auto-update week 20

middle-east/ae.json

@@ -543,21 +543,21 @@
     },
     "Executive branch": {
       "chief of state": {
-        "text": "President KHALIFA bin Zayid Al-Nuhayan (since 2 November 2004), ruler of Abu Zaby (Abu Dhabi) (since 4 November 2004); Vice President and Prime Minister MUHAMMAD BIN RASHID Al-Maktoum (since 5 January 2006)"
+        "text": "President MUHAMMAD bin Rashid Al-Nuhayan (since 14 May 2022); Vice President MUHAMMAD bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (since 5 January 2006); note - MUHAMMAD bin Rashid Al-Nuhayan elected president by the Federal Supreme Council following the death of President KHALIFA bin Zayid Al-Nuhayan on 13 May"
       },
       "head of government": {
-        "text": "Prime Minister Vice President MUHAMMAD BIN RASHID Al-Maktoum (since 5 January 2006); Deputy Prime Ministers SAIF bin Zayid Al-Nuhayyan, MANSUR bin Zayid Al-Nuhayan (both since 11 May 2009), and MAKTOUM bin Mohammed Al-Maktoum (since 25 September 2021)"
+        "text": "Prime Minister and Vice President MUHAMMAD bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (since 5 January 2006); Deputy Prime Ministers SAIF bin Zayid Al-Nuhayan, MANSUR bin Zayid Al-Nuhayan (both since 11 May 2009), and MAKTOUM bin Mohammed Al-Maktoum (since 25 September 2021)"
       },
       "cabinet": {
         "text": "Council of Ministers announced by the prime minister and approved by the president"
       },
       "elections/appointments": {
-        "text": "president and vice president indirectly elected by the Federal Supreme Council - composed of the rulers of the 7 emirates - for a 5-year term (no term limits); election last held 3 November 2009 (next election NA); prime minister and deputy prime minister appointed by the president"
+        "text": "president and vice president indirectly elected by the Federal Supreme Council - composed of the rulers of the 7 emirates - for a 5-year term (no term limits); unscheduled election held on 14 May 2022, following the death of President KHALIFA bin Zayid Al-Nuhayan (next election NA); prime minister and deputy prime minister appointed by the president"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "KHALIFA bin Zayid Al-Nuhayyan reelected president; FSC vote NA"
+        "text": "MUHAMMAD bin Rashid Al-Nuhayan elected president; Federal Supreme Council vote NA"
       },
-      "note": "<strong>note:</strong> there is also a Federal Supreme Council (FSC) composed of the 7 emirate rulers; the FSC is the highest constitutional authority in the UAE; establishes general policies and sanctions federal legislation; meets 4 times a year; Abu Zaby (Abu Dhabi) and Dubayy (Dubai) rulers have effective veto power"
+      "note": "<strong>note:</strong> there is also a Federal Supreme Council (FSC) composed of the 7 emirate rulers; the FSC is the highest constitutional authority in the UAE; establishes general policies and sanctions federal legislation; meets 4 times a year; Abu Zaby (Abu Dhabi) and Dubayy (Dubai) rulers have effective veto power; Vice President MUHAMMAD BIN RASHID Al-Maktoum assumed presidential responsibilities after the death of President KHALIFA bin Zayid Al-Nuhayan on 13 May 2022; under the constitution, MUHAMMAD BIN RASHID will serve as President until the FSC meets within 30 days to elect a new president"
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@
     },
     "Diplomatic representation in the US": {
       "chief of mission": {
-        "text": "Ambassador Yusif bin Mani bin Said al-UTAYBA (since 28 July 2008)"
+        "text": "Ambassador Yousif Mana Saeed Ahmed ALOTAIBA (since 28 July 2008)"
       },
       "chancery": {
         "text": "3522 International Court NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20008"
@@ -656,7 +656,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economic overview": {
-      "text": "<p>The UAE has an open economy with a high per capita income and a sizable annual trade surplus. Successful efforts at economic diversification have reduced the portion of GDP from the oil and gas sector to 30%.</p><p></p><p>Since the discovery of oil in the UAE nearly 60 years ago, the country has undergone a profound transformation from an impoverished region of small desert principalities to a modern state with a high standard of living. The government has increased spending on job creation and infrastructure expansion and is opening up utilities to greater private sector involvement. The country's free trade zones - offering 100% foreign ownership and zero taxes - are helping to attract foreign investors.</p><p></p><p>The global financial crisis of 2008-09, tight international credit, and deflated asset prices constricted the economy in 2009. UAE authorities tried to blunt the crisis by increasing spending and boosting liquidity in the banking sector. The crisis hit Dubai hardest, as it was heavily exposed to depressed real estate prices. Dubai lacked sufficient cash to meet its debt obligations, prompting global concern about its solvency and ultimately a $20 billion bailout from the UAE Central Bank and Abu Dhabi Government that was refinanced in March 2014.</p><p></p><p>The UAE’s dependence on oil is a significant long-term challenge, although the UAE is one of the most diversified countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Low oil prices have prompted the UAE to cut expenditures, including on some social programs, but the UAE has sufficient assets in its sovereign investment funds to cover its deficits. The government reduced fuel subsidies in August 2015, and introduced excise taxes (50% on sweetened carbonated beverages and 100% on energy drinks and tobacco) in October 2017. A five-percent value-added tax was introduced in January 2018. The UAE's strategic plan for the next few years focuses on economic diversification, promoting the UAE as a global trade and tourism hub, developing industry, and creating more job opportunities for nationals through improved education and increased private sector employment.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>The UAE has an open economy with a high per capita income and a sizable annual trade surplus. Successful efforts at economic diversification have reduced the portion of GDP from the oil and gas sector to 30%.</p> <p> </p> <p>Since the discovery of oil in the UAE nearly 60 years ago, the country has undergone a profound transformation from an impoverished region of small desert principalities to a modern state with a high standard of living. The government has increased spending on job creation and infrastructure expansion and is opening up utilities to greater private sector involvement. The country's free trade zones - offering 100% foreign ownership and zero taxes - are helping to attract foreign investors.</p> <p> </p> <p>The global financial crisis of 2008-09, tight international credit, and deflated asset prices constricted the economy in 2009. UAE authorities tried to blunt the crisis by increasing spending and boosting liquidity in the banking sector. The crisis hit Dubai hardest, as it was heavily exposed to depressed real estate prices. Dubai lacked sufficient cash to meet its debt obligations, prompting global concern about its solvency and ultimately a $20 billion bailout from the UAE Central Bank and Abu Dhabi Government that was refinanced in March 2014.</p> <p> </p> <p>The UAE’s dependence on oil is a significant long-term challenge, although the UAE is one of the most diversified countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Low oil prices have prompted the UAE to cut expenditures, including on some social programs, but the UAE has sufficient assets in its sovereign investment funds to cover its deficits. The government reduced fuel subsidies in August 2015, and introduced excise taxes (50% on sweetened carbonated beverages and 100% on energy drinks and tobacco) in October 2017. A five-percent value-added tax was introduced in January 2018. The UAE's strategic plan for the next few years focuses on economic diversification, promoting the UAE as a global trade and tourism hub, developing industry, and creating more job opportunities for nationals through improved education and increased private sector employment.</p>"
     },
     "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": {
@@ -982,10 +982,10 @@
   "Communications": {
     "Telephones - fixed lines": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "2,380,866 (2020)"
+        "text": "2,380,866 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "24.07 (2020 est.)"
+        "text": "24 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@@ -1024,10 +1024,10 @@
     },
     "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
       "total": {
-        "text": "3,245,123 (2021)"
+        "text": "3,245,123 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "32.81 (2021 est.)"
+        "text": "33 (2020 est.)"
       }
     }
   },

middle-east/aj.json

@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economic overview": {
-      "text": "<p>Prior to the decline in global oil prices since 2014, Azerbaijan's high economic growth was attributable to rising energy exports and to some non-export sectors. Oil exports through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, the Baku-Novorossiysk, and the Baku-Supsa Pipelines remain the main economic driver, but efforts to boost Azerbaijan's gas production are underway. The expected completion of the geopolitically important Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) between Azerbaijan and Europe will open up another source of revenue from gas exports. First gas to Turkey through the SGC is expected in 2018 with project completion expected by 2020-21.</p><p></p><p>Declining oil prices caused a 3.1% contraction in GDP in 2016, and a 0.8% decline in 2017, highlighted by a sharp reduction in the construction sector. The economic decline was accompanied by higher inflation, a weakened banking sector, and two sharp currency devaluations in 2015. Azerbaijan’s financial sector continued to struggle. In May 2017, Baku allowed the majority state-owed International Bank of Azerbaijan (IBA), the nation’s largest bank, to default on some of its outstanding debt and file for restructuring in Azerbaijani courts; IBA also filed in US and UK bankruptcy courts to have its restructuring recognized in their respective jurisdictions.</p><p></p><p>Azerbaijan has made limited progress with market-based economic reforms. Pervasive public and private sector corruption and structural economic inefficiencies remain a drag on long-term growth, particularly in non-energy sectors. The government has, however, made efforts to combat corruption, particularly in customs and government services. Several other obstacles impede Azerbaijan's economic progress, including the need for more foreign investment in the non-energy sector and the continuing conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. While trade with Russia and the other former Soviet republics remains important, Azerbaijan has expanded trade with Turkey and Europe and is seeking new markets for non-oil/gas exports - mainly in the agricultural sector - with Gulf Cooperation Council member countries, the US, and others. It is also improving Baku airport and the Caspian Sea port of Alat for use as a regional transportation and logistics hub.</p><p></p><p>Long-term prospects depend on world oil prices, Azerbaijan's ability to develop export routes for its growing gas production, and its ability to improve the business environment and diversify the economy. In late 2016, the president approved a strategic roadmap for economic reforms that identified key non-energy segments of the economy for development, such as agriculture, logistics, information technology, and tourism. In October 2017, the long-awaited Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, stretching from the Azerbaijani capital to Kars in north-eastern Turkey, began limited service.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Prior to the decline in global oil prices since 2014, Azerbaijan's high economic growth was attributable to rising energy exports and to some non-export sectors. Oil exports through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, the Baku-Novorossiysk, and the Baku-Supsa Pipelines remain the main economic driver, but efforts to boost Azerbaijan's gas production are underway. The expected completion of the geopolitically important Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) between Azerbaijan and Europe will open up another source of revenue from gas exports. First gas to Turkey through the SGC is expected in 2018 with project completion expected by 2020-21.</p> <p> </p> <p>Declining oil prices caused a 3.1% contraction in GDP in 2016, and a 0.8% decline in 2017, highlighted by a sharp reduction in the construction sector. The economic decline was accompanied by higher inflation, a weakened banking sector, and two sharp currency devaluations in 2015. Azerbaijan’s financial sector continued to struggle. In May 2017, Baku allowed the majority state-owed International Bank of Azerbaijan (IBA), the nation’s largest bank, to default on some of its outstanding debt and file for restructuring in Azerbaijani courts; IBA also filed in US and UK bankruptcy courts to have its restructuring recognized in their respective jurisdictions.</p> <p> </p> <p>Azerbaijan has made limited progress with market-based economic reforms. Pervasive public and private sector corruption and structural economic inefficiencies remain a drag on long-term growth, particularly in non-energy sectors. The government has, however, made efforts to combat corruption, particularly in customs and government services. Several other obstacles impede Azerbaijan's economic progress, including the need for more foreign investment in the non-energy sector and the continuing conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. While trade with Russia and the other former Soviet republics remains important, Azerbaijan has expanded trade with Turkey and Europe and is seeking new markets for non-oil/gas exports - mainly in the agricultural sector - with Gulf Cooperation Council member countries, the US, and others. It is also improving Baku airport and the Caspian Sea port of Alat for use as a regional transportation and logistics hub.</p> <p> </p> <p>Long-term prospects depend on world oil prices, Azerbaijan's ability to develop export routes for its growing gas production, and its ability to improve the business environment and diversify the economy. In late 2016, the president approved a strategic roadmap for economic reforms that identified key non-energy segments of the economy for development, such as agriculture, logistics, information technology, and tourism. In October 2017, the long-awaited Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, stretching from the Azerbaijani capital to Kars in north-eastern Turkey, began limited service.</p>"
     },
     "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@@ -981,15 +981,15 @@
   "Communications": {
     "Telephones - fixed lines": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "1,652,688 (2020)"
+        "text": "1,652,688 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "16.3 (2020 est.)"
+        "text": "16 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Telephones - mobile cellular": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "10,344,300 (2020)"
+        "text": "10,344,300 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
         "text": "102 (2020 est.)"
@@ -1023,10 +1023,10 @@
     },
     "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
       "total": {
-        "text": "1,995,474 (2022)"
+        "text": "1,995,474 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "19.68 (2022)"
+        "text": "20 (2020 est.)"
       }
     }
   },

middle-east/am.json

@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economic overview": {
-      "text": "<p>Under the old Soviet central planning system, Armenia developed a modern industrial sector, supplying machine tools, textiles, and other manufactured goods to sister republics, in exchange for raw materials and energy. Armenia has since switched to small-scale agriculture and away from the large agro industrial complexes of the Soviet era. Armenia has only two open trade borders - Iran and Georgia - because its borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey have been closed since 1991 and 1993, respectively, as a result of Armenia's ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan over the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh region.</p><p></p><p>Armenia joined the World Trade Organization in January 2003. The government has made some improvements in tax and customs administration in recent years, but anti-corruption measures have been largely ineffective. Armenia will need to pursue additional economic reforms and strengthen the rule of law in order to raise its economic growth and improve economic competitiveness and employment opportunities, especially given its economic isolation from Turkey and Azerbaijan.</p><p></p><p>Armenia's geographic isolation, a narrow export base, and pervasive monopolies in important business sectors have made it particularly vulnerable to volatility in the global commodity markets and the economic challenges in Russia. Armenia is particularly dependent on Russian commercial and governmental support, as most key Armenian infrastructure is Russian-owned and/or managed, especially in the energy sector. Remittances from expatriates working in Russia are equivalent to about 12-14% of GDP. Armenia joined the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union in January 2015, but has remained interested in pursuing closer ties with the EU as well, signing a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU in November 2017. Armenia’s rising government debt is leading Yerevan to tighten its fiscal policies – the amount is approaching the debt to GDP ratio threshold set by national legislation.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Under the old Soviet central planning system, Armenia developed a modern industrial sector, supplying machine tools, textiles, and other manufactured goods to sister republics, in exchange for raw materials and energy. Armenia has since switched to small-scale agriculture and away from the large agro industrial complexes of the Soviet era. Armenia has only two open trade borders - Iran and Georgia - because its borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey have been closed since 1991 and 1993, respectively, as a result of Armenia's ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan over the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh region.</p> <p> </p> <p>Armenia joined the World Trade Organization in January 2003. The government has made some improvements in tax and customs administration in recent years, but anti-corruption measures have been largely ineffective. Armenia will need to pursue additional economic reforms and strengthen the rule of law in order to raise its economic growth and improve economic competitiveness and employment opportunities, especially given its economic isolation from Turkey and Azerbaijan.</p> <p> </p> <p>Armenia's geographic isolation, a narrow export base, and pervasive monopolies in important business sectors have made it particularly vulnerable to volatility in the global commodity markets and the economic challenges in Russia. Armenia is particularly dependent on Russian commercial and governmental support, as most key Armenian infrastructure is Russian-owned and/or managed, especially in the energy sector. Remittances from expatriates working in Russia are equivalent to about 12-14% of GDP. Armenia joined the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union in January 2015, but has remained interested in pursuing closer ties with the EU as well, signing a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU in November 2017. Armenia’s rising government debt is leading Yerevan to tighten its fiscal policies – the amount is approaching the debt to GDP ratio threshold set by national legislation.</p>"
     },
     "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@@ -979,18 +979,18 @@
   "Communications": {
     "Telephones - fixed lines": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "427,539 (2020)"
+        "text": "427,539 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "14.43 (2020 est.)"
+        "text": "14 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Telephones - mobile cellular": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "3,488,797 (2020)"
+        "text": "3,488,797 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "117.7 (2020 est.)"
+        "text": "118 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Telecommunication systems": {
@@ -1021,10 +1021,10 @@
     },
     "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
       "total": {
-        "text": "430,407 (2022)"
+        "text": "430,407 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "14.52 (2022)"
+        "text": "15 (2020 est.)"
       }
     }
   },

middle-east/ba.json

@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economic overview": {
-      "text": "<p>Oil and natural gas play a dominant role in Bahrain’s economy. Despite the Government’s past efforts to diversify the economy, oil still comprises 85% of Bahraini budget revenues. In the last few years lower world energy prices have generated sizable budget deficits - about 10% of GDP in 2017 alone. Bahrain has few options for covering these deficits, with low foreign assets and fewer oil resources compared to its GCC neighbors. The three major US credit agencies downgraded Bahrain’s sovereign debt rating to \"junk\" status in 2016, citing persistently low oil prices and the government’s high debt levels. Nevertheless, Bahrain was able to raise about $4 billion by issuing foreign currency denominated debt in 2017.</p><p></p><p>Other major economic activities are production of aluminum - Bahrain's second biggest export after oil and gas –finance, and construction. Bahrain continues to seek new natural gas supplies as feedstock to support its expanding petrochemical and aluminum industries. In April 2018 Bahrain announced it had found a significant oil field off the country’s west coast, but is still assessing how much of the oil can be extracted profitably.</p><p></p><p>In addition to addressing its current fiscal woes, Bahraini authorities face the long-term challenge of boosting Bahrain’s regional competitiveness — especially regarding industry, finance, and tourism — and reconciling revenue constraints with popular pressure to maintain generous state subsidies and a large public sector. Since 2015, the government lifted subsidies on meat, diesel, kerosene, and gasoline and has begun to phase in higher prices for electricity and water. As part of its diversification plans, Bahrain implemented a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US in August 2006, the first FTA between the US and a Gulf state. It plans to introduce a Value Added Tax (VAT) by the end of 2018.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Oil and natural gas play a dominant role in Bahrain’s economy. Despite the Government’s past efforts to diversify the economy, oil still comprises 85% of Bahraini budget revenues. In the last few years lower world energy prices have generated sizable budget deficits - about 10% of GDP in 2017 alone. Bahrain has few options for covering these deficits, with low foreign assets and fewer oil resources compared to its GCC neighbors. The three major US credit agencies downgraded Bahrain’s sovereign debt rating to \"junk\" status in 2016, citing persistently low oil prices and the government’s high debt levels. Nevertheless, Bahrain was able to raise about $4 billion by issuing foreign currency denominated debt in 2017.</p> <p> </p> <p>Other major economic activities are production of aluminum - Bahrain's second biggest export after oil and gas –finance, and construction. Bahrain continues to seek new natural gas supplies as feedstock to support its expanding petrochemical and aluminum industries. In April 2018 Bahrain announced it had found a significant oil field off the country’s west coast, but is still assessing how much of the oil can be extracted profitably.</p> <p> </p> <p>In addition to addressing its current fiscal woes, Bahraini authorities face the long-term challenge of boosting Bahrain’s regional competitiveness — especially regarding industry, finance, and tourism — and reconciling revenue constraints with popular pressure to maintain generous state subsidies and a large public sector. Since 2015, the government lifted subsidies on meat, diesel, kerosene, and gasoline and has begun to phase in higher prices for electricity and water. As part of its diversification plans, Bahrain implemented a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US in August 2006, the first FTA between the US and a Gulf state. It plans to introduce a Value Added Tax (VAT) by the end of 2018.</p>"
     },
     "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@@ -957,18 +957,18 @@
   "Communications": {
     "Telephones - fixed lines": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "266,659 (2020)"
+        "text": "274,106 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "15.67 (2020 est.)"
+        "text": "16 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Telephones - mobile cellular": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "1,748,672 (2020)"
+        "text": "1,748,672 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "102.8 (2020 est.)"
+        "text": "103 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Telecommunication systems": {
@@ -999,10 +999,10 @@
     },
     "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
       "total": {
-        "text": "148,928 (2021)"
+        "text": "148,928 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "8.75 (2021)"
+        "text": "9 (2020 est.)"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -1077,6 +1077,9 @@
       "note": "note(s) - the Royal Guard is officially under the command of the Army, but exercises considerable autonomy; the National Guard's primary mission is to guard critical infrastructure such as the airport and oil fields; while the Guard is under the Ministry of Interior, it reports directly to the king"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
+      "Military Expenditures 2021": {
+        "text": "3.6% of GDP (2021 est.)"
+      },
       "Military Expenditures 2020": {
         "text": "4.2% of GDP (2020 est.)"
       },
@@ -1088,9 +1091,6 @@
       },
       "Military Expenditures 2017": {
         "text": "4.2% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $2.18 billion)"
-      },
-      "Military Expenditures 2016": {
-        "text": "4.7% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $2.25 billion)"
       }
     },
     "Military and security service personnel strengths": {

middle-east/gg.json

@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economic overview": {
-      "text": "<p>Georgia's main economic activities include cultivation of agricultural products such as grapes, citrus fruits, and hazelnuts; mining of manganese, copper, and gold; and producing alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages, metals, machinery, and chemicals in small-scale industries. The country imports nearly all of its needed supplies of natural gas and oil products. It has sizeable hydropower capacity that now provides most of its electricity needs.</p><p></p><p>Georgia has overcome the chronic energy shortages and gas supply interruptions of the past by renovating hydropower plants and by increasingly relying on natural gas imports from Azerbaijan instead of from Russia. Construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the South Caucasus gas pipeline, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad are part of a strategy to capitalize on Georgia's strategic location between Europe and Asia and develop its role as a transit hub for gas, oil, and other goods.</p><p></p><p>Georgia's economy sustained GDP growth of more than 10% in 2006-07, based on strong inflows of foreign investment, remittances, and robust government spending. However, GDP growth slowed following the August 2008 conflict with Russia, and sank to negative 4% in 2009 as foreign direct investment and workers' remittances declined in the wake of the global financial crisis. The economy rebounded in the period 2010-17, but FDI inflows, the engine of Georgian economic growth prior to the 2008 conflict, have not recovered fully. Unemployment remains persistently high.</p><p></p><p>The country is pinning its hopes for faster growth on a continued effort to build up infrastructure, enhance support for entrepreneurship, simplify regulations, and improve professional education, in order to attract foreign investment and boost employment, with a focus on transportation projects, tourism, hydropower, and agriculture. Georgia had historically suffered from a chronic failure to collect tax revenues; however, since 2004 the government has simplified the tax code, increased tax enforcement, and cracked down on petty corruption, leading to higher revenues. The government has received high marks from the World Bank for improvements in business transparency. Since 2012, the Georgian Dream-led government has continued the previous administration's low-regulation, low-tax, free market policies, while modestly increasing social spending and amending the labor code to comply with International Labor Standards. In mid-2014, Georgia concluded an association agreement with the EU, paving the way to free trade and visa-free travel. In 2017, Georgia signed Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China as part of Tbilisi’s efforts to diversify its economic ties. Georgia is seeking to develop its Black Sea ports to further facilitate East-West trade.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Georgia's main economic activities include cultivation of agricultural products such as grapes, citrus fruits, and hazelnuts; mining of manganese, copper, and gold; and producing alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages, metals, machinery, and chemicals in small-scale industries. The country imports nearly all of its needed supplies of natural gas and oil products. It has sizeable hydropower capacity that now provides most of its electricity needs.</p> <p> </p> <p>Georgia has overcome the chronic energy shortages and gas supply interruptions of the past by renovating hydropower plants and by increasingly relying on natural gas imports from Azerbaijan instead of from Russia. Construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the South Caucasus gas pipeline, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad are part of a strategy to capitalize on Georgia's strategic location between Europe and Asia and develop its role as a transit hub for gas, oil, and other goods.</p> <p> </p> <p>Georgia's economy sustained GDP growth of more than 10% in 2006-07, based on strong inflows of foreign investment, remittances, and robust government spending. However, GDP growth slowed following the August 2008 conflict with Russia, and sank to negative 4% in 2009 as foreign direct investment and workers' remittances declined in the wake of the global financial crisis. The economy rebounded in the period 2010-17, but FDI inflows, the engine of Georgian economic growth prior to the 2008 conflict, have not recovered fully. Unemployment remains persistently high.</p> <p> </p> <p>The country is pinning its hopes for faster growth on a continued effort to build up infrastructure, enhance support for entrepreneurship, simplify regulations, and improve professional education, in order to attract foreign investment and boost employment, with a focus on transportation projects, tourism, hydropower, and agriculture. Georgia had historically suffered from a chronic failure to collect tax revenues; however, since 2004 the government has simplified the tax code, increased tax enforcement, and cracked down on petty corruption, leading to higher revenues. The government has received high marks from the World Bank for improvements in business transparency. Since 2012, the Georgian Dream-led government has continued the previous administration's low-regulation, low-tax, free market policies, while modestly increasing social spending and amending the labor code to comply with International Labor Standards. In mid-2014, Georgia concluded an association agreement with the EU, paving the way to free trade and visa-free travel. In 2017, Georgia signed Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China as part of Tbilisi’s efforts to diversify its economic ties. Georgia is seeking to develop its Black Sea ports to further facilitate East-West trade.</p>"
     },
     "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@@ -979,10 +979,10 @@
   "Communications": {
     "Telephones - fixed lines": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "378,498 (2020)"
+        "text": "387,698 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "9.49 (2020 est.)"
+        "text": "10 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@@ -1021,10 +1021,10 @@
     },
     "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
       "total": {
-        "text": "972,162 (2022)"
+        "text": "972,162 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "24.37 (2022)"
+        "text": "24 (2020 est.)"
       }
     }
   },

middle-east/gz.json

@@ -637,10 +637,10 @@
   "Communications": {
     "Telephones - fixed lines": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "472,293 (includes the West Bank); (July 2016 est.)"
+        "text": "466,283 (2020 est.) includes the West Bank"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "9 (includes the West Bank); (July 2016 est.)"
+        "text": "9 (2020 est.) includes the West Bank"
       }
     },
     "Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@@ -679,10 +679,10 @@
     },
     "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
       "total": {
-        "text": "320,500"
+        "text": "376,911 (2020 est.) includes the West Bank"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "14 (2016 est.)"
+        "text": "7 (2020 est.) includes the West Bank"
       },
       "note": "<strong>note:</strong> includes West Bank"
     }

middle-east/ir.json

@@ -660,7 +660,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economic overview": {
-      "text": "<p>Iran's economy is marked by statist policies, inefficiencies, and reliance on oil and gas exports, but Iran also possesses significant agricultural, industrial, and service sectors. The Iranian government directly owns and operates hundreds of state-owned enterprises and indirectly controls many companies affiliated with the country's security forces. Distortions - including corruption, price controls, subsidies, and a banking system holding billions of dollars of non-performing loans - weigh down the economy, undermining the potential for private-sector-led growth.</p><p></p><p>Private sector activity includes small-scale workshops, farming, some manufacturing, and services, in addition to medium-scale construction, cement production, mining, and metalworking. Significant informal market activity flourishes and corruption is widespread.</p><p></p><p>The lifting of most nuclear-related sanctions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in January 2016 sparked a restoration of Iran’s oil production and revenue that drove rapid GDP growth, but economic growth declined in 2017 as oil production plateaued. The economy continues to suffer from low levels of investment and declines in productivity since before the JCPOA, and from high levels of unemployment, especially among women and college-educated Iranian youth.</p><p></p><p>In May 2017, the re-election of President Hasan RUHANI generated widespread public expectations that the economic benefits of the JCPOA would expand and reach all levels of society. RUHANI will need to implement structural reforms that strengthen the banking sector and improve Iran’s business climate to attract foreign investment and encourage the growth of the private sector. Sanctions that are not related to Iran’s nuclear program remain in effect, and these—plus fears over the possible re-imposition of nuclear-related sanctions—will continue to deter foreign investors from engaging with Iran.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Iran's economy is marked by statist policies, inefficiencies, and reliance on oil and gas exports, but Iran also possesses significant agricultural, industrial, and service sectors. The Iranian government directly owns and operates hundreds of state-owned enterprises and indirectly controls many companies affiliated with the country's security forces. Distortions - including corruption, price controls, subsidies, and a banking system holding billions of dollars of non-performing loans - weigh down the economy, undermining the potential for private-sector-led growth.</p> <p> </p> <p>Private sector activity includes small-scale workshops, farming, some manufacturing, and services, in addition to medium-scale construction, cement production, mining, and metalworking. Significant informal market activity flourishes and corruption is widespread.</p> <p> </p> <p>The lifting of most nuclear-related sanctions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in January 2016 sparked a restoration of Iran’s oil production and revenue that drove rapid GDP growth, but economic growth declined in 2017 as oil production plateaued. The economy continues to suffer from low levels of investment and declines in productivity since before the JCPOA, and from high levels of unemployment, especially among women and college-educated Iranian youth.</p> <p> </p> <p>In May 2017, the re-election of President Hasan RUHANI generated widespread public expectations that the economic benefits of the JCPOA would expand and reach all levels of society. RUHANI will need to implement structural reforms that strengthen the banking sector and improve Iran’s business climate to attract foreign investment and encourage the growth of the private sector. Sanctions that are not related to Iran’s nuclear program remain in effect, and these—plus fears over the possible re-imposition of nuclear-related sanctions—will continue to deter foreign investors from engaging with Iran.</p>"
     },
     "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@@ -975,10 +975,10 @@
   "Communications": {
     "Telephones - fixed lines": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "29,093,587 (2020)"
+        "text": "29,093,587 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "34.64 (2020 est.)"
+        "text": "35 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@@ -1017,10 +1017,10 @@
     },
     "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
       "total": {
-        "text": "9,564,195 (2021)"
+        "text": "9,564,195 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "11.39 (2021)"
+        "text": "11 (2020 est.)"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -1141,6 +1141,9 @@
       "note": "note(s) - the Artesh Navy operates Iran&rsquo;s larger warships and operates in the Gulf of Oman, the Caspian Sea, and deep waters in the region and beyond; the IRGC Navy has responsibility for the closer-in Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz; the Basij is a volunteer paramilitary group with local organizations across the country, which sometimes acts as an auxiliary law enforcement unit subordinate to Revolutionary Guard ground forces"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
+      "Military Expenditures 2021": {
+        "text": "2.3% of GDP (2021 est.)"
+      },
       "Military Expenditures 2020": {
         "text": "2.1% of GDP (2020 est.)"
       },
@@ -1152,9 +1155,6 @@
       },
       "Military Expenditures 2017": {
         "text": "3.4% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $31.2 billion)"
-      },
-      "Military Expenditures 2016": {
-        "text": "3.1% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $29.2 billion)"
       }
     },
     "Military and security service personnel strengths": {

middle-east/is.json

@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Ethnic groups": {
-      "text": "Jewish 74.1% (of which Israel-born 78.1%, Europe/America/Oceania-born 15.2%, Africa-born 4.3%, Asia-born 2.4%), Arab 21%, other 4.9% (2019 est.)"
+      "text": "Jewish 74% (of which Israel-born 78.7%, Europe/America/Oceania-born 14.8%, Africa-born 4.2%, Asia-born 2.3%), Arab 21.1%, other 4.9% (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Languages": {
       "Languages": {
@@ -1017,10 +1017,10 @@
   "Communications": {
     "Telephones - fixed lines": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "3.08 million (2020)"
+        "text": "3.37 million (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "35.58 (2020 est.)"
+        "text": "39 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@@ -1059,10 +1059,10 @@
     },
     "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
       "total": {
-        "text": "2,602,079 (2021)"
+        "text": "2,602,079 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "30.06 (2021 est.)"
+        "text": "30 (2020 est.)"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -1165,6 +1165,9 @@
       "note": "note - the Border Police is a unit within the Israel Police with its own organizational and command structure; it works both independently as well as in cooperation with or in support of the Israel Police and the IDF"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
+      "Military Expenditures 2021": {
+        "text": "5% of GDP (2021 est.)"
+      },
       "Military Expenditures 2020": {
         "text": "5% of GDP (2020 est.)"
       },
@@ -1176,9 +1179,6 @@
       },
       "Military Expenditures 2017": {
         "text": "5.5% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $19.7 billion)"
-      },
-      "Military Expenditures 2016": {
-        "text": "5.6% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $19.2 billion)"
       }
     },
     "Military and security service personnel strengths": {

middle-east/iz.json

@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economic overview": {
-      "text": "<p>Iraq's GDP growth slowed to 1.1% in 2017, a marked decline compared to the previous two years as domestic consumption and investment fell because of civil violence and a sluggish oil market. The Iraqi Government received its third tranche of funding from its 2016 Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF in August 2017, which is intended to stabilize its finances by encouraging improved fiscal management, needed economic reform, and expenditure reduction. Additionally, in late 2017 Iraq received more than $1.4 billion in financing from international lenders, part of which was generated by issuing a $1 billion bond for reconstruction and rehabilitation in areas liberated from ISIL. Investment and key sector diversification are crucial components to Iraq’s long-term economic development and require a strengthened business climate with enhanced legal and regulatory oversight to bolster private-sector engagement. The overall standard of living depends on global oil prices, the central government passage of major policy reforms, a stable security environment post-ISIS, and the resolution of civil discord with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).</p><p></p><p>Iraq's largely state-run economy is dominated by the oil sector, which provides roughly 85% of government revenue and 80% of foreign exchange earnings, and is a major determinant of the economy's fortunes. Iraq's contracts with major oil companies have the potential to further expand oil exports and revenues, but Iraq will need to make significant upgrades to its oil processing, pipeline, and export infrastructure to enable these deals to reach their economic potential.</p><p></p><p>In 2017, Iraqi oil exports from northern fields were disrupted following a KRG referendum that resulted in the Iraqi Government reasserting federal control over disputed oil fields and energy infrastructure in Kirkuk. The Iraqi government and the KRG dispute the role of federal and regional authorities in the development and export of natural resources. In 2007, the KRG passed an oil law to develop IKR oil and gas reserves independent of the federal government. The KRG has signed about 50 contracts with foreign energy companies to develop its reserves, some of which lie in territories taken by Baghdad in October 2017. The KRG is able to unilaterally export oil from the fields it retains control of through its own pipeline to Turkey, which Baghdad claims is illegal. In the absence of a national hydrocarbons law, the two sides have entered into five provisional oil- and revenue-sharing deals since 2009, all of which collapsed.</p><p></p><p>Iraq is making slow progress enacting laws and developing the institutions needed to implement economic policy, and political reforms are still needed to assuage investors' concerns regarding the uncertain business climate. The Government of Iraq is eager to attract additional foreign direct investment, but it faces a number of obstacles, including a tenuous political system and concerns about security and societal stability. Rampant corruption, outdated infrastructure, insufficient essential services, skilled labor shortages, and antiquated commercial laws stifle investment and continue to constrain growth of private, nonoil sectors. Under the Iraqi constitution, some competencies relevant to the overall investment climate are either shared by the federal government and the regions or are devolved entirely to local governments. Investment in the IKR operates within the framework of the Kurdistan Region Investment Law (Law 4 of 2006) and the Kurdistan Board of Investment, which is designed to provide incentives to help economic development in areas under the authority of the KRG.</p><p></p><p>Inflation has remained under control since 2006. However, Iraqi leaders remain hard-pressed to translate macroeconomic gains into an improved standard of living for the Iraqi populace. Unemployment remains a problem throughout the country despite a bloated public sector. Overregulation has made it difficult for Iraqi citizens and foreign investors to start new businesses. Corruption and lack of economic reforms - such as restructuring banks and developing the private sector – have inhibited the growth of the private sector.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Iraq's GDP growth slowed to 1.1% in 2017, a marked decline compared to the previous two years as domestic consumption and investment fell because of civil violence and a sluggish oil market. The Iraqi Government received its third tranche of funding from its 2016 Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF in August 2017, which is intended to stabilize its finances by encouraging improved fiscal management, needed economic reform, and expenditure reduction. Additionally, in late 2017 Iraq received more than $1.4 billion in financing from international lenders, part of which was generated by issuing a $1 billion bond for reconstruction and rehabilitation in areas liberated from ISIL. Investment and key sector diversification are crucial components to Iraq’s long-term economic development and require a strengthened business climate with enhanced legal and regulatory oversight to bolster private-sector engagement. The overall standard of living depends on global oil prices, the central government passage of major policy reforms, a stable security environment post-ISIS, and the resolution of civil discord with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).</p> <p> </p> <p>Iraq's largely state-run economy is dominated by the oil sector, which provides roughly 85% of government revenue and 80% of foreign exchange earnings, and is a major determinant of the economy's fortunes. Iraq's contracts with major oil companies have the potential to further expand oil exports and revenues, but Iraq will need to make significant upgrades to its oil processing, pipeline, and export infrastructure to enable these deals to reach their economic potential.</p> <p> </p> <p>In 2017, Iraqi oil exports from northern fields were disrupted following a KRG referendum that resulted in the Iraqi Government reasserting federal control over disputed oil fields and energy infrastructure in Kirkuk. The Iraqi government and the KRG dispute the role of federal and regional authorities in the development and export of natural resources. In 2007, the KRG passed an oil law to develop IKR oil and gas reserves independent of the federal government. The KRG has signed about 50 contracts with foreign energy companies to develop its reserves, some of which lie in territories taken by Baghdad in October 2017. The KRG is able to unilaterally export oil from the fields it retains control of through its own pipeline to Turkey, which Baghdad claims is illegal. In the absence of a national hydrocarbons law, the two sides have entered into five provisional oil- and revenue-sharing deals since 2009, all of which collapsed.</p> <p> </p> <p>Iraq is making slow progress enacting laws and developing the institutions needed to implement economic policy, and political reforms are still needed to assuage investors' concerns regarding the uncertain business climate. The Government of Iraq is eager to attract additional foreign direct investment, but it faces a number of obstacles, including a tenuous political system and concerns about security and societal stability. Rampant corruption, outdated infrastructure, insufficient essential services, skilled labor shortages, and antiquated commercial laws stifle investment and continue to constrain growth of private, nonoil sectors. Under the Iraqi constitution, some competencies relevant to the overall investment climate are either shared by the federal government and the regions or are devolved entirely to local governments. Investment in the IKR operates within the framework of the Kurdistan Region Investment Law (Law 4 of 2006) and the Kurdistan Board of Investment, which is designed to provide incentives to help economic development in areas under the authority of the KRG.</p> <p> </p> <p>Inflation has remained under control since 2006. However, Iraqi leaders remain hard-pressed to translate macroeconomic gains into an improved standard of living for the Iraqi populace. Unemployment remains a problem throughout the country despite a bloated public sector. Overregulation has made it difficult for Iraqi citizens and foreign investors to start new businesses. Corruption and lack of economic reforms - such as restructuring banks and developing the private sector – have inhibited the growth of the private sector.</p>"
     },
     "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@@ -1008,10 +1008,10 @@
   "Communications": {
     "Telephones - fixed lines": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "4,166,461 (2020)"
+        "text": "2,699,758 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "10.36 (2020 est.)"
+        "text": "7 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@@ -1050,10 +1050,10 @@
     },
     "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
       "total": {
-        "text": "6,254,099 (2021)"
+        "text": "6,254,099 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "15.55 (2021)"
+        "text": "16 (2020 est.)"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -1164,6 +1164,9 @@
       "text": "Ministry of Defense: Iraqi Army, Army Aviation Command, Iraqi Navy, Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi Air Defense Command, Special Forces Command, Special Security Division (Green Zone protection)<br><br>National-Level Security Forces: Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS; a Special Forces Division aka the \"Golden Division\"), Prime Minister's Special Forces Division, Presidential Brigades<br><br>Ministry of Interior: Federal Police Forces Command, Border Guard Forces Command, Federal Intelligence and Investigations Agency, Emergency Response Division, Facilities Protection Directorate, and Provincial Police<br><br>Ministry of Oil: Energy Police Directorate<br><br>Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Peshmerga: Regional Guard Brigades, Unit (or Division) 70 Forces, Unit (or Division) 80 Forces, special operations/counter-terrorism forces (Counter Terrorism Group, CTG and Counter Terrorism Directorate, CTD); note - Unit 70 and the CTG are associated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) political party, while Unit 80 and the CTD are associated with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP); Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior: Zeravani and Emergency Response Forces (paramilitary internal security forces)<br><br>Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC): Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Tribal Mobilization Forces (TMF); the PMF and TMF are a collection of approximately 60 militias of widely varied sizes and political interests (2021)"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
+      "Military Expenditures 2021": {
+        "text": "3.7% of GDP (2021 est.)"
+      },
       "Military Expenditures 2020": {
         "text": "4.1% of GDP (2020 est.)"
       },
@@ -1175,9 +1178,6 @@
       },
       "Military Expenditures 2017": {
         "text": "6% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $20.4 billion)"
-      },
-      "Military Expenditures 2016": {
-        "text": "5.6% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $18.5 billion)"
       }
     },
     "Military and security service personnel strengths": {

middle-east/jo.json

@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economic overview": {
-      "text": "<p>Jordan's economy is among the smallest in the Middle East, with insufficient supplies of water, oil, and other natural resources, underlying the government's heavy reliance on foreign assistance. Other economic challenges for the government include chronic high rates of unemployment and underemployment, budget and current account deficits, and government debt.</p><p></p><p>King ABDALLAH, during the first decade of the 2000s, implemented significant economic reforms, such as expanding foreign trade and privatizing state-owned companies that attracted foreign investment and contributed to average annual economic growth of 8% for 2004 through 2008. The global economic slowdown and regional turmoil contributed to slower growth from 2010 to 2017 - with growth averaging about 2.5% per year - and hurt export-oriented sectors, construction/real estate, and tourism. Since the onset of the civil war in Syria and resulting refugee crisis, one of Jordan’s most pressing socioeconomic challenges has been managing the influx of approximately 660,000 UN-registered refugees, more than 80% of whom live in Jordan’s urban areas. Jordan’s own official census estimated the refugee number at 1.3 million Syrians as of early 2016.</p><p></p><p>Jordan is nearly completely dependent on imported energy—mostly natural gas—and energy consistently makes up 25-30% of Jordan’s imports. To diversify its energy mix, Jordan has secured several contracts for liquefied and pipeline natural gas, developed several major renewables projects, and is currently exploring nuclear power generation and exploitation of abundant oil shale reserves. In August 2016, Jordan and the IMF agreed to a $723 million Extended Fund Facility that aims to build on the three-year, $2.1 billion IMF program that ended in August 2015 with the goal of helping Jordan correct budgetary and balance of payments imbalances.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Jordan's economy is among the smallest in the Middle East, with insufficient supplies of water, oil, and other natural resources, underlying the government's heavy reliance on foreign assistance. Other economic challenges for the government include chronic high rates of unemployment and underemployment, budget and current account deficits, and government debt.</p> <p> </p> <p>King ABDALLAH, during the first decade of the 2000s, implemented significant economic reforms, such as expanding foreign trade and privatizing state-owned companies that attracted foreign investment and contributed to average annual economic growth of 8% for 2004 through 2008. The global economic slowdown and regional turmoil contributed to slower growth from 2010 to 2017 - with growth averaging about 2.5% per year - and hurt export-oriented sectors, construction/real estate, and tourism. Since the onset of the civil war in Syria and resulting refugee crisis, one of Jordan’s most pressing socioeconomic challenges has been managing the influx of approximately 660,000 UN-registered refugees, more than 80% of whom live in Jordan’s urban areas. Jordan’s own official census estimated the refugee number at 1.3 million Syrians as of early 2016.</p> <p> </p> <p>Jordan is nearly completely dependent on imported energy—mostly natural gas—and energy consistently makes up 25-30% of Jordan’s imports. To diversify its energy mix, Jordan has secured several contracts for liquefied and pipeline natural gas, developed several major renewables projects, and is currently exploring nuclear power generation and exploitation of abundant oil shale reserves. In August 2016, Jordan and the IMF agreed to a $723 million Extended Fund Facility that aims to build on the three-year, $2.1 billion IMF program that ended in August 2015 with the goal of helping Jordan correct budgetary and balance of payments imbalances.</p>"
     },
     "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@@ -1003,10 +1003,10 @@
   "Communications": {
     "Telephones - fixed lines": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "391,486 (2020)"
+        "text": "391,486 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "3.84 (2020 est.)"
+        "text": "4 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@@ -1045,10 +1045,10 @@
     },
     "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
       "total": {
-        "text": "630,545 (2021)"
+        "text": "630,545 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "6.18 (2021)"
+        "text": "6 (2020 est.)"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -1141,6 +1141,9 @@
       "text": "Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF): Royal Jordanian Army (includes Special Operations Forces, Border Guards, Royal Guard), Royal Jordanian Air Force, Royal Jordanian Coast Guard; Ministry of Interior: Public Security Directorate (includes national police, the Gendarmerie, and the Civil Defense Directorate) (2021)"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
+      "Military Expenditures 2021": {
+        "text": "5% of GDP (2021 est.)"
+      },
       "Military Expenditures 2020": {
         "text": "5% of GDP (2020 est.)"
       },
@@ -1152,9 +1155,6 @@
       },
       "Military Expenditures 2017": {
         "text": "5.7% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $5.18 billion)"
-      },
-      "Military Expenditures 2016": {
-        "text": "5.5% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $4.91 billion)"
       }
     },
     "Military and security service personnel strengths": {
@@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@
     },
     "Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
       "refugees (country of origin)": {
-        "text": "2,307,011 (Palestinian refugees) (2020); 674,268 (Syria), 66,665 (Iraq), 12,866 (Yemen), 6,013 Sudan (2021)"
+        "text": "2,307,011 (Palestinian refugees) (2020); 66,665 (Iraq), 12,866 (Yemen), 6,013 Sudan (2021); 674,458 (Syria) (2022)"
       },
       "stateless persons": {
         "text": "63 (mid-year 2021)"

middle-east/ku.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "<p>Kuwait has been ruled by the AL-SABAH dynasty since the 18th century. The threat of Ottoman invasion in 1899 prompted Amir Mubarak AL-SABAH to seek protection from Britain, ceding foreign and defense responsibility to Britain until 1961, when the country attained its independence. Kuwait was attacked and overrun by Iraq in August 1990. Following several weeks of aerial bombardment, a US-led UN coalition began a ground assault in February 1991 that liberated Kuwait in four days. In 1992, the Amir reconstituted the parliament that he had dissolved in 1986. Amid the 2010-11 uprisings and protests across the Arab world, stateless Arabs, known as Bidoon, staged small protests in early 2011 demanding citizenship, jobs, and other benefits available to Kuwaiti nationals. Other demographic groups, notably Islamists and Kuwaitis from tribal backgrounds, soon joined the growing protest movements, which culminated in late 2011 with the resignation of the prime minister amidst allegations of corruption. Demonstrations renewed in late 2012 in response to an amiri decree amending the electoral law that lessened the voting power of the tribal blocs. <br><br>An opposition coalition of Sunni Islamists, tribal populists, and some liberals, largely boycotted legislative elections in 2012 and 2013, which ushered in a legislature more amenable to the government's agenda. Faced with the prospect of painful subsidy cuts, oppositionists and independents actively participated in the November 2016 election, winning nearly half of the seats but a cohesive opposition alliance largely ceased to exist with the 2016 election and the opposition became increasingly factionalized. Since coming to power in 2006, the Amir has dissolved the National Assembly on seven occasions (the Constitutional Court annulled the Assembly elections in June 2012 and again in June 2013) and shuffled the cabinet over a dozen times, usually citing political stagnation and gridlock between the legislature and the government.<br><br>The current Amir, who assumed his role in 2020, launched a \"National Dialogue\" in September 2021 meant to resolve political gridlock. As part of the \"National Dialogue,\" the Amir pardoned several opposition figures who had been living in exile, and they returned to Kuwait. Legislative challenges remain, and the cabinet was reshuffled in March 2022. </p>"
+      "text": "<p>Kuwait has been ruled by the AL-SABAH dynasty since the 18th century. The threat of Ottoman invasion in 1899 prompted Amir Mubarak AL-SABAH to seek protection from Britain, ceding foreign and defense responsibility to Britain until 1961, when the country attained its independence. Kuwait was attacked and overrun by Iraq in August 1990. Following several weeks of aerial bombardment, a US-led UN coalition began a ground assault in February 1991 that liberated Kuwait in four days. In 1992, the Amir reconstituted the parliament that he had dissolved in 1986. Amid the 2010-11 uprisings and protests across the Arab world, stateless Arabs, known as Bidoon, staged small protests in early 2011 demanding citizenship, jobs, and other benefits available to Kuwaiti nationals. Other demographic groups, notably Islamists and Kuwaitis from tribal backgrounds, soon joined the growing protest movements, which culminated in late 2011 with the resignation of the prime minister amidst allegations of corruption. Demonstrations renewed in late 2012 in response to an amiri decree amending the electoral law that lessened the voting power of the tribal blocs. <br><br>An opposition coalition of Sunni Islamists, tribal populists, and some liberals, largely boycotted legislative elections in 2012 and 2013, which ushered in a legislature more amenable to the government's agenda. Faced with the prospect of painful subsidy cuts, oppositionists and independents actively participated in the November 2016 election, winning nearly half of the seats but a cohesive opposition alliance largely ceased to exist with the 2016 election and the opposition became increasingly factionalized. Since coming to power in 2006, the Amir has dissolved the National Assembly on seven occasions (the Constitutional Court annulled the Assembly elections in June 2012 and again in June 2013) and shuffled the cabinet over a dozen times, usually citing political stagnation and gridlock between the legislature and the government.<br><br>The current Amir, who assumed his role in 2020, launched a \"National Dialogue\" in September 2021 meant to resolve political gridlock. As part of the \"National Dialogue,\" the Amir pardoned several opposition figures who had been living in exile, and they returned to Kuwait. Legislative challenges remain, and the cabinet was reshuffled in March 2022.</p>"
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@
     },
     "Diplomatic representation from the US": {
       "chief of mission": {
-        "text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charg&eacute; d&rsquo;Affaires James HOLTSNIDER"
+        "text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charg&eacute; d&rsquo;Affaires James HOLTSNIDER (July 2021)"
       },
       "embassy": {
         "text": "P.O. Box 77, Safat 13001"
@@ -625,7 +625,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economic overview": {
-      "text": "<p>Kuwait has a geographically small, but wealthy, relatively open economy with crude oil reserves of about 102 billion barrels - more than 6% of world reserves. Kuwaiti officials plan to increase production to 4 million barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2020. Petroleum accounts for over half of GDP, 92% of export revenues, and 90% of government income.</p><p></p><p>With world oil prices declining, Kuwait realized a budget deficit in 2015 for the first time more than a decade; in 2016, the deficit grew to 16.5% of GDP. Kuwaiti authorities announced cuts to fuel subsidies in August 2016, provoking outrage among the public and National Assembly, and the Amir dissolved the government for the seventh time in ten years. In 2017 the deficit was reduced to 7.2% of GDP, and the government raised $8 billion by issuing international bonds. Despite Kuwait’s dependence on oil, the government has cushioned itself against the impact of lower oil prices, by saving annually at least 10% of government revenue in the Fund for Future Generations.</p><p></p><p>Kuwait has failed to diversify its economy or bolster the private sector, because of a poor business climate, a large public sector that employs about 74% of citizens, and an acrimonious relationship between the National Assembly and the executive branch that has stymied most economic reforms. The Kuwaiti Government has made little progress on its long-term economic development plan first passed in 2010. While the government planned to spend up to $104 billion over four years to diversify the economy, attract more investment, and boost private sector participation in the economy, many of the projects did not materialize because of an uncertain political situation or delays in awarding contracts. To increase non-oil revenues, the Kuwaiti Government in August 2017 approved draft bills supporting a Gulf Cooperation Council-wide value added tax scheduled to take effect in 2018.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Kuwait has a geographically small, but wealthy, relatively open economy with crude oil reserves of about 102 billion barrels - more than 6% of world reserves. Kuwaiti officials plan to increase production to 4 million barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2020. Petroleum accounts for over half of GDP, 92% of export revenues, and 90% of government income.</p> <p> </p> <p>With world oil prices declining, Kuwait realized a budget deficit in 2015 for the first time more than a decade; in 2016, the deficit grew to 16.5% of GDP. Kuwaiti authorities announced cuts to fuel subsidies in August 2016, provoking outrage among the public and National Assembly, and the Amir dissolved the government for the seventh time in ten years. In 2017 the deficit was reduced to 7.2% of GDP, and the government raised $8 billion by issuing international bonds. Despite Kuwait’s dependence on oil, the government has cushioned itself against the impact of lower oil prices, by saving annually at least 10% of government revenue in the Fund for Future Generations.</p> <p> </p> <p>Kuwait has failed to diversify its economy or bolster the private sector, because of a poor business climate, a large public sector that employs about 74% of citizens, and an acrimonious relationship between the National Assembly and the executive branch that has stymied most economic reforms. The Kuwaiti Government has made little progress on its long-term economic development plan first passed in 2010. While the government planned to spend up to $104 billion over four years to diversify the economy, attract more investment, and boost private sector participation in the economy, many of the projects did not materialize because of an uncertain political situation or delays in awarding contracts. To increase non-oil revenues, the Kuwaiti Government in August 2017 approved draft bills supporting a Gulf Cooperation Council-wide value added tax scheduled to take effect in 2018.</p>"
     },
     "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": {
@@ -942,10 +942,10 @@
   "Communications": {
     "Telephones - fixed lines": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "583,463 (2020)"
+        "text": "583,463 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "13.66 (2020 est.)"
+        "text": "14 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@@ -984,10 +984,10 @@
     },
     "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
       "total": {
-        "text": "73,948 (2021)"
+        "text": "73,948 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "1.73 (2021 est.)"
+        "text": "1.7 (2020 est.)"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -1076,6 +1076,9 @@
       "note": "note(s) - the Kuwait Emiri Guard Authority and the 25th Commando Brigade exercise independent command authority within the Kuwaiti Armed Forces, although activities such as training and equipment procurement are often coordinated with the other services; the Kuwaiti National Guard reports directly to the prime minister and amir and possesses an independent command structure, equipment inventory, and logistics corps separate from the Ministry of Defense, the regular armed services, and the Ministry of Interior"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
+      "Military Expenditures 2021": {
+        "text": "6.8% of GDP (2021 est.)"
+      },
       "Military Expenditures 2020": {
         "text": "6.3% of GDP (2020 est.)"
       },
@@ -1087,9 +1090,6 @@
       },
       "Military Expenditures 2017": {
         "text": "5.6% of GDP (2017) (approximately $10 billion)"
-      },
-      "Military Expenditures 2016": {
-        "text": "5.9% of GDP (2016) (approximately $10.6 billion)"
       }
     },
     "Military and security service personnel strengths": {

middle-east/le.json

@@ -656,7 +656,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economic overview": {
-      "text": "<p>Lebanon has a free-market economy and a strong laissez-faire commercial tradition. The government does not restrict foreign investment; however, the investment climate suffers from red tape, corruption, arbitrary licensing decisions, complex customs procedures, high taxes, tariffs, and fees, archaic legislation, and inadequate intellectual property rights protection. The Lebanese economy is service-oriented; main growth sectors include banking and tourism.</p><p></p><p>The 1975-90 civil war seriously damaged Lebanon's economic infrastructure, cut national output by half, and derailed Lebanon's position as a Middle Eastern banking hub. Following the civil war, Lebanon rebuilt much of its war-torn physical and financial infrastructure by borrowing heavily, mostly from domestic banks, which saddled the government with a huge debt burden. Pledges of economic and financial reforms made at separate international donor conferences during the 2000s have mostly gone unfulfilled, including those made during the Paris III Donor Conference in 2007, following the July 2006 war. The \"CEDRE\" investment event hosted by France in April 2018 again rallied the international community to assist Lebanon with concessional financing and some grants for capital infrastructure improvements, conditioned upon long-delayed structural economic reforms in fiscal management, electricity tariffs, and transparent public procurement, among many others.</p><p></p><p>The Syria conflict cut off one of Lebanon's major markets and a transport corridor through the Levant. The influx of nearly one million registered and an estimated 300,000 unregistered Syrian refugees has increased social tensions and heightened competition for low-skill jobs and public services. Lebanon continues to face several long-term structural weaknesses that predate the Syria crisis, notably, weak infrastructure, poor service delivery, institutionalized corruption, and bureaucratic over-regulation. Chronic fiscal deficits have increased Lebanon’s debt-to-GDP ratio, the third highest in the world; most of the debt is held internally by Lebanese banks. These factors combined to slow economic growth to the 1-2% range in 2011-17, after four years of averaging 8% growth. Weak economic growth limits tax revenues, while the largest government expenditures remain debt servicing, salaries for government workers, and transfers to the electricity sector. These limitations constrain other government spending, limiting its ability to invest in necessary infrastructure improvements, such as water, electricity, and transportation. In early 2018, the Lebanese government signed long-awaited contract agreements with an international consortium for petroleum exploration and production as part of the country’s first offshore licensing round. Exploration is expected to begin in 2019.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Lebanon has a free-market economy and a strong laissez-faire commercial tradition. The government does not restrict foreign investment; however, the investment climate suffers from red tape, corruption, arbitrary licensing decisions, complex customs procedures, high taxes, tariffs, and fees, archaic legislation, and inadequate intellectual property rights protection. The Lebanese economy is service-oriented; main growth sectors include banking and tourism.</p> <p> </p> <p>The 1975-90 civil war seriously damaged Lebanon's economic infrastructure, cut national output by half, and derailed Lebanon's position as a Middle Eastern banking hub. Following the civil war, Lebanon rebuilt much of its war-torn physical and financial infrastructure by borrowing heavily, mostly from domestic banks, which saddled the government with a huge debt burden. Pledges of economic and financial reforms made at separate international donor conferences during the 2000s have mostly gone unfulfilled, including those made during the Paris III Donor Conference in 2007, following the July 2006 war. The \"CEDRE\" investment event hosted by France in April 2018 again rallied the international community to assist Lebanon with concessional financing and some grants for capital infrastructure improvements, conditioned upon long-delayed structural economic reforms in fiscal management, electricity tariffs, and transparent public procurement, among many others.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Syria conflict cut off one of Lebanon's major markets and a transport corridor through the Levant. The influx of nearly one million registered and an estimated 300,000 unregistered Syrian refugees has increased social tensions and heightened competition for low-skill jobs and public services. Lebanon continues to face several long-term structural weaknesses that predate the Syria crisis, notably, weak infrastructure, poor service delivery, institutionalized corruption, and bureaucratic over-regulation. Chronic fiscal deficits have increased Lebanon’s debt-to-GDP ratio, the third highest in the world; most of the debt is held internally by Lebanese banks. These factors combined to slow economic growth to the 1-2% range in 2011-17, after four years of averaging 8% growth. Weak economic growth limits tax revenues, while the largest government expenditures remain debt servicing, salaries for government workers, and transfers to the electricity sector. These limitations constrain other government spending, limiting its ability to invest in necessary infrastructure improvements, such as water, electricity, and transportation. In early 2018, the Lebanese government signed long-awaited contract agreements with an international consortium for petroleum exploration and production as part of the country’s first offshore licensing round. Exploration is expected to begin in 2019.</p>"
     },
     "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@@ -980,10 +980,10 @@
   "Communications": {
     "Telephones - fixed lines": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "875,480 (2020)"
+        "text": "875,480 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "12.83 (2020 est.)"
+        "text": "13 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@@ -1022,10 +1022,10 @@
     },
     "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
       "total": {
-        "text": "432,070 (2021)"
+        "text": "432,070 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "6.33 (2021)"
+        "text": "6 (2020 est.)"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -1126,9 +1126,6 @@
       "note": "note(s) - the commander of the LAF is also the commander of the Army; the LAF patrols external borders, while official checkpoints are under the authority of Directorate for General Security"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
-      "Military Expenditures 2020": {
-        "text": "3% of GDP (2020 est.)"
-      },
       "Military Expenditures 2019": {
         "text": "4.7% of GDP (2019 est.) (approximately $3.6 billion)"
       },
@@ -1140,6 +1137,9 @@
       },
       "Military Expenditures 2016": {
         "text": "5.1% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $4.15 billion)"
+      },
+      "Military Expenditures 2015": {
+        "text": "4.5% of GDP (2015 est.) (approximately $3.7 billion)"
       }
     },
     "Military and security service personnel strengths": {

middle-east/mu.json

@@ -630,7 +630,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economic overview": {
-      "text": "<p>Oman is heavily dependent on oil and gas resources, which can generate between and 68% and 85% of government revenue, depending on fluctuations in commodity prices. In 2016, low global oil prices drove Oman’s budget deficit to $13.8 billion, or approximately 20% of GDP, but the budget deficit is estimated to have reduced to 12% of GDP in 2017 as Oman reduced government subsidies. As of January 2018, Oman has sufficient foreign assets to support its currency’s fixed exchange rates. It is issuing debt to cover its deficit.</p><p></p><p>Oman is using enhanced oil recovery techniques to boost production, but it has simultaneously pursued a development plan that focuses on diversification, industrialization, and privatization, with the objective of reducing the oil sector's contribution to GDP. The key components of the government's diversification strategy are tourism, shipping and logistics, mining, manufacturing, and aquaculture.</p><p></p><p>Muscat also has notably focused on creating more Omani jobs to employ the rising number of nationals entering the workforce. However, high social welfare benefits - that had increased in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring - have made it impossible for the government to balance its budget in light of current oil prices. In response, Omani officials imposed austerity measures on its gasoline and diesel subsidies in 2016. These spending cuts have had only a moderate effect on the government’s budget, which is projected to again face a deficit of $7.8 billion in 2018.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Oman is heavily dependent on oil and gas resources, which can generate between and 68% and 85% of government revenue, depending on fluctuations in commodity prices. In 2016, low global oil prices drove Oman’s budget deficit to $13.8 billion, or approximately 20% of GDP, but the budget deficit is estimated to have reduced to 12% of GDP in 2017 as Oman reduced government subsidies. As of January 2018, Oman has sufficient foreign assets to support its currency’s fixed exchange rates. It is issuing debt to cover its deficit.</p> <p> </p> <p>Oman is using enhanced oil recovery techniques to boost production, but it has simultaneously pursued a development plan that focuses on diversification, industrialization, and privatization, with the objective of reducing the oil sector's contribution to GDP. The key components of the government's diversification strategy are tourism, shipping and logistics, mining, manufacturing, and aquaculture.</p> <p> </p> <p>Muscat also has notably focused on creating more Omani jobs to employ the rising number of nationals entering the workforce. However, high social welfare benefits - that had increased in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring - have made it impossible for the government to balance its budget in light of current oil prices. In response, Omani officials imposed austerity measures on its gasoline and diesel subsidies in 2016. These spending cuts have had only a moderate effect on the government’s budget, which is projected to again face a deficit of $7.8 billion in 2018.</p>"
     },
     "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": {
@@ -952,10 +952,10 @@
   "Communications": {
     "Telephones - fixed lines": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "594,550 (2020)"
+        "text": "594,550 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "12.68 (2020 est.)"
+        "text": "13 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@@ -994,10 +994,10 @@
     },
     "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
       "total": {
-        "text": "508,949 (2021)"
+        "text": "508,949 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "10.85 (2021 est.)"
+        "text": "11 (2020 est.)"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -1100,6 +1100,9 @@
       "text": "Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF): Royal Army of Oman (RAO), Royal Navy of Oman (RNO), Royal Air Force of Oman (RAFO), Royal Guard of Oman (RGO); Royal Oman Police (ROP): Civil Defense, Immigration, Customs, Royal Oman Police Coast Guard (2021)"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
+      "Military Expenditures 2021": {
+        "text": "8% of GDP (2021 est.)"
+      },
       "Military Expenditures 2020": {
         "text": "11% of GDP (2020 est.)"
       },
@@ -1111,9 +1114,6 @@
       },
       "Military Expenditures 2017": {
         "text": "12.3% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $12.7 billion)"
-      },
-      "Military Expenditures 2016": {
-        "text": "13.9% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $14.2 billion)"
       }
     },
     "Military and security service personnel strengths": {

middle-east/qa.json

@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economic overview": {
-      "text": "<p>Qatar’s oil and natural gas resources are the country’s main economic engine and government revenue source, driving Qatar’s high economic growth and per capita income levels, robust state spending on public entitlements, and booming construction spending, particularly as Qatar prepares to host the World Cup in 2022. Although the government has maintained high capital spending levels for ongoing infrastructure projects, low oil and natural gas prices in recent years have led the Qatari Government to tighten some spending to help stem its budget deficit.</p><p></p><p>Qatar’s reliance on oil and natural gas is likely to persist for the foreseeable future. Proved natural gas reserves exceed 25 trillion cubic meters - 13% of the world total and, among countries, third largest in the world. Proved oil reserves exceed 25 billion barrels, allowing production to continue at current levels for about 56 years. Despite the dominance of oil and natural gas, Qatar has made significant gains in strengthening non-oil sectors, such as manufacturing, construction, and financial services, leading non-oil GDP to steadily rise in recent years to just over half the total.</p><p></p><p>Following trade restriction imposed by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt in 2017, Qatar established new trade routes with other countries to maintain access to imports.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Qatar’s oil and natural gas resources are the country’s main economic engine and government revenue source, driving Qatar’s high economic growth and per capita income levels, robust state spending on public entitlements, and booming construction spending, particularly as Qatar prepares to host the World Cup in 2022. Although the government has maintained high capital spending levels for ongoing infrastructure projects, low oil and natural gas prices in recent years have led the Qatari Government to tighten some spending to help stem its budget deficit.</p> <p> </p> <p>Qatar’s reliance on oil and natural gas is likely to persist for the foreseeable future. Proved natural gas reserves exceed 25 trillion cubic meters - 13% of the world total and, among countries, third largest in the world. Proved oil reserves exceed 25 billion barrels, allowing production to continue at current levels for about 56 years. Despite the dominance of oil and natural gas, Qatar has made significant gains in strengthening non-oil sectors, such as manufacturing, construction, and financial services, leading non-oil GDP to steadily rise in recent years to just over half the total.</p> <p> </p> <p>Following trade restriction imposed by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt in 2017, Qatar established new trade routes with other countries to maintain access to imports.</p>"
     },
     "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@@ -959,10 +959,10 @@
   "Communications": {
     "Telephones - fixed lines": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "454,701 (2020)"
+        "text": "454,701 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "15.78 (2020 est.)"
+        "text": "16 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@@ -1001,10 +1001,10 @@
     },
     "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
       "total": {
-        "text": "296,126 (2021)"
+        "text": "296,126 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "10.28 (2021)"
+        "text": "10 (2020 est.)"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -1086,6 +1086,9 @@
       "text": "Qatari Amiri Land Force (QALF, includes Emiri Guard), Qatari Amiri Navy (QAN, includes Coast Guard), Qatari Amiri Air Force (QAAF); Internal Security Forces: Mobile Gendarmerie (2021)"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
+      "Military Expenditures 2021": {
+        "text": "4% of GDP (2021 est.)"
+      },
       "Military Expenditures 2020": {
         "text": "4% of GDP (2020 est.)"
       },
@@ -1097,9 +1100,6 @@
       },
       "Military Expenditures 2017": {
         "text": "3.4% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $8.22 billion)"
-      },
-      "Military Expenditures 2016": {
-        "text": "4.1% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $9.22 billion)"
       }
     },
     "Military and security service personnel strengths": {

middle-east/sa.json

@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economic overview": {
-      "text": "<p>Saudi Arabia has an oil-based economy with strong government controls over major economic activities. It possesses about 16% of the world's proven petroleum reserves, ranks as the largest exporter of petroleum, and plays a leading role in OPEC. The petroleum sector accounts for roughly 87% of budget revenues, 42% of GDP, and 90% of export earnings.</p><p></p><p>Saudi Arabia is encouraging the growth of the private sector in order to diversify its economy and to employ more Saudi nationals. Approximately 6 million foreign workers play an important role in the Saudi economy, particularly in the oil and service sectors; at the same time, however, Riyadh is struggling to reduce unemployment among its own nationals. Saudi officials are particularly focused on employing its large youth population.</p><p></p><p>In 2017, the Kingdom incurred a budget deficit estimated at 8.3% of GDP, which was financed by bond sales and drawing down reserves. Although the Kingdom can finance high deficits for several years by drawing down its considerable foreign assets or by borrowing, it has cut capital spending and reduced subsidies on electricity, water, and petroleum products and recently introduced a value-added tax of 5%. In January 2016, Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN announced that Saudi Arabia intends to list shares of its state-owned petroleum company, ARAMCO - another move to increase revenue and outside investment. The government has also looked at privatization and diversification of the economy more closely in the wake of a diminished oil market. Historically, Saudi Arabia has focused diversification efforts on power generation, telecommunications, natural gas exploration, and petrochemical sectors. More recently, the government has approached investors about expanding the role of the private sector in the health care, education and tourism industries. While Saudi Arabia has emphasized their goals of diversification for some time, current low oil prices may force the government to make more drastic changes ahead of their long-run timeline.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Saudi Arabia has an oil-based economy with strong government controls over major economic activities. It possesses about 16% of the world's proven petroleum reserves, ranks as the largest exporter of petroleum, and plays a leading role in OPEC. The petroleum sector accounts for roughly 87% of budget revenues, 42% of GDP, and 90% of export earnings.</p> <p> </p> <p>Saudi Arabia is encouraging the growth of the private sector in order to diversify its economy and to employ more Saudi nationals. Approximately 6 million foreign workers play an important role in the Saudi economy, particularly in the oil and service sectors; at the same time, however, Riyadh is struggling to reduce unemployment among its own nationals. Saudi officials are particularly focused on employing its large youth population.</p> <p> </p> <p>In 2017, the Kingdom incurred a budget deficit estimated at 8.3% of GDP, which was financed by bond sales and drawing down reserves. Although the Kingdom can finance high deficits for several years by drawing down its considerable foreign assets or by borrowing, it has cut capital spending and reduced subsidies on electricity, water, and petroleum products and recently introduced a value-added tax of 5%. In January 2016, Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN announced that Saudi Arabia intends to list shares of its state-owned petroleum company, ARAMCO - another move to increase revenue and outside investment. The government has also looked at privatization and diversification of the economy more closely in the wake of a diminished oil market. Historically, Saudi Arabia has focused diversification efforts on power generation, telecommunications, natural gas exploration, and petrochemical sectors. More recently, the government has approached investors about expanding the role of the private sector in the health care, education and tourism industries. While Saudi Arabia has emphasized their goals of diversification for some time, current low oil prices may force the government to make more drastic changes ahead of their long-run timeline.</p>"
     },
     "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@@ -977,10 +977,10 @@
   "Communications": {
     "Telephones - fixed lines": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "5,749,058 (2020)"
+        "text": "5,749,058 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "16.51 (2020 est.)"
+        "text": "17 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@@ -1019,10 +1019,10 @@
     },
     "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
       "total": {
-        "text": "7,890,261 (2021)"
+        "text": "7,890,261 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "22.66 (2021 est.)"
+        "text": "23 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Communications - note": {
@@ -1138,7 +1138,7 @@
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
       "Military Expenditures 2021": {
-        "text": "5.7% of GDP (2021 est.)"
+        "text": "6% of GDP (2021 est.)"
       },
       "Military Expenditures 2020": {
         "text": "7.8% of GDP (2020 est.)"

middle-east/sy.json

@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economic overview": {
-      "text": "<p>Syria's economy has deeply deteriorated amid the ongoing conflict that began in 2011, declining by more than 70% from 2010 to 2017. The government has struggled to fully address the effects of international sanctions, widespread infrastructure damage, diminished domestic consumption and production, reduced subsidies, and high inflation, which have caused dwindling foreign exchange reserves, rising budget and trade deficits, a decreasing value of the Syrian pound, and falling household purchasing power. In 2017, some economic indicators began to stabilize, including the exchange rate and inflation, but economic activity remains depressed and GDP almost certainly fell.</p><p></p><p>During 2017, the ongoing conflict and continued unrest and economic decline worsened the humanitarian crisis, necessitating high levels of international assistance, as more than 13 million people remain in need inside Syria, and the number of registered Syrian refugees increased from 4.8 million in 2016 to more than 5.4 million.</p><p></p><p>Prior to the turmoil, Damascus had begun liberalizing economic policies, including cutting lending interest rates, opening private banks, consolidating multiple exchange rates, raising prices on some subsidized items, and establishing the Damascus Stock Exchange, but the economy remains highly regulated. Long-run economic constraints include foreign trade barriers, declining oil production, high unemployment, rising budget deficits, increasing pressure on water supplies caused by heavy use in agriculture, industrial contaction, water pollution, and widespread infrastructure damage.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Syria's economy has deeply deteriorated amid the ongoing conflict that began in 2011, declining by more than 70% from 2010 to 2017. The government has struggled to fully address the effects of international sanctions, widespread infrastructure damage, diminished domestic consumption and production, reduced subsidies, and high inflation, which have caused dwindling foreign exchange reserves, rising budget and trade deficits, a decreasing value of the Syrian pound, and falling household purchasing power. In 2017, some economic indicators began to stabilize, including the exchange rate and inflation, but economic activity remains depressed and GDP almost certainly fell.</p> <p> </p> <p>During 2017, the ongoing conflict and continued unrest and economic decline worsened the humanitarian crisis, necessitating high levels of international assistance, as more than 13 million people remain in need inside Syria, and the number of registered Syrian refugees increased from 4.8 million in 2016 to more than 5.4 million.</p> <p> </p> <p>Prior to the turmoil, Damascus had begun liberalizing economic policies, including cutting lending interest rates, opening private banks, consolidating multiple exchange rates, raising prices on some subsidized items, and establishing the Damascus Stock Exchange, but the economy remains highly regulated. Long-run economic constraints include foreign trade barriers, declining oil production, high unemployment, rising budget deficits, increasing pressure on water supplies caused by heavy use in agriculture, industrial contaction, water pollution, and widespread infrastructure damage.</p>"
     },
     "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2015": {
@@ -947,10 +947,10 @@
   "Communications": {
     "Telephones - fixed lines": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "2,892,515 (2020)"
+        "text": "2,857,193 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "16.53 (2020 est.)"
+        "text": "16 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@@ -989,10 +989,10 @@
     },
     "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
       "total": {
-        "text": "1,549,356 (2021)"
+        "text": "1,549,356 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "8.85 (2021)"
+        "text": "9 (2020 est.)"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -1152,7 +1152,7 @@
       "stateless persons": {
         "text": "160,000 (mid-year 2021); note - Syria's stateless population consists of Kurds and Palestinians; stateless persons are prevented from voting, owning land, holding certain jobs, receiving food subsidies or public healthcare, enrolling in public schools, or being legally married to Syrian citizens; in 1962, some 120,000 Syrian Kurds were stripped of their Syrian citizenship, rendering them and their descendants stateless; in 2011, the Syrian Government granted citizenship to thousands of Syrian Kurds as a means of appeasement; however, resolving the question of statelessness is not a priority given Syria's ongoing civil war"
       },
-      "note": "<strong>note:</strong> the ongoing civil war has resulted in more than 5.7 million registered Syrian refugees - dispersed in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey - as of March 2022"
+      "note": "<strong>note:</strong> the ongoing civil war has resulted in more than 5.7 million registered Syrian refugees - dispersed in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey - as of May 2022"
     },
     "Trafficking in persons": {
       "current situation": {

middle-east/tu.json

@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economic overview": {
-      "text": "<p>Turkey's largely free-market economy is driven by its industry and, increasingly, service sectors, although its traditional agriculture sector still accounts for about 25% of employment. The automotive, petrochemical, and electronics industries have risen in importance and surpassed the traditional textiles and clothing sectors within Turkey's export mix. However, the recent period of political stability and economic dynamism has given way to domestic uncertainty and security concerns, which are generating financial market volatility and weighing on Turkey’s economic outlook.</p><p></p><p>Current government policies emphasize populist spending measures and credit breaks, while implementation of structural economic reforms has slowed. The government is playing a more active role in some strategic sectors and has used economic institutions and regulators to target political opponents, undermining private sector confidence in the judicial system. Between July 2016 and March 2017, three credit ratings agencies downgraded Turkey’s sovereign credit ratings, citing concerns about the rule of law and the pace of economic reforms.</p><p></p><p>Turkey remains highly dependent on imported oil and gas but is pursuing energy relationships with a broader set of international partners and taking steps to increase use of domestic energy sources including renewables, nuclear, and coal. The joint Turkish-Azerbaijani Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline is moving forward to increase transport of Caspian gas to Turkey and Europe, and when completed will help diversify Turkey's sources of imported gas.</p><p></p><p>After Turkey experienced a severe financial crisis in 2001, Ankara adopted financial and fiscal reforms as part of an IMF program. The reforms strengthened the country's economic fundamentals and ushered in an era of strong growth, averaging more than 6% annually until 2008. An aggressive privatization program also reduced state involvement in basic industry, banking, transport, power generation, and communication. Global economic conditions and tighter fiscal policy caused GDP to contract in 2009, but Turkey's well-regulated financial markets and banking system helped the country weather the global financial crisis, and GDP growth rebounded to around 9% in 2010 and 2011, as exports and investment recovered following the crisis.</p><p></p><p>The growth of Turkish GDP since 2016 has revealed the persistent underlying imbalances in the Turkish economy. In particular, Turkey’s large current account deficit means it must rely on external investment inflows to finance growth, leaving the economy vulnerable to destabilizing shifts in investor confidence. Other troublesome trends include rising unemployment and inflation, which increased in 2017, given the Turkish lira’s continuing depreciation against the dollar. Although government debt remains low at about 30% of GDP, bank and corporate borrowing has almost tripled as a percent of GDP during the past decade, outpacing its emerging-market peers and prompting investor concerns about its long-term sustainability.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Turkey's largely free-market economy is driven by its industry and, increasingly, service sectors, although its traditional agriculture sector still accounts for about 25% of employment. The automotive, petrochemical, and electronics industries have risen in importance and surpassed the traditional textiles and clothing sectors within Turkey's export mix. However, the recent period of political stability and economic dynamism has given way to domestic uncertainty and security concerns, which are generating financial market volatility and weighing on Turkey’s economic outlook.</p> <p> </p> <p>Current government policies emphasize populist spending measures and credit breaks, while implementation of structural economic reforms has slowed. The government is playing a more active role in some strategic sectors and has used economic institutions and regulators to target political opponents, undermining private sector confidence in the judicial system. Between July 2016 and March 2017, three credit ratings agencies downgraded Turkey’s sovereign credit ratings, citing concerns about the rule of law and the pace of economic reforms.</p> <p> </p> <p>Turkey remains highly dependent on imported oil and gas but is pursuing energy relationships with a broader set of international partners and taking steps to increase use of domestic energy sources including renewables, nuclear, and coal. The joint Turkish-Azerbaijani Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline is moving forward to increase transport of Caspian gas to Turkey and Europe, and when completed will help diversify Turkey's sources of imported gas.</p> <p> </p> <p>After Turkey experienced a severe financial crisis in 2001, Ankara adopted financial and fiscal reforms as part of an IMF program. The reforms strengthened the country's economic fundamentals and ushered in an era of strong growth, averaging more than 6% annually until 2008. An aggressive privatization program also reduced state involvement in basic industry, banking, transport, power generation, and communication. Global economic conditions and tighter fiscal policy caused GDP to contract in 2009, but Turkey's well-regulated financial markets and banking system helped the country weather the global financial crisis, and GDP growth rebounded to around 9% in 2010 and 2011, as exports and investment recovered following the crisis.</p> <p> </p> <p>The growth of Turkish GDP since 2016 has revealed the persistent underlying imbalances in the Turkish economy. In particular, Turkey’s large current account deficit means it must rely on external investment inflows to finance growth, leaving the economy vulnerable to destabilizing shifts in investor confidence. Other troublesome trends include rising unemployment and inflation, which increased in 2017, given the Turkish lira’s continuing depreciation against the dollar. Although government debt remains low at about 30% of GDP, bank and corporate borrowing has almost tripled as a percent of GDP during the past decade, outpacing its emerging-market peers and prompting investor concerns about its long-term sustainability.</p>"
     },
     "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@@ -1019,10 +1019,10 @@
   "Communications": {
     "Telephones - fixed lines": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "12,448,604 (2020)"
+        "text": "12,448,604 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "14.76 (2020 est.)"
+        "text": "15 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@@ -1061,10 +1061,10 @@
     },
     "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
       "total": {
-        "text": "16,734,853 (2021)"
+        "text": "16,734,853 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "19.84 (2021)"
+        "text": "20 (2020 est.)"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -1225,7 +1225,7 @@
     },
     "Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
       "refugees (country of origin)": {
-        "text": "3,763,565 (Syria) (2022)"
+        "text": "3,762,889 (Syria) (2022)"
       },
       "IDPs": {
         "text": "1.099 million (displaced from 1984-2005 because of fighting between the Kurdish PKK and Turkish military; most IDPs are Kurds from eastern and southeastern provinces; no information available on persons displaced by development projects) (2020)"

middle-east/we.json

@@ -797,10 +797,10 @@
   "Communications": {
     "Telephones - fixed lines": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "466,283 (2020 est.) (includes Gaza Strip) (2017 est.)"
+        "text": "466,283 (2020 est.) includes Gaza Strip"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "9 (2020 est.) (includes Gaza Strip) (2016 est.)"
+        "text": "9 (2020 est.) includes Gaza Strip"
       },
       "note": "<strong>note</strong>: includes Gaza Strip"
     },
@@ -844,7 +844,7 @@
         "text": "373,050 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "7.31 (2020 est.)"
+        "text": "7 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "note": "<strong>note:</strong> includes Gaza Strip"
     }

middle-east/ym.json

@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economic overview": {
-      "text": "<p>Yemen is a low-income country that faces difficult long-term challenges to stabilizing and growing its economy, and the current conflict has only exacerbated those issues. The ongoing war has halted Yemen’s exports, pressured the currency’s exchange rate, accelerated inflation, severely limited food and fuel imports, and caused widespread damage to infrastructure. The conflict has also created a severe humanitarian crisis - the world’s largest cholera outbreak currently at nearly 1 million cases, more than 7 million people at risk of famine, and more than 80% of the population in need of humanitarian assistance.</p><p></p><p>Prior to the start of the conflict in 2014, Yemen was highly dependent on declining oil and gas resources for revenue. Oil and gas earnings accounted for roughly 25% of GDP and 65% of government revenue. The Yemeni Government regularly faced annual budget shortfalls and tried to diversify the Yemeni economy through a reform program designed to bolster non-oil sectors of the economy and foreign investment. In July 2014, the government continued reform efforts by eliminating some fuel subsidies and in August 2014, the IMF approved a three-year, $570 million Extended Credit Facility for Yemen.</p><p></p><p>However, the conflict that began in 2014 stalled these reform efforts and ongoing fighting continues to accelerate the country’s economic decline. In September 2016, President HADI announced the move of the main branch of Central Bank of Yemen from Sanaa to Aden where his government could exert greater control over the central bank’s dwindling resources. Regardless of which group controls the main branch, the central bank system is struggling to function. Yemen’s Central Bank’s foreign reserves, which stood at roughly $5.2 billion prior to the conflict, have declined to negligible amounts. The Central Bank can no longer fully support imports of critical goods or the country’s exchange rate. The country also is facing a growing liquidity crisis and rising inflation. The private sector is hemorrhaging, with almost all businesses making substantial layoffs. Access to food and other critical commodities such as medical equipment is limited across the country due to security issues on the ground. The Social Welfare Fund, a cash transfer program for Yemen’s neediest, is no longer operational and has not made any disbursements since late 2014.</p><p></p><p>Yemen will require significant international assistance during and after the protracted conflict to stabilize its economy. Long-term challenges include a high population growth rate, high unemployment, declining water resources, and severe food scarcity.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Yemen is a low-income country that faces difficult long-term challenges to stabilizing and growing its economy, and the current conflict has only exacerbated those issues. The ongoing war has halted Yemen’s exports, pressured the currency’s exchange rate, accelerated inflation, severely limited food and fuel imports, and caused widespread damage to infrastructure. The conflict has also created a severe humanitarian crisis - the world’s largest cholera outbreak currently at nearly 1 million cases, more than 7 million people at risk of famine, and more than 80% of the population in need of humanitarian assistance.</p> <p> </p> <p>Prior to the start of the conflict in 2014, Yemen was highly dependent on declining oil and gas resources for revenue. Oil and gas earnings accounted for roughly 25% of GDP and 65% of government revenue. The Yemeni Government regularly faced annual budget shortfalls and tried to diversify the Yemeni economy through a reform program designed to bolster non-oil sectors of the economy and foreign investment. In July 2014, the government continued reform efforts by eliminating some fuel subsidies and in August 2014, the IMF approved a three-year, $570 million Extended Credit Facility for Yemen.</p> <p> </p> <p>However, the conflict that began in 2014 stalled these reform efforts and ongoing fighting continues to accelerate the country’s economic decline. In September 2016, President HADI announced the move of the main branch of Central Bank of Yemen from Sanaa to Aden where his government could exert greater control over the central bank’s dwindling resources. Regardless of which group controls the main branch, the central bank system is struggling to function. Yemen’s Central Bank’s foreign reserves, which stood at roughly $5.2 billion prior to the conflict, have declined to negligible amounts. The Central Bank can no longer fully support imports of critical goods or the country’s exchange rate. The country also is facing a growing liquidity crisis and rising inflation. The private sector is hemorrhaging, with almost all businesses making substantial layoffs. Access to food and other critical commodities such as medical equipment is limited across the country due to security issues on the ground. The Social Welfare Fund, a cash transfer program for Yemen’s neediest, is no longer operational and has not made any disbursements since late 2014.</p> <p> </p> <p>Yemen will require significant international assistance during and after the protracted conflict to stabilize its economy. Long-term challenges include a high population growth rate, high unemployment, declining water resources, and severe food scarcity.</p>"
     },
     "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2017": {
@@ -994,10 +994,10 @@
   "Communications": {
     "Telephones - fixed lines": {
       "total subscriptions": {
-        "text": "1.19 million (2018)"
+        "text": "1.24 million (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "4.28 (2018 est.)"
+        "text": "4 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@@ -1036,10 +1036,10 @@
     },
     "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
       "total": {
-        "text": "391,000 (2021 est.)"
+        "text": "391,000 (2020 est.)"
       },
       "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
-        "text": "1.31 (2021 est.)"
+        "text": "1.3 (2020 est.)"
       }
     }
   },