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auto-update week 32
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Yo Robot
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@ -98,7 +98,12 @@
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"text": "<p>An Nīl (Nile) (shared with Rwanda [s], Tanzania, Uganda, South Sudan, and Egypt [m]) - 6,650 km; Blue Nile river mouth (shared with Ethiopia [s]) - 1,600 km<br><br><strong>note:</strong> [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth</p>"
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},
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"Major watersheds (area sq km)": {
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"text": "Atlantic Ocean drainage: <em>(Mediterranean Sea)</em> Nile (3,254,853 sq km)<br>Internal <em>(endorheic basin) </em>drainage: Lake Chad (2,497,738 sq km)"
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"Atlantic Ocean drainage": {
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"text": "<em>(Mediterranean Sea)</em> Nile (3,254,853 sq km)"
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},
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"Internal (endorheic basin) drainage": {
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"text": "Lake Chad (2,497,738 sq km)"
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}
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},
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"Major aquifers": {
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"text": "Nubian Aquifer System, Sudd Basin (Umm Ruwaba Aquifer)"
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@ -614,43 +619,43 @@
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"text": "<p>low-income Sahel economy devastated by ongoing civil war; major impacts on rural income, basic commodity prices, industrial production, agricultural supply chain, communications and commerce; hyperinflation and currency depreciation worsening food access and humanitarian conditions</p>"
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},
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"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
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"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2024": {
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"text": "$94.42 billion (2024 est.)"
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},
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"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2023": {
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"text": "$123.565 billion (2023 est.)"
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"text": "$109.147 billion (2023 est.)"
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},
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"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2022": {
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"text": "$154.672 billion (2022 est.)"
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},
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"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2021": {
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"text": "$156.168 billion (2021 est.)"
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},
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"note": "<b>note:</b> data in 2021 dollars"
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},
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"Real GDP growth rate": {
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"Real GDP growth rate 2024": {
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"text": "-13.5% (2024 est.)"
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},
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"Real GDP growth rate 2023": {
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"text": "-20.11% (2023 est.)"
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"text": "-29.4% (2023 est.)"
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},
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"Real GDP growth rate 2022": {
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"text": "-0.96% (2022 est.)"
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},
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"Real GDP growth rate 2021": {
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"text": "-1.87% (2021 est.)"
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"text": "-1% (2022 est.)"
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},
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"note": "<b>note:</b> annual GDP % growth based on constant local currency"
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},
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"Real GDP per capita": {
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"Real GDP per capita 2024": {
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"text": "$1,900 (2024 est.)"
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},
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"Real GDP per capita 2023": {
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"text": "$2,500 (2023 est.)"
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"text": "$2,200 (2023 est.)"
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},
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"Real GDP per capita 2022": {
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"text": "$3,100 (2022 est.)"
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},
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"Real GDP per capita 2021": {
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"text": "$3,200 (2021 est.)"
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},
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"note": "<b>note:</b> data in 2021 dollars"
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},
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"GDP (official exchange rate)": {
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"text": "$109.266 billion (2023 est.)",
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"text": "$49.91 billion (2024 est.)",
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"note": "<b>note:</b> data in current dollars at official exchange rate"
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},
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"Inflation rate (consumer prices)": {
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@ -667,34 +672,34 @@
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},
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"GDP - composition, by sector of origin": {
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"agriculture": {
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"text": "5.5% (2023 est.)"
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"text": "22.1% (2024 est.)"
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},
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"industry": {
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"text": "5.1% (2023 est.)"
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"text": "23% (2024 est.)"
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},
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"services": {
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"text": "7.5% (2023 est.)"
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"text": "54.9% (2024 est.)"
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},
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"note": "<b>note:</b> figures may not total 100% due to non-allocated consumption not captured in sector-reported data"
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},
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"GDP - composition, by end use": {
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"household consumption": {
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"text": "80.7% (2023 est.)"
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"text": "80.7% (2024 est.)"
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},
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"government consumption": {
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"text": "17.4% (2023 est.)"
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"text": "16.5% (2024 est.)"
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},
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"investment in fixed capital": {
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"text": "2.2% (2023 est.)"
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"text": "2.9% (2024 est.)"
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},
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"investment in inventories": {
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"text": "0% (2023 est.)"
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"text": "0% (2024 est.)"
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},
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"exports of goods and services": {
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"text": "1.1% (2023 est.)"
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"text": "1.2% (2024 est.)"
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},
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"imports of goods and services": {
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"text": "-1.4% (2023 est.)"
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"text": "-1.3% (2024 est.)"
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},
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> figures may not total 100% due to rounding or gaps in data collection"
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},
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@ -706,7 +711,7 @@
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"text": "oil, cotton ginning, textiles, cement, edible oils, sugar, soap distilling, shoes, petroleum refining, pharmaceuticals, armaments, automobile/light truck assembly, milling"
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},
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"Industrial production growth rate": {
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"text": "-19.71% (2023 est.)",
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"text": "-13.1% (2024 est.)",
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"note": "<b>note:</b> annual % change in industrial value added based on constant local currency"
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},
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"Labor force": {
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@ -718,10 +723,10 @@
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"text": "11.45% (2023 est.)"
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},
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"Unemployment rate 2022": {
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"text": "7.5% (2022 est.)"
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"text": "7.6% (2022 est.)"
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},
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"Unemployment rate 2021": {
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"text": "11% (2021 est.)"
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"text": "11.1% (2021 est.)"
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},
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"note": "<b>note:</b> % of labor force seeking employment"
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},
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@ -737,30 +742,15 @@
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},
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"note": "<b>note:</b> % of labor force ages 15-24 seeking employment"
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},
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"Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income": {
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"Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2014": {
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"text": "34.2 (2014 est.)"
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},
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"note": "<b>note:</b> index (0-100) of income distribution; higher values represent greater inequality"
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},
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"Household income or consumption by percentage share": {
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"lowest 10%": {
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"text": "3.2% (2014 est.)"
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},
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"highest 10%": {
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"text": "27.8% (2014 est.)"
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},
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"note": "<b>note:</b> % share of income accruing to lowest and highest 10% of population"
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},
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"Remittances": {
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"Remittances 2023": {
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"text": "0.92% of GDP (2023 est.)"
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"text": "2.5% of GDP (2023 est.)"
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},
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"Remittances 2022": {
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"text": "2.9% of GDP (2022 est.)"
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},
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"Remittances 2021": {
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"text": "3.27% of GDP (2021 est.)"
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"text": "3.3% of GDP (2021 est.)"
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},
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"note": "<b>note:</b> personal transfers and compensation between resident and non-resident individuals/households/entities"
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},
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@ -773,11 +763,6 @@
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},
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"note": "<b>note:</b> central government revenues and expenses (excluding grants/extrabudgetary units/social security funds) converted to US dollars at average official exchange rate for year indicated"
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},
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"Public debt": {
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"Public debt 2017": {
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"text": "121.6% of GDP (2017 est.)"
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}
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},
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"Taxes and other revenues": {
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"text": "7.4% (of GDP) (2016 est.)",
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"note": "<b>note:</b> central government tax revenue as a % of GDP"
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@ -1045,7 +1030,7 @@
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF): Ground Force (Sudanese Army), Sudanese Navy, Sudanese Air Force; Rapid Support Forces (RSF); Border Guards<br><br>Ministry of Interior: Sudan Police Forces (SPF), Central Reserve Police (CRP) (2025)",
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"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the RSF is a semi-autonomous paramilitary force formed in 2013 to fight armed rebel groups in Sudan, with Mohammed Hamdan DAGALO (aka Hemeti) as its commander; it was initially placed under the National Intelligence and Security Service, then came under the direct command of former president Omar al-BASHIR, who boosted the RSF as his own personal security force; as a result, the RSF was better funded and equipped than the regular armed forces; the RSF has since recruited from all parts of Sudan beyond its original Darfuri Arab groups but remains under the personal patronage and control of DAGALO; the RSF has participated in military operations in Yemen, Darfur, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile State; it has also been used to respond to anti-regime demonstrations; the RSF has been accused of committing human rights abuses against civilians and is reportedly involved in business enterprises, such as gold mining<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the Central Reserve Police (aka Abu Tira) is a combat-trained paramilitary force that has been used against demonstrators and sanctioned by the US for human rights abuses<br><br><strong>note 3:</strong> there are also numerous armed militias operating in Sudan"
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"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the RSF is a semi-autonomous paramilitary force formed in 2013 to fight armed rebel groups in Sudan, with Mohammed Hamdan DAGALO (aka Hemeti) as its commander; it was initially placed under the National Intelligence and Security Service, then came under the direct command of former president Omar al-BASHIR, who boosted the RSF as his own personal security force; as a result, the RSF was better funded and equipped than the regular armed forces; the RSF has since recruited from all parts of Sudan beyond its original Darfuri Arab groups but remains under the personal patronage and control of DAGALO<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the Central Reserve Police (aka Abu Tira) is a combat-trained paramilitary force<br><br><strong>note 3:</strong> the October 2020 peace agreement provided for the establishment of a Joint Security Keeping Forces (JSKF) tasked with securing the Darfur region in the place of the UN African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), a joint African Union-UN peacekeeping force that operated in the war-torn region from 2007-December 2020; the force was intended to include the SAF, RSF, police, intelligence, and representatives from armed groups involved in peace negotiations; while the first 2,000 members of the JSKF completed training in September 2022, the status of the force since the start of the civil war is not available<br><br><strong>note 4:</strong> there are also numerous armed militias operating in Sudan"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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"Military Expenditures 2021": {
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> implementation of conscription is reportedly uneven"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "<p>the primary responsibilities of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are internal security, border control, and countering potential external threats from its neighbors; SAF operations have traditionally been supported by militia and paramilitary forces, particularly the Rapid Support Forces (RSF); in the Spring of 2023, heavy fighting broke out between the SAF and the paramilitary RSF, particularly around the capital Khartoum and in the western region of Darfur, amid disputes over an internationally-backed plan for a transition towards civilian rule; fighting has since spread and continued into 2025 with reports of atrocities, ethnic cleansing, food insecurity, heavy civilian casualties, and millions of internally displaced persons<br><br>the Sudanese military has been a dominant force in the ruling of the country since its independence in 1956; in addition, the military has a large role in the country's economy, reportedly controlling over 200 commercial companies, including businesses involved in gold mining, rubber production, agriculture, and meat exports</p> the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has operated in the disputed Abyei region along the border between Sudan and South Sudan since 2011; UNISFA's mission includes ensuring security, protecting civilians, strengthening the capacity of the Abyei Police Service, de-mining, monitoring/verifying the redeployment of armed forces from the area, and facilitating the flow of humanitarian aid; as of 2024, UNISFA had approximately 3,200 personnel assigned<br><br>the October 2020 peace agreement provided for the establishment of a Joint Security Keeping Forces (JSKF) comprised of 12,000 personnel tasked with securing the Darfur region in the place of the UN African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), a joint African Union-UN peacekeeping force that operated in the war-torn region between 2007 and the end of its mandate in December 2020; in June 2021, Sudan's transitional government announced it would increase the size of this force to 20,000 and expand its mission scope to include the capital and other parts of the country suffering from violence; the force would include the SAF, RSF, police, intelligence, and representatives from armed groups involved in peace negotiations; in September 2022, the first 2,000 members of the JSKF completed training; the status of the JSKF since the start of the civil war is not available (2025)"
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"text": "the primary responsibilities of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are border control, external defense, and internal security; SAF operations have traditionally been supported by militia and paramilitary forces, particularly the Rapid Support Forces (RSF); in the Spring of 2023, fighting broke out between the SAF and the RSF, particularly around the capital Khartoum and in the western region of Darfur, amid disputes over an internationally-backed plan for a transition towards civilian rule; fighting subsequently spread and continued into 2025 with reports of atrocities, ethnic cleansing, food insecurity, heavy civilian casualties, and millions of internally displaced persons; each side is supported by allied militias and both have received foreign support<br><br>the Sudanese military has been a dominant force in the ruling of the country since its independence in 1956; in addition, the military has a large role in the country's economy, reportedly controlling over 200 commercial companies, including businesses involved in gold mining, rubber production, agriculture, and meat exports<br><br>the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has operated in the disputed Abyei region along the border between Sudan and South Sudan since 2011; UNISFA's mission includes ensuring security, protecting civilians, strengthening the capacity of the Abyei Police Service, de-mining, monitoring/verifying the redeployment of armed forces from the area, and facilitating the flow of humanitarian aid; as of 2025, UNISFA had approximately 3,800 personnel assigned (2025)"
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}
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},
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"Terrorism": {
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