for end-users; investments have also been made into terrestrial fiber cables between Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. (2021)" + "text": "Brazil is one of the largest mobile and broadband markets in Latin America with healthy competition and pricing; the development of 5G, was scheduled for March 2020 but was delayed due to interference issues with satellite TV broadcasts and the pandemic; the auction was completed November 2021; the licenses are obliged to provide 5G services to all capital cities by July 2022, as well as about 35,500km of the national highway network; the country also has one of the largest fixed line broadband markets in Latin America, though broadband subscriptions is only slightly above the regional average, trailing behind Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay; amendments to the licensing regime adopted in October 2019 also require that ISPs which have switched to authorizations invest money saved from lighter regulations in the expansion of broadband services; the fixed line broadband market has seen rapid growth for a number of years, with a growing focus on fiber broadband; in 2019 the number of fiber accesses overtook DSL connections; the country is a key landing point for a number of important submarine cables connecting to the US, Central and South America, the Caribbean, Europe, and Africa; several new cable systems are due to come into service through to 2022, which will increase bandwidth and push down broadband prices for end-users; investments have also been made into terrestrial fiber cables between Brazil, Argentina, and Chile (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line connections stand at roughly 14 per 100 persons; less-expensive mobile-cellular technology has been a major impetus broadening telephone service to the lower-income segments of the population with mobile-cellular teledensity roughly 97 per 100 persons (2020)" diff --git a/south-america/ci.json b/south-america/ci.json index 716b98b2..ae7f0475 100644 --- a/south-america/ci.json +++ b/south-america/ci.json @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ "text": "11,100 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lago General Carrera (shared with Argentina) - 2,240 sq km; Lago O'Higgins (shared with Argentina) - 1,010 sq km; Lago Llanquihue - 800 sq km; Lago Fagnano (shared with Argentina) - 590 sq km" } }, @@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lago General Carrera (shared with Argentina) - 2,240 sq km; Lago O'Higgins (shared with Argentina) - 1,010 sq km; Lago Llanquihue - 800 sq km; Lago Fagnano (shared with Argentina) - 590 sq km" } }, @@ -1016,10 +1016,10 @@ "text": "361,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "172,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "172,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "150 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1090,7 +1090,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "the market for fixed and mobile telephony is highly competitive and rapidly evolving; the mobile rate is among the highest in South America; LTE infrastructure is extensive and 5G spectrum auctions which took place in February 2021 are expected to prompt the deployment of 5G networks by the end of the year, following extensive trials held by the MNOs; fixed broadband is relatively high for the region, with services among the fastest and least expensive in Latin America; government initiatives such as the National Fiber Optic project and Fibra Óptica Austral are providing high-capacity connectivity across the country and will further increase fixed-line broadband; there is a strong focus on fiber broadband, with the number of fiber subscribers having increased 61.7% in 2020, year-on-year; technological improvements have allowed operators to provide a variety of services via their networks, giving rise to a number of bundled packages at competitive prices, including access to video on demand services which in turn is increasing fixed-line broadband; traditional fixed-line teledensity continues to fall as consumers switch to mobile networks and to fixed broadband for voice and data connectivity; Humboldt submarine cable project to link Chile with New Zealand and Australia; more than 8,300 schools receive free broadband as part of the ‘Connectivity for Education 2030’ project; regulator completes multi-band 5G spectrum auction (2021)" + "text": "the market for fixed and mobile telephony is highly competitive and rapidly evolving; the mobile rate is among the highest in South America; LTE infrastructure is extensive and 5G spectrum auctions which took place in February 2021 are expected to prompt the deployment of 5G networks by the end of the year, following extensive trials held by the MNOs; fixed broadband is relatively high for the region, with services among the fastest and least expensive in Latin America; government initiatives such as the National Fiber Optic project and Fibra Óptica Austral are providing high-capacity connectivity across the country and will further increase fixed-line broadband; there is a strong focus on fiber broadband, with the number of fiber subscribers having increased 61.7% in 2020, year-on-year; technological improvements have allowed operators to provide a variety of services via their networks, giving rise to a number of bundled packages at competitive prices, including access to video on demand services which in turn is increasing fixed-line broadband; traditional fixed-line teledensity continues to fall as consumers switch to mobile networks and to fixed broadband for voice and data connectivity; more than 8,300 schools receive free broadband as part of the ‘Connectivity for Education 2030’ project (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "number of fixed-line connections have dropped to about 13 per 100 in recent years as mobile-cellular usage continues to increase, reaching 131 telephones per 100 persons; domestic satellite system with 3 earth stations (2020)" diff --git a/south-america/co.json b/south-america/co.json index e56a3e9c..7b487a0f 100644 --- a/south-america/co.json +++ b/south-america/co.json @@ -1053,10 +1053,10 @@ "text": "352,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "481,300 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "481,300 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "2.036 billion barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1127,7 +1127,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "the telecom sector had a solid year thanks to positive performances in the fixed-line broadband, mobile broadband, and mobile voice and data market; fixed-line remained stable by the end of 2020, though began to increase into 2021 as a result of the particular demands on households resulting from government measures associated with addressing the pandemic; at less than 15% it is well below the Latin American average; the mobile market, by contrast, reached a penetration rate of 136% (an increase of over three percentage points on 2019) and managed to keep the same upward growth trajectory that it has sustained over the last ten years; the fixed-line broadband market also expanded, with the number of subscribers increasing 11.4%, and with revenue increasing 9.9% thanks to increased data usage as many customers were forced to work or study from home during the year; the mobile broadband market was the standout performer in 2020, with a 13% increase in the number of subscribers year-on-year, albeit the subscription rate is relatively low compared to other Latin American countries; the surge in mobile broadband traffic — a 51% increase over the previous year — which was again a reflection of the strict lock downs that Colombians had to endure for much of 2020 (2021)" + "text": "the telecom sector had a solid year thanks to positive performances in the fixed-line broadband, mobile broadband, and mobile voice and data markets; the fixed-line penetration remained stable by the end of 2020, though began to increase into 2021 as a result of the particular demands on households resulting from government measures associated with addressing the pandemic; the mobile market reached a penetration rate of 136% (an increase of over three percentage points on 2019) and managed to keep the same upward growth trajectory that it has sustained over the last ten years; the fixed-line broadband market also expanded, with the number of subscribers increasing 11.4%, and with revenue increasing 9.9% thanks to increased data usage as many customers were forced to work or study from home during the year; the mobile broadband market was the standout performer in 2020, with a 13% increase in the number of subscribers year-on-year, the penetration rate is relatively low compared to other Latin American countries; most significant of all was the surge in mobile broadband traffic a 51% increase over the previous year (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line connections stand at about 14 per 100 persons; mobile cellular telephone subscribership is 133 per 100 persons; Partners Telecom Colombia's (WOM) market entrance in June 2021 increased competition among cellular service providers and is resulting in falling local and international calling rates and contributing to the steep decline in the market share of fixed-line services; domestic satellite system with 41 earth stations (2021)" diff --git a/south-america/ec.json b/south-america/ec.json index 4b92fbd2..d38ec091 100644 --- a/south-america/ec.json +++ b/south-america/ec.json @@ -1039,10 +1039,10 @@ "text": "259,000 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "349,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "349,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "8.273 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/south-america/fk.json b/south-america/fk.json index 3f9af901..59e2d22b 100644 --- a/south-america/fk.json +++ b/south-america/fk.json @@ -684,10 +684,10 @@ "text": "300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/south-america/gy.json b/south-america/gy.json index a2ff869f..00b74a86 100644 --- a/south-america/gy.json +++ b/south-america/gy.json @@ -997,10 +997,10 @@ "text": "18,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/south-america/ns.json b/south-america/ns.json index dd9fdb89..4c48b22b 100644 --- a/south-america/ns.json +++ b/south-america/ns.json @@ -994,10 +994,10 @@ "text": "15,800 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "200 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "200 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "89 million barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/south-america/pa.json b/south-america/pa.json index b9c8b7e1..55e66c21 100644 --- a/south-america/pa.json +++ b/south-america/pa.json @@ -1022,10 +1022,10 @@ "text": "56,900 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1096,7 +1096,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "limited progress on structural reform and deficient infrastructure of the landlocked country are obstacles to telecom platform; monopolized fixed-line service; effective competition in mobile market, serving 96% of population through LTE; deployment of fiber; South Korean investment in education centers; operator enabled 109 free Internet points across the country and is looking to expand to 430 points in 2022; Inter-American Development Bank loan supports modernization within regulatory framework; dependent on neighboring countries for access to submarine cables; major importer of broadcasting equipment from the USA (2022)" + "text": "limited progress on structural reform and deficient infrastructure of the landlocked country are obstacles to the telecom platform; effective competition in mobile market, serving 96% of population through LTE; deployment of fiber; operator enabled 109 free Internet points across the country and is looking to expand to 430 points in 2022; dependent on neighboring countries for access to submarine cables (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "deficiencies in provision of fixed-line service have resulted in expansion of mobile-cellular services fostered by competition among multiple providers; Internet market also open to competition; fixed-line just over 3 per 100 and mobile-cellular just over 105 per 100 of the population (2020)" diff --git a/south-america/pe.json b/south-america/pe.json index a1692360..8b8d102f 100644 --- a/south-america/pe.json +++ b/south-america/pe.json @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ "text": "25,800 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lago Titicaca (shared with Bolivia) - 8,030 sq km" } }, @@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Fresh water lake(s)": { + "fresh water lake(s)": { "text": "Lago Titicaca (shared with Bolivia) - 8,030 sq km" } }, @@ -1070,10 +1070,10 @@ "text": "265,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "6,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "6,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "112,900 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "112,900 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "858.9 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1144,7 +1144,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "after suffering a sharp retraction in the number of subscriptions and revenue during 2020 due to the pandemic, Peru’s telecom sector managed to stage a small recovery in the first half of 2021; it will likely be two to three years before penetration rates return to the peak levels last seen in 2018; this is especially true given the overwhelming influence of mobile on Peru’s telecommunications market, which now commands almost 95% of all connections; Peru’s fixed-line teledensity continued its slow dropping below 7% at the end of 2021; investment in network infrastructure is mainly focused on rolling out fiber cable for fixed broadband services in (mainly) urban areas; fixed broadband services inched higher to reach 8.4% at the end of 2020, a positive result that reflected the shift to working from home during enforced lock downs at the start of the year; yet Peru has a relatively low level of computer use, and prices for fixed broadband services are among the highest in Latin America; the overwhelmingly preferred internet access platform will remain the smartphone, with a further 8.6% growth in the number of mobile broadband subscriptions expected in 2021; one drawback to success in the mobile broadband market was the decision in January 2021 by Google’s parent company Alphabet to shut down Project Loon; this global endeavor involved the use of high-altitude balloons to provide internet access to remote, under served areas around the world; in Peru, Loon had signed a deal with Telefónica to provide internet services in areas of the Amazon rain forest as part of the Telefónica/Facebook ‘Internet para Todos’ (IPT) project launched in 2018; Alphabet was unable to make the venture financially sustainable. (2021)" + "text": "after suffering a sharp retraction in the number of subscriptions and revenue during 2020 due to the pandemic, Peru’s telecom sector managed to stage a small recovery in the first half of 2021; it will likely be two to three years before penetration rates return to the peak levels last seen in 2018; this is especially true given the overwhelming influence of mobile on Peru’s telecommunications market, which now commands almost 95% of all connections; Peru’s fixed-line teledensity continued its slow dropping below 7% at the end of 2021; investment in network infrastructure is mainly focused on rolling out fiber cable for fixed broadband services in (mainly) urban areas; fixed broadband services inched higher to reach 8.4% at the end of 2020, a positive result that reflected the shift to working from home during enforced lock downs at the start of the year; yet Peru has a relatively low level of computer use, and prices for fixed broadband services are among the highest in Latin America; the overwhelmingly preferred internet access platform will remain the smartphone, with a further 8.6% growth in the number of mobile broadband subscriptions expected in 2021 (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line teledensity is nearly 10 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity, spurred by competition among multiple providers, now nearly 124 telephones per 100 persons; nationwide microwave radio relay system and a domestic satellite system with 12 earth stations (2019)" diff --git a/south-america/uy.json b/south-america/uy.json index a293292b..a0d70495 100644 --- a/south-america/uy.json +++ b/south-america/uy.json @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ "text": "2,380 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lagoa Mirim (shared with Brazil) - 2,970 sq km" } }, @@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lagoa Mirim (shared with Brazil) - 2,970 sq km" } }, @@ -1026,10 +1026,10 @@ "text": "50,200 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "41,500 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "41,500 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/south-america/ve.json b/south-america/ve.json index bd7e2261..ba734c9c 100644 --- a/south-america/ve.json +++ b/south-america/ve.json @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ "text": "10,550 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lago de Maracaibo - 13,010 sq km" } }, @@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Lago de Maracaibo - 13,010 sq km" } }, @@ -1000,10 +1000,10 @@ "text": "470,600 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "1,002,700 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "1,002,700 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "303.806 billion barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/south-asia/af.json b/south-asia/af.json index af430a0b..6d910991 100644 --- a/south-asia/af.json +++ b/south-asia/af.json @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ "text": "32,080 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Ab-e Istadah-ye Muqur (endorheic basin) - 520 sq km" } }, @@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Ab-e Istadah-ye Muqur (endorheic basin) - 520 sq km" } }, @@ -1023,10 +1023,10 @@ "text": "24,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "before 15 August 2021, Afghanistan had successfully rebuilt infrastructure to create a functional telecom sector that covered nearly all of the population; due to mountainous geography, Afghanistan relies on its mobile network; mobile broadband penetration growing, but is still low compared to other countries in Asia; operator launched LTE in Kabul; World Bank and other donors support development of a nationwide fiber backbone; terrestrial cable connectivity to five neighboring countries; work on the ‘Wakhan Corridor Fiber Optic Survey Project’ to connect to China is nearing completion; major importer of broadcasting equipment from UAE (2021)" + "text": "the return of the Taliban to power in August 2021 following the American-led withdrawal of security forces has thrown the telecom sector into disarray; Afghanistan was near the bottom of the world’s rankings in terms of its telecom market maturity, but it had been making some positive progress toward establishing widespread coverage over the prior decade under civilian administration; after the first Taliban regime was toppled in 2001, considerable foreign investment along with open competition in the telecom sector resulted in the transformation of the mobile market; the first mobile network was set up in 2002, and by 2020 coverage had reached 90%; mobile penetration rates, too, had climbed from zero to almost 100% by the time a new insurgency kicked off in 2019 that was closely followed by the start of the Covid-19 pandemic; both events caused a drop in subscriber numbers and in revenue for the mobile operators; it was additional costs involved with repairing and replacing network infrastructure destroyed by the Taliban in the build up to their takeover that put a strain on the operators’ finances; with increased levels of risk and uncertainty now associated with running a telecom company in the embattled state (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "before 15 August 2021, less than 1 per 100 for fixed-line teledensity; 58 per 100 for mobile-cellular; an increasing number of Afghans utilize mobile-cellular phone networks (2021)" diff --git a/south-asia/bg.json b/south-asia/bg.json index 5d6632cb..c2d9f573 100644 --- a/south-asia/bg.json +++ b/south-asia/bg.json @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ } }, "Ethnic groups": { - "text": "Bengali at least 98%, other indigenous ethnic groups 1.1% (2011 est.)", + "text": "Bengali at least 98.9%, other indigenous ethnic groups 1.1% (2011 est.)", "note": "note: Bangladesh's government recognizes 27 indigenous ethnic groups under the 2010 Cultural Institution for Small Anthropological Groups Act; other sources estimate there are about 75 ethnic groups; critics of the 2011 census claim that it underestimates the size of Bangladesh's ethnic population" }, "Languages": { @@ -1065,10 +1065,10 @@ "text": "122,500 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "21,600 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "21,600 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "28 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1139,10 +1139,10 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Bangladesh’s economic resurgence over the last decade took a battering in 2020 and 2021 as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic; the country had been on track to move off the United Nation’s Least Developed Countries list by 2026, however the crisis may have pushed that back a few years; the telecommunications sector experienced a set of challenges, with mobile data usage exploding at the same time as many consumers were being forced to curb their spending in other areas; the demand on data grew so large and so rapidly that Bangladesh came close to running out of bandwidth; at the start of 2020, Bangladesh was consuming around 900Gb/s on average, well below the 2,642GB/s capacity of its submarine cables; this ballooned to over 2,300Gb/s during the pandemic; Bangladesh was looking forward to adding 7,200Gb/s capacity when the SEA-ME-WE-6 submarine cable goes into service in mid-2024, but the sudden upsurge in downloads is forcing state-run company Bangladesh Submarine Cable Company Limited (BSCCL) to scramble to find alternatives before the country’s internet supply is maxed out; the increased demand during the Covid-19 crisis also put pressure on the country’s existing mobile networks, already under strain as a result of strong growth in the mobile broadband market coupled with significant untapped potential for mobile services in general across the country; this led to premium prices being paid at auction for spectrum in the 1800MHz and 2100MHz bands, most of which will be used to enhance and expand LTE services; a 5G spectrum auction had been anticipated for 2020, but low interest from the MNOs in going down that path when there are still so many areas waiting for LTE access means that 5G rollouts will likely be deferred until 2023. (2021)" + "text": "Bangladesh’s economic resurgence over the last decade took a battering in 2020 and 2021 as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic; the country had been on track to move off the United Nation’s Least Developed Countries list by 2026, however the crisis may have pushed that back a few years; the telecommunications sector experienced a set of challenges, with mobile data usage exploding at the same time as many consumers were being forced to curb their spending in other areas; the demand on data grew so large and so rapidly that Bangladesh came close to running out of bandwidth; at the start of 2020, Bangladesh was consuming around 900Gb/s on average, well below the 2,642GB/s capacity of its submarine cables; this ballooned to over 2,300Gb/s during the pandemic; Bangladesh was looking forward to adding 7,200Gb/s capacity when the SEA-ME-WE-6 submarine cable goes into service in mid-2024, but the sudden upsurge in downloads is forcing state-run company Bangladesh Submarine Cable Company Limited (BSCCL) to scramble to find alternatives before the country’s internet supply is maxed out; the increased demand during the Covid-19 crisis also put pressure on the country’s existing mobile networks, already under strain as a result of strong growth in the mobile broadband market coupled with significant untapped potential for mobile services in general across the country; this led to premium prices being paid at auction for spectrum in the 1800MHz and 2100MHz bands, most of which will be used to enhance and expand LTE services; a 5G spectrum auction had been anticipated for 2020, but low interest from the MNOs in going down that path when there are still so many areas waiting for LTE access means that 5G  will likely be deferred until 2023 (2021)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "fixed-line teledensity remains less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular telephone subscribership has been increasing rapidly and now exceeds 103 telephones per 100 persons; mobile subscriber growth is anticipated over the next five years to 2023; strong local competition (2020)" + "text": "fixed-line teledensity remains less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular telephone subscribership has been increasing rapidly and now exceeds 107 per 100 persons; mobile subscriber growth is anticipated over the next five years to 2023 (2020)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 880; landing points for the SeaMeWe-4 and SeaMeWe-5 fiber-optic submarine cable system that provides links to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia; satellite earth stations - 6; international radiotelephone communications and landline service to neighboring countries (2019)" diff --git a/south-asia/bt.json b/south-asia/bt.json index d35be4cb..40c6368e 100644 --- a/south-asia/bt.json +++ b/south-asia/bt.json @@ -924,10 +924,10 @@ "text": "4,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/south-asia/ce.json b/south-asia/ce.json index 44408aab..54f26f44 100644 --- a/south-asia/ce.json +++ b/south-asia/ce.json @@ -1037,10 +1037,10 @@ "text": "131,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "35,300 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "35,300 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/south-asia/in.json b/south-asia/in.json index f2abdbc7..422693c4 100644 --- a/south-asia/in.json +++ b/south-asia/in.json @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ "text": "667,000 sq km (2012)" }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Chilika Lake - 1,170 sq km" } }, @@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ } }, "Major lakes (area sq km)": { - "Salt water lake(s)": { + "salt water lake(s)": { "text": "Chilika Lake - 1,170 sq km" } }, @@ -1087,10 +1087,10 @@ "text": "4,920,100 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "4.53 million barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "4.53 million bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "4,604,900,000 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/south-asia/mv.json b/south-asia/mv.json index 1a6d5c77..83c670a3 100644 --- a/south-asia/mv.json +++ b/south-asia/mv.json @@ -946,10 +946,10 @@ "text": "15,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/south-asia/np.json b/south-asia/np.json index a9b19e4b..b68acb76 100644 --- a/south-asia/np.json +++ b/south-asia/np.json @@ -1021,10 +1021,10 @@ "text": "49,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" diff --git a/south-asia/pk.json b/south-asia/pk.json index 6646dfba..7c9a32a0 100644 --- a/south-asia/pk.json +++ b/south-asia/pk.json @@ -1080,10 +1080,10 @@ "text": "493,400 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { - "text": "7,800 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "7,800 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { - "text": "198,400 barrels/day (2018 est.)" + "text": "198,400 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "540 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Pakistan’s telecom market transitioned from a regulated state-owned monopoly to a deregulated competitive structure in 2003, now aided by foreign investment; moderate growth over the last six years, supported by a young population and a rising use of mobile services; telecom infrastructure is improving, with investments in mobile-cellular networks, fixed-line subscriptions declining; system consists of microwave radio relay, coaxial cable, fiber-optic cable, cellular, and satellite networks; 4G mobile services broadly available; 5G tests ongoing; data centers in major cities; mobile and broadband doing well and dominate over fixed-broadband sector; China-Pakistan Fiber Optic Project became operational in 2020; importer of broadcasting equipment and computers from China; future growth (in market size as well as revenue) is likely to come from the wider availability of value-added services on top of the expansion of 4G LTE and (from 2023) 5G mobile networks; the Universal Service Fund (USF) continues to direct investment towards the development of mobile broadband (and, to a lesser extent, fiber-based networks) in under-served and even unserved areas of the country, with multiple projects being approved to start in 2021 and 2022. (2021)" + "text": "Pakistan’s telecom market transitioned from a regulated state-owned monopoly to a deregulated competitive structure in 2003, now aided by foreign investment; moderate growth over the last six years, supported by a young population and a rising use of mobile services; telecom infrastructure is improving, with investments in mobile-cellular networks, fixed-line subscriptions declining; system consists of microwave radio relay, coaxial cable, fiber-optic cable, cellular, and satellite networks; 4G mobile services broadly available; 5G tests ongoing; data centers in major cities; mobile and broadband doing well and dominate over fixed-broadband sector; future growth (in market size as well as revenue) is likely to come from the wider availability of value-added services on top of the expansion of 4G LTE and (from 2023) 5G mobile networks; the Universal Service Fund (USF) continues to direct investment towards the development of mobile broadband (and, to a lesser extent, fiber-based networks) in under-served and even under served areas of the country, with multiple projects being approved to start in 2021 and 2022 (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "mobile-cellular subscribership has increased; more than 90% of Pakistanis live within areas that have cell phone coverage; fiber-optic networks are being constructed throughout the country to increase broadband access and broadband penetration in Pakistan is increasing--by the end of 2021, 50% of the population had access to broadband services; fixed-line teledensity is a little over 1 per 100 and mobile-cellular roughly 84 per 100 persons (2021)" diff --git a/world/xx.json b/world/xx.json index b30ae44c..eeccdd03 100644 --- a/world/xx.json +++ b/world/xx.json @@ -43,16 +43,16 @@ "Climate": { "text": "a wide equatorial band of hot and humid tropical climates, bordered north and south by subtropical temperate zones that separate two large areas of cold and dry polar climates" }, - "Ten Driest Places on Earth (Average Annual Precipitation)": { + "ten driest places on earth (average annual precipitation)": { "text": "McMurdo Dry Valleys, Antarctica 0 mm (0 in)
Arica, Chile 0.76 mm (0.03 in)
Al Kufrah, Libya 0.86 mm (0.03 in)
Aswan, Egypt 0.86 mm (0.03 in)
Luxor, Egypt 0.86 mm (0.03 in)
Ica, Peru 2.29 mm (0.09 in)
Wadi Halfa, Sudan 2.45 mm (0.1 in)
Iquique, Chile 5.08 mm (0.2 in)
Pelican Point, Namibia 8.13 mm (0.32 in)
El Arab (Aoulef), Algeria 12.19 mm (0.48 in)" }, - "Ten Wettest Places on Earth (Average Annual Precipitation)": { + "ten wettest places on earth (average annual precipitation)": { "text": "Mawsynram, India 11,871 mm (467.4 in)
Cherrapunji, India 11,777 mm (463.7 in)
Tutunendo, Colombia 11,770 mm (463.4 in)
Cropp River, New Zealand 11,516 mm (453.4 in)
San Antonia de Ureca, Equatorial Guinea 10,450 mm (411.4 in)
Debundsha, Cameroon 10,299 mm (405.5 in)
Big Bog, US (Hawaii) 10,272 mm (404.4 in)
Mt Waialeale, US (Hawaii) 9,763 mm (384.4 in)
Kukui, US (Hawaii) 9,293 mm (365.9 in)
Emeishan, China 8,169 mm (321.6 in)" }, - "Ten Coldest Places on Earth (Lowest Average Monthly Temperature)": { + "ten coldest places on earth (lowest average monthly temperature)": { "text": "Verkhoyansk, Russia (Siberia) -47°C (-53°F) January
Oymyakon, Russia (Siberia) -46°C (-52°F) January
Eureka, Canada -38.4°C (-37.1°F) February
Isachsen, Canada -36°C (-32.8°F) February
Alert, Canada -34°C (-28°F) February
Kap Morris Jesup, Greenland -34°C (-29°F) March
Cornwallis Island, Canada -33.5°C (-28.3°F) February
Cambridge Bay, Canada -33.5°C (28.3°F) February
Ilirnej, Russia -33°C (-28°F) January
Resolute, Canada -33°C (-27.4°F) February" }, - "Ten Hottest Places on Earth (Highest Average Monthly Temperature)": { + "ten hottest places on earth (highest average monthly temperature)": { "text": "Death Valley, US (California) 39°C (101°F) July
Iranshahr, Iran 38.3°C (100.9°F) June
Ouallene, Algeria 38°C (100.4°F) July
Kuwait City, Kuwait 37.7°C (100°F) July
Medina, Saudi Arabia 36°C (97°F) July
Buckeye, US (Arizona) 34°C (93°F) July
Jazan, Saudi Arabia 33°C (91°F) June
Al Kufrah, Libya 31°C (87°F) July
Alice Springs, Australia 29°C (84°F) January
Tamanrasset, Algeria 29°C (84°F) June" } }, @@ -331,16 +331,16 @@ "Climate": { "text": "a wide equatorial band of hot and humid tropical climates, bordered north and south by subtropical temperate zones that separate two large areas of cold and dry polar climates" }, - "Ten Driest Places on Earth (Average Annual Precipitation)": { + "ten driest places on earth (average annual precipitation)": { "text": "McMurdo Dry Valleys, Antarctica 0 mm (0 in)
Arica, Chile 0.76 mm (0.03 in)
Al Kufrah, Libya 0.86 mm (0.03 in)
Aswan, Egypt 0.86 mm (0.03 in)
Luxor, Egypt 0.86 mm (0.03 in)
Ica, Peru 2.29 mm (0.09 in)
Wadi Halfa, Sudan 2.45 mm (0.1 in)
Iquique, Chile 5.08 mm (0.2 in)
Pelican Point, Namibia 8.13 mm (0.32 in)
El Arab (Aoulef), Algeria 12.19 mm (0.48 in)" }, - "Ten Wettest Places on Earth (Average Annual Precipitation)": { + "ten wettest places on earth (average annual precipitation)": { "text": "Mawsynram, India 11,871 mm (467.4 in)
Cherrapunji, India 11,777 mm (463.7 in)
Tutunendo, Colombia 11,770 mm (463.4 in)
Cropp River, New Zealand 11,516 mm (453.4 in)
San Antonia de Ureca, Equatorial Guinea 10,450 mm (411.4 in)
Debundsha, Cameroon 10,299 mm (405.5 in)
Big Bog, US (Hawaii) 10,272 mm (404.4 in)
Mt Waialeale, US (Hawaii) 9,763 mm (384.4 in)
Kukui, US (Hawaii) 9,293 mm (365.9 in)
Emeishan, China 8,169 mm (321.6 in)" }, - "Ten Coldest Places on Earth (Lowest Average Monthly Temperature)": { + "ten coldest places on earth (lowest average monthly temperature)": { "text": "Verkhoyansk, Russia (Siberia) -47°C (-53°F) January
Oymyakon, Russia (Siberia) -46°C (-52°F) January
Eureka, Canada -38.4°C (-37.1°F) February
Isachsen, Canada -36°C (-32.8°F) February
Alert, Canada -34°C (-28°F) February
Kap Morris Jesup, Greenland -34°C (-29°F) March
Cornwallis Island, Canada -33.5°C (-28.3°F) February
Cambridge Bay, Canada -33.5°C (28.3°F) February
Ilirnej, Russia -33°C (-28°F) January
Resolute, Canada -33°C (-27.4°F) February" }, - "Ten Hottest Places on Earth (Highest Average Monthly Temperature)": { + "ten hottest places on earth (highest average monthly temperature)": { "text": "Death Valley, US (California) 39°C (101°F) July
Iranshahr, Iran 38.3°C (100.9°F) June
Ouallene, Algeria 38°C (100.4°F) July
Kuwait City, Kuwait 37.7°C (100°F) July
Medina, Saudi Arabia 36°C (97°F) July
Buckeye, US (Arizona) 34°C (93°F) July
Jazan, Saudi Arabia 33°C (91°F) June
Al Kufrah, Libya 31°C (87°F) July
Alice Springs, Australia 29°C (84°F) January
Tamanrasset, Algeria 29°C (84°F) June" } },