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africa/ag.json
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@ -112,13 +112,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "47,022,473"
"text": "47,022,473 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "23,854,821"
},
"female": {
"text": "23,167,652 (2024 est.)"
"text": "23,167,652"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -144,9 +144,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Muslim (official; predominantly Sunni) 99%, other (includes Christian, Jewish, Ahmadi Muslim, Shia Muslim, Ibadi Muslim) <1% (2012 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>For the first two thirds of the 20th century, Algeria's high fertility rate caused its population to grow rapidly. However, about a decade after independence from France in 1962, the total fertility rate fell dramatically from 7 children per woman in the 1970s to about 2.4 in 2000, slowing Algeria's population growth rate by the late 1980s. The lower fertility rate was mainly the result of women's rising age at first marriage (virtually all Algerian children being born in wedlock) and to a lesser extent the wider use of contraceptives. Later marriages and a preference for smaller families are attributed to increases in women's education and participation in the labor market; higher unemployment; and a shortage of housing forcing multiple generations to live together. The average woman's age at first marriage increased from about 19 in the mid-1950s to 24 in the mid-1970s to 30.5 in the late 1990s.</p> <p>Algeria's fertility rate experienced an unexpected upturn in the early 2000s, as the average woman's age at first marriage dropped slightly. The reversal in fertility could represent a temporary fluctuation in marriage age or, less likely, a decrease in the steady rate of contraceptive use.</p> <p>Thousands of Algerian peasants - mainly Berber men from the Kabylia region - faced with land dispossession and economic hardship under French rule migrated temporarily to France to work in manufacturing and mining during the first half of the 20th century. This movement accelerated during World War I, when Algerians filled in for French factory workers or served as soldiers. In the years following independence, low-skilled Algerian workers and Algerians who had supported the French (known as Harkis) emigrated en masse to France. Tighter French immigration rules and Algiers' decision to cease managing labor migration to France in the 1970s limited legal emigration largely to family reunification.</p> <p>Not until Algeria's civil war in the 1990s did the country again experience substantial outmigration. Many Algerians legally entered Tunisia without visas claiming to be tourists and then stayed as workers. Other Algerians headed to Europe seeking asylum, although France imposed restrictions. Sub-Saharan African migrants came to Algeria after its civil war to work in agriculture and mining. In the 2000s, a wave of educated Algerians went abroad seeking skilled jobs in a wider range of destinations, increasing their presence in North America and Spain. At the same time, legal foreign workers principally from China and Egypt came to work in Algeria's construction and oil sectors. Illegal migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Malians, Nigeriens, and Gambians, continue to come to Algeria in search of work or to use it as a stepping stone to Libya and Europe.</p> <p>Since 1975, Algeria also has been the main recipient of Sahrawi refugees from the ongoing conflict in Western Sahara (today part of Morocco). More than 100,000 Sahrawis are estimated to be living in five refugee camps in southwestern Algeria near Tindouf.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "30.8% (male 7,411,337/female 7,062,794)"
@ -607,13 +604,13 @@
"text": "6 years"
},
"most recent election date": {
"text": "2/5/2022"
"text": "3/9/2025"
},
"percentage of women in chamber": {
"text": "4.1%"
},
"expected date of next election": {
"text": "March 2025"
"text": "January 2028"
}
},
"Judicial branch": {

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africa/ao.json
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@ -115,13 +115,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "37,202,061"
"text": "37,202,061 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "18,196,058"
},
"female": {
"text": "19,006,003 (2024 est.)"
"text": "19,006,003"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -142,9 +142,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Roman Catholic 41.1%, Protestant 38.1%, other 8.6%, none 12.3% (2014 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>More than two decades after the end of Angola's 27-year civil war, the country still faces a variety of socioeconomic problems, including poverty, high maternal and child mortality, and illiteracy. Despite the country's rapid post-war economic growth based on oil production, about 30 percent of Angolans live below the poverty line and unemployment is widespread, especially among the large young-adult population. Only about 70% of the population is literate, and the rate drops to around 60% for women. The youthful population - about 48% are under the age of 15 as of 2022 - is expected to continue growing rapidly with a fertility rate of more than 5 children per woman and a low rate of contraceptive use. Fewer than half of women deliver their babies with the assistance of trained health care personnel, which contributes to Angola's high maternal mortality rate.</p> <p>Of the estimated 550,000 Angolans who fled their homeland during its civil war, most have returned home since 2002. In 2012, the UN assessed that conditions in Angola had been stable for several years and invoked a cessation of refugee status for Angolans. Following the cessation clause, some of those still in exile returned home voluntarily through UN repatriation programs, and others integrated into host countries.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "46.9% (male 8,752,419/female 8,701,422)"

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africa/bc.json
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@ -107,13 +107,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "2,450,668"
"text": "2,450,668 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "1,174,306"
},
"female": {
"text": "1,276,362 (2024 est.)"
"text": "1,276,362"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -133,9 +133,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Christian 79.1%, Badimo 4.1%, other 1.4% (includes Baha'i, Hindu, Muslim, Rastafarian), none 15.2%, unspecified 0.3% (2011 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Botswana has experienced one of the most rapid declines in fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa. The total fertility rate fell from more than 5 children per woman in the mid 1980s to approximately 2.4 in 2013, and remains at that level in 2022. The fertility reduction has been attributed to a host of factors, including higher educational attainment among women, greater participation of women in the workforce, increased contraceptive use, later first births, and a strong national family planning program. Botswana was making significant progress in several health indicators, including life expectancy and infant and child mortality rates, until being devastated by the HIV/AIDs epidemic in the 1990s.</p> <p>In 2021,  Botswana had one of the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the world at close to 20%, however comprehensive and effective treatment programs have reduced HIV/AIDS-related deaths. The combination of declining fertility and increasing mortality rates because of HIV/AIDS is slowing the population aging process, with a narrowing of the youngest age groups and little expansion of the oldest age groups. Nevertheless, having the bulk of its population (about 60% as of 2022) of working age will only yield economic benefits if the labor force is healthy, educated, and productively employed.</p> <p>Batswana have been working as contract miners in South Africa since the 19th century. Although Botswana’s economy improved shortly after independence in 1966 with the discovery of diamonds and other minerals, its lingering high poverty rate and lack of job opportunities continued to push workers to seek mining work in southern African countries. In the early 1970s, about a third of Botswana’s male labor force worked in South Africa (lesser numbers went to Namibia and Zimbabwe). Not until the 1980s and 1990s, when South African mining companies had reduced their recruitment of foreign workers and Botswana’s economic prospects had improved, were Batswana increasingly able to find job opportunities at home.</p> <p>Most Batswana prefer life in their home country and choose cross-border migration on a temporary basis only for work, shopping, visiting family, or tourism. Since the 1970s, Botswana has pursued an open migration policy enabling it to recruit thousands of foreign workers to fill skilled labor shortages. In the late 1990s, Botswana’s prosperity and political stability attracted not only skilled workers but small numbers of refugees from neighboring Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "28.7% (male 355,583/female 348,863)"
@ -1117,7 +1114,7 @@
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Botswana Defense Force (BDF): Ground Forces Command, Air Arm Command, Defense Logistics Command (2024)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> both the BDF and the Botswana Police Service report to the Ministry of Defense and Security; the Botswana Police Service has primary responsibility for internal security; the BDF reports to the Office of the President through the minister of defense and security and has some domestic security responsibilities<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>the Ground Force Command includes a marine unit with boats and river craft for patrolling Botswana's internal waterways and supporting anti-poaching operations"
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> both the BDF and the Botswana Police Service (BPS) report to the Ministry of Defense, Justice and Security; the BPS has primary responsibility for internal security<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>the Ground Force Command includes a marine unit with boats and river craft for patrolling Botswana's internal waterways and supporting anti-poaching operations"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2023": {

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africa/bn.json
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@ -109,13 +109,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "14,697,052"
"text": "14,697,052 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "7,253,258"
},
"female": {
"text": "7,443,794 (2024 est.)"
"text": "7,443,794"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -135,9 +135,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Muslim 27.7%, Roman Catholic 25.5%, Protestant 13.5% (Celestial 6.7%, Methodist 3.4%, other Protestant 3.4%), Vodoun 11.6%, other Christian 9.5%, other traditional religions 2.6%, other 2.6%, none 5.8% (2013 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Benin has a youthful age structure – almost 65% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2022 – which is bolstered by high fertility and population growth rates. Benin’s total fertility has been falling over time but remains high, declining from almost 7 children per women in 1990 to 5.4 in 2022. Benin’s low contraceptive use and high unmet need for contraception contribute to the sustained high fertility rate. Although the majority of Beninese women use skilled health care personnel for antenatal care and delivery, the high rate of maternal mortality indicates the need for more access to high quality obstetric care.</p> <p>Poverty, unemployment, increased living costs, and dwindling resources increasingly drive the Beninese to migrate. An estimated 4.4 million, more than 30%, of Beninese live abroad. Virtually all Beninese emigrants move to West African countries, particularly Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire. Of the less than 1% of Beninese emigrants who settle in Europe, the vast majority live in France, Benin’s former colonial ruler.</p> <p>With about 40% of the population living below the poverty line as of 2019, many desperate parents resort to sending their children to work in wealthy households as domestic servants (a common practice known as vidomegon), mines, quarries, or agriculture domestically or in Nigeria and other neighboring countries, often under brutal conditions. Unlike in other West African countries, where rural people move to the coast, farmers from Benin’s densely populated southern and northwestern regions move to the historically sparsely populated central region to pursue agriculture. Immigrants from West African countries came to Benin in increasing numbers between 1992 and 2002 because of its political stability and porous borders.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "45.3% (male 3,360,027/female 3,294,201)"
@ -919,11 +916,11 @@
"note": "<b>note:</b> top five import commodities based on value in dollars"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": {
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": {
"text": "$698.9 million (31 December 2017 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": {
"text": "$698.9 million (2017 est.)"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": {
"text": "$57.5 million (31 December 2016 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": {
"text": "$57.5 million (2016 est.)"
}
},
"Debt - external": {
@ -1159,7 +1156,7 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Beninese Armed Forces (Forces Armees Beninoises, FAB; aka Benin Defense Forces): Land Force, Air Force, National Navy, National Guard (aka Republican Guard)<br><br>Ministry of Interior and Public Security: Republican Police (Police Republicaine, DGPR) (2024)",
"text": "Beninese Armed Forces (Forces Armees Beninoises, FAB; aka Benin Defense Forces): Army, Air Force, National Navy, National Guard (aka Republican Guard)<br><br>Ministry of Interior and Public Security: Republican Police (Police Republicaine, DGPR) (2025)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> FAB is under the Ministry of Defense and is responsible for external security and supporting the DGPR in maintaining internal security, which has primary responsibility for enforcing law and maintaining order; the DGPR was formed in 2018 through a merger of police and gendarmes"
},
"Military expenditures": {
@ -1180,7 +1177,7 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
"text": "approximately 12,000 active-duty troops, including about 3,000 National Guard; estimated 5,000 Republican Police (2024)"
"text": "approximately 12,000 active-duty troops, including about 3,000 National Guard (2024)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the FAB is equipped with a small mix of mostly older or secondhand French, Soviet-era, and US equipment; in recent years, the EU, France, and the US have provided it with limited amounts of newer military hardware such as armored vehicles and helicopters (2024)"

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africa/by.json
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@ -106,13 +106,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "13,590,102"
"text": "13,590,102 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "6,755,456"
},
"female": {
"text": "6,834,646 (2024 est.)"
"text": "6,834,646"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -138,9 +138,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Christian 93.9% (Roman Catholic 58.6%, Protestant 35.3% [includes Adventist 2.7% and other Protestant religions 32.6%]), Muslim 3.4%, other 1.3%, none 1.3% (2016-17 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Burundi is a densely populated country with a high population growth rate, factors that combined with land scarcity and poverty place a large share of its population at risk of food insecurity. About 90% of the population relies on subsistence agriculture. Subdivision of land to sons, and redistribution to returning refugees, results in smaller, overworked, and less-productive plots. Food shortages, poverty, and a lack of clean water contribute to a 60% chronic malnutrition rate among children. A lack of reproductive health services has prevented a significant reduction in Burundi’s maternal mortality and fertility rates, which are both among the world’s highest. With almost two-thirds of its population under the age of 25 and a birth rate of about 5 children per woman as of 2022, Burundi’s population will continue to expand rapidly for decades to come, putting additional strain on a poor country.</p> <p>Historically, migration flows into and out of Burundi have consisted overwhelmingly of refugees from violent conflicts. In the last decade, more than a half million Burundian refugees returned home from neighboring countries, mainly Tanzania. Reintegrating the returnees has been problematic due to their prolonged time in exile, land scarcity, poor infrastructure, poverty, and unemployment. Repatriates and existing residents (including internally displaced persons) compete for limited land and other resources. To further complicate matters, international aid organizations reduced their assistance because they no longer classified Burundi as a post-conflict country. Conditions deteriorated when renewed violence erupted in April 2015, causing another outpouring of refugees. In addition to refugee out-migration, Burundi has hosted thousands of refugees from neighboring countries, mostly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and lesser numbers from Rwanda.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "42.3% (male 2,895,275/female 2,848,286)"
@ -1111,7 +1108,7 @@
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Burundi National Defense Force (BNDF; Force de Defense Nationale du Burundi or FDNB) : Land Force (la Force Terrestre), the Navy Force (la Force de la Marine), the Air Force (la Force Aérienne) and Specialized Units (des Unités Spécialisées)<br><br>Ministry of Interior, Community Development, and Public Security: Burundi National Police (Police Nationale du Burundi) (2024)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the Naval Force is responsible for monitoring Burundi’s 175-km shoreline on Lake Tanganyika; the Specialized Units include a special security brigade for the protection of institutions (aka BSPI), commandos, special forces, and military police<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> in 2022, Burundi created a new reserve force (Force de réserve et d’appui au développement, FRAD); the FRAD's duties include organizing paramilitary trainings, supporting other components in protecting the integrity of the national territory, conceiving and implementing development projects, and operationalizing national and international partnerships"
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the Naval Force is responsible for monitoring Burundi’s 175-km shoreline on Lake Tanganyika; the Specialized Units include a special security brigade for the protection of institutions (aka BSPI), commandos, special forces, and military police"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2023": {

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africa/cd.json
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"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "19,093,595"
"text": "19,093,595 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "9,464,699"
},
"female": {
"text": "9,628,896 (2024 est.)"
"text": "9,628,896"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -140,9 +140,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Muslim 52.1%, Protestant 23.9%, Roman Catholic 20%, animist 0.3%, other Christian 0.2%, none 2.8%, unspecified 0.7% (2014-15 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Despite the start of oil production in 2003, around 40% of Chad’s population lived below the poverty line as of 2018. The population will continue to grow rapidly because of the country’s very high fertility rate and large youth cohort – more than 65% of the populace is under the age of 25 as of 2022 – although the mortality rate is high and life expectancy is low. Chad has the world’s second highest maternal mortality rate as of 2017. Among the primary risk factors are poverty, anemia, rural habitation, high fertility, poor education, and a lack of access to family planning and obstetric care. Impoverished, uneducated adolescents living in rural areas are most affected. To improve women’s reproductive health and reduce fertility, Chad will need to increase women’s educational attainment, job participation, and knowledge of and access to family planning. Less than a quarter of women are literate, less than 10% use contraceptives, and more than 40% undergo genital cutting.</p> <p>As of December 2022, more than 403,000 refugees from Sudan and more than 120,000 from the Central African Republic strain Chad’s limited resources and create tensions in host communities. Thousands of new refugees fled to Chad in 2013 to escape worsening violence in the Darfur region of Sudan. The large refugee populations are hesitant to return to their home countries because of continued instability. Chad was relatively stable in 2012 in comparison to other states in the region, but past fighting between government forces and opposition groups and inter-communal violence have left more than 380,000 of its citizens displaced in the eastern part of the country as of 2022.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "45.8% (male 4,428,132/female 4,323,398)"
@ -626,6 +623,9 @@
"most recent election date": {
"text": "2/25/2025"
},
"percentage of women in chamber": {
"text": "37.7%"
},
"expected date of next election": {
"text": "February 2031"
}
@ -1119,8 +1119,8 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Chadian National Army (Armee Nationale du Tchad, ANT): Land Forces (l'Armee de Terre, AdT), Chadian Air Force (l'Armee de l'Air Tchadienne, AAT), General Direction of the Security Services of State Institutions (Direction Generale des Services de Securite des Institutions de l'Etat, GDSSIE); National Gendarmerie; Ministry of Public Security and Immigration: National Nomadic Guard of Chad (GNNT) (2023)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the GDSSIE, formerly known as the Republican Guard, is the presidential guard force and is considered to be Chad's elite military unit; it is reportedly a division-sized force with infantry, armor, and special forces/anti-terrorism regiments (known as the Special Anti-Terrorist Group or SATG, aka Division of Special Anti-Terrorist Groups or DGSAT)<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the Chadian National Police are under the Ministry of Public Security and Immigration; border security duties are shared by the Army, Customs (Ministry of Public Security and Immigration), the Gendarmerie, and the GNNT"
"text": "Chadian National Army (Armee Nationale du Tchad, ANT): Ground Forces (l'Armee de Terre, AdT), Chadian Air Force (l'Armee de l'Air Tchadienne, AAT), Chadian National Gendarmerie; General Direction of the Security Services of State Institutions (Direction Generale des Services de Securite des Institutions de l'Etat, GDSSIE)<br><br>Ministry of Public Security and Immigration: National Nomadic Guard of Chad (GNNT) (2023)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the GDSSIE is the presidential guard force and is considered to be Chad's elite military unit; it is reportedly a division-sized force with infantry, armor, and special forces/anti-terrorism regiments (known as the Special Anti-Terrorist Group or SATG, aka Division of Special Anti-Terrorist Groups or DGSAT); it reports directly to the president<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the Chadian National Police are under the Ministry of Public Security and Immigration; border security duties are shared by the ANT, Customs (Ministry of Public Security and Immigration), the National Gendarmerie, and the GNNT"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2023": {

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africa/cf.json
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"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "6,097,665"
"text": "6,097,665 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "3,045,973"
},
"female": {
"text": "3,051,692 (2024 est.)"
"text": "3,051,692"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -146,9 +146,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Roman Catholic 33.1%, Awakening Churches/Christian Revival 22.3%, Protestant 19.9%, Salutiste 2.2%, Muslim 1.6%, Kimbanguiste 1.5%, other 8.1%, none 11.3% (2007 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>The Republic of the Congo is one of the most urbanized countries in Africa, with nearly 70% of Congolese living in urban areas.  The population is concentrated in the southwest of the country, mainly in the capital Brazzaville, Pointe-Noire, and along the railway line that connects the two.  The tropical jungles in the north of the country are sparsely populated.  Most Congolese are Bantu, and most belong to one of four main ethnic groups, the Kongo, Teke, Mbochi, and Sangha, which consist of over 70 subgroups.</p> <p>The Republic of Congo is in the early stages of a demographic transition, whereby a population shifts from high fertility and mortality rates to low fertility and mortality rates associated with industrialized societies.  Its total fertility rate (TFR), the average number of children born per woman, remains high at 4.4 as of 2022.  While its TFR has steadily decreased, the progress slowed beginning in about 1995.  The slowdown in fertility reduction has delayed the demographic transition and Congo’s potential to reap a demographic dividend, the economic boost that can occur when the share of the working-age population is larger than the dependent age groups. </p> <p>The TFR differs significantly between urban and rural areas – 3.7 in urban areas versus 6.5 in rural areas.  The TFR also varies among regions.  The urban regions of Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire have much lower TFRs than other regions, which are predominantly or completely rural.  The gap between desired fertility and actual fertility is also greatest in rural areas.  Rural families may have more children to contribute to agricultural production and/or due to a lack of information about and access to contraception.  Urban families may prefer to have fewer children because raising them is more expensive and balancing work and childcare may be more difficult.  The number of births among teenage girls, the frequency of giving birth before the age of fifteen, and a lack of education are the most likely reasons for higher TFRs in rural areas.  Although 90% of school-age children are enrolled in primary school, repetition and dropout rates are high and the quality of education is poor.  Congolese women with no or little education start having children earlier and have more children in total than those with at least some secondary education.</p> <p> </p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "37.8% (male 1,162,298/female 1,143,668)"

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africa/cg.json
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@ -118,13 +118,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "115,403,027"
"text": "115,403,027 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "57,688,160"
},
"female": {
"text": "57,714,867 (2024 est.)"
"text": "57,714,867"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -149,9 +149,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "&nbsp;Christian 93/1% (Roman Catholic 29.9%, Protestant 26.7%, other Christian 36.5%), Kimbanguist 2.8%, Muslim 1.3%, other (includes syncretic sects and indigenous beliefs) 1.2%, none 1.3%, unspecified 0.2% (2014 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Despite a wealth of fertile soil, hydroelectric power potential, and mineral resources, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) struggles with many socioeconomic problems, including high infant and maternal mortality rates, malnutrition, poor vaccination coverage, lack of access to improved water sources and sanitation, and frequent and early fertility. Ongoing conflict, mismanagement of resources, and a lack of investment have resulted in food insecurity; almost 25% of children under the age of 5 were malnourished as of 2018. The overall coverage of basic public services – education, health, sanitation, and potable water – is very limited and piecemeal, with substantial regional and rural/urban disparities. Fertility remains high at more than 5 children per woman and is likely to remain high because of the low use of contraception and the cultural preference for larger families.</p> <p>The DRC is a source and host country for refugees. Between 2012 and 2014, more than 119,000 Congolese refugees returned from the Republic of Congo to the relative stability of northwest DRC, but more than 1 million Congolese refugees and asylum seekers were hosted by neighboring countries as of December 2022. In addition, an estimated 5.5 million Congolese were internally displaced as of October 2022, the vast majority fleeing violence between rebel group and Congolese armed forces. Thousands of refugees have come to the DRC from neighboring countries, including Rwanda, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Burundi.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "45.7% (male 26,584,268/female 26,208,891)"
@ -1240,8 +1237,8 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Forces d'Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo, FARDC): Land Forces, National Navy (La Marine Nationale), Congolese Air Force (Force Aerienne Congolaise, FAC); Republican Guard<br><br>Ministry of Interior: Congolese National Police (2024)",
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>the Republican Guard is a division-size element with armored and infantry units; it is regarded as the country’s most capable unit and is under the direct control of the president"
"text": "Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Forces d'Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo, FARDC): Land Forces (Forces Terrestres), National Navy (La Marine Nationale), Congolese Air Force (Force Aerienne Congolaise, FAC); Republican Guard (Garde Républicaine, GR)<br><br>Ministry of Interior: Congolese National Police (Police Nationale Congolaise, PNC) (2025)",
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>the Republican Guard is a military unit under the direct control of the president"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2023": {

9
africa/cm.json
View file

@ -114,13 +114,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "30,966,105"
"text": "30,966,105 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "15,429,588"
},
"female": {
"text": "15,536,517 (2024 est.)"
"text": "15,536,517"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -145,9 +145,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Roman Catholic 33.1%, Muslim 30.6%, Protestant 27.1% other Christian 6.1%, animist 1.3%, other 0.7%, none 1.2% (2022 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Cameroon has a large youth population, with more than 60% of the populace under the age of 25 as of 2020. Fertility is falling but remains at a high level, especially among poor, rural, and uneducated women, in part because of inadequate access to contraception. Life expectancy remains low at about 55 years due to the prevalence of HIV and AIDs and an elevated maternal mortality rate, which has remained high since 1990. Cameroon, particularly the northern region, is vulnerable to food insecurity largely because of government mismanagement, corruption, high production costs, inadequate infrastructure, and natural disasters. Despite economic growth in some regions, poverty is on the rise, and is most prevalent in rural areas, which are especially affected by a shortage of jobs, declining incomes, poor school and health care infrastructure, and a lack of clean water and sanitation. Underinvestment in social safety nets and ineffective public financial management also contribute to Cameroon’s high rate of poverty.  The activities of Boko Haram, other armed groups, and counterinsurgency operations have worsened food insecurity in the Far North region.  </p> <p>International migration has been driven by unemployment (including fewer government jobs), poverty, the search for educational opportunities, and corruption. The US and Europe are preferred destinations, but, with tighter immigration restrictions in these countries, young Cameroonians are increasingly turning to neighboring states, such as Gabon and Nigeria, South Africa, other parts of Africa, and the Near and Far East. Cameroon’s limited resources make it dependent on UN support to host more than 480,000 refugees and asylum seekers as of December 2022. These refugees and asylum seekers are primarily from the Central African Republic and Nigeria.  Internal and external displacement have grown dramatically in recent years.  Boko Haram's attacks and counterattacks by government forces in the Far North since 2014 have increased the number of internally displaced people.  Armed conflict between separatists and Cameroon's military in the Northwest and Southwest since 2016 have displaced hundreds of thousands of the country's Anglophone minority.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "41.5% (male 6,477,438/female 6,364,987)"
@ -1244,7 +1241,7 @@
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Cameroon Armed Forces (Forces Armees Camerounaises, FAC): Army (L'Armee de Terre), Navy (Marine Nationale Republique, MNR, includes naval infantry or fusiliers marin), Air Force (Armee de l'Air du Cameroun, AAC), National Gendarmerie (Gendamerie Nationale, GN), National Firefighting Corps (Corps National de Sapeurs-Pompiers, CNSP), Presidential Guard (Garde Présidentielle du Cameroun, GP)<br><br>General Delegation for National Security (Délégation Générale à la Sûreté Nationale or DGSN): Cameroon Police (2024)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the Police and the National Gendarmerie are responsible for internal security; the Gendarmerie conducts administrative, criminal, and military investigative functions; other missions include customs, air and maritime surveillance, and road traffic control; in times of conflict, it participates in internal defense<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the Army includes the Rapid Intervention Brigade (Brigade d’Intervention Rapide or BIR), which maintains its own command and control structure and reports directly to the Chief of Defense staff and the Presidency; the BIR includes airborne/airmobile, amphibious, armored reconnaissance, artillery, and counterterrorism forces, as well as support elements, such as intelligence"
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the Army includes the Rapid Intervention Brigade (Brigade d’Intervention Rapide or BIR), which maintains its own command and control structure and reports directly to the Chief of Defense staff and the Presidency; the BIR includes airborne/airmobile, amphibious, armored reconnaissance, artillery, and counterterrorism forces, as well as support elements, such as intelligence <br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the Cameroon Police and the National Gendarmerie are responsible for internal security; the Gendarmerie conducts administrative, criminal, and military investigative functions; other missions include customs, air and maritime surveillance, and road traffic control; in times of conflict, it participates in internal defense"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2023": {

9
africa/cn.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "slightly more than 12 times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "slightly more than 12 times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -97,13 +97,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "900,141"
"text": "900,141 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "435,758"
},
"female": {
"text": "464,383 (2024 est.)"
"text": "464,383"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -124,9 +124,6 @@
"text": "Muslim 98.1% (overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, small Shia Muslim and Ahmadiyya Muslim populations), ethnic religionist 1.1%, Christian 0.6%, other 0.3% (2020 est.)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> Sunni Islam is the state religion"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Comoros’ population is a melange of Arabs, Persians, Indonesians, Africans, and Indians, and the much smaller number of Europeans that settled on the islands between the 8th and 19th centuries, when they served as a regional trade hub. The Arab and Persian influence is most evident in the islands’ overwhelmingly Muslim majority – about 98% of Comorans are Sunni Muslims. The country is densely populated, averaging nearly 350 people per square mile, although this varies widely among the islands, with Anjouan being the most densely populated.</p><p>Given the large share of land dedicated to agriculture and Comoros’ growing population, habitable land is becoming increasingly crowded. The combination of increasing population pressure on limited land and resources, widespread poverty, and poor job prospects motivates thousands of Comorans each year to attempt to illegally migrate using small fishing boats to the neighboring island of Mayotte, which is a French territory. The majority of legal Comoran migration to France came after Comoros’ independence from France in 1975, with the flow peaking in the mid-1980s.</p><p>At least 150,000 to 200,000 people of Comoran citizenship or descent live abroad, mainly in France, where they have gone seeking a better quality of life, job opportunities, higher education (Comoros has no universities), advanced health care, and to finance elaborate traditional wedding ceremonies (aada). Remittances from the diaspora are an economic mainstay, in 2013 representing approximately 25% of Comoros’ GDP and significantly more than the value of its exports of goods and services (only 15% of GDP). Grand Comore, Comoros’ most populous island, is both the primary source of emigrants and the main recipient of remittances. Most remittances are spent on private consumption, but this often goes toward luxury goods and the aada and does not contribute to economic development or poverty reduction. Although the majority of the diaspora is now French-born with more distant ties to Comoros, it is unclear whether they will sustain the current level of remittances.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "32.6% (male 146,480/female 146,626)"

15
africa/ct.json
View file

@ -107,13 +107,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "5,650,957"
"text": "5,650,957 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "2,814,497"
},
"female": {
"text": "2,836,460 (2024 est.)"
"text": "2,836,460"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -134,9 +134,6 @@
"text": "Roman Catholic 34.6%, Protestant 15.7%, other Christian 22.9%, Muslim 13.8%, ethnic religionist 12%, Baha'i 0.2%, agnostic/atheist 0.7% (2020 est.)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> animistic beliefs and practices strongly influence the Christian majority"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>The Central African Republic’s (CAR) humanitarian crisis has worsened since the coup of March 2013. CAR’s high mortality rate and low life expectancy are attributed to elevated rates of preventable and treatable diseases (including malaria and malnutrition), an inadequate health care system, precarious food security, and armed conflict. Some of the worst mortality rates are in western CAR’s diamond mining region, which has been impoverished because of government attempts to control the diamond trade and the fall in industrial diamond prices. To make matters worse, the government and international donors have reduced health funding in recent years. The CAR’s weak educational system and low literacy rate have also suffered as a result of the country’s ongoing conflict. Schools are closed, qualified teachers are scarce, infrastructure, funding, and supplies are lacking and subject to looting, and many students and teachers have been displaced by violence.</p> <p>Rampant poverty, human rights violations, unemployment, poor infrastructure, and a lack of security and stability have led to forced displacement internally and externally. Since the political crisis that resulted in CAR’s March 2013 coup began in December 2012, approximately 600,000 people have fled to Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and other neighboring countries, while another estimated 515,000 were displaced internally as of December 2022. The UN has urged countries to refrain from repatriating CAR refugees amid the heightened lawlessness.</p> (2019)"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "38.5% (male 1,113,795/female 1,063,971)"
@ -1075,8 +1072,8 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Central African Armed Forces (Forces Armees Centrafricaines, FACA): Army (includes an air squadron, Escadrille Centrafricaine)<br><br>Ministry of Interior: National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Nationale), National Police (2023)",
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>the Special Republican Protection Group (Groupement Spécial Chargé de la Protection Républicaine or GSPR) is part of the Army per a March 2022 decree, but reports to the president; the GSPR provides protection to the head of state"
"text": "Central African Armed Forces (Forces Armees Centrafricaines, FACA): Army (includes an air squadron, Escadrille Centrafricaine)<br><br>Ministry of Interior: National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Nationale), National Police (2024)",
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>the Special Republican Protection Group (Groupement Spécial Chargé de la Protection Républicaine or GSPR) provides protection to the head of state; it is part of the Army but reports to the president"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2023": {
@ -1096,7 +1093,7 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
"text": "limited and varied information available; estimated to have up to 15,000 FACA troops (2023)"
"text": "limited and varied information available; the FACA is estimated to have up to 30,000 troops (2024)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "most of the military's heavy weapons and equipment were destroyed or captured during the 2012–2014 civil war; prior to the war, most of its equipment was of French, Russian, or Soviet origin; in recent years, it has received some secondhand equipment from China and Russia, including light weapons, as well as some armored vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and helicopters (2024)",
@ -1106,7 +1103,7 @@
"text": "18 years of age for military service; no conscription although the constitution provides for the possibility of conscription in the event of an imminent threat to the country (2023)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the 2013 coup resulted in the institutional collapse of the FACA; its forces were overwhelmed and forced to flee to neighboring countries; it has been estimated that only 10% of the FACA returned after the coup, and the FACA has struggled to rebuild in the years of instability since, despite significant foreign assistance; considerable portions of the country remain outside state control and are ungoverned, with the presence of multiple armed actors creating insecurity in much of the country <br><br>in late 2020 and early 2021, the Coalition des Patriotes pour le Change (CPC), a loose coalition of armed groups comprised largely of former Seleka and anti-Balaka fighters, attacked the capital Bangui; CAR Government forces, along with Russian private military contractors and Rwandan troops, repelled the attack while the CPC retreated to its rear bases and into neighboring countries and continued conducting attacks; as of 2023, the CAR Government claimed to have restored authority across much of the country, including the capital, although armed groups, including some not affiliated with CPC, continued to carry out violent activities in regions outside the capital, threatening local stability; forces on both sides have been accused of abuses and atrocities in the fighting <br><br>in 2018, the UN Security Council approved Russian security assistance for the CAR to help train and advise FACA personnel, as well as transport them to operational areas, provide logistical support, and assist with medical evacuation; in addition to teams of military trainers, Russia sent private military contractors to provide assistance to the FACA; the Russians have also performed other security roles such as guarding mines and government officials; some Russian contractors and the CAR forces they supported have been accused of carrying out indiscriminate killings, using excessive force against civilians, and looting<br><br>the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) has operated in the country since 2014; its mission includes providing security, protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, disarming and demobilizing armed groups, and supporting the country’s fragile transitional government; as of early 2024, MINUSCA had more than 16,000 military and police personnel <br><br>the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA) has operated in the country since 2016, providing advice, training, and educational programs to the country's security forces; the EU mission has trained five FACA territorial infantry battalions and one amphibious infantry battalion; France and Rwanda have also provided assistance to the FACA; France suspended its support in 2021, but Rwanda continued providing troops and military training as of 2024 (2024)"
"text": "the 2013 coup resulted in the institutional collapse of the FACA; its forces were overwhelmed and forced to flee to neighboring countries; it has been estimated that only 10% of the FACA returned after the coup, and the FACA has struggled to rebuild in the years of instability since, despite significant foreign assistance; considerable portions of the country remain outside state control and are ungoverned, with the presence of multiple armed actors creating insecurity in much of the country <br><br>in late 2020 and early 2021, the Coalition des Patriotes pour le Change (CPC), a loose coalition of armed groups comprised largely of former Seleka and anti-Balaka fighters, attacked the capital Bangui; CAR Government forces, along with Russian private military contractors and Rwandan troops, repelled the attack while the CPC retreated to its rear bases and into neighboring countries and continued conducting attacks; as of 2023, the CAR Government claimed to have restored authority across much of the country, including the capital, although armed groups, including some not affiliated with CPC, continued to carry out violent activities in regions outside the capital, threatening local stability; forces on both sides have been accused of abuses and atrocities in the fighting <br><br>in 2018, the UN Security Council approved Russian security assistance for the CAR to help train and advise FACA personnel, as well as transport them to operational areas, provide logistical support, and assist with medical evacuation; in addition to teams of military trainers, Russia sent private military contractors to provide assistance to the FACA; the Russians have also performed other security roles such as guarding mines and government officials; some Russian contractors and the CAR forces they supported have been accused of carrying out indiscriminate killings, using excessive force against civilians, and looting<br><br>the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) has operated in the country since 2014; its mission includes providing security, protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, disarming and demobilizing armed groups, and supporting the country’s fragile transitional government; as of early 2024, MINUSCA had more than 16,000 military and police personnel <br><br>the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA) has operated in the country since 2016, providing advice, training, and educational programs to the country's security forces; France and Rwanda have also provided assistance to the FACA; France suspended its support in 2021, but Rwanda continued providing troops and military training as of 2024 (2024)"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

9
africa/cv.json
View file

@ -101,13 +101,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "611,014"
"text": "611,014 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "297,106"
},
"female": {
"text": "313,908 (2024 est.)"
"text": "313,908"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -127,9 +127,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Roman Catholic 72.5%, Protestant 4% (includes Adventist 1.9%, Nazarene 1.8%, Assembly of God 0.2%, God is Love 0.1%), Christian Rationalism 1.7%, Muslim 1.3%, Jehovah's Witness 1.2%, Church of Jesus Christ 1%, other Christian 1.3%, other 1.2%, none 15.6%, no response 0.4% (2021 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Cabo Verde’s population descends from its first permanent inhabitants in the late 15th-century – a preponderance of West African slaves, a small share of Portuguese colonists, and even fewer Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese Jews. Over the centuries, the country’s overall population size has fluctuated significantly, as recurring periods of famine and epidemics have caused high death tolls and emigration.</p><p>Labor migration historically reduced Cabo Verde’s population growth and still provides a key source of income through remittances. Expatriates probably outnumber Cabo Verde’s resident population, with most families having a member abroad. Cabo Verdeans have settled in the US, Europe, Africa, and South America. The largest diaspora community in New Bedford, Massachusetts, dating to the early 1800s, is a byproduct of the transatlantic whaling industry. Cabo Verdean men fleeing poverty at home joined the crews of US whaling ships that stopped in the islands. Many settled in New Bedford and stayed in the whaling or shipping trade, worked in the textile or cranberry industries, or operated their own transatlantic packet ships that transported compatriots to the US. Increased Cabo Verdean emigration to the US coincided with the gradual and eventually complete abolition of slavery in the archipelago in 1878.</p><p>During the same period, Portuguese authorities coerced Cabo Verdeans to go to Sao Tome and Principe and other Portuguese colonies in Africa to work as indentured laborers on plantations. In the 1920s, when the US implemented immigration quotas, Cabo Verdean emigration shifted toward Portugal, West Africa (Senegal), and South America (Argentina). Growing numbers of Cabo Verdean labor migrants headed to Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. They filled unskilled jobs in Portugal, as many Portuguese sought out work opportunities in the more prosperous economies of northwest Europe. Cabo Verdeans eventually expanded their emigration to the Netherlands, where they worked in the shipping industry. Migration to the US resumed under relaxed migration laws. Cabo Verdean women also began migrating to southern Europe to become domestic workers, a trend that continues today and has shifted the gender balance of Cabo Verdean emigration.</p><p>Emigration has declined in more recent decades due to the adoption of more restrictive migration policies in destination countries. Reduced emigration along with a large youth population, decreased mortality rates, and increased life expectancies, has boosted population growth, putting further pressure on domestic employment and resources. In addition, Cabo Verde has attracted increasing numbers of migrants in recent decades, consisting primarily of people from West Africa, Portuguese-speaking African countries, Portugal, and China. Since the 1990s, some West African migrants have used Cabo Verde as a stepping stone for illegal migration to Europe.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "26.4% (male 80,973/female 80,129)"
@ -1087,7 +1084,7 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Cabo Verdean Armed Forces (FACV): National Guard (GN; serves as the army and includes a small air component), Cabo Verde Coast Guard (Guardia Costeira de Cabo Verde, GCCV) (2024)",
"text": "Cabo Verdean Armed Forces (FACV): National Guard (GN), Cabo Verde Coast Guard (Guardia Costeira de Cabo Verde, GCCV) (2025)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong>  the National Police are under the Ministry of Internal Affairs"
},
"Military expenditures": {

15
africa/dj.json
View file

@ -111,13 +111,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "994,974"
"text": "994,974 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "450,796"
},
"female": {
"text": "544,178 (2024 est.)"
"text": "544,178"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -137,9 +137,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Sunni Muslim 94% (nearly all Djiboutians), other 6% (mainly foreign-born residents - Shia Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Baha'i, and atheist)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Djibouti is a poor, predominantly urban country, characterized by high rates of illiteracy, unemployment, and childhood malnutrition. Approximately 70% of the population lives in cities and towns (predominantly in the capital, Djibouti). The rural population subsists primarily on nomadic herding. Prone to droughts and floods, the country has few natural resources and must import more than 80% of its food from neighboring countries or Europe. Health care, particularly outside the capital, is limited by poor infrastructure, shortages of equipment and supplies, and a lack of qualified personnel. More than a third of health care recipients are migrants because the services are still better than those available in their neighboring home countries. The nearly universal practice of female genital cutting reflects Djibouti’s lack of gender equality and is a major contributor to obstetrical complications and its high rates of maternal and infant mortality. A 1995 law prohibiting the practice has never been enforced.</p> <p>Because of its political stability and its strategic location at the confluence of East Africa and the Gulf States along the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, Djibouti is a key transit point for migrants and asylum seekers heading for the Gulf States and beyond. Each year some 100,000 people, mainly Ethiopians and some Somalis, journey through Djibouti, usually to the port of Obock, to attempt a dangerous sea crossing to Yemen. However, with the escalation of the ongoing Yemen conflict, Yemenis began fleeing to Djibouti in March 2015, with almost 20,000 arriving by August 2017. Most Yemenis remain unregistered and head for Djibouti City rather than seeking asylum at one of Djibouti’s three spartan refugee camps. Djibouti has been hosting refugees and asylum seekers, predominantly Somalis and lesser numbers of Ethiopians and Eritreans, at camps for 20 years, despite lacking potable water, food shortages, and unemployment.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "28.4% (male 141,829/female 140,696)"
@ -1096,8 +1093,8 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Djibouti Armed Forces (Forces Armées Djiboutiennes or FAD): Army, Navy, Air Force; Djibouti Coast Guard<br><br>Ministry of Interior: National Police (2024)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the National Police is responsible for security within Djibouti City and has primary control over immigration and customs procedures for all land border-crossing points, while the National Gendarmerie, which reports to the Ministry of Defense, is responsible for all security outside of Djibouti City, as well as for protecting critical infrastructure within the city, such as the international airport"
"text": "Djibouti Armed Forces (Forces Armées Djiboutiennes or FAD): Djiboutian (or National) Army, Djiboutian Navy (includes Djiboutian Coast Guard), Djiboutian Air Force; Djiboutian National Gendarmerie<br><br>Ministry of Interior: National Police (Police Nationale) (2025)",
"note": "<strong>note 1: </strong>the National Gendarmerie is a security force with military status under the FAD and the Ministry of Defense, but also has responsibilities to the Ministry of Interior; the Gendarmerie's duties include providing security outside of Djibouti City and protecting critical infrastructure within the city, such as the international airport<strong><br><br>note 2:</strong> the National Police is responsible for security within Djibouti City and has primary control over immigration and customs procedures for all land border-crossing points"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2019": {
@ -1120,7 +1117,7 @@
"text": "approximately 10,000 active-duty military personnel; approximately 2,000 Gendarmerie (2023)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the FAD's inventory is a mix of mostly older or secondhand equipment from a wide variety of suppliers, including China, France, Italy, Russia/former Soviet Union, South Africa, Turkey, and the US (2024)"
"text": "the FAD's inventory is a mix of mostly older or secondhand equipment from a wide variety of suppliers, including China, France, Italy, Japan, Russia/former Soviet Union, South Africa, Turkey, and the US (2024)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; 16-25 years of age for voluntary military training; no conscription (2023)"
@ -1129,7 +1126,7 @@
"text": "approximately 1,500 Somalia (AUSSOM) (2025)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "Djibouti's military forces are largely focused on border, coastal, and internal security duties, such as counterterrorism; China, France, Italy, Japan, and the US maintain bases in Djibouti for regional military missions, including counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, crisis response, and security assistance (note &ndash; France has multiple bases and hosts troop contingents from Germany and Spain); the EU and NATO also maintain a presence to support multinational naval counter-piracy operations and maritime training efforts (2023)"
"text": "Djibouti's military forces are largely focused on border, coastal, and internal security duties, such as counterterrorism; as recently as February 2025, Djiboutian forces have conducted operations near its border with Ethiopia against members of the Armed Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD A), which Djibouti considers a terrorist group<br> <br>China, France, Italy, Japan, and the US maintain bases in Djibouti for regional military missions, including counterterrorism, counter-piracy, crisis response, and security assistance; other countries, such as Germany and Spain, also maintain a smaller presence; the EU and NATO also maintain a presence to support multinational naval counter-piracy operations and maritime training efforts (2025)"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

11
africa/eg.json
View file

@ -123,13 +123,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "111,247,248"
"text": "111,247,248 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "57,142,484"
},
"female": {
"text": "54,104,764 (2024 est.)"
"text": "54,104,764"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -155,9 +155,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Muslim (predominantly Sunni) 90%, Christian (majority Coptic Orthodox, other Christians include Armenian Apostolic, Catholic, Maronite, Orthodox, and Anglican) 10%"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world and the third-most-populous country in Africa, behind Nigeria and Ethiopia. Most of the country is desert, so about 95% of the population is concentrated in a narrow strip of fertile land along the Nile River, which represents only about 5% of Egypt’s land area. Egypt’s rapid population growth – 46% between 1994 and 2014 – stresses limited natural resources, jobs, housing, sanitation, education, and health care.</p> <p>Although the country’s total fertility rate (TFR) fell from roughly 5.5 children per woman in 1980 to just over 3 in the late 1990s, largely as a result of state-sponsored family planning programs, the population growth rate dropped more modestly because of decreased mortality rates and longer life expectancies. During the last decade, Egypt’s TFR decline stalled for several years and then reversed, reaching 3.6 in 2011, and is under 3 as of 2022. Contraceptive use has held steady at about 60%, while preferences for larger families and early marriage may have strengthened in the wake of the recent 2011 revolution. The large cohort of women of or nearing childbearing age will sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future (an effect called population momentum).</p> <p>Nevertheless, post-MUBARAK governments have not made curbing population growth a priority. To increase contraceptive use and to prevent further overpopulation will require greater government commitment and substantial social change, including encouraging smaller families and better educating and empowering women. Currently, literacy, educational attainment, and labor force participation rates are much lower for women than men. In addition, the prevalence of violence against women, the lack of female political representation, and the perpetuation of the nearly universal practice of female genital cutting continue to keep women from playing a more significant role in Egypt’s public sphere.</p> <p>Population pressure, poverty, high unemployment, and the fragmentation of inherited land holdings have historically motivated Egyptians, primarily young men, to migrate internally from rural and smaller urban areas in the Nile Delta region and the poorer rural south to Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban centers in the north, while a much smaller number migrated to the Red Sea and Sinai areas. Waves of forced internal migration also resulted from the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the floods caused by the completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1970. Limited numbers of students and professionals emigrated temporarily prior to the early 1970s, when economic problems and high unemployment pushed the Egyptian Government to lift restrictions on labor migration. At the same time, high oil revenues enabled Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and other Gulf states, as well as Libya and Jordan, to fund development projects, creating a demand for unskilled labor (mainly in construction), which attracted tens of thousands of young Egyptian men.</p> <p>Between 1970 and 1974 alone, Egyptian migrants in the Gulf countries increased from approximately 70,000 to 370,000. Egyptian officials encouraged legal labor migration both to alleviate unemployment and to generate remittance income (remittances continue to be one of Egypt’s largest sources of foreign currency and GDP). During the mid-1980s, however, depressed oil prices resulting from the Iran-Iraq War, decreased demand for low-skilled labor, competition from less costly South Asian workers, and efforts to replace foreign workers with locals significantly reduced Egyptian migration to the Gulf States. The number of Egyptian migrants dropped from a peak of almost 3.3 million in 1983 to about 2.2 million at the start of the 1990s, but numbers gradually recovered.</p> <p>In the 2000s, Egypt began facilitating more labor migration through bilateral agreements, notably with Arab countries and Italy, but illegal migration to Europe through overstayed visas or maritime human smuggling via Libya also rose. The Egyptian Government estimated there were 6.5 million Egyptian migrants in 2009, with roughly 75% being temporary migrants in other Arab countries (Libya, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates) and 25% being predominantly permanent migrants in the West (US, UK, Italy, France, and Canada).</p> <p>During the 2000s, Egypt became an increasingly important transit and destination country for economic migrants and asylum seekers, including Palestinians, East Africans, and South Asians and, more recently, Iraqis and Syrians. Egypt draws many refugees because of its resettlement programs with the West; Cairo has one of the largest urban refugee populations in the world. Many East African migrants are interned or live in temporary encampments along the Egypt-Israel border, and some have been shot and killed by Egyptian border guards.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "33.8% (male 19,349,395/female 18,243,571)"
@ -1269,7 +1266,7 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF): Army (includes Republican Guard), Navy (includes Coast Guard), Air Force, Air Defense Forces, Border Guard Forces; Interior Ministry: Public Security Sector Police, the Central Security Force, National Security Agency (2024)",
"text": "Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF): Army (includes Republican Guard), Navy (includes Coast Guard), Air Force, Air Defense Forces, Border Guard Forces<br><br>Interior Ministry: Public Security Sector Police, the Central Security Force, National Security Agency (2024)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the Public Security Sector Police are responsible for law enforcement nationwide; the Central Security Force protects infrastructure and is responsible for crowd control; the National Security Agency is responsible for internal security threats and counterterrorism along with other security services<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> in addition to its external defense duties, the EAF also has a mandate to assist police in protecting vital infrastructure during a state of emergency; military personnel were granted full arrest authority in 2011 but normally only use this authority during states of emergency and “periods of significant turmoil”"
},
"Military expenditures": {
@ -1303,7 +1300,7 @@
"text": "1,000 (plus nearly 200 police) Central African Republic (MINUSCA); also has about 350 police deployed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo under MONUSCO; slated to have about 1,100 personnel in Somalia under AUSSOM in 2025 (2024)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) are responsible for external defense but also have an internal role assisting police and paramilitary security forces during emergencies and in anti-terrorism operations; the EAF also participates in foreign peacekeeping and other security missions, as well as both bilateral and multinational exercises; the military has considerable political power and independence; it has long had a crucial role in Egypt’s politics and has a large stake in the civilian economy, including running banks, businesses, gas stations, shipping lines, and utilities, and producing consumer and industrial goods, importing commodities, and building and managing infrastructure projects, such as bridges, roads, hospitals, and housing<br><br>the EAF is the largest and one of the best equipped militaries in the region; key areas of concern for the EAF include Islamist militant groups operating out of the Sinai Peninsula, regional challenges such as ongoing conflicts and instability, and maritime security; since 2011, the EAF has been conducting operations alongside other security forces in the North Sinai governorate against several militant groups, particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS); over the past decade, it has deployed large numbers of troops along Egypt's border with Libya, provided air support to the Saudi-led coalition's intervention in Yemen, and most recently boosted its presence on the border with Gaza in response to the HAMAS-Israel conflict; the Navy in recent years has sought to modernize and expand its capabilities and profile in the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea, including the acquisition of helicopter carriers, modern frigates, and attack submarines; in 2020, the EAF inaugurated a large joint service military base on the Red Sea to secure the country’s southern coasts, protect economic investments and natural resources, and confront security challenges in the Red Sea region<br><br>Egypt is a major security partner of the US and one of the largest recipients of US military aid in the region; it also has Major Non-NATO Ally status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation<br><br>the Multinational Force &amp; Observers (MFO) has operated in the Sinai since 1982 as a peacekeeping and monitoring force to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace; the MFO is an independent international organization, created by agreement between Egypt and Israel; it is composed of about 1,150 troops from 13 countries; Colombia, Fiji, and the US are the leading providers of troops to the MFO (2024)"
"text": "the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) are responsible for external defense but also have an internal role assisting police and paramilitary security forces during emergencies and in anti-terrorism operations; the EAF also participates in foreign peacekeeping and other security missions, as well as both bilateral and multinational exercises; the military has considerable political power and independence; it has long had a crucial role in Egypt’s politics and has a large stake in the civilian economy, including running banks, businesses, gas stations, shipping lines, and utilities, and producing consumer and industrial goods, importing commodities, and building and managing infrastructure projects, such as bridges, roads, hospitals, and housing<br><br>the EAF is the largest and one of the better equipped militaries in the region; key areas of concern for the EAF include Islamist militant groups operating out of the Sinai Peninsula, regional challenges such as ongoing conflicts and instability, and maritime security; since 2011, the EAF has been conducting operations alongside other security forces in the North Sinai governorate against several militant groups, particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS); over the past decade, it has deployed large numbers of troops along Egypt's border with Libya, provided air support to the Saudi-led coalition's intervention in Yemen, and most recently boosted its presence on the border with Gaza in response to the HAMAS-Israel conflict; the Navy in recent years has sought to modernize and expand its capabilities and profile in the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea, including the acquisition of helicopter carriers, modern frigates, and attack submarines; in 2020, the EAF inaugurated a large joint service military base on the Red Sea to secure the country’s southern coasts, protect economic investments and natural resources, and confront security challenges in the Red Sea region<br><br>Egypt is a major security partner of the US and one of the largest recipients of US military aid in the region; it also has Major Non-NATO Ally status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation<br><br>the Multinational Force &amp; Observers (MFO) has operated in the Sinai since 1982 as a peacekeeping and monitoring force to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace; the MFO is an independent international organization, created by agreement between Egypt and Israel; it is composed of about 1,150 troops from 13 countries; Colombia, Fiji, and the US are the leading providers of troops to the MFO (2024)"
}
},
"Space": {

7
africa/ek.json
View file

@ -103,13 +103,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "1,795,834"
"text": "1,795,834 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "962,385"
},
"female": {
"text": "833,449 (2024 est.)"
"text": "833,449"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -134,9 +134,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Roman Catholic 88%, Protestant 5%, Muslim 2%, other 5% (animist, Baha'i, Jewish) (2015 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Equatorial Guinea is one of the smallest and least populated countries in continental Africa and is the only independent African country where Spanish is an official language. Despite a boom in oil production in the 1990s, authoritarianism, corruption, and resource mismanagement have concentrated the benefits among a small elite. These practices have perpetuated income inequality and unbalanced development, such as low public spending on education and health care. Unemployment remains problematic because the oil-dominated economy employs a small labor force dependent on skilled foreign workers. The agricultural sector, Equatorial Guinea’s main employer, continues to deteriorate because of a lack of investment and the migration of rural workers to urban areas. About two-thirds of the population lives below the poverty line as of 2020.</p> <p>Equatorial Guinea’s large and growing youth population – about 60% are under the age of 25 as of 2022 – is particularly affected because job creation in the non-oil sectors is limited, and young people often do not have the skills needed in the labor market. Equatorial Guinean children frequently enter school late, have poor attendance, and have high dropout rates. Thousands of Equatorial Guineans fled across the border to Gabon in the 1970s to escape the dictatorship of Francisco MACIAS NGUEMA; smaller numbers have followed in the decades since. Continued inequitable economic growth and high youth unemployment increases the likelihood of ethnic and regional violence.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "35.6% (male 330,636/female 309,528)"

30
africa/er.json
View file

@ -100,13 +100,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "6,343,956"
"text": "6,343,956 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "3,122,433"
},
"female": {
"text": "3,221,523 (2024 est.)"
"text": "3,221,523"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -127,9 +127,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Eritrean Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Evangelical Lutheran, Sunni Muslim"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Eritrea is a persistently poor country that has made progress in some socioeconomic categories but not in others. Education and human capital formation are national priorities for facilitating economic development and eradicating poverty. To this end, Eritrea has made great strides in improving adult literacy – doubling the literacy rate over the last 20 years – in large part because of its successful adult education programs. The overall literacy rate was estimated to be more than 75% in 2018; more work needs to be done to raise female literacy and school attendance among nomadic and rural communities. Subsistence farming fails to meet the needs of Eritrea’s growing population because of repeated droughts, dwindling arable land, overgrazing, soil erosion, and a shortage of farmers due to conscription and displacement. The government’s emphasis on spending on defense over agriculture and its lack of foreign exchange to import food also contribute to food insecurity.</p> <p>Eritrea has been a leading refugee source country since at least the 1960s, when its 30-year war for independence from Ethiopia began. Since gaining independence in 1993, Eritreans have continued migrating to Sudan, Ethiopia, Yemen, Egypt, or Israel because of a lack of basic human rights or political freedom, educational and job opportunities, or to seek asylum because of militarization. Eritrea’s large diaspora has been a source of vital remittances, funding its war for independence and providing 30% of the country’s GDP annually since it became independent.</p> <p>In the last few years, Eritreans have increasingly been trafficked and held hostage by Bedouins in the Sinai Desert, where they are victims of organ harvesting, rape, extortion, and torture. Some Eritrean trafficking victims are kidnapped after being smuggled to Sudan or Ethiopia, while others are kidnapped from within or around refugee camps or crossing Eritrea’s borders. Eritreans composed approximately 90% of the conservatively estimated 25,000-30,000 victims of Sinai trafficking from 2009-2013, according to a 2013 consultancy firm report.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "35.7% (male 1,138,382/female 1,123,925)"
@ -533,28 +530,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the president is both chief of state and head of government and is head of the State Council and National Assembly"
},
"Legislative branch": {
"legislature name": {
"text": "National Assembly (Hagerawi Baito)"
},
"legislative structure": {
"text": "unicameral"
},
"number of seats": {
"text": "150 (all indirectly elected)"
},
"scope of elections": {
"text": "full renewal"
},
"term in office": {
"text": "4 years"
},
"most recent election date": {
"text": "2/1/1994"
},
"percentage of women in chamber": {
"text": "22%"
},
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> in 1997, after the new constitution was adopted, the government formed a Transitional National Assembly to serve as the country's legislative body until countrywide elections to form a National Assembly could be held; the constitution stipulates that once past the transition stage, all National Assembly members will be elected by secret ballot of all eligible voters; National Assembly elections scheduled for December 2001 were postponed indefinitely due to the war with Ethiopia; as of 2024, no sitting legislative body exists"
"text": "<strong>note:</strong> in 1997, after the new constitution was adopted, the government formed a Transitional National Assembly to serve as the country's legislative body until countrywide elections to form a National Assembly could be held; the constitution stipulates that once past the transition stage, all National Assembly members will be elected by secret ballot of all eligible voters; National Assembly elections scheduled for December 2001 were postponed indefinitely due to the war with Ethiopia; as of 2025, no sitting legislative body exists"
},
"Judicial branch": {
"highest court(s)": {

7
africa/et.json
View file

@ -116,13 +116,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "118,550,298"
"text": "118,550,298 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "59,062,093"
},
"female": {
"text": "59,488,205 (2024 est.)"
"text": "59,488,205"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -147,9 +147,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Ethiopian Orthodox 43.8%, Muslim 31.3%, Protestant 22.8%, Catholic 0.7%, traditional 0.6%, other 0.8% (2016 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Ethiopia is a predominantly agricultural country – nearly 80% of the population lives in rural areas – that is in the early stages of demographic transition. Infant, child, and maternal mortality have fallen sharply over the past decade, but the total fertility rate has declined more slowly and the population continues to grow. The rising age of marriage and the increasing proportion of women remaining single have contributed to fertility reduction. While the use of modern contraceptive methods among married women has increased significantly from 6 percent in 2000 to 27 percent in 2012, the overall rate is still quite low.</p> <p>Ethiopia’s rapid population growth is putting increasing pressure on land resources, expanding environmental degradation, and raising vulnerability to food shortages. With about 40 percent of the population below the age of 15 and a fertility rate of 4 children per woman (and even higher in rural areas), Ethiopia will have to make further progress in meeting its family planning needs if it is to achieve the age structure necessary for reaping a demographic dividend in the coming decades.</p> <p>Poverty, drought, political repression, and forced government resettlement have driven Ethiopia’s internal and external migration since the 1960s. Before the 1974 revolution, only small numbers of the Ethiopian elite went abroad to study and then returned home, but under the brutal Derg regime thousands fled the country, primarily as refugees. Between 1982 and 1991 there was a new wave of migration to the West for family reunification. Since the defeat of the Derg in 1991, Ethiopians have migrated to escape violence among some of the country’s myriad ethnic groups or to pursue economic opportunities. Internal and international trafficking of women and children for domestic work and prostitution is a growing problem.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "38.7% (male 23,092,496/female 22,765,882)"

7
africa/ga.json
View file

@ -115,13 +115,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "2,523,327"
"text": "2,523,327 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "1,250,490"
},
"female": {
"text": "1,272,837 (2024 est.)"
"text": "1,272,837"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -141,9 +141,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Muslim 96.4%, Christian 3.5%, other or none 0.1% (2019-20 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>The Gambia’s youthful age structure – approximately 55% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2021 – is likely to persist because the country’s total fertility rate remains strong at nearly 4 children per woman. The overall literacy rate is around 50%, and is significantly lower for women than for men. At least 70% of the populace are farmers who are reliant on rain-fed agriculture and cannot afford improved seeds and fertilizers. Crop failures caused by droughts between 2011 and 2013 increased poverty, food shortages, and malnutrition.</p> <p>The Gambia is a source country for migrants and a transit and destination country for migrants and refugees. Since the 1980s, economic deterioration, drought, and high unemployment, especially among youths, have driven both domestic migration (largely urban) and migration abroad (legal and illegal). Emigrants are largely skilled workers, including doctors and nurses, and provide a significant amount of remittances. The top receiving countries for Gambian emigrants are Spain, the US, Nigeria, Senegal, and the UK. While the Gambia and Spain do not share historic, cultural, or trade ties, rural Gambians have migrated to Spain in large numbers because of its proximity and the availability of jobs in its underground economy (this flow slowed following the onset of Spain’s late 2007 economic crisis).</p> <p>The Gambia’s role as a host country to refugees is a result of wars in several of its neighboring West African countries. Since 2006, refugees from the Casamance conflict in Senegal have replaced their pattern of flight and return with permanent settlement in The Gambia, often moving in with relatives along the Senegal-Gambia border. The strain of providing for about 7,400 Casamance refugees increased poverty among Gambian villagers. The number of refugees decreased to around 3,500 by 2022.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "38.2% (male 486,472/female 477,309)"

7
africa/gb.json
View file

@ -112,13 +112,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "2,455,105"
"text": "2,455,105 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "1,270,023"
},
"female": {
"text": "1,185,082 (2024 est.)"
"text": "1,185,082"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -138,9 +138,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Protestant 46.4% (Revival Church 37%, other Protestant 9.4%), Roman Catholic 29.8%, other Christian 4%, Muslim 10.8%, traditional/animist 1.1%, other 0.9%, none 7% (2019-21 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Gabon’s oil revenues have given it one of the highest per capita income levels in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the wealth is not evenly distributed and poverty is widespread. Unemployment is especially prevalent among the large youth population; more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020. With a fertility rate still averaging more than 3 children per woman, the youth population will continue to grow and further strain the mismatch between Gabon’s supply of jobs and the skills of its labor force.</p> <p>Gabon has been a magnet to migrants from neighboring countries since the 1960s because of the discovery of oil, as well as the country’s political stability and timber, mineral, and natural gas resources. Nonetheless, income inequality and high unemployment have created slums in Libreville full of migrant workers from Senegal, Nigeria, Cameroon, Benin, Togo, and elsewhere in West Africa. In 2011, Gabon declared an end to refugee status for 9,500 remaining Congolese nationals to whom it had granted asylum during the Republic of the Congo’s civil war between 1997 and 2003. About 5,400 of these refugees received permits to reside in Gabon.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "34.6% (male 429,133/female 421,120)"

7
africa/gh.json
View file

@ -115,13 +115,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "34,589,092"
"text": "34,589,092 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "16,902,073"
},
"female": {
"text": "17,687,019 (2024 est.)"
"text": "17,687,019"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -142,9 +142,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Christian 71.3% (Pentecostal/Charismatic 31.6%, Protestant 17.4%, Catholic 10%, other 12.3%), Muslim 19.9%, traditionalist 3.2%, other 4.5%, none 1.1% (2021 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Ghana has a young age structure, with approximately 56% of the population under the age of 25 as of 2020. Its total fertility rate fell significantly during the 1980s and 1990s but has stalled at around four children per woman for the last few years. Fertility remains higher in the northern region than the Greater Accra region. On average, desired fertility has remained stable for several years; urban dwellers want fewer children than rural residents. Increased life expectancy, due to better health care, nutrition, and hygiene, and reduced fertility have increased Ghana’s share of elderly persons; Ghana’s proportion of persons aged 60+ is among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Poverty has declined in Ghana, but it remains pervasive in the northern region, which is susceptible to droughts and floods and has less access to transportation infrastructure, markets, fertile farming land, and industrial centers. The northern region also has lower school enrollment, higher illiteracy, and fewer opportunities for women.</p> <p>Ghana was a country of immigration in the early years after its 1957 independence, attracting labor migrants largely from Nigeria and other neighboring countries to mine minerals and harvest cocoa – immigrants composed about 12% of Ghana’s population in 1960. In the late 1960s, worsening economic and social conditions discouraged immigration, and hundreds of thousands of immigrants, mostly Nigerians, were expelled.</p> <p>During the 1970s, severe drought and an economic downturn transformed Ghana into a country of emigration; neighboring Cote d’Ivoire was the initial destination. Later, hundreds of thousands of Ghanaians migrated to Nigeria to work in its booming oil industry, but most were deported in 1983 and 1985 as oil prices plummeted. Many Ghanaians then turned to more distant destinations, including other parts of Africa, Europe, and North America, but the majority continued to migrate within West Africa. Since the 1990s, increased emigration of skilled Ghanaians, especially to the US and the UK, drained the country of its health care and education professionals. Internally, poverty and other developmental disparities continue to drive Ghanaians from the north to the south, particularly to its urban centers.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "37.4% (male 6,527,386/female 6,400,245)"

7
africa/gv.json
View file

@ -109,13 +109,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "13,986,179"
"text": "13,986,179 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "6,985,606"
},
"female": {
"text": "7,000,573 (2024 est.)"
"text": "7,000,573"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -136,9 +136,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Muslim 85.2%, Christian 13.4%, animist 0.2%, none 1.2% (2018 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Guinea’s strong population growth is a result of declining mortality rates and sustained elevated fertility. The population growth rate was somewhat tempered in the 2000s because of a period of net outmigration. Although life expectancy and mortality rates have improved over the last two decades, the nearly universal practice of female genital cutting continues to contribute to high infant and maternal mortality rates. Guinea’s total fertility remains high at about 5 children per woman as of 2022 because of the ongoing preference for larger families, low contraceptive usage and availability, a lack of educational attainment and empowerment among women, and poverty. A lack of literacy and vocational training programs limit job prospects for youths, but even those with university degrees often have no option but to work in the informal sector. About 60% of the country’s large youth population is unemployed.</p> <p>Tensions and refugees have spilled over Guinea’s borders with Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire. During the 1990s Guinea harbored as many as half a million refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia, more refugees than any other African country for much of that decade. About half sought refuge in the volatile \"Parrot’s Beak\" region of southwest Guinea, a wedge of land jutting into Sierra Leone near the Liberian border. Many were relocated within Guinea in the early 2000s because the area suffered repeated cross-border attacks from various government and rebel forces, as well as anti-refugee violence.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "40.9% (male 2,884,146/female 2,835,794)"

21
africa/iv.json
View file

@ -114,13 +114,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "29,981,758"
"text": "29,981,758 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "15,040,032"
},
"female": {
"text": "14,941,726 (2024 est.)"
"text": "14,941,726"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -146,9 +146,6 @@
"text": "Muslim 42.9%, Catholic 17.2%, Evangelical 11.8%, Methodist 1.7%, other Christian 3.2%, animist 3.6%, other religion 0.5%, none 19.1% (2014 est.)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the majority of foreign migrant workers are Muslim (72.7%) and Christian (17.7%)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Cote d’Ivoire’s population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future because almost 60% of the populace is younger than 25 as of 2020, the total fertility rate is holding steady at about 3.5 children per woman, and contraceptive use is under 30%. The country will need to improve education, health care, and gender equality in order to turn its large and growing youth cohort into human capital. Even prior to 2010 unrest that shuttered schools for months, access to education was poor, especially for women. The lack of educational attainment contributes to Cote d’Ivoire’s high rates of unskilled labor, adolescent pregnancy, and HIV/AIDS prevalence.</p> <p>Following its independence in 1960, Cote d’Ivoire’s stability and the blossoming of its labor-intensive cocoa and coffee industries in the southwest made it an attractive destination for migrants from other parts of the country and its neighbors, particularly Burkina Faso. The HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY administration continued the French colonial policy of encouraging labor immigration by offering liberal land ownership laws. Foreigners from West Africa, Europe (mainly France), and Lebanon composed about 25% of the population by 1998.</p> <p>Ongoing economic decline since the 1980s and the power struggle after HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY’s death in 1993 ushered in the politics of \"Ivoirite,\" institutionalizing an Ivoirian identity that further marginalized northern Ivoirians and scapegoated immigrants. The hostile Muslim north-Christian south divide snowballed into a 2002 civil war, pushing tens of thousands of foreign migrants, Liberian refugees, and Ivoirians to flee to war-torn Liberia or other regional countries and more than a million people to be internally displaced. Subsequently, violence following the contested 2010 presidential election prompted some 250,000 people to seek refuge in Liberia and other neighboring countries and again internally displaced as many as a million people. By July 2012, the majority had returned home, but ongoing inter-communal tension and armed conflict continue to force people from their homes.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "36.1% (male 5,437,108/female 5,390,782)"
@ -966,11 +963,11 @@
"note": "<b>note:</b> top five import commodities based on value in dollars"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": {
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": {
"text": "$6.257 billion (31 December 2017 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": {
"text": "$6.257 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": {
"text": "$4.935 billion (31 December 2016 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": {
"text": "$4.935 billion (2016 est.)"
}
},
"Debt - external": {
@ -1215,8 +1212,8 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (Forces Armees de Cote d'Ivoire, FACI; aka Republican Forces of Ivory Coast, FRCI): Army (Land Force), National Navy, Air Force, Special Forces; National Gendarmerie (under the Ministry of Defense)<br><br>Ministry of Security and Civil Protection: National Police, Coordination Center for Operational Decisions (a mix of police, gendarmerie, and FACI personnel for assisting police in providing security in some large cities), Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (2024)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the National Gendarmerie is a military force established to ensure public safety, maintain order, enforce laws, and protect institutions, people, and property; it is organized into \"legions\" and has both territorial and mobile units; the Mobile Gendarmerie is responsible for maintaining and restoring order and is considered the backbone of the country’s domestic security; the Territorial Gendarmerie is responsible for the administrative, judicial, and military police; the Gendarmerie also has separate specialized units for security, intervention (counterterrorism, hostage rescue, etc), VIP protection, and surveillance; the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance is responsible for countering internal threats"
"text": "Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (Forces Armees de Cote d'Ivoire, FACI; aka Republican Forces of Ivory Coast, FRCI): Army, National Navy, Air Force, Special Forces; National Gendarmerie <br><br>Ministry of Security and Civil Protection: National Police (2025)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the National Gendarmerie is a paramilitary force under the Ministry of Defense that is responsible for ensuring public safety, maintaining order, enforcing laws, and protecting institutions, people, and property; it is organized into mobile and territorial components; the Mobile Gendarmerie is responsible for maintaining and restoring order and is considered the backbone of the country’s domestic security; the Territorial Gendarmerie is responsible for the administrative, judicial, and military police; the Gendarmerie also has separate specialized units for security, intervention (counterterrorism, hostage rescue, etc), VIP protection, and surveillance<br>"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2023": {
@ -1239,7 +1236,7 @@
"text": "approximately 20-25,000 active FACI troops; approximately 5,000 Gendarmerie (2024)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the inventory of the FACI consists mostly of older or second-hand equipment, typically of French or Soviet-era origin; Cote d'Ivoire was under a partial UN arms embargo from 2004 to 2016; in recent years it has received some new and second-hand equipment from a variety of suppliers, including Bulgaria, China, France, South Africa, and Turkey (2024)"
"text": "the inventory of the FACI consists mostly of older or second-hand equipment, typically of French or Soviet-era origin; Cote d'Ivoire was under a partial UN arms embargo from 2004 to 2016; in recent years it has received some new and secondhand equipment from a variety of suppliers, including Bulgaria, China, France, South Africa, and Turkey (2024)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "18-26 years of age for compulsory and voluntary military service for men and women; conscription is reportedly not enforced (2023)"

9
africa/ke.json
View file

@ -120,13 +120,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "58,246,378"
"text": "58,246,378 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "29,091,800"
},
"female": {
"text": "29,154,578 (2024 est.)"
"text": "29,154,578"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -151,9 +151,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Christian 85.5% (Protestant 33.4%, Catholic 20.6%, Evangelical 20.4%, African Instituted Churches 7%, other Christian 4.1%), Muslim 10.9%, other 1.8%, none 1.6%,&nbsp;don't&nbsp;know/no answer&nbsp;0.2% (2019 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Kenya has experienced dramatic population growth since the mid-20th century as a result of its high birth rate and its declining mortality rate. Almost 40% of Kenyans are under the age of 15 as of 2020 because of sustained high fertility, early marriage and childbearing, and an unmet need for family planning. Kenya’s persistent rapid population growth strains the labor market, social services, arable land, and natural resources. Although Kenya in 1967 was the first Sub-Saharan country to launch a nationwide family planning program, progress in reducing the birth rate has largely stalled since the late 1990s, when the government decreased its support for family planning to focus on the HIV epidemic. Government commitment and international technical support spurred Kenyan contraceptive use, decreasing the fertility rate (children per woman) from about 8 in the late 1970s to less than 5 children twenty years later, but it has plateaued at about 3 children as of 2022.</p> <p>Kenya is a source of emigrants and a host country for refugees. In the 1960s and 1970s, Kenyans pursued higher education in the UK because of colonial ties, but as British immigration rules tightened, the US, the then Soviet Union, and Canada became attractive study destinations. Kenya’s stagnant economy and political problems during the 1980s and 1990s led to an outpouring of Kenyan students and professionals seeking permanent opportunities in the West and southern Africa. Nevertheless, Kenya’s relative stability since its independence in 1963 has attracted hundreds of thousands of refugees escaping violent conflicts in neighboring countries; Kenya was sheltering nearly 280,000 Somali refugees as of 2022.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "35.8% (male 10,464,384/female 10,366,997)"
@ -495,7 +492,7 @@
"text": "British East Africa"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "named for Mount Kenya; the meaning of the name is unclear but may derive from the Kikuyu, Embu, and Kamba words \"kirinyaga,\" \"kirenyaa,\" and \"kiinyaa\" - all of which mean \"God's resting place\""
"text": "named for Mount Kenya; the mountain's name may derive from the Kikuyu word <em>kere nyaga</em>, or \"white mountain\""
}
},
"Government type": {

9
africa/li.json
View file

@ -109,13 +109,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "5,437,249"
"text": "5,437,249 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "2,711,324"
},
"female": {
"text": "2,725,925 (2024 est.)"
"text": "2,725,925"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -135,9 +135,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Christian 84.9%, Muslim 12%, Traditional 0.5%, other 0.1%, none 2.6% (2022 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Liberia’s high fertility rate of nearly 5 children per woman and large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020 – will sustain a high dependency ratio for many years to come. Significant progress has been made in preventing child deaths, despite a lack of health care workers and infrastructure. Infant and child mortality have dropped nearly 70% since 1990; the annual reduction rate of about 5.4% is the highest in Africa.</p> <p>Nevertheless, Liberia’s high maternal mortality rate remains among the world’s worst; it reflects a high unmet need for family planning services, frequency of early childbearing, lack of quality obstetric care, high adolescent fertility, and a low proportion of births attended by a medical professional. Female mortality is also increased by the prevalence of female genital cutting (FGC), which is practiced by 10 of Liberia’s 16 tribes and affects more than two-thirds of women and girls. FGC is an initiation ritual performed in rural bush schools, which teach traditional beliefs on marriage and motherhood and are an obstacle to formal classroom education for Liberian girls.</p> <p>Liberia has been both a source and a destination for refugees. During Liberia’s 14-year civil war (1989-2003), more than 250,000 people became refugees and another half million were internally displaced. Between 2004 and the cessation of refugee status for Liberians in June 2012, the UNHCR helped more than 155,000 Liberians to voluntarily repatriate, while others returned home on their own. Some Liberian refugees spent more than two decades living in other West African countries. Between 2011 and 2022, more than 300,000 Ivoirian refugees in Liberia have been repatriated; as of year-end 2022, less than 2,300 Ivoirian refugees were still living in Liberia.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "38.9% (male 1,064,100/female 1,052,556)"
@ -461,7 +458,7 @@
"text": "Liberia"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "name derives from the Latin word \"liber\" meaning \"free\"; so named because the nation was created as a homeland for liberated African-American slaves"
"text": "name derives from the Latin word <em>liber, </em>meaning \"free;\" so named because the nation was created as a homeland for liberated African-American slaves"
}
},
"Government type": {

9
africa/lt.json
View file

@ -104,13 +104,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "2,227,548"
"text": "2,227,548 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "1,101,959"
},
"female": {
"text": "1,125,589 (2024 est.)"
"text": "1,125,589"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -130,9 +130,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Protestant 47.8% (Pentecostal 23.1%, Lesotho Evangelical 17.3%, Anglican 7.4%), Roman Catholic 39.3%, other Christian 9.1%, non-Christian 1.4%, none 2.3% (2014 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Lesotho faces great socioeconomic challenges. Almost half of its population lives below the poverty line as of 2017, and the country’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is the second highest in the world as of 2021. In addition, Lesotho is a small, mountainous, landlocked country with little arable land, leaving its population vulnerable to food shortages and reliant on remittances. Lesotho’s persistently high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates have been increasing during the last decade, according to the last two Demographic and Health Surveys. Despite these significant shortcomings, Lesotho has made good progress in education; it is on-track to achieve universal primary education and has one of the highest adult literacy rates in Africa.</p> <p>Lesotho’s migration history is linked to its unique geography; it is surrounded by South Africa with which it shares linguistic and cultural traits. Lesotho at one time had more of its workforce employed outside its borders than any other country. Today remittances equal about 20% of its GDP. With few job options at home, a high rate of poverty, and higher wages available across the border, labor migration to South Africa replaced agriculture as the prevailing Basotho source of income decades ago. The majority of Basotho migrants were single men contracted to work as gold miners in South Africa. However, migration trends changed in the 1990s, and fewer men found mining jobs in South Africa because of declining gold prices, stricter immigration policies, and a preference for South African workers.</p> <p>Although men still dominate cross-border labor migration, more women are working in South Africa, mostly as domestics, because they are widows or their husbands are unemployed. Internal rural-urban flows have also become more frequent, with more women migrating within the country to take up jobs in the garment industry or moving to care for loved ones with HIV/AIDS. Lesotho’s small population of immigrants is increasingly composed of Taiwanese and Chinese migrants who are involved in the textile industry and small retail businesses.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "32% (male 358,137/female 353,618)"
@ -482,7 +479,7 @@
"text": "Basutoland"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "the name translates as \"Land of the Sesotho Speakers\""
"text": "the name comes from the Sotho people, whose name means \"dark-skinned;\"<em> Le</em>- is a singular noun prefix; the former name, Basutoland, uses the plural noun prefix, <em>Ba</em>-"
}
},
"Government type": {

9
africa/ly.json
View file

@ -110,13 +110,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "7,361,263"
"text": "7,361,263 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "3,747,364"
},
"female": {
"text": "3,613,899 (2024 est.)"
"text": "3,613,899"
},
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> immigrants make up just over 12% of the total population, according to UN data (2019)"
},
@ -143,9 +143,6 @@
"text": "Muslim (official; virtually all Sunni) 96.6%, Christian 2.7%, Buddhist &lt;1%, Hindu &lt;1%, Jewish &lt;1%, folk religion &lt;1%, other &lt;1%, unaffiliated &lt;1% (2020 est.)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> non-Sunni Muslims include native Ibadhi Muslims (&lt;1% of the population) and foreign Muslims"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Despite continuing unrest, Libya remains a destination country for economic migrants. It is also a hub for transit migration to Europe because of its proximity to southern Europe and its lax border controls. Labor migrants have been drawn to Libya since the development of its oil sector in the 1960s. Until the latter part of the 1990s, most migrants to Libya were Arab (primarily Egyptians and Sudanese). However, international isolation stemming from Libya’s involvement in international terrorism and a perceived lack of support from Arab countries led QADHAFI in 1998 to adopt a decade-long pan-African policy that enabled large numbers of Sub-Saharan migrants to enter Libya without visas to work in the construction and agricultural industries. Although Sub-Saharan Africans provided a cheap labor source, they were poorly treated and were subjected to periodic mass expulsions.</p> <p>By the mid-2000s, domestic animosity toward African migrants and a desire to reintegrate into the international community motivated QADHAFI to impose entry visas on Arab and African immigrants and to agree to joint maritime patrols and migrant repatriations with Italy, the main recipient of illegal migrants departing Libya. As his regime neared collapse in 2011, QADHAFI reversed his policy of cooperating with Italy to curb illegal migration and sent boats loaded with migrants and asylum seekers to strain European resources. Libya’s 2011 revolution decreased immigration drastically and prompted nearly 800,000 migrants to flee to third countries, mainly Tunisia and Egypt, or to their countries of origin. The inflow of migrants declined in 2012 but returned to normal levels by 2013, despite continued hostility toward Sub-Saharan Africans and a less-inviting job market.</p> <p>While Libya is not an appealing destination for migrants, since 2014, transiting migrants – primarily from East and West Africa – continue to exploit its political instability and weak border controls and use it as a primary departure area to migrate across the central Mediterranean to Europe in growing numbers. In addition, approximately 135,000 people were displaced internally as of  August 2022 by fighting between armed groups in eastern and western Libya and, to a lesser extent, by inter-tribal clashes in the country’s south.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "32.3% (male 1,211,087/female 1,165,648)"
@ -455,7 +452,7 @@
"text": "Libiya"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "name derives from the Libu, an ancient Libyan tribe first mentioned in texts from the 13th century B.C."
"text": "the name probably derives from the Libu, a North African tribe first mentioned in texts from the 13th century B.C.; the ancient Greeks and Romans used the name for the entire North African coast west of Egypt"
}
},
"Government type": {

9
africa/ma.json
View file

@ -106,13 +106,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "29,452,714"
"text": "29,452,714 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "14,760,501"
},
"female": {
"text": "14,692,213 (2024 est.)"
"text": "14,692,213"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -133,9 +133,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Church of Jesus Christ in Madagascar/Malagasy Lutheran Church/Anglican Church 34%, Roman Catholic 32.3%, other Christian 8.1%, traditional/Animist 1.7%, Muslim 1.4%, other 0.6%, none 21.9% (2021 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Madagascar’s youthful population – nearly 60% are under the age of 25 as of 2020 – and moderately high total fertility rate of more than 3.6 children per woman ensures that the Malagasy population will continue its rapid growth trajectory for the foreseeable future. The population is predominantly rural and poor; chronic malnutrition is prevalent, and large families are the norm. Many young Malagasy girls are withdrawn from school, marry early (often pressured to do so by their parents), and soon begin having children. Early childbearing, coupled with Madagascar’s widespread poverty and lack of access to skilled health care providers during delivery, increases the risk of death and serious health problems for young mothers and their babies.</p> <p>Child marriage perpetuates gender inequality and is prevalent among the poor, the uneducated, and rural households – as of 2018, 40% of Malagasy women aged 20 to 24 were married. Although the legal age for marriage is 18, parental consent is often given for earlier marriages or the law is flouted, especially in rural areas that make up approximately 60% of the country. Forms of arranged marriage whereby young girls are married to older men in exchange for oxen or money are traditional. If a union does not work out, a girl can be placed in another marriage, but the dowry paid to her family diminishes with each unsuccessful marriage.</p> <p>Madagascar’s population consists of 18 main ethnic groups, all of whom speak the same Malagasy language. Most Malagasy are multi-ethnic, however, reflecting the island’s diversity of settlers and historical contacts (see Background). Madagascar’s legacy of hierarchical societies practicing domestic slavery (most notably the Merina Kingdom of the 16th to the 19th century) is evident today in persistent class tension, with some ethnic groups maintaining a caste system. Slave descendants are vulnerable to unequal access to education and jobs, despite Madagascar’s constitutional guarantee of free compulsory primary education and its being party to several international conventions on human rights. Historical distinctions also remain between central highlanders and coastal people.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "37% (male 5,507,847/female 5,400,551)"
@ -482,7 +479,7 @@
"text": "Malagasy Republic"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "the name \"Madageiscar\" was first used by the 13th-century Venetian explorer Marco POLO, as a corrupted transliteration of Mogadishu, the Somali port with which POLO confused the island"
"text": "a variant of the name was first used by 13th-century Venetian explorer Marco POLO when he confused the island with the Somali port of Mogadishu; the transliteration was later adopted as the official name"
}
},
"Government type": {

9
africa/mi.json
View file

@ -112,13 +112,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "21,763,309"
"text": "21,763,309 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "10,674,594"
},
"female": {
"text": "11,088,715 (2024 est.)"
"text": "11,088,715"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -139,9 +139,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Protestant 33.5% (includes Church of Central Africa Presbyterian 14.2%, Seventh Day Adventist/Baptist 9.4%, Pentecostal 7.6%, Anglican 2.3%), Roman Catholic 17.2%, other Christian 26.6%, Muslim 13.8%, traditionalist 1.1%, other 5.6%, none 2.1% (2018 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Malawi has made great improvements in maternal and child health, but has made less progress in reducing its high fertility rate. In both rural and urban areas, very high proportions of mothers are receiving prenatal care and skilled birth assistance, and most children are being vaccinated. Malawi’s fertility rate, however, has only declined slowly, decreasing from more than 7 children per woman in the 1980s to about 5.5 today. Nonetheless, Malawians prefer smaller families than in the past, and women are increasingly using contraceptives to prevent or space pregnancies. Rapid population growth and high population density is putting pressure on Malawi’s land, water, and forest resources. Reduced plot sizes and increasing vulnerability to climate change, further threaten the sustainability of Malawi’s agriculturally based economy and will worsen food shortages. About 80% of the population is employed in agriculture.</p><p>Historically, Malawians migrated abroad in search of work, primarily to South Africa and present-day Zimbabwe, but international migration became uncommon after the 1970s, and most migration in recent years has been internal. During the colonial period, Malawians regularly migrated to southern Africa as contract farm laborers, miners, and domestic servants. In the decade and a half after independence in 1964, the Malawian Government sought to transform its economy from one dependent on small-scale farms to one based on estate agriculture. The resulting demand for wage labor induced more than 300,000 Malawians to return home between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s. In recent times, internal migration has generally been local, motivated more by marriage than economic reasons.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "37.7% (male 4,080,567/female 4,132,710)"
@ -502,7 +499,7 @@
"text": "British Central African Protectorate, Nyasaland Protectorate, Nyasaland"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "named for the East African Maravi Kingdom of the 16th century; the word \"maravi\" means \"fire flames\""
"text": "named for the Maravi people who inhabited the area since the 14th century; the word <em>maravi </em>means \"flames\""
}
},
"Government type": {

17
africa/ml.json
View file

@ -113,13 +113,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "21,990,607"
"text": "21,990,607 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "10,688,755"
},
"female": {
"text": "11,301,852 (2024 est.)"
"text": "11,301,852"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -140,9 +140,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Muslim 93.9%, Christian 2.8%, animist 0.7%, none 2.5% (2018 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Mali’s total population is expected to double by 2035; its capital Bamako is one of the fastest-growing cities in Africa. A young age structure, a declining mortality rate, and a sustained high total fertility rate of 5.5 children per woman – the fourth highest in the world, as of 2022 – ensure continued rapid population growth for the foreseeable future. Significant outmigration only marginally tempers this growth. Despite decreases, Mali’s infant, child, and maternal mortality rates remain among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa because of limited access to and adoption of family planning, early childbearing, short birth intervals, the prevalence of female genital cutting, infrequent use of skilled birth attendants, and a lack of emergency obstetrical and neonatal care.</p> <p>Mali’s high total fertility rate has been virtually unchanged for decades, as a result of the ongoing preference for large families, early childbearing, the lack of female education and empowerment, poverty, and extremely low contraceptive use. Slowing Mali’s population growth by lowering its birth rate will be essential for poverty reduction, improving food security, and developing human capital and the economy.</p> <p>Mali has a long history of seasonal migration and emigration driven by poverty, conflict, demographic pressure, unemployment, food insecurity, and droughts. Many Malians from rural areas migrate during the dry period to nearby villages and towns to do odd jobs or to adjoining countries to work in agriculture or mining. Pastoralists and nomads move seasonally to southern Mali or nearby coastal states. Others migrate long term to Mali’s urban areas, Cote d’Ivoire, other neighboring countries, and in smaller numbers to France, Mali’s former colonial ruler. Since the early 1990s, Mali’s role has grown as a transit country for regional migration flows and illegal migration to Europe. Human smugglers and traffickers exploit the same regional routes used for moving contraband drugs, arms, and cigarettes.</p> <p>Between early 2012 and 2013, renewed fighting in northern Mali between government forces and Tuareg secessionists and their Islamist allies, a French-led international military intervention, as well as chronic food shortages, caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Malians. Most of those displaced domestically sought shelter in urban areas of southern Mali, except for pastoralist and nomadic groups, who abandoned their traditional routes, gave away or sold their livestock, and dispersed into the deserts of northern Mali or crossed into neighboring countries. Almost all Malians who took refuge abroad (mostly Tuareg and Maure pastoralists) stayed in the region, largely in Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "46.8% (male 5,175,714/female 5,114,128)"
@ -503,7 +500,7 @@
"text": "French Sudan, Sudanese Republic, Mali Federation"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "name derives from the West African Mali Empire of the 13th to 16th centuries A.D."
"text": "name derives from the Mali Empire of the 13th to 16th centuries A.D.; the Mali name may come from a local ethnic group, the Malinke, whose name is derived from the words <em>ma</em>, meaning \"mother,\" and <em>dink</em>, meaning \"child\" -- a reference to the matrilinear descent of Malinke families"
}
},
"Government type": {
@ -924,11 +921,11 @@
"note": "<b>note:</b> top five import commodities based on value in dollars"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": {
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": {
"text": "$647.8 million (31 December 2017 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": {
"text": "$647.8 million (2017 est.)"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": {
"text": "$395.7 million (31 December 2016 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": {
"text": "$395.7 million (2016 est.)"
}
},
"Debt - external": {

9
africa/mo.json
View file

@ -115,13 +115,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "37,387,585"
"text": "37,387,585 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "18,664,263"
},
"female": {
"text": "18,723,322 (2024 est.)"
"text": "18,723,322"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -149,9 +149,6 @@
"text": "Muslim 99% (official; virtually all Sunni, &lt;0.1% Shia), other 1% (includes Christian, Jewish, and Baha'i); note - Jewish about 3,000-3,500 (2020 est.)",
"note": "note: does not include data from the former Western Sahara"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Morocco is undergoing a demographic transition. Its population is growing but at a declining rate, as people live longer and women have fewer children. Infant, child, and maternal mortality rates have been reduced through better health care, nutrition, hygiene, and vaccination coverage, although disparities between urban and rural and rich and poor households persist. Morocco’s shrinking child cohort reflects the decline of its total fertility rate from 5 in mid-1980s to 2.2 in 2010, which is a result of increased female educational attainment, higher contraceptive use, delayed marriage, and the desire for smaller families. Young adults (persons aged 15-29) make up almost 26% of the total population and represent a potential economic asset if they can be gainfully employed. Currently, however, many youths are unemployed because Morocco’s job creation rate has not kept pace with the growth of its working-age population. Most youths who have jobs work in the informal sector with little security or benefits.</p><p>During the second half of the 20th century, Morocco became one of the world’s top emigration countries, creating large, widely dispersed migrant communities in Western Europe. The Moroccan Government has encouraged emigration since its independence in 1956, both to secure remittances for funding national development and as an outlet to prevent unrest in rebellious (often Berber) areas. Although Moroccan labor migrants earlier targeted Algeria and France, the flood of Moroccan \"guest workers\" from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s spread widely across northwestern Europe to fill unskilled jobs in the booming manufacturing, mining, construction, and agriculture industries. Host societies and most Moroccan migrants expected this migration to be temporary, but deteriorating economic conditions in Morocco related to the 1973 oil crisis and tighter European immigration policies resulted in these stays becoming permanent.</p><p>A wave of family migration followed in the 1970s and 1980s, with a growing number of second generation Moroccans opting to become naturalized citizens of their host countries. Spain and Italy emerged as new destination countries in the mid-1980s, but their introduction of visa restrictions in the early 1990s pushed Moroccans increasingly to migrate either legally by marrying Moroccans already in Europe or illegally to work in the underground economy. Women began to make up a growing share of these labor migrants. At the same time, some higher-skilled Moroccans went to the US and Quebec, Canada.</p><p>In the mid-1990s, Morocco developed into a transit country for asylum seekers from Sub-Saharan Africa and illegal labor migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia trying to reach Europe via southern Spain, Spain’s Canary Islands, or Spain’s North African enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla. Forcible expulsions by Moroccan and Spanish security forces have not deterred these illegal migrants or calmed Europe’s security concerns. Rabat remains unlikely to adopt an EU agreement to take back third-country nationals who have entered the EU illegally via Morocco. Thousands of other illegal migrants have chosen to stay in Morocco until they earn enough money for further travel or permanently as a \"second-best\" option. The launching of a regularization program in 2014 legalized the status of some migrants and granted them equal access to education, health care, and work, but xenophobia and racism remain obstacles.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "25.7% (male 4,898,154/female 4,701,786)"
@ -523,7 +520,7 @@
"text": "French Protectorate in Morocco, Spanish Protectorate in Morocco, Ifni, Spanish Sahara, Western Sahara"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "the English name \"Morocco\" derives from, respectively, the Spanish and Portuguese names \"Marruecos\" and \"Marrocos,\" which stem from \"Marrakesh\" the Latin name for the former capital of ancient Morocco; the Arabic name \"Al Maghrib\" translates as \"The West\""
"text": "the English name of Morocco derives from, respectively, the Spanish and Portuguese names Marruecos and Marrocos, which stem from Marrakesh, the Latin name for the former capital of ancient Morocco; the Arabic name, Al Maghrib, translates as \"The West\""
}
},
"Government type": {

11
africa/mp.json
View file

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> includes Agalega Islands, Cargados Carajos Shoals (Saint Brandon), and Rodrigues"
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "almost 11 times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "almost 11 times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -102,13 +102,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "1,310,504"
"text": "1,310,504 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "639,270"
},
"female": {
"text": "671,234 (2024 est.)"
"text": "671,234"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -129,9 +129,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Hindu 48.5%, Roman Catholic 26.3%, Muslim 17.3%, other Christian 6.4%, other 0.6%, none 0.7%, unspecified 0.1% (2011 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Mauritius has transitioned from a country of high fertility and high mortality rates in the 1950s and mid-1960s to one with among the lowest population growth rates in the developing world today. After World War II, Mauritius’ population began to expand quickly due to increased fertility and a dramatic drop in mortality rates as a result of improved health care and the eradication of malaria. This period of heightened population growth – reaching about 3% a year – was followed by one of the world’s most rapid birth rate declines.</p> <p>The total fertility rate fell from 6.2 children per women in 1963 to 3.2 in 1972 – largely the result of improved educational attainment, especially among young women, accompanied by later marriage and the adoption of family planning methods. The family planning programs’ success was due to support from the government and eventually the traditionally pronatalist religious communities, which both recognized that controlling population growth was necessary because of Mauritius’ small size and limited resources. Mauritius’ fertility rate has consistently been below replacement level since the late 1990s, a rate that is substantially lower than nearby countries in southern Africa.</p> <p>With no indigenous population, Mauritius’ ethnic mix is a product of more than two centuries of European colonialism and continued international labor migration. Sugar production relied on slave labor mainly from Madagascar, Mozambique, and East Africa from the early 18th century until its abolition in 1835, when slaves were replaced with indentured Indians. Most of the influx of indentured labor – peaking between the late 1830s and early 1860s – settled permanently creating massive population growth of more than 7% a year and reshaping the island’s social and cultural composition. While Indians represented about 12% of Mauritius’ population in 1837, they and their descendants accounted for roughly two-thirds by the end of the 19th century. Most were Hindus, but the majority of the free Indian traders were Muslims.</p> <p>Mauritius again turned to overseas labor when its success in clothing and textile exports led to a labor shortage in the mid-1980s. Clothing manufacturers brought in contract workers (increasingly women) from China, India, and, to a lesser extent Bangladesh and Madagascar, who worked longer hours for lower wages under poor conditions and were viewed as more productive than locals. Downturns in the sugar and textile industries in the mid-2000s and a lack of highly qualified domestic workers for Mauritius’ growing services sector led to the emigration of low-skilled workers and a reliance on skilled foreign labor. Since 2007, Mauritius has pursued a circular migration program to enable citizens to acquire new skills and savings abroad and then return home to start businesses and to invest in the country’s development.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "15.1% (male 100,973/female 96,711)"
@ -455,7 +452,7 @@
"text": "Mauritius"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "island named after Prince Maurice VAN NASSAU, stadtholder of the Dutch Republic, in 1598"
"text": "named after Prince Maurice VAN NASSAU, stadtholder (governor) of the Dutch Republic, in 1598"
},
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> pronounced mah-rish-us"
},

9
africa/mr.json
View file

@ -118,13 +118,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "4,328,040"
"text": "4,328,040 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "2,083,690"
},
"female": {
"text": "2,244,350 (2024 est.)"
"text": "2,244,350"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -150,9 +150,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Muslim (official) 100%"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>With a sustained total fertility rate of about 3.5 children per woman and almost 60% of the population under the age of 25 as of 2020, Mauritania's population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future. Mauritania's large youth cohort is vital to its development prospects, but available schooling does not adequately prepare students for the workplace. Girls continue to be underrepresented in the classroom, educational quality remains poor, and the dropout rate is high. The literacy rate is only about 50%, even though access to primary education has improved since the mid-2000s. Women's restricted access to education and discriminatory laws maintain gender inequality - worsened by early and forced marriages and female genital cutting.</p> <p>The denial of education to black Moors also helps to perpetuate slavery. Although Mauritania abolished slavery in 1981 (the last country in the world to do so) and made it a criminal offense in 2007, the millenniums-old practice persists largely because anti-slavery laws are rarely enforced and the custom is so ingrained.  According to a 2018 nongovernmental organization's report, a little more than 2% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which includes individuals subjected to forced labor and forced marriage, while many thousands of individuals who are legally free contend with discrimination, poor education, and a lack of identity papers and, therefore, live in de facto slavery.  The UN and international press outlets have claimed that up to 20% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which would be the highest rate worldwide.</p> <p>Drought, poverty, and unemployment have driven outmigration from Mauritania since the 1970s. Early flows were directed toward other West African countries, including Senegal, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gambia. The 1989 Mauritania-Senegal conflict forced thousands of black Mauritanians to take refuge in Senegal and pushed labor migrants toward the Gulf, Libya, and Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mauritania has accepted migrants from neighboring countries to fill labor shortages since its independence in 1960 and more recently has received refugees escaping civil wars, including tens of thousands of Tuaregs who fled Mali in 2012.</p> <p>Mauritania was an important transit point for Sub-Saharan migrants moving illegally to North Africa and Europe. In the mid-2000s, as border patrols increased in the Strait of Gibraltar, security increased around Spain's North African enclaves (Ceuta and Melilla), and Moroccan border controls intensified, illegal migration flows shifted from the Western Mediterranean to Spain's Canary Islands. In 2006, departure points moved southward along the West African coast from Morocco and then Western Sahara to Mauritania's two key ports (Nouadhibou and the capital Nouakchott), and illegal migration to the Canaries peaked at almost 32,000. The numbers fell dramatically in the following years because of joint patrolling off the West African coast by Frontex (the EU's border protection agency), Spain, Mauritania, and Senegal; the expansion of Spain's border surveillance system; and the 2008 European economic downturn.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "35.7% (male 776,035/female 770,132)"
@ -508,7 +505,7 @@
"text": "Muritaniyah"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "named for the ancient kingdom of Mauretania (3rd century B.C. to 1st century A.D.) and the subsequent Roman province (1st-7th centuries A.D.), which existed further north in present-day Morocco; the name derives from the Mauri (Moors), the Berber-speaking peoples of northwest Africa"
"text": "named for the ancient kingdom of Mauretania (3rd century B.C. to 1st century A.D.); its name derives from the Mauri (Moors) of northwest Africa"
}
},
"Government type": {

9
africa/mz.json
View file

@ -114,13 +114,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "33,350,954"
"text": "33,350,954 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "16,449,734"
},
"female": {
"text": "16,901,220 (2024 est.)"
"text": "16,901,220"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -140,9 +140,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Roman Catholic 27.2%, Muslim 18.9%, Zionist Christian 15.6%, Evangelical/Pentecostal 15.3%, Anglican 1.7%, other 4.8%, none 13.9%, unspecified 2.5% (2017 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Mozambique is a poor, sparsely populated country with high fertility and mortality rates and a rapidly growing youthful population – 45% of the population is younger than 15, as of 2020. Mozambique’s high poverty rate is sustained by natural disasters, disease, high population growth, low agricultural productivity, and the unequal distribution of wealth. The country’s birth rate is among the world’s highest, averaging around  5 children per woman (and higher in rural areas) for at least the last three decades. The sustained high level of fertility reflects gender inequality, low contraceptive use, early marriages and childbearing, and a lack of education, particularly among women. The high population growth rate is somewhat restrained by the country’s high HIV/AIDS and overall mortality rates. Mozambique ranks among the worst in the world for HIV/AIDS prevalence, HIV/AIDS deaths, and life expectancy at birth, as of 2022.</p> <p>Mozambique is predominantly a country of emigration, but internal, rural-urban migration has begun to grow. Mozambicans, primarily from the country’s southern region, have been migrating to South Africa for work for more than a century. Additionally, approximately 1.7 million Mozambicans fled to Malawi, South Africa, and other neighboring countries between 1979 and 1992 to escape from civil war. Labor migrants have usually been men from rural areas whose crops have failed or who are unemployed and have headed to South Africa to work as miners; multiple generations of the same family often become miners. Since the abolition of apartheid in South Africa in 1991, other job opportunities have opened to Mozambicans, including in the informal and manufacturing sectors, but mining remains their main source of employment.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "44.7% (male 7,548,247/female 7,350,012)"
@ -495,7 +492,7 @@
"text": "Portuguese East Africa, People's Republic of Mozambique"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "named for the offshore island of Mozambique; the island was apparently named after Mussa al-BIK, an influential Arab slave trader who set himself up as sultan on the island in the 15th century"
"text": "named for an offshore island; the island was named after Mussa bin BIQUE (or Mussa Ibn MALIK), an influential Arab slave trader who set himself up as sultan on the island in the 15th century"
}
},
"Government type": {

47
africa/ng.json
View file

@ -112,13 +112,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "26,342,784"
"text": "26,342,784 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "13,056,203"
},
"female": {
"text": "13,286,581 (2024 est.)"
"text": "13,286,581"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -139,9 +139,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Muslim 95.5%, ethnic religionist 4.1%, Christian 0.3%, agnostics and other 0.1% (2020 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Niger has the highest total fertility rate (TFR) of any country in the world, averaging close to 7 children per woman in 2022. A slight decline in fertility over the last few decades has stalled. This leveling off of the high fertility rate is in large part a product of the continued desire for large families. In Niger, the TFR is lower than the desired fertility rate, which makes it unlikely that contraceptive use will increase. The high TFR sustains rapid population growth and a large youth population – almost 70% of the populace is under the age of 25, as of 2020. Gender inequality, including a lack of educational opportunities for women and early marriage and childbirth, also contributes to high population growth.</p> <p>Because of large family sizes, children are inheriting smaller and smaller parcels of land. The dependence of most Nigeriens on subsistence farming on increasingly small landholdings, coupled with declining rainfall and the resultant shrinkage of arable land, are all preventing food production from keeping up with population growth.</p> <p>For more than half a century, Niger's lack of economic development has led to steady net outmigration. In the 1960s, Nigeriens mainly migrated to coastal West African countries to work on a seasonal basis. Some headed to Libya and Algeria in the 1970s to work in the booming oil industry until its decline in the 1980s. Since the 1990s, the principal destinations for Nigerien labor migrants have been West African countries, especially Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire, while emigration to Europe and North America has remained modest. During the same period, Niger’s desert trade route town Agadez became a hub for West African and other Sub-Saharan migrants crossing the Sahara to North Africa and sometimes onward to Europe.</p> <p>More than 60,000 Malian refugees have fled to Niger since violence between Malian government troops and armed rebels began in early 2012. Ongoing attacks by the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency, dating to 2013 in northern Nigeria and February 2015 in southeastern Niger, pushed tens of thousands of Nigerian refugees and Nigerien returnees across the border to Niger and displaced thousands of locals in Niger’s already impoverished Diffa region.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "49.5% (male 6,567,460/female 6,463,877)"
@ -576,37 +573,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> deposed president BAZOUM has been under house arrest since a military coup on 26 July 2023"
},
"Legislative branch": {
"legislature name": {
"text": "National Assembly (Assembl&eacute;e nationale)"
},
"legislative structure": {
"text": "unicameral"
},
"number of seats": {
"text": "171 (all directly elected)"
},
"electoral system": {
"text": "mixed system"
},
"scope of elections": {
"text": "full renewal"
},
"term in office": {
"text": "5 years"
},
"most recent election date": {
"text": "12/27/2020"
},
"parties elected and seats per party": {
"text": "Niger Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS Tarayya) (80); Nigerien Democratic Movement for an African Federation (Moden Fa . Lumana Africa ) (19); Patriotic Movement for the Republic (MPR-JAMHURIYA) (13); National Movement for the Development of Society (MNSD) - Nassara (13); Other (41)"
},
"percentage of women in chamber": {
"text": "30.7%"
},
"expected date of next election": {
"text": "December 2025"
},
"note": "<strong>Note:</strong> on 26 July 2023, the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland, a military junta which took control of Niger's government, dissolved the National Assembly; a commission recommended to the junta in February 2025 a minimum of a five-year transition to democratic rule"
"text": "<strong>Note:</strong> on 26 July 2023, the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland, a military junta which took control of Niger's government, dissolved the National Assembly; a commission recommended to the junta in February 2025 a minimum of a five-year transition to democratic rule"
},
"Judicial branch": {
"highest court(s)": {
@ -922,11 +889,11 @@
"note": "<b>note:</b> top five import commodities based on value in dollars"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": {
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": {
"text": "$1.314 billion (31 December 2017 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": {
"text": "$1.314 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": {
"text": "$1.186 billion (31 December 2016 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": {
"text": "$1.186 billion (2016 est.)"
}
},
"Debt - external": {

7
africa/ni.json
View file

@ -120,13 +120,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "236,747,130"
"text": "236,747,130 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "119,514,449"
},
"female": {
"text": "117,232,681 (2024 est.)"
"text": "117,232,681"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -147,9 +147,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Muslim 53.5%, Roman Catholic 10.6%, other Christian 35.3%, other 0.6% (2018 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Nigeria’s population is projected to grow from more than 186 million people in 2016 to 392 million in 2050, becoming the world’s fourth most populous country. Nigeria’s sustained high population growth rate will continue for the foreseeable future because of population momentum and its high birth rate. Abuja has not successfully implemented family planning programs to reduce and space births because of a lack of political will, government financing, and the availability and affordability of services and products, as well as a cultural preference for large families. Increased educational attainment, especially among women, and improvements in health care are needed to encourage and to better enable parents to opt for smaller families.</p><p>Nigeria needs to harness the potential of its burgeoning youth population in order to boost economic development, reduce widespread poverty, and channel large numbers of unemployed youth into productive activities and away from ongoing religious and ethnic violence. While most movement of Nigerians is internal, significant emigration regionally and to the West provides an outlet for Nigerians looking for economic opportunities, seeking asylum, and increasingly pursuing higher education. Immigration largely of West Africans continues to be insufficient to offset emigration and the loss of highly skilled workers. Nigeria also is a major source, transit, and destination country for forced labor and sex trafficking.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "40.4% (male 48,856,606/female 46,770,810)"

7
africa/od.json
View file

@ -99,13 +99,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "12,703,714"
"text": "12,703,714 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "6,476,341"
},
"female": {
"text": "6,227,373 (2024 est.)"
"text": "6,227,373"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -131,9 +131,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Christian 60.5%, folk religion 32.9%, Muslim 6.2%, other &lt;1%, unaffiliated &lt;1% (2020 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>South Sudan, independent from Sudan since July 2011 after decades of civil war, is one of the world’s poorest countries and ranks among the lowest in many socioeconomic categories. Problems are exacerbated by ongoing tensions with Sudan over oil revenues and land borders, fighting between government forces and rebel groups, and inter-communal violence. Most of the population lives off of farming, while smaller numbers rely on animal husbandry; abput 80% of the populace lives in rural areas. The maternal mortality rate is among the world’s highest for a variety of reasons, including a shortage of health care workers, facilities, and supplies; poor roads and a lack of transport; and cultural beliefs that prevent women from seeking obstetric care. Most women marry and start having children early, giving birth at home with the assistance of traditional birth attendants, who are unable to handle complications.</p> <p>Educational attainment is extremely poor due to the lack of schools, qualified teachers, and materials. Only one-third of the population is literate (the rate is even lower among women), and half live below the poverty line. Teachers and students are also struggling with the switch from Arabic to English as the language of instruction. Many adults missed out on schooling because of warfare and displacement.</p> <p>More than 2 million South Sudanese have sought refuge in neighboring countries since the current conflict began in December 2013. Another 2.2 million South Sudanese are internally displaced as of October 2022. Despite South Sudan’s instability and lack of infrastructure and social services, more than 275,000 people had fled to South Sudan to escape fighting in Sudan as of December 2022.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "42.1% (male 2,725,520/female 2,619,035)"

15
africa/pu.json
View file

@ -106,13 +106,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "2,132,325"
"text": "2,132,325 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "1,042,910"
},
"female": {
"text": "1,089,415 (2024 est.)"
"text": "1,089,415"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -132,9 +132,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Muslim 46.1%, folk religions 30.6%, Christian 18.9%, other or unaffiliated 4.4% (2020 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Guinea-Bissau’s young and growing population is sustained by high fertility; approximately 60% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020. Its large reproductive-age population and total fertility rate of more than 4 children per woman offsets the country’s high infant and maternal mortality rates. The latter is among the world’s highest because of the prevalence of early childbearing, a lack of birth spacing, the high percentage of births outside of health care facilities, and a shortage of medicines and supplies.</p> <p>Guinea-Bissau’s history of political instability, a civil war, and several coups (the latest in 2012) have resulted in a fragile state with a weak economy, high unemployment, rampant corruption, widespread poverty, and thriving drug and child trafficking. With the country lacking educational infrastructure, school funding and materials, and qualified teachers, and with the cultural emphasis placed on religious education, parents frequently send boys to study in residential Koranic schools (daaras) in Senegal and The Gambia. They often are extremely deprived and are forced into street begging or agricultural work by marabouts (Muslim religious teachers), who enrich themselves at the expense of the children. Boys who leave their marabouts often end up on the streets of Dakar or other large Senegalese towns and are vulnerable to even worse abuse.</p> <p>Some young men lacking in education and job prospects become involved in the flourishing international drug trade. Local drug use and associated violent crime are growing.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "42.3% (male 453,513/female 448,514)"
@ -860,11 +857,11 @@
"note": "<b>note:</b> top five import commodities based on value in dollars"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": {
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": {
"text": "$356.4 million (31 December 2017 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": {
"text": "$356.4 million (2017 est.)"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": {
"text": "$349.4 million (31 December 2016 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": {
"text": "$349.4 million (2016 est.)"
}
},
"Debt - external": {

7
africa/rw.json
View file

@ -109,13 +109,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "13,623,302"
"text": "13,623,302 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "6,684,655"
},
"female": {
"text": "6,938,647 (2024 est.)"
"text": "6,938,647"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -140,9 +140,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Christian 95.9% (Protestant 57.7% [includes Adventist 12.6%], Roman Catholic 38.2%), Muslim 2.1%, other 1% (includes traditional, Jehovah's Witness), none 1.1% (2019-20 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Rwanda’s fertility rate declined sharply during the last decade, as a result of the government’s commitment to family planning, the increased use of contraceptives, and a downward trend in ideal family size. Increases in educational attainment, particularly among girls, and exposure to social media also contributed to the reduction in the birth rate. The average number of births per woman decreased from a 5.6 in 2005 to 4.5 in 2016 and 3.3 in 2022. Despite these significant strides in reducing fertility, Rwanda’s birth rate remains very high and will continue to for an extended period of time because of its large population entering reproductive age. Because Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, its persistent high population growth and increasingly small agricultural landholdings will put additional strain on families’ ability to raise foodstuffs and access potable water. These conditions will also hinder the government’s efforts to reduce poverty and prevent environmental degradation.</p> <p>The UNHCR recommended that effective 30 June 2013 countries invoke a cessation of refugee status for those Rwandans who fled their homeland between 1959 and 1998, including the 1994 genocide, on the grounds that the conditions that drove them to seek protection abroad no longer exist. The UNHCR’s decision is controversial because many Rwandan refugees still fear persecution if they return home, concerns that are supported by the number of Rwandans granted asylum since 1998 and by the number exempted from the cessation. Rwandan refugees can still seek an exemption or local integration, but host countries are anxious to send the refugees back to Rwanda and are likely to avoid options that enable them to stay. Conversely, Rwanda itself hosts approximately 125,000 refugees as of 2022; virtually all of them fleeing conflict in neighboring Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "37.2% (male 2,561,884/female 2,508,218)"

9
africa/se.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "2.5 times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "2.5 times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -103,13 +103,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "98,187"
"text": "98,187 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "50,973"
},
"female": {
"text": "47,214 (2024 est.)"
"text": "47,214"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -129,9 +129,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Roman Catholic 76.2%, Protestant 10.5% (Anglican 6.1%, Pentecostal Assembly 1.5%, Seventh Day Adventist 1.2%, other Protestant 1.7%), other Christian 2.4%, Hindu 2.4%, Muslim 1.6%, other non-Christian 1.1%, unspecified 4.8%, none 0.9% (2010 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Seychelles has no indigenous population and was first permanently settled by a small group of French planters, African slaves, and South Indians in 1770. Seychelles’ modern population is composed of the descendants of French and later British settlers, Africans, and Indian, Chinese, and Middle Eastern traders and is concentrated on three of its 155 islands – the vast majority on Mahe and lesser numbers on Praslin and La Digue. Seychelles’ population grew rapidly during the second half of the 20th century, largely due to natural increase, but the pace has slowed because of fertility decline. The total fertility rate dropped sharply from 4.0 children per woman in 1980 to 1.9 in 2015, mainly as a result of a family planning program, free education and health care, and increased female labor force participation. Life expectancy has increased steadily, but women on average live 9 years longer than men, a difference that is higher than that typical of developed countries.</p><p>The combination of reduced fertility and increased longevity has resulted in an aging population, which will put pressure on the government’s provision of pensions and health care. Seychelles’ sustained investment in social welfare services, such as free primary health care and education up to the post-secondary level, have enabled the country to achieve a high human development index score – among the highest in Africa. Despite some of its health and education indicators being nearly on par with Western countries, Seychelles has a high level of income inequality.</p><p>An increasing number of migrant workers – mainly young men – have been coming to Seychelles in recent years to work in the construction and tourism industries. As of 2011, foreign workers made up nearly a quarter of the workforce. Indians are the largest non-Seychellois population – representing half of the country’s foreigners – followed by Malagasy.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "17.7% (male 8,912/female 8,439)"

9
africa/sf.json
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File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long

15
africa/sg.json
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@ -118,13 +118,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "18,847,519"
"text": "18,847,519 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "9,283,314"
},
"female": {
"text": "9,564,205 (2024 est.)"
"text": "9,564,205"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -144,9 +144,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Muslim 97.2% (most adhere to one of the four main Sufi brotherhoods), Christian 2.7% (mostly Roman Catholic) (2019 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Senegal has a large and growing youth population but has not been successful in developing its potential human capital. Senegal’s high total fertility rate of almost 4.5 children per woman continues to bolster the country’s large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25. Fertility remains high because of the continued desire for large families, the low use of family planning, and early childbearing. Because of the country’s high illiteracy rate (more than 40%), high unemployment (even among university graduates), and widespread poverty, Senegalese youths face dim prospects; women are especially disadvantaged.</p> <p>Senegal historically was a destination country for economic migrants, but in recent years West African migrants more often use Senegal as a transit point to North Africa – and sometimes illegally onward to Europe. The country also has been host to several thousand black Mauritanian refugees since they were expelled from their homeland during its 1989 border conflict with Senegal. The country’s economic crisis in the 1970s stimulated emigration; departures accelerated in the 1990s. Destinations shifted from neighboring countries, which were experiencing economic decline, civil wars, and increasing xenophobia, to Libya and Mauritania because of their booming oil industries and to developed countries (most notably former colonial ruler France, as well as Italy and Spain). The latter became attractive in the 1990s because of job opportunities and their periodic regularization programs (legalizing the status of illegal migrants).</p> <p> </p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "40.7% (male 3,907,986/female 3,760,594)"
@ -922,11 +919,11 @@
"note": "<b>note:</b> top five import commodities based on value in dollars"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": {
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": {
"text": "$1.827 billion (31 December 2017 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": {
"text": "$1.827 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": {
"text": "$116.9 million (31 December 2016 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": {
"text": "$116.9 million (2016 est.)"
}
},
"Debt - external": {

9
africa/sh.json
View file

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
"note": "88 sq km Ascension Island, 184 sq km Tristan da Cunha island group (includes Tristan (98 sq km), Inaccessible, Nightingale, and Gough islands)"
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "slightly more than twice the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "slightly more than twice the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -98,13 +98,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "7,943"
"text": "7,943 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "3,978"
},
"female": {
"text": "3,965 (2024 est.)"
"text": "3,965"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -127,9 +127,6 @@
"text": "Protestant 69.4% (includes Anglican 63.2%, Baptist 2.3%, Salvation Army 2%, Seventh Day Adventist 1.9%), Jehovah's Witness 3.8%, Roman Catholic 2.2%, New Apostolic 1.6%, other Christian 1.4%, other 1.1%, none 9%, unspecified 11.4% (2021 est.)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> data represent Saint Helena only"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>The vast majority of the population of Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha live on Saint Helena. Ascension has no indigenous or permanent residents and is inhabited only by persons contracted to work on the island (mainly with the UK and US military or in the space and communications industries) or their dependents, while Tristan da Cunha – the main island in a small archipelago – has fewer than 300 residents. The population of Saint Helena consists of the descendants of 17th century British sailors and settlers from the East India Company, African slaves, and indentured servants and laborers from India, Indonesia, and China. Most of the population of Ascension are Saint Helenians, Britons, and Americans, while that of Tristan da Cunha descends from shipwrecked sailors and Saint Helenians.</p> <p>Change in Saint Helena’s population size is driven by net outward migration. Since the 1980s, Saint Helena’s population steadily has shrunk and aged as the birth rate has decreased and many working-age residents left for better opportunities elsewhere. The restoration of British citizenship in 2002 accelerated family emigration; from 1998 to 2008 alone, population declined by about 20%.</p> <p>In the 2010s, the population experienced some temporary growth, as foreigners and returning Saint Helenians, came to build an international airport, but numbers faded as the project reached completion and workers departed. With the airport fully operational, increased access to the remote island has the potential to boost tourism and fishing, provide more jobs for Saint Helenians domestically, and could encourage some ex-patriots to return home. In the meantime, however, Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha have to contend with the needs of an aging population. The elderly population of the islands has risen from an estimated 9.4% in 1998 to 18% in 2022.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "14.3% (male 579/female 556)"

7
africa/sl.json
View file

@ -112,13 +112,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "9,121,049"
"text": "9,121,049 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "4,515,726"
},
"female": {
"text": "4,605,323 (2024 est.)"
"text": "4,605,323"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -138,9 +138,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Muslim 77.1%, Christian 22.9% (2019 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Sierra Leone’s youthful and growing population is driven by its high total fertility rate (TFR) of almost 4 children per woman as of 2022, which has declined little over the last two decades. Its elevated TFR is sustained by the continued desire for large families, the low level of contraceptive use, and the early start of childbearing. Despite its high TFR, Sierra Leone’s population growth is somewhat tempered by high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates that are among the world’s highest and are a result of poverty, a lack of potable water and sanitation, poor nutrition, limited access to quality health care services, and the prevalence of female genital cutting.</p> <p>Sierra Leone’s large youth cohort – about 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – continues to struggle with high levels of unemployment, which was one of the major causes of the country’s 1991-2002 civil war and remains a threat to stability today. Its estimated 60% youth unemployment rate is attributed to high levels of illiteracy and unskilled labor, a lack of private sector jobs, and low pay.</p> <p>Sierra Leone has been a source of and destination for refugees. Sierra Leone’s civil war internally displaced as many as 2 million people, or almost half the population, and forced almost another half million to seek refuge in neighboring countries (370,000 Sierra Leoneans fled to Guinea and 120,000 to Liberia). The UNHCR has helped almost 180,000 Sierra Leoneans to return home, while more than 90,000 others have repatriated on their own. Of the more than 65,000 Liberians who took refuge in Sierra Leone during their country’s civil war (1989-2003), about 50,000 have been voluntarily repatriated by the UNHCR and others have returned home independently.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "40.1% (male 1,843,606/female 1,812,304)"

7
africa/so.json
View file

@ -106,13 +106,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "13,017,273"
"text": "13,017,273 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "6,546,312"
},
"female": {
"text": "6,470,961 (2024 est.)"
"text": "6,470,961"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -137,9 +137,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Muslim 99.9% (Sunni Muslim 98.1%, Shia Muslim 1.2%, Islamic schismatic 0.6%), ethnic religionist 0.1% (2020 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Somalia scores very low for most humanitarian indicators, suffering from poor governance, protracted internal conflict, underdevelopment, economic decline, poverty, social and gender inequality, and environmental degradation. Despite civil war and famine raising its mortality rate, Somalia’s high fertility rate and large proportion of people of reproductive age maintain rapid population growth, with each generation being larger than the prior one. More than 60% of Somalia’s population is younger than 25 as of 2020, and the fertility rate is among the world’s highest at almost 5.5 children per woman – a rate that has decreased little since the 1970s.</p> <p>A lack of educational and job opportunities is a major source of tension for Somalia’s large youth cohort, making them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist and pirate groups. Somalia has one of the world’s lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school – and one of the world’s highest youth unemployment rates. Life expectancy is low as a result of high infant and maternal mortality rates, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition, and inadequate health services.</p> <p>During the two decades of conflict that followed the fall of the SIAD regime in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes. Today Somalia is the world’s fourth highest source country for refugees, after Ukraine, Syria and Afghanistan. Insecurity, drought, floods, food shortages, and a lack of economic opportunities are the driving factors.</p> <p>As of 2022, more than 660,000 Somali refugees were hosted in the region, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, while nearly 3 million Somalis were internally displaced. Since the implementation of a tripartite voluntary repatriation agreement among Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR in 2013, many Somali refugees have returned home, some 80,000 between 2014 and 2022.  The Kenyan Government in March 2021 ordered the closure of its two largest refugee camps, Dadaab and Kakuma, which then hosted more than 410,000 mainly Somali refugees.  However, the UN refugee agency presented a road map, including voluntary repatriation, relocation to third countries, and alternative stay options that persuaded the Kenyan Government to delay the closures.  The plan was supposed to lead to both camps being closed by 30 June 2022. Yet, as of May 2022, few Somali refugees had decided to return home because of security concerns and the lack of job prospects, instead waiting in the camps unsure of what the future held for them. Other Somali asylum seekers brave the dangers of crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen – despite its internal conflict – with aspirations to move onward to Saudi Arabia and other locations.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "41.4% (male 2,689,086/female 2,694,372)"

7
africa/su.json
View file

@ -116,13 +116,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "50,467,278"
"text": "50,467,278 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "25,335,092"
},
"female": {
"text": "25,132,186 (2024 est.)"
"text": "25,132,186"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -147,9 +147,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Sunni Muslim, small Christian minority"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Sudan’s population grew almost fourfold between 1956 and 2008, the date of its last census.  Even after the southern part of the country became independent South Sudan in 2011, the population of Sudan has continued to grow.  The gender balance overall is fairly even.  Females, however, are more prevalent in rural areas because of males migrating to urban areas in search of work.  The total fertility rate (TFR) remains high despite falling from 7 children per woman in Sudan’s first census in 1955 to about 4.5 in 2022, which can be attributed to early marriage and a low contraceptive prevalence rate.  Among the factors that led to the reduction in fertility are family planning, improvement in women’s education and participation in the labor force outside the home, and migration and urbanization. </p> <p>The continued slow decline in fertility accompanied by a drop in mortality and increased life expectancy has produced an age structure where approximately 55% of the population was of working age (15-64) as of 2020.  This share will grow as the sizable youth population becomes working age.  As Sudan’s working age population increasingly outnumbers the youth and elderly populations (the dependent populations), the country will approach the possibility of a demographic dividend.  The window of opportunity for potential economic growth depends not only on a favorable age structure but also on having a trained and educated workforce, job creation (particularly in the formal market), and investment in health, as well as generating savings to invest in schooling and care for the elderly.  As of 2018, Sudan’s literacy rate was just over 60%, and even lower among women.  Improvements in school enrollment, student-teacher ratio, infrastructure, funding, and educational quality could help the country to realize a demographic dividend.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "40.1% (male 10,278,453/female 9,949,343)"

18
africa/to.json
View file

@ -106,13 +106,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "8,917,994"
"text": "8,917,994 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "4,395,271"
},
"female": {
"text": "4,522,723 (2024 est.)"
"text": "4,522,723"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -133,9 +133,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Christian 42.3%, folk religion 36.9%, Muslim 14%, Hindu &lt;1%, Buddhist &lt;1%, Jewish &lt;1%, other &lt;1%, none 6.2% (2020 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Togo’s population is estimated to have grown to four times its size between 1960 and 2010. With nearly 60% of its populace under the age of 25 and a high annual growth rate attributed largely to high fertility, Togo’s population is likely to continue to expand for the foreseeable future. Reducing fertility, boosting job creation, and improving education will be essential to reducing the country’s high poverty rate. In 2008, Togo eliminated primary school enrollment fees, leading to higher enrollment but increased pressure on limited classroom space, teachers, and materials. Togo has a good chance of achieving universal primary education, but educational quality, the underrepresentation of girls, and the low rate of enrollment in secondary and tertiary schools remain concerns.</p> <p>Togo is both a country of emigration and asylum. In the early 1990s, southern Togo suffered from the economic decline of the phosphate sector and ethnic and political repression at the hands of dictator Gnassingbe EYADEMA and his northern, Kabye-dominated administration. The turmoil led 300,000 to 350,000 predominantly southern Togolese to flee to Benin and Ghana, with most not returning home until relative stability was restored in 1997. In 2005, another outflow of 40,000 Togolese to Benin and Ghana occurred when violence broke out between the opposition and security forces over the disputed election of EYADEMA’s son Faure GNASSINGBE to the presidency. About half of the refugees reluctantly returned home in 2006, many still fearing for their safety. Despite ethnic tensions and periods of political unrest, Togo in December 2022 was home to almost 8,400 refugees from Ghana.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "38.7% (male 1,749,533/female 1,699,084)"
@ -620,6 +617,9 @@
"parties elected and seats per party": {
"text": "Union for the Republic (UNIR) (34); Independents (3); Other (4)"
},
"percentage of women in chamber": {
"text": "24.6%"
},
"expected date of next election": {
"text": "February 2031"
}
@ -942,11 +942,11 @@
"note": "<b>note:</b> top five import commodities based on value in dollars"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": {
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": {
"text": "$77.8 million (31 December 2017 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": {
"text": "$77.8 million (2017 est.)"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": {
"text": "$42.6 million (31 December 2016 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": {
"text": "$42.6 million (2016 est.)"
}
},
"Debt - external": {

9
africa/tp.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "more than five times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "more than five times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -98,13 +98,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "223,561"
"text": "223,561 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "111,553"
},
"female": {
"text": "112,008 (2024 est.)"
"text": "112,008"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -125,9 +125,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Catholic 55.7%, Adventist 4.1%, Assembly of God 3.4%, New Apostolic 2.9%, Mana 2.3%, Universal Kingdom of God 2%, Jehovah's Witness 1.2%, other 6.2%, none 21.2%, unspecified 1% (2012 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Sao Tome and Principe’s youthful age structure – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020 – and high fertility rate ensure future population growth. Although Sao Tome has a net negative international migration rate, emigration is not a sufficient safety valve to reduce already high levels of unemployment and poverty. While literacy and primary school attendance have improved in recent years, Sao Tome still struggles to improve its educational quality and to increase its secondary school completion rate. Despite some improvements in education and access to healthcare, Sao Tome and Principe has much to do to decrease its high poverty rate, create jobs, and increase its economic growth.</p> <p>The population of Sao Tome and Principe descends primarily from the islands’ colonial Portuguese settlers, who first arrived in the late 15th century, and the much larger number of African slaves brought in for sugar production and the slave trade. For about 100 years after the abolition of slavery in 1876, the population was further shaped by the widespread use of imported unskilled contract laborers from Portugal’s other African colonies, who worked on coffee and cocoa plantations. In the first decades after abolition, most workers were brought from Angola under a system similar to slavery. While Angolan laborers were technically free, they were forced or coerced into long contracts that were automatically renewed and extended to their children. Other contract workers from Mozambique and famine-stricken Cape Verde first arrived in the early 20th century under short-term contracts and had the option of repatriation, although some chose to remain in Sao Tome and Principe.</p> <p>Today’s Sao Tomean population consists of mesticos (creole descendants of the European immigrants and African slaves that first inhabited the islands), forros (descendants of freed African slaves), angolares (descendants of runaway African slaves that formed a community in the south of Sao Tome Island and today are fishermen), servicais (contract laborers from Angola, Mozambique, and Cape Verde), tongas (locally born children of contract laborers), and lesser numbers of Europeans and Asians.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "36.4% (male 41,337/female 40,106)"

7
africa/ts.json
View file

@ -109,13 +109,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "12,048,847"
"text": "12,048,847 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "5,972,242"
},
"female": {
"text": "6,076,605 (2024 est.)"
"text": "6,076,605"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -141,9 +141,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Muslim (official; Sunni) 99%, other (includes Christian, Jewish, Shia Muslim, and Baha'i) &lt;1%"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>The Tunisian Government took steps in the 1960s to decrease population growth and gender inequality in order to improve socioeconomic development. Through its introduction of a national family planning program (the first in Africa) and by raising the legal age of marriage, Tunisia rapidly reduced its total fertility rate from about 7 children per woman in 1960 to 2 in 2022. Unlike many of its North African and Middle Eastern neighbors, Tunisia will soon be shifting from being a youth-bulge country to having a transitional age structure, characterized by lower fertility and mortality rates, a slower population growth rate, a rising median age, and a longer average life expectancy.</p> <p>Currently, the sizable young working-age population is straining Tunisia’s labor market and education and health care systems. Persistent high unemployment among Tunisia’s growing workforce, particularly its increasing number of university graduates and women, was a key factor in the uprisings that led to the overthrow of the BEN ALI regime in 2011. In the near term, Tunisia’s large number of jobless young, working-age adults; deficiencies in primary and secondary education; and the ongoing lack of job creation and skills mismatches could contribute to future unrest. In the longer term, a sustained low fertility rate will shrink future youth cohorts and alleviate demographic pressure on Tunisia’s labor market, but employment and education hurdles will still need to be addressed.</p> <p>Tunisia has a history of labor emigration. In the 1960s, workers migrated to European countries to escape poor economic conditions and to fill Europe’s need for low-skilled labor in construction and manufacturing. The Tunisian Government signed bilateral labor agreements with France, Germany, Belgium, Hungary, and the Netherlands, with the expectation that Tunisian workers would eventually return home. At the same time, growing numbers of Tunisians headed to Libya, often illegally, to work in the expanding oil industry. In the mid-1970s, with European countries beginning to restrict immigration and Tunisian-Libyan tensions brewing, Tunisian economic migrants turned toward the Gulf countries. After mass expulsions from Libya in 1983, Tunisian migrants increasingly sought family reunification in Europe or moved illegally to southern Europe, while Tunisia itself developed into a transit point for Sub-Saharan migrants heading to Europe.</p> <p>Following the ousting of BEN ALI in 2011, the illegal migration of unemployed Tunisian youths to Italy and onward to France soared into the tens of thousands. Thousands more Tunisian and foreign workers escaping civil war in Libya flooded into Tunisia and joined the exodus. A readmission agreement signed by Italy and Tunisia in April 2011 helped stem the outflow, leaving Tunisia and international organizations to repatriate, resettle, or accommodate some 1 million Libyans and third-country nationals.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "24.4% (male 1,516,871/female 1,426,522)"

7
africa/tz.json
View file

@ -118,13 +118,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "67,462,121"
"text": "67,462,121 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "33,691,904"
},
"female": {
"text": "33,770,217 (2024 est.)"
"text": "33,770,217"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -150,9 +150,6 @@
"text": "Christian 63.1%, Muslim 34.1%, folk religion 1.1%, Buddhist &lt;1%, Hindu &lt;1%, Jewish &lt;1%, other &lt;1%, unspecified 1.6% (2020 est.)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> Zanzibar is almost entirely Muslim"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Tanzania has the largest population in East Africa and the lowest population density; more than a third of the population is urban. Tanzania’s youthful population – over 60% of the population is under 25 as of 2020 – is growing rapidly because of the high total fertility rate of 4.4 children per woman, as of 2022. Progress in reducing the birth rate has stalled, sustaining the country’s nearly 3% annual growth rate. The maternal mortality rate has improved since 2000, yet it remains very high because of early and frequent pregnancies, inadequate maternal health services, and a lack of skilled birth attendants – problems that are worse among poor and rural women. Tanzania has made strides in reducing under-5 and infant mortality rates, but a recent drop in immunization threatens to undermine gains in child health. Malaria is a leading killer of children under 5, while HIV is the main source of adult mortality.</p> <p>For Tanzania, most migration is internal, rural to urban movement, while some temporary labor migration from towns to plantations takes place seasonally for harvests. Tanzania was Africa’s largest refugee-hosting country for decades, hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Great Lakes region, primarily Burundi, over the last fifty years. However, the assisted repatriation and naturalization of tens of thousands of Burundian refugees between 2002 and 2014 dramatically reduced the refugee population. Tanzania is increasingly a transit country for illegal migrants from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region who are heading to southern Africa for security reasons and/or economic opportunities. Some of these migrants choose to settle in Tanzania.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "41.2% (male 14,039,292/female 13,740,439)"

7
africa/ug.json
View file

@ -106,13 +106,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "49,283,041"
"text": "49,283,041 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "24,040,560"
},
"female": {
"text": "25,242,481 (2024 est.)"
"text": "25,242,481"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -132,9 +132,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Protestant 45.1% (Anglican 32.0%, Pentecostal/Born Again/Evangelical 11.1%, Seventh Day Adventist 1.7%, Baptist .3%), Roman Catholic 39.3%, Muslim 13.7%, other 1.6%, none 0.2% (2014 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Uganda has one of the youngest and most rapidly growing populations in the world; its total fertility rate is among the world’s highest at close to 5.5 children per woman in 2022. Except in urban areas, actual fertility exceeds women’s desired fertility by one or two children, which is indicative of the widespread unmet need for contraception, lack of government support for family planning, and a cultural preference for large families. High numbers of births, short birth intervals, and the early age of childbearing contribute to Uganda’s high maternal mortality rate. Gender inequities also make fertility reduction difficult; women on average are less-educated, participate less in paid employment, and often have little say in decisions over childbearing and their own reproductive health. However, even if the birth rate were significantly reduced, Uganda’s large pool of women entering reproductive age ensures rapid population growth for decades to come.</p> <p>Unchecked, population increase will further strain the availability of arable land and natural resources and overwhelm the country’s limited means for providing food, employment, education, health care, housing, and basic services. The country’s north and northeast lag even further behind developmentally than the rest of the country as a result of long-term conflict (the Ugandan Bush War 1981-1986 and more than 20 years of fighting between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and Ugandan Government forces), ongoing inter-communal violence, and periodic natural disasters.</p> <p>Uganda has been both a source of refugees and migrants and a host country for refugees. In 1972, then President Idi AMIN, in his drive to return Uganda to Ugandans, expelled the South Asian population that composed a large share of the country’s business people and bankers. Since the 1970s, thousands of Ugandans have emigrated, mainly to southern Africa or the West, for security reasons, to escape poverty, to search for jobs, and for access to natural resources. The emigration of Ugandan doctors and nurses due to low wages is a particular concern given the country’s shortage of skilled health care workers. Africans escaping conflicts in neighboring states have found refuge in Uganda since the 1950s; the country currently struggles to host tens of thousands from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and other nearby countries.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "47% (male 11,747,745/female 11,427,932)"

19
africa/uv.json
View file

@ -104,13 +104,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "23,042,199"
"text": "23,042,199 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "11,297,749"
},
"female": {
"text": "11,744,450 (2024 est.)"
"text": "11,744,450"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -130,9 +130,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Muslim 63.8%, Roman Catholic 20.1%, Animiste 9%, Protestant 6.2%, other 0.2%, none 0.7% (2019 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Burkina Faso has a young age structure – the result of declining mortality combined with steady high fertility – and continues to experience rapid population growth, which is putting increasing pressure on the country’s limited arable land. Almost 65% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020, and the population is growing at 2.5% annually. Mortality rates, especially those of infants and children, have decreased because of improved health care, hygiene, and sanitation, but women continue to have an average of more than 4 children. Even if fertility were substantially reduced, today’s large cohort entering their reproductive years would sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future. Only about a third of the population is literate and unemployment is widespread, dampening the economic prospects of Burkina Faso’s large working-age population.</p> <p>Migration has traditionally been a way of life for Burkinabe, with seasonal migration being replaced by stints of up to two years abroad. Cote d’Ivoire remains the top destination, although it has experienced periods of internal conflict. Under French colonization, Burkina Faso became a main labor source for agricultural and factory work in Cote d’Ivoire. Burkinabe also migrated to Ghana, Mali, and Senegal for work between the world wars. Burkina Faso attracts migrants from Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Mali, who often share common ethnic backgrounds with the Burkinabe. Despite its food shortages and high poverty rate, Burkina Faso has become a destination for refugees in recent years and hosts about 33,600 Malian refugees as of October 2022.</p> (2018)"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "41.6% (male 4,868,488/female 4,727,316)"
@ -901,11 +898,11 @@
"note": "<b>note:</b> top five import commodities based on value in dollars"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": {
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": {
"text": "$49 million (31 December 2017 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": {
"text": "$49 million (2017 est.)"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": {
"text": "$50.9 million (31 December 2016 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": {
"text": "$50.9 million (2016 est.)"
}
},
"Debt - external": {
@ -1097,8 +1094,8 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Armed Forces of Burkina Faso (FABF; aka National Armed Forces (FAN), aka Defense and Security Forces (Forces de Défense et de Sécurité or FDS)): Army of Burkina Faso (L’Armee de Terre, LAT), Air Force of Burkina Faso (Force Aerienne de Burkina Faso), National Gendarmerie, National Fire Brigade (Brigade Nationale de Sapeurs-Pompiers or BNSP); Homeland Defense Volunteers (Forcés de Volontaires de Défense pour la Patrie or VDP)<br><br>Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Security (Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale, de la Décentralisation et de la Sécurité): National Police (2024)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the National Gendarmerie officially reports to the Ministry of Defense, but usually operates in support of the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security; the Gendarmerie's primary mission is counterterrorism; it is comprised of “legions” and mobile squadrons, including a Special Legion for combating organized crime and terrorism and providing security for high-level officials and government institutions; other government forces specializing in counterterrorism include the Army's Special Forces and the Multipurpose Intervention Unit of the National Police<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the VDP is a lightly-armed civilian defense/militia force established in 2019 to act as auxiliaries to the Army; the volunteers receive two weeks of training and typically assist with carrying out surveillance, information-gathering, and escort duties, as well as local defense, and were to be based in each of the country's more than 300 municipalities; in 2022, the military government created a \"Patriotic Watch and Defense Brigade\" (La Brigade de Veille et de Défense Patriotique or BVDP) under the FABF to coordinate the VDP recruits"
"text": "Armed Forces of Burkina Faso (FABF; aka National Armed Forces (FAN), aka Defense and Security Forces (Forces de Défense et de Sécurité or FDS)): Army of Burkina Faso (L’Armee de Terre), Air Force of Burkina Faso (Force Aerienne de Burkina Faso), National Gendarmerie, National Fire Brigade (Brigade Nationale de Sapeurs-Pompiers or BNSP); Homeland Defense Volunteers (Forcés de Volontaires de Défense pour la Patrie or VDP)<br><br>Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Security (Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale, de la Décentralisation et de la Sécurité): National Police of Burkina Faso (includes Border Police, Judicial Police, and Intervention Units, as well as State and Public Security forces) (2025)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the National Gendarmerie is under the Ministry of Defense, but usually operates in support of the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security; the Gendarmerie's primary mission is counterterrorism<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the VDP is a lightly-armed civilian defense/militia force established in 2019 to act as auxiliaries to the Army; the volunteers receive two weeks of training and typically assist with carrying out surveillance, information-gathering, and escort duties, as well as local defense; they are based in each of the country's more than 300 municipalities"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2023": {

9
africa/wa.json
View file

@ -116,13 +116,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "2,803,660"
"text": "2,803,660 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "1,377,286"
},
"female": {
"text": "1,426,374 (2024 est.)"
"text": "1,426,374"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -143,9 +143,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Christian 97.5%, other 0.6% (includes Muslim, Baha'i, Jewish, Buddhist), unaffiliated 1.9% (2020 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Planning officials view Namibia’s reduced population growth rate as sustainable based on the country’s economic growth over the past decade. Prior to independence in 1990, Namibia’s relatively small population grew at about 3% annually, but declining fertility and the impact of HIV/AIDS slowed this growth to 1.4% by 2011, rebounding to close to 2% by 2016. Namibia’s fertility rate has fallen over the last two decades – from about 4.5 children per woman in 1996 to 3.4 in 2016 and to 3 in 2022 – due to increased contraceptive use, higher educational attainment among women, and greater female participation in the labor force. The average age at first birth has stayed fairly constant, but the age at first marriage continues to increase, indicating a rising incidence of premarital childbearing.</p> <p>The majority of Namibians are rural dwellers (about 55%) and live in the better-watered north and northeast parts of the country. Migration, historically male-dominated, generally flows from northern communal areas – non-agricultural lands where blacks were sequestered under the apartheid system – to agricultural, mining, and manufacturing centers in the center and south. After independence from South Africa, restrictions on internal movement eased, and rural-urban migration increased, bolstering urban growth.</p> <p>Some Namibians – usually persons who are better-educated, more affluent, and from urban areas – continue to legally migrate to South Africa temporarily to visit family and friends and, much less frequently, to pursue tertiary education or better economic opportunities. Namibians concentrated along the country’s other borders make unauthorized visits to Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, or Botswana, to visit family and to trade agricultural goods. Few Namibians express interest in permanently settling in other countries; they prefer the safety of their homeland, have a strong national identity, and enjoy a well-supplied retail sector. Although Namibia is receptive to foreign investment and cross-border trade, intolerance toward non-citizens is widespread.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "34.1% (male 482,790/female 473,306)"
@ -485,7 +482,7 @@
"text": "German South-West Africa (Deutsch-Suedwestafrika), South-West Africa"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "named for the coastal Namib Desert; the name \"namib\" means \"vast place\" in the Nama/Damara language"
"text": "named for the coastal Namib Desert; the word <em>namib </em>comes from the local Nama language and means \"an area where there is nothing\""
}
},
"Government type": {

7
africa/wz.json
View file

@ -98,13 +98,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "1,138,089"
"text": "1,138,089 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "538,600"
},
"female": {
"text": "599,489 (2024 est.)"
"text": "599,489"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -124,9 +124,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Christian 90% (Zionist - a blend of Christianity and traditional African religions - 40%, Roman Catholic 20%, other Christian 30% - includes Anglican, Methodist, Church of Jesus Christ, Jehovah's Witness), Muslim 2%, other 8% (includes Baha'i, Buddhist, Hindu, indigenous, Jewish) (2015 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Eswatini, a small, predominantly rural, landlocked country surrounded by South Africa and Mozambique, suffers from severe poverty and the world’s highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate. A weak and deteriorating economy, high unemployment, rapid population growth, and an uneven distribution of resources all combine to worsen already persistent poverty and food insecurity, especially in rural areas. Erratic weather (frequent droughts and intermittent heavy rains and flooding), overuse of small plots, the overgrazing of cattle, and outdated agricultural practices reduce crop yields and further degrade the environment, exacerbating Eswatini's poverty and subsistence problems. Eswatini's extremely high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate – nearly 28% of adults have the disease – compounds these issues. Agricultural production has declined due to HIV/AIDS, as the illness causes households to lose manpower and to sell livestock and other assets to pay for medicine and funerals.</p> <p>Swazis, mainly men from the country’s rural south, have been migrating to South Africa to work in coal, and later gold, mines since the late 19th century. Although the number of miners abroad has never been high in absolute terms because of Eswatini's small population, the outflow has had important social and economic repercussions. The peak of mining employment in South Africa occurred during the 1980s. Cross-border movement has accelerated since the 1990s, as increasing unemployment has pushed more Swazis to look for work in South Africa (creating a \"brain drain\" in the health and educational sectors); southern Swazi men have continued to pursue mining, although the industry has downsized. Women now make up an increasing share of migrants and dominate cross-border trading in handicrafts, using the proceeds to purchase goods back in Eswatini. Much of today’s migration, however, is not work-related but focuses on visits to family and friends, tourism, and shopping.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "31.6% (male 180,328/female 179,840)"

7
africa/za.json
View file

@ -112,13 +112,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "20,799,116"
"text": "20,799,116 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "10,407,253"
},
"female": {
"text": "10,391,863 (2024 est.)"
"text": "10,391,863"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -139,9 +139,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Protestant 75.3%, Roman Catholic 20.2%, other 2.7% (includes Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, and Baha'i), none 1.8% (2010 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Zambia’s poor, youthful population consists primarily of Bantu-speaking people representing nearly 70 different ethnicities. Zambia’s high fertility rate continues to drive rapid population growth, averaging almost 3% annually between 2000 and 2010, and reaching over 3.3% in 2022. The country’s total fertility rate has fallen by less than 1.5 children per woman during the last 30 years and still averages among the world’s highest, almost 6 children per woman, largely because of the country’s lack of access to family planning services, education for girls, and employment for women. Zambia also exhibits wide fertility disparities based on rural or urban location, education, and income. Poor, uneducated women from rural areas are more likely to marry young, to give birth early, and to have more children, viewing children as a sign of prestige and recognizing that not all of their children will live to adulthood. HIV/AIDS is prevalent in Zambia and contributes to its low life expectancy.</p> <p>Zambian emigration is low compared to many other African countries and is comprised predominantly of the well-educated. The small amount of brain drain, however, has a major impact in Zambia because of its limited human capital and lack of educational infrastructure for developing skilled professionals in key fields. For example, Zambia has few schools for training doctors, nurses, and other health care workers. Its spending on education is low compared to other Sub-Saharan countries.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "42.1% (male 4,418,980/female 4,337,187)"

7
africa/zi.json
View file

@ -107,13 +107,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "17,150,352"
"text": "17,150,352 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "8,343,790"
},
"female": {
"text": "8,806,562 (2024 est.)"
"text": "8,806,562"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -134,9 +134,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Apostolic Sect 40.3%, Pentecostal 17%, Protestant 13.8%, other Christian 7.8%, Roman Catholic 6.4%, African traditionalist 5%, other 1.5% (includes Muslim, Jewish, Hindu), none 8.3% (2022 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Zimbabwe’s progress in reproductive, maternal, and child health has stagnated in recent years. According to a 2010 Demographic and Health Survey, contraceptive use, the number of births attended by skilled practitioners, and child mortality have either stalled or somewhat deteriorated since the mid-2000s. Zimbabwe’s total fertility rate has remained fairly stable at about 4 children per woman for the last two decades, although an uptick in the urban birth rate in recent years has caused a slight rise in the country’s overall fertility rate. Zimbabwe’s HIV prevalence rate dropped from approximately 29% to 15% since 1997 but remains among the world’s highest and continues to suppress the country’s life expectancy rate. The proliferation of HIV/AIDS information and prevention programs and personal experience with those suffering or dying from the disease have helped to change sexual behavior and reduce the epidemic.</p> <p>Historically, the vast majority of Zimbabwe’s migration has been internal – a rural-urban flow. In terms of international migration, over the last 40 years Zimbabwe has gradually shifted from being a destination country to one of emigration and, to a lesser degree, one of transit (for East African illegal migrants traveling to South Africa). As a British colony, Zimbabwe attracted significant numbers of permanent immigrants from the UK and other European countries, as well as temporary economic migrants from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. Although Zimbabweans have migrated to South Africa since the beginning of the 20th century to work as miners, the first major exodus from the country occurred in the years before and after independence in 1980. The outward migration was politically and racially influenced; a large share of the white population of European origin chose to leave rather than live under a new black-majority government.</p> <p>In the 1990s and 2000s, economic mismanagement and hyperinflation sparked a second, more diverse wave of emigration. This massive outmigration – primarily to other southern African countries, the UK, and the US – has created a variety of challenges, including brain drain, illegal migration, and human smuggling and trafficking. Several factors have pushed highly skilled workers to go abroad, including unemployment, lower wages, a lack of resources, and few opportunities for career growth.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "38.3% (male 3,315,075/female 3,254,643)"

2
antarctica/bv.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "about 0.3 times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "about 0.3 times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {

2
antarctica/fs.json
View file

@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
"text": "<strong>Ile Amsterdam (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): </strong>total - 55 sq km; land - 55 sq km; water - 0 sq km<br> <strong>Ile Saint-Paul (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): </strong>total - 7 sq km; land - 7 sq km; water - 0 sq km<br> <strong>Iles Crozet: </strong>total - 352 sq km; land - 352 sq km; water - 0 sq km<br> <strong>Iles Kerguelen: </strong>total - 7,215 sq km; land - 7,215 sq km; water - 0 sq km<br> <strong>Bassas da India (Iles Eparses): </strong>total - 80 sq km; land - 0.2 sq km; water - 79.8 sq km (lagoon)<br> <strong>Europa Island (Iles Eparses): </strong>total - 28 sq km; land - 28 sq km; water - 0 sq km<br> <strong>Glorioso Islands (Iles Eparses): </strong>total - 5 sq km; land - 5 sq km; water - 0 sq km<br> <strong>Juan de Nova Island (Iles Eparses): </strong>total - 4.4 sq km; land - 4.4 sq km; water - 0 sq km<br> <strong>Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses): </strong>total - 1 sq km; land - 1 sq km; water - 0 sq km<br> <strong>note: </strong>excludes \"Adelie Land\" claim of about 500,000 sq km in Antarctica that is not recognized by the US"
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "<p><strong>Ile Amsterdam (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul):</strong> less than one-half the size of Washington, DC; </p><p><strong>Ile Saint-Paul (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul):</strong> more than 10 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; </p><p><strong>Iles Crozet:</strong> about twice the size of Washington, DC; </p><p><strong>Iles Kerguelen:</strong> slightly larger than Delaware; </p><p><strong>Bassas da India (Iles Eparses):</strong> land area about one-third the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; </p><p><strong>Europa Island (Iles Eparses):</strong> about one-sixth the size of Washington, DC; </p><p><strong>Glorioso Islands (Iles Eparses):</strong> about eight times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; </p><p><strong>Juan de Nova Island (Iles Eparses):</strong> about seven times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; </p><p><strong>Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses):</strong> about 1.7 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC</p>"
"text": "<p><strong>Ile Amsterdam (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul):</strong> less than one-half the size of Washington, D.C.;</p> <p><strong>Ile Saint-Paul (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul):</strong> more than 10 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;</p> <p><strong>Iles Crozet:</strong> about twice the size of Washington, D.C.;</p> <p><strong>Iles Kerguelen:</strong> slightly larger than Delaware;</p> <p><strong>Bassas da India (Iles Eparses):</strong> land area about one-third the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;</p> <p><strong>Europa Island (Iles Eparses):</strong> about one-sixth the size of Washington, D.C.;</p> <p><strong>Glorioso Islands (Iles Eparses):</strong> about eight times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;</p> <p><strong>Juan de Nova Island (Iles Eparses):</strong> about seven times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;</p> <p><strong>Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses):</strong> about 1.7 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.</p>"
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {

6
antarctica/hm.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "slightly more than two times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "slightly more than two times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -111,7 +111,7 @@
"text": "HIMI"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "named after American Captain John HEARD, who sighted the island on 25 November 1853, and American Captain William McDONALD, who discovered the islands on 4 January 1854"
"text": "named after US Captain John HEARD, who sighted the island on 25 November 1853, and US Captain William McDONALD, who discovered the islands on 4 January 1854"
}
},
"Dependency status": {
@ -149,7 +149,7 @@
},
"Transportation": {
"Heliports": {
"text": "2 (2024)"
"text": "2 (2025)"
}
},
"Military and Security": {

22
australia-oceania/aq.json
View file

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> includes Rose Atoll and Swains Island"
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "slightly larger than Washington, DC"
"text": "slightly larger than Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -95,13 +95,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "43,895"
"text": "43,895 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "21,804"
},
"female": {
"text": "22,091 (2024 est.)"
"text": "22,091"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -606,34 +606,34 @@
"Energy": {
"Electricity": {
"installed generating capacity": {
"text": "48,000 kW (2022 est.)"
"text": "50,000 kW (2023 est.)"
},
"consumption": {
"text": "157.326 million kWh (2022 est.)"
"text": "157.697 million kWh (2023 est.)"
},
"transmission/distribution losses": {
"text": "13.975 million kWh (2022 est.)"
"text": "13.975 million kWh (2023 est.)"
}
},
"Electricity generation sources": {
"fossil fuels": {
"text": "97.1% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)"
"text": "97.1% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)"
},
"solar": {
"text": "2.9% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)"
"text": "2.9% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)"
}
},
"Petroleum": {
"refined petroleum consumption": {
"text": "3,000 bbl/day (2022 est.)"
"text": "3,000 bbl/day (2023 est.)"
}
},
"Carbon dioxide emissions": {
"total emissions": {
"text": "391,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)"
"text": "389,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)"
},
"from petroleum and other liquids": {
"text": "391,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)"
"text": "389,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)"
}
},
"Energy consumption per capita": {

4
australia-oceania/as.json
View file

@ -125,13 +125,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "26,768,598"
"text": "26,768,598 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "13,305,110"
},
"female": {
"text": "13,463,488 (2024 est.)"
"text": "13,463,488"
}
},
"Nationality": {

2
australia-oceania/at.json
View file

@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> includes Ashmore Reef (West, Middle, and East Islets) and Cartier Island"
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "about eight times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC"
"text": "about eight times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {

4
australia-oceania/bp.json
View file

@ -101,13 +101,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "726,799"
"text": "726,799 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "370,970"
},
"female": {
"text": "355,829 (2024 est.)"
"text": "355,829"
}
},
"Nationality": {

2
australia-oceania/ck.json
View file

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> includes the two main islands of West Island and Home Island"
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "about 24 times the size of The Mall in Washington, DC"
"text": "about 24 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {

6
australia-oceania/cq.json
View file

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> consists of 14 islands including Saipan, Rota, and Tinian"
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "2.5 times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "2.5 times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -98,13 +98,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "51,118"
"text": "51,118 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "27,044"
},
"female": {
"text": "24,074 (2024 est.)"
"text": "24,074"
}
},
"Nationality": {

6
australia-oceania/cr.json
View file

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> includes numerous small islands and reefs scattered over a sea area of about 780,000 sq km (300,000 sq mi) with the Willis Islets the most important"
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "about four times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC"
"text": "about four times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -80,7 +80,7 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "no indigenous inhabitants (2021)"
"text": "(2021) no indigenous inhabitants"
},
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> a staff of four operates the meteorological station on Willis Island"
}
@ -136,8 +136,6 @@
},
"Economy": {
},
"Energy": {
},
"Communications": {
"Communications - note": {
"text": "automatic weather stations on many of the isles and reefs relay data to the mainland"

24
australia-oceania/cw.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "1.3 times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "1.3 times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -100,13 +100,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "7,761"
"text": "7,761 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "3,980"
},
"female": {
"text": "3,781 (2024 est.)"
"text": "3,781"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -655,39 +655,39 @@
"Energy": {
"Electricity": {
"installed generating capacity": {
"text": "17,000 kW (2022 est.)"
"text": "17,000 kW (2023 est.)"
},
"consumption": {
"text": "37.5 million kWh (2022 est.)"
"text": "37.5 million kWh (2023 est.)"
},
"transmission/distribution losses": {
"text": "3.2 million kWh (2022 est.)"
"text": "3.2 million kWh (2023 est.)"
}
},
"Electricity generation sources": {
"fossil fuels": {
"text": "60.9% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)"
"text": "60.9% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)"
},
"solar": {
"text": "39.1% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)"
"text": "39.1% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)"
}
},
"Coal": {
"imports": {
"text": "1.3 metric tons (2022 est.)"
"text": "1 metric tons (2022 est.)"
}
},
"Petroleum": {
"refined petroleum consumption": {
"text": "600 bbl/day (2022 est.)"
"text": "700 bbl/day (2023 est.)"
}
},
"Carbon dioxide emissions": {
"total emissions": {
"text": "87,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)"
"text": "103,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)"
},
"from petroleum and other liquids": {
"text": "87,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)"
"text": "103,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)"
}
}
},

4
australia-oceania/fj.json
View file

@ -104,13 +104,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "951,611"
"text": "951,611 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "482,304"
},
"female": {
"text": "469,307 (2024 est.)"
"text": "469,307"
}
},
"Nationality": {

8
australia-oceania/fm.json
View file

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> includes Pohnpei (Ponape), Chuuk (Truk) Islands, Yap Islands, and Kosrae (Kosaie)"
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "four times the size of Washington, DC (land area only)"
"text": "four times the size of Washington, D.C. (land area only)"
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -98,13 +98,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "99,603"
"text": "99,603 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "48,708"
},
"female": {
"text": "50,895 (2024 est.)"
"text": "50,895"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -402,7 +402,7 @@
"text": "FSM"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "the term \"Micronesia\" is a 19th-century construct of two Greek words, \"micro\" (small) and \"nesoi\" (islands), and refers to thousands of small islands in the western Pacific Ocean"
"text": "the name is a 19th-century construct of two Greek words, <em>mikros </em>(small) and <em>nesoi </em>(islands), and refers to its thousands of small islands in the western Pacific Ocean"
}
},
"Government type": {

4
australia-oceania/fp.json
View file

@ -97,13 +97,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "303,540"
"text": "303,540 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "155,138"
},
"female": {
"text": "148,402 (2024 est.)"
"text": "148,402"
}
},
"Nationality": {

6
australia-oceania/gq.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "three times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "three times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -97,13 +97,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "169,532"
"text": "169,532 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "87,345"
},
"female": {
"text": "82,187 (2024 est.)"
"text": "82,187"
}
},
"Nationality": {

28
australia-oceania/kr.json
View file

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> includes three island groups - Gilbert Islands, Line Islands, and Phoenix Islands - dispersed over about 3.5 million sq km (1.35 million sq mi)"
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "four times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "four times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -101,13 +101,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "116,545"
"text": "116,545 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "56,364"
},
"female": {
"text": "60,181 (2024 est.)"
"text": "60,181"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -443,7 +443,7 @@
"text": "Gilbert Islands"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "the name is the local pronunciation of \"Gilberts,\" the former designation of the islands; originally named after explorer Thomas GILBERT, who mapped many of the islands in 1788"
"text": "the name is the local pronunciation of \"Gilbert,\" the former designation of the islands; originally named after explorer Thomas GILBERT, who mapped many of the islands in 1788"
},
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> pronounced keer-ree-bahss"
},
@ -865,39 +865,39 @@
},
"Electricity": {
"installed generating capacity": {
"text": "11,000 kW (2022 est.)"
"text": "12,000 kW (2023 est.)"
},
"consumption": {
"text": "26.225 million kWh (2022 est.)"
"text": "27.388 million kWh (2023 est.)"
},
"transmission/distribution losses": {
"text": "5 million kWh (2022 est.)"
"text": "5 million kWh (2023 est.)"
}
},
"Electricity generation sources": {
"fossil fuels": {
"text": "84.5% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)"
"text": "81.5% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)"
},
"solar": {
"text": "15.5% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)"
"text": "18.5% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)"
}
},
"Petroleum": {
"refined petroleum consumption": {
"text": "500 bbl/day (2022 est.)"
"text": "500 bbl/day (2023 est.)"
}
},
"Carbon dioxide emissions": {
"total emissions": {
"text": "78,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)"
"text": "81,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)"
},
"from petroleum and other liquids": {
"text": "78,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)"
"text": "81,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)"
}
},
"Energy consumption per capita": {
"Total energy consumption per capita 2022": {
"text": "8.403 million Btu/person (2022 est.)"
"Total energy consumption per capita 2023": {
"text": "8.578 million Btu/person (2023 est.)"
}
}
},

2
australia-oceania/kt.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "about three-quarters the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "about three-quarters the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {

6
australia-oceania/nc.json
View file

@ -97,13 +97,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "304,167"
"text": "304,167 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "151,389"
},
"female": {
"text": "152,778 (2024 est.)"
"text": "152,778"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -366,7 +366,7 @@
"text": "Nouvelle-Cal&eacute;donie"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "British explorer Captain James COOK discovered and named New Caledonia in 1774; he used the appellation because the northeast of the island reminded him of Scotland (Caledonia is the Latin designation for Scotland)"
"text": "the name came from British explorer Captain James COOK in 1774 and uses the Latin name for Scotland, Caledonia"
}
},
"Government type": {

18
australia-oceania/ne.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "1.5 times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "1.5 times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -97,7 +97,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "2,000 (2022 est.)"
"text": "1,681 (2022)"
},
"male": {
"text": "827"
},
"female": {
"text": "854"
},
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> because of the island's limited economic and educational opportunities, Niueans have emigrated for decades - primarily to New Zealand but also to Australia and other Pacific island states; Niue's population peaked in 1966 at 5,194, but by 2005 had fallen to 1,508; since then, it has rebounded slightly; as of 2013, 23,883 people of Niuean ancestry lived in New Zealand - with more than 20% Niue-born - or about 15 times as many persons of Niuean ancestry living in New Zealand as in Niue"
},
@ -150,6 +156,14 @@
"Major urban areas - population": {
"text": "1,000 ALOFI (capital) (2018)"
},
"Life expectancy at birth": {
"male": {
"text": "71.8 years (2016)"
},
"female": {
"text": "75.7 years (2016 est.)"
}
},
"Drinking water source": {
"improved: total": {
"text": "total: 97% of population"

4
australia-oceania/nf.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "about 0.2 times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "about 0.2 times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -100,7 +100,7 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "1,748 (2016 est.)"
"text": "2,188 (2021)"
}
},
"Nationality": {

4
australia-oceania/nh.json
View file

@ -105,13 +105,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "318,007"
"text": "318,007 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "157,932"
},
"female": {
"text": "160,075 (2024 est.)"
"text": "160,075"
}
},
"Nationality": {

8
australia-oceania/nr.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "about 0.1 times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "about 0.1 times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -100,13 +100,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "9,892"
"text": "9,892 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "4,856"
},
"female": {
"text": "5,036 (2024 est.)"
"text": "5,036"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -416,7 +416,7 @@
"text": "Pleasant Island"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "the island name may derive from the Nauruan word \"anaoero\" meaning \"I go to the beach\""
"text": "the island name may derive from the Nauruan word \"anaoero\" meaning \"I go to the beach\"; the former name, Pleasant Island, came from British navigator John Frean, who visited in 1798"
}
},
"Government type": {

9
australia-oceania/nz.json
View file

@ -112,13 +112,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "5,161,211"
"text": "5,161,211 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "2,584,607"
},
"female": {
"text": "2,576,604 (2024 est.)"
"text": "2,576,604"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -463,11 +463,14 @@
"conventional short form": {
"text": "New Zealand"
},
"former": {
"text": "Nieuw Zeeland"
},
"abbreviation": {
"text": "NZ"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "Dutch explorer Abel TASMAN was the first European to reach New Zealand in 1642; he named it Staten Landt, but Dutch cartographers renamed it Nova Zeelandia in 1645 after the Dutch province of Zeeland; British explorer Captain James COOK subsequently anglicized the name to New Zealand when he mapped the islands in 1769"
"text": "the name is an anglicized form of the Dutch name Nieuw Zeeland, or \"New Sea Land,\" which was first used in 1643 in honor of the Dutch province of Zeeland"
}
},
"Government type": {

2
australia-oceania/pc.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "about three-tenths the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "about three-tenths the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {

2
australia-oceania/ps.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "slightly more than 2.5 times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "slightly more than 2.5 times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {

6
australia-oceania/rm.json
View file

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the archipelago includes 11,673 sq km of lagoon waters and encompasses the atolls of Bikini, Enewetak, Kwajalein, Majuro, Rongelap, and Utirik"
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "about the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "about the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -104,13 +104,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "82,011"
"text": "82,011 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "41,581"
},
"female": {
"text": "40,430 (2024 est.)"
"text": "40,430"
}
},
"Nationality": {

10
australia-oceania/tl.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "about 17 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC"
"text": "about 17 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -97,7 +97,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "1,647 (2019 est.)"
"text": "2,453 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "1,201"
},
"female": {
"text": "1,252"
}
},
"Nationality": {

6
australia-oceania/tn.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "four times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "four times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -100,13 +100,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "104,889"
"text": "104,889 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "52,606"
},
"female": {
"text": "52,283 (2024 est.)"
"text": "52,283"
}
},
"Nationality": {

6
australia-oceania/tv.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "0.1 times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "0.1 times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -103,13 +103,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "11,733"
"text": "11,733 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "5,816"
},
"female": {
"text": "5,917 (2024 est.)"
"text": "5,917"
}
},
"Nationality": {

12
australia-oceania/um.json
View file

@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
"note": "<strong>Baker Island: </strong>total - 129.1 sq km; emergent land - 2.1 sq km; submerged - 127 sq km<br> <strong>Howland Island: </strong>total - 138.6 sq km; emergent land - 2.6 sq km; submerged - 136 sq km<br> <strong>Jarvis Island: </strong>total - 152 sq km; emergent land - 5 sq km; submerged - 147 sq km<br> <strong>Johnston Atoll: </strong>total - 276.6 sq km; emergent land - 2.6 sq km; submerged - 274 sq km<br> <strong>Kingman Reef: </strong>total - 1,958.01 sq km; emergent land - 0.01 sq km; submerged - 1,958 sq km<br> <strong>Midway Islands: </strong>total - 2,355.2 sq km; emergent land - 6.2 sq km; submerged - 2,349 sq km<br> <strong>Palmyra Atoll: </strong>total - 1,949.9 sq km; emergent land - 3.9 sq km; submerged - 1,946 sq km"
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "<p><strong>Baker Island:</strong> about 2.5 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; </p><p><strong>Howland Island:</strong> about three times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; </p><p><strong>Jarvis Island:</strong> about eight times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; </p><p><strong>Johnston Atoll:</strong> about 4.5 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; </p><p><strong>Kingman Reef:</strong> a little more than 1.5 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; </p><p><strong>Midway Islands:</strong> about nine times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; </p><p><strong>Palmyra Atoll:</strong> about 20 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC</p>"
"text": "<p><strong>Baker Island:</strong> about 2.5 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;</p> <p><strong>Howland Island:</strong> about three times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;</p> <p><strong>Jarvis Island:</strong> about eight times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;</p> <p><strong>Johnston Atoll:</strong> about 4.5 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;</p> <p><strong>Kingman Reef:</strong> a little more than 1.5 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;</p> <p><strong>Midway Islands:</strong> about nine times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;</p> <p><strong>Palmyra Atoll:</strong> about 20 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.</p>"
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -120,26 +120,26 @@
"Energy": {
"Coal": {
"imports": {
"text": "108,000 metric tons (2022 est.)"
"text": "108,000 metric tons (2023 est.)"
}
},
"Petroleum": {
"refined petroleum consumption": {
"text": "2,000 bbl/day (2022 est.)"
"text": "2,000 bbl/day (2023 est.)"
}
},
"Carbon dioxide emissions": {
"total emissions": {
"text": "297,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)"
"text": "294,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)"
},
"from petroleum and other liquids": {
"text": "297,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)"
"text": "294,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)"
}
}
},
"Transportation": {
"Airports": {
"text": "2 (2024)"
"text": "2 (2025)"
}
},
"Military and Security": {

6
australia-oceania/wf.json
View file

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> includes Ile Uvea (Wallis Island), Ile Futuna (Futuna Island), Ile Alofi, and 20 islets"
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "1.5 times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "1.5 times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -95,13 +95,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "15,964"
"text": "15,964 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "8,201"
},
"female": {
"text": "7,763 (2024 est.)"
"text": "7,763"
}
},
"Nationality": {

8
australia-oceania/wq.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "about 11 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC"
"text": "about 11 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -141,15 +141,15 @@
},
"Petroleum": {
"refined petroleum consumption": {
"text": "8,000 bbl/day (2022 est.)"
"text": "8,000 bbl/day (2023 est.)"
}
},
"Carbon dioxide emissions": {
"total emissions": {
"text": "1.221 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)"
"text": "1.214 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)"
},
"from petroleum and other liquids": {
"text": "1.221 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)"
"text": "1.214 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)"
}
}
},

30
australia-oceania/ws.json
View file

@ -100,13 +100,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "208,853"
"text": "208,853 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "105,920"
},
"female": {
"text": "102,933 (2024 est.)"
"text": "102,933"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -895,48 +895,48 @@
},
"Electricity": {
"installed generating capacity": {
"text": "53,000 kW (2022 est.)"
"text": "54,000 kW (2023 est.)"
},
"consumption": {
"text": "177.279 million kWh (2022 est.)"
"text": "141.846 million kWh (2023 est.)"
},
"transmission/distribution losses": {
"text": "17.175 million kWh (2022 est.)"
"text": "17.284 million kWh (2023 est.)"
}
},
"Electricity generation sources": {
"fossil fuels": {
"text": "66.9% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)"
"text": "59.7% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)"
},
"solar": {
"text": "12.3% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)"
"text": "15.1% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)"
},
"wind": {
"text": "0.1% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)"
"text": "0.1% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)"
},
"hydroelectricity": {
"text": "20.6% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)"
"text": "18.9% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)"
},
"biomass and waste": {
"text": "0.1% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)"
"text": "6.3% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)"
}
},
"Petroleum": {
"refined petroleum consumption": {
"text": "2,000 bbl/day (2022 est.)"
"text": "2,000 bbl/day (2023 est.)"
}
},
"Carbon dioxide emissions": {
"total emissions": {
"text": "311,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)"
"text": "335,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)"
},
"from petroleum and other liquids": {
"text": "311,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)"
"text": "335,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)"
}
},
"Energy consumption per capita": {
"Total energy consumption per capita 2022": {
"text": "20.949 million Btu/person (2022 est.)"
"Total energy consumption per capita 2023": {
"text": "23.476 million Btu/person (2023 est.)"
}
}
},

6
central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "slightly larger than Washington, DC"
"text": "slightly larger than Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -97,13 +97,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "125,063"
"text": "125,063 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "59,101"
},
"female": {
"text": "65,962 (2024 est.)"
"text": "65,962"
}
},
"Nationality": {

6
central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json
View file

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> includes Redonda, 1.6 sq km"
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "2.5 times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "2.5 times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -104,13 +104,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "102,634"
"text": "102,634 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "48,311"
},
"female": {
"text": "54,323 (2024 est.)"
"text": "54,323"
}
},
"Nationality": {

14
central-america-n-caribbean/av.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "about one-half the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "about one-half the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -100,13 +100,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "19,416"
"text": "19,416 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "9,107"
},
"female": {
"text": "10,309 (2024 est.)"
"text": "10,309"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -575,11 +575,11 @@
"note": "<b>note:</b> top five import commodities based on value in dollars"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": {
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": {
"text": "$76.38 million (31 December 2017 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": {
"text": "$76.38 million (2017 est.)"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2015": {
"text": "$48.14 million (31 December 2015 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2015": {
"text": "$48.14 million (2015 est.)"
}
},
"Exchange rates": {

6
central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "2.5 times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "2.5 times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -97,13 +97,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "304,139"
"text": "304,139 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "146,587"
},
"female": {
"text": "157,552 (2024 est.)"
"text": "157,552"
}
},
"Nationality": {

4
central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json
View file

@ -97,13 +97,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "410,862"
"text": "410,862 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "190,100"
},
"female": {
"text": "220,762 (2024 est.)"
"text": "220,762"
}
},
"Nationality": {

17
central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json
View file

@ -103,13 +103,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "415,789"
"text": "415,789 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "205,895"
},
"female": {
"text": "209,894 (2024 est.)"
"text": "209,894"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -136,9 +136,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Roman Catholic 40.1%, Protestant 31.5% (includes Pentecostal 8.4%, Seventh Day Adventist 5.4%, Anglican 4.7%, Mennonite 3.7%, Baptist 3.6%, Methodist 2.9%, Nazarene 2.8%), Jehovah's Witness 1.7%, other 10.5% (includes Baha'i, Buddhist, Hindu, Church of Jesus Christ, Muslim, Rastafarian, Salvation Army), unspecified 0.6%, none 15.5% (2010 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Migration continues to transform Belize's population. About 16% of Belizeans live abroad, while immigrants constitute approximately 15% of Belize's population. Belizeans seeking job and educational opportunities have preferred to emigrate to the United States rather than former colonizer Great Britain because of the United States' closer proximity and stronger trade ties with Belize. Belizeans also emigrate to Canada, Mexico, and English-speaking Caribbean countries. The emigration of a large share of Creoles (Afro-Belizeans) and the influx of Central American immigrants, mainly Guatemalans, Salvadorans, and Hondurans, has changed Belize's ethnic composition. Mestizos have become the largest ethnic group, and Belize now has more native Spanish speakers than English or Creole speakers, despite English being the official language. In addition, Central American immigrants are establishing new communities in rural areas, which contrasts with the urbanization trend seen in neighboring countries. Recently, Chinese, European, and North American immigrants have become more frequent.</p><p>Immigration accounts for an increasing share of Belize's population growth rate, which is steadily falling due to fertility decline. Belize's declining birth rate and its increased life expectancy are creating an aging population. As the elderly population grows and nuclear families replace extended households, Belize's government will be challenged to balance a rising demand for pensions, social services, and healthcare for its senior citizens with the need to reduce poverty and social inequality and to improve sanitation.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "27.7% (male 58,529/female 56,811)"
@ -567,16 +564,16 @@
"text": "5 years"
},
"most recent election date": {
"text": "11/11/2020"
"text": "3/12/2025"
},
"parties elected and seats per party": {
"text": "People's United Party (PUP) (26); United Democratic Party (UDP) (5)"
},
"percentage of women in chamber": {
"text": "15.6%"
"text": "9.7%"
},
"expected date of next election": {
"text": "March 2025"
"text": "March 2030"
}
},
"Legislative branch - upper chamber": {
@ -1139,8 +1136,8 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Belize Defense Force (BDF): Army, Air Wing; Belize Coast Guard; Belize Police Department (2024)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the Ministry of National Defense and Border Security is responsible for oversight of the BDF and the Coast Guard, while the Ministry of Home Affairs and New Growth Industries has responsibility for the Belize Police Department and prisons; the Police Department is primarily responsible for internal security"
"text": "Belize Defense Force (BDF): Army, Air Wing; Belize Coast Guard (BCG) (2025)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the Ministry of National Defense and Border Security is responsible for oversight of the BDF and the Coast Guard, while the Ministry of Home Affairs and New Growth Industries has responsibility for the Belize Police Department (BPD) and prisons"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2023": {

4
central-america-n-caribbean/bq.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "about nine times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC"
"text": "about nine times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -102,7 +102,7 @@
"text": "Navassa Island"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "the flat island was named \"Navaza\" by some of Christopher COLUMBUS' sailors in 1504; the name derives from the Spanish term \"nava\" meaning \"flat land, plain, or field\""
"text": "the flat island was named \"Navaza\" by sailors with the Christopher COLUMBUS expedition in 1504; the name derives from the Spanish word <em>nava</em>, meaning \"flat land or level ground\""
}
},
"Dependency status": {

6
central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "1.5 times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "1.5 times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -100,13 +100,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "66,653"
"text": "66,653 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "32,379"
},
"female": {
"text": "34,274 (2024 est.)"
"text": "34,274"
}
},
"Nationality": {

11
central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json
View file

@ -107,13 +107,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "5,265,575"
"text": "5,265,575 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "2,635,481"
},
"female": {
"text": "2,630,094 (2024 est.)"
"text": "2,630,094"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -138,9 +138,6 @@
"Religions": {
"text": "Roman Catholic 47.5%, Evangelical and Pentecostal 19.8%, Jehovah's Witness 1.4%, other Protestant 1.2%, other 3.1%, none 27% (2021 est.)"
},
"Demographic profile": {
"text": "<p>Costa Rica's political stability, high standard of living, and well-developed social benefits system set it apart from its Central American neighbors. Through the government's sustained social spending - almost 20% of GDP annually - Costa Rica has made tremendous progress toward achieving its goal of providing universal access to education, healthcare, clean water, sanitation, and electricity. Since the 1970s, expansion of these services has led to a rapid decline in infant mortality, an increase in life expectancy at birth, and a sharp decrease in the birth rate. The average number of children born per women has fallen from about 7 in the 1960s to 3.5 in the early 1980s to below replacement level today. Costa Rica's poverty rate is lower than in most Latin American countries, but it has stalled at around 20% for almost two decades.</p><p>Costa Rica is a popular regional immigration destination because of its job opportunities and social programs. Almost 9% of the population is foreign-born, with Nicaraguans comprising nearly three-quarters of the foreign population. Many Nicaraguans who perform unskilled seasonal labor enter Costa Rica illegally or overstay their visas, which continues to be a source of tension. Less than 3% of Costa Rica's population lives abroad. The overwhelming majority of expatriates have settled in the United States after completing a university degree or in order to work in a highly skilled field.</p>"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
"text": "18.8% (male 506,041/female 482,481)"
@ -1160,7 +1157,7 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "no regular military forces; Ministry of Public Security: National Police (Fuerza Pública), Air Surveillance Service (Servicio de Vigilancia Aérea), National Coast Guard Service (Servicio Nacional de Guardacostas), Drug Control Police (Policía Control de Drogas), Border Police (Policia de Fronteras), Professional Migration Police (Policía Profesional de Migración); Ministry of Presidency: Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DIS), Special Intervention Unit (UEI) (2024)",
"text": "no regular military forces; Ministry of Public Security (Ministerio de Seguridad Pública de Costa Rica): National Police (Fuerza Pública), Air Surveillance Service (Servicio de Vigilancia Aérea), National Coast Guard Service (Servicio Nacional de Guardacostas), Drug Control Police (Policía Control de Drogas), Border Police (Policia de Fronteras), Professional Migration Police (Policía Profesional de Migración)<br><br>Ministry of Presidency: Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DIS), Special Intervention Unit (UEI) (2025)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> Costa Rica's armed forces were constitutionally abolished in 1949"
},
"Military expenditures": {
@ -1184,7 +1181,7 @@
"text": "approximately 15,000 Ministry of Public Security personnel (2024)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the National Police are lightly armed although small special units are trained and equipped for tactical operations; the US has provided equipment and support to forces such the National Coast Guard, including secondhand US vessels and aircraft (2024)"
"text": "the National Police are lightly armed although small special units are trained and equipped for tactical operations; the US has provided equipment and support to forces such the Coast Guard, including secondhand US vessels and aircraft (2024)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "Costa Rica relies on specialized paramilitary units within the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) for internal security missions and countering transnational threats such as narcotics smuggling and organized crime, as well as for participating in regional security operations and exercises; MPS forces have received advisory and training support from both Colombia and the US; since 2012, the US has also provided some military equipment, including aircraft and patrol boats (2024)"

18
central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json
View file

@ -107,13 +107,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "10,966,038"
"text": "10,966,038 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "5,441,507"
},
"female": {
"text": "5,524,531 (2024 est.)"
"text": "5,524,531"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -868,11 +868,11 @@
"note": "<b>note:</b> top five import commodities based on value in dollars"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": {
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": {
"text": "$11.35 billion (31 December 2017 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": {
"text": "$11.35 billion (2017 est.)"
},
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": {
"text": "$12.3 billion (31 December 2016 est.)"
"Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": {
"text": "$12.3 billion (2016 est.)"
}
},
"Exchange rates": {
@ -1123,7 +1123,7 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, FAR): Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Revolucionario, ER), Revolutionary Navy (Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria, MGR, includes Marine Corps), Revolutionary Air and Air Defense Forces (Defensas Anti-Aereas y Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria, DAAFAR); Paramilitary forces: Youth Labor Army (Ejercito Juvenil del Trabajo, EJT), Territorial Militia Troops (Milicia de Tropas de Territoriales, MTT), Civil Defense Force<br><br>Ministry of Interior: Border Guards, State Security, National Revolutionary Police (2023)"
"text": "Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, FAR): Ground Troops (Tropas Terrestres), Revolutionary Navy (Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria, MGR), Revolutionary Air and Air Defense Forces (Defensas Anti-Aereas y Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria, DAAFAR)<br><br>Paramilitary forces under the FAR: Youth Labor Army (Ejercito Juvenil del Trabajo, EJT), Territorial Militia Troops (Milicia de Tropas de Territoriales, MTT), Defense and Production Brigades (Brigadas de Producción y Defensa, BPD), Civil Defense Organization (Defensa Civil de Cuba) <br><br>Ministry of Interior: National Revolutionary Police (Policía Nacional Revolucionaria, PNR), Directorate of Border Guard Troops (Dirección de Tropas de Guardia Fronteriza, TGF), Department of State Security (Departamento de Seguridad del Estado, DSE) (2025)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
@ -1149,10 +1149,10 @@
"text": "the military's inventory is comprised of Russian and Soviet-era equipment (2024)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "17-28 years of age for compulsory (men) and voluntary (men and women) military service; conscripts serve for 24 months (2024)"
"text": "17-28 years of age for compulsory (men) and voluntary (men and women) military service; conscripts serve for 18-24 months (2025)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) are a central pillar of the Cuban regime and viewed as the guardian of the Cuban revolution; the FAR has a large role in the country’s politics and economy; many senior government posts are held by military officers, and a FAR-controlled umbrella enterprise known as the Armed Forces Business Group (Grupo de Administración Empresarial or GAESA) has interests in banking and finance, construction, import/export, ports, real estate, retail, shipping, transportation, and tourism<br><br>the FAR is largely focused on protecting territorial integrity and the state, and perceives the US as its primary threat; the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent end of Soviet military aid had far-reaching consequences for the FAR, transforming it from one of the largest and most capable militaries in the region, as well as one that was heavily involved in foreign missions during the Cold War, particularly in Africa, into a much smaller, home-based and defensive force with limited capabilities and armed with Soviet-era weapons and equipment (2023)"
"text": "the Cuban military is largely focused on protecting territorial integrity and the state, and perceives the US as its primary threat; the military is a central pillar of the Cuban regime and viewed as the guardian of the Cuban revolution; it has a large role in the country&rsquo;s politics and economy; many senior government posts are held by military officers, and the FAR reportedly has interests in agriculture, banking and finance, construction, import/export, ports, industry, real estate, retail, shipping, transportation, and tourism (2024)"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

10
central-america-n-caribbean/do.json
View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
}
},
"Area - comparative": {
"text": "slightly more than four times the size of Washington, DC"
"text": "slightly more than four times the size of Washington, D.C."
},
"Land boundaries": {
"total": {
@ -100,13 +100,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "74,661"
"text": "74,661 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "37,753"
},
"female": {
"text": "36,908 (2024 est.)"
"text": "36,908"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -931,10 +931,10 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "no regular military forces; Commonwealth of Dominica Police Force (includes Coast Guard) under the Ministry of Justice, Immigration, and National Security (2024)"
"text": "no regular military forces; Commonwealth of Dominica Police Force (CDPF) under the Ministry of National Security and Legal Affairs (2025)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "Dominica has been a member of the Caribbean Regional Security System (RSS) since its creation in 1982; RSS signatories (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines) agreed to prepare contingency plans and assist one another, on request, in national emergencies, prevention of smuggling, search and rescue, immigration control, fishery protection, customs and excise control, maritime policing duties, protection of off-shore installations, pollution control, national and other disasters, and threats to national security (2024)"
"text": "Dominica has been a member of the Caribbean Regional Security System (RSS) since its creation in 1982; RSS signatories (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines) agreed to prepare contingency plans and assist one another, on request, in national emergencies, prevention of smuggling, search and rescue, immigration control, fishery protection, customs and excise control, maritime policing duties, protection of off-shore installations, pollution control, national and other disasters, and threats to national security (2025)"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

6
central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json
View file

@ -115,13 +115,13 @@
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"total": {
"text": "10,815,857"
"text": "10,815,857 (2024 est.)"
},
"male": {
"text": "5,465,776"
},
"female": {
"text": "5,350,081 (2024 est.)"
"text": "5,350,081"
}
},
"Nationality": {
@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> as of 2023, women made up approximately 18% of the active duty military"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the military is responsible for defending the independence, integrity, and sovereignty of the Dominican Republic; it also has an internal security role, which includes assisting with airport, border, port, tourism, and urban security, supporting the police in maintaining or restoring public order, countering transnational crime, and providing disaster or emergency relief/management; a key area of focus is securing the country&rsquo;s 217-mile (350-kilometer) long border with Haiti; the Army in recent years, for example, has assigned three of its six infantry brigades and some 10-12,000 troops to assist with security along the Haitian border; these forces complement the personnel of the Border Security Corps permanently deployed along the border; the Air Force and Navy also provide support to the Haitian border mission; the Army has a brigade dedicated to managing and providing relief during natural disasters; the military also contributes personnel to the National Drug Control Directorate, and both the Air Force and Navy devote assets to detecting and interdicting narcotics trafficking; the Navy conducts regular bilateral maritime interdiction exercises with the US Navy (2024)"
"text": "the military is responsible for defending the independence, integrity, and sovereignty of the Dominican Republic; it also has an internal security role, which includes assisting with airport, border, port, tourism, and urban security, supporting the police in maintaining or restoring public order, countering transnational crime, and providing disaster or emergency relief/management; a key area of focus is securing the country&rsquo;s 217-mile (350-kilometer) long border with Haiti; the Army in recent years, for example, has assigned as many as 12,000 troops to assist with security along the Haitian border; these forces complement the personnel of the Border Security Corps permanently deployed along the border; the Air Force and Navy also provide support to the Haitian border mission; the Army has a brigade dedicated to managing and providing relief during natural disasters; the military also contributes personnel to the National Drug Control Directorate, and both the Air Force and Navy devote assets to detecting and interdicting narcotics trafficking; the Navy conducts regular bilateral maritime interdiction exercises with the US Navy (2025)"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

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