auto-update week 24

This commit is contained in:
Yo Robot 2022-06-16 22:11:42 +00:00
parent 270a562a6d
commit 5d3efed636
182 changed files with 1972 additions and 170 deletions

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@ -320,6 +320,17 @@
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "19.9% (2016)"
},
"Tobacco use": {
"total": {
"text": "24% (2020 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "47.9% (2020 est.)"
},
"female": {
"text": "0.1% (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Children under the age of 5 years underweight": {
"text": "4.9% (2013)"
},
@ -1117,7 +1128,7 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Land Forces (Combined Arms Army), Air Forces, Navy Forces; Ministry of Internal Affairs: State Border Service (includes Coast Guard), Internal Security Troops (2021)"
"text": "Azerbaijan Armed Forces: Land Forces (Combined Arms Army), Air Forces, Navy Forces; Ministry of Internal Affairs: State Border Service (includes Coast Guard), Internal Security Troops (2022)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
@ -1140,7 +1151,7 @@
"text": "information varies; approximately 65,000 total active troops (55,000 Army; 2,000 Navy; 8,000 Air Force); approximately 15,000 Ministry of Internal Affairs troops (2021)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the inventory of the Azerbaijan military is comprised mostly of Russian and Soviet-era weapons systems with a smaller mix of equipment from other countries; since 2010, Russia is the leading supplier of arms to Azerbaijan, followed by Israel (2021)"
"text": "the inventory of the Azerbaijan military is comprised mostly of Russian and Soviet-era weapons systems with a small mix of equipment from other countries, including Israel and Turkey (2022)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "men age 18-35 years for compulsory military service; service obligation 18 months (non-university graduate) or 12 months (university graduates); 17 years of age for voluntary service (men and women); 17-year-olds are considered to be on active service at cadet military schools (2021)",

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@ -315,6 +315,17 @@
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "20.2% (2016)"
},
"Tobacco use": {
"total": {
"text": "25.5% (2020 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "49.4% (2020 est.)"
},
"female": {
"text": "1.5% (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Children under the age of 5 years underweight": {
"text": "2.6% (2015/16)"
},

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@ -313,6 +313,17 @@
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "29.8% (2016)"
},
"Tobacco use": {
"total": {
"text": "14.9% (2020 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "25.3% (2020 est.)"
},
"female": {
"text": "4.5% (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Children under the age of 5 years underweight": {
"text": "NA"
},

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@ -318,6 +318,17 @@
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "21.7% (2016)"
},
"Tobacco use": {
"total": {
"text": "31.7% (2020 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "56.3% (2020 est.)"
},
"female": {
"text": "7.1% (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Children under the age of 5 years underweight": {
"text": "2.1% (2018)"
},
@ -583,7 +594,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation in the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador David BAKRADZE (since 18 January 2017)"
"text": "Ambassador David ZALKALIANI (since 6 May 2022)"
},
"chancery": {
"text": "1824 R Street NW, Washington, DC 20009"

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@ -341,6 +341,17 @@
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "25.8% (2016)"
},
"Tobacco use": {
"total": {
"text": "13.6% (2020 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "24.1% (2020 est.)"
},
"female": {
"text": "3.1% (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Children under the age of 5 years underweight": {
"text": "4.1% (2010/11)"
},

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@ -324,6 +324,17 @@
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "26.1% (2016)"
},
"Tobacco use": {
"total": {
"text": "21.2% (2020 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "28.9% (2020 est.)"
},
"female": {
"text": "13.5% (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Children under the age of 5 years underweight": {
"text": "NA"
},
@ -1192,7 +1203,7 @@
"note": "note(s) - women have served in the Israeli military since its establishment in 1948; as of 2021, women made up about 35% of IDF personnel; more than 90% of military specialties, including combat specialties, were open to women and more than 3,000 women were serving in combat units; the IDF's first mixed-gender infantry unit, the Caracal Battalion, was established in 2004; as of 2021, conscripts comprised about 70% of the IDF ground forces"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has operated in the Golan between Israel and Syria since 1974 to monitor the ceasefire following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and supervise the areas of separation between the two countries; as of February 2022, UNDOF consisted of about 1,100 personnel<br> <p>as of 2022 and since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Israel has routinely carried out air strikes in Syria targeting Iranian, Iranian-backed militia and Hizballah forces, and some Syrian Government military positions; over the same period, the IDF has carried out numerous strikes against Hizballah in Lebanon in response to attacks on Israeli territory; Israel fought a month-long war in Lebanon with Hizballah in 2006 (see Appendix-T for details on Hizballah)</p> <p>as of 2022, the IDF also conducted frequent operations against the HAMAS and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorist groups operating out of the Gaza Strip; since seizing control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, HAMAS has claimed responsibility for numerous rocket attacks into Israel and organized protests at the border between Gaza and Israel, resulting in violent clashes, casualties, and reprisal military actions by the IDF; HAMAS and Israel fought an 11-day conflict in May of 2021, which ended in an informal truce; sporadic clashes continued into 2022, including incendiary balloon attacks from Palestinian territory and retaliatory IDF strikes; PIJ has conducted numerous attacks on Israel since the 1980s, including a barrage of mortar and rocket strikes in February 2020 (see Appendix-T for more details on HAMAS and Palestine Islamic Jihad)<br><br>Israel has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments</p> (2022)"
"text": "the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has operated in the Golan between Israel and Syria since 1974 to monitor the ceasefire following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and supervise the areas of separation between the two countries; as of February 2022, UNDOF consisted of about 1,100 personnel<br><br>as of 2022 and since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Israel has routinely carried out air strikes in Syria targeting Iranian, Iranian-backed militia and Hizballah forces, and some Syrian Government military positions; over the same period, the IDF has carried out numerous strikes against Hizballah in Lebanon in response to attacks on Israeli territory; Israel fought a month-long war in Lebanon with Hizballah in 2006 (see Appendix-T for details on Hizballah) <p>as of 2022, the IDF also conducted frequent operations against the HAMAS and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorist groups operating out of the Gaza Strip; since seizing control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, HAMAS has claimed responsibility for numerous rocket attacks into Israel and organized protests at the border between Gaza and Israel, resulting in violent clashes, casualties, and reprisal military actions by the IDF; HAMAS and Israel fought an 11-day conflict in May of 2021, which ended in an informal truce; sporadic clashes continued into 2022, including incendiary balloon attacks from Palestinian territory and retaliatory IDF strikes; PIJ has conducted numerous attacks on Israel since the 1980s, including a barrage of mortar and rocket strikes in February 2020 (see Appendix-T for more details on HAMAS and Palestine Islamic Jihad)<br><br>Israel has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments</p> (2022)"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

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@ -337,6 +337,17 @@
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "30.4% (2016)"
},
"Tobacco use": {
"total": {
"text": "18.5% (2020 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "35.1% (2020 est.)"
},
"female": {
"text": "1.8% (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Children under the age of 5 years underweight": {
"text": "3.9% (2018)"
},
@ -615,7 +626,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation in the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador Fareed Mustafa Kamil YASSEEN (since 18 January 2017)"
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Mohammed Husham Malik AL FITYAN (since 22 March 2022)"
},
"chancery": {
"text": "3421 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20007"
@ -635,7 +646,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador Matthew TUELLER (since&nbsp;9&nbsp;June&nbsp;2019)"
"text": "Ambassador Alina L. ROMANOWSKI (since 2 June 2022)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "Al-Kindi Street, International Zone, Baghdad; note - consulate in Al Basrah closed as of 28 September 2018"
@ -1191,7 +1202,7 @@
"note": "note - in late 2021, the Iraqi Government approved a draft conscription law for the Council of Representatives to debate"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "<p>- as of 2022, Iraqi security forces (ISF) continued to conduct counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) terrorist group, particularly in northern and western Iraq; Kurdish Security Forces (KSF, aka Peshmerga) also conducted operations against ISIS<br><br>- the KSF were formally recognized as a legitimate Iraqi military force under the countrys constitution and have operated jointly with the Iraqi military against ISIS militants, but they also operate outside of Iraqi military command structure; since 2021, the ISF and the KSF have conducted joint counter-ISIS operations in an area known as the Kurdish Coordination Line (KCL), a swath of disputed territory in northern Iraq claimed by both the Kurdistan Regional Government and the central Iraqi Government; the KSF/Peshmerga report to the Kurdistan Regional Government or Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties instead of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense<br><br>- Popular Mobilization Commission and Affiliated Forces (PMF or PMC), also known as Popular Mobilization Units (PMU, or al-Hashd al-Shaabi in Arabic), tribal militia units have fought alongside the Iraqi military against ISIS since 2014, but the majority of these forces continue to largely ignore the 2016 Law of the Popular Mobilization Authority, which mandated that armed militias must be regulated in a fashion similar to Iraqs other security forces and act under the Iraqi Governments direct control; the Iraqi prime minister legally commands the PMF, but many of the militia units take orders from associated political parties and/or other government officials, including some with ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and some that have been designated as terrorist organizations by the US; the PMF/PMU is an umbrella organization comprised of many different militias, the majority of which are Shia; there are typically three types of Shia militia:</p> <p>--militias backed by Iran; they are considered the most active and capable, and include such groups as the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kataib Hizballah</p> <p>--militias affiliated with Shia political parties, but not aligned with Iran, such as Moqtada al-SADR's Saray al-Salam (Peace Brigades)</p> <p>--militias not connected with political parties, but affiliated with the Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Ali al-SISTANI (Iraqs supreme Shia cleric), such as the Hawza militias</p> <p>other PMF/PMU militias include Tribal Mobilization militias, or Hashd al-Ashairi, which are composed of fighters from Sunni tribes; some of these militias take orders from the ISF and local authorities while others respond to orders from the larger Shia PMU militias; still other militias include Yazidi and Christian militias and the Turkmen brigades; the links of these forces to the PMU is not always clear-cut and may be loosely based on financial, legal, or political incentives</p> <p>- at the request of the Iraqi government, NATO agreed to establish an advisory, training and capacity-building mission in Iraq in October 2018 to help Iraqi forces in their fight against ISIS; as of 2022, the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) had about 500 troops; in December 2021, the task force that leads the defeat ISIS mission in Iraq, Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), transitioned from a combat role to an advise, assist, and enable role</p> (2022)"
"text": "<p>- as of 2022, Iraqi security forces (ISF) continued to conduct counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) terrorist group, particularly in northern and western Iraq; Kurdish Security Forces (KSF, aka Peshmerga) also conducted operations against ISIS<br><br>- the KSF were formally recognized as a legitimate Iraqi military force under the countrys constitution and have operated jointly with the Iraqi military against ISIS militants, but they also operate outside of Iraqi military command structure; since 2021, the ISF and the KSF have conducted joint counter-ISIS operations in an area known as the Kurdish Coordination Line (KCL), a swath of disputed territory in northern Iraq claimed by both the Kurdistan Regional Government and the central Iraqi Government; the KSF/Peshmerga report to the Kurdistan Regional Government or Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties instead of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense<br><br>- Popular Mobilization Commission and Affiliated Forces (PMF or PMC), also known as Popular Mobilization Units (PMU, or al-Hashd al-Shaabi in Arabic), tribal militia units have fought alongside the Iraqi military against ISIS since 2014, but the majority of these forces continue to largely ignore the 2016 Law of the Popular Mobilization Authority, which mandated that armed militias must be regulated in a fashion similar to Iraqs other security forces and act under the Iraqi Governments direct control; the Iraqi Government funds the PMF, and the prime minister legally commands it, but many of the militia units take orders from associated political parties and/or other government officials, including some with ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and some that have been designated as terrorist organizations by the US; the PMF/PMU is an umbrella organization comprised of many different militias, the majority of which are Shia; there are typically three types of Shia militia:</p> <p>--militias backed by Iran; they are considered the most active and capable, and include such groups as the Badr Organization (Saraya al-Sala), Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kataib Hizballah</p> <p>--militias affiliated with Shia political parties, but not aligned with Iran, such as Moqtada al-SADR's Saray al-Salam (Peace Brigades)</p> <p>--militias not connected with political parties, but affiliated with the Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Ali al-SISTANI (Iraqs supreme Shia cleric), such as the Hawza militias</p> <p>other PMF/PMU militias include Tribal Mobilization militias, or Hashd al-Ashairi, which are composed of fighters from Sunni tribes; some of these militias take orders from the ISF and local authorities while others respond to orders from the larger Shia PMU militias; still other militias include Yazidi and Christian militias and the Turkmen brigades; the links of these forces to the PMU is not always clear-cut and may be loosely based on financial, legal, or political incentives</p> <p>- at the request of the Iraqi government, NATO agreed to establish an advisory, training and capacity-building mission for the Iraqi military in October 2018; as of 2022, the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) had about 500 troops; in December 2021, the task force that leads the defeat ISIS mission in Iraq, Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), transitioned from a combat role to an advise, assist, and enable role</p> (2022)"
}
},
"Terrorism": {
@ -1206,7 +1217,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "15,272 (Turkey), 7,881 (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (mid-year 2021); 257,974 (Syria) (2022)"
"text": "15,272 (Turkey), 7,881 (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (mid-year 2021); 260,686 (Syria) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "1,198,940 (displacement in central and northern Iraq since January 2014) (2021)"

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@ -329,6 +329,17 @@
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "35.5% (2016)"
},
"Tobacco use": {
"total": {
"text": "34.8% (2020 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "56.8% (2020 est.)"
},
"female": {
"text": "12.8% (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Children under the age of 5 years underweight": {
"text": "3% (2012)"
},

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@ -317,6 +317,17 @@
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "37.9% (2016)"
},
"Tobacco use": {
"total": {
"text": "17.9% (2020 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "33.5% (2020 est.)"
},
"female": {
"text": "2.2% (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Children under the age of 5 years underweight": {
"text": "3% (2014)"
},
@ -569,7 +580,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation in the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador SALEM Abdallah al-Jaber al-Sabah<br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br>SALEM Abdallah al-Jaber al-Sabah (since 10 October 2001)"
"text": "Ambassador SALEM Abdallah al-Jaber al-Sabah (since 10 October 2021)"
},
"chancery": {
"text": "2940 Tilden Street NW, Washington, DC 20008"

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@ -314,6 +314,17 @@
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "32% (2016)"
},
"Tobacco use": {
"total": {
"text": "38.2% (2020 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "47.5% (2020 est.)"
},
"female": {
"text": "28.9% (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Children under the age of 5 years underweight": {
"text": "NA"
},
@ -592,7 +603,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation in the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador Ambassador Gabriel ISSA (since late January 2018)"
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Wael HACHEM, Counselor (since 15 March 2021)"
},
"chancery": {
"text": "2560 28th Street NW, Washington, DC 20008"

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@ -320,6 +320,17 @@
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "27% (2016)"
},
"Tobacco use": {
"total": {
"text": "8% (2020 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "15.5% (2020 est.)"
},
"female": {
"text": "0.4% (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Children under the age of 5 years underweight": {
"text": "11.2% (2016/17)"
},

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@ -318,6 +318,17 @@
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "35.1% (2016)"
},
"Tobacco use": {
"total": {
"text": "11.8% (2020 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "21.7% (2020 est.)"
},
"female": {
"text": "1.9% (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Children under the age of 5 years underweight": {
"text": "NA"
},

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@ -323,6 +323,17 @@
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "35.4% (2016)"
},
"Tobacco use": {
"total": {
"text": "14.3% (2020 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "26.5% (2020 est.)"
},
"female": {
"text": "2% (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Children under the age of 5 years underweight": {
"text": "NA"
},
@ -576,7 +587,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation in the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador Princess REEMA bint Bandar Al Saud (since 8 July 2019)"
"text": "Ambassador Princess RIMA bint Bandar bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud (since 8 July 2019)"
},
"chancery": {
"text": "601 New Hampshire Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037"

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@ -1147,12 +1147,12 @@
"text": "568,730 (Palestinian Refugees) (2020); 12,435 (Iraq) (mid-year 2021)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "6.568 million (ongoing civil war since 2011) (2020)"
"text": "6.662 million (ongoing civil war since 2011) (2021)"
},
"stateless persons": {
"text": "160,000 (mid-year 2021); note - Syria's stateless population consists of Kurds and Palestinians; stateless persons are prevented from voting, owning land, holding certain jobs, receiving food subsidies or public healthcare, enrolling in public schools, or being legally married to Syrian citizens; in 1962, some 120,000 Syrian Kurds were stripped of their Syrian citizenship, rendering them and their descendants stateless; in 2011, the Syrian Government granted citizenship to thousands of Syrian Kurds as a means of appeasement; however, resolving the question of statelessness is not a priority given Syria's ongoing civil war"
},
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the ongoing civil war has resulted in more than 5.7 million registered Syrian refugees - dispersed in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey - as of May 2022"
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the ongoing civil war has resulted in more than 5.7 million registered Syrian refugees - dispersed in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey - as of June 2022"
},
"Trafficking in persons": {
"current situation": {

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@ -336,6 +336,17 @@
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "32.1% (2016)"
},
"Tobacco use": {
"total": {
"text": "30.7% (2020 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "42.1% (2020 est.)"
},
"female": {
"text": "19.2% (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Children under the age of 5 years underweight": {
"text": "1.5% (2018/19)"
},
@ -500,14 +511,15 @@
"text": "Turkey"
},
"local long form": {
"text": "Turkiye Cumhuriyeti"
"text": "Turkey Cumhuriyeti"
},
"local short form": {
"text": "Turkiye"
"text": "Turkey"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "the name means \"Land of the Turks\""
}
},
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> Turkiye is an approved English short-form name for Turkey"
},
"Government type": {
"text": "presidential republic"
@ -585,7 +597,7 @@
},
"Legislative branch": {
"description": {
"text": "unicameral Grand National Assembly of Turkey or Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi (600 seats - increased from 550 seats beginning with June 2018 election; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote to serve 5-year terms - increased from 4 to 5 years beginning with June 2018 election)"
"text": "unicameral Grand National Assembly of Turkey or Turkey Buyuk Millet Meclisi (600 seats - increased from 550 seats beginning with June 2018 election; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote to serve 5-year terms - increased from 4 to 5 years beginning with June 2018 election)"
},
"elections": {
"text": "last held on 24 June 2018 (next to be held in June 2023)"

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@ -338,6 +338,17 @@
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "17.1% (2016)"
},
"Tobacco use": {
"total": {
"text": "20.3% (2020 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "32.5% (2020 est.)"
},
"female": {
"text": "8.1% (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Children under the age of 5 years underweight": {
"text": "39.9% (2013)"
},
@ -617,7 +628,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation in the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "ambassador (vacant); note - on 18 December 2020, former Ambassador Ahmad Awadh BIN MUBARAK (since 3 August 2015) was appointed Yemen's Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates"
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); note - on 18 December 2020, former Ambassador Ahmad Awadh BIN MUBARAK (since 3 August 2015) was appointed Yemen's Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates"
},
"chancery": {
"text": "2319 Wyoming Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008"
@ -634,7 +645,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "ambassador (vacant); Charg&eacute; d&rsquo;Affaires Cathy WESTLEY (since 23 May 2021); note - the embassy closed in March 2015; Yemen Affairs Unit currently operates out of US Embassy Riyadh"
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charg&eacute; d&rsquo;Affaires Cathy WESTLEY (since 23 May 2021); note - the embassy closed in March 2015; Yemen Affairs Unit currently operates out of US Embassy Riyadh"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "previously - Sa'awan Street, Sanaa"
@ -1143,13 +1154,13 @@
"text": "information limited and widely varied; ROYG: up to 300,000 estimated military, paramilitary, and militia forces; UAE- and Saudi-backed forces: 150-200,000 estimated trained fighters; Huthis: up to 200,000 estimated fighters&nbsp; (2021)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the inventory of the Yemeni Government forces consists primarily of Russian and Soviet-era equipment, although much of it has been lost in the current conflict; since the start of the civil war in 2014, it has received limited amounts of donated equipment from some Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and UAE (2021)"
"text": "the inventory of the Yemeni Government forces consists primarily of Russian and Soviet-era equipment, although much of it has been lost in the current conflict; since the start of the civil war in 2014, it has received limited amounts of donated equipment from some Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and UAE <br><br>Huthi forces are armed with weapons seized from Yemeni Government forces; in addition, they have reportedly received arms from Iran (2021)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary military service; conscription abolished in 2001; 2-year service obligation (note - limited information since the start of the civil war) (2021)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "<p>in 2015, a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states intervened militarily in Yemen in support of the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) against the separatist Huthis; as of early 2022, the conflict had become largely stalemated, but the coalition (consisting largely of Saudi forces), ROYG forces, and the Huthis continued to engage in fighting, mostly with air and missile forces, although some ground fighting was also taking place over the key oil-rich province of Marib; the Saudis have conducted numerous air strikes in northern Yemen, while the Huthis have launched attacks into Saudi territory with ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles armed with explosives; Saudi Arabia also has raised and equipped paramilitary/militia security forces in Yemen based largely on tribal or regional affiliation to deploy along the Saudi-Yemen border, especially the areas bordering the governorates of Saada and Al-Jawf; in April 2022, the warring parties agreed to a two-month cease-fire</p> <p>the United Arab Emirates (UAE) intervened in Yemen in 2015 as part of the Saudi-led coalition with about 3,500 troops, as well as supporting air and naval forces; UAE withdrew its main military force from Yemen in 2019, but has retained a small military presence while working with proxies in southern Yemen, most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC); as of 2021, UAE had recruited, trained, and equipped an estimated 150-200,000 Yemeni fighters and formed them into dozens of militia and paramilitary units</p>"
"text": "in 2015, a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states intervened militarily in Yemen in support of the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) against the separatist Huthis; as of early 2022, the conflict had become largely stalemated, but the coalition (consisting largely of Saudi forces), ROYG forces, and the Huthis continued to engage in fighting, mostly with air and missile forces, although some ground fighting was also taking place over the key oil-rich province of Marib; the Saudis have conducted numerous air strikes in northern Yemen, while the Huthis have launched attacks into Saudi territory with ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles armed with explosives; Saudi Arabia also has raised and equipped paramilitary/militia security forces in Yemen based largely on tribal or regional affiliation to deploy along the Saudi-Yemen border, especially the areas bordering the governorates of Saada and Al-Jawf; in April 2022, the warring parties agreed to a two-month cease-fire <br><br>the United Arab Emirates (UAE) intervened in Yemen in 2015 as part of the Saudi-led coalition with about 3,500 troops, as well as supporting air and naval forces; UAE withdrew its main military force from Yemen in 2019, but has retained a small military presence while working with proxies in southern Yemen, most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC); as of 2021, UAE had recruited, trained, and equipped an estimated 150-200,000 Yemeni fighters and formed them into dozens of militia and paramilitary units <br><br>Iran reportedly has backed the Huthi forces by providing military training, lethal support, and technical assistance; Iran has said it supports the Huthis politically, but denies sending the group weapons (2022)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "<p>the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued Maritime Advisory 2022-003 (Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean-Violence Due to Regional Conflict and Piracy) effective 28 February 2022, which states in part the \"Conflict in Yemen continues to pose potential risk to US flagged commercial vessels transiting the southern Red Sea, Bab al Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden. Threats may come from a variety of different sources including, but not limited to, missiles, rockets, projectiles, mines, small arms, unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned surface vessels, or waterborne improvised explosive devices. These threat vectors continue to pose a direct or collateral risk to US flagged commercial vessels operating in the region. Additionally, piracy poses a threat in the Gulf of Aden, Western Arabian Sea, and Western Indian Ocean.\"</p>"