For the first two thirds of the 20th century, Algeria's high fertility rate caused its population to grow rapidly. However, about a decade after independence from France in 1962, the total fertility rate fell dramatically from 7 children per woman in the 1970s to about 2.4 in 2000, slowing Algeria's population growth rate by the late 1980s. The lower fertility rate was mainly the result of women's rising age at first marriage (virtually all Algerian children being born in wedlock) and to a lesser extent the wider use of contraceptives. Later marriages and a preference for smaller families are attributed to increases in women's education and participation in the labor market; higher unemployment; and a shortage of housing forcing multiple generations to live together. The average woman's age at first marriage increased from about 19 in the mid-1950s to 24 in the mid-1970s to 30.5 in the late 1990s.
Algeria's fertility rate experienced an unexpected upturn in the early 2000s, as the average woman's age at first marriage dropped slightly. The reversal in fertility could represent a temporary fluctuation in marriage age or, less likely, a decrease in the steady rate of contraceptive use.
Thousands of Algerian peasants - mainly Berber men from the Kabylia region - faced with land dispossession and economic hardship under French rule migrated temporarily to France to work in manufacturing and mining during the first half of the 20th century. This movement accelerated during World War I, when Algerians filled in for French factory workers or served as soldiers. In the years following independence, low-skilled Algerian workers and Algerians who had supported the French (known as Harkis) emigrated en masse to France. Tighter French immigration rules and Algiers' decision to cease managing labor migration to France in the 1970s limited legal emigration largely to family reunification.
Not until Algeria's civil war in the 1990s did the country again experience substantial outmigration. Many Algerians legally entered Tunisia without visas claiming to be tourists and then stayed as workers. Other Algerians headed to Europe seeking asylum, although France imposed restrictions. Sub-Saharan African migrants came to Algeria after its civil war to work in agriculture and mining. In the 2000s, a wave of educated Algerians went abroad seeking skilled jobs in a wider range of destinations, increasing their presence in North America and Spain. At the same time, legal foreign workers principally from China and Egypt came to work in Algeria's construction and oil sectors. Illegal migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Malians, Nigeriens, and Gambians, continue to come to Algeria in search of work or to use it as a stepping stone to Libya and Europe.
Since 1975, Algeria also has been the main recipient of Sahrawi refugees from the ongoing conflict in Western Sahara (today part of Morocco). More than 100,000 Sahrawis are estimated to be living in five refugee camps in southwestern Algeria near Tindouf.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "30.8% (male 7,411,337/female 7,062,794)" @@ -607,13 +604,13 @@ "text": "6 years" }, "most recent election date": { - "text": "2/5/2022" + "text": "3/9/2025" }, "percentage of women in chamber": { "text": "4.1%" }, "expected date of next election": { - "text": "March 2025" + "text": "January 2028" } }, "Judicial branch": { diff --git a/africa/ao.json b/africa/ao.json index 94ba796e..80a0f41a 100644 --- a/africa/ao.json +++ b/africa/ao.json @@ -115,13 +115,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "37,202,061" + "text": "37,202,061 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "18,196,058" }, "female": { - "text": "19,006,003 (2024 est.)" + "text": "19,006,003" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -142,9 +142,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Roman Catholic 41.1%, Protestant 38.1%, other 8.6%, none 12.3% (2014 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "More than two decades after the end of Angola's 27-year civil war, the country still faces a variety of socioeconomic problems, including poverty, high maternal and child mortality, and illiteracy. Despite the country's rapid post-war economic growth based on oil production, about 30 percent of Angolans live below the poverty line and unemployment is widespread, especially among the large young-adult population. Only about 70% of the population is literate, and the rate drops to around 60% for women. The youthful population - about 48% are under the age of 15 as of 2022 - is expected to continue growing rapidly with a fertility rate of more than 5 children per woman and a low rate of contraceptive use. Fewer than half of women deliver their babies with the assistance of trained health care personnel, which contributes to Angola's high maternal mortality rate.
Of the estimated 550,000 Angolans who fled their homeland during its civil war, most have returned home since 2002. In 2012, the UN assessed that conditions in Angola had been stable for several years and invoked a cessation of refugee status for Angolans. Following the cessation clause, some of those still in exile returned home voluntarily through UN repatriation programs, and others integrated into host countries.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "46.9% (male 8,752,419/female 8,701,422)" diff --git a/africa/bc.json b/africa/bc.json index 1dd5d252..e9b7fe33 100644 --- a/africa/bc.json +++ b/africa/bc.json @@ -107,13 +107,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "2,450,668" + "text": "2,450,668 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "1,174,306" }, "female": { - "text": "1,276,362 (2024 est.)" + "text": "1,276,362" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -133,9 +133,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Christian 79.1%, Badimo 4.1%, other 1.4% (includes Baha'i, Hindu, Muslim, Rastafarian), none 15.2%, unspecified 0.3% (2011 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Botswana has experienced one of the most rapid declines in fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa. The total fertility rate fell from more than 5 children per woman in the mid 1980s to approximately 2.4 in 2013, and remains at that level in 2022. The fertility reduction has been attributed to a host of factors, including higher educational attainment among women, greater participation of women in the workforce, increased contraceptive use, later first births, and a strong national family planning program. Botswana was making significant progress in several health indicators, including life expectancy and infant and child mortality rates, until being devastated by the HIV/AIDs epidemic in the 1990s.
In 2021, Botswana had one of the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the world at close to 20%, however comprehensive and effective treatment programs have reduced HIV/AIDS-related deaths. The combination of declining fertility and increasing mortality rates because of HIV/AIDS is slowing the population aging process, with a narrowing of the youngest age groups and little expansion of the oldest age groups. Nevertheless, having the bulk of its population (about 60% as of 2022) of working age will only yield economic benefits if the labor force is healthy, educated, and productively employed.
Batswana have been working as contract miners in South Africa since the 19th century. Although Botswana’s economy improved shortly after independence in 1966 with the discovery of diamonds and other minerals, its lingering high poverty rate and lack of job opportunities continued to push workers to seek mining work in southern African countries. In the early 1970s, about a third of Botswana’s male labor force worked in South Africa (lesser numbers went to Namibia and Zimbabwe). Not until the 1980s and 1990s, when South African mining companies had reduced their recruitment of foreign workers and Botswana’s economic prospects had improved, were Batswana increasingly able to find job opportunities at home.
Most Batswana prefer life in their home country and choose cross-border migration on a temporary basis only for work, shopping, visiting family, or tourism. Since the 1970s, Botswana has pursued an open migration policy enabling it to recruit thousands of foreign workers to fill skilled labor shortages. In the late 1990s, Botswana’s prosperity and political stability attracted not only skilled workers but small numbers of refugees from neighboring Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "28.7% (male 355,583/female 348,863)" @@ -1117,7 +1114,7 @@ "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { "text": "Botswana Defense Force (BDF): Ground Forces Command, Air Arm Command, Defense Logistics Command (2024)", - "note": "note 1: both the BDF and the Botswana Police Service report to the Ministry of Defense and Security; the Botswana Police Service has primary responsibility for internal security; the BDF reports to the Office of the President through the minister of defense and security and has some domestic security responsibilitiesBenin has a youthful age structure – almost 65% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2022 – which is bolstered by high fertility and population growth rates. Benin’s total fertility has been falling over time but remains high, declining from almost 7 children per women in 1990 to 5.4 in 2022. Benin’s low contraceptive use and high unmet need for contraception contribute to the sustained high fertility rate. Although the majority of Beninese women use skilled health care personnel for antenatal care and delivery, the high rate of maternal mortality indicates the need for more access to high quality obstetric care.
Poverty, unemployment, increased living costs, and dwindling resources increasingly drive the Beninese to migrate. An estimated 4.4 million, more than 30%, of Beninese live abroad. Virtually all Beninese emigrants move to West African countries, particularly Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire. Of the less than 1% of Beninese emigrants who settle in Europe, the vast majority live in France, Benin’s former colonial ruler.
With about 40% of the population living below the poverty line as of 2019, many desperate parents resort to sending their children to work in wealthy households as domestic servants (a common practice known as vidomegon), mines, quarries, or agriculture domestically or in Nigeria and other neighboring countries, often under brutal conditions. Unlike in other West African countries, where rural people move to the coast, farmers from Benin’s densely populated southern and northwestern regions move to the historically sparsely populated central region to pursue agriculture. Immigrants from West African countries came to Benin in increasing numbers between 1992 and 2002 because of its political stability and porous borders.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "45.3% (male 3,360,027/female 3,294,201)" @@ -919,11 +916,11 @@ "note": "note: top five import commodities based on value in dollars" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": { - "text": "$698.9 million (31 December 2017 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": { + "text": "$698.9 million (2017 est.)" }, - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": { - "text": "$57.5 million (31 December 2016 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": { + "text": "$57.5 million (2016 est.)" } }, "Debt - external": { @@ -1159,7 +1156,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Beninese Armed Forces (Forces Armees Beninoises, FAB; aka Benin Defense Forces): Land Force, Air Force, National Navy, National Guard (aka Republican Guard)Burundi is a densely populated country with a high population growth rate, factors that combined with land scarcity and poverty place a large share of its population at risk of food insecurity. About 90% of the population relies on subsistence agriculture. Subdivision of land to sons, and redistribution to returning refugees, results in smaller, overworked, and less-productive plots. Food shortages, poverty, and a lack of clean water contribute to a 60% chronic malnutrition rate among children. A lack of reproductive health services has prevented a significant reduction in Burundi’s maternal mortality and fertility rates, which are both among the world’s highest. With almost two-thirds of its population under the age of 25 and a birth rate of about 5 children per woman as of 2022, Burundi’s population will continue to expand rapidly for decades to come, putting additional strain on a poor country.
Historically, migration flows into and out of Burundi have consisted overwhelmingly of refugees from violent conflicts. In the last decade, more than a half million Burundian refugees returned home from neighboring countries, mainly Tanzania. Reintegrating the returnees has been problematic due to their prolonged time in exile, land scarcity, poor infrastructure, poverty, and unemployment. Repatriates and existing residents (including internally displaced persons) compete for limited land and other resources. To further complicate matters, international aid organizations reduced their assistance because they no longer classified Burundi as a post-conflict country. Conditions deteriorated when renewed violence erupted in April 2015, causing another outpouring of refugees. In addition to refugee out-migration, Burundi has hosted thousands of refugees from neighboring countries, mostly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and lesser numbers from Rwanda.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "42.3% (male 2,895,275/female 2,848,286)" @@ -1111,7 +1108,7 @@ "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { "text": "Burundi National Defense Force (BNDF; Force de Defense Nationale du Burundi or FDNB) : Land Force (la Force Terrestre), the Navy Force (la Force de la Marine), the Air Force (la Force Aérienne) and Specialized Units (des Unités Spécialisées)Despite the start of oil production in 2003, around 40% of Chad’s population lived below the poverty line as of 2018. The population will continue to grow rapidly because of the country’s very high fertility rate and large youth cohort – more than 65% of the populace is under the age of 25 as of 2022 – although the mortality rate is high and life expectancy is low. Chad has the world’s second highest maternal mortality rate as of 2017. Among the primary risk factors are poverty, anemia, rural habitation, high fertility, poor education, and a lack of access to family planning and obstetric care. Impoverished, uneducated adolescents living in rural areas are most affected. To improve women’s reproductive health and reduce fertility, Chad will need to increase women’s educational attainment, job participation, and knowledge of and access to family planning. Less than a quarter of women are literate, less than 10% use contraceptives, and more than 40% undergo genital cutting.
As of December 2022, more than 403,000 refugees from Sudan and more than 120,000 from the Central African Republic strain Chad’s limited resources and create tensions in host communities. Thousands of new refugees fled to Chad in 2013 to escape worsening violence in the Darfur region of Sudan. The large refugee populations are hesitant to return to their home countries because of continued instability. Chad was relatively stable in 2012 in comparison to other states in the region, but past fighting between government forces and opposition groups and inter-communal violence have left more than 380,000 of its citizens displaced in the eastern part of the country as of 2022.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "45.8% (male 4,428,132/female 4,323,398)" @@ -626,6 +623,9 @@ "most recent election date": { "text": "2/25/2025" }, + "percentage of women in chamber": { + "text": "37.7%" + }, "expected date of next election": { "text": "February 2031" } @@ -1119,8 +1119,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Chadian National Army (Armee Nationale du Tchad, ANT): Land Forces (l'Armee de Terre, AdT), Chadian Air Force (l'Armee de l'Air Tchadienne, AAT), General Direction of the Security Services of State Institutions (Direction Generale des Services de Securite des Institutions de l'Etat, GDSSIE); National Gendarmerie; Ministry of Public Security and Immigration: National Nomadic Guard of Chad (GNNT) (2023)", - "note": "note 1: the GDSSIE, formerly known as the Republican Guard, is the presidential guard force and is considered to be Chad's elite military unit; it is reportedly a division-sized force with infantry, armor, and special forces/anti-terrorism regiments (known as the Special Anti-Terrorist Group or SATG, aka Division of Special Anti-Terrorist Groups or DGSAT)The Republic of the Congo is one of the most urbanized countries in Africa, with nearly 70% of Congolese living in urban areas. The population is concentrated in the southwest of the country, mainly in the capital Brazzaville, Pointe-Noire, and along the railway line that connects the two. The tropical jungles in the north of the country are sparsely populated. Most Congolese are Bantu, and most belong to one of four main ethnic groups, the Kongo, Teke, Mbochi, and Sangha, which consist of over 70 subgroups.
The Republic of Congo is in the early stages of a demographic transition, whereby a population shifts from high fertility and mortality rates to low fertility and mortality rates associated with industrialized societies. Its total fertility rate (TFR), the average number of children born per woman, remains high at 4.4 as of 2022. While its TFR has steadily decreased, the progress slowed beginning in about 1995. The slowdown in fertility reduction has delayed the demographic transition and Congo’s potential to reap a demographic dividend, the economic boost that can occur when the share of the working-age population is larger than the dependent age groups.
The TFR differs significantly between urban and rural areas – 3.7 in urban areas versus 6.5 in rural areas. The TFR also varies among regions. The urban regions of Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire have much lower TFRs than other regions, which are predominantly or completely rural. The gap between desired fertility and actual fertility is also greatest in rural areas. Rural families may have more children to contribute to agricultural production and/or due to a lack of information about and access to contraception. Urban families may prefer to have fewer children because raising them is more expensive and balancing work and childcare may be more difficult. The number of births among teenage girls, the frequency of giving birth before the age of fifteen, and a lack of education are the most likely reasons for higher TFRs in rural areas. Although 90% of school-age children are enrolled in primary school, repetition and dropout rates are high and the quality of education is poor. Congolese women with no or little education start having children earlier and have more children in total than those with at least some secondary education.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "37.8% (male 1,162,298/female 1,143,668)" diff --git a/africa/cg.json b/africa/cg.json index 35712b92..b6578481 100644 --- a/africa/cg.json +++ b/africa/cg.json @@ -118,13 +118,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "115,403,027" + "text": "115,403,027 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "57,688,160" }, "female": { - "text": "57,714,867 (2024 est.)" + "text": "57,714,867" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -149,9 +149,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": " Christian 93/1% (Roman Catholic 29.9%, Protestant 26.7%, other Christian 36.5%), Kimbanguist 2.8%, Muslim 1.3%, other (includes syncretic sects and indigenous beliefs) 1.2%, none 1.3%, unspecified 0.2% (2014 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "
Despite a wealth of fertile soil, hydroelectric power potential, and mineral resources, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) struggles with many socioeconomic problems, including high infant and maternal mortality rates, malnutrition, poor vaccination coverage, lack of access to improved water sources and sanitation, and frequent and early fertility. Ongoing conflict, mismanagement of resources, and a lack of investment have resulted in food insecurity; almost 25% of children under the age of 5 were malnourished as of 2018. The overall coverage of basic public services – education, health, sanitation, and potable water – is very limited and piecemeal, with substantial regional and rural/urban disparities. Fertility remains high at more than 5 children per woman and is likely to remain high because of the low use of contraception and the cultural preference for larger families.
The DRC is a source and host country for refugees. Between 2012 and 2014, more than 119,000 Congolese refugees returned from the Republic of Congo to the relative stability of northwest DRC, but more than 1 million Congolese refugees and asylum seekers were hosted by neighboring countries as of December 2022. In addition, an estimated 5.5 million Congolese were internally displaced as of October 2022, the vast majority fleeing violence between rebel group and Congolese armed forces. Thousands of refugees have come to the DRC from neighboring countries, including Rwanda, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Burundi.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "45.7% (male 26,584,268/female 26,208,891)" @@ -1240,8 +1237,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Forces d'Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo, FARDC): Land Forces, National Navy (La Marine Nationale), Congolese Air Force (Force Aerienne Congolaise, FAC); Republican GuardCameroon has a large youth population, with more than 60% of the populace under the age of 25 as of 2020. Fertility is falling but remains at a high level, especially among poor, rural, and uneducated women, in part because of inadequate access to contraception. Life expectancy remains low at about 55 years due to the prevalence of HIV and AIDs and an elevated maternal mortality rate, which has remained high since 1990. Cameroon, particularly the northern region, is vulnerable to food insecurity largely because of government mismanagement, corruption, high production costs, inadequate infrastructure, and natural disasters. Despite economic growth in some regions, poverty is on the rise, and is most prevalent in rural areas, which are especially affected by a shortage of jobs, declining incomes, poor school and health care infrastructure, and a lack of clean water and sanitation. Underinvestment in social safety nets and ineffective public financial management also contribute to Cameroon’s high rate of poverty. The activities of Boko Haram, other armed groups, and counterinsurgency operations have worsened food insecurity in the Far North region.
International migration has been driven by unemployment (including fewer government jobs), poverty, the search for educational opportunities, and corruption. The US and Europe are preferred destinations, but, with tighter immigration restrictions in these countries, young Cameroonians are increasingly turning to neighboring states, such as Gabon and Nigeria, South Africa, other parts of Africa, and the Near and Far East. Cameroon’s limited resources make it dependent on UN support to host more than 480,000 refugees and asylum seekers as of December 2022. These refugees and asylum seekers are primarily from the Central African Republic and Nigeria. Internal and external displacement have grown dramatically in recent years. Boko Haram's attacks and counterattacks by government forces in the Far North since 2014 have increased the number of internally displaced people. Armed conflict between separatists and Cameroon's military in the Northwest and Southwest since 2016 have displaced hundreds of thousands of the country's Anglophone minority.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "41.5% (male 6,477,438/female 6,364,987)" @@ -1244,7 +1241,7 @@ "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { "text": "Cameroon Armed Forces (Forces Armees Camerounaises, FAC): Army (L'Armee de Terre), Navy (Marine Nationale Republique, MNR, includes naval infantry or fusiliers marin), Air Force (Armee de l'Air du Cameroun, AAC), National Gendarmerie (Gendamerie Nationale, GN), National Firefighting Corps (Corps National de Sapeurs-Pompiers, CNSP), Presidential Guard (Garde Présidentielle du Cameroun, GP)Comoros’ population is a melange of Arabs, Persians, Indonesians, Africans, and Indians, and the much smaller number of Europeans that settled on the islands between the 8th and 19th centuries, when they served as a regional trade hub. The Arab and Persian influence is most evident in the islands’ overwhelmingly Muslim majority – about 98% of Comorans are Sunni Muslims. The country is densely populated, averaging nearly 350 people per square mile, although this varies widely among the islands, with Anjouan being the most densely populated.
Given the large share of land dedicated to agriculture and Comoros’ growing population, habitable land is becoming increasingly crowded. The combination of increasing population pressure on limited land and resources, widespread poverty, and poor job prospects motivates thousands of Comorans each year to attempt to illegally migrate using small fishing boats to the neighboring island of Mayotte, which is a French territory. The majority of legal Comoran migration to France came after Comoros’ independence from France in 1975, with the flow peaking in the mid-1980s.
At least 150,000 to 200,000 people of Comoran citizenship or descent live abroad, mainly in France, where they have gone seeking a better quality of life, job opportunities, higher education (Comoros has no universities), advanced health care, and to finance elaborate traditional wedding ceremonies (aada). Remittances from the diaspora are an economic mainstay, in 2013 representing approximately 25% of Comoros’ GDP and significantly more than the value of its exports of goods and services (only 15% of GDP). Grand Comore, Comoros’ most populous island, is both the primary source of emigrants and the main recipient of remittances. Most remittances are spent on private consumption, but this often goes toward luxury goods and the aada and does not contribute to economic development or poverty reduction. Although the majority of the diaspora is now French-born with more distant ties to Comoros, it is unclear whether they will sustain the current level of remittances.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "32.6% (male 146,480/female 146,626)" diff --git a/africa/ct.json b/africa/ct.json index dcc5adf8..98d515e1 100644 --- a/africa/ct.json +++ b/africa/ct.json @@ -107,13 +107,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "5,650,957" + "text": "5,650,957 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "2,814,497" }, "female": { - "text": "2,836,460 (2024 est.)" + "text": "2,836,460" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -134,9 +134,6 @@ "text": "Roman Catholic 34.6%, Protestant 15.7%, other Christian 22.9%, Muslim 13.8%, ethnic religionist 12%, Baha'i 0.2%, agnostic/atheist 0.7% (2020 est.)", "note": "note: animistic beliefs and practices strongly influence the Christian majority" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "The Central African Republic’s (CAR) humanitarian crisis has worsened since the coup of March 2013. CAR’s high mortality rate and low life expectancy are attributed to elevated rates of preventable and treatable diseases (including malaria and malnutrition), an inadequate health care system, precarious food security, and armed conflict. Some of the worst mortality rates are in western CAR’s diamond mining region, which has been impoverished because of government attempts to control the diamond trade and the fall in industrial diamond prices. To make matters worse, the government and international donors have reduced health funding in recent years. The CAR’s weak educational system and low literacy rate have also suffered as a result of the country’s ongoing conflict. Schools are closed, qualified teachers are scarce, infrastructure, funding, and supplies are lacking and subject to looting, and many students and teachers have been displaced by violence.
Rampant poverty, human rights violations, unemployment, poor infrastructure, and a lack of security and stability have led to forced displacement internally and externally. Since the political crisis that resulted in CAR’s March 2013 coup began in December 2012, approximately 600,000 people have fled to Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and other neighboring countries, while another estimated 515,000 were displaced internally as of December 2022. The UN has urged countries to refrain from repatriating CAR refugees amid the heightened lawlessness.
(2019)" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "38.5% (male 1,113,795/female 1,063,971)" @@ -1075,8 +1072,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Central African Armed Forces (Forces Armees Centrafricaines, FACA): Army (includes an air squadron, Escadrille Centrafricaine)Cabo Verde’s population descends from its first permanent inhabitants in the late 15th-century – a preponderance of West African slaves, a small share of Portuguese colonists, and even fewer Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese Jews. Over the centuries, the country’s overall population size has fluctuated significantly, as recurring periods of famine and epidemics have caused high death tolls and emigration.
Labor migration historically reduced Cabo Verde’s population growth and still provides a key source of income through remittances. Expatriates probably outnumber Cabo Verde’s resident population, with most families having a member abroad. Cabo Verdeans have settled in the US, Europe, Africa, and South America. The largest diaspora community in New Bedford, Massachusetts, dating to the early 1800s, is a byproduct of the transatlantic whaling industry. Cabo Verdean men fleeing poverty at home joined the crews of US whaling ships that stopped in the islands. Many settled in New Bedford and stayed in the whaling or shipping trade, worked in the textile or cranberry industries, or operated their own transatlantic packet ships that transported compatriots to the US. Increased Cabo Verdean emigration to the US coincided with the gradual and eventually complete abolition of slavery in the archipelago in 1878.
During the same period, Portuguese authorities coerced Cabo Verdeans to go to Sao Tome and Principe and other Portuguese colonies in Africa to work as indentured laborers on plantations. In the 1920s, when the US implemented immigration quotas, Cabo Verdean emigration shifted toward Portugal, West Africa (Senegal), and South America (Argentina). Growing numbers of Cabo Verdean labor migrants headed to Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. They filled unskilled jobs in Portugal, as many Portuguese sought out work opportunities in the more prosperous economies of northwest Europe. Cabo Verdeans eventually expanded their emigration to the Netherlands, where they worked in the shipping industry. Migration to the US resumed under relaxed migration laws. Cabo Verdean women also began migrating to southern Europe to become domestic workers, a trend that continues today and has shifted the gender balance of Cabo Verdean emigration.
Emigration has declined in more recent decades due to the adoption of more restrictive migration policies in destination countries. Reduced emigration along with a large youth population, decreased mortality rates, and increased life expectancies, has boosted population growth, putting further pressure on domestic employment and resources. In addition, Cabo Verde has attracted increasing numbers of migrants in recent decades, consisting primarily of people from West Africa, Portuguese-speaking African countries, Portugal, and China. Since the 1990s, some West African migrants have used Cabo Verde as a stepping stone for illegal migration to Europe.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "26.4% (male 80,973/female 80,129)" @@ -1087,7 +1084,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Cabo Verdean Armed Forces (FACV): National Guard (GN; serves as the army and includes a small air component), Cabo Verde Coast Guard (Guardia Costeira de Cabo Verde, GCCV) (2024)", + "text": "Cabo Verdean Armed Forces (FACV): National Guard (GN), Cabo Verde Coast Guard (Guardia Costeira de Cabo Verde, GCCV) (2025)", "note": "note: the National Police are under the Ministry of Internal Affairs" }, "Military expenditures": { diff --git a/africa/dj.json b/africa/dj.json index c678da6f..99864423 100644 --- a/africa/dj.json +++ b/africa/dj.json @@ -111,13 +111,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "994,974" + "text": "994,974 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "450,796" }, "female": { - "text": "544,178 (2024 est.)" + "text": "544,178" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -137,9 +137,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Sunni Muslim 94% (nearly all Djiboutians), other 6% (mainly foreign-born residents - Shia Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Baha'i, and atheist)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Djibouti is a poor, predominantly urban country, characterized by high rates of illiteracy, unemployment, and childhood malnutrition. Approximately 70% of the population lives in cities and towns (predominantly in the capital, Djibouti). The rural population subsists primarily on nomadic herding. Prone to droughts and floods, the country has few natural resources and must import more than 80% of its food from neighboring countries or Europe. Health care, particularly outside the capital, is limited by poor infrastructure, shortages of equipment and supplies, and a lack of qualified personnel. More than a third of health care recipients are migrants because the services are still better than those available in their neighboring home countries. The nearly universal practice of female genital cutting reflects Djibouti’s lack of gender equality and is a major contributor to obstetrical complications and its high rates of maternal and infant mortality. A 1995 law prohibiting the practice has never been enforced.
Because of its political stability and its strategic location at the confluence of East Africa and the Gulf States along the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, Djibouti is a key transit point for migrants and asylum seekers heading for the Gulf States and beyond. Each year some 100,000 people, mainly Ethiopians and some Somalis, journey through Djibouti, usually to the port of Obock, to attempt a dangerous sea crossing to Yemen. However, with the escalation of the ongoing Yemen conflict, Yemenis began fleeing to Djibouti in March 2015, with almost 20,000 arriving by August 2017. Most Yemenis remain unregistered and head for Djibouti City rather than seeking asylum at one of Djibouti’s three spartan refugee camps. Djibouti has been hosting refugees and asylum seekers, predominantly Somalis and lesser numbers of Ethiopians and Eritreans, at camps for 20 years, despite lacking potable water, food shortages, and unemployment.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "28.4% (male 141,829/female 140,696)" @@ -1096,8 +1093,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Djibouti Armed Forces (Forces Armées Djiboutiennes or FAD): Army, Navy, Air Force; Djibouti Coast GuardEgypt is the most populous country in the Arab world and the third-most-populous country in Africa, behind Nigeria and Ethiopia. Most of the country is desert, so about 95% of the population is concentrated in a narrow strip of fertile land along the Nile River, which represents only about 5% of Egypt’s land area. Egypt’s rapid population growth – 46% between 1994 and 2014 – stresses limited natural resources, jobs, housing, sanitation, education, and health care.
Although the country’s total fertility rate (TFR) fell from roughly 5.5 children per woman in 1980 to just over 3 in the late 1990s, largely as a result of state-sponsored family planning programs, the population growth rate dropped more modestly because of decreased mortality rates and longer life expectancies. During the last decade, Egypt’s TFR decline stalled for several years and then reversed, reaching 3.6 in 2011, and is under 3 as of 2022. Contraceptive use has held steady at about 60%, while preferences for larger families and early marriage may have strengthened in the wake of the recent 2011 revolution. The large cohort of women of or nearing childbearing age will sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future (an effect called population momentum).
Nevertheless, post-MUBARAK governments have not made curbing population growth a priority. To increase contraceptive use and to prevent further overpopulation will require greater government commitment and substantial social change, including encouraging smaller families and better educating and empowering women. Currently, literacy, educational attainment, and labor force participation rates are much lower for women than men. In addition, the prevalence of violence against women, the lack of female political representation, and the perpetuation of the nearly universal practice of female genital cutting continue to keep women from playing a more significant role in Egypt’s public sphere.
Population pressure, poverty, high unemployment, and the fragmentation of inherited land holdings have historically motivated Egyptians, primarily young men, to migrate internally from rural and smaller urban areas in the Nile Delta region and the poorer rural south to Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban centers in the north, while a much smaller number migrated to the Red Sea and Sinai areas. Waves of forced internal migration also resulted from the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the floods caused by the completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1970. Limited numbers of students and professionals emigrated temporarily prior to the early 1970s, when economic problems and high unemployment pushed the Egyptian Government to lift restrictions on labor migration. At the same time, high oil revenues enabled Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and other Gulf states, as well as Libya and Jordan, to fund development projects, creating a demand for unskilled labor (mainly in construction), which attracted tens of thousands of young Egyptian men.
Between 1970 and 1974 alone, Egyptian migrants in the Gulf countries increased from approximately 70,000 to 370,000. Egyptian officials encouraged legal labor migration both to alleviate unemployment and to generate remittance income (remittances continue to be one of Egypt’s largest sources of foreign currency and GDP). During the mid-1980s, however, depressed oil prices resulting from the Iran-Iraq War, decreased demand for low-skilled labor, competition from less costly South Asian workers, and efforts to replace foreign workers with locals significantly reduced Egyptian migration to the Gulf States. The number of Egyptian migrants dropped from a peak of almost 3.3 million in 1983 to about 2.2 million at the start of the 1990s, but numbers gradually recovered.
In the 2000s, Egypt began facilitating more labor migration through bilateral agreements, notably with Arab countries and Italy, but illegal migration to Europe through overstayed visas or maritime human smuggling via Libya also rose. The Egyptian Government estimated there were 6.5 million Egyptian migrants in 2009, with roughly 75% being temporary migrants in other Arab countries (Libya, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates) and 25% being predominantly permanent migrants in the West (US, UK, Italy, France, and Canada).
During the 2000s, Egypt became an increasingly important transit and destination country for economic migrants and asylum seekers, including Palestinians, East Africans, and South Asians and, more recently, Iraqis and Syrians. Egypt draws many refugees because of its resettlement programs with the West; Cairo has one of the largest urban refugee populations in the world. Many East African migrants are interned or live in temporary encampments along the Egypt-Israel border, and some have been shot and killed by Egyptian border guards.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "33.8% (male 19,349,395/female 18,243,571)" @@ -1269,7 +1266,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF): Army (includes Republican Guard), Navy (includes Coast Guard), Air Force, Air Defense Forces, Border Guard Forces; Interior Ministry: Public Security Sector Police, the Central Security Force, National Security Agency (2024)", + "text": "Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF): Army (includes Republican Guard), Navy (includes Coast Guard), Air Force, Air Defense Forces, Border Guard ForcesEquatorial Guinea is one of the smallest and least populated countries in continental Africa and is the only independent African country where Spanish is an official language. Despite a boom in oil production in the 1990s, authoritarianism, corruption, and resource mismanagement have concentrated the benefits among a small elite. These practices have perpetuated income inequality and unbalanced development, such as low public spending on education and health care. Unemployment remains problematic because the oil-dominated economy employs a small labor force dependent on skilled foreign workers. The agricultural sector, Equatorial Guinea’s main employer, continues to deteriorate because of a lack of investment and the migration of rural workers to urban areas. About two-thirds of the population lives below the poverty line as of 2020.
Equatorial Guinea’s large and growing youth population – about 60% are under the age of 25 as of 2022 – is particularly affected because job creation in the non-oil sectors is limited, and young people often do not have the skills needed in the labor market. Equatorial Guinean children frequently enter school late, have poor attendance, and have high dropout rates. Thousands of Equatorial Guineans fled across the border to Gabon in the 1970s to escape the dictatorship of Francisco MACIAS NGUEMA; smaller numbers have followed in the decades since. Continued inequitable economic growth and high youth unemployment increases the likelihood of ethnic and regional violence.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "35.6% (male 330,636/female 309,528)" diff --git a/africa/er.json b/africa/er.json index cbab3b2b..b64ad821 100644 --- a/africa/er.json +++ b/africa/er.json @@ -100,13 +100,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "6,343,956" + "text": "6,343,956 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "3,122,433" }, "female": { - "text": "3,221,523 (2024 est.)" + "text": "3,221,523" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -127,9 +127,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Eritrean Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Evangelical Lutheran, Sunni Muslim" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Eritrea is a persistently poor country that has made progress in some socioeconomic categories but not in others. Education and human capital formation are national priorities for facilitating economic development and eradicating poverty. To this end, Eritrea has made great strides in improving adult literacy – doubling the literacy rate over the last 20 years – in large part because of its successful adult education programs. The overall literacy rate was estimated to be more than 75% in 2018; more work needs to be done to raise female literacy and school attendance among nomadic and rural communities. Subsistence farming fails to meet the needs of Eritrea’s growing population because of repeated droughts, dwindling arable land, overgrazing, soil erosion, and a shortage of farmers due to conscription and displacement. The government’s emphasis on spending on defense over agriculture and its lack of foreign exchange to import food also contribute to food insecurity.
Eritrea has been a leading refugee source country since at least the 1960s, when its 30-year war for independence from Ethiopia began. Since gaining independence in 1993, Eritreans have continued migrating to Sudan, Ethiopia, Yemen, Egypt, or Israel because of a lack of basic human rights or political freedom, educational and job opportunities, or to seek asylum because of militarization. Eritrea’s large diaspora has been a source of vital remittances, funding its war for independence and providing 30% of the country’s GDP annually since it became independent.
In the last few years, Eritreans have increasingly been trafficked and held hostage by Bedouins in the Sinai Desert, where they are victims of organ harvesting, rape, extortion, and torture. Some Eritrean trafficking victims are kidnapped after being smuggled to Sudan or Ethiopia, while others are kidnapped from within or around refugee camps or crossing Eritrea’s borders. Eritreans composed approximately 90% of the conservatively estimated 25,000-30,000 victims of Sinai trafficking from 2009-2013, according to a 2013 consultancy firm report.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "35.7% (male 1,138,382/female 1,123,925)" @@ -533,28 +530,7 @@ "note": "note: the president is both chief of state and head of government and is head of the State Council and National Assembly" }, "Legislative branch": { - "legislature name": { - "text": "National Assembly (Hagerawi Baito)" - }, - "legislative structure": { - "text": "unicameral" - }, - "number of seats": { - "text": "150 (all indirectly elected)" - }, - "scope of elections": { - "text": "full renewal" - }, - "term in office": { - "text": "4 years" - }, - "most recent election date": { - "text": "2/1/1994" - }, - "percentage of women in chamber": { - "text": "22%" - }, - "note": "note: in 1997, after the new constitution was adopted, the government formed a Transitional National Assembly to serve as the country's legislative body until countrywide elections to form a National Assembly could be held; the constitution stipulates that once past the transition stage, all National Assembly members will be elected by secret ballot of all eligible voters; National Assembly elections scheduled for December 2001 were postponed indefinitely due to the war with Ethiopia; as of 2024, no sitting legislative body exists" + "text": "note: in 1997, after the new constitution was adopted, the government formed a Transitional National Assembly to serve as the country's legislative body until countrywide elections to form a National Assembly could be held; the constitution stipulates that once past the transition stage, all National Assembly members will be elected by secret ballot of all eligible voters; National Assembly elections scheduled for December 2001 were postponed indefinitely due to the war with Ethiopia; as of 2025, no sitting legislative body exists" }, "Judicial branch": { "highest court(s)": { diff --git a/africa/et.json b/africa/et.json index a5071099..50b3a1d1 100644 --- a/africa/et.json +++ b/africa/et.json @@ -116,13 +116,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "118,550,298" + "text": "118,550,298 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "59,062,093" }, "female": { - "text": "59,488,205 (2024 est.)" + "text": "59,488,205" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -147,9 +147,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Ethiopian Orthodox 43.8%, Muslim 31.3%, Protestant 22.8%, Catholic 0.7%, traditional 0.6%, other 0.8% (2016 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Ethiopia is a predominantly agricultural country – nearly 80% of the population lives in rural areas – that is in the early stages of demographic transition. Infant, child, and maternal mortality have fallen sharply over the past decade, but the total fertility rate has declined more slowly and the population continues to grow. The rising age of marriage and the increasing proportion of women remaining single have contributed to fertility reduction. While the use of modern contraceptive methods among married women has increased significantly from 6 percent in 2000 to 27 percent in 2012, the overall rate is still quite low.
Ethiopia’s rapid population growth is putting increasing pressure on land resources, expanding environmental degradation, and raising vulnerability to food shortages. With about 40 percent of the population below the age of 15 and a fertility rate of 4 children per woman (and even higher in rural areas), Ethiopia will have to make further progress in meeting its family planning needs if it is to achieve the age structure necessary for reaping a demographic dividend in the coming decades.
Poverty, drought, political repression, and forced government resettlement have driven Ethiopia’s internal and external migration since the 1960s. Before the 1974 revolution, only small numbers of the Ethiopian elite went abroad to study and then returned home, but under the brutal Derg regime thousands fled the country, primarily as refugees. Between 1982 and 1991 there was a new wave of migration to the West for family reunification. Since the defeat of the Derg in 1991, Ethiopians have migrated to escape violence among some of the country’s myriad ethnic groups or to pursue economic opportunities. Internal and international trafficking of women and children for domestic work and prostitution is a growing problem.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "38.7% (male 23,092,496/female 22,765,882)" diff --git a/africa/ga.json b/africa/ga.json index b58f99e7..e48e404d 100644 --- a/africa/ga.json +++ b/africa/ga.json @@ -115,13 +115,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "2,523,327" + "text": "2,523,327 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "1,250,490" }, "female": { - "text": "1,272,837 (2024 est.)" + "text": "1,272,837" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -141,9 +141,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Muslim 96.4%, Christian 3.5%, other or none 0.1% (2019-20 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "The Gambia’s youthful age structure – approximately 55% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2021 – is likely to persist because the country’s total fertility rate remains strong at nearly 4 children per woman. The overall literacy rate is around 50%, and is significantly lower for women than for men. At least 70% of the populace are farmers who are reliant on rain-fed agriculture and cannot afford improved seeds and fertilizers. Crop failures caused by droughts between 2011 and 2013 increased poverty, food shortages, and malnutrition.
The Gambia is a source country for migrants and a transit and destination country for migrants and refugees. Since the 1980s, economic deterioration, drought, and high unemployment, especially among youths, have driven both domestic migration (largely urban) and migration abroad (legal and illegal). Emigrants are largely skilled workers, including doctors and nurses, and provide a significant amount of remittances. The top receiving countries for Gambian emigrants are Spain, the US, Nigeria, Senegal, and the UK. While the Gambia and Spain do not share historic, cultural, or trade ties, rural Gambians have migrated to Spain in large numbers because of its proximity and the availability of jobs in its underground economy (this flow slowed following the onset of Spain’s late 2007 economic crisis).
The Gambia’s role as a host country to refugees is a result of wars in several of its neighboring West African countries. Since 2006, refugees from the Casamance conflict in Senegal have replaced their pattern of flight and return with permanent settlement in The Gambia, often moving in with relatives along the Senegal-Gambia border. The strain of providing for about 7,400 Casamance refugees increased poverty among Gambian villagers. The number of refugees decreased to around 3,500 by 2022.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "38.2% (male 486,472/female 477,309)" diff --git a/africa/gb.json b/africa/gb.json index 18c2bb97..78fac1f6 100644 --- a/africa/gb.json +++ b/africa/gb.json @@ -112,13 +112,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "2,455,105" + "text": "2,455,105 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "1,270,023" }, "female": { - "text": "1,185,082 (2024 est.)" + "text": "1,185,082" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -138,9 +138,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Protestant 46.4% (Revival Church 37%, other Protestant 9.4%), Roman Catholic 29.8%, other Christian 4%, Muslim 10.8%, traditional/animist 1.1%, other 0.9%, none 7% (2019-21 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Gabon’s oil revenues have given it one of the highest per capita income levels in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the wealth is not evenly distributed and poverty is widespread. Unemployment is especially prevalent among the large youth population; more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020. With a fertility rate still averaging more than 3 children per woman, the youth population will continue to grow and further strain the mismatch between Gabon’s supply of jobs and the skills of its labor force.
Gabon has been a magnet to migrants from neighboring countries since the 1960s because of the discovery of oil, as well as the country’s political stability and timber, mineral, and natural gas resources. Nonetheless, income inequality and high unemployment have created slums in Libreville full of migrant workers from Senegal, Nigeria, Cameroon, Benin, Togo, and elsewhere in West Africa. In 2011, Gabon declared an end to refugee status for 9,500 remaining Congolese nationals to whom it had granted asylum during the Republic of the Congo’s civil war between 1997 and 2003. About 5,400 of these refugees received permits to reside in Gabon.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "34.6% (male 429,133/female 421,120)" diff --git a/africa/gh.json b/africa/gh.json index f371688c..c7422901 100644 --- a/africa/gh.json +++ b/africa/gh.json @@ -115,13 +115,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "34,589,092" + "text": "34,589,092 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "16,902,073" }, "female": { - "text": "17,687,019 (2024 est.)" + "text": "17,687,019" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -142,9 +142,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Christian 71.3% (Pentecostal/Charismatic 31.6%, Protestant 17.4%, Catholic 10%, other 12.3%), Muslim 19.9%, traditionalist 3.2%, other 4.5%, none 1.1% (2021 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Ghana has a young age structure, with approximately 56% of the population under the age of 25 as of 2020. Its total fertility rate fell significantly during the 1980s and 1990s but has stalled at around four children per woman for the last few years. Fertility remains higher in the northern region than the Greater Accra region. On average, desired fertility has remained stable for several years; urban dwellers want fewer children than rural residents. Increased life expectancy, due to better health care, nutrition, and hygiene, and reduced fertility have increased Ghana’s share of elderly persons; Ghana’s proportion of persons aged 60+ is among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Poverty has declined in Ghana, but it remains pervasive in the northern region, which is susceptible to droughts and floods and has less access to transportation infrastructure, markets, fertile farming land, and industrial centers. The northern region also has lower school enrollment, higher illiteracy, and fewer opportunities for women.
Ghana was a country of immigration in the early years after its 1957 independence, attracting labor migrants largely from Nigeria and other neighboring countries to mine minerals and harvest cocoa – immigrants composed about 12% of Ghana’s population in 1960. In the late 1960s, worsening economic and social conditions discouraged immigration, and hundreds of thousands of immigrants, mostly Nigerians, were expelled.
During the 1970s, severe drought and an economic downturn transformed Ghana into a country of emigration; neighboring Cote d’Ivoire was the initial destination. Later, hundreds of thousands of Ghanaians migrated to Nigeria to work in its booming oil industry, but most were deported in 1983 and 1985 as oil prices plummeted. Many Ghanaians then turned to more distant destinations, including other parts of Africa, Europe, and North America, but the majority continued to migrate within West Africa. Since the 1990s, increased emigration of skilled Ghanaians, especially to the US and the UK, drained the country of its health care and education professionals. Internally, poverty and other developmental disparities continue to drive Ghanaians from the north to the south, particularly to its urban centers.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "37.4% (male 6,527,386/female 6,400,245)" diff --git a/africa/gv.json b/africa/gv.json index 59870657..72f51d54 100644 --- a/africa/gv.json +++ b/africa/gv.json @@ -109,13 +109,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "13,986,179" + "text": "13,986,179 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "6,985,606" }, "female": { - "text": "7,000,573 (2024 est.)" + "text": "7,000,573" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -136,9 +136,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Muslim 85.2%, Christian 13.4%, animist 0.2%, none 1.2% (2018 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Guinea’s strong population growth is a result of declining mortality rates and sustained elevated fertility. The population growth rate was somewhat tempered in the 2000s because of a period of net outmigration. Although life expectancy and mortality rates have improved over the last two decades, the nearly universal practice of female genital cutting continues to contribute to high infant and maternal mortality rates. Guinea’s total fertility remains high at about 5 children per woman as of 2022 because of the ongoing preference for larger families, low contraceptive usage and availability, a lack of educational attainment and empowerment among women, and poverty. A lack of literacy and vocational training programs limit job prospects for youths, but even those with university degrees often have no option but to work in the informal sector. About 60% of the country’s large youth population is unemployed.
Tensions and refugees have spilled over Guinea’s borders with Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire. During the 1990s Guinea harbored as many as half a million refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia, more refugees than any other African country for much of that decade. About half sought refuge in the volatile \"Parrot’s Beak\" region of southwest Guinea, a wedge of land jutting into Sierra Leone near the Liberian border. Many were relocated within Guinea in the early 2000s because the area suffered repeated cross-border attacks from various government and rebel forces, as well as anti-refugee violence.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "40.9% (male 2,884,146/female 2,835,794)" diff --git a/africa/iv.json b/africa/iv.json index 23544b86..925f3c51 100644 --- a/africa/iv.json +++ b/africa/iv.json @@ -114,13 +114,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "29,981,758" + "text": "29,981,758 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "15,040,032" }, "female": { - "text": "14,941,726 (2024 est.)" + "text": "14,941,726" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -146,9 +146,6 @@ "text": "Muslim 42.9%, Catholic 17.2%, Evangelical 11.8%, Methodist 1.7%, other Christian 3.2%, animist 3.6%, other religion 0.5%, none 19.1% (2014 est.)", "note": "note: the majority of foreign migrant workers are Muslim (72.7%) and Christian (17.7%)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Cote d’Ivoire’s population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future because almost 60% of the populace is younger than 25 as of 2020, the total fertility rate is holding steady at about 3.5 children per woman, and contraceptive use is under 30%. The country will need to improve education, health care, and gender equality in order to turn its large and growing youth cohort into human capital. Even prior to 2010 unrest that shuttered schools for months, access to education was poor, especially for women. The lack of educational attainment contributes to Cote d’Ivoire’s high rates of unskilled labor, adolescent pregnancy, and HIV/AIDS prevalence.
Following its independence in 1960, Cote d’Ivoire’s stability and the blossoming of its labor-intensive cocoa and coffee industries in the southwest made it an attractive destination for migrants from other parts of the country and its neighbors, particularly Burkina Faso. The HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY administration continued the French colonial policy of encouraging labor immigration by offering liberal land ownership laws. Foreigners from West Africa, Europe (mainly France), and Lebanon composed about 25% of the population by 1998.
Ongoing economic decline since the 1980s and the power struggle after HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY’s death in 1993 ushered in the politics of \"Ivoirite,\" institutionalizing an Ivoirian identity that further marginalized northern Ivoirians and scapegoated immigrants. The hostile Muslim north-Christian south divide snowballed into a 2002 civil war, pushing tens of thousands of foreign migrants, Liberian refugees, and Ivoirians to flee to war-torn Liberia or other regional countries and more than a million people to be internally displaced. Subsequently, violence following the contested 2010 presidential election prompted some 250,000 people to seek refuge in Liberia and other neighboring countries and again internally displaced as many as a million people. By July 2012, the majority had returned home, but ongoing inter-communal tension and armed conflict continue to force people from their homes.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "36.1% (male 5,437,108/female 5,390,782)" @@ -966,11 +963,11 @@ "note": "note: top five import commodities based on value in dollars" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": { - "text": "$6.257 billion (31 December 2017 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": { + "text": "$6.257 billion (2017 est.)" }, - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": { - "text": "$4.935 billion (31 December 2016 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": { + "text": "$4.935 billion (2016 est.)" } }, "Debt - external": { @@ -1215,8 +1212,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (Forces Armees de Cote d'Ivoire, FACI; aka Republican Forces of Ivory Coast, FRCI): Army (Land Force), National Navy, Air Force, Special Forces; National Gendarmerie (under the Ministry of Defense)Kenya has experienced dramatic population growth since the mid-20th century as a result of its high birth rate and its declining mortality rate. Almost 40% of Kenyans are under the age of 15 as of 2020 because of sustained high fertility, early marriage and childbearing, and an unmet need for family planning. Kenya’s persistent rapid population growth strains the labor market, social services, arable land, and natural resources. Although Kenya in 1967 was the first Sub-Saharan country to launch a nationwide family planning program, progress in reducing the birth rate has largely stalled since the late 1990s, when the government decreased its support for family planning to focus on the HIV epidemic. Government commitment and international technical support spurred Kenyan contraceptive use, decreasing the fertility rate (children per woman) from about 8 in the late 1970s to less than 5 children twenty years later, but it has plateaued at about 3 children as of 2022.
Kenya is a source of emigrants and a host country for refugees. In the 1960s and 1970s, Kenyans pursued higher education in the UK because of colonial ties, but as British immigration rules tightened, the US, the then Soviet Union, and Canada became attractive study destinations. Kenya’s stagnant economy and political problems during the 1980s and 1990s led to an outpouring of Kenyan students and professionals seeking permanent opportunities in the West and southern Africa. Nevertheless, Kenya’s relative stability since its independence in 1963 has attracted hundreds of thousands of refugees escaping violent conflicts in neighboring countries; Kenya was sheltering nearly 280,000 Somali refugees as of 2022.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "35.8% (male 10,464,384/female 10,366,997)" @@ -495,7 +492,7 @@ "text": "British East Africa" }, "etymology": { - "text": "named for Mount Kenya; the meaning of the name is unclear but may derive from the Kikuyu, Embu, and Kamba words \"kirinyaga,\" \"kirenyaa,\" and \"kiinyaa\" - all of which mean \"God's resting place\"" + "text": "named for Mount Kenya; the mountain's name may derive from the Kikuyu word kere nyaga, or \"white mountain\"" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/africa/li.json b/africa/li.json index 798eb8bf..7dde9f88 100644 --- a/africa/li.json +++ b/africa/li.json @@ -109,13 +109,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "5,437,249" + "text": "5,437,249 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "2,711,324" }, "female": { - "text": "2,725,925 (2024 est.)" + "text": "2,725,925" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -135,9 +135,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Christian 84.9%, Muslim 12%, Traditional 0.5%, other 0.1%, none 2.6% (2022 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Liberia’s high fertility rate of nearly 5 children per woman and large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020 – will sustain a high dependency ratio for many years to come. Significant progress has been made in preventing child deaths, despite a lack of health care workers and infrastructure. Infant and child mortality have dropped nearly 70% since 1990; the annual reduction rate of about 5.4% is the highest in Africa.
Nevertheless, Liberia’s high maternal mortality rate remains among the world’s worst; it reflects a high unmet need for family planning services, frequency of early childbearing, lack of quality obstetric care, high adolescent fertility, and a low proportion of births attended by a medical professional. Female mortality is also increased by the prevalence of female genital cutting (FGC), which is practiced by 10 of Liberia’s 16 tribes and affects more than two-thirds of women and girls. FGC is an initiation ritual performed in rural bush schools, which teach traditional beliefs on marriage and motherhood and are an obstacle to formal classroom education for Liberian girls.
Liberia has been both a source and a destination for refugees. During Liberia’s 14-year civil war (1989-2003), more than 250,000 people became refugees and another half million were internally displaced. Between 2004 and the cessation of refugee status for Liberians in June 2012, the UNHCR helped more than 155,000 Liberians to voluntarily repatriate, while others returned home on their own. Some Liberian refugees spent more than two decades living in other West African countries. Between 2011 and 2022, more than 300,000 Ivoirian refugees in Liberia have been repatriated; as of year-end 2022, less than 2,300 Ivoirian refugees were still living in Liberia.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "38.9% (male 1,064,100/female 1,052,556)" @@ -461,7 +458,7 @@ "text": "Liberia" }, "etymology": { - "text": "name derives from the Latin word \"liber\" meaning \"free\"; so named because the nation was created as a homeland for liberated African-American slaves" + "text": "name derives from the Latin word liber, meaning \"free;\" so named because the nation was created as a homeland for liberated African-American slaves" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/africa/lt.json b/africa/lt.json index 37e6990d..b465bd2d 100644 --- a/africa/lt.json +++ b/africa/lt.json @@ -104,13 +104,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "2,227,548" + "text": "2,227,548 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "1,101,959" }, "female": { - "text": "1,125,589 (2024 est.)" + "text": "1,125,589" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -130,9 +130,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Protestant 47.8% (Pentecostal 23.1%, Lesotho Evangelical 17.3%, Anglican 7.4%), Roman Catholic 39.3%, other Christian 9.1%, non-Christian 1.4%, none 2.3% (2014 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Lesotho faces great socioeconomic challenges. Almost half of its population lives below the poverty line as of 2017, and the country’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is the second highest in the world as of 2021. In addition, Lesotho is a small, mountainous, landlocked country with little arable land, leaving its population vulnerable to food shortages and reliant on remittances. Lesotho’s persistently high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates have been increasing during the last decade, according to the last two Demographic and Health Surveys. Despite these significant shortcomings, Lesotho has made good progress in education; it is on-track to achieve universal primary education and has one of the highest adult literacy rates in Africa.
Lesotho’s migration history is linked to its unique geography; it is surrounded by South Africa with which it shares linguistic and cultural traits. Lesotho at one time had more of its workforce employed outside its borders than any other country. Today remittances equal about 20% of its GDP. With few job options at home, a high rate of poverty, and higher wages available across the border, labor migration to South Africa replaced agriculture as the prevailing Basotho source of income decades ago. The majority of Basotho migrants were single men contracted to work as gold miners in South Africa. However, migration trends changed in the 1990s, and fewer men found mining jobs in South Africa because of declining gold prices, stricter immigration policies, and a preference for South African workers.
Although men still dominate cross-border labor migration, more women are working in South Africa, mostly as domestics, because they are widows or their husbands are unemployed. Internal rural-urban flows have also become more frequent, with more women migrating within the country to take up jobs in the garment industry or moving to care for loved ones with HIV/AIDS. Lesotho’s small population of immigrants is increasingly composed of Taiwanese and Chinese migrants who are involved in the textile industry and small retail businesses.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "32% (male 358,137/female 353,618)" @@ -482,7 +479,7 @@ "text": "Basutoland" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the name translates as \"Land of the Sesotho Speakers\"" + "text": "the name comes from the Sotho people, whose name means \"dark-skinned;\" Le- is a singular noun prefix; the former name, Basutoland, uses the plural noun prefix, Ba-" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/africa/ly.json b/africa/ly.json index 40c99300..c82a0dec 100644 --- a/africa/ly.json +++ b/africa/ly.json @@ -110,13 +110,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "7,361,263" + "text": "7,361,263 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "3,747,364" }, "female": { - "text": "3,613,899 (2024 est.)" + "text": "3,613,899" }, "note": "note: immigrants make up just over 12% of the total population, according to UN data (2019)" }, @@ -143,9 +143,6 @@ "text": "Muslim (official; virtually all Sunni) 96.6%, Christian 2.7%, Buddhist <1%, Hindu <1%, Jewish <1%, folk religion <1%, other <1%, unaffiliated <1% (2020 est.)", "note": "note: non-Sunni Muslims include native Ibadhi Muslims (<1% of the population) and foreign Muslims" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Despite continuing unrest, Libya remains a destination country for economic migrants. It is also a hub for transit migration to Europe because of its proximity to southern Europe and its lax border controls. Labor migrants have been drawn to Libya since the development of its oil sector in the 1960s. Until the latter part of the 1990s, most migrants to Libya were Arab (primarily Egyptians and Sudanese). However, international isolation stemming from Libya’s involvement in international terrorism and a perceived lack of support from Arab countries led QADHAFI in 1998 to adopt a decade-long pan-African policy that enabled large numbers of Sub-Saharan migrants to enter Libya without visas to work in the construction and agricultural industries. Although Sub-Saharan Africans provided a cheap labor source, they were poorly treated and were subjected to periodic mass expulsions.
By the mid-2000s, domestic animosity toward African migrants and a desire to reintegrate into the international community motivated QADHAFI to impose entry visas on Arab and African immigrants and to agree to joint maritime patrols and migrant repatriations with Italy, the main recipient of illegal migrants departing Libya. As his regime neared collapse in 2011, QADHAFI reversed his policy of cooperating with Italy to curb illegal migration and sent boats loaded with migrants and asylum seekers to strain European resources. Libya’s 2011 revolution decreased immigration drastically and prompted nearly 800,000 migrants to flee to third countries, mainly Tunisia and Egypt, or to their countries of origin. The inflow of migrants declined in 2012 but returned to normal levels by 2013, despite continued hostility toward Sub-Saharan Africans and a less-inviting job market.
While Libya is not an appealing destination for migrants, since 2014, transiting migrants – primarily from East and West Africa – continue to exploit its political instability and weak border controls and use it as a primary departure area to migrate across the central Mediterranean to Europe in growing numbers. In addition, approximately 135,000 people were displaced internally as of August 2022 by fighting between armed groups in eastern and western Libya and, to a lesser extent, by inter-tribal clashes in the country’s south.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "32.3% (male 1,211,087/female 1,165,648)" @@ -455,7 +452,7 @@ "text": "Libiya" }, "etymology": { - "text": "name derives from the Libu, an ancient Libyan tribe first mentioned in texts from the 13th century B.C." + "text": "the name probably derives from the Libu, a North African tribe first mentioned in texts from the 13th century B.C.; the ancient Greeks and Romans used the name for the entire North African coast west of Egypt" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/africa/ma.json b/africa/ma.json index 8e987888..c91ba349 100644 --- a/africa/ma.json +++ b/africa/ma.json @@ -106,13 +106,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "29,452,714" + "text": "29,452,714 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "14,760,501" }, "female": { - "text": "14,692,213 (2024 est.)" + "text": "14,692,213" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -133,9 +133,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Church of Jesus Christ in Madagascar/Malagasy Lutheran Church/Anglican Church 34%, Roman Catholic 32.3%, other Christian 8.1%, traditional/Animist 1.7%, Muslim 1.4%, other 0.6%, none 21.9% (2021 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Madagascar’s youthful population – nearly 60% are under the age of 25 as of 2020 – and moderately high total fertility rate of more than 3.6 children per woman ensures that the Malagasy population will continue its rapid growth trajectory for the foreseeable future. The population is predominantly rural and poor; chronic malnutrition is prevalent, and large families are the norm. Many young Malagasy girls are withdrawn from school, marry early (often pressured to do so by their parents), and soon begin having children. Early childbearing, coupled with Madagascar’s widespread poverty and lack of access to skilled health care providers during delivery, increases the risk of death and serious health problems for young mothers and their babies.
Child marriage perpetuates gender inequality and is prevalent among the poor, the uneducated, and rural households – as of 2018, 40% of Malagasy women aged 20 to 24 were married. Although the legal age for marriage is 18, parental consent is often given for earlier marriages or the law is flouted, especially in rural areas that make up approximately 60% of the country. Forms of arranged marriage whereby young girls are married to older men in exchange for oxen or money are traditional. If a union does not work out, a girl can be placed in another marriage, but the dowry paid to her family diminishes with each unsuccessful marriage.
Madagascar’s population consists of 18 main ethnic groups, all of whom speak the same Malagasy language. Most Malagasy are multi-ethnic, however, reflecting the island’s diversity of settlers and historical contacts (see Background). Madagascar’s legacy of hierarchical societies practicing domestic slavery (most notably the Merina Kingdom of the 16th to the 19th century) is evident today in persistent class tension, with some ethnic groups maintaining a caste system. Slave descendants are vulnerable to unequal access to education and jobs, despite Madagascar’s constitutional guarantee of free compulsory primary education and its being party to several international conventions on human rights. Historical distinctions also remain between central highlanders and coastal people.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "37% (male 5,507,847/female 5,400,551)" @@ -482,7 +479,7 @@ "text": "Malagasy Republic" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the name \"Madageiscar\" was first used by the 13th-century Venetian explorer Marco POLO, as a corrupted transliteration of Mogadishu, the Somali port with which POLO confused the island" + "text": "a variant of the name was first used by 13th-century Venetian explorer Marco POLO when he confused the island with the Somali port of Mogadishu; the transliteration was later adopted as the official name" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/africa/mi.json b/africa/mi.json index dd15a36a..17207ec4 100644 --- a/africa/mi.json +++ b/africa/mi.json @@ -112,13 +112,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "21,763,309" + "text": "21,763,309 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "10,674,594" }, "female": { - "text": "11,088,715 (2024 est.)" + "text": "11,088,715" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -139,9 +139,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Protestant 33.5% (includes Church of Central Africa Presbyterian 14.2%, Seventh Day Adventist/Baptist 9.4%, Pentecostal 7.6%, Anglican 2.3%), Roman Catholic 17.2%, other Christian 26.6%, Muslim 13.8%, traditionalist 1.1%, other 5.6%, none 2.1% (2018 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Malawi has made great improvements in maternal and child health, but has made less progress in reducing its high fertility rate. In both rural and urban areas, very high proportions of mothers are receiving prenatal care and skilled birth assistance, and most children are being vaccinated. Malawi’s fertility rate, however, has only declined slowly, decreasing from more than 7 children per woman in the 1980s to about 5.5 today. Nonetheless, Malawians prefer smaller families than in the past, and women are increasingly using contraceptives to prevent or space pregnancies. Rapid population growth and high population density is putting pressure on Malawi’s land, water, and forest resources. Reduced plot sizes and increasing vulnerability to climate change, further threaten the sustainability of Malawi’s agriculturally based economy and will worsen food shortages. About 80% of the population is employed in agriculture.
Historically, Malawians migrated abroad in search of work, primarily to South Africa and present-day Zimbabwe, but international migration became uncommon after the 1970s, and most migration in recent years has been internal. During the colonial period, Malawians regularly migrated to southern Africa as contract farm laborers, miners, and domestic servants. In the decade and a half after independence in 1964, the Malawian Government sought to transform its economy from one dependent on small-scale farms to one based on estate agriculture. The resulting demand for wage labor induced more than 300,000 Malawians to return home between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s. In recent times, internal migration has generally been local, motivated more by marriage than economic reasons.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "37.7% (male 4,080,567/female 4,132,710)" @@ -502,7 +499,7 @@ "text": "British Central African Protectorate, Nyasaland Protectorate, Nyasaland" }, "etymology": { - "text": "named for the East African Maravi Kingdom of the 16th century; the word \"maravi\" means \"fire flames\"" + "text": "named for the Maravi people who inhabited the area since the 14th century; the word maravi means \"flames\"" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/africa/ml.json b/africa/ml.json index a506fae1..a626fe22 100644 --- a/africa/ml.json +++ b/africa/ml.json @@ -113,13 +113,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "21,990,607" + "text": "21,990,607 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "10,688,755" }, "female": { - "text": "11,301,852 (2024 est.)" + "text": "11,301,852" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -140,9 +140,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Muslim 93.9%, Christian 2.8%, animist 0.7%, none 2.5% (2018 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Mali’s total population is expected to double by 2035; its capital Bamako is one of the fastest-growing cities in Africa. A young age structure, a declining mortality rate, and a sustained high total fertility rate of 5.5 children per woman – the fourth highest in the world, as of 2022 – ensure continued rapid population growth for the foreseeable future. Significant outmigration only marginally tempers this growth. Despite decreases, Mali’s infant, child, and maternal mortality rates remain among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa because of limited access to and adoption of family planning, early childbearing, short birth intervals, the prevalence of female genital cutting, infrequent use of skilled birth attendants, and a lack of emergency obstetrical and neonatal care.
Mali’s high total fertility rate has been virtually unchanged for decades, as a result of the ongoing preference for large families, early childbearing, the lack of female education and empowerment, poverty, and extremely low contraceptive use. Slowing Mali’s population growth by lowering its birth rate will be essential for poverty reduction, improving food security, and developing human capital and the economy.
Mali has a long history of seasonal migration and emigration driven by poverty, conflict, demographic pressure, unemployment, food insecurity, and droughts. Many Malians from rural areas migrate during the dry period to nearby villages and towns to do odd jobs or to adjoining countries to work in agriculture or mining. Pastoralists and nomads move seasonally to southern Mali or nearby coastal states. Others migrate long term to Mali’s urban areas, Cote d’Ivoire, other neighboring countries, and in smaller numbers to France, Mali’s former colonial ruler. Since the early 1990s, Mali’s role has grown as a transit country for regional migration flows and illegal migration to Europe. Human smugglers and traffickers exploit the same regional routes used for moving contraband drugs, arms, and cigarettes.
Between early 2012 and 2013, renewed fighting in northern Mali between government forces and Tuareg secessionists and their Islamist allies, a French-led international military intervention, as well as chronic food shortages, caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Malians. Most of those displaced domestically sought shelter in urban areas of southern Mali, except for pastoralist and nomadic groups, who abandoned their traditional routes, gave away or sold their livestock, and dispersed into the deserts of northern Mali or crossed into neighboring countries. Almost all Malians who took refuge abroad (mostly Tuareg and Maure pastoralists) stayed in the region, largely in Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "46.8% (male 5,175,714/female 5,114,128)" @@ -503,7 +500,7 @@ "text": "French Sudan, Sudanese Republic, Mali Federation" }, "etymology": { - "text": "name derives from the West African Mali Empire of the 13th to 16th centuries A.D." + "text": "name derives from the Mali Empire of the 13th to 16th centuries A.D.; the Mali name may come from a local ethnic group, the Malinke, whose name is derived from the words ma, meaning \"mother,\" and dink, meaning \"child\" -- a reference to the matrilinear descent of Malinke families" } }, "Government type": { @@ -924,11 +921,11 @@ "note": "note: top five import commodities based on value in dollars" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": { - "text": "$647.8 million (31 December 2017 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": { + "text": "$647.8 million (2017 est.)" }, - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": { - "text": "$395.7 million (31 December 2016 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": { + "text": "$395.7 million (2016 est.)" } }, "Debt - external": { diff --git a/africa/mo.json b/africa/mo.json index 7762015d..451e7d6d 100644 --- a/africa/mo.json +++ b/africa/mo.json @@ -115,13 +115,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "37,387,585" + "text": "37,387,585 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "18,664,263" }, "female": { - "text": "18,723,322 (2024 est.)" + "text": "18,723,322" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -149,9 +149,6 @@ "text": "Muslim 99% (official; virtually all Sunni, <0.1% Shia), other 1% (includes Christian, Jewish, and Baha'i); note - Jewish about 3,000-3,500 (2020 est.)", "note": "note: does not include data from the former Western Sahara" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Morocco is undergoing a demographic transition. Its population is growing but at a declining rate, as people live longer and women have fewer children. Infant, child, and maternal mortality rates have been reduced through better health care, nutrition, hygiene, and vaccination coverage, although disparities between urban and rural and rich and poor households persist. Morocco’s shrinking child cohort reflects the decline of its total fertility rate from 5 in mid-1980s to 2.2 in 2010, which is a result of increased female educational attainment, higher contraceptive use, delayed marriage, and the desire for smaller families. Young adults (persons aged 15-29) make up almost 26% of the total population and represent a potential economic asset if they can be gainfully employed. Currently, however, many youths are unemployed because Morocco’s job creation rate has not kept pace with the growth of its working-age population. Most youths who have jobs work in the informal sector with little security or benefits.
During the second half of the 20th century, Morocco became one of the world’s top emigration countries, creating large, widely dispersed migrant communities in Western Europe. The Moroccan Government has encouraged emigration since its independence in 1956, both to secure remittances for funding national development and as an outlet to prevent unrest in rebellious (often Berber) areas. Although Moroccan labor migrants earlier targeted Algeria and France, the flood of Moroccan \"guest workers\" from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s spread widely across northwestern Europe to fill unskilled jobs in the booming manufacturing, mining, construction, and agriculture industries. Host societies and most Moroccan migrants expected this migration to be temporary, but deteriorating economic conditions in Morocco related to the 1973 oil crisis and tighter European immigration policies resulted in these stays becoming permanent.
A wave of family migration followed in the 1970s and 1980s, with a growing number of second generation Moroccans opting to become naturalized citizens of their host countries. Spain and Italy emerged as new destination countries in the mid-1980s, but their introduction of visa restrictions in the early 1990s pushed Moroccans increasingly to migrate either legally by marrying Moroccans already in Europe or illegally to work in the underground economy. Women began to make up a growing share of these labor migrants. At the same time, some higher-skilled Moroccans went to the US and Quebec, Canada.
In the mid-1990s, Morocco developed into a transit country for asylum seekers from Sub-Saharan Africa and illegal labor migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia trying to reach Europe via southern Spain, Spain’s Canary Islands, or Spain’s North African enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla. Forcible expulsions by Moroccan and Spanish security forces have not deterred these illegal migrants or calmed Europe’s security concerns. Rabat remains unlikely to adopt an EU agreement to take back third-country nationals who have entered the EU illegally via Morocco. Thousands of other illegal migrants have chosen to stay in Morocco until they earn enough money for further travel or permanently as a \"second-best\" option. The launching of a regularization program in 2014 legalized the status of some migrants and granted them equal access to education, health care, and work, but xenophobia and racism remain obstacles.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "25.7% (male 4,898,154/female 4,701,786)" @@ -523,7 +520,7 @@ "text": "French Protectorate in Morocco, Spanish Protectorate in Morocco, Ifni, Spanish Sahara, Western Sahara" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the English name \"Morocco\" derives from, respectively, the Spanish and Portuguese names \"Marruecos\" and \"Marrocos,\" which stem from \"Marrakesh\" the Latin name for the former capital of ancient Morocco; the Arabic name \"Al Maghrib\" translates as \"The West\"" + "text": "the English name of Morocco derives from, respectively, the Spanish and Portuguese names Marruecos and Marrocos, which stem from Marrakesh, the Latin name for the former capital of ancient Morocco; the Arabic name, Al Maghrib, translates as \"The West\"" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/africa/mp.json b/africa/mp.json index 430afe7d..aad6dcc6 100644 --- a/africa/mp.json +++ b/africa/mp.json @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ "note": "note: includes Agalega Islands, Cargados Carajos Shoals (Saint Brandon), and Rodrigues" }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "almost 11 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "almost 11 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -102,13 +102,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "1,310,504" + "text": "1,310,504 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "639,270" }, "female": { - "text": "671,234 (2024 est.)" + "text": "671,234" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -129,9 +129,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Hindu 48.5%, Roman Catholic 26.3%, Muslim 17.3%, other Christian 6.4%, other 0.6%, none 0.7%, unspecified 0.1% (2011 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Mauritius has transitioned from a country of high fertility and high mortality rates in the 1950s and mid-1960s to one with among the lowest population growth rates in the developing world today. After World War II, Mauritius’ population began to expand quickly due to increased fertility and a dramatic drop in mortality rates as a result of improved health care and the eradication of malaria. This period of heightened population growth – reaching about 3% a year – was followed by one of the world’s most rapid birth rate declines.
The total fertility rate fell from 6.2 children per women in 1963 to 3.2 in 1972 – largely the result of improved educational attainment, especially among young women, accompanied by later marriage and the adoption of family planning methods. The family planning programs’ success was due to support from the government and eventually the traditionally pronatalist religious communities, which both recognized that controlling population growth was necessary because of Mauritius’ small size and limited resources. Mauritius’ fertility rate has consistently been below replacement level since the late 1990s, a rate that is substantially lower than nearby countries in southern Africa.
With no indigenous population, Mauritius’ ethnic mix is a product of more than two centuries of European colonialism and continued international labor migration. Sugar production relied on slave labor mainly from Madagascar, Mozambique, and East Africa from the early 18th century until its abolition in 1835, when slaves were replaced with indentured Indians. Most of the influx of indentured labor – peaking between the late 1830s and early 1860s – settled permanently creating massive population growth of more than 7% a year and reshaping the island’s social and cultural composition. While Indians represented about 12% of Mauritius’ population in 1837, they and their descendants accounted for roughly two-thirds by the end of the 19th century. Most were Hindus, but the majority of the free Indian traders were Muslims.
Mauritius again turned to overseas labor when its success in clothing and textile exports led to a labor shortage in the mid-1980s. Clothing manufacturers brought in contract workers (increasingly women) from China, India, and, to a lesser extent Bangladesh and Madagascar, who worked longer hours for lower wages under poor conditions and were viewed as more productive than locals. Downturns in the sugar and textile industries in the mid-2000s and a lack of highly qualified domestic workers for Mauritius’ growing services sector led to the emigration of low-skilled workers and a reliance on skilled foreign labor. Since 2007, Mauritius has pursued a circular migration program to enable citizens to acquire new skills and savings abroad and then return home to start businesses and to invest in the country’s development.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "15.1% (male 100,973/female 96,711)" @@ -455,7 +452,7 @@ "text": "Mauritius" }, "etymology": { - "text": "island named after Prince Maurice VAN NASSAU, stadtholder of the Dutch Republic, in 1598" + "text": "named after Prince Maurice VAN NASSAU, stadtholder (governor) of the Dutch Republic, in 1598" }, "note": "note: pronounced mah-rish-us" }, diff --git a/africa/mr.json b/africa/mr.json index 6626dfad..4c8b31b5 100644 --- a/africa/mr.json +++ b/africa/mr.json @@ -118,13 +118,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "4,328,040" + "text": "4,328,040 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "2,083,690" }, "female": { - "text": "2,244,350 (2024 est.)" + "text": "2,244,350" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -150,9 +150,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Muslim (official) 100%" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "With a sustained total fertility rate of about 3.5 children per woman and almost 60% of the population under the age of 25 as of 2020, Mauritania's population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future. Mauritania's large youth cohort is vital to its development prospects, but available schooling does not adequately prepare students for the workplace. Girls continue to be underrepresented in the classroom, educational quality remains poor, and the dropout rate is high. The literacy rate is only about 50%, even though access to primary education has improved since the mid-2000s. Women's restricted access to education and discriminatory laws maintain gender inequality - worsened by early and forced marriages and female genital cutting.
The denial of education to black Moors also helps to perpetuate slavery. Although Mauritania abolished slavery in 1981 (the last country in the world to do so) and made it a criminal offense in 2007, the millenniums-old practice persists largely because anti-slavery laws are rarely enforced and the custom is so ingrained. According to a 2018 nongovernmental organization's report, a little more than 2% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which includes individuals subjected to forced labor and forced marriage, while many thousands of individuals who are legally free contend with discrimination, poor education, and a lack of identity papers and, therefore, live in de facto slavery. The UN and international press outlets have claimed that up to 20% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which would be the highest rate worldwide.
Drought, poverty, and unemployment have driven outmigration from Mauritania since the 1970s. Early flows were directed toward other West African countries, including Senegal, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gambia. The 1989 Mauritania-Senegal conflict forced thousands of black Mauritanians to take refuge in Senegal and pushed labor migrants toward the Gulf, Libya, and Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mauritania has accepted migrants from neighboring countries to fill labor shortages since its independence in 1960 and more recently has received refugees escaping civil wars, including tens of thousands of Tuaregs who fled Mali in 2012.
Mauritania was an important transit point for Sub-Saharan migrants moving illegally to North Africa and Europe. In the mid-2000s, as border patrols increased in the Strait of Gibraltar, security increased around Spain's North African enclaves (Ceuta and Melilla), and Moroccan border controls intensified, illegal migration flows shifted from the Western Mediterranean to Spain's Canary Islands. In 2006, departure points moved southward along the West African coast from Morocco and then Western Sahara to Mauritania's two key ports (Nouadhibou and the capital Nouakchott), and illegal migration to the Canaries peaked at almost 32,000. The numbers fell dramatically in the following years because of joint patrolling off the West African coast by Frontex (the EU's border protection agency), Spain, Mauritania, and Senegal; the expansion of Spain's border surveillance system; and the 2008 European economic downturn.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "35.7% (male 776,035/female 770,132)" @@ -508,7 +505,7 @@ "text": "Muritaniyah" }, "etymology": { - "text": "named for the ancient kingdom of Mauretania (3rd century B.C. to 1st century A.D.) and the subsequent Roman province (1st-7th centuries A.D.), which existed further north in present-day Morocco; the name derives from the Mauri (Moors), the Berber-speaking peoples of northwest Africa" + "text": "named for the ancient kingdom of Mauretania (3rd century B.C. to 1st century A.D.); its name derives from the Mauri (Moors) of northwest Africa" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/africa/mz.json b/africa/mz.json index fdda1557..1528befe 100644 --- a/africa/mz.json +++ b/africa/mz.json @@ -114,13 +114,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "33,350,954" + "text": "33,350,954 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "16,449,734" }, "female": { - "text": "16,901,220 (2024 est.)" + "text": "16,901,220" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -140,9 +140,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Roman Catholic 27.2%, Muslim 18.9%, Zionist Christian 15.6%, Evangelical/Pentecostal 15.3%, Anglican 1.7%, other 4.8%, none 13.9%, unspecified 2.5% (2017 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Mozambique is a poor, sparsely populated country with high fertility and mortality rates and a rapidly growing youthful population – 45% of the population is younger than 15, as of 2020. Mozambique’s high poverty rate is sustained by natural disasters, disease, high population growth, low agricultural productivity, and the unequal distribution of wealth. The country’s birth rate is among the world’s highest, averaging around 5 children per woman (and higher in rural areas) for at least the last three decades. The sustained high level of fertility reflects gender inequality, low contraceptive use, early marriages and childbearing, and a lack of education, particularly among women. The high population growth rate is somewhat restrained by the country’s high HIV/AIDS and overall mortality rates. Mozambique ranks among the worst in the world for HIV/AIDS prevalence, HIV/AIDS deaths, and life expectancy at birth, as of 2022.
Mozambique is predominantly a country of emigration, but internal, rural-urban migration has begun to grow. Mozambicans, primarily from the country’s southern region, have been migrating to South Africa for work for more than a century. Additionally, approximately 1.7 million Mozambicans fled to Malawi, South Africa, and other neighboring countries between 1979 and 1992 to escape from civil war. Labor migrants have usually been men from rural areas whose crops have failed or who are unemployed and have headed to South Africa to work as miners; multiple generations of the same family often become miners. Since the abolition of apartheid in South Africa in 1991, other job opportunities have opened to Mozambicans, including in the informal and manufacturing sectors, but mining remains their main source of employment.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "44.7% (male 7,548,247/female 7,350,012)" @@ -495,7 +492,7 @@ "text": "Portuguese East Africa, People's Republic of Mozambique" }, "etymology": { - "text": "named for the offshore island of Mozambique; the island was apparently named after Mussa al-BIK, an influential Arab slave trader who set himself up as sultan on the island in the 15th century" + "text": "named for an offshore island; the island was named after Mussa bin BIQUE (or Mussa Ibn MALIK), an influential Arab slave trader who set himself up as sultan on the island in the 15th century" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/africa/ng.json b/africa/ng.json index 06d8c53f..91945257 100644 --- a/africa/ng.json +++ b/africa/ng.json @@ -112,13 +112,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "26,342,784" + "text": "26,342,784 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "13,056,203" }, "female": { - "text": "13,286,581 (2024 est.)" + "text": "13,286,581" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -139,9 +139,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Muslim 95.5%, ethnic religionist 4.1%, Christian 0.3%, agnostics and other 0.1% (2020 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Niger has the highest total fertility rate (TFR) of any country in the world, averaging close to 7 children per woman in 2022. A slight decline in fertility over the last few decades has stalled. This leveling off of the high fertility rate is in large part a product of the continued desire for large families. In Niger, the TFR is lower than the desired fertility rate, which makes it unlikely that contraceptive use will increase. The high TFR sustains rapid population growth and a large youth population – almost 70% of the populace is under the age of 25, as of 2020. Gender inequality, including a lack of educational opportunities for women and early marriage and childbirth, also contributes to high population growth.
Because of large family sizes, children are inheriting smaller and smaller parcels of land. The dependence of most Nigeriens on subsistence farming on increasingly small landholdings, coupled with declining rainfall and the resultant shrinkage of arable land, are all preventing food production from keeping up with population growth.
For more than half a century, Niger's lack of economic development has led to steady net outmigration. In the 1960s, Nigeriens mainly migrated to coastal West African countries to work on a seasonal basis. Some headed to Libya and Algeria in the 1970s to work in the booming oil industry until its decline in the 1980s. Since the 1990s, the principal destinations for Nigerien labor migrants have been West African countries, especially Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire, while emigration to Europe and North America has remained modest. During the same period, Niger’s desert trade route town Agadez became a hub for West African and other Sub-Saharan migrants crossing the Sahara to North Africa and sometimes onward to Europe.
More than 60,000 Malian refugees have fled to Niger since violence between Malian government troops and armed rebels began in early 2012. Ongoing attacks by the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency, dating to 2013 in northern Nigeria and February 2015 in southeastern Niger, pushed tens of thousands of Nigerian refugees and Nigerien returnees across the border to Niger and displaced thousands of locals in Niger’s already impoverished Diffa region.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "49.5% (male 6,567,460/female 6,463,877)" @@ -576,37 +573,7 @@ "note": "note: deposed president BAZOUM has been under house arrest since a military coup on 26 July 2023" }, "Legislative branch": { - "legislature name": { - "text": "National Assembly (Assemblée nationale)" - }, - "legislative structure": { - "text": "unicameral" - }, - "number of seats": { - "text": "171 (all directly elected)" - }, - "electoral system": { - "text": "mixed system" - }, - "scope of elections": { - "text": "full renewal" - }, - "term in office": { - "text": "5 years" - }, - "most recent election date": { - "text": "12/27/2020" - }, - "parties elected and seats per party": { - "text": "Niger Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS Tarayya) (80); Nigerien Democratic Movement for an African Federation (Moden Fa . Lumana Africa ) (19); Patriotic Movement for the Republic (MPR-JAMHURIYA) (13); National Movement for the Development of Society (MNSD) - Nassara (13); Other (41)" - }, - "percentage of women in chamber": { - "text": "30.7%" - }, - "expected date of next election": { - "text": "December 2025" - }, - "note": "Note: on 26 July 2023, the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland, a military junta which took control of Niger's government, dissolved the National Assembly; a commission recommended to the junta in February 2025 a minimum of a five-year transition to democratic rule" + "text": "Note: on 26 July 2023, the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland, a military junta which took control of Niger's government, dissolved the National Assembly; a commission recommended to the junta in February 2025 a minimum of a five-year transition to democratic rule" }, "Judicial branch": { "highest court(s)": { @@ -922,11 +889,11 @@ "note": "note: top five import commodities based on value in dollars" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": { - "text": "$1.314 billion (31 December 2017 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": { + "text": "$1.314 billion (2017 est.)" }, - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": { - "text": "$1.186 billion (31 December 2016 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": { + "text": "$1.186 billion (2016 est.)" } }, "Debt - external": { diff --git a/africa/ni.json b/africa/ni.json index 0485d538..302807c9 100644 --- a/africa/ni.json +++ b/africa/ni.json @@ -120,13 +120,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "236,747,130" + "text": "236,747,130 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "119,514,449" }, "female": { - "text": "117,232,681 (2024 est.)" + "text": "117,232,681" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -147,9 +147,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Muslim 53.5%, Roman Catholic 10.6%, other Christian 35.3%, other 0.6% (2018 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Nigeria’s population is projected to grow from more than 186 million people in 2016 to 392 million in 2050, becoming the world’s fourth most populous country. Nigeria’s sustained high population growth rate will continue for the foreseeable future because of population momentum and its high birth rate. Abuja has not successfully implemented family planning programs to reduce and space births because of a lack of political will, government financing, and the availability and affordability of services and products, as well as a cultural preference for large families. Increased educational attainment, especially among women, and improvements in health care are needed to encourage and to better enable parents to opt for smaller families.
Nigeria needs to harness the potential of its burgeoning youth population in order to boost economic development, reduce widespread poverty, and channel large numbers of unemployed youth into productive activities and away from ongoing religious and ethnic violence. While most movement of Nigerians is internal, significant emigration regionally and to the West provides an outlet for Nigerians looking for economic opportunities, seeking asylum, and increasingly pursuing higher education. Immigration largely of West Africans continues to be insufficient to offset emigration and the loss of highly skilled workers. Nigeria also is a major source, transit, and destination country for forced labor and sex trafficking.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "40.4% (male 48,856,606/female 46,770,810)" diff --git a/africa/od.json b/africa/od.json index 6a2db16d..5980567a 100644 --- a/africa/od.json +++ b/africa/od.json @@ -99,13 +99,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "12,703,714" + "text": "12,703,714 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "6,476,341" }, "female": { - "text": "6,227,373 (2024 est.)" + "text": "6,227,373" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -131,9 +131,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Christian 60.5%, folk religion 32.9%, Muslim 6.2%, other <1%, unaffiliated <1% (2020 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "South Sudan, independent from Sudan since July 2011 after decades of civil war, is one of the world’s poorest countries and ranks among the lowest in many socioeconomic categories. Problems are exacerbated by ongoing tensions with Sudan over oil revenues and land borders, fighting between government forces and rebel groups, and inter-communal violence. Most of the population lives off of farming, while smaller numbers rely on animal husbandry; abput 80% of the populace lives in rural areas. The maternal mortality rate is among the world’s highest for a variety of reasons, including a shortage of health care workers, facilities, and supplies; poor roads and a lack of transport; and cultural beliefs that prevent women from seeking obstetric care. Most women marry and start having children early, giving birth at home with the assistance of traditional birth attendants, who are unable to handle complications.
Educational attainment is extremely poor due to the lack of schools, qualified teachers, and materials. Only one-third of the population is literate (the rate is even lower among women), and half live below the poverty line. Teachers and students are also struggling with the switch from Arabic to English as the language of instruction. Many adults missed out on schooling because of warfare and displacement.
More than 2 million South Sudanese have sought refuge in neighboring countries since the current conflict began in December 2013. Another 2.2 million South Sudanese are internally displaced as of October 2022. Despite South Sudan’s instability and lack of infrastructure and social services, more than 275,000 people had fled to South Sudan to escape fighting in Sudan as of December 2022.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "42.1% (male 2,725,520/female 2,619,035)" diff --git a/africa/pu.json b/africa/pu.json index 548c79bc..6bd82dd2 100644 --- a/africa/pu.json +++ b/africa/pu.json @@ -106,13 +106,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "2,132,325" + "text": "2,132,325 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "1,042,910" }, "female": { - "text": "1,089,415 (2024 est.)" + "text": "1,089,415" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -132,9 +132,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Muslim 46.1%, folk religions 30.6%, Christian 18.9%, other or unaffiliated 4.4% (2020 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Guinea-Bissau’s young and growing population is sustained by high fertility; approximately 60% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020. Its large reproductive-age population and total fertility rate of more than 4 children per woman offsets the country’s high infant and maternal mortality rates. The latter is among the world’s highest because of the prevalence of early childbearing, a lack of birth spacing, the high percentage of births outside of health care facilities, and a shortage of medicines and supplies.
Guinea-Bissau’s history of political instability, a civil war, and several coups (the latest in 2012) have resulted in a fragile state with a weak economy, high unemployment, rampant corruption, widespread poverty, and thriving drug and child trafficking. With the country lacking educational infrastructure, school funding and materials, and qualified teachers, and with the cultural emphasis placed on religious education, parents frequently send boys to study in residential Koranic schools (daaras) in Senegal and The Gambia. They often are extremely deprived and are forced into street begging or agricultural work by marabouts (Muslim religious teachers), who enrich themselves at the expense of the children. Boys who leave their marabouts often end up on the streets of Dakar or other large Senegalese towns and are vulnerable to even worse abuse.
Some young men lacking in education and job prospects become involved in the flourishing international drug trade. Local drug use and associated violent crime are growing.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "42.3% (male 453,513/female 448,514)" @@ -860,11 +857,11 @@ "note": "note: top five import commodities based on value in dollars" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": { - "text": "$356.4 million (31 December 2017 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": { + "text": "$356.4 million (2017 est.)" }, - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": { - "text": "$349.4 million (31 December 2016 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": { + "text": "$349.4 million (2016 est.)" } }, "Debt - external": { diff --git a/africa/rw.json b/africa/rw.json index 6b2cdd81..8375ade4 100644 --- a/africa/rw.json +++ b/africa/rw.json @@ -109,13 +109,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "13,623,302" + "text": "13,623,302 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "6,684,655" }, "female": { - "text": "6,938,647 (2024 est.)" + "text": "6,938,647" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -140,9 +140,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Christian 95.9% (Protestant 57.7% [includes Adventist 12.6%], Roman Catholic 38.2%), Muslim 2.1%, other 1% (includes traditional, Jehovah's Witness), none 1.1% (2019-20 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Rwanda’s fertility rate declined sharply during the last decade, as a result of the government’s commitment to family planning, the increased use of contraceptives, and a downward trend in ideal family size. Increases in educational attainment, particularly among girls, and exposure to social media also contributed to the reduction in the birth rate. The average number of births per woman decreased from a 5.6 in 2005 to 4.5 in 2016 and 3.3 in 2022. Despite these significant strides in reducing fertility, Rwanda’s birth rate remains very high and will continue to for an extended period of time because of its large population entering reproductive age. Because Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, its persistent high population growth and increasingly small agricultural landholdings will put additional strain on families’ ability to raise foodstuffs and access potable water. These conditions will also hinder the government’s efforts to reduce poverty and prevent environmental degradation.
The UNHCR recommended that effective 30 June 2013 countries invoke a cessation of refugee status for those Rwandans who fled their homeland between 1959 and 1998, including the 1994 genocide, on the grounds that the conditions that drove them to seek protection abroad no longer exist. The UNHCR’s decision is controversial because many Rwandan refugees still fear persecution if they return home, concerns that are supported by the number of Rwandans granted asylum since 1998 and by the number exempted from the cessation. Rwandan refugees can still seek an exemption or local integration, but host countries are anxious to send the refugees back to Rwanda and are likely to avoid options that enable them to stay. Conversely, Rwanda itself hosts approximately 125,000 refugees as of 2022; virtually all of them fleeing conflict in neighboring Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "37.2% (male 2,561,884/female 2,508,218)" diff --git a/africa/se.json b/africa/se.json index dfa706b0..42963414 100644 --- a/africa/se.json +++ b/africa/se.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "2.5 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "2.5 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -103,13 +103,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "98,187" + "text": "98,187 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "50,973" }, "female": { - "text": "47,214 (2024 est.)" + "text": "47,214" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -129,9 +129,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Roman Catholic 76.2%, Protestant 10.5% (Anglican 6.1%, Pentecostal Assembly 1.5%, Seventh Day Adventist 1.2%, other Protestant 1.7%), other Christian 2.4%, Hindu 2.4%, Muslim 1.6%, other non-Christian 1.1%, unspecified 4.8%, none 0.9% (2010 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Seychelles has no indigenous population and was first permanently settled by a small group of French planters, African slaves, and South Indians in 1770. Seychelles’ modern population is composed of the descendants of French and later British settlers, Africans, and Indian, Chinese, and Middle Eastern traders and is concentrated on three of its 155 islands – the vast majority on Mahe and lesser numbers on Praslin and La Digue. Seychelles’ population grew rapidly during the second half of the 20th century, largely due to natural increase, but the pace has slowed because of fertility decline. The total fertility rate dropped sharply from 4.0 children per woman in 1980 to 1.9 in 2015, mainly as a result of a family planning program, free education and health care, and increased female labor force participation. Life expectancy has increased steadily, but women on average live 9 years longer than men, a difference that is higher than that typical of developed countries.
The combination of reduced fertility and increased longevity has resulted in an aging population, which will put pressure on the government’s provision of pensions and health care. Seychelles’ sustained investment in social welfare services, such as free primary health care and education up to the post-secondary level, have enabled the country to achieve a high human development index score – among the highest in Africa. Despite some of its health and education indicators being nearly on par with Western countries, Seychelles has a high level of income inequality.
An increasing number of migrant workers – mainly young men – have been coming to Seychelles in recent years to work in the construction and tourism industries. As of 2011, foreign workers made up nearly a quarter of the workforce. Indians are the largest non-Seychellois population – representing half of the country’s foreigners – followed by Malagasy.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "17.7% (male 8,912/female 8,439)" diff --git a/africa/sf.json b/africa/sf.json index ba0c9439..77051bbf 100644 --- a/africa/sf.json +++ b/africa/sf.json @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ "text": "Ntheledi (Mafadi) 3,450 m" }, "lowest point": { - "text": "Atlantic Ocean 0 m" + "text": "Atlantic/Indian Oceans 0 m" }, "mean elevation": { "text": "1,034 m" @@ -120,13 +120,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "60,442,647" + "text": "60,442,647 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "29,664,388" }, "female": { - "text": "30,778,259 (2024 est.)" + "text": "30,778,259" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -153,9 +153,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Christian 86%, ancestral, tribal, animist, or other traditional African religions 5.4%, Muslim 1.9%, other 1.5%, nothing in particular 5.2% (2015 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "South Africa’s youthful population is gradually aging, as the country’s total fertility rate (TFR) has declined dramatically from about 6 children per woman in the 1960s to roughly 2.2 in 2014, and has remained at this level as of 2022. This pattern is similar to fertility trends in South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, and sets South Africa apart from the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, where the average TFR remains higher than other regions of the world. Today, South Africa’s decreasing number of reproductive age women is having fewer children, as women increase their educational attainment, workforce participation, and use of family planning methods; delay marriage; and opt for smaller families.
As the proportion of working-age South Africans has grown relative to children and the elderly, South Africa has been unable to achieve a demographic dividend because persistent high unemployment and the prevalence of HIV/AIDs have created a larger-than-normal dependent population. HIV/AIDS was also responsible for South Africa’s average life expectancy plunging to less than 43 years in 2008; it has rebounded to 65 years as of 2022. HIV/AIDS continues to be a serious public health threat, although awareness-raising campaigns and the wider availability of anti-retroviral drugs is stabilizing the number of new cases, enabling infected individuals to live longer, healthier lives, and reducing mother-child transmissions.
Migration to South Africa began in the second half of the 17th century when traders from the Dutch East India Company settled in the Cape and started using slaves from South and southeast Asia (mainly from India but also from present-day Indonesia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia) and southeast Africa (Madagascar and Mozambique) as farm laborers and, to a lesser extent, as domestic servants. The Indian subcontinent remained the Cape Colony’s main source of slaves in the early 18th century, while slaves were increasingly obtained from southeast Africa in the latter part of the 18th century and into the 19th century under British rule.
After slavery was completely abolished in the British Empire in 1838, South Africa’s colonists turned to temporary African migrants and indentured labor through agreements with India and later China, countries that were anxious to export workers to alleviate domestic poverty and overpopulation. Of the more than 150,000 indentured Indian laborers hired to work in Natal’s sugar plantations between 1860 and 1911, most exercised the right as British subjects to remain permanently (a small number of Indian immigrants came freely as merchants). Because of growing resentment toward Indian workers, the 63,000 indentured Chinese workers who mined gold in Transvaal between 1904 and 1911 were under more restrictive contracts and generally were forced to return to their homeland.
In the late 19th century and nearly the entire 20th century, South Africa’s then British colonies’ and Dutch states’ enforced selective immigration policies that welcomed \"assimilable\" white Europeans as permanent residents but excluded or restricted other immigrants. Following the Union of South Africa’s passage of a law in 1913 prohibiting Asian and other non-white immigrants and its elimination of the indenture system in 1917, temporary African contract laborers from neighboring countries became the dominant source of labor in the burgeoning mining industries. Others worked in agriculture and smaller numbers in manufacturing, domestic service, transportation, and construction. Throughout the 20th century, at least 40% of South Africa’s miners were foreigners; the numbers peaked at over 80% in the late 1960s. Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana, and Eswatini were the primary sources of miners, and Malawi and Zimbabwe were periodic suppliers.
Under apartheid, a \"two gates\" migration policy focused on policing and deporting illegal migrants rather than on managing migration to meet South Africa’s development needs. The exclusionary 1991 Aliens Control Act limited labor recruitment to the highly skilled as defined by the ruling white minority, while bilateral labor agreements provided exemptions that enabled the influential mining industry and, to a lesser extent, commercial farms, to hire temporary, low-paid workers from neighboring states. Illegal African migrants were often tacitly allowed to work for low pay in other sectors but were always under threat of deportation.
The abolishment of apartheid in 1994 led to the development of a new inclusive national identity and the strengthening of the country’s restrictive immigration policy. Despite South Africa’s protectionist approach to immigration, the downsizing and closing of mines, and rising unemployment, migrants from across the continent believed that the country held work opportunities. Fewer African labor migrants were issued temporary work permits and, instead, increasingly entered South Africa with visitors’ permits or came illegally, which drove growth in cross-border trade and the informal job market. A new wave of Asian immigrants has also arrived over the last two decades, many operating small retail businesses.
In the post-apartheid period, increasing numbers of highly skilled white workers emigrated, citing dissatisfaction with the political situation, crime, poor services, and a reduced quality of life. The 2002 Immigration Act and later amendments were intended to facilitate the temporary migration of skilled foreign labor to fill labor shortages, but instead the legislation continues to create regulatory obstacles. Although the education system has improved and brain drain has slowed in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, South Africa continues to face skills shortages in several key sectors, such as health care and technology.
South Africa’s stability and economic growth has acted as a magnet for refugees and asylum seekers from nearby countries, despite the prevalence of discrimination and xenophobic violence. Refugees have included an estimated 350,000 Mozambicans during its 1980s civil war and, more recently, several thousand Somalis, Congolese, and Ethiopians. Nearly all of the tens of thousands of Zimbabweans who have applied for asylum in South Africa have been categorized as economic migrants and denied refuge.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "27.2% (male 8,227,690/female 8,194,392)" diff --git a/africa/sg.json b/africa/sg.json index 99b6715e..b24d3c84 100644 --- a/africa/sg.json +++ b/africa/sg.json @@ -118,13 +118,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "18,847,519" + "text": "18,847,519 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "9,283,314" }, "female": { - "text": "9,564,205 (2024 est.)" + "text": "9,564,205" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -144,9 +144,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Muslim 97.2% (most adhere to one of the four main Sufi brotherhoods), Christian 2.7% (mostly Roman Catholic) (2019 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Senegal has a large and growing youth population but has not been successful in developing its potential human capital. Senegal’s high total fertility rate of almost 4.5 children per woman continues to bolster the country’s large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25. Fertility remains high because of the continued desire for large families, the low use of family planning, and early childbearing. Because of the country’s high illiteracy rate (more than 40%), high unemployment (even among university graduates), and widespread poverty, Senegalese youths face dim prospects; women are especially disadvantaged.
Senegal historically was a destination country for economic migrants, but in recent years West African migrants more often use Senegal as a transit point to North Africa – and sometimes illegally onward to Europe. The country also has been host to several thousand black Mauritanian refugees since they were expelled from their homeland during its 1989 border conflict with Senegal. The country’s economic crisis in the 1970s stimulated emigration; departures accelerated in the 1990s. Destinations shifted from neighboring countries, which were experiencing economic decline, civil wars, and increasing xenophobia, to Libya and Mauritania because of their booming oil industries and to developed countries (most notably former colonial ruler France, as well as Italy and Spain). The latter became attractive in the 1990s because of job opportunities and their periodic regularization programs (legalizing the status of illegal migrants).
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "40.7% (male 3,907,986/female 3,760,594)" @@ -922,11 +919,11 @@ "note": "note: top five import commodities based on value in dollars" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": { - "text": "$1.827 billion (31 December 2017 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": { + "text": "$1.827 billion (2017 est.)" }, - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": { - "text": "$116.9 million (31 December 2016 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": { + "text": "$116.9 million (2016 est.)" } }, "Debt - external": { diff --git a/africa/sh.json b/africa/sh.json index dd233345..3d53960c 100644 --- a/africa/sh.json +++ b/africa/sh.json @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ "note": "88 sq km Ascension Island, 184 sq km Tristan da Cunha island group (includes Tristan (98 sq km), Inaccessible, Nightingale, and Gough islands)" }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "slightly more than twice the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "slightly more than twice the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -98,13 +98,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "7,943" + "text": "7,943 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "3,978" }, "female": { - "text": "3,965 (2024 est.)" + "text": "3,965" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -127,9 +127,6 @@ "text": "Protestant 69.4% (includes Anglican 63.2%, Baptist 2.3%, Salvation Army 2%, Seventh Day Adventist 1.9%), Jehovah's Witness 3.8%, Roman Catholic 2.2%, New Apostolic 1.6%, other Christian 1.4%, other 1.1%, none 9%, unspecified 11.4% (2021 est.)", "note": "note: data represent Saint Helena only" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "
The vast majority of the population of Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha live on Saint Helena. Ascension has no indigenous or permanent residents and is inhabited only by persons contracted to work on the island (mainly with the UK and US military or in the space and communications industries) or their dependents, while Tristan da Cunha – the main island in a small archipelago – has fewer than 300 residents. The population of Saint Helena consists of the descendants of 17th century British sailors and settlers from the East India Company, African slaves, and indentured servants and laborers from India, Indonesia, and China. Most of the population of Ascension are Saint Helenians, Britons, and Americans, while that of Tristan da Cunha descends from shipwrecked sailors and Saint Helenians.
Change in Saint Helena’s population size is driven by net outward migration. Since the 1980s, Saint Helena’s population steadily has shrunk and aged as the birth rate has decreased and many working-age residents left for better opportunities elsewhere. The restoration of British citizenship in 2002 accelerated family emigration; from 1998 to 2008 alone, population declined by about 20%.
In the 2010s, the population experienced some temporary growth, as foreigners and returning Saint Helenians, came to build an international airport, but numbers faded as the project reached completion and workers departed. With the airport fully operational, increased access to the remote island has the potential to boost tourism and fishing, provide more jobs for Saint Helenians domestically, and could encourage some ex-patriots to return home. In the meantime, however, Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha have to contend with the needs of an aging population. The elderly population of the islands has risen from an estimated 9.4% in 1998 to 18% in 2022.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "14.3% (male 579/female 556)" diff --git a/africa/sl.json b/africa/sl.json index ccd38e77..4fbe8d39 100644 --- a/africa/sl.json +++ b/africa/sl.json @@ -112,13 +112,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "9,121,049" + "text": "9,121,049 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "4,515,726" }, "female": { - "text": "4,605,323 (2024 est.)" + "text": "4,605,323" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -138,9 +138,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Muslim 77.1%, Christian 22.9% (2019 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Sierra Leone’s youthful and growing population is driven by its high total fertility rate (TFR) of almost 4 children per woman as of 2022, which has declined little over the last two decades. Its elevated TFR is sustained by the continued desire for large families, the low level of contraceptive use, and the early start of childbearing. Despite its high TFR, Sierra Leone’s population growth is somewhat tempered by high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates that are among the world’s highest and are a result of poverty, a lack of potable water and sanitation, poor nutrition, limited access to quality health care services, and the prevalence of female genital cutting.
Sierra Leone’s large youth cohort – about 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – continues to struggle with high levels of unemployment, which was one of the major causes of the country’s 1991-2002 civil war and remains a threat to stability today. Its estimated 60% youth unemployment rate is attributed to high levels of illiteracy and unskilled labor, a lack of private sector jobs, and low pay.
Sierra Leone has been a source of and destination for refugees. Sierra Leone’s civil war internally displaced as many as 2 million people, or almost half the population, and forced almost another half million to seek refuge in neighboring countries (370,000 Sierra Leoneans fled to Guinea and 120,000 to Liberia). The UNHCR has helped almost 180,000 Sierra Leoneans to return home, while more than 90,000 others have repatriated on their own. Of the more than 65,000 Liberians who took refuge in Sierra Leone during their country’s civil war (1989-2003), about 50,000 have been voluntarily repatriated by the UNHCR and others have returned home independently.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "40.1% (male 1,843,606/female 1,812,304)" diff --git a/africa/so.json b/africa/so.json index ed7617b8..c9d91d5d 100644 --- a/africa/so.json +++ b/africa/so.json @@ -106,13 +106,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "13,017,273" + "text": "13,017,273 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "6,546,312" }, "female": { - "text": "6,470,961 (2024 est.)" + "text": "6,470,961" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -137,9 +137,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Muslim 99.9% (Sunni Muslim 98.1%, Shia Muslim 1.2%, Islamic schismatic 0.6%), ethnic religionist 0.1% (2020 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Somalia scores very low for most humanitarian indicators, suffering from poor governance, protracted internal conflict, underdevelopment, economic decline, poverty, social and gender inequality, and environmental degradation. Despite civil war and famine raising its mortality rate, Somalia’s high fertility rate and large proportion of people of reproductive age maintain rapid population growth, with each generation being larger than the prior one. More than 60% of Somalia’s population is younger than 25 as of 2020, and the fertility rate is among the world’s highest at almost 5.5 children per woman – a rate that has decreased little since the 1970s.
A lack of educational and job opportunities is a major source of tension for Somalia’s large youth cohort, making them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist and pirate groups. Somalia has one of the world’s lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school – and one of the world’s highest youth unemployment rates. Life expectancy is low as a result of high infant and maternal mortality rates, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition, and inadequate health services.
During the two decades of conflict that followed the fall of the SIAD regime in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes. Today Somalia is the world’s fourth highest source country for refugees, after Ukraine, Syria and Afghanistan. Insecurity, drought, floods, food shortages, and a lack of economic opportunities are the driving factors.
As of 2022, more than 660,000 Somali refugees were hosted in the region, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, while nearly 3 million Somalis were internally displaced. Since the implementation of a tripartite voluntary repatriation agreement among Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR in 2013, many Somali refugees have returned home, some 80,000 between 2014 and 2022. The Kenyan Government in March 2021 ordered the closure of its two largest refugee camps, Dadaab and Kakuma, which then hosted more than 410,000 mainly Somali refugees. However, the UN refugee agency presented a road map, including voluntary repatriation, relocation to third countries, and alternative stay options that persuaded the Kenyan Government to delay the closures. The plan was supposed to lead to both camps being closed by 30 June 2022. Yet, as of May 2022, few Somali refugees had decided to return home because of security concerns and the lack of job prospects, instead waiting in the camps unsure of what the future held for them. Other Somali asylum seekers brave the dangers of crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen – despite its internal conflict – with aspirations to move onward to Saudi Arabia and other locations.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "41.4% (male 2,689,086/female 2,694,372)" diff --git a/africa/su.json b/africa/su.json index 4ca75744..a6dcc010 100644 --- a/africa/su.json +++ b/africa/su.json @@ -116,13 +116,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "50,467,278" + "text": "50,467,278 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "25,335,092" }, "female": { - "text": "25,132,186 (2024 est.)" + "text": "25,132,186" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -147,9 +147,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Sunni Muslim, small Christian minority" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Sudan’s population grew almost fourfold between 1956 and 2008, the date of its last census. Even after the southern part of the country became independent South Sudan in 2011, the population of Sudan has continued to grow. The gender balance overall is fairly even. Females, however, are more prevalent in rural areas because of males migrating to urban areas in search of work. The total fertility rate (TFR) remains high despite falling from 7 children per woman in Sudan’s first census in 1955 to about 4.5 in 2022, which can be attributed to early marriage and a low contraceptive prevalence rate. Among the factors that led to the reduction in fertility are family planning, improvement in women’s education and participation in the labor force outside the home, and migration and urbanization.
The continued slow decline in fertility accompanied by a drop in mortality and increased life expectancy has produced an age structure where approximately 55% of the population was of working age (15-64) as of 2020. This share will grow as the sizable youth population becomes working age. As Sudan’s working age population increasingly outnumbers the youth and elderly populations (the dependent populations), the country will approach the possibility of a demographic dividend. The window of opportunity for potential economic growth depends not only on a favorable age structure but also on having a trained and educated workforce, job creation (particularly in the formal market), and investment in health, as well as generating savings to invest in schooling and care for the elderly. As of 2018, Sudan’s literacy rate was just over 60%, and even lower among women. Improvements in school enrollment, student-teacher ratio, infrastructure, funding, and educational quality could help the country to realize a demographic dividend.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "40.1% (male 10,278,453/female 9,949,343)" diff --git a/africa/to.json b/africa/to.json index 0d71d76b..b0a7cc71 100644 --- a/africa/to.json +++ b/africa/to.json @@ -106,13 +106,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "8,917,994" + "text": "8,917,994 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "4,395,271" }, "female": { - "text": "4,522,723 (2024 est.)" + "text": "4,522,723" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -133,9 +133,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Christian 42.3%, folk religion 36.9%, Muslim 14%, Hindu <1%, Buddhist <1%, Jewish <1%, other <1%, none 6.2% (2020 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Togo’s population is estimated to have grown to four times its size between 1960 and 2010. With nearly 60% of its populace under the age of 25 and a high annual growth rate attributed largely to high fertility, Togo’s population is likely to continue to expand for the foreseeable future. Reducing fertility, boosting job creation, and improving education will be essential to reducing the country’s high poverty rate. In 2008, Togo eliminated primary school enrollment fees, leading to higher enrollment but increased pressure on limited classroom space, teachers, and materials. Togo has a good chance of achieving universal primary education, but educational quality, the underrepresentation of girls, and the low rate of enrollment in secondary and tertiary schools remain concerns.
Togo is both a country of emigration and asylum. In the early 1990s, southern Togo suffered from the economic decline of the phosphate sector and ethnic and political repression at the hands of dictator Gnassingbe EYADEMA and his northern, Kabye-dominated administration. The turmoil led 300,000 to 350,000 predominantly southern Togolese to flee to Benin and Ghana, with most not returning home until relative stability was restored in 1997. In 2005, another outflow of 40,000 Togolese to Benin and Ghana occurred when violence broke out between the opposition and security forces over the disputed election of EYADEMA’s son Faure GNASSINGBE to the presidency. About half of the refugees reluctantly returned home in 2006, many still fearing for their safety. Despite ethnic tensions and periods of political unrest, Togo in December 2022 was home to almost 8,400 refugees from Ghana.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "38.7% (male 1,749,533/female 1,699,084)" @@ -620,6 +617,9 @@ "parties elected and seats per party": { "text": "Union for the Republic (UNIR) (34); Independents (3); Other (4)" }, + "percentage of women in chamber": { + "text": "24.6%" + }, "expected date of next election": { "text": "February 2031" } @@ -942,11 +942,11 @@ "note": "note: top five import commodities based on value in dollars" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": { - "text": "$77.8 million (31 December 2017 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": { + "text": "$77.8 million (2017 est.)" }, - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": { - "text": "$42.6 million (31 December 2016 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": { + "text": "$42.6 million (2016 est.)" } }, "Debt - external": { diff --git a/africa/tp.json b/africa/tp.json index 7f8eb103..78d3ddc4 100644 --- a/africa/tp.json +++ b/africa/tp.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "more than five times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "more than five times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -98,13 +98,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "223,561" + "text": "223,561 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "111,553" }, "female": { - "text": "112,008 (2024 est.)" + "text": "112,008" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -125,9 +125,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Catholic 55.7%, Adventist 4.1%, Assembly of God 3.4%, New Apostolic 2.9%, Mana 2.3%, Universal Kingdom of God 2%, Jehovah's Witness 1.2%, other 6.2%, none 21.2%, unspecified 1% (2012 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Sao Tome and Principe’s youthful age structure – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020 – and high fertility rate ensure future population growth. Although Sao Tome has a net negative international migration rate, emigration is not a sufficient safety valve to reduce already high levels of unemployment and poverty. While literacy and primary school attendance have improved in recent years, Sao Tome still struggles to improve its educational quality and to increase its secondary school completion rate. Despite some improvements in education and access to healthcare, Sao Tome and Principe has much to do to decrease its high poverty rate, create jobs, and increase its economic growth.
The population of Sao Tome and Principe descends primarily from the islands’ colonial Portuguese settlers, who first arrived in the late 15th century, and the much larger number of African slaves brought in for sugar production and the slave trade. For about 100 years after the abolition of slavery in 1876, the population was further shaped by the widespread use of imported unskilled contract laborers from Portugal’s other African colonies, who worked on coffee and cocoa plantations. In the first decades after abolition, most workers were brought from Angola under a system similar to slavery. While Angolan laborers were technically free, they were forced or coerced into long contracts that were automatically renewed and extended to their children. Other contract workers from Mozambique and famine-stricken Cape Verde first arrived in the early 20th century under short-term contracts and had the option of repatriation, although some chose to remain in Sao Tome and Principe.
Today’s Sao Tomean population consists of mesticos (creole descendants of the European immigrants and African slaves that first inhabited the islands), forros (descendants of freed African slaves), angolares (descendants of runaway African slaves that formed a community in the south of Sao Tome Island and today are fishermen), servicais (contract laborers from Angola, Mozambique, and Cape Verde), tongas (locally born children of contract laborers), and lesser numbers of Europeans and Asians.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "36.4% (male 41,337/female 40,106)" diff --git a/africa/ts.json b/africa/ts.json index b200cb75..dc8461a2 100644 --- a/africa/ts.json +++ b/africa/ts.json @@ -109,13 +109,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "12,048,847" + "text": "12,048,847 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "5,972,242" }, "female": { - "text": "6,076,605 (2024 est.)" + "text": "6,076,605" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -141,9 +141,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Muslim (official; Sunni) 99%, other (includes Christian, Jewish, Shia Muslim, and Baha'i) <1%" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "The Tunisian Government took steps in the 1960s to decrease population growth and gender inequality in order to improve socioeconomic development. Through its introduction of a national family planning program (the first in Africa) and by raising the legal age of marriage, Tunisia rapidly reduced its total fertility rate from about 7 children per woman in 1960 to 2 in 2022. Unlike many of its North African and Middle Eastern neighbors, Tunisia will soon be shifting from being a youth-bulge country to having a transitional age structure, characterized by lower fertility and mortality rates, a slower population growth rate, a rising median age, and a longer average life expectancy.
Currently, the sizable young working-age population is straining Tunisia’s labor market and education and health care systems. Persistent high unemployment among Tunisia’s growing workforce, particularly its increasing number of university graduates and women, was a key factor in the uprisings that led to the overthrow of the BEN ALI regime in 2011. In the near term, Tunisia’s large number of jobless young, working-age adults; deficiencies in primary and secondary education; and the ongoing lack of job creation and skills mismatches could contribute to future unrest. In the longer term, a sustained low fertility rate will shrink future youth cohorts and alleviate demographic pressure on Tunisia’s labor market, but employment and education hurdles will still need to be addressed.
Tunisia has a history of labor emigration. In the 1960s, workers migrated to European countries to escape poor economic conditions and to fill Europe’s need for low-skilled labor in construction and manufacturing. The Tunisian Government signed bilateral labor agreements with France, Germany, Belgium, Hungary, and the Netherlands, with the expectation that Tunisian workers would eventually return home. At the same time, growing numbers of Tunisians headed to Libya, often illegally, to work in the expanding oil industry. In the mid-1970s, with European countries beginning to restrict immigration and Tunisian-Libyan tensions brewing, Tunisian economic migrants turned toward the Gulf countries. After mass expulsions from Libya in 1983, Tunisian migrants increasingly sought family reunification in Europe or moved illegally to southern Europe, while Tunisia itself developed into a transit point for Sub-Saharan migrants heading to Europe.
Following the ousting of BEN ALI in 2011, the illegal migration of unemployed Tunisian youths to Italy and onward to France soared into the tens of thousands. Thousands more Tunisian and foreign workers escaping civil war in Libya flooded into Tunisia and joined the exodus. A readmission agreement signed by Italy and Tunisia in April 2011 helped stem the outflow, leaving Tunisia and international organizations to repatriate, resettle, or accommodate some 1 million Libyans and third-country nationals.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "24.4% (male 1,516,871/female 1,426,522)" diff --git a/africa/tz.json b/africa/tz.json index eda737f0..7d0968ef 100644 --- a/africa/tz.json +++ b/africa/tz.json @@ -118,13 +118,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "67,462,121" + "text": "67,462,121 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "33,691,904" }, "female": { - "text": "33,770,217 (2024 est.)" + "text": "33,770,217" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -150,9 +150,6 @@ "text": "Christian 63.1%, Muslim 34.1%, folk religion 1.1%, Buddhist <1%, Hindu <1%, Jewish <1%, other <1%, unspecified 1.6% (2020 est.)", "note": "note: Zanzibar is almost entirely Muslim" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Tanzania has the largest population in East Africa and the lowest population density; more than a third of the population is urban. Tanzania’s youthful population – over 60% of the population is under 25 as of 2020 – is growing rapidly because of the high total fertility rate of 4.4 children per woman, as of 2022. Progress in reducing the birth rate has stalled, sustaining the country’s nearly 3% annual growth rate. The maternal mortality rate has improved since 2000, yet it remains very high because of early and frequent pregnancies, inadequate maternal health services, and a lack of skilled birth attendants – problems that are worse among poor and rural women. Tanzania has made strides in reducing under-5 and infant mortality rates, but a recent drop in immunization threatens to undermine gains in child health. Malaria is a leading killer of children under 5, while HIV is the main source of adult mortality.
For Tanzania, most migration is internal, rural to urban movement, while some temporary labor migration from towns to plantations takes place seasonally for harvests. Tanzania was Africa’s largest refugee-hosting country for decades, hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Great Lakes region, primarily Burundi, over the last fifty years. However, the assisted repatriation and naturalization of tens of thousands of Burundian refugees between 2002 and 2014 dramatically reduced the refugee population. Tanzania is increasingly a transit country for illegal migrants from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region who are heading to southern Africa for security reasons and/or economic opportunities. Some of these migrants choose to settle in Tanzania.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "41.2% (male 14,039,292/female 13,740,439)" diff --git a/africa/ug.json b/africa/ug.json index 0f15f600..e7719203 100644 --- a/africa/ug.json +++ b/africa/ug.json @@ -106,13 +106,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "49,283,041" + "text": "49,283,041 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "24,040,560" }, "female": { - "text": "25,242,481 (2024 est.)" + "text": "25,242,481" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -132,9 +132,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Protestant 45.1% (Anglican 32.0%, Pentecostal/Born Again/Evangelical 11.1%, Seventh Day Adventist 1.7%, Baptist .3%), Roman Catholic 39.3%, Muslim 13.7%, other 1.6%, none 0.2% (2014 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Uganda has one of the youngest and most rapidly growing populations in the world; its total fertility rate is among the world’s highest at close to 5.5 children per woman in 2022. Except in urban areas, actual fertility exceeds women’s desired fertility by one or two children, which is indicative of the widespread unmet need for contraception, lack of government support for family planning, and a cultural preference for large families. High numbers of births, short birth intervals, and the early age of childbearing contribute to Uganda’s high maternal mortality rate. Gender inequities also make fertility reduction difficult; women on average are less-educated, participate less in paid employment, and often have little say in decisions over childbearing and their own reproductive health. However, even if the birth rate were significantly reduced, Uganda’s large pool of women entering reproductive age ensures rapid population growth for decades to come.
Unchecked, population increase will further strain the availability of arable land and natural resources and overwhelm the country’s limited means for providing food, employment, education, health care, housing, and basic services. The country’s north and northeast lag even further behind developmentally than the rest of the country as a result of long-term conflict (the Ugandan Bush War 1981-1986 and more than 20 years of fighting between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and Ugandan Government forces), ongoing inter-communal violence, and periodic natural disasters.
Uganda has been both a source of refugees and migrants and a host country for refugees. In 1972, then President Idi AMIN, in his drive to return Uganda to Ugandans, expelled the South Asian population that composed a large share of the country’s business people and bankers. Since the 1970s, thousands of Ugandans have emigrated, mainly to southern Africa or the West, for security reasons, to escape poverty, to search for jobs, and for access to natural resources. The emigration of Ugandan doctors and nurses due to low wages is a particular concern given the country’s shortage of skilled health care workers. Africans escaping conflicts in neighboring states have found refuge in Uganda since the 1950s; the country currently struggles to host tens of thousands from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and other nearby countries.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "47% (male 11,747,745/female 11,427,932)" diff --git a/africa/uv.json b/africa/uv.json index c9fb4225..30517ddc 100644 --- a/africa/uv.json +++ b/africa/uv.json @@ -104,13 +104,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "23,042,199" + "text": "23,042,199 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "11,297,749" }, "female": { - "text": "11,744,450 (2024 est.)" + "text": "11,744,450" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -130,9 +130,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Muslim 63.8%, Roman Catholic 20.1%, Animiste 9%, Protestant 6.2%, other 0.2%, none 0.7% (2019 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Burkina Faso has a young age structure – the result of declining mortality combined with steady high fertility – and continues to experience rapid population growth, which is putting increasing pressure on the country’s limited arable land. Almost 65% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020, and the population is growing at 2.5% annually. Mortality rates, especially those of infants and children, have decreased because of improved health care, hygiene, and sanitation, but women continue to have an average of more than 4 children. Even if fertility were substantially reduced, today’s large cohort entering their reproductive years would sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future. Only about a third of the population is literate and unemployment is widespread, dampening the economic prospects of Burkina Faso’s large working-age population.
Migration has traditionally been a way of life for Burkinabe, with seasonal migration being replaced by stints of up to two years abroad. Cote d’Ivoire remains the top destination, although it has experienced periods of internal conflict. Under French colonization, Burkina Faso became a main labor source for agricultural and factory work in Cote d’Ivoire. Burkinabe also migrated to Ghana, Mali, and Senegal for work between the world wars. Burkina Faso attracts migrants from Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Mali, who often share common ethnic backgrounds with the Burkinabe. Despite its food shortages and high poverty rate, Burkina Faso has become a destination for refugees in recent years and hosts about 33,600 Malian refugees as of October 2022.
(2018)" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "41.6% (male 4,868,488/female 4,727,316)" @@ -901,11 +898,11 @@ "note": "note: top five import commodities based on value in dollars" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": { - "text": "$49 million (31 December 2017 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": { + "text": "$49 million (2017 est.)" }, - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": { - "text": "$50.9 million (31 December 2016 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": { + "text": "$50.9 million (2016 est.)" } }, "Debt - external": { @@ -1097,8 +1094,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Armed Forces of Burkina Faso (FABF; aka National Armed Forces (FAN), aka Defense and Security Forces (Forces de Défense et de Sécurité or FDS)): Army of Burkina Faso (L’Armee de Terre, LAT), Air Force of Burkina Faso (Force Aerienne de Burkina Faso), National Gendarmerie, National Fire Brigade (Brigade Nationale de Sapeurs-Pompiers or BNSP); Homeland Defense Volunteers (Forcés de Volontaires de Défense pour la Patrie or VDP)Planning officials view Namibia’s reduced population growth rate as sustainable based on the country’s economic growth over the past decade. Prior to independence in 1990, Namibia’s relatively small population grew at about 3% annually, but declining fertility and the impact of HIV/AIDS slowed this growth to 1.4% by 2011, rebounding to close to 2% by 2016. Namibia’s fertility rate has fallen over the last two decades – from about 4.5 children per woman in 1996 to 3.4 in 2016 and to 3 in 2022 – due to increased contraceptive use, higher educational attainment among women, and greater female participation in the labor force. The average age at first birth has stayed fairly constant, but the age at first marriage continues to increase, indicating a rising incidence of premarital childbearing.
The majority of Namibians are rural dwellers (about 55%) and live in the better-watered north and northeast parts of the country. Migration, historically male-dominated, generally flows from northern communal areas – non-agricultural lands where blacks were sequestered under the apartheid system – to agricultural, mining, and manufacturing centers in the center and south. After independence from South Africa, restrictions on internal movement eased, and rural-urban migration increased, bolstering urban growth.
Some Namibians – usually persons who are better-educated, more affluent, and from urban areas – continue to legally migrate to South Africa temporarily to visit family and friends and, much less frequently, to pursue tertiary education or better economic opportunities. Namibians concentrated along the country’s other borders make unauthorized visits to Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, or Botswana, to visit family and to trade agricultural goods. Few Namibians express interest in permanently settling in other countries; they prefer the safety of their homeland, have a strong national identity, and enjoy a well-supplied retail sector. Although Namibia is receptive to foreign investment and cross-border trade, intolerance toward non-citizens is widespread.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "34.1% (male 482,790/female 473,306)" @@ -485,7 +482,7 @@ "text": "German South-West Africa (Deutsch-Suedwestafrika), South-West Africa" }, "etymology": { - "text": "named for the coastal Namib Desert; the name \"namib\" means \"vast place\" in the Nama/Damara language" + "text": "named for the coastal Namib Desert; the word namib comes from the local Nama language and means \"an area where there is nothing\"" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/africa/wz.json b/africa/wz.json index 2781961c..5b63ee4c 100644 --- a/africa/wz.json +++ b/africa/wz.json @@ -98,13 +98,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "1,138,089" + "text": "1,138,089 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "538,600" }, "female": { - "text": "599,489 (2024 est.)" + "text": "599,489" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -124,9 +124,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Christian 90% (Zionist - a blend of Christianity and traditional African religions - 40%, Roman Catholic 20%, other Christian 30% - includes Anglican, Methodist, Church of Jesus Christ, Jehovah's Witness), Muslim 2%, other 8% (includes Baha'i, Buddhist, Hindu, indigenous, Jewish) (2015 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Eswatini, a small, predominantly rural, landlocked country surrounded by South Africa and Mozambique, suffers from severe poverty and the world’s highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate. A weak and deteriorating economy, high unemployment, rapid population growth, and an uneven distribution of resources all combine to worsen already persistent poverty and food insecurity, especially in rural areas. Erratic weather (frequent droughts and intermittent heavy rains and flooding), overuse of small plots, the overgrazing of cattle, and outdated agricultural practices reduce crop yields and further degrade the environment, exacerbating Eswatini's poverty and subsistence problems. Eswatini's extremely high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate – nearly 28% of adults have the disease – compounds these issues. Agricultural production has declined due to HIV/AIDS, as the illness causes households to lose manpower and to sell livestock and other assets to pay for medicine and funerals.
Swazis, mainly men from the country’s rural south, have been migrating to South Africa to work in coal, and later gold, mines since the late 19th century. Although the number of miners abroad has never been high in absolute terms because of Eswatini's small population, the outflow has had important social and economic repercussions. The peak of mining employment in South Africa occurred during the 1980s. Cross-border movement has accelerated since the 1990s, as increasing unemployment has pushed more Swazis to look for work in South Africa (creating a \"brain drain\" in the health and educational sectors); southern Swazi men have continued to pursue mining, although the industry has downsized. Women now make up an increasing share of migrants and dominate cross-border trading in handicrafts, using the proceeds to purchase goods back in Eswatini. Much of today’s migration, however, is not work-related but focuses on visits to family and friends, tourism, and shopping.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "31.6% (male 180,328/female 179,840)" diff --git a/africa/za.json b/africa/za.json index eb0c5d1d..9babcc4b 100644 --- a/africa/za.json +++ b/africa/za.json @@ -112,13 +112,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "20,799,116" + "text": "20,799,116 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "10,407,253" }, "female": { - "text": "10,391,863 (2024 est.)" + "text": "10,391,863" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -139,9 +139,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Protestant 75.3%, Roman Catholic 20.2%, other 2.7% (includes Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, and Baha'i), none 1.8% (2010 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Zambia’s poor, youthful population consists primarily of Bantu-speaking people representing nearly 70 different ethnicities. Zambia’s high fertility rate continues to drive rapid population growth, averaging almost 3% annually between 2000 and 2010, and reaching over 3.3% in 2022. The country’s total fertility rate has fallen by less than 1.5 children per woman during the last 30 years and still averages among the world’s highest, almost 6 children per woman, largely because of the country’s lack of access to family planning services, education for girls, and employment for women. Zambia also exhibits wide fertility disparities based on rural or urban location, education, and income. Poor, uneducated women from rural areas are more likely to marry young, to give birth early, and to have more children, viewing children as a sign of prestige and recognizing that not all of their children will live to adulthood. HIV/AIDS is prevalent in Zambia and contributes to its low life expectancy.
Zambian emigration is low compared to many other African countries and is comprised predominantly of the well-educated. The small amount of brain drain, however, has a major impact in Zambia because of its limited human capital and lack of educational infrastructure for developing skilled professionals in key fields. For example, Zambia has few schools for training doctors, nurses, and other health care workers. Its spending on education is low compared to other Sub-Saharan countries.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "42.1% (male 4,418,980/female 4,337,187)" diff --git a/africa/zi.json b/africa/zi.json index bae9a30a..3d0841c7 100644 --- a/africa/zi.json +++ b/africa/zi.json @@ -107,13 +107,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "17,150,352" + "text": "17,150,352 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "8,343,790" }, "female": { - "text": "8,806,562 (2024 est.)" + "text": "8,806,562" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -134,9 +134,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Apostolic Sect 40.3%, Pentecostal 17%, Protestant 13.8%, other Christian 7.8%, Roman Catholic 6.4%, African traditionalist 5%, other 1.5% (includes Muslim, Jewish, Hindu), none 8.3% (2022 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Zimbabwe’s progress in reproductive, maternal, and child health has stagnated in recent years. According to a 2010 Demographic and Health Survey, contraceptive use, the number of births attended by skilled practitioners, and child mortality have either stalled or somewhat deteriorated since the mid-2000s. Zimbabwe’s total fertility rate has remained fairly stable at about 4 children per woman for the last two decades, although an uptick in the urban birth rate in recent years has caused a slight rise in the country’s overall fertility rate. Zimbabwe’s HIV prevalence rate dropped from approximately 29% to 15% since 1997 but remains among the world’s highest and continues to suppress the country’s life expectancy rate. The proliferation of HIV/AIDS information and prevention programs and personal experience with those suffering or dying from the disease have helped to change sexual behavior and reduce the epidemic.
Historically, the vast majority of Zimbabwe’s migration has been internal – a rural-urban flow. In terms of international migration, over the last 40 years Zimbabwe has gradually shifted from being a destination country to one of emigration and, to a lesser degree, one of transit (for East African illegal migrants traveling to South Africa). As a British colony, Zimbabwe attracted significant numbers of permanent immigrants from the UK and other European countries, as well as temporary economic migrants from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. Although Zimbabweans have migrated to South Africa since the beginning of the 20th century to work as miners, the first major exodus from the country occurred in the years before and after independence in 1980. The outward migration was politically and racially influenced; a large share of the white population of European origin chose to leave rather than live under a new black-majority government.
In the 1990s and 2000s, economic mismanagement and hyperinflation sparked a second, more diverse wave of emigration. This massive outmigration – primarily to other southern African countries, the UK, and the US – has created a variety of challenges, including brain drain, illegal migration, and human smuggling and trafficking. Several factors have pushed highly skilled workers to go abroad, including unemployment, lower wages, a lack of resources, and few opportunities for career growth.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "38.3% (male 3,315,075/female 3,254,643)" diff --git a/antarctica/bv.json b/antarctica/bv.json index 9979d36e..146184b9 100644 --- a/antarctica/bv.json +++ b/antarctica/bv.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about 0.3 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "about 0.3 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { diff --git a/antarctica/fs.json b/antarctica/fs.json index 267dde13..ee99c988 100644 --- a/antarctica/fs.json +++ b/antarctica/fs.json @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ "text": "Ile Amsterdam (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): total - 55 sq km; land - 55 sq km; water - 0 sq kmIle Amsterdam (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): less than one-half the size of Washington, DC;
Ile Saint-Paul (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): more than 10 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC;
Iles Crozet: about twice the size of Washington, DC;
Iles Kerguelen: slightly larger than Delaware;
Bassas da India (Iles Eparses): land area about one-third the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC;
Europa Island (Iles Eparses): about one-sixth the size of Washington, DC;
Glorioso Islands (Iles Eparses): about eight times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC;
Juan de Nova Island (Iles Eparses): about seven times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC;
Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses): about 1.7 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC
" + "text": "Ile Amsterdam (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): less than one-half the size of Washington, D.C.;
Ile Saint-Paul (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): more than 10 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;
Iles Crozet: about twice the size of Washington, D.C.;
Iles Kerguelen: slightly larger than Delaware;
Bassas da India (Iles Eparses): land area about one-third the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;
Europa Island (Iles Eparses): about one-sixth the size of Washington, D.C.;
Glorioso Islands (Iles Eparses): about eight times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;
Juan de Nova Island (Iles Eparses): about seven times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;
Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses): about 1.7 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.
" }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { diff --git a/antarctica/hm.json b/antarctica/hm.json index ab1c035e..8df09a1e 100644 --- a/antarctica/hm.json +++ b/antarctica/hm.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "slightly more than two times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "slightly more than two times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ "text": "HIMI" }, "etymology": { - "text": "named after American Captain John HEARD, who sighted the island on 25 November 1853, and American Captain William McDONALD, who discovered the islands on 4 January 1854" + "text": "named after US Captain John HEARD, who sighted the island on 25 November 1853, and US Captain William McDONALD, who discovered the islands on 4 January 1854" } }, "Dependency status": { @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ }, "Transportation": { "Heliports": { - "text": "2 (2024)" + "text": "2 (2025)" } }, "Military and Security": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/aq.json b/australia-oceania/aq.json index 5c905459..fef0183d 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/aq.json +++ b/australia-oceania/aq.json @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ "note": "note: includes Rose Atoll and Swains Island" }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "slightly larger than Washington, DC" + "text": "slightly larger than Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -95,13 +95,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "43,895" + "text": "43,895 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "21,804" }, "female": { - "text": "22,091 (2024 est.)" + "text": "22,091" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -606,34 +606,34 @@ "Energy": { "Electricity": { "installed generating capacity": { - "text": "48,000 kW (2022 est.)" + "text": "50,000 kW (2023 est.)" }, "consumption": { - "text": "157.326 million kWh (2022 est.)" + "text": "157.697 million kWh (2023 est.)" }, "transmission/distribution losses": { - "text": "13.975 million kWh (2022 est.)" + "text": "13.975 million kWh (2023 est.)" } }, "Electricity generation sources": { "fossil fuels": { - "text": "97.1% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "97.1% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" }, "solar": { - "text": "2.9% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "2.9% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" } }, "Petroleum": { "refined petroleum consumption": { - "text": "3,000 bbl/day (2022 est.)" + "text": "3,000 bbl/day (2023 est.)" } }, "Carbon dioxide emissions": { "total emissions": { - "text": "391,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "389,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" }, "from petroleum and other liquids": { - "text": "391,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "389,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" } }, "Energy consumption per capita": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/as.json b/australia-oceania/as.json index 976a20b3..846601ae 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/as.json +++ b/australia-oceania/as.json @@ -125,13 +125,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "26,768,598" + "text": "26,768,598 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "13,305,110" }, "female": { - "text": "13,463,488 (2024 est.)" + "text": "13,463,488" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/at.json b/australia-oceania/at.json index ff947a2c..e817ebe2 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/at.json +++ b/australia-oceania/at.json @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ "note": "note: includes Ashmore Reef (West, Middle, and East Islets) and Cartier Island" }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about eight times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC" + "text": "about eight times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/bp.json b/australia-oceania/bp.json index bbf34df2..c11279d2 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/bp.json +++ b/australia-oceania/bp.json @@ -101,13 +101,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "726,799" + "text": "726,799 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "370,970" }, "female": { - "text": "355,829 (2024 est.)" + "text": "355,829" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/ck.json b/australia-oceania/ck.json index 8b78bfc7..9306a208 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ck.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ck.json @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ "note": "note: includes the two main islands of West Island and Home Island" }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about 24 times the size of The Mall in Washington, DC" + "text": "about 24 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/cq.json b/australia-oceania/cq.json index 448abda5..e5070867 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/cq.json +++ b/australia-oceania/cq.json @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ "note": "note: consists of 14 islands including Saipan, Rota, and Tinian" }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "2.5 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "2.5 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -98,13 +98,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "51,118" + "text": "51,118 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "27,044" }, "female": { - "text": "24,074 (2024 est.)" + "text": "24,074" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/cr.json b/australia-oceania/cr.json index fe7c3c59..1bd49039 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/cr.json +++ b/australia-oceania/cr.json @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ "note": "note: includes numerous small islands and reefs scattered over a sea area of about 780,000 sq km (300,000 sq mi) with the Willis Islets the most important" }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about four times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC" + "text": "about four times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "no indigenous inhabitants (2021)" + "text": "(2021) no indigenous inhabitants" }, "note": "note: a staff of four operates the meteorological station on Willis Island" } @@ -136,8 +136,6 @@ }, "Economy": { }, - "Energy": { - }, "Communications": { "Communications - note": { "text": "automatic weather stations on many of the isles and reefs relay data to the mainland" diff --git a/australia-oceania/cw.json b/australia-oceania/cw.json index 428aaacd..e8c46fa5 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/cw.json +++ b/australia-oceania/cw.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "1.3 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "1.3 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -100,13 +100,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "7,761" + "text": "7,761 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "3,980" }, "female": { - "text": "3,781 (2024 est.)" + "text": "3,781" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -655,39 +655,39 @@ "Energy": { "Electricity": { "installed generating capacity": { - "text": "17,000 kW (2022 est.)" + "text": "17,000 kW (2023 est.)" }, "consumption": { - "text": "37.5 million kWh (2022 est.)" + "text": "37.5 million kWh (2023 est.)" }, "transmission/distribution losses": { - "text": "3.2 million kWh (2022 est.)" + "text": "3.2 million kWh (2023 est.)" } }, "Electricity generation sources": { "fossil fuels": { - "text": "60.9% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "60.9% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" }, "solar": { - "text": "39.1% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "39.1% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" } }, "Coal": { "imports": { - "text": "1.3 metric tons (2022 est.)" + "text": "1 metric tons (2022 est.)" } }, "Petroleum": { "refined petroleum consumption": { - "text": "600 bbl/day (2022 est.)" + "text": "700 bbl/day (2023 est.)" } }, "Carbon dioxide emissions": { "total emissions": { - "text": "87,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "103,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" }, "from petroleum and other liquids": { - "text": "87,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "103,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/fj.json b/australia-oceania/fj.json index c73d9d08..c20bd5c7 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/fj.json +++ b/australia-oceania/fj.json @@ -104,13 +104,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "951,611" + "text": "951,611 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "482,304" }, "female": { - "text": "469,307 (2024 est.)" + "text": "469,307" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/fm.json b/australia-oceania/fm.json index 8d9416b4..a7e0c631 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/fm.json +++ b/australia-oceania/fm.json @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ "note": "note: includes Pohnpei (Ponape), Chuuk (Truk) Islands, Yap Islands, and Kosrae (Kosaie)" }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "four times the size of Washington, DC (land area only)" + "text": "four times the size of Washington, D.C. (land area only)" }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -98,13 +98,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "99,603" + "text": "99,603 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "48,708" }, "female": { - "text": "50,895 (2024 est.)" + "text": "50,895" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ "text": "FSM" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the term \"Micronesia\" is a 19th-century construct of two Greek words, \"micro\" (small) and \"nesoi\" (islands), and refers to thousands of small islands in the western Pacific Ocean" + "text": "the name is a 19th-century construct of two Greek words, mikros (small) and nesoi (islands), and refers to its thousands of small islands in the western Pacific Ocean" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/fp.json b/australia-oceania/fp.json index 80a5f7d7..5290a7b8 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/fp.json +++ b/australia-oceania/fp.json @@ -97,13 +97,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "303,540" + "text": "303,540 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "155,138" }, "female": { - "text": "148,402 (2024 est.)" + "text": "148,402" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/gq.json b/australia-oceania/gq.json index bbcbd3bd..a1479a0a 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/gq.json +++ b/australia-oceania/gq.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "three times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "three times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -97,13 +97,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "169,532" + "text": "169,532 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "87,345" }, "female": { - "text": "82,187 (2024 est.)" + "text": "82,187" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/kr.json b/australia-oceania/kr.json index 1521a544..ea5ac162 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/kr.json +++ b/australia-oceania/kr.json @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ "note": "note: includes three island groups - Gilbert Islands, Line Islands, and Phoenix Islands - dispersed over about 3.5 million sq km (1.35 million sq mi)" }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "four times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "four times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -101,13 +101,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "116,545" + "text": "116,545 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "56,364" }, "female": { - "text": "60,181 (2024 est.)" + "text": "60,181" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ "text": "Gilbert Islands" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the name is the local pronunciation of \"Gilberts,\" the former designation of the islands; originally named after explorer Thomas GILBERT, who mapped many of the islands in 1788" + "text": "the name is the local pronunciation of \"Gilbert,\" the former designation of the islands; originally named after explorer Thomas GILBERT, who mapped many of the islands in 1788" }, "note": "note: pronounced keer-ree-bahss" }, @@ -865,39 +865,39 @@ }, "Electricity": { "installed generating capacity": { - "text": "11,000 kW (2022 est.)" + "text": "12,000 kW (2023 est.)" }, "consumption": { - "text": "26.225 million kWh (2022 est.)" + "text": "27.388 million kWh (2023 est.)" }, "transmission/distribution losses": { - "text": "5 million kWh (2022 est.)" + "text": "5 million kWh (2023 est.)" } }, "Electricity generation sources": { "fossil fuels": { - "text": "84.5% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "81.5% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" }, "solar": { - "text": "15.5% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "18.5% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" } }, "Petroleum": { "refined petroleum consumption": { - "text": "500 bbl/day (2022 est.)" + "text": "500 bbl/day (2023 est.)" } }, "Carbon dioxide emissions": { "total emissions": { - "text": "78,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "81,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" }, "from petroleum and other liquids": { - "text": "78,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "81,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" } }, "Energy consumption per capita": { - "Total energy consumption per capita 2022": { - "text": "8.403 million Btu/person (2022 est.)" + "Total energy consumption per capita 2023": { + "text": "8.578 million Btu/person (2023 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/kt.json b/australia-oceania/kt.json index e3f9547c..0c2c7d74 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/kt.json +++ b/australia-oceania/kt.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about three-quarters the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "about three-quarters the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/nc.json b/australia-oceania/nc.json index 1f1bd1ed..e6fe8980 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nc.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nc.json @@ -97,13 +97,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "304,167" + "text": "304,167 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "151,389" }, "female": { - "text": "152,778 (2024 est.)" + "text": "152,778" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ "text": "Nouvelle-Calédonie" }, "etymology": { - "text": "British explorer Captain James COOK discovered and named New Caledonia in 1774; he used the appellation because the northeast of the island reminded him of Scotland (Caledonia is the Latin designation for Scotland)" + "text": "the name came from British explorer Captain James COOK in 1774 and uses the Latin name for Scotland, Caledonia" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/ne.json b/australia-oceania/ne.json index 428ee2bd..ed1be245 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ne.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ne.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "1.5 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "1.5 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -97,7 +97,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "2,000 (2022 est.)" + "text": "1,681 (2022)" + }, + "male": { + "text": "827" + }, + "female": { + "text": "854" }, "note": "note: because of the island's limited economic and educational opportunities, Niueans have emigrated for decades - primarily to New Zealand but also to Australia and other Pacific island states; Niue's population peaked in 1966 at 5,194, but by 2005 had fallen to 1,508; since then, it has rebounded slightly; as of 2013, 23,883 people of Niuean ancestry lived in New Zealand - with more than 20% Niue-born - or about 15 times as many persons of Niuean ancestry living in New Zealand as in Niue" }, @@ -150,6 +156,14 @@ "Major urban areas - population": { "text": "1,000 ALOFI (capital) (2018)" }, + "Life expectancy at birth": { + "male": { + "text": "71.8 years (2016)" + }, + "female": { + "text": "75.7 years (2016 est.)" + } + }, "Drinking water source": { "improved: total": { "text": "total: 97% of population" diff --git a/australia-oceania/nf.json b/australia-oceania/nf.json index cc61e0c8..fd7b3737 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nf.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nf.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about 0.2 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "about 0.2 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "1,748 (2016 est.)" + "text": "2,188 (2021)" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/nh.json b/australia-oceania/nh.json index 20bf87b6..a3bdc8a4 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nh.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nh.json @@ -105,13 +105,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "318,007" + "text": "318,007 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "157,932" }, "female": { - "text": "160,075 (2024 est.)" + "text": "160,075" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/nr.json b/australia-oceania/nr.json index 16ecbd4a..ee581f99 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nr.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nr.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about 0.1 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "about 0.1 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -100,13 +100,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "9,892" + "text": "9,892 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "4,856" }, "female": { - "text": "5,036 (2024 est.)" + "text": "5,036" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ "text": "Pleasant Island" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the island name may derive from the Nauruan word \"anaoero\" meaning \"I go to the beach\"" + "text": "the island name may derive from the Nauruan word \"anaoero\" meaning \"I go to the beach\"; the former name, Pleasant Island, came from British navigator John Frean, who visited in 1798" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/nz.json b/australia-oceania/nz.json index 2debb9d8..c59f0c27 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nz.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nz.json @@ -112,13 +112,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "5,161,211" + "text": "5,161,211 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "2,584,607" }, "female": { - "text": "2,576,604 (2024 est.)" + "text": "2,576,604" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -463,11 +463,14 @@ "conventional short form": { "text": "New Zealand" }, + "former": { + "text": "Nieuw Zeeland" + }, "abbreviation": { "text": "NZ" }, "etymology": { - "text": "Dutch explorer Abel TASMAN was the first European to reach New Zealand in 1642; he named it Staten Landt, but Dutch cartographers renamed it Nova Zeelandia in 1645 after the Dutch province of Zeeland; British explorer Captain James COOK subsequently anglicized the name to New Zealand when he mapped the islands in 1769" + "text": "the name is an anglicized form of the Dutch name Nieuw Zeeland, or \"New Sea Land,\" which was first used in 1643 in honor of the Dutch province of Zeeland" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/pc.json b/australia-oceania/pc.json index 12d4bfd0..0f741180 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/pc.json +++ b/australia-oceania/pc.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about three-tenths the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "about three-tenths the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/ps.json b/australia-oceania/ps.json index 980eb227..8575a62a 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ps.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ps.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "slightly more than 2.5 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "slightly more than 2.5 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/rm.json b/australia-oceania/rm.json index e2785c56..b08c4889 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/rm.json +++ b/australia-oceania/rm.json @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ "note": "note: the archipelago includes 11,673 sq km of lagoon waters and encompasses the atolls of Bikini, Enewetak, Kwajalein, Majuro, Rongelap, and Utirik" }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "about the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -104,13 +104,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "82,011" + "text": "82,011 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "41,581" }, "female": { - "text": "40,430 (2024 est.)" + "text": "40,430" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/tl.json b/australia-oceania/tl.json index 12c506d9..a675c9c6 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/tl.json +++ b/australia-oceania/tl.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about 17 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC" + "text": "about 17 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -97,7 +97,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "1,647 (2019 est.)" + "text": "2,453 (2024 est.)" + }, + "male": { + "text": "1,201" + }, + "female": { + "text": "1,252" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/tn.json b/australia-oceania/tn.json index 3652a150..06e00cc6 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/tn.json +++ b/australia-oceania/tn.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "four times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "four times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -100,13 +100,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "104,889" + "text": "104,889 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "52,606" }, "female": { - "text": "52,283 (2024 est.)" + "text": "52,283" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/tv.json b/australia-oceania/tv.json index 98c86ec0..bdf7277d 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/tv.json +++ b/australia-oceania/tv.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "0.1 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "0.1 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -103,13 +103,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "11,733" + "text": "11,733 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "5,816" }, "female": { - "text": "5,917 (2024 est.)" + "text": "5,917" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/um.json b/australia-oceania/um.json index 0eede94d..e65ab577 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/um.json +++ b/australia-oceania/um.json @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ "note": "Baker Island: total - 129.1 sq km; emergent land - 2.1 sq km; submerged - 127 sq kmBaker Island: about 2.5 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC;
Howland Island: about three times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC;
Jarvis Island: about eight times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC;
Johnston Atoll: about 4.5 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC;
Kingman Reef: a little more than 1.5 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC;
Midway Islands: about nine times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC;
Palmyra Atoll: about 20 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC
" + "text": "Baker Island: about 2.5 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;
Howland Island: about three times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;
Jarvis Island: about eight times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;
Johnston Atoll: about 4.5 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;
Kingman Reef: a little more than 1.5 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;
Midway Islands: about nine times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.;
Palmyra Atoll: about 20 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.
" }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -120,26 +120,26 @@ "Energy": { "Coal": { "imports": { - "text": "108,000 metric tons (2022 est.)" + "text": "108,000 metric tons (2023 est.)" } }, "Petroleum": { "refined petroleum consumption": { - "text": "2,000 bbl/day (2022 est.)" + "text": "2,000 bbl/day (2023 est.)" } }, "Carbon dioxide emissions": { "total emissions": { - "text": "297,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "294,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" }, "from petroleum and other liquids": { - "text": "297,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "294,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" } } }, "Transportation": { "Airports": { - "text": "2 (2024)" + "text": "2 (2025)" } }, "Military and Security": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/wf.json b/australia-oceania/wf.json index d999ac7c..c0781054 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/wf.json +++ b/australia-oceania/wf.json @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ "note": "note: includes Ile Uvea (Wallis Island), Ile Futuna (Futuna Island), Ile Alofi, and 20 islets" }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "1.5 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "1.5 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -95,13 +95,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "15,964" + "text": "15,964 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "8,201" }, "female": { - "text": "7,763 (2024 est.)" + "text": "7,763" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/wq.json b/australia-oceania/wq.json index 513df6dc..52e3f148 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/wq.json +++ b/australia-oceania/wq.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about 11 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC" + "text": "about 11 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -141,15 +141,15 @@ }, "Petroleum": { "refined petroleum consumption": { - "text": "8,000 bbl/day (2022 est.)" + "text": "8,000 bbl/day (2023 est.)" } }, "Carbon dioxide emissions": { "total emissions": { - "text": "1.221 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "1.214 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" }, "from petroleum and other liquids": { - "text": "1.221 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "1.214 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/ws.json b/australia-oceania/ws.json index 97c19ebb..4b7f991f 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ws.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ws.json @@ -100,13 +100,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "208,853" + "text": "208,853 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "105,920" }, "female": { - "text": "102,933 (2024 est.)" + "text": "102,933" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -895,48 +895,48 @@ }, "Electricity": { "installed generating capacity": { - "text": "53,000 kW (2022 est.)" + "text": "54,000 kW (2023 est.)" }, "consumption": { - "text": "177.279 million kWh (2022 est.)" + "text": "141.846 million kWh (2023 est.)" }, "transmission/distribution losses": { - "text": "17.175 million kWh (2022 est.)" + "text": "17.284 million kWh (2023 est.)" } }, "Electricity generation sources": { "fossil fuels": { - "text": "66.9% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "59.7% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" }, "solar": { - "text": "12.3% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "15.1% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" }, "wind": { - "text": "0.1% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "0.1% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" }, "hydroelectricity": { - "text": "20.6% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "18.9% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" }, "biomass and waste": { - "text": "0.1% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "6.3% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" } }, "Petroleum": { "refined petroleum consumption": { - "text": "2,000 bbl/day (2022 est.)" + "text": "2,000 bbl/day (2023 est.)" } }, "Carbon dioxide emissions": { "total emissions": { - "text": "311,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "335,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" }, "from petroleum and other liquids": { - "text": "311,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "335,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" } }, "Energy consumption per capita": { - "Total energy consumption per capita 2022": { - "text": "20.949 million Btu/person (2022 est.)" + "Total energy consumption per capita 2023": { + "text": "23.476 million Btu/person (2023 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json index dcba83ac..7e1ba2c8 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "slightly larger than Washington, DC" + "text": "slightly larger than Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -97,13 +97,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "125,063" + "text": "125,063 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "59,101" }, "female": { - "text": "65,962 (2024 est.)" + "text": "65,962" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json index 5cec9bdb..cba7a773 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ "note": "note: includes Redonda, 1.6 sq km" }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "2.5 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "2.5 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -104,13 +104,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "102,634" + "text": "102,634 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "48,311" }, "female": { - "text": "54,323 (2024 est.)" + "text": "54,323" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json index a501eb52..b920da7c 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about one-half the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "about one-half the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -100,13 +100,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "19,416" + "text": "19,416 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "9,107" }, "female": { - "text": "10,309 (2024 est.)" + "text": "10,309" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -575,11 +575,11 @@ "note": "note: top five import commodities based on value in dollars" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": { - "text": "$76.38 million (31 December 2017 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": { + "text": "$76.38 million (2017 est.)" }, - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2015": { - "text": "$48.14 million (31 December 2015 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2015": { + "text": "$48.14 million (2015 est.)" } }, "Exchange rates": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json index b633557e..862e4052 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "2.5 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "2.5 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -97,13 +97,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "304,139" + "text": "304,139 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "146,587" }, "female": { - "text": "157,552 (2024 est.)" + "text": "157,552" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json index 2225ea58..115aa4f7 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json @@ -97,13 +97,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "410,862" + "text": "410,862 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "190,100" }, "female": { - "text": "220,762 (2024 est.)" + "text": "220,762" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json index 52ba5fb3..eed750a4 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json @@ -103,13 +103,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "415,789" + "text": "415,789 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "205,895" }, "female": { - "text": "209,894 (2024 est.)" + "text": "209,894" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -136,9 +136,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Roman Catholic 40.1%, Protestant 31.5% (includes Pentecostal 8.4%, Seventh Day Adventist 5.4%, Anglican 4.7%, Mennonite 3.7%, Baptist 3.6%, Methodist 2.9%, Nazarene 2.8%), Jehovah's Witness 1.7%, other 10.5% (includes Baha'i, Buddhist, Hindu, Church of Jesus Christ, Muslim, Rastafarian, Salvation Army), unspecified 0.6%, none 15.5% (2010 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Migration continues to transform Belize's population. About 16% of Belizeans live abroad, while immigrants constitute approximately 15% of Belize's population. Belizeans seeking job and educational opportunities have preferred to emigrate to the United States rather than former colonizer Great Britain because of the United States' closer proximity and stronger trade ties with Belize. Belizeans also emigrate to Canada, Mexico, and English-speaking Caribbean countries. The emigration of a large share of Creoles (Afro-Belizeans) and the influx of Central American immigrants, mainly Guatemalans, Salvadorans, and Hondurans, has changed Belize's ethnic composition. Mestizos have become the largest ethnic group, and Belize now has more native Spanish speakers than English or Creole speakers, despite English being the official language. In addition, Central American immigrants are establishing new communities in rural areas, which contrasts with the urbanization trend seen in neighboring countries. Recently, Chinese, European, and North American immigrants have become more frequent.
Immigration accounts for an increasing share of Belize's population growth rate, which is steadily falling due to fertility decline. Belize's declining birth rate and its increased life expectancy are creating an aging population. As the elderly population grows and nuclear families replace extended households, Belize's government will be challenged to balance a rising demand for pensions, social services, and healthcare for its senior citizens with the need to reduce poverty and social inequality and to improve sanitation.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "27.7% (male 58,529/female 56,811)" @@ -567,16 +564,16 @@ "text": "5 years" }, "most recent election date": { - "text": "11/11/2020" + "text": "3/12/2025" }, "parties elected and seats per party": { "text": "People's United Party (PUP) (26); United Democratic Party (UDP) (5)" }, "percentage of women in chamber": { - "text": "15.6%" + "text": "9.7%" }, "expected date of next election": { - "text": "March 2025" + "text": "March 2030" } }, "Legislative branch - upper chamber": { @@ -1139,8 +1136,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Belize Defense Force (BDF): Army, Air Wing; Belize Coast Guard; Belize Police Department (2024)", - "note": "note: the Ministry of National Defense and Border Security is responsible for oversight of the BDF and the Coast Guard, while the Ministry of Home Affairs and New Growth Industries has responsibility for the Belize Police Department and prisons; the Police Department is primarily responsible for internal security" + "text": "Belize Defense Force (BDF): Army, Air Wing; Belize Coast Guard (BCG) (2025)", + "note": "note: the Ministry of National Defense and Border Security is responsible for oversight of the BDF and the Coast Guard, while the Ministry of Home Affairs and New Growth Industries has responsibility for the Belize Police Department (BPD) and prisons" }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2023": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bq.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bq.json index 918ff7e4..a2cbd95e 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bq.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bq.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about nine times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC" + "text": "about nine times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ "text": "Navassa Island" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the flat island was named \"Navaza\" by some of Christopher COLUMBUS' sailors in 1504; the name derives from the Spanish term \"nava\" meaning \"flat land, plain, or field\"" + "text": "the flat island was named \"Navaza\" by sailors with the Christopher COLUMBUS expedition in 1504; the name derives from the Spanish word nava, meaning \"flat land or level ground\"" } }, "Dependency status": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json index a609b1cb..8e66c1d7 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "1.5 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "1.5 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -100,13 +100,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "66,653" + "text": "66,653 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "32,379" }, "female": { - "text": "34,274 (2024 est.)" + "text": "34,274" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json index fa6bbc79..96b0ca53 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json @@ -107,13 +107,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "5,265,575" + "text": "5,265,575 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "2,635,481" }, "female": { - "text": "2,630,094 (2024 est.)" + "text": "2,630,094" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -138,9 +138,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Roman Catholic 47.5%, Evangelical and Pentecostal 19.8%, Jehovah's Witness 1.4%, other Protestant 1.2%, other 3.1%, none 27% (2021 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Costa Rica's political stability, high standard of living, and well-developed social benefits system set it apart from its Central American neighbors. Through the government's sustained social spending - almost 20% of GDP annually - Costa Rica has made tremendous progress toward achieving its goal of providing universal access to education, healthcare, clean water, sanitation, and electricity. Since the 1970s, expansion of these services has led to a rapid decline in infant mortality, an increase in life expectancy at birth, and a sharp decrease in the birth rate. The average number of children born per women has fallen from about 7 in the 1960s to 3.5 in the early 1980s to below replacement level today. Costa Rica's poverty rate is lower than in most Latin American countries, but it has stalled at around 20% for almost two decades.
Costa Rica is a popular regional immigration destination because of its job opportunities and social programs. Almost 9% of the population is foreign-born, with Nicaraguans comprising nearly three-quarters of the foreign population. Many Nicaraguans who perform unskilled seasonal labor enter Costa Rica illegally or overstay their visas, which continues to be a source of tension. Less than 3% of Costa Rica's population lives abroad. The overwhelming majority of expatriates have settled in the United States after completing a university degree or in order to work in a highly skilled field.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "18.8% (male 506,041/female 482,481)" @@ -1160,7 +1157,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "no regular military forces; Ministry of Public Security: National Police (Fuerza Pública), Air Surveillance Service (Servicio de Vigilancia Aérea), National Coast Guard Service (Servicio Nacional de Guardacostas), Drug Control Police (Policía Control de Drogas), Border Police (Policia de Fronteras), Professional Migration Police (Policía Profesional de Migración); Ministry of Presidency: Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DIS), Special Intervention Unit (UEI) (2024)", + "text": "no regular military forces; Ministry of Public Security (Ministerio de Seguridad Pública de Costa Rica): National Police (Fuerza Pública), Air Surveillance Service (Servicio de Vigilancia Aérea), National Coast Guard Service (Servicio Nacional de Guardacostas), Drug Control Police (Policía Control de Drogas), Border Police (Policia de Fronteras), Professional Migration Police (Policía Profesional de Migración)El Salvador is the smallest and most densely populated country in Central America. It is well into its demographic transition, experiencing slower population growth, a decline in its number of youths, and the gradual aging of its population. The increased use of family planning has substantially lowered El Salvador's fertility rate, from approximately 6 children per woman in the 1970s to replacement level today. A 2008 national family planning survey showed that female sterilization remained the most common contraception method in El Salvador - its sterilization rate is among the highest in Latin America and the Caribbean - but that the use of injectable contraceptives is growing. Fertility differences between rich and poor and urban and rural women are narrowing.
Salvadorans fled during the 1979 to 1992 civil war mainly to the United States but also to Canada and to neighboring Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Emigration to the United States increased again in the 1990s and 2000s as a result of deteriorating economic conditions, natural disasters (Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and earthquakes in 2001), and family reunification. At least 20% of El Salvador's population lives abroad. The remittances they send home account for close to 20% of GDP, are the second largest source of external income after exports, and have helped reduce poverty.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "25.3% (male 855,841/female 818,642)" @@ -616,7 +613,7 @@ "text": "[1] (202) 232-3763" }, "email address and website": { - "text": "Guatemala is a predominantly poor country that struggles in several areas of health and development, including infant, child, and maternal mortality, malnutrition, literacy, and contraceptive awareness and use. The country's large indigenous population is disproportionately affected. Guatemala is the most populous country in Central America and has the highest fertility rate in Latin America. It also has the highest population growth rate in Latin America, which is likely to continue because of its large reproductive-age population and high birth rate. Almost half of Guatemala's population is under age 19, making it the youngest population in Latin America. Guatemala's total fertility rate has slowly declined during the last few decades due in part to limited government-funded health programs. However, the birth rate is still more close to three children per woman and is markedly higher among its rural and indigenous populations.
Guatemalans have a history of emigrating legally and illegally to Mexico, the United States, and Canada because of a lack of economic opportunity, political instability, and natural disasters. Emigration, primarily to the United States, escalated during the 1960 to 1996 civil war and accelerated after a peace agreement was signed. Thousands of Guatemalans who fled to Mexico returned after the war, but labor migration to southern Mexico continues.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "31.5% (male 2,925,079/female 2,819,927)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json index f444d5df..45ae36d7 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json @@ -109,13 +109,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "11,753,943" + "text": "11,753,943 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "5,792,443" }, "female": { - "text": "5,961,500 (2024 est.)" + "text": "5,961,500" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ "text": "Haïti (French)/ Ayiti (Haitian Creole)" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the native Taino name means \"Land of High Mountains\" and was originally applied to the entire island of Hispaniola" + "text": "derived from the Arawak name Ayti, meaning \"Land of Mountains,\" that was originally applied to the entire island of Hispaniola" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json index 3ef39971..37acaf0e 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json @@ -114,13 +114,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "9,529,188" + "text": "9,529,188 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "4,591,247" }, "female": { - "text": "4,937,941 (2024 est.)" + "text": "4,937,941" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -145,9 +145,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Evangelical 55%, Roman Catholic 33.4%, none 10.1%, unspecified 1.5% (2023 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Honduras is one of the poorest countries in Latin America and has one of the world's highest murder rates. More than half of the population lives in poverty and per capita income is one of the lowest in the region. Poverty rates are higher among rural and indigenous people and in the south, west, and along the eastern border than in the north and central areas where most of Honduras' industries and infrastructure are concentrated. The increased productivity needed to break Honduras' persistent high poverty rate depends, in part, on further improvements in educational attainment. Although primary-school enrollment is near 100%, educational quality is poor, the drop-out rate and grade repetition remain high, and teacher and school accountability is low.
Honduras' population growth rate has slowed since the 1990s and is now 1.2% annually with a birth rate that averages 2.1 children per woman and more among rural, indigenous, and poor women. Honduras' young adult population - ages 15 to 29 - is projected to continue growing rapidly for the next three decades and then stabilize or slowly shrink. Population growth and limited job prospects outside of agriculture will continue to drive emigration. Remittances represent about a fifth of GDP.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "28.7% (male 1,378,026/female 1,353,238)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json index 8809829a..20ba7338 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json @@ -107,13 +107,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "2,823,713" + "text": "2,823,713 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "1,397,495" }, "female": { - "text": "1,426,218 (2024 est.)" + "text": "1,426,218" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ "text": "Jamaica" }, "etymology": { - "text": "from the native Taino word \"haymaca\" meaning \"Land of Wood and Water\" or possibly \"Land of Springs\"" + "text": "from the Arawak word xaymaca, meaning \"Land of Wood and Water\" or possibly \"Land of Springs\"" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json index 178c7f30..2642aa1e 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about 0.6 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "about 0.6 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -97,15 +97,14 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "5,468" + "text": "5,468 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "2,728" }, "female": { - "text": "2,740 (2024 est.)" - }, - "note": "note: an estimated 8,000 refugees left the island following the resumption of volcanic activity in July 1995; some have returned" + "text": "2,740" + } }, "Nationality": { "noun": { @@ -348,7 +347,7 @@ "text": "Montserrat" }, "etymology": { - "text": "island named by explorer Christopher COLUMBUS in 1493 after the Benedictine abbey Santa Maria de Montserrat, near Barcelona, Spain" + "text": "explorer Christopher COLUMBUS named the island in 1493 after the Benedictine abbey Santa Maria de Montserrat, near Barcelona, Spain" } }, "Government type": { @@ -593,11 +592,11 @@ "note": "note: top five import commodities based on value in dollars" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": { - "text": "$47.58 million (31 December 2017 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": { + "text": "$47.58 million (2017 est.)" }, - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2015": { - "text": "$51.47 million (31 December 2015 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2015": { + "text": "$51.47 million (2015 est.)" } }, "Exchange rates": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/nn.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/nn.json index 872f8cb8..c393ce97 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/nn.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/nn.json @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ "note": "note: Dutch part of the island of Saint Martin" }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "one-fifth the size of Washington, DC
" + "text": "one-fifth the size of Washington, D.C.
" }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ }, "Elevation": { "highest point": { - "text": "Mount Flagstaff 383 m" + "text": "250 m SW of Mount Flagstaff summit, 383 m" }, "lowest point": { "text": "Caribbean Sea 0 m" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json index 5041ed08..99afbad8 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "slightly larger than Pennsylvania; slightly smaller than New York state" + "text": "slightly larger than Pennsylvania; slightly smaller than New York State" }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -111,13 +111,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "6,676,948" + "text": "6,676,948 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "3,273,900" }, "female": { - "text": "3,403,048 (2024 est.)" + "text": "3,403,048" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -143,9 +143,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Roman Catholic 44.9%, Protestant 38.7% (Evangelical 38.2, Adventist 0.5%), other 1.2%, (includes Jehovah's Witness and Church of Jesus Christ), believer but not belonging to a church 1%, agnostic or atheist 0.4%, none 13.7%, unspecified 0.2% (2020 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Despite being one of the poorest countries in Latin America, Nicaragua has improved its access to potable water and sanitation and has ameliorated its life expectancy, infant and child mortality, and immunization rates. However, income distribution is very uneven, and the poor, agriculturalists, and indigenous people continue to have less access to healthcare services. Nicaragua's total fertility rate has fallen from around 6 children per woman in 1980 to below replacement level today, but the high birth rate among adolescents perpetuates a cycle of poverty and low educational attainment.
Nicaraguans emigrate primarily to Costa Rica and to a lesser extent the United States. Nicaraguan men have been migrating seasonally to Costa Rica to harvest bananas and coffee since the early 20th century. Political turmoil, civil war, and natural disasters from the 1970s through the 1990s dramatically increased the flow of refugees and permanent migrants seeking jobs, higher wages, and better social and healthcare benefits. Since 2000, Nicaraguan emigration to Costa Rica has slowed and stabilized. Today roughly 300,000 Nicaraguans are permanent residents of Costa Rica - about 75% of the foreign population - and thousands more migrate seasonally for work, many illegally.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "25.1% (male 855,256/female 818,714)" @@ -461,7 +458,7 @@ "text": "Nicaragua" }, "etymology": { - "text": "Nicarao was the name of the largest indigenous settlement at the time of Spanish arrival; conquistador Gil GONZALEZ Davila, who explored the area (1622-23), combined the name of the community with the Spanish word \"agua\" (water), referring to the two large lakes in the west of the country (Lake Managua and Lake Nicaragua)" + "text": "16th-century Spanish explorer Gil GONZALEZ Davila is said to have combined the name of a local chieftain, Nicarao, with the Spanish word agua (water), referring to the two large lakes in the west of the country (Lake Managua and Lake Nicaragua)" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json index d9208725..67b6bb6f 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json @@ -111,13 +111,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "4,470,241" + "text": "4,470,241 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "2,251,257" }, "female": { - "text": "2,218,984 (2024 est.)" + "text": "2,218,984" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -142,9 +142,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Evangelical 55%, Roman Catholic 33.4%, none 10.1%, unspecified 1.5% (2023 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Panama is a country of demographic and economic contrasts. It is in the midst of a demographic transition, characterized by steadily declining rates of fertility, mortality, and population growth, but disparities persist based on wealth, geography, and ethnicity. Panama has one of the fastest growing economies in Latin America and dedicates substantial funding to social programs, yet poverty and inequality remain prevalent. The indigenous population accounts for a growing share of Panama's poor and extreme poor, while the non-indigenous rural poor have been more successful at rising out of poverty through rural-to-urban labor migration. The government's large expenditures on untargeted, indirect subsidies for water, electricity, and fuel have been ineffective, but its conditional cash transfer program has shown some promise in helping to decrease extreme poverty among the indigenous population.
Panama has expanded access to education and clean water, but the availability of sanitation and, to a lesser extent, electricity remains poor. The increase in secondary schooling - led by female enrollment - is spreading to rural and indigenous areas, which probably will help to alleviate poverty if educational quality and the availability of skilled jobs improve. Inadequate access to sanitation contributes to a high incidence of diarrhea in Panama's children, which is one of the main causes of Panama's elevated chronic malnutrition rate, especially among indigenous communities.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "25% (male 574,336/female 544,180)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/rn.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/rn.json index c6ed85fc..15e39505 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/rn.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/rn.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "more than one-third the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "more than one-third the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json index 826855b3..acf8c953 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json @@ -100,13 +100,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "3,019,450" + "text": "3,019,450 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "1,418,753" }, "female": { - "text": "1,600,697 (2024 est.)" + "text": "1,600,697" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json index bb0df5dc..acad963b 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "1.5 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "1.5 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -103,13 +103,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "55,133" + "text": "55,133 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "27,599" }, "female": { - "text": "27,534 (2024 est.)" + "text": "27,534" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -603,6 +603,9 @@ "selected World Heritage Site locales": { "text": "Brimstone Hill Fortress National Park" } + }, + "National coat of arms": { + "text": "The coat of arms of Saint Kitts and Nevis features a Carib that represents the original inhabitants of the islands, and a fleur-de-lis and rose that represent the French and English who arrived in the 1620s. The shield also features the poinciana (the national flower) and a traditional boat. Three hands hold the torch, which represents the quest for freedom: the hand of an African, a European, and a person of mixed ethnicity. Pelicans (the national bird) support the shield, with a sugarcane plant and a coconut tree that symbolize the land.
" } }, "Economy": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json index 4d469200..e623204a 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "three and a half times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "three and a half times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -103,13 +103,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "168,038" + "text": "168,038 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "81,517" }, "female": { - "text": "86,521 (2024 est.)" + "text": "86,521" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/tb.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/tb.json index 8620b6d2..c89010db 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/tb.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/tb.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "less than one-eighth the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "less than one-eighth the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json index 5513ccb5..eeb12d53 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json @@ -107,13 +107,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "1,408,966" + "text": "1,408,966 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "708,260" }, "female": { - "text": "700,706 (2024 est.)" + "text": "700,706" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ "text": "26.8%" }, "expected date of next election": { - "text": "August 2025" + "text": "April 2025" } }, "Legislative branch - upper chamber": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json index 2cdea59c..19d0c1b1 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "2.5 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "2.5 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -97,13 +97,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "60,439" + "text": "60,439 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "30,389" }, "female": { - "text": "30,050 (2024 est.)" + "text": "30,050" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json index 42c6b8a3..5c9d90ae 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "more than twice the size of Washington, DC
" + "text": "more than twice the size of Washington, D.C.
" }, "Land boundaries": { "text": "0" @@ -89,13 +89,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "153,289" + "text": "153,289 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "73,755" }, "female": { - "text": "79,534 (2024 est.)" + "text": "79,534" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -800,10 +800,10 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "no regular military forces; Curacao Militia (CURMIL); Police Department for local law enforcement, supported by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (Gendarmerie), the Dutch Caribbean Police Force (Korps Politie Caribisch Nederland, KPCN), and the Dutch Caribbean Coast Guard (DCCG or Kustwacht Caribisch Gebied (KWCARIB)) (2024)" + "text": "no regular military forces; Curaçao Militia (CURMIL); Curaçao Volunteer Corps; Curacao Police Force (Korps Politie Curacao) (2025)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "defense is the responsibility of the Kingdom of the Netherlands; the Dutch Government controls foreign and defense policy; the Dutch Caribbean Coast Guard (DCCG) provides maritime security (2024)" + "text": "defense is the responsibility of the Kingdom of the Netherlands; the Dutch Government controls foreign and defense policy; local security forces are supported by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (Gendarmerie), the Dutch Caribbean Police Force (Korps Politie Caribisch Nederland, KPCN), and the Dutch Caribbean Coast Guard (DCCG or Kustwacht Caribisch Gebied (KWCARIB)); there are two Dutch naval bases on Curaçao, and the Dutch Army maintains a small unit on a rotational basis (2025)" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json index 932e6dda..c34f5eee 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "twice the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "twice the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -103,13 +103,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "100,647" + "text": "100,647 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "51,249" }, "female": { - "text": "49,398 (2024 est.)" + "text": "49,398" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json index 34f421e5..a20a3ab4 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ "note": "note: comprised of 16 inhabited and more than 20 uninhabited islands; includes the islands of Tortola, Anegada, Virgin Gorda, Jost van Dyke" }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about 0.9 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "about 0.9 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -98,13 +98,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "40,102" + "text": "40,102 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "19,042" }, "female": { - "text": "21,060 (2024 est.)" + "text": "21,060" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json index 9adce407..e5695055 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "twice the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "twice the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -97,13 +97,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "104,377" + "text": "104,377 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "49,520" }, "female": { - "text": "54,857 (2024 est.)" + "text": "54,857" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/central-asia/kg.json b/central-asia/kg.json index c2676240..542e1edf 100644 --- a/central-asia/kg.json +++ b/central-asia/kg.json @@ -109,13 +109,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "6,172,101" + "text": "6,172,101 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "3,021,318" }, "female": { - "text": "3,150,783 (2024 est.)" + "text": "3,150,783" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -140,9 +140,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Muslim 90% (majority Sunni), Christian 7% (Russian Orthodox 3%), other 3% (includes Jewish, Buddhist, Baha'i) (2017 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Kyrgyzstan is a sparsely populated country whose population is unevenly distributed. More than 50% of the population lives in or around the two cities of Bishkek and Osh and their surrounding districts, which together account for about 12% of the country’s area. Kyrgyzstan’s population continues to grow rapidly owing to its high fertility rate and the traditional preference for larger families, a low mortality rate, a growing share of women of reproductive age, and measures to support families with children. The country has a youthful age structure; over 45% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2022. Nevertheless, Kyrgyzstan is transitioning from an agricultural society with high fertility and mortality rates to an industrial society with lower fertility and mortality rates.
As part of the USSR, Kyrgyzstan’s rapid population growth was not problematic because its needs were redistributed among the Soviet States. As an independent state, however, population growth became burdensome. International labor migration continues to serve as a safety valve that decreases pressure on the labor market and resources (healthcare, education, and pensions), while also reducing poverty through much-needed remittances. The main destinations for labor migrants are Russia and Kazakhstan, where wages are higher; almost a third of Kyrgyzstan’s working-age population migrates to Russia alone. Outmigration was most pronounced in the 1990s, after the collapse of the USSR, when ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and Germans left Kyrgyzstan, changing the proportion of ethnic Kyrgyz in the country from barely 50% in 1992 to almost three-quarters today.
While Kyrgyzstan is a net emigration country, it does receive immigrants. The majority of immigrants are from the Commonwealth of Independent States – particularly Kazakhstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan – but more recent arrivals also include persons from China, Turkey, and Turkmenistan. Chinese immigrants work primarily in construction and gold mining, while Turkish immigrants mainly work in construction, trade, education, and services. Border areas between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan experience irregular migration, but many of these migrants plan to move on to Europe.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "29.1% (male 922,086/female 873,245)" @@ -488,7 +485,7 @@ "text": "Kyrgyzstan" }, "etymology": { - "text": "a combination of the Turkic words \"kyrg\" (forty) and \"-yz\" (tribes) with the Persian suffix \"-stan\" (country) creating the meaning \"Land of the Forty Tribes\"; the name refers to the 40 clans united by the mythic Kyrgyz hero, MANAS" + "text": "named for the local Kyrgyz people, with \"-stan\" coming from the Persian word ostan, meaning \"country;\" the Kyrgyz name may derive from the Turkic root words kir, or \"steppe,\" and gismek, \"to wander;\" the name is traditionally said to come from a combination of the Turkic words kyrg (forty) and -is (hundred), based on a tale about two tribes and the number of their tents" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/central-asia/kz.json b/central-asia/kz.json index 70f6a128..e9a407e3 100644 --- a/central-asia/kz.json +++ b/central-asia/kz.json @@ -112,13 +112,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "20,260,006" + "text": "20,260,006 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "9,817,172" }, "female": { - "text": "10,442,834 (2024 est.)" + "text": "10,442,834" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -144,9 +144,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Muslim 69.3%, Christian 17.2% (Orthodox 17%, other 0.2%), Buddhism 0.1%, other 0.1%, non-believers 2.3%, unspecified 11% (2021 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Nearly 40% of Kazakhstan’s population is under the age of 25. Like many former Soviet states, Kazakhstan’s total fertility rate (TFR) – the average number of births per woman – decreased after independence amidst economic problems and fell below replacement level, 2.1. However, in the late 2000s, as the economy improved and incomes rose, Kazakhstan experienced a small baby boom and TFR reached 2.5. TFR has since fallen and is now just over 2.1. Mortality rates are also decreasing and life expectancy is rising, signs that Kazakhstan’s demographic transition is progressing.
Kazakhstan has a diverse population consisting of Asian ethnic groups (predominantly Kazakhs, as well as Uzbeks, Uighurs, and Tatars) and ethnic Europeans (mainly Russians but also Ukrainians and Germans). Approximately two thirds of Kazakhstan’s population today is Kazakh. During the mid-20th century, as Kazakhstan industrialized, waves of ethnic Russians and deportees from other parts of the Soviet Union arrived. Eventually, the ethnic Russian population outnumbered the Kazakhs. In the 1990s, following Kazakhstan’s independence, Russian and other ethnic Europeans began emigrating, while some ethnic Kazakhs (referred to as Oralmans) returned to their homeland from neighboring countries, China, and Mongolia. As a result, the country’s ethnic make-up changed, and a Kazakh majority was reestablished.
In recent years, Kazakhstan has shifted from being mainly a migrant-sending country to a migrant-receiving country. Due to its oil-driven economic boom, Kazakhstan has become a more popular destination. The country needs highly skilled workers in the industrial, business, and education sectors and low-skilled labor in agriculture, markets, services, and construction. Kazakhstan is increasingly reliant on migrant workers, primarily from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, to fill its labor shortage. At the same time, highly skilled Kazakhs continue to emigrate, mostly to Russia, seeking higher salaries or further education.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "27.6% (male 2,883,200/female 2,712,772)" @@ -497,7 +494,7 @@ "text": "Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the name \"Kazakh\" may derive from the Turkic word \"kaz\" meaning \"to wander,\" recalling the Kazakh's nomadic lifestyle; the Persian suffix \"-stan\" means \"place of\" or \"country,\" so the word Kazakhstan literally means \"Land of the Wanderers\"" + "text": "the name may derive from the Turkic word kazak, meaning \"nomad;\" the Persian suffix -stan means \"place of\" or \"country\"" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/central-asia/rs.json b/central-asia/rs.json index 23390f91..69430151 100644 --- a/central-asia/rs.json +++ b/central-asia/rs.json @@ -127,13 +127,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "140,820,810" + "text": "140,820,810 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "65,496,805" }, "female": { - "text": "75,324,005 (2024 est.)" + "text": "75,324,005" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -660,8 +660,20 @@ "number of seats": { "text": "170 (all appointed)" }, + "scope of elections": { + "text": "Full renewal" + }, + "most recent election date": { + "text": "12/27/2020" + }, + "parties elected and seats per party": { + "text": "Niger Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS Tarayya) (80); Nigerien Democratic Movement for an African Federation (Moden Fa . Lumana Africa ) (19); Patriotic Movement for the Republic (MPR-JAMHURIYA) (13); National Movement for the Development of Society (MNSD) - Nassara (13); Other (41)" + }, "percentage of women in chamber": { "text": "18.5%" + }, + "expected date of next election": { + "text": "December 2025" } }, "Judicial branch": { diff --git a/central-asia/ti.json b/central-asia/ti.json index f55cdeca..a71f6e4d 100644 --- a/central-asia/ti.json +++ b/central-asia/ti.json @@ -104,13 +104,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "10,394,063" + "text": "10,394,063 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "5,221,818" }, "female": { - "text": "5,172,245 (2024 est.)" + "text": "5,172,245" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -136,9 +136,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Muslim 98% (Sunni 95%, Shia 3%) other 2% (2014 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Tajikistan has a youthful age structure with almost 50% of the population under the age of 25. As a Soviet republic, Tajikistan had the highest fertility rate in the Soviet Union. The total fertility rate – the average number of births per woman – was highest in the mid-1970s, when it reached 6.3. In an effort to expand populations to meet economic goals, the Soviets provided resources that made large families affordable. The fertility rate decreased to 5 by the time of independence in 1991 and continued to decline thereafter. In 1996, the Tajik Government discontinued subsidies for large families and having several children became too expensive. The loss of subsidies, the 5-year civil war that followed independence, and other factors caused fertility to continue to fall steadily, but it remains above replacement level at 2.5. The availability of healthcare providers and family planning services is limited, contributing to couples having more children than they would like. As of 2017, 21% of women were using contraceptives.
Tajikistan’s ethnic make-up changed with the Soviet’s introduction of industrialization. Large numbers of Russian and Ukrainian immigrants arrived in the mid-1920s. Some were forced to immigrate while others came voluntarily to work in the cotton industry and in Tajikistan’s Soviet Government. The Russian and Ukrainian immigrants formed urban communities, while Tajiks and Uzbeks continued to live predominantly in rural areas. In addition, thousands of Tatars and Germans were deported to Tajikistan, accused of Nazi complicity during WWII.
Tajikistan’s ethnic composition was later shaped by the post-independence civil war from 1992-1997 and the economic devastation that followed. Most non-Tajik ethnic groups, including Uzbeks, Russians, Kyrgyz, and Ukrainians, fled to Russia and other former Soviet republics and many never returned, making the country overwhelming Tajik; approximately 80% of the population was Tajik by 2000.
Since the mid-1990s, labor has probably been Tajikistan’s main export. Remittances accounted for 30% of GDP in 2018 and are Tajikistan’s largest source of external income. Poverty, a lack of jobs, and higher wages abroad push Tajiks to emigrate. Russia – particularly Moscow – is the main destination, while a smaller number of religious Muslims, usually of Uzbek ancestry, migrate to Uzbekistan. The vast majority of labor migrants are unskilled or low-skilled young men who work primarily in construction but also agriculture, transportation, and retail. Many Tajik families are dependent on the money they send home for necessities, such as food and clothing, as well as for education and weddings rather than investment.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "36.9% (male 1,953,472/female 1,877,192)" @@ -574,7 +571,7 @@ "text": "5 years" }, "most recent election date": { - "text": "3/1/2020" + "text": "3/2/2025" }, "parties elected and seats per party": { "text": "People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) (47); Agrarian Party of Tajikistan (APT) (7); Party of Economic Reforms of Tajikistan (PERT) (5); Other (4)" @@ -583,7 +580,7 @@ "text": "27%" }, "expected date of next election": { - "text": "March 2025" + "text": "March 2030" } }, "Legislative branch - upper chamber": { diff --git a/central-asia/tx.json b/central-asia/tx.json index d4e8a866..e6571aeb 100644 --- a/central-asia/tx.json +++ b/central-asia/tx.json @@ -109,13 +109,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "5,744,151" + "text": "5,744,151 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "2,842,870" }, "female": { - "text": "2,901,281 (2024 est.)" + "text": "2,901,281" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -140,9 +140,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Muslim 93%, Christian 6.4%, Buddhist <1%, folk religion <1%, Jewish <1%, other <1%, unspecified <1% (2020 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "While Turkmenistan reputedly has a population of more than 5.6 million, the figure is most likely considerably less. Getting an accurate population estimate for the country is impossible because then President Gurbanguly BERDIMUHAMEDOW withheld the results of the last two censuses. The 2012 census results reportedly show that nearly 2 million citizens have emigrated in the last decade, which prompted BERDIMUHAMEDOW to order another census. Results of this census, covering 2008-2018, also were not released to the public but purportedly are similar. Another census was held in December 2022.
Authorities have reacted to the dramatic population decline by preventing Turkmen from leaving the country, including removing citizens from international flights and refusing to provide necessary documents. Turkmenistan’s rise in outmigration – mainly to Turkey, Russia, and Uzbekistan – coincided with the country’s 2013-2014 economic crisis. The outflow has been sustained by poor living standards, inflation, low income, and a lack of health care. At the same time, Ashbagat is encouraging people to have more children to make up for its shrinking population.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "24.5% (male 711,784/female 692,967)" @@ -888,11 +885,11 @@ "note": "note: top five import commodities based on value in dollars" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": { - "text": "$24.91 billion (31 December 2017 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": { + "text": "$24.91 billion (2017 est.)" }, - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": { - "text": "$25.05 billion (31 December 2016 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": { + "text": "$25.05 billion (2016 est.)" } }, "Debt - external": { diff --git a/central-asia/uz.json b/central-asia/uz.json index 5beceb8a..98e99ff2 100644 --- a/central-asia/uz.json +++ b/central-asia/uz.json @@ -106,13 +106,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "36,520,593" + "text": "36,520,593 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "18,324,813" }, "female": { - "text": "18,195,780 (2024 est.)" + "text": "18,195,780" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json index 7e171b84..9c33949b 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json @@ -115,13 +115,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "57,527,139" + "text": "57,527,139 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "28,387,831" }, "female": { - "text": "29,139,308 (2024 est.)" + "text": "29,139,308" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -149,9 +149,6 @@ "text": "Buddhist 87.9%, Christian 6.2%, Muslim 4.3%, Animist 0.8%, Hindu 0.5%, other 0.2%, none 0.1% (2014 est.)", "note": "note: religion estimate is based on the 2014 national census, including an estimate for the non-enumerated population of Rakhine State, which is assumed to mainly affiliate with the Islamic faith; as of December 2019, Muslims probably make up less than 3% of Burma's total population due to the large outmigration of the Rohingya population since 2017" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Burma’s 2014 national census – the first in more than 30 years – revealed that the country’s total population is approximately 51.5 million, significantly lower than the Burmese Government’s prior estimate of 61 million. The Burmese Government assumed that the 2% population growth rate between 1973 and 1983 remained constant and that emigration was zero, ignoring later sample surveys showing declining fertility rates and substantial labor migration abroad in recent decades. These factors reduced the estimated average annual growth rate between 2003 and 2014 to about .9%. Among Southeast Asian countries, Burma’s life expectancy is among the lowest and its infant and maternal mortality rates are among the highest. The large difference in life expectancy between women and men has resulted in older age cohorts consisting of far more women than men.
Burma’s demographic transition began in the 1950s, when mortality rates began to drop. Fertility did not start to decrease until the 1960s, sustaining high population growth until the decline accelerated in the 1980s. The birth rate has held fairly steady from 2000 until today. Since the 1970s, the total fertility rate (TFR) has fallen more than 60%, from almost 6 children per woman to 2.2 in 2016. The reduced TFR is largely a result of women marrying later and more women never marrying, both being associated with greater educational attainment and labor force participation among women. TFR, however, varies regionally, between urban and rural areas, by educational attainment, and among ethnic groups, with fertility lowest in urban areas (where it is below replacement level).
The shift in Burma’s age structure has been slow (45% of the population is still under 25 years of age) and uneven among its socioeconomic groups. Any economic boost from the growth of the working-age population is likely to take longer to develop, to have a smaller impact, and to be distributed unequally. Rural poverty and unemployment continue to drive high levels of internal and international migration. The majority of labor migration is internal, mainly from rural to urban areas. The new government’s growing regional integration, reforms, and improved diplomatic relations are increasing the pace of international migration and destination choices. As many as 4-5 million Burmese, mostly from rural areas and several ethnic groups, have taken up unskilled jobs abroad in agriculture, fishing, manufacturing, and domestic service. Thailand is the most common destination, hosting about 70% of Burma’s international migrants, followed by Malaysia, China, and Singapore.
Burma is a patchwork of more than 130 religious and ethnic groups, distinguishing it as one of the most diverse countries in the region. Ethnic minorities face substantial discrimination, and the Rohingya, the largest Muslim group, are arguably the most persecuted population in the country. The Burmese Government and the Buddhist majority see the Rohingya as a threat to identity, competitors for jobs and resources, terrorists, and some still resent them for their alliance with Burma’s British colonizers during its 19th century. Since at least the 1960s, they have been subjected to systematic human rights abuses, violence, marginalization, and disenfranchisement, which authorities continue to deny. Despite living in Burma for centuries, many Burmese see the Rohingya as illegal Bengali immigrants and refer to them Bengalis. As a result, the Rohingya have been classified as foreign residents and stripped of their citizenship, rendering them one of the largest stateless populations in the world.
Hundreds of thousands of Burmese from various ethnic groups have been internally displaced (an estimated 644,000 as of year-end 2016) or have fled to neighboring countries over the decades because of persecution, armed conflict, rural development projects, drought, and natural disasters. Bangladesh has absorbed the most refugees from Burma, with an estimated 33,000 officially recognized and 200,000 to 500,000 unrecognized Rohingya refugees, as of 2016. An escalation in violation has caused a surge in the inflow of Rohingya refugees since late August 2017, raising the number to an estimated 870,000. As of June 2017, another approximately 132,500 refugees, largely Rohingya and Chin, were living in Malaysia, and more than 100,000, mostly Karen, were housed in camps along the Burma-Thailand border.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "24.4% (male 7,197,177/female 6,843,879)" @@ -1190,7 +1187,7 @@ "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { "text": "Burmese Defense Service (aka Armed Forces of Burma, Myanmar Army, Royal Armed Forces, the Tatmadaw, or the Sit-Tat): Army (Tatmadaw Kyi), Navy (Tatmadaw Yay), Air Force (Tatmadaw Lay); People’s MilitiaBrunei is a small, oil-rich sultanate of less than half a million people, making it the smallest country in Southeast Asia by population. Its total fertility rate – the average number of births per woman – has been steadily declining over the last few decades, from over 3.5 in the 1980s to below replacement level today at nearly 1.8. The trend is due to women’s increased years of education and participation in the workforce, which have resulted in later marriages and fewer children. Yet, the population continues to grow because of the large number of women of reproductive age and a reliance on foreign labor – mainly from Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and South Asian countries – to fill low-skilled jobs.
Brunei is officially Muslim, and Malay is the official language. The country follows an official Malay national ideology, Malay Islamic Monarchy, which promotes Malay language and culture, Islamic values, and the monarchy. Only seven of Brunei’s native groups are recognized in the constitution and are defined as “Malay” – Brunei Malays, Belait, Kedayan, Dusun, Bisayak, Lun Bawang, and Sama-Baiau. Together they make up about 66% percent of the population and are referred to as the Bumiputera. The Bumiputera are entitled to official privileges, including land ownership, access to certain types of employment (Royal Brunei Armed Forces and Brunei Shell Petroleum), easier access to higher education, and better job opportunities in the civil service.
Brunei’s Chinese population descends from migrants who arrived when Brunei was a British protectorate (1888 and 1984). They are prominent in the non-state commercial sector and account for approximately 10% of the population. Most Bruneian Chinese are permanent residents rather than citizens despite roots going back several generations. Many are stateless and are denied rights granted to citizens, such as land ownership, subsidized health care, and free secondary and university education. Because of the discriminatory policies, the number of Chinese in Brunei has shrunk considerably in the last 50 years. Native ethnic groups that are not included in the Bumiputera are not recognized in the constitution and are not officially identified as “Malay” or automatically granted citizenship. Foreign workers constitute some quarter of the labor force.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "21.7% (male 54,924/female 51,710)" @@ -1080,8 +1077,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) or Angkatan Bersenjata Diraja Brunei (ABDB): Royal Brunei Land Force (RBLF) or Tentera Darat Diraja Brunei (TDDB), Royal Brunei Navy (RBN) or Tentera Laut Diraja Brunei (TLDB),Cambodia is a predominantly rural country with among the most ethnically and religiously homogenous populations in Southeast Asia: more than 95% of its inhabitants are Khmer and more than 95% are Buddhist. The population’s size and age structure shrank and then rebounded during the 20th century as a result of conflict and mass death. During the Khmer Rouge regime between 1975 and 1979 as many as 1.5 to 2 million people are estimated to have been killed or died as a result of starvation, disease, or overwork – a loss of about 25% of the population. At the same time, emigration was high, and the fertility rate sharply declined. In the 1980s, after the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge, fertility nearly doubled and reached pre-Khmer Rouge levels of close to 7 children per woman, reflecting in part higher infant survival rates. The baby boom was followed by a sustained fertility decline starting in the early 1990s, eventually decreasing from 3.8 in 2000 to 2.9 in 2010, although the rate varied by income, education, and rural versus urban location. Despite continuing fertility reduction, Cambodia still has a youthful population that is likely to maintain population growth through population momentum. Improvements have also been made in mortality, life expectancy, and contraceptive prevalence, although reducing malnutrition among children remains stalled. Differences in health indicators are pronounced between urban and rural areas, which experience greater poverty.
Cambodia is predominantly a country of migration, driven by the search for work, education, or marriage. Internal migration is more prevalent than international migration, with rural to urban migration being the most common, followed by rural to rural migration. Urban migration focuses on the pursuit of unskilled or semi-skilled jobs in Phnom Penh, with men working mainly in the construction industry and women working in garment factories. Most Cambodians who migrate abroad do so illegally using brokers because it is cheaper and faster than through formal channels, but doing so puts them at risk of being trafficked for forced labor or sexual exploitation. Young Cambodian men and women migrate short distances across the Thai border using temporary passes to work in agriculture, while others migrate long distances primarily into Thailand and Malaysia for work in agriculture, fishing, construction, manufacturing, and domestic service. Cambodia was a refugee sending country in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of the brutality of the Khmer Rouge regime, its ousting by the Vietnamese invasion, and the resultant civil war. Tens of thousands of Cambodians fled to Thailand; more than 100,000 were resettled in the US in the 1980s. Cambodia signed a multi-million dollar agreement with Australia in 2014 to voluntarily resettle refugees seeking shelter in Australia. However, the deal has proven to be a failure because of poor conditions and a lack of support services for the few refugees willing to accept the offer.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "28.9% (male 2,497,056/female 2,436,618)" @@ -1171,7 +1168,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF): Royal Cambodian Army, Royal Khmer Navy, Royal Cambodian Air Force, Royal Gendarmerie; the National Committee for Maritime Security (2024)", + "text": "Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF): Royal Cambodian Army, Royal Khmer Navy, Royal Cambodian Air Force, Royal Gendarmerie (Military Police); National Committee for Maritime Security (2025)", "note": "note 1: the National Committee for Maritime Security performs coast guard functions and has representation from military and civilian agenciesIndonesia has the world’s fourth-largest population. It is predominantly Muslim and has the largest Muslim population of any country in the world. The population is projected to increase to as much as 320 million by 2045. A government-supported family planning program. The total fertility rate (TFR) – the average number of births per woman – from 5.6 in the mid-1960s to 2.7 in the mid-1990s. The success of the program was also due to the social acceptance of family planning, which received backing from influential Muslim leaders and organizations.
The fertility decline slowed in the late 1990’s when responsibility for family planning programs shifted to the district level, where the programs were not prioritized. Since 2012 the national government revitalized the national family planning program, and Indonesia’s TFR has slowly decreased to 2.3 in 2020. The government may reach its goal of achieving replacement level fertility – 2.1 children per woman – but the large number of women of childbearing age ensures significant population growth for many years.
Indonesia is a source country for labor migrants, a transit country for asylum seekers, and a destination mainly for highly skilled migrant workers. International labor migration, both legal and illegal, from Indonesia to other parts of Asia (most commonly Malaysia) and the Middle East has taken place for decades because of high unemployment and underemployment, poverty, and low wages domestically. Increasing numbers of migrant workers are drawn to Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the US. The majority of Indonesian labor migration is temporary and consists predominantly of low-skilled workers, mainly women working as domestics.
Indonesia’s strategic location between Asia and Australia and between the Pacific and Indian Oceans – and its relatively easy accessibility via boat – appeal to asylum seekers. It is also an attractive transit location because of its easy entry requirements and the ability to continue on to Australia. Recent asylum seekers have come from Afghanistan, Burma (Rohingyas), Iraq, Somalia, and Sri Lanka. Since 2013, when Australia tightening its immigration policy, thousands of migrants and asylum seekers have been stranded in Indonesia, where they live in precarious conditions and receive only limited support from international organizations. The situation for refugees in Indonesia has also worsened because Australia and the US, which had resettled the majority of refugees in Indonesia, have significantly lowered their intake.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "23.8% (male 34,247,218/female 32,701,367)" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json index bc62247f..27dc663f 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json @@ -110,13 +110,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "123,201,945" + "text": "123,201,945 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "59,875,269" }, "female": { - "text": "63,326,676 (2024 est.)" + "text": "63,326,676" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ "text": "Nihon/Nippon" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the English word for Japan comes via the Chinese name for the country \"Cipangu\"; both Nihon and Nippon mean \"where the sun originates\" and are frequently translated as \"Land of the Rising Sun\"" + "text": "the English word for Japan comes from the Chinese name for the country, Cipangu; both Nihon and Nippon come from the Japanese words nichi, or \"sun,\" and hon, or \"origin,\" which is frequently translated as \"Land of the Rising Sun\"" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json index 8e413306..df36a120 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json @@ -104,13 +104,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "26,298,666" + "text": "26,298,666 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "12,828,269" }, "female": { - "text": "13,470,397 (2024 est.)" + "text": "13,470,397" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -762,56 +762,56 @@ }, "Electricity": { "installed generating capacity": { - "text": "8.277 million kW (2022 est.)" + "text": "8.357 million kW (2023 est.)" }, "consumption": { - "text": "18.24 billion kWh (2022 est.)" + "text": "22.448 billion kWh (2023 est.)" }, "transmission/distribution losses": { - "text": "4.033 billion kWh (2022 est.)" + "text": "4.101 billion kWh (2023 est.)" } }, "Electricity generation sources": { "fossil fuels": { - "text": "42.1% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "36.9% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" }, "solar": { - "text": "0.3% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "0.6% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" }, "hydroelectricity": { - "text": "57.6% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "62.5% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" } }, "Coal": { "production": { - "text": "21.747 million metric tons (2022 est.)" + "text": "21.928 million metric tons (2023 est.)" }, "consumption": { - "text": "21.747 million metric tons (2022 est.)" + "text": "22.105 million metric tons (2023 est.)" }, "proven reserves": { - "text": "10.6 billion metric tons (2022 est.)" + "text": "10.6 billion metric tons (2023 est.)" } }, "Petroleum": { "refined petroleum consumption": { - "text": "17,000 bbl/day (2022 est.)" + "text": "18,000 bbl/day (2023 est.)" } }, "Carbon dioxide emissions": { "total emissions": { - "text": "61.605 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "55.744 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" }, "from coal and metallurgical coke": { - "text": "58.987 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "52.985 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" }, "from petroleum and other liquids": { - "text": "2.617 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "2.759 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" } }, "Energy consumption per capita": { - "Total energy consumption per capita 2022": { - "text": "25.876 million Btu/person (2022 est.)" + "Total energy consumption per capita 2023": { + "text": "23.83 million Btu/person (2023 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json index 8a160601..ae277603 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json @@ -109,13 +109,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "52,081,799" + "text": "52,081,799 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "26,119,111" }, "female": { - "text": "25,962,688 (2024 est.)" + "text": "25,962,688" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ "text": "ROK" }, "etymology": { - "text": "derived from the Chinese name for Goryeo, which was the Korean dynasty that united the peninsula in the 10th century A.D.; the South Korean name \"Han'guk\" derives from the long form, \"Taehan-min'guk,\" which is itself a derivation from \"Daehan-je'guk,\" which means \"the Great Empire of the Han\"; \"Han\" refers to the \"Sam'han\" or the \"Three Han Kingdoms\" (Goguryeo, Baekje, and Silla from the Three Kingdoms Era, 1st-7th centuries A.D.)" + "text": "derived from the Chinese name for Goryeo, which was the Korean dynasty that united the peninsula in the 10th century A.D.; the South Korean name \"Han'guk\" derives from the long form, \"Taehan-min'guk,\" which is itself a derivation from \"Daehan-je'guk,\" which means \"the Great Han Empire\"" } }, "Government type": { @@ -544,16 +544,16 @@ }, "Executive branch": { "chief of state": { - "text": "President YOON Suk Yeol (since 10 May 2022); note - Prime Minister HAN Duck-soo became Acting President on 14 December 2024 after the National Assembly impeached and suspended YOON from office (South Korea's Constitutional Court has 180 days to rule on YOON's removal); Deputy Prime Minister CHOI Sang-mok became Acting President on 27 December 2024 after the National Assembly impeached and suspended HAN from office; on 24 March 2025, the Constitutional Court dismissed the 27 December impeachment of HAN Duck-soo, reinstating him as prime minister and acting president" + "text": "Prime Minister HAN Duck-soo became Acting President on 14 December 2024 after the National Assembly impeached and suspended President YOON Suk Yeol (inaugurated 10 May 2022) from office; on 4 April 2025, the Constitutional Court confirmed YOON's impeachment and removal from office; under Article 68 of the Constitution, a new presidential election must be held within 60 days of the court's ruling" }, "head of government": { - "text": "President YOON Suk Yeol (since 10 May 2022); note - Prime Minister HAN Duck-soo became Acting President on 14 December 2024 after the National Assembly impeached and suspended YOON from office (South Korea's Constitutional Court has 180 days to rule on YOON's removal); Deputy Prime Minister CHOI Sang-mok became Acting President on 27 December 2024 after the National Assembly impeached and suspended HAN from office; on 24 March 2025, the Constitutional Court dismissed the 27 December impeachment of HAN Duck-soo, reinstating him as prime minister and acting president" + "text": "Prime Minister HAN Duck-soo became Acting President on 14 December 2024 after the National Assembly impeached and suspended President YOON Suk Yeol (inaugurated 10 May 2022) from office; on 4 April 2025, the Constitutional Court confirmed YOON's impeachment and removal from office" }, "cabinet": { "text": "State Council appointed by the president on the prime minister's recommendation" }, "elections/appointments": { - "text": "president directly elected by simple majority popular vote for a single 5-year term; election last held on 9 March 2022 (next to be held in March 2027); prime minister appointed by president with consent of the National Assembly" + "text": "president directly elected by simple majority popular vote for a single 5-year term; election last held on 9 March 2022 (next to be held by 3 June 2025); prime minister appointed by president with consent of the National Assembly" }, "election results": { "text": "2022: YOON Suk-yeol elected president; YOON Suk-yeol (PPP) 48.6%, LEE Jae-myung (DP) 47.8%; other 3.6%Laos is a predominantly rural country with a youthful population – almost 55% of the population is under the age of 25. Its progress on health and development issues has been uneven geographically, among ethnic groups, and socioeconomically. Laos has made headway in poverty reduction, with the poverty rate almost halving from 46% in 1992/93 to 22% in 2012/13. Nevertheless, pronounced rural-urban disparities persist, and income inequality is rising. Poverty most affects populations in rural and highland areas, particularly ethnic minority groups.
The total fertility rate (TFR) has decreased markedly from around 6 births per woman on average in 1990 to approximately 2.8 in 2016, but it is still one of the highest in Southeast Asia. TFR is higher in rural and remote areas, among ethnic minority groups, the less-educated, and the poor; it is lower in urban areas and among the more educated and those with higher incomes. Although Laos’ mortality rates have improved substantially over the last few decades, the maternal mortality rate and childhood malnutrition remain at high levels. As fertility and mortality rates continue to decline, the proportion of Laos’ working-age population will increase, and its share of dependents will shrink. The age structure shift will provide Laos with the potential to realize a demographic dividend during the next few decades, if it can improve educational access and quality and gainfully employ its growing working-age population in productive sectors. Currently, Laos primary school enrollment is nearly universal, but the drop-out rate remains problematic. Secondary school enrollment has also increased but remains low, especially for girls.
Laos has historically been a country of emigration and internal displacement due to conflict and a weak economy. The Laos civil war (1953 – 1975) mainly caused internal displacement (numbering in the hundreds of thousands). Following the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, indigenous people in remote, war-struck areas were resettled and more than 300,000 people fled to Thailand to escape the communist regime that took power. The majority of those who sought refuge in Thailand ultimately were resettled in the US (mainly Hmong who fought with US forces), and lesser numbers went to France, Canada, and Australia.
The Laos Government carried out resettlement programs between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s to relocate ethnic minority groups from the rural northern highlands to development areas in the lowlands ostensibly to alleviate poverty, make basic services more accessible, eliminate slash-and-burn agriculture and opium production, integrate ethnic minorities, and control rebel groups (including Hmong insurgents). For many, however, resettlement has exacerbated poverty, led to the loss of livelihoods, and increased food insecurity and mortality rates. As the resettlement programs started to wane in the second half of the 1990s, migration from the northern highlands to urban centers – chiefly the capital Vientiane – to pursue better jobs in the growing manufacturing and service sectors became the main type of relocation. Migration of villagers from the south seeking work in neighboring Thailand also increased. Thailand is the main international migration destination for Laotians because of the greater availability of jobs and higher pay than at home; nearly a million Laotian migrants were estimated to live in Thailand as of 2015.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "30.1% (male 1,214,429/female 1,181,845)" @@ -473,7 +470,7 @@ "text": "Lao People's Democratic Republic" }, "conventional short form": { - "text": "Laos " + "text": "Laos" }, "local long form": { "text": "Sathalanalat Paxathipatai Paxaxon Lao" @@ -485,7 +482,7 @@ "text": "Lao PDR" }, "etymology": { - "text": "name means \"Land of the Lao [people]\"" + "text": "name means \"Land of the Lao [people];\" it derives from the name of the country's founder, Lao" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json index 8b182f68..4268ff3a 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "less than one-sixth the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "less than one-sixth the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -86,13 +86,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "644,426" + "text": "644,426 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "304,988" }, "female": { - "text": "339,438 (2024 est.)" + "text": "339,438" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ "text": "Aomen (Chinese)/ Macau (Portuguese)" }, "etymology": { - "text": "name is thought to derive from the A-Ma Temple - built in 1488 and dedicated to Mazu, the goddess of seafarers and fishermen - which is referred to locally as \"Maa Gok\" - and in Portuguese became \"Macau\"; the Chinese name Aomen means \"inlet gates\"" + "text": "name derived from the Chinese ama-gao, or “Bay of Ama,” for Ama, the patron goddess of sailors" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json index 6aff0765..d2bda6a8 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json @@ -109,13 +109,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "3,281,676" + "text": "3,281,676 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "1,595,596" }, "female": { - "text": "1,686,080 (2024 est.)" + "text": "1,686,080" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ "text": "Outer Mongolia, Mongolian People's Republic" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the name means \"Land of the Mongols\" in Latin; the Mongolian name Mongol Uls translates as \"Mongol State\"" + "text": "name comes from the Mongol people, whose name derives from the Mongol root word mengu or mongu, meaning \"brave\" or \"unconquered;\" the Mongolian name Mongol Uls translates as \"Mongol State\"" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json index a8247fde..24456e95 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json @@ -106,13 +106,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "34,564,810" + "text": "34,564,810 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "17,666,212" }, "female": { - "text": "16,898,598 (2024 est.)" + "text": "16,898,598" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -138,9 +138,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Muslim (official) 63.5%, Buddhist 18.7%, Christian 9.1%, Hindu 6.1%, other (Confucianism, Taoism, other traditional Chinese religions) 0.9%, none/unspecified 1.8% (2020 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Malaysia’s multi-ethnic population consists of the bumiputera – Malays and other indigenous peoples – (62%), ethnic Chinese (21%), ethnic Indians (6%), and foreigners (10%). The majority of Malaysia’s ethnic Chinese and Indians trace their roots to the British colonialists’ recruitment of hundreds of thousands of Chinese and Indians as mine and plantation workers between the early-19th century and the 1930s. Most Malays have maintained their rural lifestyle, while the entrepreneurial Chinese have achieved greater wealth and economic dominance. In order to eradicate Malay poverty, the Malaysian Government in 1971 adopted policies that gave preference to the bumiputera in public university admissions, government jobs and contracts, and property ownership. Affirmative action continues to benefit well-off urban bumiputera but has done little to alleviate poverty for their more numerous rural counterparts. The policies have pushed ethnic Chinese and Indians to study at private or foreign universities (many do not return) and have created and sustained one of the world’s largest civil services, which is 85-90% Malay.
The country’s age structure has changed significantly since the 1960s, as fertility and mortality rates have declined. Malaysia’s total fertility rate (TFR) has dropped from 5 children per woman in 1970, to 3 in 1998, to 2.1 in 2015 as a result of increased educational attainment and labor participation among women, later marriages, increased use of contraception, and changes in family size preference related to urbanization. The TFR is higher among Malays, rural residents (who are mainly Malay), the poor, and the less-educated. Despite the reduced fertility rate, Malaysia’s population will continue to grow, albeit at a decreasing rate, for the next few decades because of its large number of reproductive-age women. The youth population has been shrinking, and the working-age population (15-64 year olds) has been growing steadily. Malaysia’s labor market has successfully absorbed the increasing number of job seekers, leading to sustained economic growth. However, the favorable age structure is changing, and around 2020, Malaysia will start to become a rapidly aging society. As the population ages, Malaysia will need to better educate and train its labor force, raise productivity, and continue to increase the number of women workers in order to further develop its economy.
More than 1.8 million Malaysians lived abroad as of 2015, including anywhere from 350,000 to 785,000 workers, more than half of whom have an advanced level of education. The vast majority of emigrants are ethnic Chinese, seeking better educational and job opportunities abroad because of institutionalized ethnic discrimination favoring the Malays. The primary destination country is nearby Singapore, followed by Bangladesh and Australia. Hundreds of thousands of Malaysians also commute across the causeway to Singapore daily for work.
Brain drain is an impediment to Malaysia’s goal of becoming a high-income country. The situation is compounded by a migrant inflow that is composed almost entirely of low-skilled laborers who work mainly in manufacturing, agriculture, and construction. Officially, Malaysia had about 1.8 million legal foreign workers as of mid-year 2017 – largely from Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, and Bangladesh – but as many as 3 to 4 million are estimated to be in the country illegally. Immigrants outnumber ethnic Indians and could supplant the ethnic Chinese as Malaysia’s second largest population group around 2035.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "22.2% (male 3,947,914/female 3,730,319)" @@ -481,7 +478,7 @@ "text": "British Malaya, Malayan Union, Federation of Malaya" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the name means \"Land of the Malays\"" + "text": "devised in the early 19th century by British geographers; the suffix -sia was added to the name of the Malay people to form a classical-style name; the name Malay may come from the Tamil word malai, meaning \"mountain\"" } }, "Government type": { @@ -601,6 +598,15 @@ "number of seats": { "text": "70 (26 indirectly elected; 44 appointed)" }, + "scope of elections": { + "text": "Full renewal" + }, + "most recent election date": { + "text": "11/8/2020" + }, + "parties elected and seats per party": { + "text": "National League for Democracy (NLD) (138); Other (23)" + }, "percentage of women in chamber": { "text": "16.1%" } diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/pf.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/pf.json index 54fa4250..572118d4 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/pf.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/pf.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "land area is about 13 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC" + "text": "land area is about 13 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "1,440 (July 2014 est.)" + "text": "1,440 (2024 est.)" }, "note": "note: Chinese activity has increased in recent years, particularly on Woody Island, where the population exceeds 1,000; some other islands have scattered Chinese garrisons" }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/pg.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/pg.json index d6bcddf0..ec9f9fee 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/pg.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/pg.json @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ "note": "note: includes 100 or so islets, coral reefs, and sea mounts scattered over an area of nearly 410,000 sq km (158,000 sq mi) of the central South China Sea" }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "land area is about seven times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC" + "text": "land area is about seven times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "(July 2021 est.) no indigenous inhabitants" + "text": "no indigenous inhabitants" }, "note": "note: scattered garrisons are occupied by military personnel of several claimant states" } diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json index 05e7a6b8..ede7f4ab 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json @@ -110,13 +110,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "10,046,233" + "text": "10,046,233 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "5,092,262" }, "female": { - "text": "4,953,971 (2024 est.)" + "text": "4,953,971" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json index 8e397354..d2c51dc2 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json @@ -108,13 +108,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "118,277,063" + "text": "118,277,063 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "59,227,092" }, "female": { - "text": "59,049,971 (2024 est.)" + "text": "59,049,971" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -140,9 +140,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Roman Catholic 78.8%, Muslim 6.4%, Iglesia ni Cristo 2.6%, other Christian 3.9%, other 8.2%, none/unspecified <0.1 (2020 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "The Philippines is an ethnically diverse country that is in the early stages of demographic transition. Its fertility rate has dropped steadily since the 1950s. The decline was more rapid after the introduction of a national population program in the 1970s in large part due to the increased use of modern contraceptive methods, but fertility has decreased more slowly in recent years. The country’s total fertility rate (TFR) – the average number of births per woman – dropped below 5 in the 1980s, below 4 in the 1990s, and below 3 in the 2010s. TFR continues to be above replacement level at 2.9 and even higher among the poor, rural residents, and the less-educated. Significant reasons for elevated TFR are the desire for more than two children, in part because children are a means of financial assistance and security for parents as they age, particularly among the poor.
The Philippines are the source of one of the world’s largest emigrant populations, much of which consists of legal temporary workers known as Overseas Foreign Workers or OFWs. As of 2019, there were 2.2 million OFWs. They work in a wide array of fields, most frequently in services (such as caregivers and domestic work), skilled trades, and construction but also in professional fields, including nursing and engineering. OFWs most often migrate to Middle Eastern countries, but other popular destinations include Hong Kong, China, and Singapore, as well as employment on ships. Filipino seafarers make up 35-40% of the world’s seafarers, as of 2014. Women OFWs, who work primarily in domestic services and entertainment, have outnumbered men since 1992.
Migration and remittances have been a feature of Philippine culture for decades. The government has encouraged and facilitated emigration, regulating recruitment agencies and adopting legislation to protect the rights of migrant workers. Filipinos began emigrating to the US and Hawaii early in the 20th century. In 1934, US legislation limited Filipinos to 50 visas per year except during labor shortages, causing emigration to plummet. It was not until the 1960s, when the US and other destination countries – Canada, Australia, and New Zealand – loosened their immigration policies, that Filipino emigration expanded and diversified. The government implemented an overseas employment program in the 1970s, promoting Filipino labor to Gulf countries needing more workers for their oil industries. Filipino emigration increased rapidly. The government had intended for international migration to be temporary, but a lack of jobs and poor wages domestically, the ongoing demand for workers in the Gulf countries, and new labor markets in Asia continue to spur Philippine emigration.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "30.2% (male 18,234,279/female 17,462,803)" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json index 5a1ba0dc..9f232d8a 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "slightly more than 3.5 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "slightly more than 3.5 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -97,13 +97,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "6,028,459" + "text": "6,028,459 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "3,013,630" }, "female": { - "text": "3,014,829 (2024 est.)" + "text": "3,014,829" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -130,9 +130,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Buddhist 31.1%, Christian 18.9%, Muslim 15.6%, Taoist 8.8%, Hindu 5%, other 0.6%, none 20% (2020 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Singapore has one of the lowest total fertility rates (TFR) in the world – an average of 1.15 children born per woman – and a rapidly aging population. Women’s expanded educations, widened aspirations, and a desire to establish careers has contributed to delayed marriage and smaller families. Most married couples have only one or two children in order to invest more in each child, including the high costs of education. In addition, more and more Singaporeans, particularly women, are staying single. Factors contributing to this trend are a focus on careers, long working hours, the high cost of living, and long waits for public housing. With fertility at such a low rate and rising life expectancy, the proportion of the population aged 65 or over is growing and the youth population is shrinking. Singapore is projected to experience one of the largest percentage point increases in the elderly share of the population at 21% between 2019 and 2050, according to the UN. The working-age population (aged 15-64) will gradually decrease, leaving fewer workers to economically support the elderly population.
Migration has played a key role in Singapore’s development. As Singapore’s economy expanded during the 19th century, more and more Chinese, Indian, and Malay labor immigrants arrived. Most of Singapore’s pre-World War II population growth was a result of immigration. During World War II, immigration came to a halt when the Japanese occupied the island but revived in the postwar years. Policy was restrictive during the 1950s and 1960s, aiming to protect jobs for residents by reducing the intake of low-skilled foreign workers and focusing instead on attracting professionals from abroad with specialist skills. Consequently, the nonresident share of Singapore’s population plummeted to less than 3%.
As the country industrialized, however, it loosened restrictions on the immigration of manual workers. From the 1980s through the 2000s, the foreign population continued to grow as a result of policies aimed at attracting foreign workers of all skill levels. More recently, the government has instituted immigration policies that target highly skilled workers. Skilled workers are encouraged to stay and are given the opportunity to become permanent residents or citizens. The country, however, imposes restrictions on unskilled and low-skilled workers to ensure they do not establish roots, including prohibiting them from bringing their families and requiring employers to pay a monthly foreign worker levy and security bond. The country has also become increasingly attractive to international students. The growth of the foreign-born population has continued to be rapid; as of 2015, the foreign-born composed 46% of the total population. At the same time, growing numbers of Singaporeans are emigrating for education and work experience in highly skilled sectors such finance, information technology, and medicine. Increasingly, the moves abroad are permanent.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "14.6% (male 455,536/female 424,969)" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json index 5b9f061d..38dae538 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json @@ -117,13 +117,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "69,920,998" + "text": "69,920,998 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "34,065,311" }, "female": { - "text": "35,855,687 (2024 est.)" + "text": "35,855,687" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -150,9 +150,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Buddhist 92.5%, Muslim 5.4%, Christian 1.2%, other 0.9% (includes animist, Confucian, Hindu, Jewish, Sikh, and Taoist) (2021 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Thailand has experienced a substantial fertility decline since the 1960s largely due to the nationwide success of its voluntary family planning program. In just one generation, the total fertility rate (TFR) shrank from 6.5 children per woman in the 1960s to below the replacement level of 2.1 in the late 1980s. Reduced fertility occurred among all segments of the Thai population, despite disparities between urban and rural areas in terms of income, education, and access to public services. The country’s “reproductive revolution” gained momentum in the 1970s as a result of the government’s launch of an official population policy to reduce population growth, the introduction of new forms of birth control, and the assistance of foreign non-government organizations. Contraceptive use rapidly increased as new ways were developed to deliver family planning services to Thailand’s then overwhelmingly rural population. The contraceptive prevalence rate increased from just 14% in 1970 to 58% in 1981 and has remained about 80% since 2000.
Thailand’s receptiveness to family planning reflects the predominant faith, Theravada Buddhism, which emphasizes individualism, personal responsibility, and independent decision-making. Thai women have more independence and a higher status than women in many other developing countries and are not usually pressured by their husbands or other family members about family planning decisions. Thailand’s relatively egalitarian society also does not have the son preference found in a number of other Asian countries; most Thai ideally want one child of each sex.
Because of its low fertility rate, increasing life expectancy, and growing elderly population, Thailand has become an aging society that will face growing labor shortages. The proportion of the population under 15 years of age has shrunk dramatically, the proportion of working-age individuals has peaked and is starting to decrease, and the proportion of elderly is growing rapidly. In the short-term, Thailand will have to improve educational quality to increase the productivity of its workforce and to compete globally in skills-based industries. An increasing reliance on migrant workers will be necessary to mitigate labor shortfalls.
Thailand is a destination, transit, and source country for migrants. It has 3-4 million migrant workers as of 2017, mainly providing low-skilled labor in the construction, agriculture, manufacturing, services, and fishing and seafood processing sectors. Migrant workers from other Southeast Asian countries with lower wages – primarily Burma and, to a lesser extent, Laos and Cambodia – have been coming to Thailand for decades to work in labor-intensive industries. Many are undocumented and are vulnerable to human trafficking for forced labor, especially in the fisheries industry, or sexual exploitation. A July 2017 migrant worker law stiffening fines on undocumented workers and their employers, prompted tens of thousands of migrants to go home. Fearing a labor shortage, the Thai Government has postponed implementation of the law until January 2018 and is rapidly registering workers. Thailand has also hosted ethnic minority refugees from Burma for more than 30 years; as of 2016, approximately 105,000 mainly Karen refugees from Burma were living in nine camps along the Thailand-Burma border.
Thailand has a significant amount of internal migration, most often from rural areas to urban centers, where there are more job opportunities. Low- and semi-skilled Thais also go abroad to work, mainly in Asia and a smaller number in the Middle East and Africa, primarily to more economically developed countries where they can earn higher wages.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "15.8% (male 5,669,592/female 5,394,398)" @@ -734,6 +731,9 @@ "selected World Heritage Site locales": { "text": "Historic City of Ayutthaya (c); Historic Sukhothai and Associated Historic Towns (c); Thungyai-Huai Kha Khaeng Wildlife Sanctuaries (n); Ban Chiang Archaeological Site (c); Dong Phayayen-Khao Yai Forest Complex (n); Kaeng Krachan Forest Complex (n); The Ancient Town of Si Thep and its Associated Dvaravati Monuments (n); Phu Phrabat, a testimony to the Sīma stone tradition of the Dvaravati period (c)
" } + }, + "National coat of arms": { + "text": "In 1911, King Vajiravudh (Rama VI) of Thailand officially adopted the Garuda as the national coat of arms and emblem. This mythological half-man, half-bird figure from the Hindu and Buddhist traditions is considered the vahana (vehicle) of the god Vishnu (Narayana) and was a symbol of royalty in Thailand for centuries.
" } }, "Economy": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json index 86e8dd9f..9ab9e326 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json @@ -103,13 +103,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "1,506,909" + "text": "1,506,909 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "750,665" }, "female": { - "text": "756,244 (2024 est.)" + "text": "756,244" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -130,9 +130,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Roman Catholic 97.6%, Protestant/Evangelical 2%, Muslim 0.2%, other 0.2% (2015 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Timor-Leste’s high fertility and population growth rates sustain its very youthful age structure – approximately 40% of the population is below the age of 15 and the country’s median age is 20. While Timor-Leste’s total fertility rate (TFR) – the average number of births per woman – decreased significantly from over 7 in the early 2000s, it remains high at 4.3 in 2021 and will probably continue to decline slowly. The low use of contraceptives and the traditional preference for large families is keeping fertility elevated. The high TFR and falling mortality rates continue to fuel a high population growth rate of nearly 2.2%, which is the highest in Southeast Asia. The country’s high total dependency ratio – a measure of the ratio of dependents to the working-age population – could divert more government spending toward social programs. Timor-Leste’s growing, poorly educated working-age population and insufficient job creation are ongoing problems. Some 70% of the population lives in rural areas, where most of people are dependent on the agricultural sector. Malnutrition and poverty are prevalent, with 42% of the population living under the poverty line as of 2014.
During the Indonesian occupation (1975-1999) and Timor-Leste’s fight for independence, approximately 250,000 Timorese fled to western Timor and, in lesser numbers, Australia, Portugal, and other countries. Many of these emigrants later returned. Since Timor-Leste’s 1999 independence referendum, economic motives and periods of conflict have been the main drivers of emigration. Bilateral labor agreements with Australia, Malaysia, and South Korea and the presence of Timorese populations abroad, are pull factors, but the high cost prevents many young Timorese from emigrating. Timorese communities are found in its former colonizers, Indonesia and Portugal, as well as the Philippines and the UK. The country has also become a destination for migrants in the surrounding region, mainly men seeking work in construction, commerce, and services in Dili.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "38.7% (male 299,929/female 283,416)" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json index af6738d8..5131eb5b 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json @@ -101,13 +101,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "23,595,274" + "text": "23,595,274 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "11,606,491" }, "female": { - "text": "11,988,783 (2024 est.)" + "text": "11,988,783" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -740,11 +740,11 @@ "note": "note: top five import commodities based on value in dollars" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": { - "text": "$456.7 billion (31 December 2017 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": { + "text": "$456.7 billion (2017 est.)" }, - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": { - "text": "$439 billion (31 December 2016 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": { + "text": "$439 billion (2016 est.)" } }, "Exchange rates": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json index 1846f054..d6b89f12 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json @@ -115,13 +115,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "105,758,975" + "text": "105,758,975 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "53,109,175" }, "female": { - "text": "52,649,800 (2024 est.)" + "text": "52,649,800" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -148,9 +148,6 @@ "text": "Catholic 6.1%, Buddhist 5.8%, Protestant 1%, other 0.8%, none 86.3% (2019 est.)", "note": "note: most Vietnamese are culturally Buddhist" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "When Vietnam was reunified in 1975, the country had a youthful age structure and a high fertility rate. The population growth rate slowed dramatically during the next 25 years, as fertility declined and infant mortality and life expectancy improved. The country’s adoption of a one-or-two-child policy in 1988 led to increased rates of contraception and abortion. The total fertility rate dropped rapidly from nearly 5 in 1979 to 2.1 or replacement level in 1990, and at 1.8 is below replacement level today. Fertility is higher in the more rural central highlands and northern uplands, which are inhabited primarily by poorer ethnic minorities, and is lower among the majority Kinh, ethnic Chinese, and a few other ethnic groups, particularly in urban centers. With more than two-thirds of the population of working age (15-64), Vietnam has the potential to reap a demographic dividend for approximately three decades (between 2010 and 2040). However, its ability to do so will depend on improving the quality of education and training for its workforce and creating jobs. The Vietnamese Government is also considering changes to the country’s population policy because if the country’s fertility rate remains below replacement level, it could lead to a worker shortage in the future.
Vietnam has experienced both internal migration and net emigration, both for humanitarian and economic reasons, for the last several decades. Internal migration – rural-rural and rural-urban, temporary and permanent – continues to be a means of coping with Vietnam’s extreme weather and flooding. Although Vietnam’s population is still mainly rural, increasing numbers of young men and women have been drawn to the country’s urban centers where they are more likely to find steady jobs and higher pay in the growing industrial and service sectors.
The aftermath of the Vietnam War in 1975 resulted in an outpouring of approximately 1.6 million Vietnamese refugees over the next two decades. Between 1975 and 1997, programs such as the Orderly Departure Program and the Comprehensive Plan of Action resettled hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese refugees abroad, including the United States (880,000), China (260,000, mainly ethnic Chinese Hoa), Canada (160,000), Australia (155,000), and European countries (150,000).
In the 1980s, some Vietnamese students and workers began to migrate to allied communist countries, including the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and East Germany. The vast majority returned home following the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. Since that time, Vietnamese labor migrants instead started to pursue opportunities in Asia and the Middle East. They often perform low-skilled jobs under harsh conditions for low pay and are vulnerable to forced labor, including debt bondage to the private brokers who arrange the work contracts. Despite Vietnam’s current labor surplus, the country has in recent years attracted some foreign workers, mainly from China and other Asian countries.
Modern immigration to Denmark began in the 1960s and 1970s, although immigration, primarily from the Nordic countries and Western Europe, has earlier roots. Dutch migrants came in the 16th century and Germans in the 18th, in both cases to work in agriculture. Between the late 19th century and World War I, Denmark absorbed unskilled Polish, German, and Swedish labor migrants in significant numbers, sometimes at the request of the Danish Government. Between the two World Wars, Denmark received many Eastern European, Jewish, and German migrants. It wasn’t until after World War II, that refugees began seeking sanctuary in Demark, including a large number of German refugees and later Hungarians, Czechs, and Polish Jews. Denmark also imported foreign labor during the 1960s, mainly from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, and Pakistan. Although the “guest worker” program was halted in 1973, immigrants continued to arrive to be reunited with family members who were already in Denmark as refugees or as guest workers. Non-European refugees came from Chile, Uganda, and Vietnam. In the 1990s, Denmark began receiving migrants and refugees from new places, including Russia, Hungary, Bosnia, Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. Despite raising more restrictions on immigration, in the 2000s, Denmark continued to receive asylum seekers, particularly from Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia, as well as labor migrants from new EU member states.
In more recent years, Denmark has severely limited its refugee intake, aiming to accept as few refugees outside of the UN resettlement program as possible. In the mid-2010s, Denmark passed legislation enabling it to withdraw temporary protective status as soon as conditions in the home country, as determined by Denmark, have improved. This policy has lead Denmark, to deem Damascus and other areas in Syria safe for return, making it the only country in Europe to do so. Consequently, some Syrian refugees have had their residency status revoked, and they are detained in deportation centers because Denmark does not have diplomatic relations with Syria and, therefore, cannot send them back. Copenhagen hopes its stricter policies will discourage asylum seekers, particularly those from non-Western countries.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "16.2% (male 496,793/female 471,018)" @@ -1186,7 +1183,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Danish Armed Forces (Forsvaret): Royal Danish Army, Royal Danish Navy, Royal Danish Air Force, Danish Home Guard (Reserves) (2024)" + "text": "Danish Armed Forces (Forsvaret): Royal Danish Army, Royal Danish Navy, Royal Danish Air Force (2025)" }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2024": { @@ -1219,7 +1216,7 @@ "text": "approximately 800 Latvia (NATO); Denmark contributes small numbers of air, ground, and naval forces to a variety of other NATO and international missions (2024)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the Danish Armed Forces (Forsvaret) have a variety of missions, including enforcing the country’s sovereignty, monitoring Danish waters and airspace, search and rescue, environmental protection, host nation support for alliance partners, international peacekeeping, fulfilling Denmark’s commitments to NATO, and providing assistance to the police for border control, guard tasks, air surveillance, and during national disasters and other emergenciesFinland has a relatively high fertility rate for Europe at about 1.75 children per woman in 2023. Finnish women have high labor force participation rates, and their educational attainment is higher than that of Finnish men. Finland’s family policy, like other Nordic countries, puts an emphasis on reconciling work and family life. Both parents can stay at home with an earnings-based allowance until the baby is about 11 months old. Finland also has a publicly subsidized childcare system. Alternatively, parents can choose to take care of a small child through home care leave with a flat allowance rate. These benefits have encouraged fathers to do a greater share of housework and childcare, although women still perform the lion’s share of domestic work. In other instances, women have reduced the burden of household work by outsourcing domestic chores, rather than men taking on more of the responsibilities. Finland has high family size ideals compared to other European countries, and childlessness and one-child families are not favored. The proportion of couples having at least three children has been growing since the 1970s.
Finland has historically been a country of emigration. In the 20th century, Finns emigrated largely in two waves. Before World War II, the majority of Finns went to North America, and after World War II most went to Sweden, where industrialization was generating much-needed jobs that offered higher salaries and a better standard of living. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Finnish returnees (mainly from Sweden) began to outnumber Finnish emigrants. Also arriving in Finland between April 1990 and 2010, were Ingrian Finns – descendants of ethnic Finns who settled near St. Petersburg, Russia, in the 17th century – who immigrated to Finland under the Right of Return Law. In addition, the country has absorbed immigrants from Russia, Estonia, the former Yugoslavia, and Sweden for a variety of reasons, most commonly for marriage and family reunification. Finland has also accepted refugees and asylum seekers from Somalia, Iraq, China, and Thailand.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "16.2% (male 464,939/female 444,585)" diff --git a/europe/fo.json b/europe/fo.json index 3c073540..02661a55 100644 --- a/europe/fo.json +++ b/europe/fo.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "eight times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "eight times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -97,13 +97,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "52,933" + "text": "52,933 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "27,400" }, "female": { - "text": "25,533 (2024 est.)" + "text": "25,533" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/europe/fr.json b/europe/fr.json index 7752e5ab..2d25dcde 100644 --- a/europe/fr.json +++ b/europe/fr.json @@ -133,13 +133,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "68,374,591" + "text": "68,374,591 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "33,557,094" }, "female": { - "text": "34,817,497 (2024 est.)" + "text": "34,817,497" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/europe/gi.json b/europe/gi.json index 7fbd04c6..edb7cc16 100644 --- a/europe/gi.json +++ b/europe/gi.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "more than 10 times the size of The National Mall in Washington, D.C." + "text": "more than 10 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -85,13 +85,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "29,683" + "text": "29,683 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "14,919" }, "female": { - "text": "14,764 (2024 est.)" + "text": "14,764" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/europe/gk.json b/europe/gk.json index e20456c8..b2814bd8 100644 --- a/europe/gk.json +++ b/europe/gk.json @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ "note": "note: includes Alderney, Guernsey, Herm, Sark, and some other smaller islands" }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about one-half the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "about one-half the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -95,13 +95,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "67,787" + "text": "67,787 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "33,712" }, "female": { - "text": "34,075 (2024 est.)" + "text": "34,075" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/europe/gm.json b/europe/gm.json index fe6cf445..cae5b77a 100644 --- a/europe/gm.json +++ b/europe/gm.json @@ -120,13 +120,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "84,119,100" + "text": "84,119,100 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "41,572,702" }, "female": { - "text": "42,546,398 (2024 est.)" + "text": "42,546,398" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ "text": "2/23/2025" }, "parties elected and seats per party": { - "text": "Social Democratic Party (SPD) (206); Christian Democratic Union (CDU) (152); Green Party (118); Free Democratic Party (FDP) (92); Alternative for Germany (AfD) (83); Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU) (45); Left Party (Die Linke) (39); Other (1)" + "text": "Christian Democratic Union (CDU) (164); Alternative for Germany (AfD) (152); Social Democratic Party (SPD) (120); Green Party (85); Left Party (Die Linke) (64); Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU) (44); Other (1)" }, "percentage of women in chamber": { "text": "32.4%" @@ -630,6 +630,12 @@ "number of seats": { "text": "69 (all appointed)" }, + "scope of elections": { + "text": "Full renewal" + }, + "most recent election date": { + "text": "11/8/2020" + }, "percentage of women in chamber": { "text": "34.8%" } diff --git a/europe/gr.json b/europe/gr.json index 839f86de..7abe6841 100644 --- a/europe/gr.json +++ b/europe/gr.json @@ -104,13 +104,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "10,461,091" + "text": "10,461,091 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "5,117,862" }, "female": { - "text": "5,343,229 (2024 est.)" + "text": "5,343,229" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/europe/hr.json b/europe/hr.json index 6b26341e..ccf1334d 100644 --- a/europe/hr.json +++ b/europe/hr.json @@ -109,13 +109,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "4,150,116" + "text": "4,150,116 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "2,003,431" }, "female": { - "text": "2,146,685 (2024 est.)" + "text": "2,146,685" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -1197,7 +1197,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia (Oruzane Snage Republike Hrvatske, OSRH): Ground Forces (Hrvatska Kopnena Vojska, HKoV), Naval Forces (Hrvatska Ratna Mornarica, HRM; includes Coast Guard), Air Force (Hrvatsko Ratno Zrakoplovstvo, HRZ) (2024)", + "text": "Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia (Oruzane Snage Republike Hrvatske, OSRH): Croatian Army (Hrvatska Kopnena Vojska, HKoV), Croatian Navy (Hrvatska Ratna Mornarica, HRM; includes Coast Guard), Croatian Air Force (Hrvatsko Ratno Zrakoplovstvo, HRZ) (2025)", "note": "note: the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for internal security, including law enforcement (Croatia Police) and border security" }, "Military expenditures": { diff --git a/europe/hu.json b/europe/hu.json index ce59efd3..421a2b83 100644 --- a/europe/hu.json +++ b/europe/hu.json @@ -106,13 +106,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "9,855,745" + "text": "9,855,745 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "4,812,668" }, "female": { - "text": "5,043,077 (2024 est.)" + "text": "5,043,077" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ "text": "Kingdom of Hungary, Hungarian People's Republic, Hungarian Soviet Republic, Hungarian Republic" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the Byzantine Greeks refered to the tribes that arrived on the steppes of Eastern Europe in the 9th century as the \"Oungroi,\" a name that was later Latinized to \"Ungri\" and which became \"Hungari\"; the name originally meant an \"[alliance of] ten tribes\"; the Hungarian name \"Magyarorszag\" means \"Country of the Magyars\"; the term may derive from the most prominent of the Hungarian tribes, the Megyer" + "text": "the Byzantine Greeks referred to the tribes that arrived on the steppes of Eastern Europe in the 9th century as the \"Oungroi,\" a name that later became \"Hungari,\" which originally meant an \"[alliance of] ten tribes;\" the Hungarian name Magyarorszag means \"Country of the Magyars,\" which may be derived from the name of the most prominent of the Hungarian tribes" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/europe/ic.json b/europe/ic.json index f60d6d5b..8caf8395 100644 --- a/europe/ic.json +++ b/europe/ic.json @@ -103,13 +103,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "364,036" + "text": "364,036 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "182,268" }, "female": { - "text": "181,768 (2024 est.)" + "text": "181,768" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -130,9 +130,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Evangelical Lutheran Church of Iceland (official) 58.6% Roman Catholic 3.8%, Independent Congregation of Reykjavik 2.6%, Independent Congregation of Hafnarfjordur 1.9%, pagan worship 1.5%, Icelandic Ethical Humanist Association 1.4%, other (includes Zuist and Pentecostal) or unspecified 18.7%, none 7.7% (2024 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Iceland is one of the most gender-equal countries in the world. Its welfare policies enable both men and women to balance work and family life. Iceland lagged its Nordic neighbors in introducing new childcare policies, and even when they did in the 1990s, parents still faced a childcare gap between the paid parental leave period and the start of pre-school. The female labor participation rate continued to grow from the 1960s to the 2000s, as women’s educational attainment increased. Icelanders are marrying later, if they marry at all, and people are having children later. The interval between births has decreased. Non-marital cohabitation and childbearing outside of marriage are common. Approximately 2 out of 3 children are born out of wedlock, which is among the highest in Europe. Iceland’s total fertility rate (TFR) has been fairly stable, hovering around replacement level (2.1 children per woman), for decades – a rate higher even than its Nordic neighbors.
Iceland has fluctuated over time between being a country of net emigration and one of net immigration. Most Icelandic emigrants return to their native country after a few years. From 1960 to 1996, Iceland registered a net outflow, followed by a net inflow until the 2008 banking crisis. During and after the crisis, more Icelanders left the country than immigrated to it. Following the crisis, Iceland returned to being a country of net immigration. In 2017, the country’s foreign-born population accounted for 11% of the population and 17% had an immigrant background. The countries of origin have become more diverse over time, with Polish immigrants composing the largest share in 2017. Foreigners acquiring Icelandic citizenship must have a basic comprehension of the Icelandic language. The requirement that new citizens modify or change their names to be more Icelandic was dropped in 1996. The most popular emigration destination was Sweden, followed by Denmark and Norway in 2021.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "19.8% (male 36,692/female 35,239)" @@ -470,7 +467,7 @@ "text": "Island" }, "etymology": { - "text": "Floki VILGERDARSON, an early Norse explorer of the island (9th century), applied the name \"Land of Ice\" after spotting a fjord full of drift ice to the north and spending a bitter winter on the island; he eventually settled on the island, however, after he saw how it greened up in the summer and that it was, in fact, habitable" + "text": "Floki VILGERDARSON, an early Norse explorer of the island in the 10th century, applied the name \"Land of Ice,\" from the local words ís (ice) and land (land)" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/europe/im.json b/europe/im.json index 0d2bcd3b..7402ea3d 100644 --- a/europe/im.json +++ b/europe/im.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "slightly more than three times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "slightly more than three times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -97,13 +97,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "92,269" + "text": "92,269 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "46,331" }, "female": { - "text": "45,938 (2024 est.)" + "text": "45,938" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -350,11 +350,14 @@ "conventional short form": { "text": "Isle of Man" }, + "local long form": { + "text": "Ellan Vannin" + }, "abbreviation": { "text": "I.O.M." }, "etymology": { - "text": "the name \"man\" may be derived from the Celtic word for \"mountain\"" + "text": "the name \"man\" may be derived from the Gaelic word for \"mountain;\" the local name is from the words ellan, or \"island,\" and Vannin, a form of the name Mannan" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/europe/it.json b/europe/it.json index 7bec3fa4..cb8c1da1 100644 --- a/europe/it.json +++ b/europe/it.json @@ -107,13 +107,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "60,964,931" + "text": "60,964,931 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "29,414,065" }, "female": { - "text": "31,550,866 (2024 est.)" + "text": "31,550,866" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ "text": "Kingdom of Italy" }, "etymology": { - "text": "derivation is unclear, but the Latin \"Italia\" may come from the Oscan \"Viteliu\" meaning \"[Land] of Young Cattle\" (the bull was a symbol of southern Italic tribes)" + "text": "derivation is unclear; traditionally said to come from the Vitali, a tribe that settled in what is now Calabria, and whose name is believed to be linked to the Latin word vitulus, or \"calf;\" alternatively, the name may derive from a local ruler known to the Romans as Italus" } }, "Government type": { @@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ "text": "Prime Minister Giorgia MELONI (since 22 October 2022); the prime minister's official title is President of the Council of Ministers" }, "cabinet": { - "text": "Council of Ministers proposed by the prime minister, known officially as the President of the Council of Ministers and locally as the Premier; nominated by the president" + "text": "Council of Ministers proposed by the prime minister, who is known officially as the President of the Council of Ministers and locally as the Premier; nominated by the president" }, "elections/appointments": { "text": "president indirectly elected by an electoral college consisting of both houses of Parliament and 58 regional representatives for a 7-year term (no term limits); election last held on 24-29 January 2022 (eight rounds) (next to be held in 2029); prime minister appointed by the president, confirmed by parliament" diff --git a/europe/je.json b/europe/je.json index 656c0085..d24c02a3 100644 --- a/europe/je.json +++ b/europe/je.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about two-thirds the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "about two-thirds the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -97,13 +97,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "103,387" + "text": "103,387 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "51,028" }, "female": { - "text": "52,359 (2024 est.)" + "text": "52,359" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ "text": "Norman Isles" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the name is of Old Norse origin, but the meaning of the root \"Jer(s)\" is uncertain; the \"-ey\" ending means \"island\"" + "text": "the name is of Old Norse origin, with -ey meaning \"island;\" \"Jer(s)\" may derive from a person with the Scandinavian name Geirr, meaning \"spear\"" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/europe/jn.json b/europe/jn.json index fa97d88b..56b1e287 100644 --- a/europe/jn.json +++ b/europe/jn.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "slightly more than twice the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "slightly more than twice the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ "text": "Haakon VII Toppen on Beerenberg 2,277" }, "lowest point": { - "text": "Norwegian Sea 0 m" + "text": "Norwegian/Greenland Seas 0 m" }, "note": "note: Beerenberg volcano has numerous peaks; the highest point on the volcano rim is named Haakon VII Toppen, after Norway's first king following the reestablishment of Norwegian independence in 1905" }, diff --git a/europe/kv.json b/europe/kv.json index 3fcb1d2b..e9ede315 100644 --- a/europe/kv.json +++ b/europe/kv.json @@ -98,13 +98,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "1,977,093" + "text": "1,977,093 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "1,017,992" }, "female": { - "text": "959,101 (2024 est.)" + "text": "959,101" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ "text": "Kosove (Albanian)/ Kosovo (Serbian)" }, "etymology": { - "text": "name derives from the Serbian \"kos\" meaning \"blackbird,\" an ellipsis (linguistic omission) for \"kosove polje\" or \"field of the blackbirds\"" + "text": "name may derive from the Serbian word kos, meaning \"blackbird,\" or from a personal name" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/europe/lg.json b/europe/lg.json index 5b2fe587..fadb5ab2 100644 --- a/europe/lg.json +++ b/europe/lg.json @@ -107,13 +107,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "1,801,246" + "text": "1,801,246 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "836,982" }, "female": { - "text": "964,264 (2024 est.)" + "text": "964,264" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ "text": "Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic (while occupied by the USSR)" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the name \"Latvia\" originates from the ancient Latgalians, one of four eastern Baltic tribes that formed the ethnic core of the Latvian people (ca. 8th-12th centuries A.D.)" + "text": "the name originates from the Latgalians, one of four eastern Baltic tribes that formed the ethnic core of the Latvian people (ca. 8th-12th centuries A.D.)" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/europe/lh.json b/europe/lh.json index 6ee792cb..5c1e34f3 100644 --- a/europe/lh.json +++ b/europe/lh.json @@ -105,13 +105,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "2,628,186" + "text": "2,628,186 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "1,214,994" }, "female": { - "text": "1,413,192 (2024 est.)" + "text": "1,413,192" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ "text": "Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (while occupied by the USSR)" }, "etymology": { - "text": "meaning of the name \"Lietuva\" remains unclear and is debated by scholars; it may derive from the Lietava, a stream in east central Lithuania" + "text": "meaning of the name is obscure; may be derived from the local words lietava, meaning \"small river,\" or lietus, meaning \"rain\" or \"land of rain,\" or the Latin word litus, meaning \"shore\"" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/europe/lo.json b/europe/lo.json index 0e99b9c3..090bc468 100644 --- a/europe/lo.json +++ b/europe/lo.json @@ -104,13 +104,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "5,563,649" + "text": "5,563,649 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "2,684,747" }, "female": { - "text": "2,878,902 (2024 est.)" + "text": "2,878,902" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/europe/ls.json b/europe/ls.json index ae0ccd02..0ab459f4 100644 --- a/europe/ls.json +++ b/europe/ls.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about 0.9 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "about 0.9 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -98,13 +98,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "40,272" + "text": "40,272 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "20,072" }, "female": { - "text": "20,200 (2024 est.)" + "text": "20,200" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ "text": "Liechtenstein" }, "etymology": { - "text": "named after the Liechtenstein dynasty that purchased and united the counties of Schellenburg and Vaduz and that was allowed by the Holy Roman Emperor in 1719 to rename the new property after their family; the name in German means \"light (bright) stone\"" + "text": "named after the Liechtenstein family that purchased and united the counties of Schellenburg and Vaduz in 1719; the family name was taken from its Austrian castle of the same name, which in German means \"light stone\"" } }, "Government type": { @@ -508,16 +508,16 @@ "text": "4 years" }, "most recent election date": { - "text": "9 February 2025" + "text": "2/9/2025" }, "parties elected and seats per party": { "text": "Patriotic Union (VU) (10); Progressive Citizens' Party (FBP) (10); Free List (FL) (3); Democrats for Liechtenstein (DpL) (2)" }, "percentage of women in chamber": { - "text": "28%" + "text": "32%" }, "expected date of next election": { - "text": "28 February 2029" + "text": "February 2029" } }, "Judicial branch": { @@ -573,6 +573,9 @@ "text": "Jakob Joseph JAUCH/Josef FROMMELT" }, "note": "note: adopted 1850, revised 1963; uses the tune of \"God Save the King\"" + }, + "National coat of arms": { + "text": "The six motifs on Liechtenstein‘s coat of arms provide a history of the royal House of Liechtenstein since 1719, when the country was founded. The small shield at the center is the royal family’s gold-and-red coat of arms, the gold-crowned eagle signifies the Silesia family, the diamond wreath represents the Kuenringer family, the red-and-silver shield is the Duchy of Troppau, the black eagle comes from the coat of arms of a family that married into the royal line, and the golden hunting horn represents the Duchy of Jägerndorf.
" } }, "Economy": { diff --git a/europe/lu.json b/europe/lu.json index b96917a3..68628a68 100644 --- a/europe/lu.json +++ b/europe/lu.json @@ -101,13 +101,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "671,254" + "text": "671,254 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "338,702" }, "female": { - "text": "332,552 (2024 est.)" + "text": "332,552" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ "text": "Luxembourg" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the name derives from the Celtic \"lucilem\" (little) and the German \"burg\" (castle or fortress) to produce the meaning of the \"little castle\"; the name is actually ironic, since for centuries the Fortress of Luxembourg was one of Europe's most formidable fortifications; the name passed to the surrounding city and then to the country itself" + "text": "probably derived from an early Celtic or Germanic form of the name, Lucilinburhuc, that was thought to mean \"little fortress;\" the name first referred to the city and was later used for the country" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/europe/md.json b/europe/md.json index f1a00686..c07c5520 100644 --- a/europe/md.json +++ b/europe/md.json @@ -104,13 +104,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "3,599,528" + "text": "3,599,528 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "1,698,249" }, "female": { - "text": "1,901,279 (2024 est.)" + "text": "1,901,279" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ "text": "Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic" }, "etymology": { - "text": "named for the Moldova River in neighboring eastern Romania" + "text": "named for the Moldova River in neighboring eastern Romania; the river's name probably comes from the Indoeuropean root word mel, meaning \"dark\" or \"black\"" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/europe/mj.json b/europe/mj.json index 3c9686ce..54f4ad33 100644 --- a/europe/mj.json +++ b/europe/mj.json @@ -111,13 +111,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "599,849" + "text": "599,849 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "294,482" }, "female": { - "text": "305,367 (2024 est.)" + "text": "305,367" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ "text": "People's Republic of Montenegro, Socialist Republic of Montenegro, Republic of Montenegro" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the country's name locally as well as in most Western European languages means \"black mountain\" and refers to the dark coniferous forests on Mount Lovcen and the surrounding area" + "text": "the name in Italian means \"dark mountain\" and is a translation of the Serbo-Croatian name Crna Gora; both refer to the dark coniferous forests in the mountainous region" } }, "Government type": { @@ -981,71 +981,71 @@ }, "Electricity": { "installed generating capacity": { - "text": "1.066 million kW (2022 est.)" + "text": "1.082 million kW (2023 est.)" }, "consumption": { - "text": "2.963 billion kWh (2022 est.)" + "text": "2.719 billion kWh (2023 est.)" }, "exports": { - "text": "8.326 billion kWh (2022 est.)" + "text": "6.288 billion kWh (2023 est.)" }, "imports": { - "text": "8.467 billion kWh (2022 est.)" + "text": "5.421 billion kWh (2023 est.)" }, "transmission/distribution losses": { - "text": "507.151 million kWh (2022 est.)" + "text": "601.023 million kWh (2023 est.)" } }, "Electricity generation sources": { "fossil fuels": { - "text": "47% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "39.1% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" }, "solar": { - "text": "0.1% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "0.4% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" }, "wind": { - "text": "9.8% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "7.5% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" }, "hydroelectricity": { - "text": "43.1% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "53% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" } }, "Coal": { "production": { - "text": "1.734 million metric tons (2022 est.)" + "text": "1.862 million metric tons (2023 est.)" }, "consumption": { - "text": "1.517 million metric tons (2022 est.)" + "text": "1.658 million metric tons (2023 est.)" }, "exports": { - "text": "234,000 metric tons (2022 est.)" + "text": "205,000 metric tons (2023 est.)" }, "imports": { "text": "2.8 metric tons (2022 est.)" }, "proven reserves": { - "text": "337 million metric tons (2022 est.)" + "text": "337 million metric tons (2023 est.)" } }, "Petroleum": { "refined petroleum consumption": { - "text": "8,000 bbl/day (2022 est.)" + "text": "9,000 bbl/day (2023 est.)" } }, "Carbon dioxide emissions": { "total emissions": { - "text": "2.566 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "2.808 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" }, "from coal and metallurgical coke": { - "text": "1.401 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "1.543 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" }, "from petroleum and other liquids": { - "text": "1.165 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "1.265 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" } }, "Energy consumption per capita": { - "Total energy consumption per capita 2022": { - "text": "59.174 million Btu/person (2022 est.)" + "Total energy consumption per capita 2023": { + "text": "63.407 million Btu/person (2023 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/mk.json b/europe/mk.json index 22f62f44..00b865f5 100644 --- a/europe/mk.json +++ b/europe/mk.json @@ -101,13 +101,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "2,135,622" + "text": "2,135,622 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "1,064,727" }, "female": { - "text": "1,070,895 (2024 est.)" + "text": "1,070,895" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/europe/mn.json b/europe/mn.json index a2a7c380..1ea479cc 100644 --- a/europe/mn.json +++ b/europe/mn.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about three times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC" + "text": "about three times the size of the National Mall in Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -100,13 +100,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "31,813" + "text": "31,813 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "15,366" }, "female": { - "text": "16,447 (2024 est.)" + "text": "16,447" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ "text": "Monaco" }, "etymology": { - "text": "founded as a Greek colony in the 6th century B.C., the name derives from two Greek words \"monos\" (single, alone) and \"oikos\" (house) to convey the sense of a people \"living apart\" or in a \"single habitation\"" + "text": "founded as a Greek colony in the 6th century B.C., the name's origin is unclear; it could derive from the Greek term monoikos (solitary), the Ligurian word monegu (rock), or the Basque word muno (mountain)" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/europe/mt.json b/europe/mt.json index e8e8659f..b0646699 100644 --- a/europe/mt.json +++ b/europe/mt.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "slightly less than twice the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "slightly less than twice the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -103,13 +103,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "469,730" + "text": "469,730 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "237,023" }, "female": { - "text": "232,707 (2024 est.)" + "text": "232,707" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ "text": "Malta" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the ancient Greeks called the island \"Melite\" meaning \"honey-sweet\" from the Greek word \"meli\" meaning \"honey\" and referring to the island's honey production" + "text": "the origin is unclear; the name may come from the ancient term mel, meaning \"high\" and probably referring to the island's rocks; the ancient Greeks called the island \"Melite,\" possibly from the Greek word meli, meaning \"honey\" and referring to the island's honey production" } }, "Government type": { diff --git a/europe/nl.json b/europe/nl.json index 8b7e9333..a4b50f77 100644 --- a/europe/nl.json +++ b/europe/nl.json @@ -113,13 +113,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "17,772,378" + "text": "17,772,378 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "8,844,100" }, "female": { - "text": "8,928,278 (2024 est.)" + "text": "8,928,278" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ "text": "NL" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the country name literally means \"the lowlands\" and refers to the geographic features of the land being both flat and down river from higher areas (i.e., at the estuaries of the Scheldt, Meuse, and Rhine Rivers; only about half of the Netherlands is more than 1 meter above sea level)" + "text": "the English name is derived from the country's Dutch name, which means \"the lowlands\" and describes the geographic area; only about half the Netherlands is more than 1 meter (3.3 ft) above sea level" } }, "Government type": { @@ -1277,8 +1277,8 @@ "note": "note: in 2023, women made up about 14% of the military's full-time personnel" }, "Military deployments": { - "text": "350 Lithuania (NATO); 200 Romania (NATO) (2024)", - "note": "note: as of 2024, the Dutch military had close to 1,000 total military personnel deployed abroad" + "text": "350 Lithuania (NATO); 150 Romania (NATO); approximately 800 deployed to Dutch territories in the Caribbean (2025)", + "note": "note: the Netherlands contributes naval assets to support freedom of the sea missions in such places as the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz; it also assists with monitoring the airspace of the eastern flank of NATO territory by means of fighter aircraft and provides some ground personnel to a variety of other NATO, UN, and EU security missions" }, "Military - note": { "text": "the Dutch military is charged with the three core tasks of defending the country’s national territory and that of its allies, enforcing the national and international rule of law, and providing assistance during disasters and other crises; it also has some domestic security duties, including in the Dutch Caribbean territories; the military operates globally but rarely carries out military operations independently and focuses on cooperating with the armed forces of other countries, particularly with Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and the UK
Norway is a trendsetter country in gender equality, especially in workforce participation. Of particular value to families are the child and parental leave benefits. This supplement is a monthly allowance paid to families from a month after birth until the child reaches 18 to defray some of the costs of raising children. This is helpful to families with young children where the mother works limited hours. The parental leave benefit is available to qualified mothers in a child’s first year, enabling parents to share at-home childcare for up to 49 weeks at full salary (or 59 weeks with 80% of their salary). Afterward, parents can put their child in high-quality subsidized daycare or receive funding toward private child care or as compensation for one parent staying home to care for their child.
Norway was originally a country of emigration with almost 850,000 Norwegians going abroad between 1825 and 1945. At the turn of the 20th century, most Norwegians emigrated temporarily to work in the US. Immigrants to Norway in the 1960s were mostly from neighboring Nordic countries, with whom they shared a common labor market. By the end of the 1960s, with a strong economy and population shortage, Norway admitted guest workers from Pakistan, Morocco, then Yugoslavia, and Turkey. The labor migrants were expected to be temporary, but many settled in Norway. Eventually, Norway imposed immigration restrictions and the majority of migrants came in as refugees or for family reunification. Beginning in the 1990s, Norway’s migration policy aimed at achieving integration – including language instruction and integration into the job market – as well as combatting racism and xenophobia.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "16.3% (male 461,979/female 438,243)" diff --git a/europe/pl.json b/europe/pl.json index ad191a62..ab34d0d3 100644 --- a/europe/pl.json +++ b/europe/pl.json @@ -114,13 +114,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "38,746,310" + "text": "38,746,310 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "18,441,415" }, "female": { - "text": "20,304,895 (2024 est.)" + "text": "20,304,895" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -1018,53 +1018,53 @@ }, "Electricity": { "installed generating capacity": { - "text": "58.719 million kW (2022 est.)" + "text": "64.806 million kW (2023 est.)" }, "consumption": { - "text": "156.869 billion kWh (2022 est.)" + "text": "159.639 billion kWh (2023 est.)" }, "exports": { - "text": "16.915 billion kWh (2022 est.)" + "text": "11.403 billion kWh (2023 est.)" }, "imports": { - "text": "15.238 billion kWh (2022 est.)" + "text": "15.14 billion kWh (2023 est.)" }, "transmission/distribution losses": { - "text": "8.659 billion kWh (2022 est.)" + "text": "8.549 billion kWh (2023 est.)" } }, "Electricity generation sources": { "fossil fuels": { - "text": "78.4% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "72.7% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" }, "solar": { - "text": "4.9% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "6.9% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" }, "wind": { - "text": "11% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "14.4% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" }, "hydroelectricity": { - "text": "0.8% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "1.1% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" }, "biomass and waste": { - "text": "4.9% of total installed capacity (2022 est.)" + "text": "4.9% of total installed capacity (2023 est.)" } }, "Coal": { "production": { - "text": "116.682 million metric tons (2022 est.)" + "text": "96.72 million metric tons (2023 est.)" }, "consumption": { - "text": "123.782 million metric tons (2022 est.)" + "text": "99.932 million metric tons (2023 est.)" }, "exports": { - "text": "12.047 million metric tons (2022 est.)" + "text": "10.805 million metric tons (2023 est.)" }, "imports": { - "text": "13.347 million metric tons (2022 est.)" + "text": "10.041 million metric tons (2023 est.)" }, "proven reserves": { - "text": "28.531 billion metric tons (2022 est.)" + "text": "27.758 billion metric tons (2023 est.)" } }, "Petroleum": { @@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@ "text": "24,000 bbl/day (2023 est.)" }, "refined petroleum consumption": { - "text": "722,000 bbl/day (2023 est.)" + "text": "743,000 bbl/day (2024 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "113 million barrels (2021 est.)" @@ -1080,16 +1080,16 @@ }, "Natural gas": { "production": { - "text": "5.551 billion cubic meters (2022 est.)" + "text": "5.345 billion cubic meters (2023 est.)" }, "consumption": { - "text": "20.056 billion cubic meters (2022 est.)" + "text": "20.602 billion cubic meters (2023 est.)" }, "exports": { - "text": "587.771 million cubic meters (2022 est.)" + "text": "747.124 million cubic meters (2023 est.)" }, "imports": { - "text": "14.42 billion cubic meters (2022 est.)" + "text": "15.111 billion cubic meters (2023 est.)" }, "proven reserves": { "text": "91.492 billion cubic meters (2021 est.)" @@ -1097,21 +1097,21 @@ }, "Carbon dioxide emissions": { "total emissions": { - "text": "293.356 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "264.031 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" }, "from coal and metallurgical coke": { - "text": "163.359 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "132.101 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" }, "from petroleum and other liquids": { - "text": "94.138 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "95.095 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" }, "from consumed natural gas": { - "text": "35.86 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2022 est.)" + "text": "36.835 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2023 est.)" } }, "Energy consumption per capita": { - "Total energy consumption per capita 2022": { - "text": "106.196 million Btu/person (2022 est.)" + "Total energy consumption per capita 2023": { + "text": "103.651 million Btu/person (2023 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/po.json b/europe/po.json index 7281d28d..e41e741c 100644 --- a/europe/po.json +++ b/europe/po.json @@ -110,13 +110,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "10,207,177" + "text": "10,207,177 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "4,835,763" }, "female": { - "text": "5,371,414 (2024 est.)" + "text": "5,371,414" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ "text": "34.8%" }, "expected date of next election": { - "text": "September 2028" + "text": "May 2025" } }, "Judicial branch": { diff --git a/europe/ri.json b/europe/ri.json index 138421da..dc6feb8c 100644 --- a/europe/ri.json +++ b/europe/ri.json @@ -104,13 +104,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "6,652,212" + "text": "6,652,212 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "3,242,751" }, "female": { - "text": "3,409,461 (2024 est.)" + "text": "3,409,461" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ "text": "President Aleksandar VUCIC (since 31 May 2017)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Prime Minister Milos VUCEVIC (since 2 May 2024)" + "text": "Acting Prime Minister Milos VUCEVIC (in office since 2 May 2024; resigned on 28 January 2025 but will remain in an acting capacity until a new prime minister is elected)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Cabinet elected by the National Assembly" diff --git a/europe/ro.json b/europe/ro.json index 3fd7d5ed..06d73daf 100644 --- a/europe/ro.json +++ b/europe/ro.json @@ -115,13 +115,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "18,148,155" + "text": "18,148,155 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "8,747,795" }, "female": { - "text": "9,400,360 (2024 est.)" + "text": "9,400,360" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/europe/si.json b/europe/si.json index 6ab03478..d455e280 100644 --- a/europe/si.json +++ b/europe/si.json @@ -103,13 +103,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "2,097,893" + "text": "2,097,893 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "1,051,044" }, "female": { - "text": "1,046,849 (2024 est.)" + "text": "1,046,849" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/europe/sm.json b/europe/sm.json index 66d27a18..f96f9dbc 100644 --- a/europe/sm.json +++ b/europe/sm.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about one-third the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "about one-third the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -92,13 +92,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "35,095" + "text": "35,095 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "16,944" }, "female": { - "text": "18,151 (2024 est.)" + "text": "18,151" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ }, "Executive branch": { "chief of state": { - "text": "co-chiefs of state Captains Regent Francesca CIVERCHIA and Dalibor RICCARDI (for the period 1 October 2024 - 30 March 2025)" + "text": "co-chiefs of state Captains Regent Denise BRONZETTI and Italo RIGHI (for the period 1 April 2025 - 30 September 2025)" }, "head of government": { "text": "Secretary of State for Foreign and Political Affairs Luca BECCARI (since 8 January 2020)" @@ -469,10 +469,10 @@ "text": "Congress of State elected by the Grand and General Council" }, "elections/appointments": { - "text": "co-chiefs of state (captains regent) indirectly elected by the Grand and General Council for a single 6-month term; election last held on 1 October 2024 (next to be held in March 2025); Secretary of State for Foreign and Political Affairs indirectly elected by the Grand and General Council for a single 5-year term; election last held on 28 December 2019" + "text": "co-chiefs of state (captains regent) indirectly elected by the Grand and General Council for a single 6-month term; election last held on 1 April 2025 (next to be held in September 2025); Secretary of State for Foreign and Political Affairs indirectly elected by the Grand and General Council for a single 5-year term; election last held on 28 December 2019" }, "election results": { - "text": "October 2024: Francesca CIVERCHIA (PDCS) and Dalibor RICCARDI (Free San Marino) elected captains regent; percent of Grand and General Council vote - NASweden, the largest Nordic country in terms of size and population, is also Europe’s most sparsely populated. Most Swedish men and women agree that both partners should contribute to household income. Swedish society is very gender equal, which is reflected in the country’s public policies. A generous leave policy and high-quality subsidized childcare allows mothers and fathers to balance work and family life. Sweden’s income-replacement-based parental leave policy encourages women to establish themselves in the workforce before having children. In fact, Swedish women have one of the highest labor participation rates in Europe and one of its highest total fertility rates (TFR), the number of children women have in their lifetime. Postponement of parenthood has increased steadily. Since the late 1960s, marriage and divorce rates have declined, while non-marital cohabitation and births out of wedlock have increased rapidly. Sweden’s TFR has hovered for decades around 2, which is close to replacement level and among Europe’s highest.
Sweden experienced “the great emigration” between 1850 and the 1930s when, faced with famines, approximately 1.5 million Swedes sought a better life in the Americas and Australia. However, since World War II, Sweden has been a country of immigration. During World War II, thousands of refugees from neighboring countries worked in Swedish factories, agriculture, and forestry, replacing Swedish men who were called up for military service. During the 1950s and 1960s, Sweden joined the Geneva Convention and granted permanent residence to refugees from the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries. During this period, Sweden also welcomed labor migrants, mainly from Finland and other Nordic countries, who bolstered the tax base needed to fund the country’s welfare programs.
Until 1971, labor migrants, particularly from Finland, southern Europe (including then Yugoslavia, Italy, and Greece) the Baltics, and Turkey, came to Sweden as its industries flourished. Companies recruited many of the workers, but others came on their own. Sweden’s labor demand eventually decreased, and the job market became saturated. The government restricted the flow of labor migrants, putting an end to labor migration from non-Nordic countries in 1972. From then until the 1990s, inflows consisted largely of asylum seekers from the Middle East, the Balkans, and South America, as well as persons looking to reunite with family members already in Sweden. The country began a new era of labor immigration in 2008, as companies were encouraged to hire non-EU workers. Among the largest source countries have been India, Thailand, and China. As of 2020, over a quarter of Sweden’s population had a migrant background.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "17.1% (male 934,668/female 880,310)" @@ -1230,7 +1227,7 @@ "text": "approximately 600 Latvia (NATO) (2025)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the Swedish military is responsible for the defense of the country and its territories against armed attack, supporting Sweden’s national security interests, providing societal support, such as humanitarian aid, and contributing to international peacekeeping and peacemaking operationsAzerbaijan’s citizenry has over 80 ethnic groups. The far eastern part of the country has the highest population density, particularly in and around Baku. Apart from smaller urbanized areas, the rest of the country has a fairly light and evenly distributed population. Approximately 57% of the country’s inhabitants lives in urban areas. While the population is continuing to grow, it is in the early stages of aging. The declining fertility rate – which has decreased from about 5.5 children per woman in the 1950s to less than the 2.1 replacement level in 2022 – combined with increasing life expectancy has resulted in the elderly making up a larger share of Azerbaijan’s populace. The percentage of elderly residents and the slowed growth and eventual shrinkage of the working-age population could put pressure on the country’s pension and healthcare systems.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "22.3% (male 1,269,241/female 1,104,529)" diff --git a/middle-east/am.json b/middle-east/am.json index 45775203..5a738f4a 100644 --- a/middle-east/am.json +++ b/middle-east/am.json @@ -103,13 +103,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "2,976,765" + "text": "2,976,765 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "1,456,415" }, "female": { - "text": "1,520,350 (2024 est.)" + "text": "1,520,350" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -134,9 +134,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Armenian Apostolic Christian 95.2%, other Christian 1.6%, other 0.9%, none 0.6%, unspecified 1.7% (2022 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Armenia’s population peaked at nearly 3.7 million in the late 1980s but has declined sharply since independence in 1991, to just over 3 million in 2021, largely as a result of its decreasing fertility rate, increasing death rate, and negative net emigration rate. The total fertility rate (the average number of children born per woman) first fell below the 2.1 replacement level in the late 1990s and has hovered around 1.6-1.65 for over 15 years. In an effort to increase the country’s birth rate, the government has expanded its child benefits, including a substantial increase in the lump sum payment for having a first and second child and a boost in the monthly payment to mothers of children under two. Reversing net negative migration, however, remains the biggest obstacle to stabilizing or increasing population growth. Emigration causes Armenia not only lose individuals but also the children they might have.
The emigration of a significant number of working-age people combined with decreased fertility and increased life expectancy is causing the elderly share of Armenia’s population to grow. The growing elderly population will put increasing pressure on the government’s ability to fund the pension system, health care, and other services for seniors. Improving education, creating more jobs (particularly in the formal sector), promoting labor market participation, and increasing productivity would mitigate the financial impact of supporting a growing elderly population.
Armenia has a long history of migration, some forced and some voluntary. Its large diaspora is diverse and dispersed around the world. Widely varying estimates suggest the Armenian diaspora may number anywhere from 5-9 million, easily outnumbering the number of Armenians living in Armenia. Armenians forged communities abroad from ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome to Russia and to the Americas, where they excelled as craftsmen, merchants, and in other occupations.
Several waves of Armenian migration occurred in the 20th century. In the aftermath of the 1915 Armenian genocide, hundreds of thousands of survivors fled to communities in the Caucasus (including present day Armenia), Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Europe, and Russia and established new communities in Africa and the Americas. In the 1930s, the Soviets deported thousands of Armenians to Siberia and Central Asia. After World War II, the Soviets encouraged the Armenian diaspora in France, the Middle East, and Iran to return the Armenian homeland in order to encourage population growth after significant losses in the male workforce during the war.
Following Armenian independence in 1991, the economic downturn and high unemployment prompted hundreds of thousands of Armenians to seek better economic opportunities primarily in Russia but also in the US, former Soviet states, and Europe. In the early 1990s, hundreds of thousands of Armenians fled from Azerbaijan to Armenia because of the ongoing Nagorno-Karbakh conflict, but many of them then emigrated again, mainly to Russia and the US. When the economy became more stable in the late 1990s, permanent emigration slowed, but Armenians continued to seek temporary seasonal work in Russia. The remittances families receive from relatives working abroad is vital to Armenian households and the country’s economy." - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "17.7% (male 275,589/female 250,630)" diff --git a/middle-east/ba.json b/middle-east/ba.json index f3d2b2c7..8775af8d 100644 --- a/middle-east/ba.json +++ b/middle-east/ba.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "3.5 times the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "3.5 times the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -103,13 +103,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "1,566,888" + "text": "1,566,888 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "940,022" }, "female": { - "text": "626,866 (2024 est.)" + "text": "626,866" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/middle-east/gg.json b/middle-east/gg.json index f532c953..b85713b8 100644 --- a/middle-east/gg.json +++ b/middle-east/gg.json @@ -104,13 +104,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "4,900,961" + "text": "4,900,961 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "2,343,068" }, "female": { - "text": "2,557,893 (2024 est.)" + "text": "2,557,893" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -135,9 +135,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Eastern Orthodox Christian (official) 83.4%, Muslim 10.7%, Armenian Apostolic Christian 2.9%, other 1.2% (includes Roman Catholic Christian, Jehovah's Witness, Yazidi, Protestant Christian, Jewish), none 0.5%, unspecified/no answer 1.2% (2014 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Analyzing population trends in Georgia since independence in 1991 has proven difficult due to a lack of reliable demographic statistics. Censuses were fairly accurately and regularly updated through a vital statistics system during Georgia’s period of Soviet rule, but from independence until about 2010, the system broke down as a result of institutional and economic change, social unrest, and large-scale outmigration. The 2002 census is believed to have significantly overestimated the size of Georgia’s population, in part because respondents continued to include relatives living abroad as part of their household count. The 2014 census indicates that Georgia’s population is decreasing and aging. Census data shows that the median age increased from 34.5 years in 2002 to 37.7 years in 2014. The working-age population (ages 15-65 years) was fairly high in 2002 and rose between 2005 and 2011. Nonetheless, Georgia did not reap economic benefits from this age structure, since the working-age population increase seems to have stimulated labor outmigration to Russia, Ukraine, and other neighboring countries.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Georgia has seen its economy grow to its highest level in years due to the influx of Russian businesses, information and communications technology specialists, and money transfers. This growth may only be temporary and conditions could still easily change depending on future events. Meanwhile, the Russian inflow is also a source of concern, as some Georgians fear it could prompt Putin to target their country next. In addition, Ukrainian refugees use Georgia not just as a transit country but also as a destination. Some 25,000 Ukrainians remain in the country as of November 2022; they pose an additional strain on resources in Georgia, which has a significant population of its own displaced citizens – from the 2008 Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – who continue to need government support.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "20.6% (male 520,091/female 489,882)" diff --git a/middle-east/gz.json b/middle-east/gz.json index 332232ce..f1e7c04a 100644 --- a/middle-east/gz.json +++ b/middle-east/gz.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "slightly more than twice the size of Washington, DC" + "text": "slightly more than twice the size of Washington, D.C." }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -95,13 +95,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "2,141,643" + "text": "2,141,643 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "1,086,340" }, "female": { - "text": "1,055,303 (2024 est.)" + "text": "1,055,303" } }, "Ethnic groups": { diff --git a/middle-east/ir.json b/middle-east/ir.json index c2317473..aaaae594 100644 --- a/middle-east/ir.json +++ b/middle-east/ir.json @@ -120,13 +120,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "88,386,937" + "text": "88,386,937 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "44,795,539" }, "female": { - "text": "43,591,398 (2024 est.)" + "text": "43,591,398" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ "text": "Persia" }, "etymology": { - "text": "name derives from the Avestan term \"aryanam\" meaning \"Land of the Noble [Ones]\"" + "text": "the name derives from the Sanskrit word arya, referring to people living in a mountainous land, from the root word ar-, or \"mountain;\" the former name, Persia, was originally \"Pars\" (or the Arabic-influenced variant \"Fars\") from the Old Persian parsi, meaning \"pure\"" } }, "Government type": { @@ -890,11 +890,11 @@ "note": "note: top five import commodities based on value in dollars" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": { - "text": "$120.6 billion (31 December 2017 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2017": { + "text": "$120.6 billion (2017 est.)" }, - "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": { - "text": "$133.7 billion (31 December 2016 est.)" + "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2016": { + "text": "$133.7 billion (2016 est.)" } }, "Debt - external": { diff --git a/middle-east/is.json b/middle-east/is.json index f81b049f..062a8b63 100644 --- a/middle-east/is.json +++ b/middle-east/is.json @@ -108,13 +108,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "9,402,617" + "text": "9,402,617 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "4,731,275" }, "female": { - "text": "4,671,342 (2024 est.)" + "text": "4,671,342" }, "note": "note: approximately 236,600 Israeli settlers live in East Jerusalem (2021); following the March 2019 US recognition of the Golan Heights as being part of Israel, The World Factbook no longer includes Israeli settler population of the Golan Heights (estimated at 23,400 in 2019) in its overall Israeli settler total" }, @@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ "text": "Mandatory Palestine" }, "etymology": { - "text": "named after the ancient Kingdom of Israel; according to Biblical tradition, the Jewish patriarch Jacob received the name \"Israel\" (\"He who struggles with God\") after he wrestled an entire night with an angel of the Lord; Jacob's 12 sons became the ancestors of the Israelites, also known as the Twelve Tribes of Israel, who formed the Kingdom of Israel" + "text": "named after the ancient Kingdom of Israel; according to Biblical tradition, the Jewish patriarch Jacob received the name Israel (meaning \"He who struggles with God\") after he wrestled with an angel of the Lord" } }, "Government type": { @@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ "note": "note: the IDF recruits foreign Jews and non-Jews with a minimum of one Jewish grandparent, as well as converts to Judaism; each year the IDF brings in about 800-1,000 foreign recruits from around the world" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the IDF is responsible for external defense but also has some domestic security responsibilities; its primary operational focuses include the threat posed by Iran, instability in Syria, and terrorist organizations, including HAMAS, Hizballah, the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ); it has considerable experience in conventional and unconventional warfare; since the country’s founding in 1948, the IDF has been in conflicts against one or more of its Arab neighbors in 1948-49, 1956, 1967, 1967-70 (“War of Attrition”), 1973, 1982, and 2006; it bombed nuclear sites in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007, and since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, has conducted numerous air strikes in Syria against Iranian, Iranian-backed militia, Hizballah, and Syrian Government targets; over the same period, the IDF has carried out strikes against Hizballah in Lebanon in response to attacks on Israeli territory; the IDF has conducted numerous operations against HAMAS and PIJ, which operate out of the Gaza Strip and have launched dozens of rocket attacks against Israel; HAMAS and Israel fought an 11-day conflict in 2021, which ended in an informal truce, although sporadic clashes continued; in October 2023, HAMAS conducted a surprise ground assault from Gaza into Israel, supported by rockets and armed drones, killing more than 1,000 Israelis and foreigners living in Israel; the attack resulted in an IDF ground invasion of Gaza where fighting continued into 2024Argentina’s population continues to grow but at a slower rate because of its steadily declining birth rate. Argentina’s fertility decline began earlier than in the rest of Latin America, occurring most rapidly between the early 20th century and the 1950s and then becoming more gradual in the 1990s. Life expectancy has been improving, most notably among the young and the poor. While the population under age 15 is shrinking, the youth cohort – ages 15 – 24 – is the largest in Argentina’s history and will continue to bolster the working-age population. If this large working-age population is well-educated and gainfully employed, Argentina is likely to experience an economic boost and possibly higher per capita savings and investment. Although literacy and primary school enrollment are nearly universal, grade repetition is problematic and secondary school completion is low. Both of these issues vary widely by region and socioeconomic group. Only 24% of Argentinians complete tertiary education. With wages failing to keep pace with soaring inflation – one of the highest in the world – the poverty rate has climbed to over 4]0% in the first half of 2023.
Argentina has been primarily a country of immigration for most of its history, welcoming European immigrants (often providing needed low-skilled labor) after its independence in the 19th century and attracting especially large numbers from Spain and Italy. More than 7 million European immigrants are estimated to have arrived in Argentina between 1880 and 1930 (composing 30% of the total population by 1914), when it adopted a more restrictive immigration policy. European immigration also began to wane in the 1930s because of the global depression. The inflow rebounded temporarily following WWII and resumed its decline in the 1950s when Argentina’s military dictators tightened immigration rules and European economies rebounded. Regional migration increased, however, supplying low-skilled workers escaping economic and political instability in their home countries. As of 2022, immigrants make up 3.1% of the population, with over half coming from Paraguay and Bolivia. Despite runaway inflation, hundreds of thousands immigrants arrive each year.
The first waves of highly skilled Argentine emigrant workers headed mainly to the United States and Spain in the 1960s and 1970s, driven by economic decline and repressive military dictatorships. The 2008 European economic crisis drove the return migration of some Argentinean and other Latin American nationals, as well as the immigration of Europeans to South America, where Argentina was a key recipient.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "23.3% (male 5,632,983/female 5,301,778)" diff --git a/south-america/bl.json b/south-america/bl.json index d5623576..b6f70995 100644 --- a/south-america/bl.json +++ b/south-america/bl.json @@ -112,13 +112,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "12,311,974" + "text": "12,311,974 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "6,192,774" }, "female": { - "text": "6,119,200 (2024 est.)" + "text": "6,119,200" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -144,9 +144,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Roman Catholic 65%, Protestant 19.6% (Evangelical (non-specific) 11.9%, Evangelical Baptist 2.1%, Evangelical Pentecostal 1.8%, Evangelical Methodist 0.7%, Adventist 2.8%, Protestant (non-specific) 0.3%), Believer (not belonging to the church) 0.9%, other 4.8%, atheist 1.7%, agnostic 0.6%, none 6.1%, unspecified 1.3% (2023 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Bolivia ranks at or near the bottom among Latin American countries in several areas of health and development, including poverty, education, fertility, malnutrition, mortality, and life expectancy. On the positive side, more children are being vaccinated and more pregnant women are getting prenatal care and having skilled health practitioners attend their births.
Bolivia’s income inequality is the highest in Latin America and one of the highest in the world. Public education is of poor quality, and educational opportunities are among the most unevenly distributed in Latin America, with girls and indigenous and rural children less likely to be literate or to complete primary school. The lack of access to education and family planning services helps to sustain Bolivia’s high fertility rate—approximately three children per woman. Bolivia’s lack of clean water and basic sanitation, especially in rural areas, contributes to health problems.
Between 7% and 16% of Bolivia’s population lives abroad (estimates vary in part because of illegal migration). Emigrants primarily seek jobs and better wages in Argentina (the principal destination), the US, and Spain. In recent years, more restrictive immigration policies in Europe and the US have increased the flow of Bolivian emigrants to neighboring countries. Fewer Bolivians migrated to Brazil in 2015 and 2016 because of its recession; increasing numbers have been going to Chile, mainly to work as miners.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "28.5% (male 1,792,803/female 1,718,081)" @@ -1217,8 +1214,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Bolivian Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas de Bolivia or FAB): Bolivian Army (Ejercito de Boliviano, EB), Bolivian Naval Force (Fuerza Naval Boliviana, FNB), Bolivian Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, FAB)Brazil’s rapid fertility decline since the 1960s is the main factor behind the country's slowing population growth rate, aging population, and fast-paced demographic transition. As of 2023, Brazil’s total fertility rate – the average number of children born per woman – was 1.75, below the 2.1 replacement rate needed to prevent a population decrease. The 2022 national census showed that population growth had slowed more than expected. Factors behind the decrease include fewer births as couples marry later and more women work, an increase in the mortality rate as the population ages, the Zika epidemic, the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as economic troubles and the emigration of young people. The current window of opportunity to benefit from a demographic bonus – when the working-age population exceeds the number of children and the elderly combined – is expected to close around 2035, ten years earlier than expected.
Well-funded public pensions have nearly wiped out poverty among the elderly, and Bolsa Familia and other social programs have lifted tens of millions out of poverty. More than half of Brazil’s population is considered middle class, but poverty and income inequality levels remain high; the Northeast, North, and Center-West, women, and black, mixed race, and indigenous populations are disproportionately affected. Disparities in opportunities foster social exclusion and contribute to Brazil’s high crime rate, particularly violent crime in cities and favelas.
Brazil has traditionally been a net recipient of immigrants, with its southeast being the prime destination. After abolishing slavery in 1888, the last country in the Americas to do so, Brazil sought Europeans (Italians, Portuguese, Spaniards, and Germans) and later Asians (Japanese) to work in agriculture, especially coffee cultivation. Lebanese and Syrian immigrants arrived at the end of the 19th century and focused on trade and later commerce. Between 2011 and 2020, the largest immigrant groups came from Venezuela, Haiti, Bolivia, Colombia, and the US. Since Brazil’s economic downturn in the 1980s, emigration to the United States, Paraguay, Europe, and Japan has been rising but is negligible relative to Brazil’s total population. The majority of these emigrants are well-educated and middle-class. Fewer Brazilian peasants are emigrating to neighboring countries to take up agricultural work.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "19.6% (male 22,025,593/female 21,088,398)" @@ -1307,8 +1304,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Brazilian Armed Forces (Forças Armadas Brasileiras): Brazilian Army (Exercito Brasileiro, EB), Brazilian Navy (Marinha do Brasil, MB, includes Naval Aviation (Aviacao Naval Brasileira) and Marine Corps (Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais)), Brazilian Air Force (Forca Aerea Brasileira, FAB) (2024)", - "note": "note: the three national police forces – the Federal Police, Federal Highway Police, and Federal Railway Police – have domestic security responsibilities and report to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (Ministry of Justice); there are two distinct units within the state police forces: the civil police, which performs an investigative role, and the military police, charged with maintaining law and order in the states and the Federal District; despite the name, military police forces report to the Ministry of Justice, not the Ministry of Defense; the armed forces also have some domestic security responsibilities and report to the Ministry of Defense" + "text": "Brazilian Armed Forces (Forças Armadas Brasileiras): Brazilian Army (Exercito Brasileiro, EB), Brazilian Navy (Marinha do Brasil; includes Naval Aviation (Aviacao Naval Brasileira) and Marine Corps (Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais)), Brazilian Air Force (Forca Aerea Brasileira) (2025)", + "note": "note: the three national police forces – the Federal Police, Federal Highway Police, and Federal Railway Police – have domestic security responsibilities and report to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (Ministry of Justice)" }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2023": { diff --git a/south-america/ci.json b/south-america/ci.json index ea4fd0a1..49f685f6 100644 --- a/south-america/ci.json +++ b/south-america/ci.json @@ -115,13 +115,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "18,664,652" + "text": "18,664,652 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "9,169,736" }, "female": { - "text": "9,494,916 (2024 est.)" + "text": "9,494,916" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -147,9 +147,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Roman Catholic 42%, Evangelical 14%, other 6%, none 37% (2021 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Chile is in the advanced stages of demographic transition and is becoming an aging society—with fertility below replacement level, low mortality rates, and life expectancy on par with developed countries. The share of older, those 65 and early, people may exceed 65% by 2065. Nevertheless, with its dependency ratio nearing its low point, Chile could benefit from its favorable age structure. It will need to keep its large working-age population productively employed, while preparing to provide for the needs of its growing proportion of elderly people, especially as women—the traditional caregivers—increasingly enter the workforce. Over the last two decades, Chile has made great strides in reducing its poverty rate, but income inequality remains persistent in large part because a lack of a lack of access to quality education.
Chile has been both a country of emigration and immigration. After becoming independent in 1810, Chile began seeking out immigrants from Europe to establish factories and to populate the southern part of the country. Following the two World Wars, fears of an influx of refugees prompted Chile to stop encouraging European immigration. However, Arab immigration increased between 1907 and 1940. During the Pinochet dictatorship that began in 1973, hundreds of thousands of Chileans emigrated, adding to the thousands who had left in the 1950s. At the same time, the repressiveness of the Pinochet regime discouraged the arrival of new immigrants. With the return of democracy and improving economic stability in 1990, some emigrants returned and new immigrants arrived from other South American countries experiencing deteriorating economic and political conditions. Immigration became more diverse starting in the 2010s, with the arrival of Haitians and Colombians of African descent. However, the largest group of recent immigrants are Venezuelans fleeing their country’s socio-economic and political crisis. As of 2020, almost one-third of Chile’s immigrant population are Venezuelan, while other top source countries continue to be Peru, Haiti, and Colombia. Nearly 1.5 million immigrants account for almost 9% of Chile’s total population, as of 2020.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "19.2% (male 1,822,908/female 1,751,528)" @@ -1234,8 +1231,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Armed Forces of Chile (Fuerzas Armadas de Chile): Chilean Army (Ejército de Chile), Chilean Navy (Armada de Chile, includes Marine Corps and Maritime Territory and Merchant Marine Directorate or Directemar), Chilean Air Force (Fuerza Aerea de Chile, FACh) (2024)", - "note": "note 1: the Directemar is the country's coast guardColombia is in the midst of a demographic transition resulting from steady declines in its fertility, mortality, and population growth rates. The birth rate has fallen from more than 6 children per woman in the 1960s to just below replacement level today as a result of increased literacy, family planning services, and urbanization. However, income inequality is among the worst in the world, and almost one-third of the population lives below the poverty line.
Colombia experiences significant legal and illegal economic emigration and refugee outflows. Large-scale labor emigration dates to the 1960s; the United States and, until recently, Venezuela have been the main host countries. Emigration to Spain picked up in the 1990s because of its economic growth, but this flow has since diminished because of Spain’s ailing economy and high unemployment. Venezuela’s political and economic crisis since 2015 has prompted many Colombians to return home.
Forced displacement continues to be prevalent because of violence among guerrillas, paramilitary groups, and Colombian security forces. Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations are disproportionately affected. Even with the Colombian Government’s December 2016 peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the risk of displacement remains as other rebel groups fill the void left by the FARC. As of April 2023, almost 6.9 million people were internally displaced in Colombia. This estimate may undercount actual numbers because many internally displaced persons are not registered. Historically, Colombia also has one of the world’s highest levels of forced disappearances. The Colombian Truth Commission estimated than nearly 122,000 people were the victims of forced disappearances during the countries five-decade-long armed conflict—including human rights activists, trade unionists, Afro-Colombians, indigenous people, and farmers in rural conflict zones.
Because of political violence and economic problems, Colombia received limited numbers of immigrants during the 19th and 20th centuries, mostly from the Middle East, Europe, and Japan. More recently, growth in the oil, mining, and manufacturing sectors has attracted increased labor migration; the primary source countries are Venezuela, the US, Mexico, and Argentina. Colombia has also become a transit area for illegal migrants from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean – especially Haiti and Cuba – who are en route to the US or Canada. Between 2016 and October 2022, Colombia was host to the largest number of Venezuelan refugees and migrants, totaling almost 2.9 million. Ecuadorian migrants also go to Colombia, many of them attempting to transit the dense and dangerous jungles of the Darien Gap to enter Panama and head onward to the US.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "22.3% (male 5,643,995/female 5,394,147)" @@ -1241,8 +1238,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Military Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Militares de Colombia): National Army (Ejercito Nacional), Republic of Colombia Navy (Armada Republica de Colombia, ARC; includes Coast Guard and marines), Colombian Air Force (Fuerza Aerea de Colombia, FAC); Colombian National Police (PNC) (2024)", - "note": "note: the PNC is a civilian force that is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense" + "text": "Military Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Militares de Colombia): National Army (Ejercito Nacional), Colombian Aerospace Force (Fuerza Aeroespacial Colombiana, FAC), Colombian Navy (Armada de Colombia; includes Coast Guard); National Police of Colombia (Policia Nacional de Colombia, PNC) (2025)", + "note": "note: the PNC is a civilian force under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense" }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2023": { @@ -1268,7 +1265,7 @@ "text": "the military's inventory includes a wide mix of equipment from a variety of suppliers, including Canada, Germany, Israel, South Korea, and especially the US; Colombia's defense industry is active in producing air, land, and naval platforms (2024)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { - "text": "18-24 years of age for compulsory (men) and voluntary (men and women) military service; conscript service obligation is 18 months or 12 months for those with a college degree; conscripted soldiers reportedly include regular soldiers (conscripts without a high school degree), drafted high school graduates (bachilleres), and rural (campesino) soldiers who serve in their home regions (2024)", + "text": "18-24 years of age for compulsory (men) and voluntary (men and women) military (and police) service; conscript service obligation is 18 months or 12 months for those with a college degree; conscripted soldiers reportedly include regular soldiers (conscripts without a high school degree), drafted high school graduates (bachilleres), and rural (campesino) soldiers who serve in their home regions (2024)", "note": "note: the Colombian military first incorporated women in 1976 in administrative positions; women were incorporated as non-commissioned officers in 1983 and officers in 2009; as of 2023, about 6,000 women served in the uniformed military while more than 30,000 served in the National Police" }, "Military deployments": { diff --git a/south-america/ec.json b/south-america/ec.json index 2d289ec2..6277e3a6 100644 --- a/south-america/ec.json +++ b/south-america/ec.json @@ -112,13 +112,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "18,309,984" + "text": "18,309,984 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "9,023,170" }, "female": { - "text": "9,286,814 (2024 est.)" + "text": "9,286,814" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -144,9 +144,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Roman Catholic 68.2%, Protestant 19% (Evangelical 18.3%, Adventist 0.6%, other Protestant 0.2%), Jehovah's Witness 1.4%, other 2.3%, none 8.2% don't know/no response 1% (2023 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Ecuador’s high poverty and income inequality most affect indigenous, mixed race, and rural populations. The government has increased its social spending to ameliorate these problems, but critics question the efficiency and implementation of its national development plan. Nevertheless, the conditional cash transfer program, which requires participants’ children to attend school and have medical check-ups, has helped improve educational attainment and health care among poor children. Ecuador’s total fertility rate – the average number of children born per woman – is just below replacement level as of 2023, but its population is continuing to grow.
Ecuador continues to be both a country of emigration and immigration. The first large-scale emigration of largely undocumented Ecuadorians occurred between 1980 and 2000, when an economic crisis drove Ecuadorians from southern provinces to New York City, where they had connections from the earlier Panama hat trade. Emigration from all parts of Ecuador in the late 1990s was caused by another economic downturn, political instability, and a currency crisis. Spain was the logical destination because of its shared language and the wide availability of low-skilled, informal jobs at a time when increased border surveillance made illegal migration to the US difficult. Ecuador became Spain’s second largest immigrant source country. The bulk of Ecuadorian emigration, however, occurred between 2000 and 2007, largely to the US, Spain, and Italy. Emigration has again surged since 2017, as economic problems, high unemployment, poverty, and violence have lead thousands of Ecuadorian migrants and refugees to head to the US. As of 2021, Ecuadorians were the fourth-highest nationality coming into contact with US Customs and Border Protection at the US-Mexico border. Most Ecuadorian migrants and refugees traverse the dangerous Darien Gap between Colombia and Panama to reach Mexico. Although Mexico reinstated a visa requirement in September 2021, Ecuadorians continue to enter Mexico illegally and then travel to the US or Canada. Some wind up staying in Mexico if their journeys north fail. Emigrants represent 8-10% of Ecuador’s population, as of 2021.
Ecuador hosts one of the region’s largest refugee populations. From 2000-2005, Colombians arrived in growing numbers to escape armed conflict, and they have continued to immigrate to Ecuador steadily. Between 2008, when Ecuador lifted visa requirements for all countries, and 2016, immigrants entered from Haiti, Cuba, and other continents. The influx of Venezuelans began in 2017, and, as of May 2022, Ecuador was home to the third-largest community of Venezuelan migrants and refugees in the world at over half a million. Immigrants and refugees account for 3-5% of the Ecuador’s population, as of 2021.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "26.8% (male 2,505,729/female 2,395,198)" @@ -603,10 +600,10 @@ "text": "2/9/2025" }, "parties elected and seats per party": { - "text": "Citizen Revolution Movement (RC) (51); Movimiento Construye (MC25) (28); National Democratic Action (ADN) (14); Social Christian Party (PSC) (8); Let’s Act (8); Other (28)" + "text": "Citizen Revolution Movement (RC) - Renewal Movement (RETO) (67); National Democratic Action (ADN) (66); Pachakutik (9); Other (9)" }, "percentage of women in chamber": { - "text": "43.1%" + "text": "45%" }, "expected date of next election": { "text": "February 2029" @@ -1195,7 +1192,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Ecuadorian Armed Forces: the Ecuadorian Army (Ejército Ecuatoriano), Ecuadorian Navy (Armada del Ecuador, Fuerza Naval del Ecuador, FNE; includes naval infantry, naval aviation, coast guard), Ecuadorian Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Ecuatoriana, FAE) (2024)", + "text": "Ecuadorian Armed Forces ((Fuerzas Armadas del Ecuador): Ground Force (Fuerza Terrestre), Naval Force (Fuerza Naval; includes naval infantry, naval aviation, coast guard), Ecuadorian Air Force (Fuerza Aérea Ecuatoriana) (2024)", "note": "note: the National Police of Ecuador (Policía Nacional del Ecuador) is under the Ministry of Government/Interior" }, "Military expenditures": { @@ -1226,7 +1223,7 @@ "note": "note: in 2022, women made up an estimated 3-4% of the military" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the military is responsible for preserving Ecuador’s national sovereignty and defending the integrity of the state; it also has some domestic security responsibilities and may complement police operations in maintaining public order if required; the military shares responsibility for border enforcement with the National Police; it participates in bilateral and multinational training exercises and has sent troops on UN peacekeeping missions; the military has defense ties to regional countries, such as Chile, Colombia, and Peru, and security ties with the US have been revived in recent yearsGuyana is the only English-speaking country in South America and shares cultural and historical bonds with the Anglophone Caribbean. Guyana's two largest ethnic groups are the Afro-Guyanese (descendants of African slaves) and the Indo-Guyanese (descendants of Indian indentured laborers), which together comprise about three quarters of Guyana's population. Tensions periodically have boiled over between the two groups, which back ethnically based political parties and vote along ethnic lines. Poverty reduction has stagnated since the late 1990s. About one-third of the Guyanese population lives below the poverty line; indigenous people are disproportionately affected. Although Guyana's literacy rate is reported to be among the highest in the Western Hemisphere, the level of functional literacy is considerably lower, which has been attributed to poor education quality, teacher training, and infrastructure.
Guyana's emigration rate is among the highest in the world - more than 55% of its citizens reside abroad - and it is one of the largest recipients of remittances relative to GDP among Latin American and Caribbean counties. Although remittances are a vital source of income for most citizens, the pervasive emigration of skilled workers deprives Guyana of professionals in healthcare and other key sectors. More than 80% of Guyanese nationals with tertiary level educations have emigrated. Brain drain and the concentration of limited medical resources in Georgetown hamper Guyana's ability to meet the health needs of its predominantly rural population. Guyana has one of the highest HIV prevalence rates in the region and continues to rely on international support for its HIV treatment and prevention programs.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "23.5% (male 95,223/female 91,272)" @@ -471,7 +468,7 @@ "text": "British Guiana" }, "etymology": { - "text": "the name is derived from Guiana, the original name for the region that included British Guiana, Dutch Guiana, and French Guiana; ultimately the word is derived from an Amerindian language and means \"Land of Many Waters\" (referring to the area's multitude of rivers and streams)" + "text": "the name is derived from Guiana, the original name for the region that included British Guiana, Dutch Guiana, and French Guiana; the name Guiana may be derived from a local term meaning \"Land of Water\" (referring to the area's multitude of rivers and streams)" } }, "Government type": { @@ -581,7 +578,7 @@ "text": "39.4%" }, "expected date of next election": { - "text": "March 2025" + "text": "May 2025" } }, "Judicial branch": { diff --git a/south-america/ns.json b/south-america/ns.json index 22565be0..da35b62c 100644 --- a/south-america/ns.json +++ b/south-america/ns.json @@ -106,13 +106,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "646,758" + "text": "646,758 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "320,352" }, "female": { - "text": "326,406 (2024 est.)" + "text": "326,406" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -137,9 +137,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Protestant 23.6% (includes Evangelical 11.2%, Moravian 11.2%, Reformed 0.7%, Lutheran 0.5%), Hindu 22.3%, Roman Catholic 21.6%, Muslim 13.8%, other Christian 3.2%, Winti 1.8%, Jehovah's Witness 1.2%, other 1.7%, none 7.5%, unspecified 3.2% (2012 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Suriname is a pluralistic society consisting primarily of Creoles (persons of mixed African and European heritage), the descendants of escaped African slaves known as Maroons, and the descendants of Indian and Javanese (Indonesian) contract workers. The country overall is in full, post-industrial demographic transition, with a low fertility rate, a moderate mortality rate, and a rising life expectancy. However, the Maroon population of the rural interior lags behind because of lower educational attainment and contraceptive use, higher malnutrition, and significantly less access to electricity, potable water, sanitation, infrastructure, and health care.
Some 350,000 people of Surinamese descent live in the Netherlands, Suriname's former colonial ruler. In the 19th century, better-educated, largely Dutch-speaking Surinamese began emigrating to the Netherlands. World War II interrupted the outflow, but it resumed after the war when Dutch labor demands grew - emigrants included all segments of the Creole population. Suriname still is strongly influenced by the Netherlands because most Surinamese have relatives living there and it is the largest supplier of development aid. Other emigration destinations include French Guiana and the United States. Suriname's immigration rules are flexible, and the country is easy to enter illegally because rainforests obscure its borders. Since the mid-1980s, Brazilians have settled in Suriname's capital, Paramaribo, or eastern Suriname, where they mine gold. This immigration is likely to slowly re-orient Suriname toward its Latin American roots.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "22.5% (male 73,864/female 71,573)" diff --git a/south-america/pa.json b/south-america/pa.json index b068492b..37e145b2 100644 --- a/south-america/pa.json +++ b/south-america/pa.json @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ } }, "Area - comparative": { - "text": "about three times the size of New York state; slightly smaller than California" + "text": "about three times the size of New York State; slightly smaller than California" }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { @@ -107,13 +107,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "7,522,549" + "text": "7,522,549 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "3,769,376" }, "female": { - "text": "3,753,173 (2024 est.)" + "text": "3,753,173" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -139,9 +139,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Roman Catholic 80.4%, Protestant 7% (Evangelical (non-specific) 6.7%, Evangelical Pentecostal <0.1%, Adventist <0.1%, Protestant (non-specific) <0.1%), Believer (not belonging to the church) 5.7%, other 0.6%, agnostic <0.1%, none 0.2%, unspecified 6.2% (2023 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Paraguay falls below the Latin American average in several socioeconomic categories, including immunization rates, potable water, sanitation, and secondary school enrollment, and has greater rates of income inequality and child and maternal mortality. Paraguay's poverty rate has declined in recent years but remains high, especially in rural areas, with more than a third of the population below the poverty line. However, the well-being of the poor in many regions has improved in terms of housing quality and access to clean water, telephone service, and electricity. The fertility rate continues to drop, declining sharply from an average 4.3 births per woman in the late 1990s to about 2 in 2013, as a result of the greater educational attainment of women, increased use of contraception, and a desire for smaller families among young women.
Paraguay is a country of emigration; it has not attracted large numbers of immigrants because of political instability, civil wars, years of dictatorship, and the greater appeal of neighboring countries. Paraguay first tried to encourage immigration in 1870 in order to rebound from the heavy death toll it suffered during the War of the Triple Alliance, but it received few European and Middle Eastern immigrants. In the 20th century, limited numbers of immigrants arrived from Lebanon, Japan, South Korea, and China, as well as Mennonites from Canada, Russia, and Mexico. Large flows of Brazilian immigrants have been arriving since the 1960s, mainly to work in agriculture. Paraguayans continue to emigrate to Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, the United States, Italy, Spain, and France.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "22.2% (male 850,191/female 821,237)" diff --git a/south-america/pe.json b/south-america/pe.json index 59821d59..04ca3ace 100644 --- a/south-america/pe.json +++ b/south-america/pe.json @@ -120,13 +120,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "32,600,249" + "text": "32,600,249 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "15,952,556" }, "female": { - "text": "16,647,693 (2024 est.)" + "text": "16,647,693" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -151,9 +151,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Roman Catholic 66.4%, Protestant 22.4% (Evangelical 19.6%, other Protestant 1.3%), other 1.9%, agnostic/atheist none 6.8%, unspecified 1.2% (2023 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "A sharp fertility decline in urban areas has driven overall fertility reduction in Peru. The national birth rate is about 2.2 children per woman as of 2023 and averaged 2.5 in rural areas as of 2022. Contraceptive prevalence has increased largely due to a greater use of traditional rather than modern methods. Like most other Andean countries, Peru’s opportunity to benefit from its large labor force will taper off as its dependency ratio—the ratio of dependents to working-age persons—bottoms out between 2025 and 2030.
The poverty rate has climbed to 27.5% in 2022, much higher than the rate before the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, 51% of the population was living in moderate food insecurity; Peru is the most food insecure country in South America. School enrollment has improved, but achievement scores reflect ongoing problems with educational quality. Many poor children temporarily or permanently drop out of school to help support their families. As of 2018, 21.8% Peruvian children aged 5 to 14 were working, often putting in long hours at hazardous mining or construction sites.
Peru was a country of immigration in the 19th and early 20th centuries but has become a country of emigration in the last few decades. Beginning in the 19th century, Peru brought in Asian contract laborers mainly to work on coastal plantations. Populations of Chinese and Japanese descent - among the largest in Latin America - are economically and culturally influential in Peru today. Peruvian emigration began rising in the 1980s due to an economic crisis and a violent internal conflict, but outflows have stabilized in the last few years as economic conditions have improved. Nonetheless, between 1990 and 2020 over 3 million Peruvians left the country – principally to the US, Spain, and Argentina – and did not return.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "25.8% (male 4,293,229/female 4,119,269)" diff --git a/south-america/sx.json b/south-america/sx.json index 62528262..b5b69aa7 100644 --- a/south-america/sx.json +++ b/south-america/sx.json @@ -80,9 +80,8 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "(July 2021 est.) no indigenous inhabitants" - }, - "note": "note: the small military garrison on South Georgia withdrew in March 2001 and was replaced by a permanent group of scientists from the British Antarctic Survey, which also has a biological station on Bird Island; the South Sandwich Islands are uninhabited" + "text": "1,000 (2021 est.) South Georgia" + } } }, "Environment": { diff --git a/south-america/uy.json b/south-america/uy.json index 99eb73ae..dc54cabd 100644 --- a/south-america/uy.json +++ b/south-america/uy.json @@ -120,13 +120,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "3,425,330" + "text": "3,425,330 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "1,660,132" }, "female": { - "text": "1,765,198 (2024 est.)" + "text": "1,765,198" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -152,9 +152,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Roman Catholic 36.5%, Protestant 5% (Evangelical (non-specific) 4.6%, Adventist 0.2%, Protestant (non-specific) 0.3%), African American Cults/Umbanda 2.8%, Jehovah's Witness 0.6%, Church of Jesus Christ 0.2%, other 1%, Believer (not belonging to the church) 1.8%, agnostic 0.3%, atheist 1.3%, none 47.3%, unspecified 3.4%Uruguay rates high for most development indicators and is known for its secularism, liberal social laws, and well-developed social security, health, and educational systems. It is one of the few countries in Latin America and the Caribbean where the entire population has access to clean water. Uruguay's provision of free primary through university education has contributed to the country's high levels of literacy and educational attainment. However, the emigration of human capital has diminished the state's return on its investment in education. Remittances from the roughly 18% of Uruguayans abroad amount to less than 1 percent of national GDP. The emigration of young adults and a low birth rate are causing Uruguay's population to age rapidly.
In the 1960s, Uruguayans for the first time emigrated en masse - primarily to Argentina and Brazil - because of economic decline and the onset of more than a decade of military dictatorship. Economic crises in the early 1980s and 2002 also triggered waves of emigration, but since 2002 more than 70% of Uruguayan emigrants have selected the US and Spain as destinations because of better job prospects. Uruguay had a tiny population upon its independence in 1828 and welcomed thousands of predominantly Italian and Spanish immigrants, but the country has not experienced large influxes of new arrivals since the aftermath of World War II. More recent immigrants include Peruvians and Arabs.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "18.9% (male 329,268/female 317,925)" diff --git a/south-america/ve.json b/south-america/ve.json index 4950906c..2ac76840 100644 --- a/south-america/ve.json +++ b/south-america/ve.json @@ -120,13 +120,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "31,250,306" + "text": "31,250,306 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "15,555,451" }, "female": { - "text": "15,694,855 (2024 est.)" + "text": "15,694,855" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -151,9 +151,6 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Roman Catholic 48.1%, Protestant 31.6% (Evangelical 31.4%, Adventist 0.2%), Jehovah's Witness 1.4%, African American/umbanda 0.7%, other 0.1%, believer 3.5%, agnostic 0.1%, atheist, 0.4%, none 13.6%, unspecified 0.6% (2023 est.)" }, - "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Venezuela’s ongoing socio-economic, political, and human rights crises have resulted in widespread poverty and food insecurity and have devastated the country’s healthcare system. According to a 2018 national hospital survey, many hospitals were unable to provide basic services, and 20% of operating rooms and intensive care units were non-functional. Hospitals reported shortages in water (79%), medicines (88%), and surgical supplies (79%). The poor conditions in healthcare facilities have motivated many doctors and other health professionals to emigrate, resulting in shortages of specialists, particularly in emergency care. The scarcity of medicines, vaccines, medical supplies, and mosquito controls is leading to a rise in infectious diseases. Tuberculosis cases jumped by 68% between 2014 and 2017, and malaria rates had the largest rise in the world from 2016 to 2017 at 69%. Diptheria, which had been eradicated in the country in 1999, re-emerged in 2016, and new cases have surfaced in 2023. Infectious disease outbreaks, such as measles and malaria, have crossed into neighboring countries. Infant mortality, which had been decreasing since the 1950s, has been on the rise since 2009. Between 2015 and 2016, infant deaths increased 30%, while maternal mortality increased 65%.
As of November 2023, more than 7.7 million Venezuelan migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers had been reported by host governments, with approximately 85% relocating in Latin America and the Caribbean. Colombia has been the largest recipient, accommodating almost 2.5 million as of February 2022, followed by Peru and Ecuador. As of June 2022, almost 212,000 of the refugees and close to 1.04 million of the asylum seekers were recognized by national authorities. An additional 4.3 million Venezuelans have been granted residence permits or other types of regular stay arrangements, as of March 2023. The initial wave of migrants were highly educated professionals. These were followed by university-educated young people. As the economy collapsed in 2017-2018, Venezuelan migrants have been less-educated and from low-income households.
" - }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "25% (male 3,987,361/female 3,811,307)" @@ -577,7 +574,7 @@ "text": "32.1%" }, "expected date of next election": { - "text": "April 2025" + "text": "May 2025" }, "note": "note: in 2020, the National Electoral Council increased the number of seats in the National Assembly from 167 to 277 for the December 2020 election" }, diff --git a/south-asia/af.json b/south-asia/af.json index 044a739f..5aeabcb7 100644 --- a/south-asia/af.json +++ b/south-asia/af.json @@ -109,13 +109,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "40,121,552" + "text": "40,121,552 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "20,301,066" }, "female": { - "text": "19,820,486 (2024 est.)" + "text": "19,820,486" } }, "Nationality": { diff --git a/south-asia/bg.json b/south-asia/bg.json index 8c11ec2a..388cbc38 100644 --- a/south-asia/bg.json +++ b/south-asia/bg.json @@ -115,13 +115,13 @@ "People and Society": { "Population": { "total": { - "text": "168,697,184" + "text": "168,697,184 (2024 est.)" }, "male": { "text": "82,708,252" }, "female": { - "text": "85,988,932 (2024 est.)" + "text": "85,988,932" } }, "Nationality": { @@ -1186,8 +1186,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Armed Forces of Bangladesh (aka Bangladesh Defense Force): Bangladesh Army, Bangladesh Navy, Bangladesh Air Force