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"note": "note: in eastern Congo, fighters from armed groups, and in some cases government security forces, have been accused of forced recruitment of child soldiers"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "the modern FARDC was created out of the armed factions of the two Congo wars of 1996-1997 and 1998-2003; as part of the peace accords that ended the last war, the largest rebel groups were incorporated into the FARDC; many armed groups, however, continue to fight and as of 2022, there were over 100 illegal armed groups operating in the country by some estimates; as of 2022, the FARDC was actively engaged in combat operations against numerous armed groups, particularly in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, although there was also violence in Maniema, Kasai, Kasai Central, and Tanganyika provinces; the military is widely assessed as being unable to provide adequate security throughout the country due to insufficient training, poor morale and leadership, ill-discipline and corruption, low equipment readiness, a fractious ethnic makeup, and the sheer size of the country and diversity of armed rebel groups<br><br>the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has operated in the central and eastern parts of the country since 1999; as of mid-2022, MONUSCO had around 15,000 personnel; MONUSCO includes a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB; 3 infantry battalions, plus artillery and special forces), the first ever UN peacekeeping force specifically tasked to carry out targeted offensive operations to neutralize and disarm groups considered a threat to state authority and civilian security (2022)"
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"text": "the modern FARDC was created out of the armed factions of the two Congo wars of 1996-1997 and 1998-2003; as part of the peace accords that ended the last war, the largest rebel groups were incorporated into the FARDC; many armed groups, however, continue to fight and as of 2022, there were over 100 illegal armed groups operating in the country by some estimates; as of 2022, the FARDC was actively engaged in combat operations against numerous armed groups, particularly in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, although there was also violence in Maniema, Kasai, Kasai Central, and Tanganyika provinces; the military is widely assessed as being unable to provide adequate security throughout the country due to insufficient training, poor morale and leadership, ill-discipline and corruption, low equipment readiness, a fractious ethnic makeup, and the sheer size of the country and diversity of armed rebel groups<br><br>as of 2022, one of the primary armed groups the FARDC was conducting operations against was the March 23 Movement (M23, aka Congolese Revolutionary Army), which resumed attacks, largely against civilians, in the DRC province of North Kivu in 2022 after having been defeated in 2013 by FARDC and UN forces; the M23's resurgence has raised tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, as the DRC Government claims Rwanda backs the M23, which it has labeled a terrorist group, charges that the Rwandan Government has denied; M23 attacks and fighting between the FARDC and M23 in 2022 has led to the displacement of more than 200,000 people; UN troops are supporting the FARDC's operations against M23<br><br>the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has operated in the central and eastern parts of the country since 1999; as of mid-2022, MONUSCO had around 15,000 personnel; MONUSCO includes a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB; 3 infantry battalions, plus artillery and special forces), the first ever UN peacekeeping force specifically tasked to carry out targeted offensive operations to neutralize and disarm groups considered a threat to state authority and civilian security (2022)"
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}
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},
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"Terrorism": {
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@ -292,7 +292,7 @@
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}
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},
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"HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
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"text": "(2020 est.) <.1%"
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"text": "(2020 est.) <0.1%"
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},
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"HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS": {
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"text": "(2020 est.) <200"
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@ -128,7 +128,7 @@
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> animistic beliefs and practices strongly influence the Christian majority"
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},
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"Demographic profile": {
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"text": "<p>The Central African Republic’s (CAR) humanitarian crisis has worsened since a coup in March 2013. CAR’s high mortality rate and low life expectancy are attributed to elevated rates of preventable and treatable diseases (including malaria and malnutrition), an inadequate health care system, precarious food security, and armed conflict. Some of the worst mortality rates are in western CAR’s diamond mining region, which is impoverished because of government attempts to control the diamond trade and the fall in industrial diamond prices. To make matters worse, the government and international donors have reduced health funding in recent years. The CAR’s weak educational system and low literacy rate have also suffered as a result of the country’s ongoing conflict. Schools are closed, qualified teachers are scarce, infrastructure, funding, and supplies are lacking and subject to looting, and many students and teachers are displaced by violence.</p> <p>Rampant poverty, human rights violations, unemployment, poor infrastructure, and a lack of security and stability have led to forced displacement internally and externally. Since the political crisis that resulted in CAR’s March 2013 coup began in December 2012, approximately 600,000 people have fled to Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and other neighboring countries, while another estimated 600,000 are displaced internally as of October 2019. The UN has urged countries to refrain from repatriating CAR refugees amid the heightened lawlessness.</p> (2019)"
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"text": "<p>The Central African Republic’s (CAR) humanitarian crisis has worsened since the coup of March 2013. CAR’s high mortality rate and low life expectancy are attributed to elevated rates of preventable and treatable diseases (including malaria and malnutrition), an inadequate health care system, precarious food security, and armed conflict. Some of the worst mortality rates are in western CAR’s diamond mining region, which has been impoverished because of government attempts to control the diamond trade and the fall in industrial diamond prices. To make matters worse, the government and international donors have reduced health funding in recent years. The CAR’s weak educational system and low literacy rate have also suffered as a result of the country’s ongoing conflict. Schools are closed, qualified teachers are scarce, infrastructure, funding, and supplies are lacking and subject to looting, and many students and teachers have been displaced by violence.</p> <p>Rampant poverty, human rights violations, unemployment, poor infrastructure, and a lack of security and stability have led to forced displacement internally and externally. Since the political crisis that resulted in CAR’s March 2013 coup began in December 2012, approximately 600,000 people have fled to Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and other neighboring countries, while another estimated 600,000 were displaced internally as of October 2019. The UN has urged countries to refrain from repatriating CAR refugees amid the heightened lawlessness.</p> (2019)"
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},
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"Age structure": {
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"0-14 years": {
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"text": "UTC+1 (6 hours ahead of Washington, DC, during Standard Time)"
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},
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"etymology": {
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"text": "established as a French settlement in 1889 and named after its location on the northern bank of the Ubangi River; the Ubangi itself was named from the native word for the \"rapids\" located beside the outpost, which marked the end of navigable water north from from Brazzaville"
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"text": "established as a French settlement in 1889 and named after its location on the northern bank of the Ubangi River; the Ubangi itself was named from the native word for the \"rapids\" located beside the outpost, which marked the end of navigable water north from Brazzaville"
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}
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},
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"Administrative divisions": {
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"text": "under the 2015 constitution, the president is elected by universal direct suffrage for a period of 5 years (eligible for a second term); election last held 27 December 2020 (next to be held in December 2025); note - Central African Republic held presidential and partial legislative elections on December 27, 2020; voting was disrupted in some areas, so those constituencies held the first round of their legislative elections on March 14, 2021 while some of the constituencies that did vote on December 27, 2020 held runoff elections for their legislators."
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},
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"election results": {
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"text": "<em>2020/2021</em>: Faustin-Archange TOUADERA reelected president in first round; percent of vote - Faustin-Archange TOUADERA (independent) 53.9%, Anicet Georges DOLOGUELE (URCA) 21%, other 25.08%<br><br><em>2015</em>: Faustin-Archange TOUADERA elected president in the second round; percent of vote in first round - Anicet-Georges DOLOGUELE (URCA) 23.7%, Faustin-Archange TOUADERA (independent) 19.1%, Desire KOLINGBA (RDC) 12.%, Martin ZIGUELE (MLPC) 11.4%, other 33.8%; percent of vote in second round - Faustin-Archange TOUADERA 62.7%, Anicet-Georges DOLOGUELE 37.3%"
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"text": "<em>2020/2021</em>: Faustin-Archange TOUADERA reelected president in first round; percent of vote - Faustin-Archange TOUADERA (independent) 53.9%, Anicet Georges DOLOGUELE (URCA) 21%, other 25.1%<br><br><em>2015</em>: Faustin-Archange TOUADERA elected president in the second round; percent of vote in first round - Anicet-Georges DOLOGUELE (URCA) 23.7%, Faustin-Archange TOUADERA (independent) 19.1%, Desire KOLINGBA (RDC) 12%, Martin ZIGUELE (MLPC) 11.4%, other 33.8%; percent of vote in second round - Faustin-Archange TOUADERA 62.7%, Anicet-Georges DOLOGUELE 37.3%"
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}
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},
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"Legislative branch": {
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"text": "1,000 Central African Republic (MINUSCA); 1,075 Mali (MINUSMA) (May 2022)"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "since 2011, the Egyptian Armed Forces, police, and other security forces have been actively engaged in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations in the North Sinai governorate against several militant groups, particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – Sinai Province; as of 2022, Egypt had tens of thousands of military troops, police, and other security personnel deployed in the Sinai for internal security duties; in addition, tribal militias were assisting Egyptian security forces<br><br>the military has a large stake in the civilian economy, including running banks, businesses, and shipping lines, producing consumer and industrial goods, importing commodities, and building and managing infrastructure projects, such as bridges, roads, hospitals, and housing; the various enterprises are reportedly profitable enough to make the armed forces largely self-funded<br><br>Egypt has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments<br><br>the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) has operated in the Sinai since 1982 as a peacekeeping and monitoring force to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace; the MFO is an independent international organization, created by agreement between Egypt and Israel; as of 2022, it was composed of about 1,150 troops from 13 countries; Colombia, Fiji, and the US were the leading providers of troops to the MFO (2022)"
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"text": "since 2011, the Egyptian Armed Forces, police, and other security forces have been actively engaged in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations in the North Sinai governorate against several militant groups, particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – Sinai Province; as of 2022, Egypt had tens of thousands of military troops, police, and other security personnel deployed in the Sinai for internal security duties; in addition, tribal militias were assisting Egyptian security forces<br><br>the military has a large stake in the civilian economy, including running banks, businesses, gas stations, shipping lines, and utilities, and producing consumer and industrial goods, importing commodities, and building and managing infrastructure projects, such as bridges, roads, hospitals, and housing; the various enterprises are reportedly profitable enough to make the armed forces largely self-funded<br><br>Egypt has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments<br><br>the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) has operated in the Sinai since 1982 as a peacekeeping and monitoring force to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace; the MFO is an independent international organization, created by agreement between Egypt and Israel; as of 2022, it was composed of about 1,150 troops from 13 countries; Colombia, Fiji, and the US were the leading providers of troops to the MFO (2022)"
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}
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},
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"Terrorism": {
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{
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"Introduction": {
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"Background": {
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"text": "<p>Trade centers such as Mombasa have existed along the Kenyan and Tanzanian coastlines, known as the Land of Zanj, since at least the 2nd century. These centers traded with the outside world, including China, India, Indonesia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Persia. By around the 9th century, the mix of Africans, Arabs, and Persians who lived and traded there became known as Swahili (\"people of the coast\") with a distinct language (KiSwahili) and culture. The Portuguese arrived in the 1490s and, using Mombasa as a base, sought to monopolize trade in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese were pushed out in the late 1600s by the combined forces of Oman and Pate, an island off the coast. In 1890, Germany and the UK divided up the region, with the UK taking the north and the Germans the south, including present-day Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda. The British established the East Africa Protectorate in 1895, which in 1920 was converted into a colony and named Kenya after its highest mountain. Numerous political disputes between the colony and the UK subsequently led to the violent Mau Mau Uprising, which began in 1952, and the eventual declaration of independence in 1963.</p> Jomo KENYATTA, the founding president and an icon of the liberation struggle, led Kenya from independence in 1963 until his death in 1978, when Vice President Daniel Arap MOI took power in a constitutional succession. The country was a de facto one-party state from 1969 until 1982, after which time the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) changed the constitution to make itself the sole legal political party in Kenya. MOI acceded to internal and external pressure for political liberalization in late 1991. The ethnically fractured opposition failed to dislodge KANU from power in elections in 1992 and 1997, which were marred by violence and fraud. President MOI stepped down in December 2002 following fair and peaceful elections. Mwai KIBAKI, running as the candidate of the multiethnic, united opposition group, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), defeated KANU candidate Uhuru KENYATTA, the son of founding president Jomo KENYATTA, and assumed the presidency following a campaign centered on an anticorruption platform. <br><br>KIBAKI's reelection in 2007 resulted in two months of post-election ethnic violence that caused the death of more than 1,100 people and the dislocation of hundreds of thousands. Opposition candidate, Raila ODINGA, accused the government of widespread vote rigging. African Union-sponsored mediation led by former UN Secretary General Kofi ANNAN resulted in a power-sharing accord that brought ODINGA into the government in the restored position of prime minister. The power sharing accord included a broad reform agenda, the centerpiece of which was constitutional reform. In 2010, Kenyans overwhelmingly adopted a new constitution in a national referendum. The new constitution introduced additional checks and balances to executive power and devolved power and resources to 47 newly created counties. It also eliminated the position of prime minister. Uhuru KENYATTA won the first presidential election under the new constitution in March 2013. KENYATTA won a second and final term in office in November 2017 following a contentious, repeat election."
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"text": "<p>Trade centers such as Mombasa have existed along the Kenyan and Tanzanian coastlines, known as the Land of Zanj, since at least the 2nd century. These centers traded with the outside world, including China, India, Indonesia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Persia. By around the 9th century, the mix of Africans, Arabs, and Persians who lived and traded there became known as Swahili (\"people of the coast\") with a distinct language (KiSwahili) and culture. The Portuguese arrived in the 1490s and, using Mombasa as a base, sought to monopolize trade in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese were pushed out in the late 1600s by the combined forces of Oman and Pate, an island off the coast. In 1890, Germany and the UK divided up the region, with the UK taking the north and the Germans the south, including present-day Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda. The British established the East Africa Protectorate in 1895, which in 1920 was converted into a colony and named Kenya after its highest mountain. Numerous political disputes between the colony and the UK subsequently led to the violent Mau Mau Uprising, which began in 1952, and the eventual declaration of independence in 1963.</p> Jomo KENYATTA, the founding president and an icon of the liberation struggle, led Kenya from independence in 1963 until his death in 1978, when Vice President Daniel Arap MOI took power in a constitutional succession. The country was a de facto one-party state from 1969 until 1982, after which time the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) changed the constitution to make itself the sole legal political party in Kenya. MOI acceded to internal and external pressure for political liberalization in late 1991. The ethnically fractured opposition failed to dislodge KANU from power in elections in 1992 and 1997, which were marred by violence and fraud. President MOI stepped down in December 2002 following fair and peaceful elections. Mwai KIBAKI, running as the candidate of the multiethnic, united opposition group, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), defeated KANU candidate Uhuru KENYATTA, the son of founding president Jomo KENYATTA, and assumed the presidency following a campaign centered on an anticorruption platform. <br><br>KIBAKI's reelection in 2007 resulted in two months of post-election ethnic violence that caused the death of more than 1,100 people and the dislocation of hundreds of thousands. Opposition candidate, Raila ODINGA, accused the government of widespread vote rigging. African Union-sponsored mediation led by former UN Secretary General Kofi ANNAN resulted in a power-sharing accord that brought ODINGA into the government in the restored position of prime minister. The power sharing accord included a broad reform agenda, the centerpiece of which was constitutional reform. In 2010, Kenyans overwhelmingly adopted a new constitution in a national referendum. The new constitution introduced additional checks and balances to executive power and devolved power and resources to 47 newly created counties. It also eliminated the position of prime minister. Uhuru KENYATTA won the first presidential election under the new constitution in March 2013. KENYATTA won a second and final term in office in November 2017 following a contentious, repeat election. In September 2022, "
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}
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},
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"Geography": {
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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"general assessment": {
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"text": "Kenya’s telecom market continues to undergo considerable changes in the wake of increased competition, improved international connectivity, and rapid developments in the mobile market; the country is directly connected to a number of submarine cables, and with Mombasa as a landing point for LIT’s newly completed East and West Africa terrestrial network, the country serves as a key junction for onward connectivity to the Arabian states and the Far East; the additional internet capacity has meant that the cost of internet access has fallen dramatically in recent years, allowing services to be affordable to a far greater proportion of the population; the incumbent fixed-line telco Telkom Kenya has struggled to make headway in this market, prompting reorganization in 2018 which included a sale and leaseback arrangement with its mobile tower portfolio; a further restructuring exercise in late 2020 was aimed at repositioning the company for the digital age, and to improve its ability to compete in the market; numerous competitors are rolling out national and metropolitan backbone networks and wireless access networks to deliver services to population centers across the country; several fiber infrastructure sharing agreements have been forged, and as a result the number of fiber broadband connections has increased sharply in recent years; much of the progress in the broadband segment is due to the government’s revised national broadband strategy, which has been updated with goals through to 2030, and which are largely dependent on mobile broadband platforms based on LTE and 5G. (2022)"
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"text": "Kenya’s telecom market continues to undergo considerable changes in the wake of increased competition, improved international connectivity, and rapid developments in the mobile market; the country is directly connected to a number of submarine cables, and with Mombasa as a landing point for LIT’s newly completed East and West Africa terrestrial network, the country serves as a key junction for onward connectivity to the Arabian states and the Far East; the additional internet capacity has meant that the cost of internet access has fallen dramatically in recent years, allowing services to be affordable to a far greater proportion of the population; numerous competitors are rolling out national and metropolitan backbone networks and wireless access networks to deliver services to population centers across the country; several fiber infrastructure sharing agreements have been forged, and as a result the number of fiber broadband connections has increased sharply in recent years; much of the progress in the broadband segment is due to the government’s revised national broadband strategy, which has been updated with goals through to 2030, and which are largely dependent on mobile broadband platforms based on LTE and 5G (2022)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "fixed-line subscriptions stand at less than 1 per 100 persons; multiple providers in the mobile-cellular segment of the market fostering a boom in mobile-cellular telephone usage with teledensity reaching 114 per 100 persons (2020)"
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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"general assessment": {
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"text": "Liberia has a telecom market which is mainly based on mobile networks; this is due to the civil war which destroyed much of the fixed-line infrastructure; the fixed-line incumbent telco– rebranded as LTC Mobile in January 2022–has struggled with mismanagement and government neglect; its revenue is inadequate to allow it to invest in network infrastructure, and it has failed to make inroads in the market; to facilitate LTC Mobile’s market entry, the government in January 2022 set in train amendments to telecom legislation; LTC Mobile soon afterwards launched LTE services; internet services are available from a number of wireless ISPs as well as the mobile operators; the high cost and limited bandwidth of connections means that internet access is expensive and rates are very low; additional bandwidth is available from an international submarine cable but considerable investment is still needed in domestic fixed-line infrastructure before end-users can make full use of the cable. (2022)"
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"text": "Liberia has a telecom market which is mainly based on mobile networks; this is due to the civil war which destroyed much of the fixed-line infrastructure; to facilitate LTC Mobile’s market entry, the government in January 2022 set in train amendments to telecom legislation; internet services are available from a number of wireless ISPs as well as the mobile operators; the high cost and limited bandwidth of connections means that internet access is expensive and rates are very low; additional bandwidth is available from an international submarine cable but considerable investment is still needed in domestic fixed-line infrastructure before end-users can make full use of the cable (2022)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "fixed-line less than 1 per 100; mobile-cellular subscription base growing and teledensity approached 57 per 100 persons (2019)"
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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"general assessment": {
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"text": "until late 2020, Lesotho’s telecom regulator maintained a market duopoly between the privatized national operator, Econet Telecom Lesotho (ETL), which is focused on fixed-line services, and Vodacom Lesotho, which dominates the mobile sector; competition between the two was insufficient to promote effective price reductions for consumers, while the regulator had no mechanisms in place to monitor the telcos to ensure quality of service and fair pricing for consumers; the small size of the country’s population provided little incentive for new players to enter the market; legal wrangling between the regulator and the telcos are ongoing; both telcos were fined in late 2020, though Vodacom has the more troubled relationship with the regulator; this culminated in the regulator having attempted to revoke Vodacom Lesotho’s operating license, a process which was temporarily suspended by the Supreme Court after the company appealed; a positive outcome for consumers was the deployment in early 2021 of a service to monitor traffic and billing; this ended the practice whereby the regulator was dependent on telcos submitting data about their performance, billing, and other matters; the regulator has also turned its attention to addressing multiple SIM ownership and stem incidences of crimes committed using unregistered SIMs; in May 2022, it instructed the country’s MNOs to begin registering SIM cards on their networks from the following month; Vodacom was the first operator to introduce mobile broadband services in the country, supplemented with a WiMAX network; this was followed by fixed-wireless 5G trials in early 2019 based on a trial 3.5GHz license. Vodacom Lesotho was among the first network operators in the region to conduct such trials; the crucial nature of telecom services. (2022)"
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"text": "until late 2020, Lesotho’s telecom regulator maintained a market duopoly which is focused on fixed-line services; competition was insufficient to promote effective price reductions for consumers, while the regulator had no mechanisms in place to monitor the telcos to ensure quality of service and fair pricing for consumers; the small size of the country’s population provided little incentive for new players to enter the market; a positive outcome for consumers was the deployment in early 2021 of a service to monitor traffic and billing; this ended the practice whereby the regulator was dependent on telcos submitting data about their performance, billing, and other matters; the regulator has also turned its attention to addressing multiple SIM ownership and stem incidences of crimes committed using unregistered SIMs; in May 2022, it instructed the country’s MNOs to begin registering SIM cards on their networks from the following month; fixed-wireless 5G trials began in early 2019 (2022)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "fixed-line is less than 1 per 100 subscriptions; mobile-cellular service subscribership nearly 73 per 100 persons; rudimentary system consisting of a modest number of landlines, a small microwave radio relay system, and a small radiotelephone communication system (2020)"
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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"general assessment": {
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"text": "political and security instability in Libya has disrupted its telecom sector; much of its infrastructure remains superior to that in most other African countries; rival operators fight for control; investment in fiber backbone and upgrades to international cables; limited LTE and 5G service; some satellite broadband; Chinese companies have heavily invested in Libyan infrastructure and now dominate the telecommunications sector; in 2021 Libya signed deals and projects with US firms to upgrade portions of its infrastructure, increasing the diversity of its telecommunications networks (2022)"
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"text": "political and security instability in Libya has disrupted its telecom sector; much of its infrastructure remains superior to that in most other African countries; rival operators fight for control; investment in fiber backbone and upgrades to international cables; limited LTE and 5G service; some satellite broadband; in 2021 Libya signed deals and projects with US firms to upgrade portions of its infrastructure, increasing the diversity of its telecommunications networks (2022)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "nearly 24 per 100 fixed-line and over 91 per 100 mobile-cellular subscriptions; service generally adequate (2019)"
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"text": "not available"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "Turkey has been the primary backer of the GNU/GNA; Turkish military advisers have trained and assisted western/GNU Libyan forces in accordance with a 2019 Turkey-GNA security agreement; Turkey has also provided thousands of Syrian mercenaries to Libya, as well as ammunition, weapons and aerial drones; Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt have been the main supporters of the LNA; the LNA has used fighters from Syria, Chad, and Sudan <br><br>as of 2022, ISIS continued to maintain a relatively weak presence in Libya with small bands of fighters operating out of ungoverned spaces and conducting small-scale attacks throughout the country"
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"text": "Turkey has been the primary backer of the GNU/GNA; Turkish military advisers have trained and assisted western/GNU Libyan forces in accordance with a 2019 Turkey-GNA security agreement; Turkey has also provided thousands of Syrian mercenaries to Libya, as well as ammunition, weapons and aerial drones; Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt have been the main supporters of the LNA; the LNA has used fighters from other countries, including Chad, Sudan, and Syria <br><br>as of 2022, ISIS continued to maintain a relatively weak presence in Libya with small bands of fighters operating out of ungoverned spaces and conducting small-scale attacks throughout the country"
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}
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},
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"Terrorism": {
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Telecom services in Madagascar have benefited from intensifying competition between the main operators, including Orange Madagascar, Airtel, and the incumbent telco Telma; there have been positive developments with the country’s link to international submarine cables, particularly the METISS cable connecting to South Africa and Mauritius; in addition, the country’s connection to the Africa-1 cable, expected in late 2023, will provide it with links to Kenya, Djibouti, countries in north and south Africa, as well Pakistan, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and France; a national fiber backbone has been implemented connecting the major cities; Telma has progressively expanded the network to reach smaller towns; in addition, the government has progressed with its five-year plan to develop a digital platform running to 2024; various schemes within the program have been managed by a unit within the President’s office; penetration rates in all market sectors remain below the average for the African region, and so there remains considerable growth potential; much progress was made in 2020, stimulated by the particular conditions related to the pandemic, which encouraged greater use of voice and data services. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Telecom services in Madagascar have benefited from intensifying competition between the main operators; there have been positive developments with the country’s link to international submarine cables, particularly the METISS cable connecting to South Africa and Mauritius; in addition, the country’s connection to the Africa-1 cable, expected in late 2023, will provide it with links to Kenya, Djibouti, countries in north and south Africa, as well Pakistan, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and France; a national fiber backbone has been implemented connecting the major cities; in addition, the government has progressed with its five-year plan to develop a digital platform running to 2024; various schemes within the program have been managed by a unit within the President’s office; penetration rates in all market sectors remain below the average for the African region, and so there remains considerable growth potential; much progress was made in 2020, stimulated by the particular conditions related to the pandemic, which encouraged greater use of voice and data services (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "less than 1 per 100 for fixed-line and mobile-cellular teledensity about 34 per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1113,7 +1113,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "with few resources, Malawi is one of the world’s least developed countries; there has been little investment in fixed-line telecom infrastructure, and as a result, the country’s two mobile networks Airtel Malawi and TMN provide the vast majority of connections for voice and data services; both operators have invested in LTE technologies to improve the quality of data services; the lack of market competition, together with limited international internet bandwidth, has also resulted in some of the highest prices for telecom services in the region; the government in late 2020 secured an average 80% reduction in the cost of data bundles offered by the MNOs; following continuing customer complaints, the regulator in mid-2021 ensured that costs were again reduced, this time by about a third; mobile penetration remains low in comparison to the regional average and so there are considerable opportunities for further growth, particularly in the mobile broadband sector; low penetration is partly attributed to the lack of competition, though there is the possibility that a new play come launch services by the end of 2022; the internet sector is reasonably competitive, with about 50 licensed ISPs, though the limited availability and high cost of international bandwidth has held back growth and kept broadband access prices among the highest in the region; these limitations are being addressed, with the second phase of the national fiber backbone having started in mid-2021. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "with few resources, Malawi is one of the world’s least developed countries; there has been little investment in fixed-line telecom infrastructure, and as a result, the country’s two mobile networks Airtel Malawi and TMN provide the vast majority of connections for voice and data services; both operators have invested in LTE technologies to improve the quality of data services; the lack of market competition, together with limited international internet bandwidth, has also resulted in some of the highest prices for telecom services in the region; the government in late 2020 secured an average 80% reduction in the cost of data bundles offered by the MNOs; following continuing customer complaints, the regulator in mid-2021 ensured that costs were again reduced, this time by about a third; mobile penetration remains low in comparison to the regional average and so there are considerable opportunities for further growth, particularly in the mobile broadband sector; low penetration is partly attributed to the lack of competition, though there is the possibility that a new play come launch services by the end of 2022; the internet sector is reasonably competitive, with about 50 licensed ISPs, though the limited availability and high cost of international bandwidth has held back growth and kept broadband access prices among the highest in the region; these limitations are being addressed, with the second phase of the national fiber backbone having started in mid-2021 (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "limited fixed-line subscribership less than 1 per 100 households; mobile-cellular services are expanding but network coverage is limited and is based around the main urban areas; mobile-cellular subscribership roughly 52 per 100 households (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1127,7 +1127,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Mali’s telecom systems are challenged by recent conflict, geography, areas of low population, poverty, security issues, and high illiteracy; telecom infrastructure is barely adequate in urban areas and not available in most of the country with underinvestment in fixed-line networks; high mobile penetration and potential for mobile broadband service; local plans for IXP; dependent on neighboring countries for international bandwidth and access to submarine cables; there are Chinese investment agreements for infrastructure; importer of broadcasting equipment from China (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Mali’s telecom systems are challenged by recent conflict, geography, areas of low population, poverty, security issues, and high illiteracy; telecom infrastructure is barely adequate in urban areas and not available in most of the country with underinvestment in fixed-line networks; high mobile penetration and potential for mobile broadband service; local plans for IXP; dependent on neighboring countries for international bandwidth and access to submarine cables (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line subscribership is over 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscribership has increased sharply to 125 per 100 persons; increasing use of local radio loops to extend network coverage to remote areas (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "despite Morocco's economic progress, the country suffers from high unemployment and illiteracy affecting telecom market, particularly in rural areas; national network nearly 100% digital using fiber-optic links; improved rural service employs microwave radio relay; one of the most state-of-the-art markets in Africa; high mobile penetration rates in the region with low cost for broadband Internet access; improvement in LTE reach and capabilities; service providers have all successfully completed 5G proofs of concept and are currently lining up 5G equipment providers for both radio and core technology; regulatory agency expects to conduct the 5G spectrum auction in 2023; mobile Internet accounts for 93% of all Internet connections; World Bank provided funds for Morocco’s digital transformation; government supported digital education during pandemic; submarine cables and satellite provide connectivity to Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and Australia; importer of broadcasting equipment, surveillance equipment, scanning equipment, and video displays from China (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "despite Morocco's economic progress, the country suffers from high unemployment and illiteracy affecting telecom market, particularly in rural areas; national network nearly 100% digital using fiber-optic links; improved rural service employs microwave radio relay; one of the most state-of-the-art markets in Africa; high mobile penetration rates in the region with low cost for broadband Internet access; improvement in LTE reach and capabilities; service providers have all successfully completed 5G proofs of concept and are currently lining up 5G equipment providers for both radio and core technology; regulatory agency expects to conduct the 5G spectrum auction in 2023; mobile Internet accounts for 93% of all Internet connections; World Bank provided funds for Morocco’s digital transformation; government supported digital education during pandemic; submarine cables and satellite provide connectivity to Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and Australia (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line teledensity is just over 6 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular subscribership is nearly 134 per 100 persons; good system composed of open-wire lines, cables, and microwave radio relay links; principal switching centers are Casablanca and Rabat (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"Introduction": {
|
||||
"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Although known to Arab and European sailors since at least the early 1500s, the island of Mauritius was uninhabited until 1638 when the Dutch established a settlement named in honor of Prince Maurits van NASSAU. Their presence led to the rapid disappearance of the flightless dodo bird that has since become one of the most well-known examples of extinction in modern times. The Dutch abandoned their financially distressed settlement in 1710, although a number of formerly enslaved people remained. In 1722, the French established what would become a highly profitable settlement focused on sugar cane plantations that were reliant on the labor of enslaved people brought to Mauritius from other parts of Africa. In the 1790s, the island had a brief period of autonomous rule when plantation owners rejected French control because of laws ending slavery that were temporarily in effect during the French Revolution. Britain captured the Island in 1810 as part of the Napoleonic Wars, but kept most of the French administrative structure which remains to this day in the form of the country’s legal codes and widespread use of French Creole language. The abolition of slavery in 1835 - later than most other British colonies - led to increased reliance on contracted laborers from the Indian subcontinent to work on plantations. Today their descendants form the majority of the population. Mauritius remained a strategically important British naval base, and later an air station, playing a role during World War II for anti-submarine and convoy operations, as well as for the collection of signals intelligence.</p> <p>Mauritius gained independence from the UK in 1968 as a Parliamentary Republic and has remained a stable democracy with regular free elections and a positive human rights record. The country also attracted considerable foreign investment and now has one of Africa's highest per capita incomes. Mauritius’ often fractious coalition politics has been dominated by two prominent families each of which has had father-son pairs who have been prime minister over multiple, often nonconsecutive, terms. Seewoosagur RAMGOOLAM (1968-76) was Mauritius’ first prime minister and he was succeeded by Anerood JUGNAUTH (1982-95, 2000-03, 2014-17); his son Navin RAMGOOLAM (1995-2000, 2005-14); and Paul Raymond BERENGER (2003-05), the only non-Hindu prime minister of post-independence Mauritius. In 2017, Pravind JUGNAUTH became prime minister after his father stepped down short of completing his term, and he was elected in his own right in 2019. Mauritius claims the French island of Tromelin and the British Chagos Archipelago (British Indian Ocean Territory). Since 2017, Mauritius has secured favorable UN General Assembly resolutions and an International Court of Justice advisory opinion relating to its sovereignty dispute with the UK.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Although known to Arab and European sailors since at least the early 1500s, the island of Mauritius was uninhabited until 1638 when the Dutch established a settlement named in honor of Prince Maurits van NASSAU. Their presence led to the rapid disappearance of the flightless dodo bird that has since become one of the most well-known examples of extinction in modern times. The Dutch abandoned their financially distressed settlement in 1710, although a number of formerly enslaved people remained. In 1722, the French established what would become a highly profitable settlement focused on sugar cane plantations that were reliant on the labor of enslaved people brought to Mauritius from other parts of Africa. In the 1790s, the island had a brief period of autonomous rule when plantation owners rejected French control because of laws ending slavery that were temporarily in effect during the French Revolution. Britain captured the Island in 1810 as part of the Napoleonic Wars but kept most of the French administrative structure, which remains to this day in the form of the country’s legal codes and widespread use of the French Creole language. The abolition of slavery in 1835 - later than most other British colonies - led to increased reliance on contracted laborers from the Indian subcontinent to work on plantations. Today their descendants form the majority of the population. Mauritius remained a strategically important British naval base, and later an air station, playing a role during World War II for anti-submarine and convoy operations, as well as for the collection of signals intelligence.</p> <p>Mauritius gained independence from the UK in 1968 as a Parliamentary Republic and has remained a stable democracy with regular free elections and a positive human rights record. The country also attracted considerable foreign investment and now has one of Africa's highest per capita incomes. Mauritius’ often fractious coalition politics has been dominated by two prominent families each of which has had father-son pairs who have been prime minister over multiple, often nonconsecutive, terms. Seewoosagur RAMGOOLAM (1968-76) was Mauritius’ first prime minister and he was succeeded by Anerood JUGNAUTH (1982-95, 2000-03, 2014-17); his son Navin RAMGOOLAM (1995-2000, 2005-14); and Paul Raymond BERENGER (2003-05), the only non-Hindu prime minister of post-independence Mauritius. In 2017, Pravind JUGNAUTH became prime minister after his father stepped down short of completing his term, and he was elected in his own right in 2019. Mauritius claims the French island of Tromelin and the British Chagos Archipelago (British Indian Ocean Territory). Since 2017, Mauritius has secured favorable UN General Assembly resolutions and an International Court of Justice advisory opinion relating to its sovereignty dispute with the UK.</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -122,7 +122,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Hindu 48.5%, Roman Catholic 26.3%, Muslim 17.3%, other Christian 6.4%, other 0.6%, none 0.7%, unspecified 0.1% (2011 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Demographic profile": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Mauritius has transitioned from a country of high fertility and high mortality rates in the 1950s and mid-1960s to one with among the lowest population growth rates in the developing world today. After World War II, Mauritius’ population began to expand quickly due to increased fertility and a dramatic drop in mortality rates as a result of improved health care and the eradication of malaria. This period of heightened population growth – reaching about 3% a year – was followed by one of the world’s most rapid birth rate declines.</p><p>The total fertility rate fell from 6.2 children per women in 1963 to 3.2 in 1972 – largely the result of improved educational attainment, especially among young women, accompanied by later marriage and the adoption of family planning methods. The family planning programs’ success was due to support from the government and eventually the traditionally pronatalist religious communities, which both recognized that controlling population growth was necessary because of Mauritius’ small size and limited resources. Mauritius’ fertility rate has consistently been below replacement level since the late 1990s, a rate that is substantially lower than nearby countries in southern Africa.</p><p>With no indigenous population, Mauritius’ ethnic mix is a product of more than two centuries of European colonialism and continued international labor migration. Sugar production relied on slave labor mainly from Madagascar, Mozambique, and East Africa from the early 18th century until its abolition in 1835, when slaves were replaced with indentured Indians. Most of the influx of indentured labor – peaking between the late 1830s and early 1860 – settled permanently creating massive population growth of more than 7% a year and reshaping the island’s social and cultural composition. While Indians represented about 12% of Mauritius’ population in 1837, they and their descendants accounted for roughly two-thirds by the end of the 19th century. Most were Hindus, but the majority of the free Indian traders were Muslims.</p><p>Mauritius again turned to overseas labor when its success in clothing and textile exports led to a labor shortage in the mid-1980s. Clothing manufacturers brought in contract workers (increasingly women) from China, India, and, to a lesser extent Bangladesh and Madagascar, who worked longer hours for lower wages under poor conditions and were viewed as more productive than locals. Downturns in the sugar and textile industries in the mid-2000s and a lack of highly qualified domestic workers for Mauritius’ growing services sector led to the emigration of low-skilled workers and a reliance on skilled foreign labor. Since 2007, Mauritius has pursued a circular migration program to enable citizens to acquire new skills and savings abroad and then return home to start businesses and to invest in the country’s development.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Mauritius has transitioned from a country of high fertility and high mortality rates in the 1950s and mid-1960s to one with among the lowest population growth rates in the developing world today. After World War II, Mauritius’ population began to expand quickly due to increased fertility and a dramatic drop in mortality rates as a result of improved health care and the eradication of malaria. This period of heightened population growth – reaching about 3% a year – was followed by one of the world’s most rapid birth rate declines.</p> <p>The total fertility rate fell from 6.2 children per women in 1963 to 3.2 in 1972 – largely the result of improved educational attainment, especially among young women, accompanied by later marriage and the adoption of family planning methods. The family planning programs’ success was due to support from the government and eventually the traditionally pronatalist religious communities, which both recognized that controlling population growth was necessary because of Mauritius’ small size and limited resources. Mauritius’ fertility rate has consistently been below replacement level since the late 1990s, a rate that is substantially lower than nearby countries in southern Africa.</p> <p>With no indigenous population, Mauritius’ ethnic mix is a product of more than two centuries of European colonialism and continued international labor migration. Sugar production relied on slave labor mainly from Madagascar, Mozambique, and East Africa from the early 18th century until its abolition in 1835, when slaves were replaced with indentured Indians. Most of the influx of indentured labor – peaking between the late 1830s and early 1860s – settled permanently creating massive population growth of more than 7% a year and reshaping the island’s social and cultural composition. While Indians represented about 12% of Mauritius’ population in 1837, they and their descendants accounted for roughly two-thirds by the end of the 19th century. Most were Hindus, but the majority of the free Indian traders were Muslims.</p> <p>Mauritius again turned to overseas labor when its success in clothing and textile exports led to a labor shortage in the mid-1980s. Clothing manufacturers brought in contract workers (increasingly women) from China, India, and, to a lesser extent Bangladesh and Madagascar, who worked longer hours for lower wages under poor conditions and were viewed as more productive than locals. Downturns in the sugar and textile industries in the mid-2000s and a lack of highly qualified domestic workers for Mauritius’ growing services sector led to the emigration of low-skilled workers and a reliance on skilled foreign labor. Since 2007, Mauritius has pursued a circular migration program to enable citizens to acquire new skills and savings abroad and then return home to start businesses and to invest in the country’s development.</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Age structure": {
|
||||
"0-14 years": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "The telecom sector in Mauritius has long been supported by the varied needs of tourists; this has stimulated the mobile market, leading to a particularly high penetration rate; the response of the country’s telcos to tourist requirements also contributed to the country being among the first in the region to provide services based on 3G and WiMAX technologies; the incumbent telco Mauritius Telecom, part-owned by Orange Group, now provides comprehensive LTE and fiber broadband coverage, and in late 2021 it launched a gigabit fiber-based broadband service; the country has seen improved international internet capacity in recent years, with direct cables linking to India, Madagascar, and South Africa, as well as other connections to Rodrigues and Reunion. Despite these advantages, some services remain slow; at the end of 2021, the median mobile data rate available was only 21Mb/s, ranking the country 84th of 138 monitored; the median fixed broadband data rate was about 19.8Mb/s, with a rank of 117th of 178 countries; mobile subscribers in Mauritius secured 5G services in mid-2021; this followed the regulator’s award of spectrum in two bands to the MNOs; the award was made directly, rather than via an auction, since the regulator was keen to see services made available as soon as possible; this will help the government’s ambition to make telecommunications a pillar of economic growth, and to have a fully digital-based infrastructure; such infrastructure will also contribute to a revival of tourism, the mainstay of the economy; although GDP growth returned in 2021, the number of tourist arrivals remains a fraction of the pre-pandemic level. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "the telecom sector in Mauritius has long been supported by the varied needs of tourists; this has stimulated the mobile market, leading to a particularly high penetration rate; the response of the country’s telcos to tourist requirements also contributed to the country being among the first in the region to provide services based on 3G and WiMAX technologies; the country has seen improved international internet capacity in recent years, with direct cables linking to India, Madagascar, and South Africa, as well as other connections to Rodrigues and Reunion; despite these advantages, some services remain slow; at the end of 2021, the median mobile data rate available was only 21Mb/s, ranking the country 84th of 138 monitored; the median fixed broadband data rate was about 19.8Mb/s, with a rank of 117th of 178 countries; mobile subscribers in Mauritius secured 5G services in mid-2021; this followed the regulator’s award of spectrum in two bands to the MNOs; the award was made directly, rather than via an auction, since the regulator was keen to see services made available as soon as possible; this will help the government’s ambition to make telecommunications a pillar of economic growth, and to have a fully digital-based infrastructure; such infrastructure will also contribute to a revival of tourism, the mainstay of the economy; although GDP growth returned in 2021, the number of tourist arrivals remains a fraction of the pre-pandemic level (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line teledensity over 37 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular services teledensity roughly 150 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -717,7 +717,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "2 (1 cultural, 1 natural)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"selected World Heritage Site locales": {
|
||||
"text": "Banc d'Arguin National Park (n); Ancient Ksour (Fortified Villages) of Ouadane, Chinguetti, Tichitt, and Oualata (c)"
|
||||
"text": "Ancient Ksour (Fortified Villages) of Ouadane, Chinguetti, Tichitt, and Oualata (c); Banc d'Arguin National Park (n) "
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
|
@ -1125,7 +1125,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Mauritania’s small population and low economic output has limited the country’s ability to develop sustained growth in the telecom sector; low disposable income has restricted growth in the use of services, and thus of revenue which telcos can hope to gain from subscribers; this has impacted on their ability to invest in network upgrades and improvements to service offerings; this has been reflected in the repeated fines imposed against them by the regulator for failing to ensure a good quality of service; there are also practical challenges relating to transparency and tax burdens which have hindered foreign investment; financial support has been forthcoming from the government as well as the World Bank and European Investment Bank; their efforts have focused on implementing appropriate regulatory measures and promoting the further penetration of fixed-line broadband services by improving the national backbone network, ensuring connectivity to international telecom cables, and facilitating operator access to infrastructure; progress has been made to improve internet bandwidth capacity, including the completion of a cable link at the border with Algeria, and the connection to the EllaLink submarine cable; the final stage of the national backbone network was completed in December 2021, which now runs to some 4,000km; Mauritel maintains a virtual monopoly in the fixed-line sector, and there is little stimulus for new market entrants; penetration of fixed telephony and broadband service is very low and is expected to remain so in coming years, though growth is anticipated following improvements to backbone infrastructure and the reduction in access pricing; most voice and data services are carried over the mobile networks maintained by the recently rebranded Moov Mauritel, Mattel, and Chinguitel. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Mauritania’s small population and low economic output has limited the country’s ability to develop sustained growth in the telecom sector; low disposable income has restricted growth in the use of services, and thus of revenue which telcos can hope to gain from subscribers; this has impacted on their ability to invest in network upgrades and improvements to service offerings; this has been reflected in the repeated fines imposed against them by the regulator for failing to ensure a good quality of service; there are also practical challenges relating to transparency and tax burdens which have hindered foreign investment; financial support has been forthcoming from the government as well as the World Bank and European Investment Bank; their efforts have focused on implementing appropriate regulatory measures and promoting the further penetration of fixed-line broadband services by improving the national backbone network, ensuring connectivity to international telecom cables, and facilitating operator access to infrastructure; progress has been made to improve internet bandwidth capacity, including the completion of a cable link at the border with Algeria, and the connection to the EllaLink submarine cable; the final stage of the national backbone network was completed in December 2021, which now runs to some 4,000km; penetration of fixed telephony and broadband service is very low and is expected to remain so in coming years, though growth is anticipated following improvements to backbone infrastructure and the reduction in access pricing; most voice and data services are carried over the mobile networks (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line teledensity roughly 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular network coverage extends mainly to urban areas with a teledensity of roughly 106 per 100 persons; mostly cable and open-wire lines; a domestic satellite telecommunications system links Nouakchott with regional capitals (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1248,6 +1248,9 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the National Police is responsible for enforcing the law and maintaining order in urban areas, while the Gendarmerie is responsible for maintaining civil order around metropolitan areas and providing law enforcement services in rural areas<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the National Guard performs a limited police function in keeping with its peacetime role of providing security at government facilities, to include prisons; regional authorities may call upon the National Guard to restore civil order during riots and other large-scale disturbances <br><br><strong>note 3:</strong> the General Group for Road Safety maintains security on roads and operates checkpoints throughout the country"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2022": {
|
||||
"text": "2.5% of GDP (2022 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
"text": "2.4% of GDP (2021 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
|
@ -1259,9 +1262,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2018": {
|
||||
"text": "2.3% of GDP (2018 est.) (approximately $430 million)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
|
||||
"text": "2.3% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $440 million)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1129,7 +1129,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "one of the first countries in the region to embark upon telecom reform and to open the sector to competition; the mobile segment in particular has shown strong growth since the launch of services by Vodacom Mozambique to compete against mCel, the then mobile subsidiary of the national telco Telecomunicações de Moçambique; additional competition followed in late 2020 with the launch of services by Movitel; following years of poor management and underachievement, TdM and mCel were merged in early 2019, creating a new operator Mozambique Telecom (Tmcel); in the process, the structure of the market changed from having four operators (TdM, mCel, Vodafone Mozambique, and Movitel) to three (Tmcel, Vodafone Mozambique and Movitel); at the same time, a new licensing regime ensured that by mid-2019 all three operators had been provided with universal licenses, enabling them to offer all types of telephony and data services; mobile, fixed-line and broadband penetration rates remain far below the average for the region; in recent years the government has enforced the registration of SIM cards, but with varying success; at the end of 2016 almost five million unregistered SIM cards were deactivated but poor monitoring meant that the process was revisited in mid-2019 and again in late 2020; the high cost of international bandwidth had long hampered internet use, though the landing of two international submarine cables (SEACOM and EASSy) has reduced the cost of bandwidth and so led to drastic reductions in broadband retail prices as well as a significant jump in available bandwidth; there is some cross-platform competition, with DSL, cable, fibre, WiMAX, and mobile broadband options available, though fixed broadband options can be limited to urban areas; improvements can be expected from the ongoing rollout of a national fiber backbone networks by Tmcel and of upgrades to mobile infrastructure. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "one of the first countries in the region to embark upon telecom reform and to open the sector to competition; the mobile segment in particular has shown strong growth; additional competition followed in late 2020; in the process, the structure of the market changed from having four operators to three; at the same time, a new licensing regime ensured that by mid-2019 all three operators had been provided with universal licenses, enabling them to offer all types of telephony and data services; mobile, fixed-line and broadband penetration rates remain far below the average for the region; in recent years the government has enforced the registration of SIM cards, but with varying success; at the end of 2016 almost five million unregistered SIM cards were deactivated but poor monitoring meant that the process was revisited in mid-2019 and again in late 2020; the high cost of international bandwidth had long hampered internet use, though the landing of two international submarine cables (SEACOM and EASSy) has reduced the cost of bandwidth and so led to drastic reductions in broadband retail prices as well as a significant jump in available bandwidth; there is some cross-platform competition, with DSL, cable, fibre, WiMAX, and mobile broadband options available, though fixed broadband options can be limited to urban areas; improvements can be expected from the ongoing rollout of a national fiber backbone networks and of upgrades to mobile infrastructure (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "extremely low fixed-line teledensity contrasts with rapid growth in the mobile-cellular network; operators provide coverage that includes all the main cities and key roads; fixed-line less than 1 per 100 and nearly 49 per 100 mobile-cellular teledensity (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1125,7 +1125,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Niger is one of the largest countries in West Africa but also one of the poorest in the world; as with many African markets, a lack of fixed telecoms infrastructure has led to growth in mobile services; Niger’s mobile penetration is modest compared to other countries in the region, while fixed broadband penetration is negligible; recent international investment to complete the Trans-Saharan Dorsal optical fibre (SDR) network has extended the reach of fiber infrastructure in the country, and also increased international capacity; new cables linking the country with Chad and Burkina Faso have extended Niger’s connectivity with international cable infrastructure; following years of financial difficulties, the state-owned fixed line operator, Sonitel, was merged with its wholly owned mobile unit, SahelCom, in late 2016 to form a new entity, Niger Telecom; the merged company secured a global telecom license in November 2017 and is aiming to develop greater efficiency through sharing resources and infrastructure; the economic difficulties in the country in recent years, as well as a regulatory spat with authorities which saw its offices being shut down, encouraged Orange Group to sell its local business to its minority shareholder partner; the unit, once operating as Orange Niger, was rebranded as Zamani Telecom in December 2020; at the same time, the company secured funds to embark on a large-scale network upgrade program; Niger also hosts foreign investors Airtel, which leads the market, and Moov Africa, formerly Maroc Telecom. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Niger is one of the largest countries in West Africa but also one of the poorest in the world; as with many African markets, a lack of fixed telecoms infrastructure has led to growth in mobile services; Niger’s mobile penetration is modest compared to other countries in the region, while fixed broadband penetration is negligible; recent international investment to complete the Trans-Saharan Dorsal optical fibre (SDR) network has extended the reach of fiber infrastructure in the country, and also increased international capacity; new cables linking the country with Chad and Burkina Faso have extended Niger’s connectivity with international cable infrastructure (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line less than 1 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular teledensity at nearly 41 per 100 persons; a rapidly increasing cellular subscribership base; small system of wire, radio telephone communications, and microwave radio relay links concentrated in southwestern Niger; domestic satellite system with 3 earth stations and 1 planned (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1152,7 +1152,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "one of the larger telecom markets in Africa subject to sporadic access to electricity and vandalism of infrastructure; most Internet connections are via mobile networks; foreign investment presence, particularly from China; market competition with affordable access; LTE technologies available but GSM is dominant; mobile penetration high due to use of multiple SIM cards and phones; government committed to expanding broadband penetration; operators to deploy fiber optic cable in six geopolitical zones and Lagos; operators invested in base stations to deplete network congestion; submarine cable break in 2020 slowed speeds and interrupted connectivity; importer of phones and broadcast equipment from China; Nigeria concluded its first 5G spectrum auction in 2021 and granted licenses to two firms: MTN Nigeria and Mafab Communications; construction of 5G infrastructure has not yet been completed. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "one of the larger telecom markets in Africa subject to sporadic access to electricity and vandalism of infrastructure; most Internet connections are via mobile networks; market competition with affordable access; LTE technologies available but GSM is dominant; mobile penetration high due to use of multiple SIM cards and phones; government committed to expanding broadband penetration; operators to deploy fiber optic cable in six geopolitical zones and Lagos; operators invested in base stations to deplete network congestion; submarine cable break in 2020 slowed speeds and interrupted connectivity; Nigeria concluded its first 5G spectrum auction in 2021 and granted licenses to two firms; construction of 5G infrastructure has not yet been completed (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line subscribership remains less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular services growing rapidly, in part responding to the shortcomings of the fixed-line network; multiple cellular providers operate nationally with subscribership base over 99 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"Introduction": {
|
||||
"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>South Sudan, which gained independence from Sudan on 9 July 2011, is the world’s newest country. Home to a diverse array of mainly Nilotic ethnolinguistic groups that settled in the territory in the 15th through 19th centuries, South Sudanese society is heavily dependent on seasonal fluctuations in precipitation and seasonal migration. The land comprising modern-day South Sudan was conquered first by Egypt and later ruled jointly by Egyptian-British colonial administrators in the late 19th century. Christian missionaries propagated the spread of English and Christianity, rather than Arabic and Islam, leading to significant cultural differences between the northern and southern parts of Sudan. When Sudan gained its independence in 1956, the Southern region received assurances that it would participate fully in the political system. However, the Arab government in Khartoum reneged on its promises, prompting two periods of civil war (1955-1972 and 1983-2005) in which as many as 2.5 million people died - mostly civilians - due to starvation and drought. The Second Sudanese civil war was one of the deadliest since WWII, and left Southern Sudanese society devastated by humanitarian crises and economic deterioration. Peace talks resulted in a US-backed Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in January 2005, which granted the South a six-year period of autonomy followed by a referendum on final status. The result of this referendum, held in January 2011, was a vote of 98% in favor of secession.<br><br>Since independence, South Sudan has struggled to form a viable governing system and has been plagued by widespread corruption, political conflict, and communal violence. In December 2013, conflict erupted between forces loyal to President Salva KIIR, a Dinka, and forces loyal to Vice President Riek MACHAR, a Nuer. The conflict quickly spread throughout the country and unfolded along ethnic lines, killing tens of thousands and creating a dire humanitarian crisis, with millions of South Sudanese displaced and food insecure. KIIR and MACHAR signed a peace agreement in August 2015 that created a Transitional Government of National Unity in April 2016. However, in July 2016, renewed fighting broke out in Juba between KIIR and MACHAR’s forces, plunging the country back into conflict and drawing in additional armed opposition groups, including those in the southern Equatoria region that had largely stayed out of the first round of civil war. A \"revitalized\" peace agreement was signed in September 2018, which mostly ended the fighting. The government and most armed opposition groups agreed that they would form a unified national army, create a transitional government by May 2019, and prepare for elections in December 2022. Subsequent extensions pushed elections to late 2023, and the transitional government was formed in February 2020, when MACHAR returned to Juba as first vice president. Since 2020, implementation of the peace agreement has been stalled as the parties wrangle over power-sharing arrangements, contributing to an uptick in communal violence and the country’s worst food security crisis since independence, with 7 of 11 million South Sudanese citizens in need of humanitarian assistance.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>South Sudan, which gained independence from Sudan on 9 July 2011, is the world’s newest country. Home to a diverse array of mainly Nilotic ethnolinguistic groups that settled in the territory in the 15th through 19th centuries, South Sudanese society is heavily dependent on seasonal fluctuations in precipitation and seasonal migration. The land comprising modern-day South Sudan was conquered first by Egypt and later ruled jointly by Egyptian-British colonial administrators in the late 19th century. Christian missionaries propagated the spread of English and Christianity, rather than Arabic and Islam, leading to significant cultural differences between the northern and southern parts of Sudan. When Sudan gained its independence in 1956, the Southern region received assurances that it would participate fully in the political system. However, the Arab government in Khartoum reneged on its promises, prompting two periods of civil war (1955-1972 and 1983-2005) in which as many as 2.5 million people died - mostly civilians - due largely to starvation and drought. The Second Sudanese civil war was one of the deadliest since WWII and left Southern Sudanese society devastated by humanitarian crises and economic deterioration. Peace talks resulted in a US-backed Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in January 2005, which granted the South a six-year period of autonomy followed by a referendum on final status. The result of this referendum, held in January 2011, was a vote of 98% in favor of secession.<br><br>Since independence, South Sudan has struggled to form a viable governing system and has been plagued by widespread corruption, political conflict, and communal violence. In December 2013, conflict erupted between forces loyal to President Salva KIIR, a Dinka, and forces loyal to Vice President Riek MACHAR, a Nuer. The conflict quickly spread throughout the country and unfolded along ethnic lines, killing tens of thousands and creating a dire humanitarian crisis, with millions of South Sudanese displaced and food insecure. KIIR and MACHAR signed a peace agreement in August 2015 that created a Transitional Government of National Unity in April 2016. However, in July 2016, renewed fighting broke out in Juba between KIIR and MACHAR’s forces, plunging the country back into conflict and drawing in additional armed opposition groups, including those in the southern Equatoria region that had largely stayed out of the first round of civil war. A \"revitalized\" peace agreement was signed in September 2018, which mostly ended the fighting. The government and most armed opposition groups agreed that they would form a unified national army, create a transitional government by May 2019, and prepare for elections in December 2022. Subsequent extensions pushed elections to late 2023, and the transitional government was formed in February 2020, when MACHAR returned to Juba as first vice president. Since 2020, implementation of the peace agreement has been stalled as the parties wrangle over power-sharing arrangements, contributing to an uptick in communal violence and the country’s worst food security crisis since independence, with 7 of 11 million South Sudanese citizens in need of humanitarian assistance.</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -120,7 +120,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> data represent Saint Helena only"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Demographic profile": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>The vast majority of the population of Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha live on Saint Helena. Ascension has no indigenous or permanent residents and is inhabited only by persons contracted to work on the island (mainly with the UK and US military or in the space and communications industries) or their dependents, while Tristan da Cunha – the main island in a small archipelago – has fewer than 300 residents. The population of Saint Helena consists of the descendants of 17th century British sailors and settlers from the East India Company, African slaves, and indentured servants and laborers from India, Indonesia, and China. Most of the population of Ascension are Saint Helenians, Britons, and Americans, while that of Tristan da Cunha descends from shipwrecked sailors and Saint Helenians.</p><p>Change in Saint Helena’s population size is driven by net outward migration. Since the 1980s, Saint Helena’s population steadily has shrunk and aged as the birth rate has decreased and many working-age residents left for better opportunities elsewhere. The restoration of British citizenship in 2002 accelerated family emigration; from 1998 to 2008 alone, population declined by about 20%.</p><p>In the last few years, population has experienced some temporary growth, as foreigners and returning Saint Helenians, have come to build an international airport, but numbers are beginning to fade as the project reaches completion and workers depart. In the long term, once the airport is fully operational, increased access to the remote island has the potential to boost tourism and fishing, provide more jobs for Saint Helenians domestically, and could encourage some ex-patriots to return home. In the meantime, however, Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha have to contend with the needs of an aging population. The elderly population of the islands has risen from an estimated 9.4% in 1998 to 20.4% in 2016.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>The vast majority of the population of Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha live on Saint Helena. Ascension has no indigenous or permanent residents and is inhabited only by persons contracted to work on the island (mainly with the UK and US military or in the space and communications industries) or their dependents, while Tristan da Cunha – the main island in a small archipelago – has fewer than 300 residents. The population of Saint Helena consists of the descendants of 17th century British sailors and settlers from the East India Company, African slaves, and indentured servants and laborers from India, Indonesia, and China. Most of the population of Ascension are Saint Helenians, Britons, and Americans, while that of Tristan da Cunha descends from shipwrecked sailors and Saint Helenians.</p> <p>Change in Saint Helena’s population size is driven by net outward migration. Since the 1980s, Saint Helena’s population steadily has shrunk and aged as the birth rate has decreased and many working-age residents left for better opportunities elsewhere. The restoration of British citizenship in 2002 accelerated family emigration; from 1998 to 2008 alone, population declined by about 20%.</p> <p>In the 2010s, the population experienced some temporary growth, as foreigners and returning Saint Helenians, came to build an international airport, but numbers faded as the project reached completion and workers departed. With the airport fully operational, increased access to the remote island has the potential to boost tourism and fishing, provide more jobs for Saint Helenians domestically, and could encourage some ex-patriots to return home. In the meantime, however, Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha have to contend with the needs of an aging population. The elderly population of the islands has risen from an estimated 9.4% in 1998 to 18% in 2022.</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Age structure": {
|
||||
"0-14 years": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -389,7 +389,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "none (overseas territory of the UK)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"National holiday": {
|
||||
"text": "Birthday of Queen ELIZABETH II, third Monday in April (1926)"
|
||||
"text": "Official birthday of King Charles III, April or June as designated by the governor"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Constitution": {
|
||||
"history": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -410,7 +410,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "King CHARLES III (since 8 September 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"head of government": {
|
||||
"text": "Governor Nigel Phillips (since 13 August 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Governor Nigel PHILLIPS (since 13 August 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"cabinet": {
|
||||
"text": "Executive Council consists of the governor, 3 ex-officio officers, and 5 elected members of the Legislative Council"
|
||||
|
|
@ -437,7 +437,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Court of Appeal (consists of the court president and 2 justices); Supreme Court (consists of the chief justice - a nonresident - and NA judges); note - appeals beyond the Court of Appeal are heard by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (in London)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"judge selection and term of office": {
|
||||
"text": "Court of Appeal and Supreme Court justices appointed by the governor acting upon the instructions from a secretary of state acting on behalf of Queen ELIZABETH II; justices of both courts serve until retirement at age 70, but terms can be extended"
|
||||
"text": "Court of Appeal and Supreme Court justices appointed by the governor acting upon the instructions from a secretary of state acting on behalf of King CHARLES III; justices of both courts serve until retirement at age 70, but terms can be extended"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subordinate courts": {
|
||||
"text": "Magistrates' Court; Small Claims Court; Juvenile Court"
|
||||
|
|
@ -798,7 +798,7 @@
|
|||
"1,524 to 2,437 m": {
|
||||
"text": "1 (2021) Saint Helena (HLE);"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "note - weekly commercial air service to South Africa via Namibia commenced on 14 October 2017"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> weekly commercial air service to South Africa via Namibia commenced on 14 October 2017"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Roadways": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1133,7 +1133,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "estimates vary widely due to inconsistent data and ongoing efforts to integrate various militias; up to 20,000 active duty SNA personnel (2022)",
|
||||
"text": "estimates vary widely due to inconsistent data and ongoing efforts to integrate various militias; up to 20,000 active-duty SNA personnel (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> in 2017, the Somali Government announced a plan for the SNA to eventually number about 18,000 troops; the same plan called for 32,000 federal and regional police<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> as of 2021, there were estimates of up to 50,000 militia forces operating in the country"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1096,7 +1096,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Sudan emerged as a poorer country when South Sudan separated from it in 2011; although Sudan has about four times the population of South Sudan, the latter benefits from its control of the majority of known oil reserves; the Sudanese economy has been affected by hyperinflation in recent years, partly the result of the loss of oil revenue but also due to domestic volatility and social unrest; the difficult economic conditions have meant that for several years telcos have reported revenue under hyper inflationary reporting standards; pressure on revenue has made it difficult for operators to invest in infrastructure upgrades, and so provide improved services to customers; despite this, the number of mobile subscribers increased 7.% in 20201, year-on-year; this level of growth is expected to have been maintained in 2022, though could slow from 2023 as the acute influences resulting the pandemic begin to wane; the country’s poor fixed-line infrastructure has helped the development of mobile broadband services. Sudatel, Cameroon’s Camtel, and Chad-based SudaChad Telecom’s planned investment, the WE-Africa-NA terrestrial fibre link, will connect from Port-Sudan then on to Kribi in Cameroon, passing through Chad; the new build aims to respond to rising data demand in all three countries, particularly as usage has been accelerated since the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic with digital and data services gaining traction. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Sudan emerged as a poorer country when South Sudan separated from it in 2011; although Sudan has about four times the population of South Sudan, the latter benefits from its control of the majority of known oil reserves; the Sudanese economy has been affected by hyperinflation in recent years, partly the result of the loss of oil revenue but also due to domestic volatility and social unrest; the difficult economic conditions have meant that for several years telcos have reported revenue under hyper inflationary reporting standards; pressure on revenue has made it difficult for operators to invest in infrastructure upgrades, and so provide improved services to customers; despite this, the number of mobile subscribers increased 7.% in 20201, year-on-year; this level of growth is expected to have been maintained in 2022, though could slow from 2023 as the acute influences resulting the pandemic begin to wane; the country’s poor fixed-line infrastructure has helped the development of mobile broadband services (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "consists of microwave radio relay, cable, fiber optic, radiotelephone communications, tropospheric scatter, and a domestic satellite system with 14 earth stations; teledensity fixed-line less than 1 per 100 and mobile-cellular over 80 telephones per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1067,7 +1067,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Tunisia has one of the most sophisticated telecom infrastructures in North Africa; penetration rates for mobile and Internet services are among the highest in the region; government program of regulation and infrastructure projects aims to improve Internet connectivity to underserved areas; operators built extensive LTE infrastructure in 2019, and continue to discuss plans for future 5G networks and services; People’s Republic of China (PRC) company Huawei sold equipment to operators for Tunisia’s LTE networks; one operator has signed an agreement to pursue nano-satellite launches in 2023; Internet censorship abolished, though concerns of government surveillance remain; legislation passed in 2017 supporting e-commerce and active e-government; importer of some integrated circuits and broadcasting equipment (including radio, television, and communications transmitters) from the PRC (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Tunisia has one of the most sophisticated telecom infrastructures in North Africa; penetration rates for mobile and Internet services are among the highest in the region; government program of regulation and infrastructure projects aims to improve Internet connectivity to underserved areas; operators built extensive LTE infrastructure in 2019, and continue to discuss plans for future 5G networks and services; one operator has signed an agreement to pursue nano-satellite launches in 2023; internet censorship abolished, though concerns of government surveillance remain; legislation passed in 2017 supporting e-commerce and active e-government; importer of some integrated circuits and broadcasting equipment (including radio, television, and communications transmitters) from the PRC (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "in an effort to jumpstart expansion of the fixed-line network, the government awarded a concession to build and operate a VSAT network with international connectivity; rural areas are served by wireless local loops; competition between several mobile-cellular service providers has resulted in lower activation and usage charges and a surge in subscribership; fixed-line is nearly 14.1 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity has reached about 132 telephones per 100 persons (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1134,7 +1134,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Tanzania’s telecom services are being developed to reach parity with more advanced networks from neighboring countries such as Kenya and fierce competition exists amongst Tanzania's 5 major mobile network operators; one fixed-line operator with competition in mobile networks; high tariffs on telecom; mobile use remains popular, with the government subsidizing expansion of mobile networks into rural communities; most mobile networks rely on older 2G and 3G technology with 4G/LTE service available in urban centers; the government is currently testing 5G technology and plans to begin rolling out 5G service in 2024; the government continues to improve rural telecom infrastructure including work on a national fiber backbone network connecting the entire population; in late 2021, the government announced plans to extend the national backbone network from about 8,300km to 15,000km by 2023, and to provide ongoing connectivity to more countries in the region; domestically, Vodacom Tanzania contracted Eutelsat to provide satellite broadband services to areas of Tanzania which lack connectivity, while World Mobile has launched a balloon-based broadband network in Zanzibar. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Tanzania’s telecom services are being developed to reach parity with more advanced networks from neighboring countries such as Kenya and fierce competition exists amongst Tanzania's 5 major mobile network operators; one fixed-line operator with competition in mobile networks; high tariffs on telecom; mobile use remains popular, with the government subsidizing expansion of mobile networks into rural communities; most mobile networks rely on older 2G and 3G technology with 4G/LTE service available in urban centers; the government is currently testing 5G technology and plans to begin rolling out 5G service in 2024; the government continues to improve rural telecom infrastructure including work on a national fiber backbone network connecting the entire population; in late 2021, the government announced plans to extend the national backbone network from about 8,300km to 15,000km by 2023, and to provide ongoing connectivity to more countries in the region (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line telephone network inadequate with less than 1 connection per 100 persons; mobile-cellular service, aided by multiple providers, is increasing rapidly and exceeds 82 telephones per 100 persons; trunk service provided by open-wire, microwave radio relay, tropospheric scatter, and fiber-optic cable; some links being made digital (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1322,7 +1322,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "126,497 (Burundi), 80,860 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "126,335 (Burundi), 80,860 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1129,7 +1129,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "a series of reforms within Uganda’s telecom sector have provided the country with one of the most competitive markets in the region; the entry of MTN Uganda as the second national operator to compete with Uganda Telecom in all telecom sectors fundamentally improved the availability and quality of services offered to end-users; regulatory reforms in recent years have meant that Lycamobile Uganda and Airtel Uganda also now hold National Telecommunications Operator licenses; in line with the regulator’s licensing requirements by which Uganda-based companies should be broadly owned by Ugandans by mid-2022, MTN Group carried out a partial listing on the Uganda Stock Exchange in December 2021; Airtel is expected to follow suit later in 2022; a simplified and converged licensing regime has significantly reduced barriers to market entry and increased competition, but this has also led to price wars which have dented operator revenue; heightened competitive pressures against the backdrop of a weak consumer profile have worsened operating conditions, prompting the exit of Africell in 2021 while the financially strained Smile Telecom has pinned its hopes on a restructuring plan aimed at stabilizing in the challenging market; fixed-line infrastructure remains poor, with low penetration, and as a result fixed-line broadband penetration is also particularly low; consumers have largely depended on mobile infrastructure to provide voice and broadband services; there is sufficient capacity with LTE infrastructure to match data demand during the next few years; MTN Uganda has anticipated the migration to 5G, having held trials in early 2020 though the roll out of 5G is not expected until later in 2022. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "a series of reforms within Uganda’s telecom sector have provided the country with one of the most competitive markets in the region; in line with the regulator’s licensing requirements by which Uganda-based companies should be broadly owned by Ugandans by mid-2022, MTN Group carried out a partial listing on the Uganda Stock Exchange in December 2021; a simplified and converged licensing regime has significantly reduced barriers to market entry and increased competition, but this has also led to price wars which have dented operator revenue; fixed-line infrastructure remains poor, with low penetration, and as a result fixed-line broadband penetration is also particularly low; consumers have largely depended on mobile infrastructure to provide voice and broadband services; there is sufficient capacity with LTE infrastructure to match data demand during the next few years;Uganda has anticipated the migration to 5G, having held trials in early 2020 though the roll out of 5G is not expected until later in 2022 (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line less than 1 per 100 and mobile cellular systems teledensity about 61 per 100 persons; intercity traffic by wire, microwave radio relay, and radiotelephone communication stations (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1237,8 +1237,8 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "approximately 12,000 personnel (7,000 Army; 500 Air Force; 4,500 National Gendarmerie) (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> in 2022, Burkina Faso announced a special recruitment for 3,000 additional soldiers to assist with its fight against terrorist groups operating in the country"
|
||||
"text": "approximately 13,000 personnel (8,000 Army; 500 Air Force; 4,500 National Gendarmerie) (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1: </strong>in 2019, the Burkina Faso Government announced an initial strength goal for the VDF of 15,000 members, but in October 2022 announced plans to recruit up to 50,000 VDF volunteers<br><strong><br>note 2:</strong> in 2022, Burkina Faso announced a special recruitment for 3,000 additional soldiers to assist with its fight against terrorist groups operating in the country"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the FABF has a mix of foreign-supplied weapons; since 2010, it has received limited amounts of mostly donated second-hand equipment from a variety of countries (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1116,7 +1116,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "the government’s Broadband Policy aims to provide 95% population coverage by 2024, supported by the efforts of telcos including Paratus Telecom which continue to invest in their own extensive network objectives; mobile network coverage has increased sharply in recent years; by 2021, 3G infrastructure provided 89% population coverage while LTE infrastructure provided 79% coverage (compared to only 40% a year earlier); despite the relatively advanced nature of the market, progress towards 5G has been slow, partly due to unsubstantiated public concerns over health implications of the technology which caused the government to order an environmental assessment of 5G in mid-2020; the government has requested the regulator to speed up its 5G development strategy; Namibia’s internet and broadband sector is reasonably competitive, its development was for many years held back by high prices for international bandwidth caused by the lack of a direct connection to international submarine cables; this market situation improved after operators invested in diversifying terrestrial access routes to adjacent countries; by the end of 2022 Namibia is expected to be connected by a 1,050km branch line of Google’s Equiano cable running between Portugal and South Africa. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "the government’s Broadband Policy aims to provide 95% population coverage by 2024; mobile network coverage has increased sharply in recent years; by 2021, 3G infrastructure provided 89% population coverage while LTE infrastructure provided 79% coverage (compared to only 40% a year earlier); despite the relatively advanced nature of the market, progress towards 5G has been slow, partly due to unsubstantiated public concerns over health implications of the technology which caused the government to order an environmental assessment of 5G in mid-2020; the government has requested the regulator to speed up its 5G development strategy; Namibia’s internet and broadband sector is reasonably competitive, its development was for many years held back by high prices for international bandwidth caused by the lack of a direct connection to international submarine cables; this market situation improved after operators invested in diversifying terrestrial access routes to adjacent countries; by the end of 2022 Namibia is expected to be connected by a 1,050km branch line of cable running between Portugal and South Africa (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line subscribership is less than 6 per 100 and mobile-cellular roughly 102 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1122,7 +1122,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "following elections held in August 2021, the new government immediately established a Ministry of Technology and Science to promote the use of ICT in developing economic growth and social inclusion; this focus on ICT, and on telecoms in particular, has been central to government strategies for some years; as part of the Smart Zambia initiative, investment has been made in data centers, a computer assembly plant, ICT training centers, and a Smart Education program; these efforts have been combined with the extension of broadband access and improved connectivity to international submarine cables; in turn, this has resulted in a considerable reduction in fixed-line and mobile access pricing for end-users; mobile network operators continue to invest in 3G and LTE-based services, while the government also contracted Huawei to upgrade the state-owned mobile infrastructure for 5G services; delays in holding spectrum have stymied the development of 5G thus far; in mid-2021 the regulator completed a consultation of auctioning low, medium, and high band spectrum for 5G, aiming to provide sufficient spectrum to meet the anticipated increase in data traffic in coming years; fixed-line broadband services remain underdeveloped, though MTN Zambia has initiated an FttP program, initially in Lusaka. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "following elections held in August 2021, the new government immediately established a Ministry of Technology and Science to promote the use of ICT in developing economic growth and social inclusion; this focus on ICT, and on telecoms in particular, has been central to government strategies for some years; as part of the Smart Zambia initiative, investment has been made in data centers, a computer assembly plant, ICT training centers, and a Smart Education program; these efforts have been combined with the extension of broadband access and improved connectivity to international submarine cables; in turn, this has resulted in a considerable reduction in fixed-line and mobile access pricing for end-users; mobile network operators continue to invest in 3G and LTE-based services, the government contracted to upgrade the state-owned mobile infrastructure for 5G services; delays in holding spectrum have stymied the development of 5G thus far; in mid-2021 the regulator completed a consultation of auctioning low, medium, and high band spectrum for 5G, aiming to provide sufficient spectrum to meet the anticipated increase in data traffic in coming years; fixed-line broadband services remain underdeveloped (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fiber optic connections are available between most larger towns and cities with microwave radio relays serving more rural areas; 3G and LTE with FttX in limited urban areas and private Ku or Ka band VSAT terminals in remote locations; fixed-line teledensity less than 1 per 100 and mobile-cellular roughly 104 per 100 (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Zimbabwe’s telcos continue to be affected by the country’s poor economy; this has been exacerbated by the significant economic difficulties related to the pandemic; revenue has also been under pressure from a number of recent regulatory measures and additional taxes imposed by the cash-strapped government; inflation has become so high that year-on-year revenue comparisons since 2019 have been difficult to assess meaningfully; the three MNOs Econet Wireless, NetOne and Telecel Zimbabwe continue to invest in network upgrades, partly supported by government efforts and cash released from the Universal Service Fund; as a result of these investments, LTE networks have expanded steadily, though services remain concentrated in urban areas; international bandwidth has improved since fiber links to several submarine cables were established via neighboring countries; the expansion of 3G and LTE-based mobile broadband services has meant that most of the population has access to the internet; the government has started a national broadband scheme aimed at delivering a 1Mb/s service nationally by 2030; investment in fixed broadband infrastructure has also resulted in a slow but steady growth in the number of DSL connections, and also fiber subscriptions; during 2021, most growth in the fixed broadband segment has been with fiber connections. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Zimbabwe’s telcos continue to be affected by the country’s poor economy; this has been exacerbated by the significant economic difficulties related to the pandemic; revenue has also been under pressure from a number of recent regulatory measures and additional taxes imposed by the cash-strapped government; inflation has become so high that year-on-year revenue comparisons since 2019 have been difficult to assess meaningfully; the three MNOs continue to invest in network upgrades, partly supported by government efforts and cash released from the Universal Service Fund; as a result of these investments, LTE networks have expanded steadily, though services remain concentrated in urban areas; international bandwidth has improved since fiber links to several submarine cables were established via neighboring countries; the expansion of 3G and LTE-based mobile broadband services has meant that most of the population has access to the internet; the government has started a national broadband scheme aimed at delivering a 1Mb/s service nationally by 2030; investment in fixed broadband infrastructure has also resulted in a slow but steady growth in the number of DSL connections, and also fiber subscriptions; during 2021, most growth in the fixed broadband segment has been with fiber connections (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "consists of microwave radio relay links, open-wire lines, radiotelephone communication stations, fixed wireless local loop installations, fiber-optic cable, VSAT terminals, and a substantial mobile-cellular network; Internet connection is most readily available in Harare and major towns; two government owned and two private cellular providers; fixed-line teledensity at nearly 2 per 100 and mobile-cellular nearly 89 per 100 (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1279,7 +1279,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "17 years of age for voluntary military service (with parental consent); no conscription (abolished 1973); women allowed to serve in all roles, including combat arms, since 2013 (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> in 2020-2021, women comprised nearly 20% of the military"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> foreign nationals who are permanent residents, particularly New Zealanders, or those who have applied for citizenship or overseas candidates who have appropriate experience and qualifications from an overseas military can apply to join the ADF <br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> in 2020-2021, women comprised nearly 20% of the military"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "<strong>note: </strong>since the 1990s, Australia has deployed more than 30,000 personnel on nearly 100 UN peacekeeping and coalition military operations, including in Cambodia, Rwanda, the Solomon Islands, Somalia, and East Timor"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -561,7 +561,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "last held on 3 April 2019 (next to be held in April 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "percent of vote by party - UDP 10.7%, DAP 7.8%, PAP 4.4%, other 20.8%, independent 56.3%; seats by party - DAP 7, UDP 5, PAP 3, KPSI 1, SIPFP 1, SIPRA 1, independent 32; composition - men 46, women 4, percent of women 8%"
|
||||
"text": "percent of vote by party - UDP 10.7%, DAP 7.8%, PAP 4.4%, independent 56.3%, other 20.8%; seats by party - DAP 7, UDP 5, PAP 3, KPSI 1, SIPFP 1, SIPRA 1, independent 32; composition - men 46, women 4, percent of women 8%"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -715,7 +715,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Agricultural products": {
|
||||
"text": "oil palm fruit, sweet potatoes, coconuts, taro, yams, fruit, pulses nes, vegetables, cocoa, cassava"
|
||||
"text": "oil palm fruit, sweet potatoes, coconuts, taro, yams, fruit, pulses, vegetables, cocoa, cassava"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Industries": {
|
||||
"text": "fish (tuna), mining, timber"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -956,7 +956,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "no regular military forces; Cook Islands Police Service"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "defense is the responsibility of New Zealand in consultation with the Cook Islands and at its request"
|
||||
"text": "defense is the responsibility of New Zealand in consultation with the Cook Islands and at its request<br><br>the Cook Islands have a \"shiprider\" agreement with the US, which allows local maritime law enforcement officers to embark on US Coast Guard (USCG) and US Navy (USN) vessels, including to board and search vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations within its designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas; \"shiprider\" agreements also enable USCG personnel and USN vessels with embarked USCG law enforcement personnel to work with host nations to protect critical regional resources (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1214,7 +1214,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "170 Egypt (MFO); 165 Iraq (UNAMI); 150 Golan Heights (UNDOF) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the RFMF was established in 1920; it has a history of intervening in the country’s politics since the late 1980s, including coups in 1987 and 2006, and a mutiny in 2000 <br><br>the RFMF also has a long tradition of participating in UN peacekeeping operations; since its first deployment of troops to South Lebanon in 1978 under the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), it has deployed troops on nearly 20 additional UN missions (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "the RFMF was established in 1920; it has a history of intervening in the country’s politics since the late 1980s, including coups in 1987 and 2006, and a mutiny in 2000 <br><br>the RFMF also has a long tradition of participating in UN peacekeeping operations; since its first deployment of troops to South Lebanon in 1978 under the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), it has deployed troops on nearly 20 additional UN missions<br><br>Fiji has a \"shiprider\" agreement with the US, which allows local maritime law enforcement officers to embark on US Coast Guard (USCG) and US Navy (USN) vessels, including to board and search vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations within Fiji's designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas; \"shiprider\" agreements also enable USCG personnel and USN vessels with embarked USCG law enforcement personnel to work with host nations to protect critical regional resources<br> (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -993,7 +993,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "no military forces; Federated States of Micronesia National Police (includes a maritime wing)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "defense is the responsibility of the US"
|
||||
"text": "defense is the responsibility of the US<br><br>Micronesia has a \"shiprider\" agreement with the US, which allows local maritime law enforcement officers to embark on US Coast Guard (USCG) and US Navy (USN) vessels, including to board and search vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations within Micronesia's designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas; \"shiprider\" agreements also enable USCG personnel and USN vessels with embarked USCG law enforcement personnel to work with host nations to protect critical regional resources (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1104,7 +1104,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "no regular military forces; Kiribati Police and Prison Service (Ministry of Justice)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "defense assistance is provided by Australia and NZ"
|
||||
"text": "defense assistance is provided by Australia and NZ<br><br>Kiribati has a \"shiprider\" agreement with the US, which allows local maritime law enforcement officers to embark on US Coast Guard (USCG) and US Navy (USN) vessels, including to board and search vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations within Kiribati's designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas; \"shiprider\" agreements also enable USCG personnel and USN vessels with embarked USCG law enforcement personnel to work with host nations to protect critical regional resources (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -902,10 +902,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "New Caledonia’s telecom sector is dominated by OPT-NC, which holds a monopoly and provides fixed and mobile voice services, mobile internet, fixed broadband access, and wholesale services for other ISPs; the country is well serviced by extensive 3G and LTE networks, and is considered to have one of the highest smartphone adoption rates in the Pacific region. By 2025, smart phone penetration is expected to reach 71%; while DSL is still the dominant fixed broadband technology, OPT-NC is also deploying a nationwide FttP network; in April 2022, OPT-NC stated that it had connected 28,000 fiber customers to its network; the South Pacific region has become a hub for submarine cable system developments in recent years, with further networks scheduled to come online later in 2021 and into 2022; these new cables are expected to increase competition in the region with regards to international capacity; in 2020, the government owned telco OPT-NC commissioned Alcatel Submarine Networks (ASN) to build the Gondwana-2 cable system to provide additional network capacity and complement the Gondwana-1 cable. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "New Caledonia’s telecom sector provides fixed and mobile voice services, mobile internet, fixed broadband access, and wholesale services for other ISPs; the country is well serviced by extensive 3G and LTE networks, and is considered to have one of the highest smartphone adoption rates in the Pacific region; by 2025, smart phone penetration is expected to reach 71%; while DSL is still the dominant fixed broadband technology, and a nationwide FttP network; the South Pacific region has become a hub for submarine cable system developments in recent years, with further networks scheduled to come online later in 2021 and into 2022; these new cables are expected to increase competition in the region with regards to international capacity; in 2020, the government owned telco commissioned Alcatel Submarine Networks (ASN) to build the Gondwana-2 cable system to provide additional network capacity and complement the Gondwana-1 cable (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line nearly 29 per 100 and mobile-cellular telephone subscribership 96 per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line nearly 16 per 100 and mobile-cellular telephone subscribership 91 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"international": {
|
||||
"text": "country code - 687; landing points for the Gondwana-1 and Picot-1 providing connectivity via submarine cables around New Caledonia and to Australia; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Pacific Ocean) (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -761,7 +761,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "sole provider service for over 1000 landlines and fixed wireless lines; cellular telephone service operates on AMPS and GSM platforms; difficult geography presents challenges for rural areas; mobile is primary source of Internet access; mobile broadband demand is growing due to mobile services (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "service for over 1000 landlines and fixed wireless lines; cellular telephone service operates on AMPS and GSM platforms; difficult geography presents challenges for rural areas; mobile is primary source of Internet access; mobile broadband demand is growing due to mobile services (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "single-line (fixed line) telephone system connects all villages on island; fixed teledensity at nearly 62 per 100 (2018)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -507,7 +507,7 @@
|
|||
"Communications": {
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "adequate, 4G mobile telecommunication network (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "the current infrastructure consists of fixed line telephone utilizing copper twisted pair cable and optic fiber, two Satellite Earth Station, GSM Mobile switch with five remote base stations and 2 micro cells, central public exchange which switches international as well as national calls, ADSL Broadband internet connection (Asynchronous Digital Subscriber Line), and an ISP (Internet Service Provider) (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "free local calls"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "for many years, GSM was the primary mobile technology for Vanuatu’s 300,000 people; recent infrastructure projects have improved access technologies, with a transition to 3G and, to a limited degree, to LTE; Vanuatu has also benefited from the ICN1 submarine cable and the launch of the Kacific-1 satellite, both of which have considerably improved access to telecom services in recent years; Vanuatu’s telecom sector is liberalized, with the two prominent mobile operators Amalgamated Telecom Holdings (operating as TVL) and Digicel Vanuatu offering effective competition; while fixed broadband penetration remains low, the incumbent operator is slowly exchanging copper fixed-lines for fiber; a number of ongoing submarine cable developments will also assist in increasing data rates and reduce internet pricing in coming years. (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "for many years, GSM was the primary mobile technology for Vanuatu’s 300,000 people; recent infrastructure projects have improved access technologies, with a transition to 3G and, to a limited degree, to LTE; Vanuatu has also benefited from the ICN1 submarine cable and the launch of the Kacific-1 satellite, both of which have considerably improved access to telecom services in recent years; Vanuatu’s telecom sector is liberalized, with the two prominent mobile operators; while fixed broadband penetration remains low, the incumbent operator is slowly exchanging copper fixed-lines for fiber; a number of ongoing submarine cable developments will also assist in increasing data rates and reduce internet pricing in coming years (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line teledensity a bit over 1 per 100 and mobile-cellular just over 80 per 100 (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the paramilitary Vanuatu Mobile Force also has external security responsibilities"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the separate British and French police forces were unified in 1980 under Ni-Vanuatu officers as the New Hebrides Constabulary; the force retained some British and French officers as advisors; the Constabulary was subsequently renamed the Vanuatu Police Force later in 1980<br><br>the Vanuatu Mobile Force has received training and other support from Australia, China, France, New Zealand, and the US (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "the separate British and French police forces were unified in 1980 under Ni-Vanuatu officers as the New Hebrides Constabulary; the force retained some British and French officers as advisors; the Constabulary was subsequently renamed the Vanuatu Police Force later in 1980<br><br>the Vanuatu Mobile Force has received training and other support from Australia, China, France, New Zealand, and the US<br><br>Vanuatu has a \"shiprider\" agreement with the US, which allows local maritime law enforcement officers to embark on US Coast Guard (USCG) and US Navy (USN) vessels, including to board and search vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations within Vanuatu's designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas; \"shiprider\" agreements also enable USCG personnel and USN vessels with embarked USCG law enforcement personnel to work with host nations to protect critical regional resources (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -944,10 +944,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "adequate local and international radiotelephone communication provided via Australian facilities; geography is a challenge for the islands; there is a need to service the tourism sector and the South Pacific Islands economy; mobile technology is booming (2018)"
|
||||
"text": "relies on satellite as the primary Internet service provider and mobile operator; internet connectivity on the island is very limited and unstable due to the vulnerability of the network infrastructure to bad weather and limited network coverage, with several blind spots (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line 0 per 100 and mobile-cellular subscribership approximately 95 per 100 (2019)"
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line 0 per 100 and mobile-cellular subscribership approximately 92 per 100 (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"international": {
|
||||
"text": "country code - 674; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Pacific Ocean)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "no regular military forces; the police force, under the Minister for Police and Emergency Services, maintains internal security and, as necessary, external security"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "Nauru maintains no defense forces; under an informal agreement, defense is the responsibility of Australia"
|
||||
"text": "Nauru maintains no defense forces; under an informal agreement, defense is the responsibility of Australia<br><br>Nauru has a \"shiprider\" agreement with the US, which allows local maritime law enforcement officers to embark on US Coast Guard (USCG) and US Navy (USN) vessels, including to board and search vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations within Nauru's designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas; \"shiprider\" agreements also enable USCG personnel and USN vessels with embarked USCG law enforcement personnel to work with host nations to protect critical regional resources (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1075,10 +1075,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "the principal growth areas in in New Zealand’s telecom market have been in mobile broadband and fiber; the UFB1 rollout was completed in November 2019 and the UFB2 rollout is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2022; Chorus noted that as of the beginning of 2022, 1Gb/s plans accounted for about 23% of all fiber connections, while 43% of business customers adopted a gigabit service; New Zealand’s mobile market continues to undergo significant developments; there have been considerable gains made in LTE services, with effective competition between Spark, Vodafone NZ, and 2degrees; the widening coverage of LTE networks has been supported by the Rural Broadband Initiative rollout, which added a significant number of mobile sites to new or underserved areas; as the initiative is winding down, this has enabled the participating telcos to invest in NB-IoT and other platforms; Vodafone NZ expects to extend its NB-IoT footprint to cover at least 60% of the country by 2024; the market is undergoing additional consolidation, with approval of the merger between 2degrees and Orcon Group having been granted by regulators in May 2022; this will create the country’s third-largest integrated telco, offering fixed and mobile services in competition with Spark and Vodafone NZ. The merger proposal came fast of the heels of Vocus Group and its local subsidiary Orcon having acquired 2degrees from Trilogy International in December 2021; this deal created a new company, Voyage Digital. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "the principal growth areas in in New Zealand’s telecom market have been in mobile broadband and fiber; the UFB1 rollout was completed in November 2019 and the UFB2 rollout is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2022; Chorus noted that as of the beginning of 2022, 1Gb/s plans accounted for about 23% of all fiber connections, while 43% of business customers adopted a gigabit service; New Zealand’s mobile market continues to undergo significant developments; there have been considerable gains made in LTE services, with effective competition between Spark, Vodafone NZ, and 2degrees; the widening coverage of LTE networks has been supported by the Rural Broadband Initiative rollout, which added a significant number of mobile sites to new or underserved areas; as the initiative is winding down, this has enabled the participating telcos to invest in NB-IoT and other platforms; Vodafone NZ expects to extend its NB-IoT footprint to cover at least 60% of the country by 2024; the market is undergoing additional consolidation, with approval of the merger between 2degrees and Orcon Group having been granted by regulators in May 2022; this will create the country’s third-largest integrated telco, offering fixed and mobile services in competition with Spark and Vodafone NZ. The merger proposal came fast of the heels of Vocus Group and its local subsidiary Orcon having acquired 2degrees from Trilogy International in December 2021; this deal created a new company, Voyage Digital. (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line roughly 37 per 100 and mobile-cellular telephone subscribership 136 per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line roughly 18 per 100 and mobile-cellular telephone subscribership 127 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"international": {
|
||||
"text": "country code - 64; landing points for the Southern Cross NEXT, Aqualink, Nelson-Levin, SCCN and Hawaiki submarine cable system providing links to Australia, Fiji, American Samoa, Kiribati, Samo, Tokelau, US and around New Zealand; satellite earth stations - 8 (1 Inmarsat - Pacific Ocean, 7 other) (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1206,8 +1206,11 @@
|
|||
"text": "New Zealand Defense Force (NZDF): New Zealand Army, Royal New Zealand Navy, Royal New Zealand Air Force (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2022": {
|
||||
"text": "1.4% of GDP (2022 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
"text": "1.3% of GDP (2021 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "1.3% of GDP (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
|
||||
"text": "1.5% of GDP (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1217,9 +1220,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2018": {
|
||||
"text": "1.2% of GDP (2018) (approximately $2.62 billion)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
|
||||
"text": "1.1% of GDP (2017) (approximately $2.43 billion)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1230,7 +1230,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "17 years of age for men and women for voluntary military service; soldiers cannot be deployed until the age of 18; no conscription (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>New Zealand opened up all military occupations to women in 2000; in 2019, women accounted for about 18% of the uniformed full-time personnel"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1: </strong>New Zealand opened up all military occupations to women in 2000; in 2019, women accounted for about 18% of the uniformed full-time personnel<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> as of 2022, the NZDF’s program for recruiting foreign volunteers had been suspended"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "up to 220 Antarctica (summer season only) (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -970,7 +970,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "since 2018, Australia and Japan have provided patrol boats to Palau's Division of Marine Law Enforcement (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "under the Compact of Free Association (COFA) between Palau and the US, the US is responsible for the defense of Palau and the US military is granted access to the islands, but it has not stationed any military forces there; the COFA also allows citizens of Palau to serve in the US armed forces (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "under the Compact of Free Association (COFA) between Palau and the US, the US is responsible for the defense of Palau and the US military is granted access to the islands, but it has not stationed any military forces there; the COFA also allows citizens of Palau to serve in the US armed forces<br><br>Palau has a \"shiprider\" agreement with the US, which allows local maritime law enforcement officers to embark on US Coast Guard (USCG) and US Navy (USN) vessels, including to board and search vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations within Palau's designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas; \"shiprider\" agreements also enable USCG personnel and USN vessels with embarked USCG law enforcement personnel to work with host nations to protect critical regional resources (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "no regular military forces; the national police (Marshall Islands Police Department, MIPD), local police forces, and the Sea Patrol (maritime police) maintain internal security; the MIPD and Sea Patrol report to the Ministry of Justice; local police report to their respective local government councils"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "defense is the responsibility of the US"
|
||||
"text": "defense is the responsibility of the US<br><br>the Marshall Islands have a \"shiprider\" agreement with the US, which allows local maritime law enforcement officers to embark on US Coast Guard (USCG) and US Navy (USN) vessels, including to board and search vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations within its designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas; \"shiprider\" agreements also enable USCG personnel and USN vessels with embarked USCG law enforcement personnel to work with host nations to protect critical regional resources (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Natural resources": {
|
||||
"text": "NEGL"
|
||||
"text": "Fisheries"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Land use": {
|
||||
"agricultural land": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -357,7 +357,7 @@
|
|||
"time difference": {
|
||||
"text": "UTC+13 (18 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "note: there is no designated, official capital for Tokelau; the location of the capital rotates among the three atolls along with the head of government or Ulu o Tokelau"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note</strong>: there is no designated, official capital for Tokelau; the location of the capital rotates among the three atolls along with the head of government or Ulu o Tokelau"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Administrative divisions": {
|
||||
"text": "none (territory of New Zealand)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -503,7 +503,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Agricultural products": {
|
||||
"text": "coconuts, roots/tubers nes, tropical fruit, pork, bananas, eggs, poultry, pig offals, pig fat, fruit"
|
||||
"text": "coconuts, roots/tubers, tropical fruit, pork, bananas, eggs, poultry, pig offals, pig fat, fruit"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Industries": {
|
||||
"text": "small-scale enterprises for copra production, woodworking, plaited craft goods; stamps, coins; fishing"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "voluntary military service for men and women 18-25 (16 with parental approval for non-combat positions); no conscription (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "Tonga participated in World War I as part of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, but the Tonga Defense Force (TDF) was not established until 1939 at the beginning of World War II; in 1943, New Zealand helped train about 2,000 Tongan troops who saw action in the Solomon Islands; the TDF was disbanded at the end of the war, but was reactivated in 1946 as the Tonga Defense Services (TDS); in 2013, the name of the TDS was changed to His Majesty’s Armed Forces of Tonga (HMAF); Tongan troops deployed to Iraq from 2004-2008 and Afghanistan to support UK forces from 2010-2014 (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Tonga participated in World War I as part of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, but the Tonga Defense Force (TDF) was not established until 1939 at the beginning of World War II; in 1943, New Zealand helped train about 2,000 Tongan troops who saw action in the Solomon Islands; the TDF was disbanded at the end of the war, but was reactivated in 1946 as the Tonga Defense Services (TDS); in 2013, the name of the TDS was changed to His Majesty’s Armed Forces of Tonga (HMAF); Tongan troops deployed to Iraq from 2004-2008 and Afghanistan to support UK forces from 2010-2014<br><br>Tonga has a \"shiprider\" agreement with the US, which allows local maritime law enforcement officers to embark on US Coast Guard (USCG) and US Navy (USN) vessels, including to board and search vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations within Tonga's designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas; \"shiprider\" agreements also enable USCG personnel and USN vessels with embarked USCG law enforcement personnel to work with host nations to protect critical regional resources (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -945,7 +945,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "no regular military forces; Tuvalu Police Force (Ministry of Justice, Communications, and Foreign Affairs) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "Australia provides support to the Tuvalu Police Force, including donations of patrol boats (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Australia provides support to the Tuvalu Police Force, including donations of patrol boats<br><br>Tuvalu has a \"shiprider\" agreement with the US, which allows local maritime law enforcement officers to embark on US Coast Guard (USCG) and US Navy (USN) vessels, including to board and search vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations within Tuvalu's designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas; \"shiprider\" agreements also enable USCG personnel and USN vessels with embarked USCG law enforcement personnel to work with host nations to protect critical regional resources (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -661,7 +661,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "2G widespread; bandwidth is limited; mobile subscriber numbers are higher than fixed-line and better suited for islands; good mobile coverage in the capital cities and also reasonable coverage across more remote atolls; recent international interest in infrastructure development; increase in demand for mobile broadband as mobile services serve as primary source for Internet access; Kacific-1 broadband satellite launched in 2019 to improve costs and capability (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "2G widespread; bandwidth is limited; mobile subscriber numbers are higher than fixed-line and better suited for islands; good mobile coverage in the capital cities and also reasonable coverage across more remote atolls; recent international interest in infrastructure development; increase in demand for mobile broadband as mobile services serve as primary source for Internet access; broadband satellite launched in 2019 to improve costs and capability (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line teledensity 25 per 100 persons and 0 per 100 mobile subscriptions (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -574,7 +574,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "election last held on 9 April 2021 (next election to be held in 2026)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "percent of vote by party - HRPP 55%, FAST 37%, TSP 3%, independents 5%; seats by party – FAST 30, HRPP 22, independents 1; composition - men 47, women 6, percent of women 11.3% <br>note - on 29 November 2021, the Election Commissioner added two women seats to parliament, bringing the HRPP’s total from 20 to 22 seats"
|
||||
"text": "percent of vote by party - HRPP 55%, FAST 37%, TSP 3%, independents 5%; seats by party – FAST 30, HRPP 22, independents 1; composition - men 47, women 6, percent of women 11.3% <br><strong>note:</strong> on 29 November 2021, the Election Commissioner added two women seats to parliament, bringing the HRPP’s total from 20 to 22 seats"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Samoa was one of the first Pacific Island countries to establish a regulatory infrastructure and to liberalize its telecom market; in 2006, it became the first country in the region to see the market entrance of Digicel, which has since launched services in other Pacific nations; the advent of competition in the mobile market saw prices fall by around 50% and network coverage increase to more than 90% of the population; Samoa also boasts one of the highest rates of mobile phone coverage in the Pacific region; LTE is developing on the back of an initial launch of the technology in 2016 by Digicel Samoa, followed by BlueSky Samoa (now Vodafone Samoa) in 2017; Digicel Samoa completed its LTE network in September 2020; the growth of fixed-line internet has been impeded by factors including the high costs for bandwidth, under investment in fixed-line infrastructure, as well as a strained consumer profile weighing on demand for services; Digicel Samoa’s financially troubled parent company, Digicel Pacific, had been on the lookout for a potential buyer for several months as it struggled financially; after various Chinese firms registered interest in taking a stake, the Australian government sought to block further Chinese investment in the region by providing financial support for a local buyer; in October 2021, Telstra agreed to acquire Digicel Group’s Pacific operations for around $1.6 billion, with a financial input from the Australian government of around $1.33 billion, Samoa’s telecoms sector has been inhibited by a lack of international connectivity; Samoa has had access to the Samoa-America-Samoa (SAS) cable laid in 2009, this cable has insufficient capacity to meet the country’s future bandwidth needs; this issue was addressed with two new submarine cables that became available in 2018 and 2019; combined with the Samoa National Broadband Highway (SNBH), have improved internet data rates and reliability, and have helped to reduce the high costs previously associated with internet access in Samoa; in April 2022, the Samoan government announced its decision to take over control of the Samoa Submarine Cable Company, looking to the cable to generate additional revenue for the state. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Samoa was one of the first Pacific Island countries to establish a regulatory infrastructure and to liberalize its telecom market; the advent of competition in the mobile market saw prices fall by around 50% and network coverage increase to more than 90% of the population; Samoa also boasts one of the highest rates of mobile phone coverage in the Pacific region; the growth of fixed-line internet has been impeded by factors including the high costs for bandwidth, under investment in fixed-line infrastructure; Samoa’s telecoms sector has been inhibited by a lack of international connectivity; Samoa has had access to the Samoa-America-Samoa (SAS) cable laid in 2009, this cable has insufficient capacity to meet the country’s future bandwidth needs; this issue was addressed with two new submarine cables that became available in 2018 and 2019; combined with the Samoa National Broadband Highway (SNBH), have improved internet data rates and reliability, and have helped to reduce the high costs previously associated with internet access in Samoa; in April 2022, the Samoan government announced its decision to take over control of the Samoa Submarine Cable Company, looking to the cable to generate additional revenue for the state (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line roughly 4 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity nearly 64 telephones per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "no regular military forces; Samoa Police Force (Ministry of Police, Prisons, and Correction Services) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "informal defense ties exist with NZ, which is required to consider any Samoan request for assistance under the 1962 Treaty of Friendship <p>in 2012, the US and Samoa signed a mutual law enforcement agreement which allowed Samoan maritime officials to utilize US Coast Guard and Navy vessels to provide maritime policing in Samoan waters; the US Coast Guard regularly patrols Samoa’s waters</p>"
|
||||
"text": "informal defense ties exist with NZ, which is required to consider any Samoan request for assistance under the 1962 Treaty of Friendship <br><br>Samoa has a \"shiprider\" agreement with the US, which allows local maritime law enforcement officers to embark on US Coast Guard (USCG) and US Navy (USN) vessels, including to board and search vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations within Somoa's designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas; \"shiprider\" agreements also enable USCG personnel and USN vessels with embarked USCG law enforcement personnel to work with host nations to protect critical regional resources (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1107,6 +1107,9 @@
|
|||
"text": "Barbados Defense Force: The Barbados Regiment, The Barbados Coast Guard (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2022": {
|
||||
"text": "0.8% of GDP (2022 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
"text": "0.9% of GDP (2021 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
|
@ -1118,9 +1121,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2018": {
|
||||
"text": "0.8% of GDP (2018 est.) (approximately $40 million)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
|
||||
"text": "0.8% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $40 million)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1104,8 +1104,11 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the RBDF is primarily responsible for external security but also provides security at a detention center for migrants and performs some domestic security functions, such as guarding embassies; the Royal Bahamas Police Force (RBPF) maintains internal security; both the RBDF and the RBPF report to the minister of national security"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2022": {
|
||||
"text": "0.8% of GDP (2022 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
"text": "0.9% of GDP (2021 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "0.9% of GDP (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
|
||||
"text": "0.9% of GDP (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1115,9 +1118,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2018": {
|
||||
"text": "0.7% of GDP (2018)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
|
||||
"text": "0.7% of GDP (2017)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1178,6 +1178,9 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the Ministry of National Defense and Border Security is responsible for oversight of the BDF and the Coast Guard, while the Ministry of Home Affairs and New Growth Industries has responsibility for police and prisons"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2022": {
|
||||
"text": "1.2% of GDP (2022 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
"text": "1.3% of GDP (2021 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
|
@ -1189,9 +1192,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2018": {
|
||||
"text": "1.4% of GDP (2018 est.) (approximately $35 million)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
|
||||
"text": "1.4% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $30 million)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1247,6 +1247,9 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> in addition to the military, the Ministry of Armed Forces directs the Airport Security Authority and Civil Aviation, Port Security Authority, the Tourist Security Corps, and Border Security Corps; the National Police (Policia Nacional) are under the Ministry of Interior"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2022": {
|
||||
"text": "0.7% of GDP (2022 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
"text": "0.7% of GDP (2021 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
|
@ -1258,9 +1261,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2018": {
|
||||
"text": "0.7% of GDP (2018 est.) (approximately $1.33 billion)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
|
||||
"text": "0.6% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $1.2 billion)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1246,8 +1246,11 @@
|
|||
"text": "Army of Guatemala (Ejercito de Guatemala): Land Forces (Fuerzas de Tierra), Naval Forces (Fuerzas de Mar), and Air Force (Fuerza de Aire); Ministry of Government (Interior): National Civil Police (Policia Nacional Civil; includes paramilitary units) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2022": {
|
||||
"text": "0.4% of GDP (2022 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
"text": "0.4% of GDP (2021 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "0.4% of GDP (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
|
||||
"text": "0.4% of GDP (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1257,9 +1260,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2018": {
|
||||
"text": "0.4% of GDP (2018) (approximately $470 million)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
|
||||
"text": "0.4% of GDP (2017) (approximately $460 million)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "<p style=\"background: white; margin: 0in 0in 6.4pt 0in;\">Honduras is among the poorest countries in Central America and has long been plagued by an unstable political framework which has rendered telecom sector reform difficult; fixed-line teledensity, at only 4.9%, is significantly lower than the Latin American and Caribbean average; poor fixed-line infrastructure has been exacerbated by low investment and topographical difficulties which have made investment in rural areas unattractive or uneconomical; the internet has been slow to develop; DSL and cable modem technologies are available but are relatively expensive, while higher speed services are largely restricted to the major urban centers; the demand for broadband is steadily increasing and there has been some investment in network upgrades to fiber-based infrastructure; these factors have encouraged consumer take-up of mobile services, a sector where there is lively competition supported by international investment; mobile subscriptions are substantially below the regional average; revenue growth from the mobile sector looks promising in coming years as companies invest in their networks, expand their reach and upgrade their capabilities to accommodate mobile broadband services; mobile data as a proportion of overall mobile revenue has increased steadily, though low-end SMS services will continue to account for the bulk of data revenue for some years; political developments during the last few years have not facilitated the much-needed reform of legislation governing the telecoms sector; regulator frees up 3.5GHz fequencies for mobile use<br></p> <p style=\"background: white; margin: 0in 0in 6.4pt 0in;\"> </p> (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "<p style=\"background: white; margin: 0in 0in 6.4pt 0in;\">Honduras is among the poorest countries in Central America and has long been plagued by an unstable political framework which has rendered telecom sector reform difficult; this has created real difficulties for telcos as well as consumers; fixed-line teledensity, at only 4.9%, is significantly lower than the Latin American and Caribbean average; poor fixed-line infrastructure has been exacerbated by low investment and topographical difficulties which have made investment in rural areas unattractive or uneconomical; the internet has been slow to develop; DSL and cable modem technologies are available but are relatively expensive, while higher speed services are largely restricted to the major urban centers; the demand for broadband is steadily increasing and there has been some investment in network upgrades to fiber-based infrastructure</p> <p style=\"background: white; margin: 0in 0in 6.4pt 0in;\"> </p> (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "private sub-operators allowed to provide fixed lines in order to expand telephone coverage contributing to a fixed-line teledensity of slightly over 5 per 100; mobile-cellular subscribership is roughly 70 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1054,7 +1054,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Jamaica’s telecom sector has for many years been propped up by the mobile sector, which accounts for the vast majority of internet connections and voice lines; it also accounts for just over half of telecom sector revenue; the merger between Digicel and Claro’s Jamaican business in 2012 strengthened Digicel’s position in the market, but in recent quarters Digicel Group’s financial difficulties have caused it considerable problems; the Group has considered selling off its units in the Pacific region, while it has renegotiated a number of bonds to reduce its debt to about $5.8 billion; assets have been placed under the management of a newly created holding company; both Digicel and its only rival, Flow (supported by its new owner Liberty Global), have extended their LTE networks across the island, particularly during the pandemic in response to a sharp increase in data traffic; the 700MHz licensee Symbiote Investments, trading as Caricel Jamaica, had its license revoked at the end of 2018 due to breaches of the terms of the Telecommunications Act. The UK-based Privy Council in August 2020 refused Caricel’s application for permission to appeal the revocation of its telecom licenses; to fill the gap in the market, a new operator, Rock Mobile, was licensed in May 2021, with obligations to provide 95% population coverage within two years; in December 2020, the government announced the rollout of a national broadband network costing up to $237 million; the funding will be spent on improving connectivity in under served areas, improving access to education, and deploying networks to public locations such as hospitals, municipal institutions, and police stations; to aid in this national broadband effort, the government received a donation of 650km of fiber cabling from local cable TV providers and the two main toll road operators; to encourage the use of digital channels as the country deals with the Covid-19 pandemic, companies such as Scotiabank have given their customers zero-rated data access to mobile banking applications, while Digicel Jamaica has subsidized data plans and zero-rated data access to some educational platforms and websites. (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Jamaica’s telecom sector has for many years been propped up by the mobile sector, which accounts for the vast majority of internet connections and voice lines; it also accounts for just over half of telecom sector revenue; in December 2020, the government announced the rollout of a national broadband network costing up to $237 million; the funding will be spent on improving connectivity in under served areas, improving access to education, and deploying networks to public locations such as hospitals, municipal institutions, and police stations; to aid in this national broadband effort, the government received a donation of 650km of fiber cabling from local cable TV providers and the two main toll road operators; to encourage the use of digital channels as the country deals with the Covid-19 pandemic (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line subscriptions nearly 15 per 100, cellular-mobile roughly 97 per 100 subscriptions (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -419,7 +419,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Flag description": {
|
||||
"text": "two equal horizontal bands of red (top) and blue with a white isosceles triangle based on the hoist side; the center of the triangle displays the Sint Maarten coat of arms; the arms consist of an orange-bordered blue shield prominently displaying the white court house in Philipsburg, as well as a bouquet of yellow sage (the national flower) in the upper left, and the silhouette of a Dutch-French friendship monument in the upper right; the shield is surmounted by a yellow rising sun in front of which is a brown pelican in flight; a yellow scroll below the shield bears the motto: SEMPER PROGREDIENS (Always Progressing); the three main colors are identical to those on the Dutch flag",
|
||||
"text": "two equal horizontal bands of red (top) and blue with a white isosceles triangle based on the hoist side; the center of the triangle displays the Sint Maarten coat of arms; the arms consist of an orange-bordered blue shield prominently displaying the white court house in Philipsburg, as well as a bouquet of yellow sage (the national flower) in the upper left, and the silhouette of a Dutch-French friendship monument in the upper right; the shield is surmounted by a yellow rising sun in front of which is a brown pelican in flight; a yellow scroll below the shield bears the motto: SEMPER PROGREDIENS (Always Progressing); the three main colors are identical to those on the Dutch flag",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the flag somewhat resembles that of the Philippines but with the main red and blue bands reversed; the banner more closely evokes the wartime Philippine flag"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"National symbol(s)": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1082,7 +1082,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Nicaragua’s telecoms market has mirrored the country’s poor economic achievements, with fixed-line teledensity and mobile penetration also being the lowest in Central America. The fixed line broadband market remains nascent, with population penetration below 4%. Most internet users are concentrated in the largest cities, given that rural and marginal areas lack access to the most basic telecom infrastructure; internet cafés provide public access to internet and email services, but these also tend to be restricted to the larger population centers; to address poor infrastructure, the World Bank has funded a project aimed at improving connectivity via a national fiber broadband network; there are separate schemes to improve broadband in eastern regions and provide links to Caribbean submarine cables; América Móvil’s Claro has a clear lead in all of Nicaragua’s telecom sectors, including fixed-line, mobile, broadband, and pay TV; the number of mobile subscribers overtook the number of fixed lines in early 2002, and the mobile sector now accounts for most lines in service; Telefónica sold its operations in Nicaragua to Millicom in 2019; Millicom’s Tigo (previously Telefónica’s Movistar) is the only company competing with Claro in the fixed-line and mobile market; in the mobile sector, Tigo holds almost a third of the market, but in the fixed-line sector it has only about 10% market share; other companies operating in the market, including the Russian state corporation Rostejnologuii, Yota Mobile and IWB Holding; in the mobile market China’s Xinwei Nicaragua (Xinwei Intelcom) launched services in early 2016, operating under the CooTel banner. (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Nicaragua’s telecoms market has mirrored the country’s poor economic achievements, with fixed-line teledensity and mobile penetration also being the lowest in Central America; the fixed line broadband market remains nascent, with population penetration below 4%; most internet users are concentrated in the largest cities, given that rural and marginal areas lack access to the most basic telecom infrastructure; internet cafés provide public access to internet and email services, but these also tend to be restricted to the larger population centers; to address poor infrastructure, the World Bank has funded a project aimed at improving connectivity via a national fiber broadband network; there are separate schemes to improve broadband in eastern regions and provide links to Caribbean submarine cables; the number of mobile subscribers overtook the number of fixed lines in early 2002, and the mobile sector now accounts for most lines in service (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "since privatization, access to fixed-line and mobile-cellular services has improved; fixed-line teledensity roughly 3 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular telephone subscribership has increased to roughly 90 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1232,8 +1232,11 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the PNP includes paramilitary special forces units for counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions; in addition to its 3 regionally-based border security brigades, SENAFRONT includes a special forces brigade, which is comprised of special forces, counternarcotics, maritime, and rapid reaction units"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2022": {
|
||||
"text": "1.2% of GDP (2022 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
"text": "1.4% of GDP (2021 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "1.3% of GDP (2021 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
|
||||
"text": "1.4% of GDP (2020 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1243,9 +1246,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2018": {
|
||||
"text": "1.1% of GDP (2018) (approximately $1.33 billion)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
|
||||
"text": "1.2% of GDP (2017) (approximately $1.32 billion)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -68,7 +68,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "32,792 (2022 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Ethnic groups": {
|
||||
"text": "Creole (Mulatto), Black, Guadeloupe Mestizo (French-East Asia), White, East Indian, other"
|
||||
"text": "Creole (Mulatto), Black, Guadeloupe Mestizo (French-East Asian), White, East Indian, other"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Languages": {
|
||||
"Languages": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -356,7 +356,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Legislative branch": {
|
||||
"description": {
|
||||
"text": "unicameral Territorial Council (23 seats; members directly elected by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed to serve 5-year terms); Saint Martin elects 1 member to the French Senate and 1member (shared with Saint Barthelemy) to the French National Assembly"
|
||||
"text": "unicameral Territorial Council (23 seats; members directly elected by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed to serve 5-year terms); Saint Martin elects 1 member to the French Senate and 1 member (shared with Saint Barthelemy) to the French National Assembly"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections": {
|
||||
"text": "Territorial Council - first round held on 20 March 2022 (next to be held in March 2027) and second round held on 27 March 2022"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -526,7 +526,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "last held on 5 August 2022 (next to be held on 2027)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "percent of vote by party - SKNLP 44.4%, PLP 16.1%, PAM 16.2%, CCM 12.7%; seats by party - SKNLP 6, CCM 3, PLP 1, CCM 1"
|
||||
"text": "percent of vote by party - SKNLP 44.4%, PLP 16.1%, PAM 16.2%, CCM 12.7%, other 10.6%; seats by party - SKNLP 6, CCM 3, PLP 1, CCM 1"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -534,7 +534,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (ECSC) is the superior court of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States; the ECSC - headquartered on St. Lucia - consists of the Court of Appeal - headed by the chief justice and 4 judges - and the High Court with 18 judges; the Court of Appeal is itinerant, traveling to member states on a schedule to hear appeals from the High Court and subordinate courts; High Court judges reside in the member states, with 2 assigned to Saint Kitts and Nevis; note - the ECSC in 2003 replaced the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (in London) as the final court of appeal on Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Kitts and Nevis is also a member of the Caribbean Court of Justice"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"judge selection and term of office": {
|
||||
"text": "chief justice of Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court appointed by Her Majesty, Queen ELIZABETH II; other justices and judges appointed by the Judicial and Legal Services Commission, an independent body of judicial officials; Court of Appeal justices appointed for life with mandatory retirement at age 65; High Court judges appointed for life with mandatory retirement at age 62"
|
||||
"text": "chief justice of Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court appointed by His Majesty, King Charles III; other justices and judges appointed by the Judicial and Legal Services Commission, an independent body of judicial officials; Court of Appeal justices appointed for life with mandatory retirement at age 65; High Court judges appointed for life with mandatory retirement at age 62"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subordinate courts": {
|
||||
"text": "magistrates' courts"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "the country’s telecom sector (specifically the mobile segment) has likewise been able to prosper; ongoing political tension, increasing repression of the media and information, and continuing problems with corporate governance may be putting a strain on further growth by reducing the country’s appeal to much-needed foreign investors; Kyrgyzstan has been reasonably successful in its attempts to liberalize its economy and open up its telecom market to competition; the privatization of state-owned entities particularly the fixed-line incumbent provider Kyrgyztelecom and the mobile operator Alfa Telecom has been less well received, with government ownership continuing despite repeated attempts to offload its stakes in those companies; they simply haven’t been able to generate enough interest from the private sector; the mobile market has achieved high levels of penetration (140% in 2021) along with a fairly competitive operating environment with four major players; mobile broadband has come along strongly, reaching over 125% penetration in 2019 before falling back slightly during the Covid-19 crisis; slow-to-moderate growth is expected for both segments in coming years, supported by the anticipated rollout of 5G services starting from late 2022. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "the country’s telecom sector (specifically the mobile segment) has likewise been able to prosper; ongoing political tension, increasing repression of the media and information, and continuing problems with corporate governance may be putting a strain on further growth by reducing the country’s appeal to much-needed foreign investors; Kyrgyzstan has been reasonably successful in its attempts to liberalize its economy and open up its telecom market to competition; the mobile market has achieved high levels of penetration (140% in 2021) along with a fairly competitive operating environment with four major players; mobile broadband has come along strongly, reaching over 125% penetration in 2019 before falling back slightly during the Covid-19 crisis; slow-to-moderate growth is expected for both segments in coming years, supported by the anticipated rollout of 5G services starting from late 2022 (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line penetration at nearly 5 per 100 persons remains low and concentrated in urban areas; mobile-cellular subscribership up to over 134 per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Kazakhstan has one of the most developed telecommunications sectors in the Central Asian region; this is especially true of the mobile segment, where widespread network coverage has enabled very high penetration rates reaching 180% as far back as 2012; the mobile and fixed-line segments have both pared back their subscriber numbers to more modest levels; the telcos have still been successful in terms of improving their margins and revenues by growing value-added services along with exploiting the capabilities of their higher speed networks (4G LTE as well as fiber) to drive significant increases in data usage; Kazakhstan has enjoyed a high fixed-line teledensity thanks to concerted efforts to invest in the fixed-line infrastructure as well as next-generation networks; demand for traditional voice services is on the wane as customers take a preference for the flexibility and ubiquity of the mobile platform for voice as well as data services; mobile clearly dominates the telecom sector in Kazakhstan, yet 2020 saw a sharp drop in subscriber numbers for both mobile voice and mobile broadband services as the Covid-19 crisis took hold; with the exception of fixed-line voice services, Kazakhstan’s telecom market is expected to return to moderate growth from 2022 onwards; the extensive deployment of LTE networks across the country (along with the prospect of 5G services being added to the mix in 2023) points towards an even greater uptake of lucrative mobile broadband services, in particular. (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Kazakhstan has one of the most developed telecommunications sectors in the Central Asian region; this is especially true of the mobile segment, where widespread network coverage has enabled very high penetration rates reaching 180% as far back as 2012; the mobile and fixed-line segments have both pared back their subscriber numbers to more modest levels; the telcos have still been successful in terms of improving their margins and revenues by growing value-added services along with exploiting the capabilities of their higher speed networks (4G LTE as well as fiber) to drive significant increases in data usage; Kazakhstan has enjoyed a high fixed-line teledensity thanks to concerted efforts to invest in the fixed-line infrastructure as well as next-generation networks; demand for traditional voice services is on the wane as customers take a preference for the flexibility and ubiquity of the mobile platform for voice as well as data services; mobile clearly dominates the telecom sector in Kazakhstan, yet 2020 saw a sharp drop in subscriber numbers for both mobile voice and mobile broadband services as the Covid-19 crisis took hold; with the exception of fixed-line voice services, Kazakhstan’s telecom market is expected to return to moderate growth from 2022 onward; the extensive deployment of LTE networks across the country (along with the prospect of 5G services being added to the mix in 2023) points towards an even greater uptake of lucrative mobile broadband services, in particular (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "intercity by landline and microwave radio relay; number of fixed-line connections is approximately 17 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscriber base 134 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1327,15 +1327,15 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "information varies; prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, approximately 850,000 active duty troops (300,000 Ground Troops; 40,000 Airborne Troops; 150,000 Navy; 160,000 Aerospace Forces; 70,000 Strategic Rocket Forces; approximately 20,000 special operations forces; approximately 100,000 other uniformed personnel (command and control, cyber, support, logistics, security, etc.); estimated 200-250,000 Federal National Guard Troops (Feb 2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>in September 2022, President Vladimir PUTIN called up 300,000 reservists to active military duty to support the war in Ukraine, and in August 2022 ordered the military to increase the total number of armed forces personnel by 137,000"
|
||||
"text": "prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, approximately 850,000 active-duty troops (300,000 Ground Troops; 40,000 Airborne Troops; 150,000 Navy; 160,000 Aerospace Forces; 70,000 Strategic Rocket Forces; approximately 20,000 special operations forces; approximately 100,000 other uniformed personnel (command and control, cyber, support, logistics, security, etc.); estimated 200-250,000 Federal National Guard Troops (Feb 2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>in September 2022, the Russian Government called up 300,000 reservists to active military duty to support the war in Ukraine, and in August 2022 ordered the military to increase the total number of armed forces personnel by 137,000"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the Russian Federation's military and paramilitary services are equipped with domestically-produced weapons systems, although since 2010 Russia has imported limited amounts of military hardware from several countries, including Czechia, France, Iran, Israel, Italy, Turkey, and Ukraine; the Russian defense industry is capable of designing, developing, and producing a full range of advanced air, land, missile, and naval systems; Russia is the world's second largest exporter of military hardware (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "18-27 years of age for compulsory service for men; 18-40 for voluntary/contractual service; women and non-Russian citizens (18-30) may volunteer; men are registered for the draft at 17 years of age; 12- month service obligation (Russia offers the option of serving on a 24-month contract instead of completing a 12-month conscription period); reserve obligation for non-officers to age 50; enrollment in military schools from the age of 16 (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> in May 2022, Russia's parliament approved a law removing the upper age limit for contractual service in the military<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>the Russian military takes on about 260,000 conscripts each year in two semi-annual drafts (Spring and Fall); as of 2021, conscripts comprised an estimated 30% of the Russian military's active duty personnel and most reserve personnel were former conscripts; in April of 2019, the Russian Government pledged its intent to end conscription as part of a decade-long effort to shift from a large, conscript-based military to a smaller, more professional force; an existing law allows for a 21-month alternative civil service for conscripts in hospitals, nursing homes and other facilities for those who view military duty as incompatible with their beliefs, but military conscription offices reportedly often broadly ignore requests for such service<br><br><strong>note 3:</strong> as of 2020, women made up about 5% of the active duty military"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> in May 2022, Russia's parliament approved a law removing the upper age limit for contractual service in the military<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>the Russian military takes on about 260,000 conscripts each year in two semi-annual drafts (Spring and Fall); as of 2021, conscripts comprised an estimated 30% of the Russian military's active duty personnel and most reserve personnel were former conscripts; in April of 2019, the Russian Government pledged its intent to end conscription as part of a decade-long effort to shift from a large, conscript-based military to a smaller, more professional force; an existing law allows for a 21-month alternative civil service for conscripts in hospitals, nursing homes and other facilities for those who view military duty as incompatible with their beliefs, but military conscription offices reportedly often broadly ignore requests for such service<br><br><strong>note 3:</strong> as of 2020, women made up about 5% of the active duty military<br><br><strong>note 4:</strong> since 2015, foreigners 18-30 with a good command of Russian have been allowed to join the military on 5-year contracts and become eligible for Russian citizenship after serving 3 years; in October 2022, the Interior Ministry opened up recruitment centers for foreigners to sign a 1-year service contract with the armed forces, other troops, or military formations participating in the invasion of Ukraine with the promise of simplifying the process of obtaining Russian citizenship"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "information varies; approximately 3,000 Armenia; approximately 2,000 Armenia/Azerbaijan (peacekeepers for Nagorno-Karabakh); estimated 3,000-5,000 Belarus; approximately 7,000-10,000 Georgia; approximately 500 Kyrgyzstan; approximately 1,500 Moldova (Transnistria); estimated 2,000-5,000 Syria; approximately 5,000 Tajikistan (February 2022)",
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "the nation of Tajikistan has had to struggle through a further two years of economic hardship following the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic; the strain on financial resources inevitably means a continuation of the absence of any meaningful investment or development programs for telecommunications infrastructure; the fixed line telephony and fixed broadband markets continue to languish far behind the mobile sector in terms of teledensity and penetration; with only around 6,000 fixed broadband customers (0.07% penetration), there would appear to be massive growth potential but the limited fixed line infrastructure in the country suggests there’s little likelihood of that occurring any time soon; the size of Tajikistan’s mobile market dwarfs the fixed line segment, with an estimated penetration rate of nearly 120%; with a number of private sector companies active in the mobile market, there been more commitment to investment in network upgrades and expansion; three MNOs, MegaFon, Tcell, and ZET Mobile have all launched commercial 5G services, initially in areas of the capital city Dushanbe; the move towards higher speed mobile services should further underpin the growth in the nascent mobile broadband market, which is still estimated to be at a relatively low penetration level of 42% (at least relative to most other Asian nations) but is predicted to be a strong compound annual growth rate of more than 8% for at least the next five years. (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "the nation of Tajikistan has had to struggle through a further two years of economic hardship following the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic; the strain on financial resources inevitably means a continuation of the absence of any meaningful investment or development programs for telecommunications infrastructure; the fixed line telephony and fixed broadband markets continue to languish far behind the mobile sector in terms of teledensity and penetration; with only around 6,000 fixed broadband customers (0.07% penetration), there would appear to be massive growth potential but the limited fixed line infrastructure in the country suggests there’s little likelihood of that occurring any time soon; the size of Tajikistan’s mobile market dwarfs the fixed line segment, with an estimated penetration rate of nearly 120%; with a number of private sector companies active in the mobile market, there been more commitment to investment in network upgrades and expansion; three MNOs have all launched commercial 5G services, initially in areas of the capital city Dushanbe; the move towards higher speed mobile services should further underpin the growth in the nascent mobile broadband market, which is still estimated to be at a relatively low penetration level of 42% (at least relative to most other Asian nations) but is predicted to be a strong compound annual growth rate of more than 8% for at least the next five years (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed line availability has not changed significantly since 1998, while mobile cellular subscribership, aided by competition among multiple operators, has expanded; coverage now extends to all major cities and towns; fixed-line over 5 per 100 and mobile-cellular over 111 per 100 (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1045,7 +1045,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "the nation of Turkmenistan, which rivals only North Korea for its isolationism, continues to keep its telecom sector along with the broader populace under tight control; the country inched up just one point off the bottom of the world rankings for press and internet freedom in the most recent report from Reporters Without Borders; most social networks in the country are blocked, although locals do have access to the government-developed Biz Byarde (We Are Here) platform released in 2019; all internet users, however, need to identify themselves before logging on, and strict censorship over what can be viewed is in force; the end result is that Turkmenistan has one of the lowest penetration rates for internet access in the world. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "the nation of Turkmenistan, which rivals only North Korea for its isolationism, continues to keep its telecom sector along with the broader populace under tight control; the country inched up just one point off the bottom of the world rankings for press and internet freedom in the most recent report from Reporters Without Borders; most social networks in the country are blocked, although locals do have access to the government-developed platform released in 2019; all internet users, however, need to identify themselves before logging on, and strict censorship over what can be viewed is in force; the end result is that Turkmenistan has one of the lowest penetration rates for internet access in the world (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line nearly 12 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity is about 163 per 100 persons; first telecommunication satellite was launched in 2015 (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1056,7 +1056,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Uzbekistan’s telecom markets both wireline and wireless have been playing \"catch up\" in terms of their development following the country's independence from the former Soviet Union; the government has formally adopted the principles of operating as a market economy, many elements of the old centrally planned economic model remain; this has had the effect of reducing the level of interest from foreign companies and investors in building out the necessary underlying infrastructure, which in turn has constrained the rate of growth in the country’s telecoms sector; the last five years has seen an upswing in prospects for the sector as fiber network roll outs continue beyond the main urban centers, while the mobile market experiences some consolidation for stronger, more efficient competitors; the fixed line market is dominated by the incumbent state owned provider Uztelecom, which has 98% of the market share; with teledensity at 11%, the fixed line segment remains relatively underdeveloped; Uztelecom has been diligently expanding its fiber footprint across the country, and so utilization is increasing as consumers are able to take on VoIP services as part of their fiber packages; growth is present in the fixed broadband segment thanks to that same network expansion with penetration projected to reach 24% by 2027 (a 5-year CAGR of 6.2%); despite the promising signs in the fixed markets, it is the mobile segment that continues to dominate Uzbekistan’s telecoms sector in terms of penetration, revenue, and growth; there are four major operators providing a modicum of competition; three of the four are government owned entities although private operator Beeline Uzbekistan has been able to capture up to a third of the market; the mobile market is expected to reach 100% penetration in 2023 a 50% increase in the last five years. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Uzbekistan’s telecom markets both wireline and wireless have been playing \"catch up\" in terms of their development following the country's independence from the former Soviet Union; the government has formally adopted the principles of operating as a market economy, many elements of the old centrally planned economic model remain; this has had the effect of reducing the level of interest from foreign companies and investors in building out the necessary underlying infrastructure, which in turn has constrained the rate of growth in the country’s telecoms sector; the last five years has seen an upswing in prospects for the sector as fiber network roll outs continue beyond the main urban centers, while the mobile market experiences some consolidation for stronger, more efficient competitors; growth is present in the fixed broadband segment with penetration projected to reach 24% by 2027 (a 5-year CAGR of 6.2%); despite the promising signs in the fixed markets, it is the mobile segment that continues to dominate Uzbekistan’s telecoms sector in terms of penetration, revenue, and growth; there are four major operators providing a modicum of competition; three of the four are government owned entities; the mobile market is expected to reach 100% penetration in 2023 a 50% increase in the last five years (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line nearly 11 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular teledensity nearly 100 per 100 persons; the state-owned telecommunications company, Uzbek Telecom, owner of the fixed-line telecommunications system, has used loans from the Japanese government and the China Development Bank to upgrade fixed-line services including conversion to digital exchanges; mobile-cellular services are provided by 2 private and 3 state-owned operators with a total subscriber base of 22.8 million as of January 2018 (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1121,7 +1121,8 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Royal Brunei Armed Forces: Royal Brunei Land Force, Royal Brunei Navy, Royal Brunei Air Force (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Royal Brunei Armed Forces: Land Force, Navy, Air Force, Joint Force (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>the Gurkha Reserve Unit (GRU) under the Ministry of Defense is a special guard force for the Sultan, the royal family, and the country’s oil installations"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1147,7 +1148,8 @@
|
|||
"text": "the Brunei imports nearly all of its military equipment and weapons systems and has a variety of suppliers, including the US and several European countries (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "17 years of age for voluntary military service; non-Malays are ineligible to serve (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "17 years of age for voluntary military service; non-Malays are ineligible to serve (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the Gurkha Reserve Unit (GRU) employs about 500 Gurkhas from Nepal, the majority of whom are veterans of the British Army and the Singapore Police Force who have joined the GRU as a second career"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "Brunei has a long-standing defense relationship with the United Kingdom and hosts a British Army garrison, which includes a Gurkha battalion and a jungle warfare school; Brunei also hosts a Singaporean military training base (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -959,7 +959,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Hong Kong’s telecommunications sector continues to stay near the top of world rankings for the industry; it has kept its #1 spot in the Asian region in terms of the maturity of its telecom market – a reflection of the high subscription rates across mobile, mobile broadband, and fixed broadband; fixed-line teledensity in Hong Kong is impressive at over 50%, although it too has started a gradual decline in keeping with most other telecom markets around the world, as consumers slowly transition over to the mobile platform for all of their communication needs; concerns over national security prompted the US Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Defense to prevent the branch line of the newly completed Pacific Light Cable Network (PLCN) linking Los Angeles with Taiwan from being lit; and ongoing issues with the deployment of Huawei technology inside the core infrastructure of telecom networks (something that has been done extensively in Hong Kong, including in its 5G networks) means that the territory – along with its telecom sector – may become increasingly isolated from the rest of the world; Hong Kong is likely to drop back from its position as a regional and global leader in the telecom market (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Hong Kong’s telecommunications sector continues to stay near the top of world rankings for the industry; it has kept its #1 spot in the Asian region in terms of the maturity of its telecom market – a reflection of the high penetration rates across mobile, mobile broadband, and fixed broadband; even fixed-line teledensity in Hong Kong is impressive at over 50%, although it too has started a gradual decline in keeping with most other telecom markets around the world, as consumers slowly transition over to the mobile platform for all of their communication needs (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "microwave radio relay links and extensive fiber-optic network; fixed-line is over 52 per 100 and mobile-cellular is nearly 292 subscriptions per 100 (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Japan has one of the best developed telecom markets globally, the fixed-line segment remains stagnant and the focus for growth is in the mobile sector; the MNOs have shifted their investment from LTE to 5G, and growth in 5G showed early promise although there have been recent setbacks; these have partly been attributed to the economic difficulties, the impact of restrictions imposed during the pandemic, and unfavourable investment climate (not helped by the delay of the Tokyo Olympics from 2020 to 2021), and to restrictions in the supply of 5G-enabled devices; the fixed broadband market is dominated by fiber, with a strong cable platform also evident; fiber will continue to increase its share of the fixed broadband market, largely at the expense of DSL; the mobile market is dominated by three MNOs (NTT DoCoMo, KDDI, and SoftBank Mobile), while Rakuten Mobile also has a presence; the company is building out its network, and while it is focused of providing 5G services in the major metro areas it relies on roaming agreements to offer services elsewhere; mobile broadband subscriber growth is expected to be relatively low over the next five years, partly due to the high existing subscriptions though growth has been stimulated by measures which have encouraged people to school and work from home; there has also been a boost in accessing entertainment via mobile devices since 2020; NTT DoCoMo becomes wholly owned by NTT Corp, plans to provide 55% population coverage with 5G by March 2022 and nationwide 5G coverage by 2023 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Japan has one of the best developed telecom markets globally, the fixed-line segment remains stagnant and the focus for growth is in the mobile sector; the MNOs have shifted their investment from LTE to 5G, and growth in 5G showed early promise although there have been recent setbacks; these have partly been attributed to the economic difficulties, the impact of restrictions imposed during the pandemic, and unfavourable investment climate (not helped by the delay of the Tokyo Olympics from 2020 to 2021), and to restrictions in the supply of 5G-enabled devices; the fixed broadband market is dominated by fiber, with a strong cable platform also evident; fiber will continue to increase its share of the fixed broadband market, largely at the expense of DSL; the mobile market is dominated by three MNOs, mobile broadband subscriber growth is expected to be relatively low over the next five years, partly due to the high existing subscriptions though growth has been stimulated by measures which have encouraged people to school and work from home; there has also been a boost in accessing entertainment via mobile devices since 2020; plans to provide 55% population coverage with 5G by March 2022 and nationwide 5G coverage by 2023 (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "high level of modern technology and excellent service of every kind; 49 per 100 for fixed-line and 152 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1243,8 +1243,11 @@
|
|||
"text": "Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF): Ground Self-Defense Force (Rikujou Jieitai, GSDF; includes aviation), Maritime Self-Defense Force (Kaijou Jieitai, MSDF; includes naval aviation), Air Self-Defense Force (Koukuu Jieitai, ASDF); Japan Coast Guard (Ministry of Land, Transport, Infrastructure and Tourism) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2022": {
|
||||
"text": "1% of GDP (2022 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
"text": "1% of GDP (2021 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "1% of GDP (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
|
||||
"text": "1% of GDP (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1254,9 +1257,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2018": {
|
||||
"text": "0.9% of GDP (2018) (approximately $53.5 billion)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
|
||||
"text": "0.9% of GDP (2017) (approximately $52.6 billion)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -949,7 +949,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "following years of isolationism and economic under-achievement, North Korea languishes near the bottom of the world’s telecom maturity index alongside Afghanistan and Turkmenistan (who also happen to be struggling under repressive political regimes); the obstacles to building a functioning telecom network are so numerous that a fixed-line segment barely exists; foreign investors have been permitted to partner with the North Korea Post & Telecommunications Corporation (NKPTC) to progress mobile voice, text, and broadband services, albeit on a strictly limited scale and with tight restrictions over what can be accessed; mobile communication is estimated to have eased up slightly to reach 19% in 2021, yet the high cost of ownership coupled with strict censorship makes mobile communications the exclusive domain of senior government officials and diplomats; for those citizens living close to China, it has been possible to obtain Chinese handsets and SIM cards, and to connect to towers (illegally) located just across the border; while this offers access to the outside world and at much lower prices than the state-controlled offerings, the risks are high including steep fines and the possibility of jail time; North Korea has been slightly more effective in building an IT sector and a nascent digital economy on the back of a concerted effort to grow a sizeable, well-trained IT workforce; but even here, its capabilities have been directed more towards nefarious activities such as cyber crime and hacking into Western countries’ computer systems; North Korea’s determination to put itself offside with the rest of the world in pursuit of its ideology can only lead to tighter controls on communications inside and outside of the country. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "following years of isolationism and economic under-achievement, North Korea languishes near the bottom of the world’s telecom maturity index alongside Afghanistan and Turkmenistan (who also happen to be struggling under repressive political regimes); the obstacles to building a functioning telecom network are so numerous that a fixed-line segment barely exists; mobile communication is estimated to have eased up slightly to reach 19% in 2021, yet the high cost of ownership coupled with strict censorship makes mobile communications the exclusive domain of senior government officials and diplomats; for those citizens living close to China, it has been possible to obtain Chinese handsets and SIM cards, and to connect to towers (illegally) located just across the border; while this offers access to the outside world and at much lower prices than the state-controlled offerings, the risks are high including steep fines and the possibility of jail time; North Korea has been slightly more effective in building an IT sector and a nascent digital economy on the back of a concerted effort to grow a sizeable, well-trained IT workforce; but even here, its capabilities have been directed more towards nefarious activities such as cyber crime and hacking into Western countries’ computer systems; North Korea’s determination to put itself offside with the rest of the world in pursuit of its ideology can only lead to tighter controls on communications inside and outside of the country (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fiber-optic links installed down to the county level; telephone directories unavailable; mobile service launched in late 2008 for the Pyongyang area and considerable progress in expanding to other parts of the country since; fixed-lines are approximately 5 per 100 and mobile-cellular 15 per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "South Korea is second only to Hong Kong in the world rankings of telecom market maturity; it is also on the leading edge of the latest telecom technology developments, including around 6G; and it is host to two of the world’s top equipment manufacturers in the form of Samsung and LG; with its highly urbanized, tech-savvy population, South Korea also enjoys very high communication levels across all segments – fixed-line telephony (44% at the start of 2022), fixed broadband (46%), mobile voice and data (144%), and mobile broadband (120%); the performance of the mobile sector is on a par with other developed markets around the region, but it’s the wire line segment that allows South Korea to stand out from the crowd; this is partly a reflection of the large proportion of its population who live in apartment buildings (around 60%), making fiber and apartment LAN connections relatively easy and cost-effective to deploy; the government’s Ultra Broadband convergence Network (UBcN) had aimed to reach 50% adoption by the end of 2022, but that target may be a few more years away; <br>fixed-line teledensity is also at a very high level compared to most of the rest of the world, but it has been on a sharp decline from a rate of 60% ten years ago; that fall has forced the incumbent telco KT Corp to diversify into other telecom segments (including investments in 5G and the development of 6G) as well as non-telecom sectors (such as autonomous vehicles) in an effort to transform itself into a digital platform company; on the mobile front, users have enthusiastically migrated from one generation of mobile platform to the next as each iteration becomes available; there also doesn’t appear to be any great concern about there being a lack of demand for 5G in South Korea (when the country is already well supported by 4G networks), with 30% of all subscribers having already made the switch; part of the reason behind the rapid transition may be the subsidized handsets on offer from each of the MNOs and the MVNOs – a practice that has become so widespread and cutthroat that the regulators have regularly stepped in and fined the companies billions for breaching the subsidy level and risking a price war that will ultimately damage the entire industry. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "South Korea is second only to Hong Kong in the world rankings of telecom market maturity; it is also on the leading edge of the latest telecom technology developments, including around 6G; with its highly urbanized, tech-savvy population, South Korea also enjoys very high communication levels across all segments – fixed-line telephony (44% at the start of 2022), fixed broadband (46%), mobile voice and data (144%), and mobile broadband (120%); the performance of the mobile sector is on a par with other developed markets around the region, but it’s the wire line segment that allows South Korea to stand out from the crowd; this is partly a reflection of the large proportion of its population who live in apartment buildings (around 60%), making fiber and apartment LAN connections relatively easy and cost-effective to deploy; the government’s Ultra Broadband convergence Network (UBcN) had aimed to reach 50% adoption by the end of 2022, but that target may be a few more years away; fixed-line teledensity is also at a very high level compared to most of the rest of the world, but it has been on a sharp decline from a rate of 60% ten years ago; on the mobile front, users have enthusiastically migrated from one generation of mobile platform to the next as each iteration becomes available; there also doesn’t appear to be any great concern about there being a lack of demand for 5G in South Korea (when the country is already well supported by 4G networks), with 30% of all subscribers having already made the switch; part of the reason behind the rapid transition may be the subsidized handsets on offer from each of the MNOs and the MVNOs (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line approximately 47 per 100 and mobile-cellular services 138 per 100 persons; rapid assimilation of a full range of telecommunications technologies leading to a boom in e-commerce (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1227,8 +1227,11 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>in January 2022, the South Korean military announced the formation of a space branch under its Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate the development of space and space-enabled capabilities across the Army, Navy and Air Force"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2022": {
|
||||
"text": "2.6% of GDP (2022 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
"text": "2.6% of GDP (2021 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "2.6% of GDP (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
|
||||
"text": "2.6% of GDP (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1238,9 +1241,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2018": {
|
||||
"text": "2.5% of GDP (2018) (approximately $55.8 billion)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
|
||||
"text": "2.5% of GDP (2017) (approximately $52.5 billion)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1096,7 +1096,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Laos joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2013; one of the conditions of admittance was to establish an independent regulator for its telecom sector within two years; the government had committed to do so by February 2015 as part of the accession agreement; there still has been no sign of any firm plans being made to create an independent regulatory body; the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) retains the primary role in regulating the country’s telecom market; with the government also having a financial stake (in part or in whole) in every one of the major fixed-line and mobile operators, the MPT’s position and decision-making is far from what could be considered independent; sufficient returns on investment cannot be guaranteed with such strict pricing controls as well as the potential for political interference; fixed-line and mobile penetration levels have, as a result, remained much lower than what’s seen in neighboring South East Asian markets; there are signs of growth in the mobile broadband segment as LTE network coverage slowly widens and, more recently, the country’s first 5G services start to come on stream; residents in the capital will at least be able to enjoy high-speed services in the near future, while the rest of the country waits patiently to catch up with the rest of the world. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Laos joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2013; one of the conditions of admittance was to establish an independent regulator for its telecom sector within two years; the government had committed to do so by February 2015 as part of the accession agreement; there still has been no sign of any firm plans being made to create an independent regulatory body; the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) retains the primary role in regulating the country’s telecom market; with the government also having a financial stake (in part or in whole) in every one of the major fixed-line and mobile operators, the MPT’s position and decision-making is far from what could be considered independent; sufficient returns on investment cannot be guaranteed with such strict pricing controls as well as the potential for political interference; fixed-line and mobile penetration levels have, as a result, remained much lower than what’s seen in neighboring South East Asian markets; there are signs of growth in the mobile broadband segment as LTE network coverage slowly widens and, more recently, the country’s first 5G services start to come on stream; residents in the capital will at least be able to enjoy high-speed services in the near future, while the rest of the country waits patiently to catch up with the rest of the world. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line nearly 21 per 100 and 61 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -886,7 +886,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Macau’s economy and GDP have been on a roller coaster ride since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020; the Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China is heavily dependent on tourists coming from the mainland and Hong Kong to play in Macau’s many casinos, but the ensuing lock downs contributed to a dramatic fall in visitor numbers as well as income; this too, has had a major effect on the telecom sector (particularly in the mobile segment) with short-stay visitors as well as foreign workers on temporary-stay visas being forced to stay away.; total mobile subscription numbers are estimated to have dropped from a high of 2.8 million in 2019 (representing a whopping 442% penetration rate in a region with a population of just 700,000) to less than half that by the end of 2021: 1.3 million subscribers; Macau had almost the highest mobile penetration rate in the world; it is now sitting at a more ‘reasonable’ level of 200%; a significant bounce back can be expected to follow the easing of travel restrictions, although perhaps not up to the same lofty heights achieved in 2019; asecond factor behind the steep fall in 2020 was the introduction of a Cyber Security Law that required all prepaid SIM cards to become registered or face being deactivated in October 2020; the combined effect of the pandemic and the new restrictions meant that prepaid subscriber numbers fell by more than 80%; postpaid accounts, largely the domain of Macau’s permanent residents, were barely affected by the external upheaval; they continued to increase in number, year-on-year, and provided better returns to the operators thanks to substantially increased data usage during the lock downs; the mobile broadband market has experienced the same dramatic fluctuations as the broader mobile segment over the last two years, at least in terms of subscriber numbers; but this is largely because mobile broadband uptake is inextricably tied to the base mobile offering in Macau; with total mobile broadband data traffic going up, not down, between 2019 and 2021, that again points to the strength of the contract segment helping to drive future growth in Macau’s telecom sector. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Macau’s economy and GDP have been on a roller coaster ride since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020; the Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China is heavily dependent on tourists coming from the mainland and Hong Kong to play in Macau’s many casinos, but the ensuing lock downs contributed to a dramatic fall in visitor numbers as well as income; this too, has had a major effect on the telecom sector (particularly in the mobile segment) with short-stay visitors as well as foreign workers on temporary-stay visas being forced to stay away.; total mobile subscription numbers are estimated to have dropped from a high of 2.8 million in 2019 (representing a whopping 442% penetration rate in a region with a population of just 700,000) to less than half that by the end of 2021: 1.3 million subscribers; Macau had almost the highest mobile penetration rate in the world; it is now sitting at a more ‘reasonable’ level of 200%; a significant bounce back can be expected to follow the easing of travel restrictions, although perhaps not up to the same lofty heights achieved in 2019; asecond factor behind the steep fall in 2020 was the introduction of a Cyber Security Law that required all prepaid SIM cards to become registered or face being deactivated in October 2020; the combined effect of the pandemic and the new restrictions meant that prepaid subscriber numbers fell by more than 80%; postpaid accounts, largely the domain of Macau’s permanent residents, were barely affected by the external upheaval; they continued to increase in number, year-on-year, and provided better returns to the operators thanks to substantially increased data usage during the lock downs; the mobile broadband market has experienced the same dramatic fluctuations as the broader mobile segment over the last two years, at least in terms of subscriber numbers; but this is largely because mobile broadband uptake is inextricably tied to the base mobile offering in Macau; with total mobile broadband data traffic going up, not down, between 2019 and 2021, that again points to the strength of the contract segment helping to drive future growth in Macau’s telecom sector (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line nearly 20 per 100 and mobile-cellular roughly 329 per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1099,7 +1099,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "liberalized and competitive telecoms market comprises of a number of operators which have steadily eroded the dominance of the incumbent telco, Mongolia Telecom, over the years; fixed-line penetration increased steadily in the years to 2018 as more people took on fixed-line access for voice calls and to access copper-based broadband services; the number of lines fell in 2019, and again and more sharply in 2020, partly through the economic consequences of the pandemic (GDP fell 5.3% in 2020, year-on-year) and partly due to the migration to the mobile platform and to VoIP; fixed broadband penetration remains low, mainly due to a limited number of fixed lines and the dominance of the mobile platform; the attraction of fixed broadband as a preferred access where it is available is waning as the mobile networks are upgraded with greater capacity and capabilities; the growing popularity of mobile broadband continues to underpin overall broadband and telecom sector growth, with Mongolia’s market very much being dominated by mobile services, supported by widely available LTE; this will largely determine and shape the future direction of Mongolia’s developing digital economy. (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "liberalized and competitive telecoms market comprises of a number of operators; fixed-line penetration increased steadily in the years to 2018 as more people took on fixed-line access for voice calls and to access copper-based broadband services; the number of lines fell in 2019, and again and more sharply in 2020, partly through the economic consequences of the pandemic (GDP fell 5.3% in 2020, year-on-year) and partly due to the migration to the mobile platform and to VoIP; fixed broadband penetration remains low, mainly due to a limited number of fixed lines and the dominance of the mobile platform; the attraction of fixed broadband as a preferred access where it is available is waning as the mobile networks are upgraded with greater capacity and capabilities; the growing popularity of mobile broadband continues to underpin overall broadband and telecom sector growth, with Mongolia’s market very much being dominated by mobile services, supported by widely available LTE; this will largely determine and shape the future direction of Mongolia’s developing digital economy (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "very low fixed-line teledensity of less than 5 per 100; there are four mobile-cellular providers and subscribership is roughly 133 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "As part of a diverse range of initiatives designed to move the country from developing to developed status by 2025, Malaysia has enabled and encouraged open competition in its telecommunications market; the result is very high penetration levels in both the mobile (147%) and mobile broadband (127%) segments, and near-universal coverage of 4G LTE networks; the incumbent landline operator Telekom Malaysia retains an almost monopolistic hold on the fixed-line market as well as a significant lead in fixed broadband; steady growth is occurring as more fiber optic cable networks are being deployed around the country on top of Telekom Malaysia’s national backbone; consumers are the main beneficiaries of the highly competitive market; they enjoy widespread access to high-speed mobile services as well as attractive offers on bundles to keep data use up but prices low; the downside is that most of Malaysia’s MNOs and MVNOs have struggled to increase revenue in line with growth in subscriber numbers as well as demand for broadband data; while the operators have been very successful in moving a significant proportion (now over 30%) of customers from prepaid over to higher-value postpaid accounts, ARPU continues to fall year after year as a result of competitive pricing pressures; the mobile market, in particular, has become overcrowded and the government is keen to see further rationalization and consolidation with the operators; two of the country’s four MNOs – Digi and Celcom – announced plans in November 2021 to merge their Malaysian operations; while customers will no doubt continue to enjoy high quality services at competitive rates, the new entity (to be called Celcom Digi) will be hopeful of squeezing better margins through improved economies of scale; the government’s next move is to encourage the private mobile operators to sign up to the country’s wholesale 5G network being built by Ericsson for the government-owned and operated Digital Nasional Berhad (DNB); this special-purpose vehicle company was established by the Ministry of Finance to undertake the development and deployment of Malaysia’s 5G infrastructure across the country; the government’s stated intent was to avoid duplication of networks and infrastructure, and thus reduce investment costs for the operators; but with DNB being Malaysia’s single wholesale 5G network provider, the MNOs have been reluctant to commit due to having limited opportunity to differentiate their 5G services and being somewhat at the mercy of the wholesaler’s pricing; to date, no MNO has agreed to the deal and are instead demanding the development of a dual wholesale network model (one that no doubt offers more flexible terms, at least in the eyes of the MNOs); Malaysia’s 5G rollout has, in effect, come to a standstill while the government tries to find a way to restart negotiations. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "as part of a diverse range of initiatives designed to move the country from developing to developed status by 2025, Malaysia has enabled and encouraged open competition in its telecommunications market; the result is very high penetration levels in both the mobile (147%) and mobile broadband (127%) segments, and near-universal coverage of 4G LTE networks; steady growth is occurring as more fiber optic cable networks are being deployed around the country; consumers are the main beneficiaries of the highly competitive market; they enjoy widespread access to high-speed mobile services as well as attractive offers on bundles to keep data use up but prices low; the downside is that most of Malaysia’s MNOs and MVNOs have struggled to increase revenue in line with growth in subscriber numbers as well as demand for broadband data; while the operators have been very successful in moving a significant proportion (now over 30%) of customers from prepaid over to higher-value postpaid accounts, ARPU continues to fall year after year as a result of competitive pricing pressures; the mobile market, in particular, has become overcrowded and the government is keen to see further rationalization and consolidation with the operators; while customers will no doubt continue to enjoy high quality services at competitive rates, the new entity will be hopeful of squeezing better margins through improved economies of scale; the government’s next move is to encourage the private mobile operators to sign up to the country’s wholesale 5G network; this will develop and deploy the 5G infrastructure across the country; the government’s stated intent was to avoid duplication of networks and infrastructure, and thus reduce investment costs for the operators; to date, no MNO has agreed to the deal and are instead demanding the development of a dual wholesale network model (one that no doubt offers more flexible terms, at least in the eyes of the MNOs); Malaysia’s 5G rollout has, in effect, come to a standstill while the government tries to find a way to restart negotiations (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line roughly 23 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity roughly 135 per 100 persons; domestic satellite system with 2 earth stations (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1248,8 +1248,11 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note 1: </strong>the PRMD includes the General Operations Force, a paramilitary force with a variety of roles, including patrolling borders, counter-terrorism, maritime security, and counterinsurgency<br><strong><br>note 2:</strong> Malaysia created a National Special Operations Force in 2016 for combating terrorism threats; the force is comprised of personnel from the Armed Forces, the Royal Malaysian Police, and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency "
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2022": {
|
||||
"text": "1% of GDP (2022 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
"text": "1% of GDP (2021 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "1% of GDP (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
|
||||
"text": "1.1% of GDP (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1259,9 +1262,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2018": {
|
||||
"text": "1% of GDP (2018) (approximately $7.63 billion)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
|
||||
"text": "1.1% of GDP (2017) (approximately $7.75 billion)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1183,8 +1183,8 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Singapore Armed Forces (SAF; aka Singapore Defense Force): Singapore Army, Republic of Singapore Navy, Republic of Singapore Air Force (includes air defense); Ministry of Home Affairs: Singapore Police Force (includes Police Coast Guard and the paramilitary Gurkha Contingent Singapore Police Force or GCSPF) (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> in 2022, the SAF announced that it would form a Digital and Intelligence Service (DIS) by the end of the year<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> in 2009, Singapore established a multi-agency national Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF) to work with law enforcement and maritime agencies to guard Singapore’s waters, including conducting daily patrols, as well as boarding and escort operations in the Singapore Strait; the MSTF is subordinate to the Singapore Navy"
|
||||
"text": "Singapore Armed Forces (SAF; aka Singapore Defense Force): Singapore Army, Republic of Singapore Navy, Republic of Singapore Air Force (includes air defense); Ministry of Home Affairs: Singapore Police Force (includes Police Coast Guard and the Gurkha Contingent) (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the Gurkha Contingent of the Singapore Police Force (GCSPF) is a paramilitary unit for riot control and acts as a rapid reaction force <strong><br><br>note 2:</strong> in 2022, the SAF announced that it would form a Digital and Intelligence Service (DIS) by the end of the year<br><br><strong>note 3:</strong> in 2009, Singapore established a multi-agency national Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF) to work with law enforcement and maritime agencies to guard Singapore’s waters, including conducting daily patrols, as well as boarding and escort operations in the Singapore Strait; the MSTF is subordinate to the Singapore Navy"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1210,8 +1210,8 @@
|
|||
"text": "the SAF has a diverse and largely modern mix of domestically-produced and imported weapons; since 2010, the US has been the chief supplier of arms; other significant suppliers include France, Germany, Israel, and Sweden; Singapore has the most developed arms industry in Southeast Asia and is also its largest importer of weapons (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "18-21 years of age for male compulsory military service; 16.5 years of age for voluntary enlistment (with parental consent); 24-month conscript service obligation, with a reserve obligation to age 40 (enlisted) or age 50 (officers); women are not conscripted, but they are allowed to volunteer for all services and branches, including combat arms (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1: </strong>under the Enlistment Act, all male Singaporean citizens and permanent residents, unless exempted, are required to enter National Service (NS) upon attaining the age of 18; most NS conscripts serve in the Armed Forces, but some go into the Police Force or Civil Defense Force; as of 2020, conscripts comprised over half of the defense establishment<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> as of 2017, women made up about 7% of the active force"
|
||||
"text": "18-21 years of age for compulsory military service for men; 16.5 years of age for voluntary enlistment (with parental consent); 24-month conscript service obligation, with a reserve obligation to age 40 (enlisted) or age 50 (officers); women are not conscripted, but they are allowed to volunteer for all services and branches, including combat arms (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1: </strong>under the Enlistment Act, all male Singaporean citizens and permanent residents, unless exempted, are required to enter National Service (NS) upon attaining the age of 18; most NS conscripts serve in the Armed Forces, but some go into the Police Force or Civil Defense Force; as of 2020, conscripts comprised over half of the defense establishment<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> as of 2017, women made up about 7% of the active force<br><br><strong>note 3:</strong> members of the Gurkha Contingent (GC) of the Singapore Police Force are mostly recruited from a small number of hill tribes in Nepal; the GC was formed in 1949 originally from selected ex-British Army Gurkhas"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "maintains permanent training detachments of military personnel in Australia, France, and the US (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Thailand’s telecom sector is relatively mature and hosts a mix of public and private sector players; the mobile market is highly developed and has experienced strong growth over the last seven years; the market returned to growth in 2021 after it contracted in 2020 driven by the Covid-19 pandemic, and a steep decline in inbound tourism; it remains highly saturated, owing to overall maturity and the popularity of multiple SIM card use, which has resulted in a particularly high penetration rate; in general, the sector retains considerable potential given the impetus of 5G, the recent spectrum auctions, and continued network deployments by the country’s network operators; further auctions of spectrum in the 700MHz band (being repurposed from digital TV broadcasting), and in the 3.6GHz range will further improve network capacity; the announcement of the planned merger of True and DTAC, the country’s second and third largest mobile network operators, holds the potential to significantly alter the mobile market’s dynamics; if approved, the new entity would displace the current market leader AIS; additionally, this could risk establishing an unofficial duopoly in the market (despite the presence of the far smaller National Telecom and other players such as MVNOs) posing a risk to consumer choice and benefits; in the wire line segment, the decline in fixed-line penetration is expected to continue as subscribers migrate to mobile networks for voice and data services; the emphasis among operators has been to bolster their fiber footprints in key high-value areas; the transition to fiber from DSL and cable has also been facilitated by changes to the regulatory structure that have removed some barriers to investment; this is supporting the cannibalization of older copper-based DSL lines by fiber; the returns from this investment remain a long-term prospect as consumers still favor entry-level packages; there is also strong interest from the government, as well as private vendors, in establishing Thailand as a data center hub to serve the region; recent developments include Amazon tapping Thailand for a data center build to support its hyperscale infrastructure in the Asia Pacific region, as well as Telehouse’s facility set for launch in 2023; the size, capacity and spread of existing data centers in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) outside of Thailand is small; Thailand retains some advantages to attract investment, including improved fiber connectivity and international bandwidth; increasing submarine capacity, such as the SJC2 cable to come online later in 2022, will considerably improve Thailand’s potential as a regional hub. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Thailand’s telecom sector is relatively mature and hosts a mix of public and private sector players; the mobile market is highly developed and has experienced strong growth over the last seven years; the market returned to growth in 2021 after it contracted in 2020 driven by the Covid-19 pandemic, and a steep decline in inbound tourism; it remains highly saturated, owing to overall maturity and the popularity of multiple SIM card use, which has resulted in a particularly high penetration rate; in general, the sector retains considerable potential given the impetus of 5G, the recent spectrum auctions, and continued network deployments by the country’s network operators; further auctions of spectrum in the 700MHz band (being repurposed from digital TV broadcasting), and in the 3.6GHz range will further improve network capacity; in the wire line segment, the decline in fixed-line penetration is expected to continue as subscribers migrate to mobile networks for voice and data services; the emphasis among operators has been to bolster their fiber footprints in key high-value areas; the transition to fiber from DSL and cable has also been facilitated by changes to the regulatory structure that have removed some barriers to investment; this is supporting the cannibalization of older copper-based DSL lines by fiber; the returns from this investment remain a long-term prospect as consumers still favor entry-level packages; there is also strong interest from the government, as well as private vendors, in establishing Thailand as a data center hub to serve the region; the size, capacity and spread of existing data centers in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) outside of Thailand is small; Thailand retains some advantages to attract investment, including improved fiber connectivity and international bandwidth; increasing submarine capacity, such as the SJC2 cable to come online later in 2022, will considerably improve Thailand’s potential as a regional hub (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line system provided by both a government-owned and commercial provider; wireless service expanding; fixed-line over 7 per 100 and mobile-cellular nearly 167 per 100 (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1050,7 +1050,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Timor-Leste has been moving forward with the regeneration of its economy and rebuilding key infrastructure, including telecommunications networks, that were destroyed during the years of civil unrest; fixed-line and fixed broadband penetration in Timor-Leste remains extremely low, mainly due to the limited fixed-line infrastructure and the proliferation of mobile connectivity; in an effort to boost e-government services, in 2018 the government contracted Timor Telecom to build a national terrestrial fiber network; the project, completed in 2019, has helped boost fixed broadband subscriber growth and will continue to do so over the next few years; the number of subscribers through to 2026 is expected to develop steadily, though from a low base; by August 2020, Timor-Leste had three telecom service providers who jointly achieved a 98% network coverage nationally; all three major mobile operators - Timor Telecom, Telkomcel and Telemor - launched LTE services during 2019; Timor-Leste has seen a rapid increase in mobile broadband penetration over the last few years, driven by a rising proportion of mobile subscribers having smartphones; the mobile broadband market is still at an early stage of development, strong growth is predicted over the next five years; at the end of 2020, the government issued new policy guidelines to maximize the use of spectrum in Timor-Leste; it invited mobile operators to submit applications for the allocation of spectrum in the 1800MHz, 2300MHz and 2600MHz bands; in November 2020, the government approved the deployment of a submarine fiber link connecting the south of the country to Australia via the North Western Cable System (NWCS). (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Timor-Leste has been moving forward with the regeneration of its economy and rebuilding key infrastructure, including telecommunications networks, that were destroyed during the years of civil unrest; fixed-line and fixed broadband penetration in Timor-Leste remains extremely low, mainly due to the limited fixed-line infrastructure and the proliferation of mobile connectivity; in an effort to boost e-government services; the number of subscribers through to 2026 is expected to develop steadily, though from a low base; by August 2020, Timor-Leste had three telecom service providers who jointly achieved a 98% network coverage nationally; the mobile broadband market is still at an early stage of development, strong growth is predicted over the next five years; at the end of 2020, the government issued new policy guidelines to maximize the use of spectrum in Timor-Leste; it invited mobile operators to submit applications for the allocation of spectrum in the 1800MHz, 2300MHz and 2600MHz bands; in November 2020, the government approved the deployment of a submarine fiber link connecting the south of the country to Australia via the North Western Cable System (NWCS) (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "system suffered significant damage during the violence associated with independence; limited fixed-line services, less than 1 per 100 and mobile-cellular services are now available in urban and most rural areas with teledensity of over 104 per 100 (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -914,7 +914,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Taiwan has a highly developed telecoms sector in both the fixed-line and mobile segments; in part this is due to the country’s early moves to liberalize the market, allowing vigorous competition to flourish; the government has also made concerted efforts to take advantage of Taiwan’s strengths in the development of high-tech, export-oriented industries to encourage and enable the rapid adoption of advanced telecom platforms, while simultaneously leveraging the same telecoms infrastructure to push even further ahead with the country's industrial development plans; Taiwan has one of the highest teledensities in the region; while fixed-line subscriber numbers are trending downwards, the rate of decline has been slowed by the major fixed-line provider (Chunghwa Telecom) investing strongly in building out a widespread fiber network to allow customers to maintain a terrestrial voice connection as part of a fixed broadband package; fiber is the dominant platform in Taiwan’s fixed broadband market; cable services have retained an unusually strong following thanks to the success of cable providers in delivering competitive cable TV and telephony services as a way to get around Chunghwa Telecom’s control of the last mile for its copper and fiber networks; Taiwan also has high penetration rates in its mobile and mobile broadband segments, growth in both markets is almost at a standstill because the country reached 100% penetration very early on – way back when GSM was first introduced, in mobile’s case; the MNOs moved quickly to roll out 4G and 5G networks and services in rapid succession, but subscriber numbers (and market share) has barely changed; the improved quality and performance available with the new platforms will drive increased usage and ARPU; fierce competition following the launch of 4G saw the opposite happen, with price wars causing telco revenues to fall instead; it is possible that the same problem can be avoided with 5G, since the three smaller operators have recently been absorbed into the major providers Chunghwa Telecom, Taiwan Mobile, and Far EasTone; allowing Taiwan to reach the target of 50% of subscribers on 5G by mid-2023. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Taiwan has a highly developed telecoms sector in both the fixed-line and mobile segments; in part this is due to the country’s early moves to liberalize the market, allowing vigorous competition to flourish; the government has also made concerted efforts to take advantage of Taiwan’s strengths in the development of high-tech, export-oriented industries to encourage and enable the rapid adoption of advanced telecom platforms, while simultaneously leveraging the same telecoms infrastructure to push even further ahead with the country's industrial development plans; Taiwan has one of the highest teledensities in the region; while fixed-line subscriber numbers are trending downwards, the rate of decline has been slowed by the major fixed-line provider investing strongly in building out a widespread fiber network to allow customers to maintain a terrestrial voice connection as part of a fixed broadband package; fiber is the dominant platform in Taiwan’s fixed broadband market; cable services have retained an unusually strong following thanks to the success of cable providers in delivering competitive cable TV and telephony services as a way to get around Chunghwa Telecom’s control of the last mile for its copper and fiber networks; Taiwan also has high penetration rates in its mobile and mobile broadband segments, growth in both markets is almost at a standstill because the country reached 100% penetration very early on – way back when GSM was first introduced, in mobile’s case; the MNOs moved quickly to roll out 4G and 5G networks and services in rapid succession, but subscriber numbers (and market share) has barely changed; the improved quality and performance available with the new platforms will drive increased usage and ARPU; fierce competition following the launch of 4G saw the opposite happen, with price wars causing telco revenues to fall instead; it is possible that the same problem can be avoided with 5G allowing Taiwan to reach the target of 50% of subscribers on 5G by mid-2023 (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line over 53 per 100 and mobile-cellular roughly 123 per 100 (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1107,7 +1107,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "even with Covid-19 pandemic-related mobility restrictions in place, Vietnam’s economy has continued to outperform the rest of the region in 2020 and 2021; the telecom sector essentially spent most of this period in a holding pattern, focusing on maintaining service throughout the crisis while preparing for some major changes to come in the mobile market in 2022; both fixed-line telephony and mobile have experienced small drops in subscriber numbers since the start of the pandemic, but the similarities between the two markets end there; fixed-line teledensity continued its downwards trajectory towards virtual oblivion, with just 3% penetration (around 3 million subscribers) at the start of 2021; the mobile market has lost about the same number of subscribers since the end of 2019, but has been sitting on much higher penetration levels around 130% for many years; growth is expected to kick in again in 2022 following the anticipated launch of commercial 5G mobile services along with a range of government-led schemes to move consumers completely off 2G and 3G; one example is the planned redistribution of GSM/3G bandwidth to LTE; in addition to propelling Vietnam into having one of the most advanced mobile markets in the world, this should also spur on the mobile broadband segment; with a penetration level of just over 70%, mobile broadband has considerable room to grow; increasing economic prosperity coupled with the latest smartphone technology and networks should see mobile broadband underwriting the country’s telecommunications sector for at least the next few years; this report includes the regulator's market data to July 2021, telcos' financial and operating data updates to June 2021, Telecom Maturity Index charts and analyses, assessment of the global impact of Covid-19 on the telecoms sector, and other recent market developments. (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "even with Covid-19 pandemic-related mobility restrictions in place, Vietnam’s economy has continued to outperform the rest of the region in 2020 and 2021; the telecom sector essentially spent most of this period in a holding pattern, focusing on maintaining service throughout the crisis while preparing for some major changes to come in the mobile market in 2022; both fixed-line telephony and mobile have experienced small drops in subscriber numbers since the start of the pandemic, but the similarities between the two markets end there; fixed-line teledensity continued its downwards trajectory towards virtual oblivion, with just 3% penetration (around 3 million subscribers) at the start of 2021; the mobile market has lost about the same number of subscribers since the end of 2019, but has been sitting on much higher penetration levels around 130% for many years; growth is expected to kick in again in 2022 following the anticipated launch of commercial 5G mobile services along with a range of government-led schemes to move consumers completely off 2G and 3G; one example is the planned redistribution of GSM/3G bandwidth to LTE; in addition to propelling Vietnam into having one of the most advanced mobile markets in the world, this should also spur on the mobile broadband segment; with a penetration level of just over 70%, mobile broadband has considerable room to grow; increasing economic prosperity coupled with the latest smartphone technology and networks should see mobile broadband underwriting the country’s telecommunications sector for at least the next few years; this report includes the regulator's market data to July 2021, telcos' financial and operating data updates to June 2021, Telecom Maturity Index charts and analyses, assessment of the global impact of Covid-19 on the telecoms sector, and other recent market developments (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "all provincial exchanges are digitalized and connected to Hanoi, Da Nang, and Ho Chi Minh City by fiber-optic cable or microwave radio relay networks; main lines have been increased, and the use of mobile telephones is growing rapidly; fixed-line under 4 per 100 and mobile-cellular nearly 143 per 100 (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "57,887 (Syria), 41,037 (Afghanistan), 9,661 (Iraq), 8,212 (Somalia), 7,046 (Iran), 7,003 (Russia) (mid-year 2021); 84,076 (Ukraine) (as of 18 October 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "57,887 (Syria), 41,037 (Afghanistan), 9,661 (Iraq), 8,212 (Somalia), 7,046 (Iran), 7,003 (Russia) (mid-year 2021); 84,756 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "3,229 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1238,8 +1238,8 @@
|
|||
"text": "the Belgian Armed Forces have a mix of weapons systems from European countries, Israel, and the US; since 2010, several European nations have been the leading suppliers of armaments; Belgium has an export-focused defense industry that focuses on components and subcontracting (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "18 years of age for male and female voluntary military service; conscription abolished in 1995 (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> in 2020, women comprised about 9% of the military's full-time personnel<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> foreigners who speak Dutch or French from EU countries, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland may serve"
|
||||
"text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; conscription abolished in 1995 (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> in 2020, women comprised about 9% of the military's full-time personnel<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> foreign nationals 18-34 years of age who speak Dutch or French and are citizens of EU countries, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland may apply to join the military"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "125 France (contributing member of EuroCorps); 250 Romania (NATO) (2022)",
|
||||
|
|
@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "18,493 (Syria), 5,094 (Iraq) (2020); 58,019 (Ukraine) (as of 17 October 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "18,493 (Syria), 5,094 (Iraq) (2020); 58,537 (Ukraine) (as of 24 October 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "1,159 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -568,10 +568,10 @@
|
|||
"text": "Council of Ministers nominated by the council chairman, approved by the state-level House of Representatives"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections/appointments": {
|
||||
"text": "3-member presidency (1 Bosniak and 1 Croat elected from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1 Serb elected from the Republika Srpska) directly elected by simple majority popular vote for a 4-year term (eligible for a second term, but then ineligible for 4 years); the presidency chairpersonship rotates every 8 months with the new member of the presidency elected with the highest number of votes starting the new mandate as chair; election last held on 7 October 2018 (next to be held on 2 October 2022); the chairman of the Council of Ministers appointed by the presidency and confirmed by the state-level House of Representatives"
|
||||
"text": "3-member presidency (1 Bosniak and 1 Croat elected from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1 Serb elected from the Republika Srpska) directly elected by simple majority popular vote for a 4-year term (eligible for a second term, but then ineligible for 4 years); the presidency chairpersonship rotates every 8 months with the new member of the presidency elected with the highest number of votes starting the new mandate as chair; election last held on 2 October 2022 (next to be held in October 2026); the chairman of the Council of Ministers appointed by the presidency and confirmed by the state-level House of Representatives"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "<em><br>2018:</em> percent of vote - Milorad DODIK (SNSD) 53.9% - Serb seat; Zeljko KOMSIC (DF) 52.6% - Croat seat; Sefik DZAFEROVIC (SDA) 36.6% - Bosniak seat<br><br><em>2014:</em> percent of vote - Mladen IVANIC (PDP) 48.7% - Serb seat; Dragan COVIC (HDZ-BiH) 52.2% - Croat seat; Bakir IZETBEGOVIC (SDA) 32.9% - Bosniak seat"
|
||||
"text": "<em>2022: </em>percent of vote<em> -</em> Denis BECIROVIC - (SDP BiH) 57.4% - Bosniak seat; Zeljko KOMSIC (DF) 55.8% - Croat seat; Zeljka CVIJANOVIC (SNSD) 51.7% - Serb seat<em><br><br>2018: </em>percent of vote - Milorad DODIK (SNSD) 53.9% - Serb seat; Zeljko KOMSIC (DF) 52.6% - Croat seat; Sefik DZAFEROVIC (SDA) 36.6% - Bosniak seat<br><br><em>2014:</em> percent of vote - Mladen IVANIC (PDP) 48.7% - Serb seat; Dragan COVIC (HDZ-BiH) 52.2% - Croat seat; Bakir IZETBEGOVIC (SDA) 32.9% - Bosniak seat"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> President of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Marinko CAVARA (since 9 February 2015); Vice Presidents Melika MAHMUTBEGOVIC (since 9 February 2015), Milan DUNOVIC (since 9 February 2015); President of the Republika Srpska Zeljka CVIJANOVIC (since 18 November 2018); Vice Presidents Ramiz SALKIC (since 24 November 2014), Josip JERKOVIC (since 24 November 2014)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
|
@ -580,10 +580,10 @@
|
|||
"text": "bicameral Parliamentary Assembly or Skupstina consists of:<br>House of Peoples or Dom Naroda (15 seats - 5 Bosniak, 5 Croat, 5 Serb; members designated by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina's House of Peoples and the Republika Srpska's National Assembly to serve 4-year terms)<br>House of Representatives or Predstavnicki Dom (42 seats to include 28 seats allocated to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 14 to the Republika Srpska; members directly elected by proportional representation vote to serve 4-year terms); note - the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has a bicameral legislature that consists of the House of Peoples (58 seats - 17 Bosniak, 17 Croat, 17 Serb, 7 other) and the House of Representatives (98 seats; members directly elected by proportional representation vote to serve 4-year terms); Republika Srpska's unicameral legislature is the National Assembly (83 directly elected delegates serve 4-year terms)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections": {
|
||||
"text": "House of Peoples - last held on 7 October 2018 (next to be held on 2 October 2022)<br>House of Representatives - last held on 7 October 2018 (next to be held on 2 October 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "House of Peoples - last held on 2 October 2022 (next to be held in 2026)<br>House of Representatives - last held on 2 October 2022 (next to be held in 2026)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "House of Peoples - percent of vote by coalition/party - NA; seats by coalition/party - NA; composition - men 12, women 3, percent of women 20%<br>House of Representatives - percent of vote by coalition/party - SDA 17%, SNSD 16%, SDS/NDP/NS/SRS-VS 9.8%, SDP 9.1%, HDZ-BiH/HSS/HKDU/HSP-AS BiH/HDU 9.1%, DF, 5.8%, PDP 5.1%, DNS 4.2%, SBB BiH 4.2%, NS/HC 2.9%, NB 2.5%, PDA 2.3%, SP 1.9%, A-SDA 1.8%, other 17.4%; seats by coalition/party - SDA 9, SNSD 6, SDP 5, HDZ-BiH/HSS/HKDU/HSP-AS BiH/HDU 5, SDS/NDP/NS/SRS-VS 3, DF 3, PDP 2, SBB BiH 2, NS/HC 2, DNS 1, NB 1 PDA 1, SP 1, A-SDA 1; composition - men 31, women 11, percent of women 26.2%; note - total Parliamentary Assembly percent of women 24.6%"
|
||||
"text": "House of Peoples - percent of vote by coalition/party - NA; seats by coalition/party - NA; composition - men 12, women 3, percent of women 20%<br>House of Representatives - percent of vote by party/coalition - SDA 17.2%, SNSD 16.3%, HDZ BiH 8.8%, SDP 8.2%, SDS 7.1%, DF-GS 6.4%, NiP 5%, PDP 4.6%, NS/HC 3.1%, NES 3%, For Justice and Order 2.1%, DEMOS 1.9%, US 1.6%, BHI KF 1.3%, other 13.4%; seats by party/coalition - SDA 9, SNSD 6, SDP 5, HDZ BiH 4, DF-GS 3, NiP 3, SDS 2, PDP 2, NS/HC 2, NES 2, For Justice and Order 1, DEMOS 1, US 1, BHI KF 1; composition - men NA, women NA, percent of women NA; note - total Parliamentary Assembly percent of women NA"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -598,7 +598,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Political parties and leaders": {
|
||||
"text": "Alliance for a Better Future of BiH or SBB BiH [Fahrudin RADONCIC]<br>Alliance of Independent Social Democrats or SNSD [Milorad DODIK]<br>Alternative Party for Democratic Activity or A-SDA [Nermin OGRESEVIC] (merged with Independent Bosnian Herzegovinian List to form NES)<br>Croat Peasants' Party or HSS [Mario KARAMATIC]<br>Croatian Christian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina or HKDU [Ivanka BARIC]<br>Croatian Democratic Union or HDU [Miro GRABOVAC-TITAN]<br>Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina or HDZ-BiH [Dragan COVIC]<br>Croatian Democratic Union 1990 or HDZ-1990 [Ilija CVITANOVIC]<br>Croatian Party of Rights dr. Ante Starcevic or HSP-AS Bih [Stanko PRIMORAC]<br>Democratic Alliance or DEMOS [Nedeljko CUBRILOVIC]<br>Democratic Front of DF [Zeljko KOMSIC]<br>Democratic Peoples' Alliance or DNS [Nenad NESIC]<br>Independent Bloc or NB [Senad SEPIC]<br>Movement for Democratic Action or PDA [Elzina PIRIC]<br>National Democratic Movement or NDP [Dragan CAVIC]<br>Our Party or NS/HC [Edin FORTO]<br>Party for Democratic Action or SDA [Bakir IZETBEGOVIC]<br>Party of Democratic Progress or PDP [Branislav BORENOVIC]<br>People and Justice Party or NiP [Elmedin KONAKOVIC]<br>People's European Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina or NES [Nermin OGRESEVIC]<br>Progressive Srpska or NS [Goran DORDIC]<br>Serb Democratic Party or SDS [Mirko SAROVIC]<br>Serb Radical Party-Dr. Vojislav Seselj or SRS-VS [Vojislav SESELJ] (merged with PDP)<br>Social Democratic Party or SDP [Nermin NIKSIC]<br>Socialist Party or SP [Petar DOKIC]<br>United Srpska or US [Nenad STEVANDIC]"
|
||||
"text": "Alliance for a Better Future of BiH or SBB BiH [Fahrudin RADONCIC]<br>Alliance of Independent Social Democrats or SNSD [Milorad DODIK]<br>Alternative Party for Democratic Activity or A-SDA [Nermin OGRESEVIC] (merged with Independent Bosnian Herzegovinian List to form NES)<br>Bosnian-Herzegovinian Initiative or BHI KF [Fuad KASUMOVIC]<br>Civic Alliance or GS [Reuf BAJROVIC]<br>Croat Peasants' Party or HSS [Mario KARAMATIC]<br>Croatian Christian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina or HKDU [Ivanka BARIC]<br>Croatian Democratic Union or HDU [Miro GRABOVAC-TITAN]<br>Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina or HDZ-BiH [Dragan COVIC]<br>Croatian Democratic Union 1990 or HDZ-1990 [Ilija CVITANOVIC]<br>Croatian Party of Rights dr. Ante Starcevic or HSP-AS Bih [Stanko PRIMORAC]<br>Democratic Alliance or DEMOS [Nedeljko CUBRILOVIC]<br>Democratic Front of DF [Zeljko KOMSIC]<br>Democratic Peoples' Alliance or DNS [Nenad NESIC]<br>For Justice and Order [Nebojsa VUKANOVIC]<br>Independent Bloc or NB [Senad SEPIC]<br>Movement for Democratic Action or PDA [Elzina PIRIC]<br>National Democratic Movement or NDP [Dragan CAVIC]<br>Our Party or NS/HC [Edin FORTO]<br>Party for Democratic Action or SDA [Bakir IZETBEGOVIC]<br>Party of Democratic Progress or PDP [Branislav BORENOVIC]<br>People and Justice Party or NiP [Elmedin KONAKOVIC]<br>People's European Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina or NES [Nermin OGRESEVIC]<br>Progressive Srpska or NS [Goran DORDIC]<br>Serb Democratic Party or SDS [Mirko SAROVIC]<br>Serb Radical Party-Dr. Vojislav Seselj or SRS-VS [Vojislav SESELJ] (merged with PDP)<br>Social Democratic Party or SDP [Nermin NIKSIC]<br>Socialist Party or SP [Petar DOKIC]<br>United Srpska or US [Nenad STEVANDIC]"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"International organization participation": {
|
||||
"text": "BIS, CD, CE, CEI, EAPC, EBRD, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, NAM (observer), OAS (observer), OIC (observer), OIF (observer), OPCW, OSCE, PFP, SELEC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@
|
|||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "149 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>104,030 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-October 2022)"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>105, 097 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-October 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
"current situation": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1262,7 +1262,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "15,853 (Ukraine) (as of 18 October 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "15,932 (Ukraine) (as of 24 October 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "6,104 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1267,7 +1267,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "19,014 (Syria) (mid-year 2021); 54,878 (Ukraine) (as of 18 October 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "19,014 (Syria) (mid-year 2021); 55,016 (Ukraine) (as of 1 November 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "1,143 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1234,7 +1234,8 @@
|
|||
"text": "the inventory of the Cypriot National Guard is a mix of Soviet-era and some more modern weapons systems; since 2010, it has received equipment from several countries, including France, Israel, Russia, and Serbia (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "Cypriot National Guard (CNG): 18-50 years of age for compulsory military service for all Greek Cypriot males; 17 years of age for voluntary service; 14-month service obligation (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Cypriot National Guard (CNG): 18-50 years of age for compulsory military service for all Greek Cypriot males; 17 years of age for voluntary service; 14-month service obligation (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the CNG accepts all foreign nationals of at least partial Cypriot descent under age 32 as volunteers; dual citizenship Cypriot origin citizens, who were born in Cyprus or abroad, have the obligation to serve in the CNG on repatriation, regardless of whether or not they possess a foreign citizenship; a person is considered as having Cypriot origin where a grandparent or parent was/is a Cypriot citizen"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was set up in 1964 to prevent further fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities on the island and bring about a return to normal conditions; the UNFICYP mission had about 800 personnel as of mid-2022"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1252,7 +1253,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "9,820 (Syria) (mid-year 2021); 14,380 (Ukraine) (as of 18 October 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "9,820 (Syria) (mid-year 2021); 14,404 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "242,000 (both Turkish and Greek Cypriots; many displaced since 1974) (2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -577,7 +577,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "unicameral People's Assembly or Folketing (179 seats, including 2 each representing Greenland and the Faroe Islands; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by party-list proportional representation vote; members serve 4-year terms unless the Folketing is dissolved earlier)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections": {
|
||||
"text": "last held on 5 June 2019 (next to be held in June 2023)"
|
||||
"text": "last held on 5 June 2019 (next to be held on 1 November 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "percent of vote by party - SDP 27.4%, V 24.6%, DF 9.1%, SLP 9.1%, SF 8%, EL 7.4%, C 6.9%, AP 2.9%, NB 2.3%, LA 2.3%; seats by party - SDP 48, V 43, DF 16, SLP 16, SF 14, EL 13, C 12, AP 5, NB 4, LA 4; composition (as of September 2021) - men 108, women 71 (includes 2 from Greenland), percent of women 39.7%"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1236,11 +1236,11 @@
|
|||
"text": "the Danish military inventory is comprised of a mix of modern European, US, and domestically-produced equipment; the US has been the largest supplier of military equipment to Denmark since 2010; the Danish defense industry is active in the production of naval vessels, defense electronics, and subcomponents of larger weapons systems, such as the US F-35 fighter aircraft (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "18 years of age for compulsory and voluntary military service; conscripts serve an initial training period that varies from 4 to 12 months depending on specialization; former conscripts are assigned to mobilization units; women eligible to volunteer for military service; in addition to full time employment, the Danish Military offers reserve contracts in all three branches (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> women have been able serve in all military occupations, including combat arms, since 1988; as of 2019, they made up about 8% of the military's full-time personnel; conscientious objectors can choose to instead serve 6 months in a non-military position, for example in Beredskabsstyrelsen (dealing with non-military disasters like fires, flood, pollution, etc.) or overseas foreign aid work<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>foreign nationals living in another EU country may apply to join the Danish armed forces, provided they are fluent in Dutch and have lived one year in Denmark or six years if applying within an EU country<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>Denmark has had compulsory military service since 1849"
|
||||
"text": "18 years of age for compulsory and voluntary military service; conscripts serve an initial training period that varies from 4 to 12 months depending on specialization; former conscripts are assigned to mobilization units; women eligible to volunteer for military service; in addition to full time employment, the Danish military offers reserve contracts in all three branches (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> women have been able serve in all military occupations, including combat arms, since 1988; as of 2019, they made up about 8% of the military's full-time personnel; conscientious objectors can choose to instead serve 6 months in a non-military position, for example in Beredskabsstyrelsen (dealing with non-military disasters like fires, flood, pollution, etc.) or overseas foreign aid work<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>foreigners who have lived in Denmark for at least 1 year or in another EU country for 6 years may apply to join the armed forces, provided they are fluent in Danish <br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>Denmark has had compulsory military service since 1849"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "approximately 220 Estonia (NATO); approximately 100 Middle East/Iraq (NATO) (2022)",
|
||||
"text": "approximately 220 Estonia (NATO); approximately 750 Latvia (NATO); approximately 100 Middle East/Iraq (NATO) (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>in response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, some NATO countries, including Denmark, have sent additional troops and equipment to the battlegroups deployed in NATO territory in eastern Europe"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1259,7 +1259,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "19,833 (Syria), 5,634 (Eritrea) (mid-year 2021); 36,174 (Ukraine) (as of 18 October 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "19,833 (Syria), 5,634 (Eritrea) (mid-year 2021); 36,449 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "11,608 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
|
|
@ -1230,8 +1230,8 @@
|
|||
"text": "the Irish Defense Forces have a small inventory of imported weapons systems from a variety of mostly European countries; the UK is the leading supplier of military hardware to Ireland since 2010 (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "18-25 years of age for male and female voluntary military service recruits to the Defence Forces (18-27 years of age for the Naval Service); 18-26 for cadetship (officer) applicants; 12-year service (5 active, 7 reserves); Irish citizen, European Economic Area citizenship, or refugee status (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> as of 2021, women made up about 7% of the military's full-time personnel"
|
||||
"text": "18-25 years of age for male and female voluntary military service recruits to the Defence Forces (18-27 years of age for the Naval Service); 18-26 for cadetship (officer) applicants; 12-year service (5 active, 7 reserves) (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> as of 2021, women made up about 7% of the military's full-time personnel<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the Defense Forces are open to refugees under the Refugee Act of 1996 and nationals of the European Economic Area, which include EU member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "130 Golan Heights (UNDOF); 320 Lebanon (UNIFIL) (May 2022)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1252,7 +1252,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "51,904 (Ukraine) (as of 10 October 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "55,144 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "107 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1254,7 +1254,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "60,302 (Ukraine) (as of 14 October 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "60,980 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "71,873 (mid-year 2021); note - following independence in 1991, automatic citizenship was restricted to those who were Estonian citizens prior to the 1940 Soviet occupation and their descendants; thousands of ethnic Russians remained stateless when forced to choose between passing Estonian language and citizenship tests or applying for Russian citizenship; one reason for demurring on Estonian citizenship was to retain the right of visa-free travel to Russia; stateless residents can vote in local elections but not general elections; stateless parents who have been lawful residents of Estonia for at least five years can apply for citizenship for their children before they turn 15 years old"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1249,7 +1249,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "448,807 (Ukraine) (as of 18 October 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "455,731 (Ukraine) (as of 31 October 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "1,498 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1268,7 +1268,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "9,053 (Iraq) (mid-year 2021); 38,588 (Ukraine) (as of 16 October 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "9,053 (Iraq) (mid-year 2021); 38,588 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "3,416 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1270,12 +1270,12 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "38,496 (Syria), 25,188 (Afghanistan), 12,657 (Iraq), 5,002 (West Bank and Gaza) (mid-year 2021); 19,752 (Ukraine) (as of 18 October 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "38,496 (Syria), 25,188 (Afghanistan), 12,657 (Iraq), 5,002 (West Bank and Gaza) (mid-year 2021); 19,997 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "5,552 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 1,226,068 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-October 2022); as of the end of February 2022, Greece hosted an estimated 161,419 refugees and asylum seekers"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 1,226,306 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-October 2022); as of the end of February 2022, Greece hosted an estimated 161,419 refugees and asylum seekers"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
"text": "a gateway to Europe for traffickers smuggling cannabis products and heroin from the Middle East and Southwest Asia to the West and precursor chemicals to the East; some South American cocaine transits or is consumed in Greece; money laundering related to drug trafficking and organized crime"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "18,400 (Ukraine) (as of 18 October 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "18,931 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "2,910 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1104,7 +1104,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Hungary benefits from having a developed telecom infrastructure, with a focus among operators to develop the 5G sector and upgrade fixed networks to provide a 1Gb/s service; services based on 5G have been supported by the January 2021 multi-spectrum auction for spectrum in the 900MHz and 1800MHz bands; the number of fixed-lines continues to fall as subscribers migrate to the mobile platform for voice and data services; operators have bundled packages to boost revenue and retain subscribers; the broadband market has effective infrastructure-based competition, with an extensive cable network competing against DSL services and a vibrant and rapidly expanding fiber sector.; the regulator has also introduced a number of measures aimed at promoting market competition, which is pushing the drive for higher speed platforms and encouraging operators to invest in technology upgrades; Hungary now has the highest fixed broadband penetration rate in Eastern Europe; the number of super fast broadband connections (above 30Mb/s) accounted for 78% of all fixed broadband connections (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Hungary benefits from having a developed telecom infrastructure, with a focus among operators to develop the 5G sector and upgrade fixed networks to provide a 1Gb/s service; services based on 5G have been supported by the January 2021 multi-spectrum auction for spectrum in the 900MHz and 1800MHz bands; the number of fixed-lines continues to fall as subscribers migrate to the mobile platform for voice and data services; operators have looked to bundled packages to boost revenue and retain subscribers; the broadband market has effective infrastructure-based competition, with an extensive cable network competing against DSL services and a vibrant and rapidly expanding fiber sector; the regulator has also introduced a number of measures aimed at promoting market competition, which is pushing the drive for higher speed platforms and encouraging operators to invest in technology upgrades; as a result, Hungary now has the highest fixed broadband penetration rate in Eastern Europe; the number of super fast broadband connections (above 30Mb/s) accounted for 78% of all fixed broadband connections (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "competition among mobile-cellular service providers has led to a sharp increase in the use of mobile-cellular phones, and a decrease in the number of fixed-line connections, with just under 31 fixed per 100 persons and 107 mobile-cellular subscriptions per 100 (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1290,7 +1290,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "30,000 (Ukraine) (as of 18 October 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "31,290 (Ukraine) (as of 1 November 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "130 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1055,7 +1055,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Iceland has one of the smallest yet most progressive telecom markets in Europe; the country in 2020 became the top in Europe for fiber subscriptions; it aims to provide a fixed broadband service of at least 100Mb/s to 99.9% of the population by the end of 2021, an ambitious target by international standards and one which it is likely to achieve given the progress which operators have made in extending the reach of fiber networks; there is effective competition in the mobile and broadband markets; the telecom market has shown some resilience in recent years following the significant economic downturn a decade ago, supported by continuing investment in mobile and fixed-line broadband infrastructure by operators and well as by the government’s Telecommunications Fund which is supporting Next Generation Access networks, particularly in rural areas (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Iceland has one of the smallest yet most progressive telecom markets in Europe; the country in 2020 became the top in Europe for fiber penetration; it aims to provide a fixed broadband service of at least 100Mb/s to 99.9% of the population by the end of 2021, an ambitious target by international standards and one which it is likely to achieve given the progress which operators have made in extending the reach of fiber networks; there is effective competition in the mobile and broadband markets, with a number of players having emerged to challenge the dominance of the two leading operators which have interests across the telecom sectors; the telecom market has shown some resilience in recent years following the significant economic downturn a decade ago, supported by continuing investment in mobile and fixed-line broadband infrastructure by operators and well as by the government’s Telecommunications Fund which is supporting Next Generation Access networks, particularly in rural areas (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "liberalization of the telecommunications sector beginning in the late 1990s has led to increased competition especially in the mobile services segment of the market; roughly 31 per 100 for fixed line and nearing 124 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1291,7 +1291,7 @@
|
|||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "3,000 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 666,087 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-October 2022)"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 666,559 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-October 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
"text": "important gateway for drug trafficking; organized crime groups allied with Colombian and Spanish groups trafficking cocaine to Europe"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -946,7 +946,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Kosovo has benefited from financial and regulatory assistance as part of the EU pre-accession process; the telecom sector has been liberalized, and legislation has aligned the sector with the EU’s revised regulatory framework; poor telecom infrastructure has meant that fixed-line communication remains low by European standards; unlike most markets, the fixed-line broadband sector is dominated by new players, in particular the cable operator IPKO, a subsidiary of Telekom Slovenia; broadband companies in Kosovo are developing slowly; there is effective competition between the main cable and DSL operators, though as yet there is little progress with the expansion of fiber networks: investment by the incumbent PTK, trading as Telecom Kosovo, in building an upgraded fiber-based NGN has been insufficient thus far, exacerbated by the company’s financial difficulties; these difficulties encouraged the government in mid-2019 to prepare the sale of a majority stake in the company; the mobile sector accounts for most telecom lines for voice services, as well as the greater part of telecom revenue; two MNOs dominate the sector; Telenor Serbia and VIP Mobile stopped offering unlicensed mobile voice and data services in mid-2017 across border regions as part of a deal by which Kosovo secured its own dialing code. (2022 )"
|
||||
"text": "Kosovo has benefited from financial and regulatory assistance as part of the EU pre-accession process; the telecom sector has been liberalized, and legislation has aligned the sector with the EU’s revised regulatory framework; poor telecom infrastructure has meant that fixed-line communication remains low by European standards; unlike most markets, the fixed-line broadband sector is dominated by new players; there is effective competition between the main cable and DSL operators, though as yet there is little progress with the expansion of fiber networks; the mobile sector accounts for most telecom lines for voice services, as well as the greater part of telecom revenue; two MNOs dominate the sector (2022 )"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line roughly 6 per 100 and mobile-cellular 32 per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "the telecom market continues to benefit from investment and from regulatory measures aimed at developing 5G and fiber based infrastructure; there is effective competition in the mobile market, with extensive services based on LTE-A technologies to boost data speeds; operators such as Bité Latvia and Tele2 Latvia have also begun transitioning their networks to support services and applications based on 5G, though with the existing capacity of LTE infrastructure a large scale 5G deployment is not expected until 2023; to facilitate this progress, the regulator in March 2021 approved an application from Tele2 Latvia and Bité to share almost half of their spectrum assets; in the fixed-line broadband sector, the country is ranked second highest in Europe (after Iceland) for fiber coverage and take-up, closely followed by Lithuania; with this infrastructure in place, the country has also developed a sophisticated digital economy, with e-commerce and e-government services widely available. (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "the telecom market continues to benefit from investment and from regulatory measures aimed at developing 5G and fiber based infrastructure; there is effective competition in the mobile market, with extensive services based on LTE-A technologies to boost data speeds; a large scale 5G deployment is not expected until 2023; in the fixed-line broadband sector, the country is ranked second highest in Europe (after Iceland) for fiber coverage and take-up, closely followed by Lithuania; with this infrastructure in place, the country has also developed a sophisticated digital economy, with e-commerce and e-government services widely available (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line roughly 11 per 100 and mobile-cellular nearly 109 per 100 subscriptions (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1262,7 +1262,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "39,854 (Ukraine) (as of 14 October 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "40,163 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "209,168 (mid-year 2021); note - individuals who were Latvian citizens prior to the 1940 Soviet occupation and their descendants were recognized as Latvian citizens when the country's independence was restored in 1991; citizens of the former Soviet Union residing in Latvia who have neither Latvian nor other citizenship are considered non-citizens (officially there is no statelessness in Latvia) and are entitled to non-citizen passports; children born after Latvian independence to stateless parents are entitled to Latvian citizenship upon their parents' request; non-citizens cannot vote or hold certain government jobs and are exempt from military service but can travel visa-free in the EU under the Schengen accord like Latvian citizens; non-citizens can obtain naturalization if they have been permanent residents of Latvia for at least five years, pass tests in Latvian language and history, and know the words of the Latvian national anthem"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Lithuania’s small telecoms market is among the more advanced in Europe, particularly given the universal access to LTE infrastructure and the extensive fiber footprint; a number of alternative operators offer services although the incumbent Telia Lithuania remains the dominant player in the fixed-line and broadband sectors; in line with the country’s Digital Agenda, the focus among telcos has been to invest in fiber, with an emphasis on delivering gigabyte data speeds; SIM card penetration is relatively high for the region and most subscribers are higher ARPU postpaid subscribers; network operators continue to market mobile broadband services, made possible from investments in LTE technologies; LTE services are available nationally, and although there have been some initial trials of 5G commercial services are not expected to be launched until mid to late 2021; the regulator has consulted on the release of spectrum for 5G in a range of bands, and the auction is tentatively scheduled for the first quarter of 2021; according to regulator data, the total revenue of the electronic communications sector in the third quarter of 2020 was the highest it has been since the fourth quarter of 2010; revenue growth in the mobile sector was driven mainly mobile internet services. (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Lithuania’s small telecoms market is among the more advanced in Europe, particularly given the universal access to LTE infrastructure and the extensive fiber footprint; in line with the country’s Digital Agenda, the focus among telcos has been to invest in fiber, with an emphasis on delivering gigabyte data speeds; SIM card penetration is relatively high for the region and most subscribers are higher ARPU postpaid subscribers; network operators continue to market mobile broadband services, made possible from investments in LTE technologies; LTE services are available nationally, and although there have been some initial trials of 5G commercial services are not expected to be launched until mid to late 2021; the regulator has consulted on the release of spectrum for 5G in a range of bands, and the auction is tentatively scheduled for the first quarter of 2021; according to regulator data, the total revenue of the electronic communications sector in the third quarter of 2020 was the highest it has been since the fourth quarter of 2010; revenue growth in the mobile sector was driven mainly mobile internet services (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "nearly 12 per 100 for fixed-line subscriptions; rapid expansion of mobile-cellular services has resulted in a steady decline in the number of fixed-line connections; mobile-cellular teledensity stands at about 174 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "68,396 (Ukraine) (as of 18 October 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "68,925 (Ukraine) (as of 25 October 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "2,721 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "97,935 (Ukraine) (as of 18 October 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "99,393 (Ukraine) (as of 1 November 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "1,532 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
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