Algeria has known many empires and dynasties starting with the ancient Numidians (3rd century B.C.), Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, over a dozen different Arab and Berber dynasties, Spaniards, and Ottoman Turks. It was under the latter that the Barbary pirates operated from North Africa and preyed on shipping beginning in roughly 1500, peaking in the early to mid-17th century, until finally subdued by the French capture of Algiers in 1830. The French southward conquest of the entirety of Algeria proceeded throughout the 19th century and was marked by many atrocities. The country was heavily colonized by the French in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A bloody eight-year struggle culminated in Algerian independence in 1962.
Algeria's primary political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), was established in 1954 as part of the struggle for independence and has since largely dominated politics, though is falling out of favor with the youth. The Government of Algeria in 1988 instituted a multi-party system in response to public unrest, but the surprising first round success of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the December 1991 legislative elections led the Algerian army to intervene and postpone the second round of elections to prevent what the secular elite feared would be an extremist-led government from assuming power. The army began a crackdown on the FIS that spurred FIS supporters to begin attacking government targets. Fighting escalated into an insurgency, which saw intense violence from 1992-98, resulting in over 100,000 deaths – many attributed to indiscriminate massacres of villagers by extremists. The government gained the upper hand by the late-1990s, and FIS’s armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, disbanded in January 2000. FIS membership is illegal.
Former president Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA, with the backing of the military, won the presidency in 1999 in an election that was boycotted by several candidates protesting alleged fraud, and won subsequent elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014. Protests broke out across the country in late February 2019 against President BOUTEFLIKA’s decision to seek a fifth term. BOUTEFLIKA resigned in April 2019, and in December 2019, Algerians elected former Prime Minister Abdelmadjid TEBBOUNE as the country's new president. A longtime FLN member, TEBBOUNE ran for president as an independent. In 2020, Algeria held a constitutional referendum, which President TEBBOUNE enacted in January 2021. Subsequent reforms to the national electoral law introduced open list voting to curb corruption. The new law also eliminated gender quotas in Parliament, and the June 2021 legislative elections saw female representation plummet. Local elections took place in November 2021. The referendum, parliamentary elections, and local elections saw record low voter turnout. Since 2014, Algeria’s reliance on hydrocarbon revenues to fund the government and finance the large subsidies for the population has fallen under stress because of declining oil prices.
" + "text": "Algeria has known many empires and dynasties starting with the ancient Numidians (3rd century B.C.), Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, over a dozen different Arab and Berber dynasties, Spaniards, and Ottoman Turks. It was under the latter that the Barbary pirates operated from North Africa and preyed on shipping beginning in roughly 1500, peaking in the early to mid-17th century, until finally subdued by the French capture of Algiers in 1830. The French southward conquest of the entirety of Algeria proceeded throughout the 19th century and was marked by many atrocities. The country was heavily colonized by the French in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A bloody eight-year struggle culminated in Algerian independence in 1962.
Algeria's primary political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), was established in 1954 as part of the struggle for independence and has since largely dominated politics, though is falling out of favor with the youth. The Government of Algeria in 1988 instituted a multi-party system in response to public unrest, but the surprising first round success of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the December 1991 legislative elections led the Algerian army to intervene and postpone the second round of elections to prevent what the secular elite feared would be an extremist-led government from assuming power. The army began a crackdown on the FIS that spurred FIS supporters to begin attacking government targets. Fighting escalated into an insurgency, which saw intense violence from 1992-98, resulting in over 100,000 deaths – many attributed to indiscriminate massacres of villagers by extremists. The government gained the upper hand by the late-1990s, and FIS’s armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, disbanded in January 2000. FIS membership is illegal.
Former president Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA, with the backing of the military, won the presidency in 1999 in an election that was boycotted by several candidates protesting alleged fraud, and won subsequent elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014. Protests broke out across the country in late February 2019 against President BOUTEFLIKA’s decision to seek a fifth term. BOUTEFLIKA resigned in April 2019, and in December 2019, Algerians elected former Prime Minister Abdelmadjid TEBBOUNE as the country's new president. A longtime FLN member, TEBBOUNE ran for president as an independent. In 2020, Algeria held a constitutional referendum, which President TEBBOUNE enacted in January 2021. Subsequent reforms to the national electoral law introduced open list voting to curb corruption. The new law also eliminated gender quotas in Parliament, and the June 2021 legislative elections saw female representation plummet. Local elections took place in November 2021. The referendum, parliamentary elections, and local elections saw record low voter turnout. Since 2014, Algeria’s reliance on hydrocarbon revenues to fund the government and finance the large subsidies for the population has fallen under stress because of declining oil prices.
" } }, "Geography": { @@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Algeria's economy remains dominated by the state, a legacy of the country's socialist post-independence development model. In recent years the Algerian Government has halted the privatization of state-owned industries and imposed restrictions on imports and foreign involvement in its economy, pursuing an explicit import substitution policy.
Hydrocarbons have long been the backbone of the economy, accounting for roughly 30% of GDP, 60% of budget revenues, and nearly 95% of export earnings. Algeria has the 10th-largest reserves of natural gas in the world - including the 3rd-largest reserves of shale gas - and is the 6th-largest gas exporter. It ranks 16th in proven oil reserves. Hydrocarbon exports enabled Algeria to maintain macroeconomic stability, amass large foreign currency reserves, and maintain low external debt while global oil prices were high. With lower oil prices since 2014, Algeria’s foreign exchange reserves have declined by more than half and its oil stabilization fund has decreased from about $20 billion at the end of 2013 to about $7 billion in 2017, which is the statutory minimum.
Declining oil prices have also reduced the government’s ability to use state-driven growth to distribute rents and fund generous public subsidies, and the government has been under pressure to reduce spending. Over the past three years, the government has enacted incremental increases in some taxes, resulting in modest increases in prices for gasoline, cigarettes, alcohol, and certain imported goods, but it has refrained from reducing subsidies, particularly for education, healthcare, and housing programs.
Algiers has increased protectionist measures since 2015 to limit its import bill and encourage domestic production of non-oil and gas industries. Since 2015, the government has imposed additional restrictions on access to foreign exchange for imports, and import quotas for specific products, such as cars. In January 2018 the government imposed an indefinite suspension on the importation of roughly 850 products, subject to periodic review.
President BOUTEFLIKA announced in fall 2017 that Algeria intends to develop its non-conventional energy resources. Algeria has struggled to develop non-hydrocarbon industries because of heavy regulation and an emphasis on state-driven growth. Algeria has not increased non-hydrocarbon exports, and hydrocarbon exports have declined because of field depletion and increased domestic demand.
" + "text": "Algeria's economy remains dominated by the state, a legacy of the country's socialist post-independence development model. In recent years the Algerian Government has halted the privatization of state-owned industries and imposed restrictions on imports and foreign involvement in its economy, pursuing an explicit import substitution policy.
Hydrocarbons have long been the backbone of the economy, accounting for roughly 30% of GDP, 60% of budget revenues, and nearly 95% of export earnings. Algeria has the 10th-largest reserves of natural gas in the world - including the 3rd-largest reserves of shale gas - and is the 6th-largest gas exporter. It ranks 16th in proven oil reserves. Hydrocarbon exports enabled Algeria to maintain macroeconomic stability, amass large foreign currency reserves, and maintain low external debt while global oil prices were high. With lower oil prices since 2014, Algeria’s foreign exchange reserves have declined by more than half and its oil stabilization fund has decreased from about $20 billion at the end of 2013 to about $7 billion in 2017, which is the statutory minimum.
Declining oil prices have also reduced the government’s ability to use state-driven growth to distribute rents and fund generous public subsidies, and the government has been under pressure to reduce spending. Over the past three years, the government has enacted incremental increases in some taxes, resulting in modest increases in prices for gasoline, cigarettes, alcohol, and certain imported goods, but it has refrained from reducing subsidies, particularly for education, healthcare, and housing programs.
Algiers has increased protectionist measures since 2015 to limit its import bill and encourage domestic production of non-oil and gas industries. Since 2015, the government has imposed additional restrictions on access to foreign exchange for imports, and import quotas for specific products, such as cars. In January 2018 the government imposed an indefinite suspension on the importation of roughly 850 products, subject to periodic review.
President BOUTEFLIKA announced in fall 2017 that Algeria intends to develop its non-conventional energy resources. Algeria has struggled to develop non-hydrocarbon industries because of heavy regulation and an emphasis on state-driven growth. Algeria has not increased non-hydrocarbon exports, and hydrocarbon exports have declined because of field depletion and increased domestic demand.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -980,18 +980,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "4,784,306 (2020)" + "text": "4,784,306 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "10.91 (2020 est.)" + "text": "11 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "45,555,673 (2020)" + "text": "45,555,673 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "103.9 (2020 est.)" + "text": "104 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1022,10 +1022,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "3,790,459 (2022)" + "text": "3,790,459 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "8.64 (2022)" + "text": "9 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1139,6 +1139,9 @@ "text": "Algerian People's National Army (ANP): Land Forces, Naval Forces (includes coast guard), Air Forces, Territorial Air Defense Forces, Republican Guard (under ANP, but responsible to the President), National Gendarmerie; Ministry of Interior: General Directorate of National Security (national police) (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "5.6% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "6.7% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1150,9 +1153,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "5.9% of GDP (2017) (approximately $18.8 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "6.4% of GDP (2016) (approximately $19.7 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/ao.json b/africa/ao.json index 2deaeed4..f9a67e4d 100644 --- a/africa/ao.json +++ b/africa/ao.json @@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Angola's economy is overwhelmingly driven by its oil sector. Oil production and its supporting activities contribute about 50% of GDP, more than 70% of government revenue, and more than 90% of the country's exports; Angola is an OPEC member and subject to its direction regarding oil production levels. Diamonds contribute an additional 5% to exports. Subsistence agriculture provides the main livelihood for most of the people, but half of the country's food is still imported.
Increased oil production supported growth averaging more than 17% per year from 2004 to 2008. A postwar reconstruction boom and resettlement of displaced persons led to high rates of growth in construction and agriculture as well. Some of the country's infrastructure is still damaged or undeveloped from the 27-year-long civil war (1975-2002). However, the government since 2005 has used billions of dollars in credit from China, Brazil, Portugal, Germany, Spain, and the EU to help rebuild Angola's public infrastructure. Land mines left from the war still mar the countryside, and as a result, the national military, international partners, and private Angolan firms all continue to remove them.
The global recession that started in 2008 stalled Angola’s economic growth and many construction projects stopped because Luanda accrued billions in arrears to foreign construction companies when government revenue fell. Lower prices for oil and diamonds also resulted in GDP falling 0.7% in 2016. Angola formally abandoned its currency peg in 2009 but reinstituted it in April 2016 and maintains an overvalued exchange rate. In late 2016, Angola lost the last of its correspondent relationships with foreign banks, further exacerbating hard currency problems. Since 2013 the central bank has consistently spent down reserves to defend the kwanza, gradually allowing a 40% depreciation since late 2014. Consumer inflation declined from 325% in 2000 to less than 9% in 2014, before rising again to above 30% from 2015-2017.
Continued low oil prices, the depreciation of the kwanza, and slower than expected growth in non-oil GDP have reduced growth prospects, although several major international oil companies remain in Angola. Corruption, especially in the extractive sectors, is a major long-term challenge that poses an additional threat to the economy.
" + "text": "Angola's economy is overwhelmingly driven by its oil sector. Oil production and its supporting activities contribute about 50% of GDP, more than 70% of government revenue, and more than 90% of the country's exports; Angola is an OPEC member and subject to its direction regarding oil production levels. Diamonds contribute an additional 5% to exports. Subsistence agriculture provides the main livelihood for most of the people, but half of the country's food is still imported.
Increased oil production supported growth averaging more than 17% per year from 2004 to 2008. A postwar reconstruction boom and resettlement of displaced persons led to high rates of growth in construction and agriculture as well. Some of the country's infrastructure is still damaged or undeveloped from the 27-year-long civil war (1975-2002). However, the government since 2005 has used billions of dollars in credit from China, Brazil, Portugal, Germany, Spain, and the EU to help rebuild Angola's public infrastructure. Land mines left from the war still mar the countryside, and as a result, the national military, international partners, and private Angolan firms all continue to remove them.
The global recession that started in 2008 stalled Angola’s economic growth and many construction projects stopped because Luanda accrued billions in arrears to foreign construction companies when government revenue fell. Lower prices for oil and diamonds also resulted in GDP falling 0.7% in 2016. Angola formally abandoned its currency peg in 2009 but reinstituted it in April 2016 and maintains an overvalued exchange rate. In late 2016, Angola lost the last of its correspondent relationships with foreign banks, further exacerbating hard currency problems. Since 2013 the central bank has consistently spent down reserves to defend the kwanza, gradually allowing a 40% depreciation since late 2014. Consumer inflation declined from 325% in 2000 to less than 9% in 2014, before rising again to above 30% from 2015-2017.
Continued low oil prices, the depreciation of the kwanza, and slower than expected growth in non-oil GDP have reduced growth prospects, although several major international oil companies remain in Angola. Corruption, especially in the extractive sectors, is a major long-term challenge that poses an additional threat to the economy.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1025,18 +1025,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "119,164 (2020)" + "text": "119,164 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2020) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "14,645,050 (2020)" + "text": "14,645,050 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "44.56 (2020 est.)" + "text": "45 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1067,10 +1067,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "230,610 (2021) This year we included fixed wireless technologies." + "text": "230,610 (2020 est.) This year we included fixed wireless technologies." }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.7 (2021 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0.7 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1185,6 +1185,9 @@ "text": "Angolan Armed Forces (Forcas Armadas Angolanas, FAA): Army, Navy (Marinha de Guerra Angola, MGA), Angolan National Air Force (Forca Aerea Nacional Angolana, FANA; under operational control of the Army); Rapid Reaction Police (paramilitary) (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.4% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.7% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1196,9 +1199,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "2.6% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $3.65 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "2.9% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $3.9 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/bc.json b/africa/bc.json index 3704d32f..8522c185 100644 --- a/africa/bc.json +++ b/africa/bc.json @@ -999,18 +999,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "142,587 (2020)" + "text": "140,003 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "5.95 (2020 est.)" + "text": "6 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "3,819,019 (2020)" + "text": "3,829,408 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "162.4 (2020 est.)" + "text": "163 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1041,10 +1041,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "259,525 (2021)" + "text": "259,525 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "11.04 (2021)" + "text": "11 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1128,6 +1128,9 @@ "note": "note - both the armed forces and the Botswana Police Service report to the Ministry of Defense, Justice, and Security" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "3% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "3% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1139,9 +1142,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "2.9% of GDP (2017) (approximately $740 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "3.1% of GDP (2016) (approximately $760 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/bn.json b/africa/bn.json index 1a6e0f75..e19a3410 100644 --- a/africa/bn.json +++ b/africa/bn.json @@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The free market economy of Benin has grown consecutively for four years, though growth slowed in 2017, as its close trade links to Nigeria expose Benin to risks from volatile commodity prices. Cotton is a key export commodity, with export earnings significantly impacted by the price of cotton in the broader market. The economy began deflating in 2017, with the consumer price index falling 0.8%.
During the first two years of President TALON’s administration, which began in April 2016, the government has followed an ambitious action plan to kickstart development through investments in infrastructure, education, agriculture, and governance. Electricity generation, which has constrained Benin’s economic growth, has increased and blackouts have been considerably reduced. Private foreign direct investment is small, and foreign aid accounts for a large proportion of investment in infrastructure projects.
Benin has appealed for international assistance to mitigate piracy against commercial shipping in its territory, and has used equipment from donors effectively against such piracy. Pilferage has significantly dropped at the Port of Cotonou, though the port is still struggling with effective implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Projects included in Benin's $307 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) first compact (2006-11) were designed to increase investment and private sector activity by improving key institutional and physical infrastructure. The four projects focused on access to land, access to financial services, access to justice, and access to markets (including modernization of the port). The Port of Cotonou is a major contributor to Benin’s economy, with revenues projected to account for more than 40% of Benin’s national budget.
Benin will need further efforts to upgrade infrastructure, stem corruption, and expand access to foreign markets to achieve its potential. In September 2015, Benin signed a second MCC Compact for $375 million that entered into force in June 2017 and is designed to strengthen the national utility service provider, attract private sector investment, fund infrastructure investments in electricity generation and distribution, and develop off-grid electrification for poor and unserved households. As part of the Government of Benin’s action plan to spur growth, Benin passed public private partnership legislation in 2017 to attract more foreign investment, place more emphasis on tourism, facilitate the development of new food processing systems and agricultural products, encourage new information and communication technology, and establish Independent Power Producers. In April 2017, the IMF approved a three year $150.4 million Extended Credit Facility agreement to maintain debt sustainability and boost donor confidence.
" + "text": "The free market economy of Benin has grown consecutively for four years, though growth slowed in 2017, as its close trade links to Nigeria expose Benin to risks from volatile commodity prices. Cotton is a key export commodity, with export earnings significantly impacted by the price of cotton in the broader market. The economy began deflating in 2017, with the consumer price index falling 0.8%.
During the first two years of President TALON’s administration, which began in April 2016, the government has followed an ambitious action plan to kickstart development through investments in infrastructure, education, agriculture, and governance. Electricity generation, which has constrained Benin’s economic growth, has increased and blackouts have been considerably reduced. Private foreign direct investment is small, and foreign aid accounts for a large proportion of investment in infrastructure projects.
Benin has appealed for international assistance to mitigate piracy against commercial shipping in its territory, and has used equipment from donors effectively against such piracy. Pilferage has significantly dropped at the Port of Cotonou, though the port is still struggling with effective implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Projects included in Benin's $307 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) first compact (2006-11) were designed to increase investment and private sector activity by improving key institutional and physical infrastructure. The four projects focused on access to land, access to financial services, access to justice, and access to markets (including modernization of the port). The Port of Cotonou is a major contributor to Benin’s economy, with revenues projected to account for more than 40% of Benin’s national budget.
Benin will need further efforts to upgrade infrastructure, stem corruption, and expand access to foreign markets to achieve its potential. In September 2015, Benin signed a second MCC Compact for $375 million that entered into force in June 2017 and is designed to strengthen the national utility service provider, attract private sector investment, fund infrastructure investments in electricity generation and distribution, and develop off-grid electrification for poor and unserved households. As part of the Government of Benin’s action plan to spur growth, Benin passed public private partnership legislation in 2017 to attract more foreign investment, place more emphasis on tourism, facilitate the development of new food processing systems and agricultural products, encourage new information and communication technology, and establish Independent Power Producers. In April 2017, the IMF approved a three year $150.4 million Extended Credit Facility agreement to maintain debt sustainability and boost donor confidence.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1012,18 +1012,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "32,386 (2020)" + "text": "32,386 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "11,140,891 (2020)" + "text": "11,140,891 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "91.9 (2020 est.)" + "text": "92 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1054,10 +1054,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "29,981 (2021)" + "text": "29,981 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.25 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.3 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1153,6 +1153,9 @@ "text": "Benin Armed Forces (Forces Armees Beninoises, FAB): Army, Navy, Air Force; Ministry of Interior and Public Security: Republican Police (Police Republicaine, DGPR) (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "0.7% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "0.5% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1164,9 +1167,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "0.9% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $160 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "0.7% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $130 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/by.json b/africa/by.json index 4a33b2e2..9725c7e7 100644 --- a/africa/by.json +++ b/africa/by.json @@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Burundi is a landlocked, resource-poor country with an underdeveloped manufacturing sector. Agriculture accounts for over 40% of GDP and employs more than 90% of the population. Burundi's primary exports are coffee and tea, which account for more than half of foreign exchange earnings, but these earnings are subject to fluctuations in weather and international coffee and tea prices, Burundi is heavily dependent on aid from bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as foreign exchange earnings from participation in the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Foreign aid represented 48% of Burundi's national income in 2015, one of the highest percentages in Sub-Saharan Africa, but this figure decreased to 33.5% in 2016 due to political turmoil surrounding President NKURUNZIZA’s bid for a third term. Burundi joined the East African Community (EAC) in 2009.
Burundi faces several underlying weaknesses – low governmental capacity, corruption, a high poverty rate, poor educational levels, a weak legal system, a poor transportation network, and overburdened utilities – that have prevented the implementation of planned economic reforms. The purchasing power of most Burundians has decreased as wage increases have not kept pace with inflation, which reached approximately 18% in 2017.
Real GDP growth dropped precipitously following political events in 2015 and has yet to recover to pre-conflict levels. Continued resistance by donors and the international community will restrict Burundi’s economic growth as the country deals with a large current account deficit.
" + "text": "Burundi is a landlocked, resource-poor country with an underdeveloped manufacturing sector. Agriculture accounts for over 40% of GDP and employs more than 90% of the population. Burundi's primary exports are coffee and tea, which account for more than half of foreign exchange earnings, but these earnings are subject to fluctuations in weather and international coffee and tea prices, Burundi is heavily dependent on aid from bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as foreign exchange earnings from participation in the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Foreign aid represented 48% of Burundi's national income in 2015, one of the highest percentages in Sub-Saharan Africa, but this figure decreased to 33.5% in 2016 due to political turmoil surrounding President NKURUNZIZA’s bid for a third term. Burundi joined the East African Community (EAC) in 2009.
Burundi faces several underlying weaknesses – low governmental capacity, corruption, a high poverty rate, poor educational levels, a weak legal system, a poor transportation network, and overburdened utilities – that have prevented the implementation of planned economic reforms. The purchasing power of most Burundians has decreased as wage increases have not kept pace with inflation, which reached approximately 18% in 2017.
Real GDP growth dropped precipitously following political events in 2015 and has yet to recover to pre-conflict levels. Continued resistance by donors and the international community will restrict Burundi’s economic growth as the country deals with a large current account deficit.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1002,10 +1002,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "18,300 (2020)" + "text": "18,300 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1044,10 +1044,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "4,230 (2021)" + "text": "4,230 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.04 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.04 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1107,6 +1107,9 @@ "text": "National Defense Forces (Forces de Defense Nationale, FDN): Army (includes maritime wing, air wing); Ministry of Public Security: National Police (Police Nationale du Burundi) (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "2% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "2.1% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1118,9 +1121,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "2.1% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $95 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "2.4% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $100 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/cd.json b/africa/cd.json index af38bda3..42b2207a 100644 --- a/africa/cd.json +++ b/africa/cd.json @@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Chad’s landlocked location results in high transportation costs for imported goods and dependence on neighboring countries. Oil and agriculture are mainstays of Chad’s economy. Oil provides about 60% of export revenues, while cotton, cattle, livestock, and gum arabic provide the bulk of Chad's non-oil export earnings. The services sector contributes less than one-third of GDP and has attracted foreign investment mostly through telecommunications and banking.
Nearly all of Chad’s fuel is provided by one domestic refinery, and unanticipated shutdowns occasionally result in shortages. The country regulates the price of domestic fuel, providing an incentive for black market sales.
Although high oil prices and strong local harvests supported the economy in the past, low oil prices now stress Chad’s fiscal position and have resulted in significant government cutbacks. Chad relies on foreign assistance and foreign capital for most of its public and private sector investment. Investment in Chad is difficult due to its limited infrastructure, lack of trained workers, extensive government bureaucracy, and corruption. Chad obtained a three-year extended credit facility from the IMF in 2014 and was granted debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in April 2015.
In 2018, economic policy will be driven by efforts that started in 2016 to reverse the recession and to repair damage to public finances and exports. The government is implementing an emergency action plan to counterbalance the drop in oil revenue and to diversify the economy. Chad’s national development plan (NDP) cost just over $9 billion with a financing gap of $6.7 billion. The NDP emphasized the importance of private sector participation in Chad’s development, as well as the need to improve the business environment, particularly in priority sectors such as mining and agriculture.
The Government of Chad reached a deal with Glencore and four other banks on the restructuring of a $1.45 billion oil-backed loan in February 2018, after a long negotiation. The new terms include an extension of the maturity to 2030 from 2022, a two-year grace period on principal repayments, and a lower interest rate of the London Inter-bank Offer Rate (Libor) plus 2% - down from Libor plus 7.5%. The original Glencore loan was to be repaid with crude oil assets, however, Chad's oil sales were hit by the downturn in the price of oil. Chad had secured a $312 million credit from the IMF in June 2017, but release of those funds hinged on restructuring the Glencore debt. Chad had already cut public spending to try to meet the terms of the IMF program, but that prompted strikes and protests in a country where nearly 40% of the population lives below the poverty line. Multinational partners, such as the African Development Bank, the EU, and the World Bank are likely to continue budget support in 2018, but Chad will remain at high debt risk, given its dependence on oil revenue and pressure to spend on subsidies and security.
" + "text": "Chad’s landlocked location results in high transportation costs for imported goods and dependence on neighboring countries. Oil and agriculture are mainstays of Chad’s economy. Oil provides about 60% of export revenues, while cotton, cattle, livestock, and gum arabic provide the bulk of Chad's non-oil export earnings. The services sector contributes less than one-third of GDP and has attracted foreign investment mostly through telecommunications and banking.
Nearly all of Chad’s fuel is provided by one domestic refinery, and unanticipated shutdowns occasionally result in shortages. The country regulates the price of domestic fuel, providing an incentive for black market sales.
Although high oil prices and strong local harvests supported the economy in the past, low oil prices now stress Chad’s fiscal position and have resulted in significant government cutbacks. Chad relies on foreign assistance and foreign capital for most of its public and private sector investment. Investment in Chad is difficult due to its limited infrastructure, lack of trained workers, extensive government bureaucracy, and corruption. Chad obtained a three-year extended credit facility from the IMF in 2014 and was granted debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in April 2015.
In 2018, economic policy will be driven by efforts that started in 2016 to reverse the recession and to repair damage to public finances and exports. The government is implementing an emergency action plan to counterbalance the drop in oil revenue and to diversify the economy. Chad’s national development plan (NDP) cost just over $9 billion with a financing gap of $6.7 billion. The NDP emphasized the importance of private sector participation in Chad’s development, as well as the need to improve the business environment, particularly in priority sectors such as mining and agriculture.
The Government of Chad reached a deal with Glencore and four other banks on the restructuring of a $1.45 billion oil-backed loan in February 2018, after a long negotiation. The new terms include an extension of the maturity to 2030 from 2022, a two-year grace period on principal repayments, and a lower interest rate of the London Inter-bank Offer Rate (Libor) plus 2% - down from Libor plus 7.5%. The original Glencore loan was to be repaid with crude oil assets, however, Chad's oil sales were hit by the downturn in the price of oil. Chad had secured a $312 million credit from the IMF in June 2017, but release of those funds hinged on restructuring the Glencore debt. Chad had already cut public spending to try to meet the terms of the IMF program, but that prompted strikes and protests in a country where nearly 40% of the population lives below the poverty line. Multinational partners, such as the African Development Bank, the EU, and the World Bank are likely to continue budget support in 2018, but Chad will remain at high debt risk, given its dependence on oil revenue and pressure to spend on subsidies and security.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1016,10 +1016,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "5,340 (2020)" + "text": "5,340 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1058,10 +1058,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "0 (2021)" + "text": "0 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0 (2021 est.)" + "text": "0 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1138,8 +1138,11 @@ "note": "note(s) - the GDSSIE, formerly known as the Republican Guard, is the presidential guard force and is considered to be Chad's elite military unit; it is reportedly a division-size unit with infantry, armor, and special forces/anti-terrorism regiments (known as the Special Anti-Terrorist Group or SATG, aka Division of Special Anti-Terrorist Groups or DGSAT)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "2.5% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { - "text": "2.5% of GDP (2020 est.)" + "text": "2.9% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2019": { "text": "2% of GDP (2019 est.) (approximately $320 million)" @@ -1149,9 +1152,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "2% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $310 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "2.5% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $380 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { @@ -1183,7 +1183,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "384,979 (Sudan), 122,421 (Central African Republic), 42,746 (Cameroon), 19,724 (Nigeria) (2022)" + "text": "388,550 (Sudan), 122,421 (Central African Republic), 42,549 (Cameroon), 19,724 (Nigeria) (2022)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "406,573 (majority are in the east) (2022)" diff --git a/africa/cf.json b/africa/cf.json index ac13d7cf..475447bb 100644 --- a/africa/cf.json +++ b/africa/cf.json @@ -699,7 +699,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The Republic of the Congo’s economy is a mixture of subsistence farming, an industrial sector based largely on oil and support services, and government spending. Oil has supplanted forestry as the mainstay of the economy, providing a major share of government revenues and exports. Natural gas is increasingly being converted to electricity rather than being flared, greatly improving energy prospects. New mining projects, particularly iron ore, which entered production in late 2013, may add as much as $1 billion to annual government revenue. The Republic of the Congo is a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and shares a common currency – the Central African Franc – with five other member states in the region.
The current administration faces difficult economic challenges of stimulating recovery and reducing poverty. The drop in oil prices that began in 2014 has constrained government spending; lower oil prices forced the government to cut more than $1 billion in planned spending. The fiscal deficit amounted to 11% of GDP in 2017. The government’s inability to pay civil servant salaries has resulted in multiple rounds of strikes by many groups, including doctors, nurses, and teachers. In the wake of a multi-year recession, the country reached out to the IMF in 2017 for a new program; the IMF noted that the country’s continued dependence on oil, unsustainable debt, and significant governance weakness are key impediments to the country’s economy. In 2018, the country’s external debt level will approach 120% of GDP. The IMF urged the government to renegotiate debts levels to sustainable levels before it agreed to a new macroeconomic adjustment package.
" + "text": "The Republic of the Congo’s economy is a mixture of subsistence farming, an industrial sector based largely on oil and support services, and government spending. Oil has supplanted forestry as the mainstay of the economy, providing a major share of government revenues and exports. Natural gas is increasingly being converted to electricity rather than being flared, greatly improving energy prospects. New mining projects, particularly iron ore, which entered production in late 2013, may add as much as $1 billion to annual government revenue. The Republic of the Congo is a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and shares a common currency – the Central African Franc – with five other member states in the region.
The current administration faces difficult economic challenges of stimulating recovery and reducing poverty. The drop in oil prices that began in 2014 has constrained government spending; lower oil prices forced the government to cut more than $1 billion in planned spending. The fiscal deficit amounted to 11% of GDP in 2017. The government’s inability to pay civil servant salaries has resulted in multiple rounds of strikes by many groups, including doctors, nurses, and teachers. In the wake of a multi-year recession, the country reached out to the IMF in 2017 for a new program; the IMF noted that the country’s continued dependence on oil, unsustainable debt, and significant governance weakness are key impediments to the country’s economy. In 2018, the country’s external debt level will approach 120% of GDP. The IMF urged the government to renegotiate debts levels to sustainable levels before it agreed to a new macroeconomic adjustment package.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1016,10 +1016,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "17,000 (2018 est.)" + "text": "17,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2018 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1058,10 +1058,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,000 (2021)" + "text": "1,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.02 (2021 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0.02 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1168,6 +1168,9 @@ "text": "Congolese Armed Forces (Forces Armees Congolaises, FAC): Army (Armee de Terre), Navy, Congolese Air Force (Armee de l'Air Congolaise), Gendarmerie (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "2.5% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "3.2% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1179,9 +1182,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "3.6% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $580 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "4.2% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $690 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/cg.json b/africa/cg.json index a952b52f..aa8ce418 100644 --- a/africa/cg.json +++ b/africa/cg.json @@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo - a nation endowed with vast natural resource wealth - continues to perform poorly. Systemic corruption since independence in 1960, combined with countrywide instability and intermittent conflict that began in the early-90s, has reduced national output and government revenue, and increased external debt. With the installation of a transitional government in 2003 after peace accords, economic conditions slowly began to improve as the government reopened relations with international financial institutions and international donors, and President KABILA began implementing reforms. Progress on implementing substantive economic reforms remains slow because of political instability, bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, and patronage, which also dampen international investment prospects.
Renewed activity in the mining sector, the source of most export income, boosted Kinshasa's fiscal position and GDP growth until 2015, but low commodity prices have led to slower growth, volatile inflation, currency depreciation, and a growing fiscal deficit. An uncertain legal framework, corruption, and a lack of transparency in government policy are long-term problems for the large mining sector and for the economy as a whole. Much economic activity still occurs in the informal sector and is not reflected in GDP data.
Poverty remains widespread in DRC, and the country failed to meet any Millennium Development Goals by 2015. DRC also concluded its program with the IMF in 2015. The price of copper – the DRC’s primary export - plummeted in 2015 and remained at record lows during 2016-17, reducing government revenues, expenditures, and foreign exchange reserves, while inflation reached nearly 50% in mid-2017 – its highest level since the early 2000s.
" + "text": "The economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo - a nation endowed with vast natural resource wealth - continues to perform poorly. Systemic corruption since independence in 1960, combined with countrywide instability and intermittent conflict that began in the early-90s, has reduced national output and government revenue, and increased external debt. With the installation of a transitional government in 2003 after peace accords, economic conditions slowly began to improve as the government reopened relations with international financial institutions and international donors, and President KABILA began implementing reforms. Progress on implementing substantive economic reforms remains slow because of political instability, bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, and patronage, which also dampen international investment prospects.
Renewed activity in the mining sector, the source of most export income, boosted Kinshasa's fiscal position and GDP growth until 2015, but low commodity prices have led to slower growth, volatile inflation, currency depreciation, and a growing fiscal deficit. An uncertain legal framework, corruption, and a lack of transparency in government policy are long-term problems for the large mining sector and for the economy as a whole. Much economic activity still occurs in the informal sector and is not reflected in GDP data.
Poverty remains widespread in DRC, and the country failed to meet any Millennium Development Goals by 2015. DRC also concluded its program with the IMF in 2015. The price of copper – the DRC’s primary export - plummeted in 2015 and remained at record lows during 2016-17, reducing government revenues, expenditures, and foreign exchange reserves, while inflation reached nearly 50% in mid-2017 – its highest level since the early 2000s.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1051,10 +1051,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "0 (2019)" + "text": "0 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0 (2019 est.)" + "text": "0 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1093,10 +1093,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "31,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "31,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.03 (2021 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0.03 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "210,621 (Rwanda), 210,084 (Central African Republic), 56,351 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 40,511 (Burundi) (2022)" + "text": "210,621 (Rwanda), 210,357 (Central African Republic), 56,356 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 40,522 (Burundi) (2022)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "5.61 million (fighting between government forces and rebels since mid-1990s; conflict in Kasai region since 2016) (2021)" diff --git a/africa/cm.json b/africa/cm.json index 5f79df76..9d041cfb 100644 --- a/africa/cm.json +++ b/africa/cm.json @@ -723,7 +723,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Cameroon’s market-based, diversified economy features oil and gas, timber, aluminum, agriculture, mining and the service sector. Oil remains Cameroon’s main export commodity, and despite falling global oil prices, still accounts for nearly 40% of exports. Cameroon’s economy suffers from factors that often impact underdeveloped countries, such as stagnant per capita income, a relatively inequitable distribution of income, a top-heavy civil service, endemic corruption, continuing inefficiencies of a large parastatal system in key sectors, and a generally unfavorable climate for business enterprise.
Since 1990, the government has embarked on various IMF and World Bank programs designed to spur business investment, increase efficiency in agriculture, improve trade, and recapitalize the nation's banks. The IMF continues to press for economic reforms, including increased budget transparency, privatization, and poverty reduction programs. The Government of Cameroon provides subsidies for electricity, food, and fuel that have strained the federal budget and diverted funds from education, healthcare, and infrastructure projects, as low oil prices have led to lower revenues.
Cameroon devotes significant resources to several large infrastructure projects currently under construction, including a deep seaport in Kribi and the Lom Pangar Hydropower Project. Cameroon’s energy sector continues to diversify, recently opening a natural gas-powered electricity generating plant. Cameroon continues to seek foreign investment to improve its inadequate infrastructure, create jobs, and improve its economic footprint, but its unfavorable business environment remains a significant deterrent to foreign investment.
" + "text": "Cameroon’s market-based, diversified economy features oil and gas, timber, aluminum, agriculture, mining and the service sector. Oil remains Cameroon’s main export commodity, and despite falling global oil prices, still accounts for nearly 40% of exports. Cameroon’s economy suffers from factors that often impact underdeveloped countries, such as stagnant per capita income, a relatively inequitable distribution of income, a top-heavy civil service, endemic corruption, continuing inefficiencies of a large parastatal system in key sectors, and a generally unfavorable climate for business enterprise.
Since 1990, the government has embarked on various IMF and World Bank programs designed to spur business investment, increase efficiency in agriculture, improve trade, and recapitalize the nation's banks. The IMF continues to press for economic reforms, including increased budget transparency, privatization, and poverty reduction programs. The Government of Cameroon provides subsidies for electricity, food, and fuel that have strained the federal budget and diverted funds from education, healthcare, and infrastructure projects, as low oil prices have led to lower revenues.
Cameroon devotes significant resources to several large infrastructure projects currently under construction, including a deep seaport in Kribi and the Lom Pangar Hydropower Project. Cameroon’s energy sector continues to diversify, recently opening a natural gas-powered electricity generating plant. Cameroon continues to seek foreign investment to improve its inadequate infrastructure, create jobs, and improve its economic footprint, but its unfavorable business environment remains a significant deterrent to foreign investment.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1054,10 +1054,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "883,015 (2020)" + "text": "964,378 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "3.33 (2020 est.)" + "text": "4 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1096,10 +1096,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "722,579 (2021)" + "text": "722,579 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "2.72 (2021)" + "text": "3 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1207,6 +1207,9 @@ "note": "note(s) - the National Police (under the General Delegation of National Security) and the Gendarmerie are responsible for internal security; the Rapid Intervention Battalion (RIB) is a large brigade-sized force comprised of approximately 9 battalions, detachments, or groups (5 infantry, 1 airborne, 1 amphibious, 1 armored reconnaissance, and 1 counter-terrorism); the RIB maintains its own command and control structure and reports directly to the president, rather than the defense minister" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1218,9 +1221,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.5% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $710 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.5% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $700 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { @@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "345,587 (Central African Republic), 129,266 (Nigeria) (2022)" + "text": "345,622 (Central African Republic), 128,893 (Nigeria) (2022)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "936,767 (2022) (includes far north, northwest, and southwest)" diff --git a/africa/cn.json b/africa/cn.json index 9b16a278..819050c8 100644 --- a/africa/cn.json +++ b/africa/cn.json @@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "One of the world's poorest and smallest economies, the Comoros is made up of three islands that are hampered by inadequate transportation links, a young and rapidly increasing population, and few natural resources. The low educational level of the labor force contributes to a subsistence level of economic activity and a heavy dependence on foreign grants and technical assistance. Agriculture, including fishing, hunting, and forestry, accounts for about 50% of GDP, employs a majority of the labor force, and provides most of the exports. Export income is heavily reliant on the three main crops of vanilla, cloves, and ylang ylang (perfume essence); and the Comoros' export earnings are easily disrupted by disasters such as fires and extreme weather. Despite agriculture’s importance to the economy, the country imports roughly 70% of its food; rice, the main staple, and other dried vegetables account for more than 25% of imports. Remittances from about 300,000 Comorans contribute about 25% of the country’s GDP. France, Comoros’s colonial power, remains a key trading partner and bilateral donor.
Comoros faces an education system in need of upgrades, limited opportunities for private commercial and industrial enterprises, poor health services, limited exports, and a high population growth rate. Recurring political instability, sometimes initiated from outside the country, and an ongoing electricity crisis have inhibited growth. The government, elected in mid-2016, has moved to improve revenue mobilization, reduce expenditures, and improve electricity access, although the public sector wage bill remains one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. In mid-2017, Comoros joined the Southern African Development Community with 15 other regional member states.
" + "text": "One of the world's poorest and smallest economies, the Comoros is made up of three islands that are hampered by inadequate transportation links, a young and rapidly increasing population, and few natural resources. The low educational level of the labor force contributes to a subsistence level of economic activity and a heavy dependence on foreign grants and technical assistance. Agriculture, including fishing, hunting, and forestry, accounts for about 50% of GDP, employs a majority of the labor force, and provides most of the exports. Export income is heavily reliant on the three main crops of vanilla, cloves, and ylang ylang (perfume essence); and the Comoros' export earnings are easily disrupted by disasters such as fires and extreme weather. Despite agriculture’s importance to the economy, the country imports roughly 70% of its food; rice, the main staple, and other dried vegetables account for more than 25% of imports. Remittances from about 300,000 Comorans contribute about 25% of the country’s GDP. France, Comoros’s colonial power, remains a key trading partner and bilateral donor.
Comoros faces an education system in need of upgrades, limited opportunities for private commercial and industrial enterprises, poor health services, limited exports, and a high population growth rate. Recurring political instability, sometimes initiated from outside the country, and an ongoing electricity crisis have inhibited growth. The government, elected in mid-2016, has moved to improve revenue mobilization, reduce expenditures, and improve electricity access, although the public sector wage bill remains one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. In mid-2017, Comoros joined the Southern African Development Community with 15 other regional member states.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -913,10 +913,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "7,573 (2020)" + "text": "7,573 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -955,10 +955,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,066 (2021)" + "text": "1,066 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.12 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.12 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, diff --git a/africa/ct.json b/africa/ct.json index 51eb3db6..466c5e85 100644 --- a/africa/ct.json +++ b/africa/ct.json @@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Subsistence agriculture, together with forestry and mining, remains the backbone of the economy of the Central African Republic (CAR), with about 60% of the population living in outlying areas. The agricultural sector generates more than half of estimated GDP, although statistics are unreliable in the conflict-prone country. Timber and diamonds account for most export earnings, followed by cotton. Important constraints to economic development include the CAR's landlocked geography, poor transportation system, largely unskilled work force, and legacy of misdirected macroeconomic policies. Factional fighting between the government and its opponents remains a drag on economic revitalization. Distribution of income is highly unequal and grants from the international community can only partially meet humanitarian needs. CAR shares a common currency with the Central African Monetary Union. The currency is pegged to the Euro.
Since 2009, the IMF has worked closely with the government to institute reforms that have resulted in some improvement in budget transparency, but other problems remain. The government's additional spending in the run-up to the 2011 election worsened CAR's fiscal situation. In 2012, the World Bank approved $125 million in funding for transport infrastructure and regional trade, focused on the route between CAR's capital and the port of Douala in Cameroon. In July 2016, the IMF approved a three-year extended credit facility valued at $116 million; in mid-2017, the IMF completed a review of CAR’s fiscal performance and broadly approved of the government’s management, although issues with revenue collection, weak government capacity, and transparency remain. The World Bank in late 2016 approved a $20 million grant to restore basic fiscal management, improve transparency, and assist with economic recovery.
Participation in the Kimberley Process, a commitment to remove conflict diamonds from the global supply chain, led to a partially lifted the ban on diamond exports from CAR in 2015, but persistent insecurity is likely to constrain real GDP growth.
" + "text": "Subsistence agriculture, together with forestry and mining, remains the backbone of the economy of the Central African Republic (CAR), with about 60% of the population living in outlying areas. The agricultural sector generates more than half of estimated GDP, although statistics are unreliable in the conflict-prone country. Timber and diamonds account for most export earnings, followed by cotton. Important constraints to economic development include the CAR's landlocked geography, poor transportation system, largely unskilled work force, and legacy of misdirected macroeconomic policies. Factional fighting between the government and its opponents remains a drag on economic revitalization. Distribution of income is highly unequal and grants from the international community can only partially meet humanitarian needs. CAR shares a common currency with the Central African Monetary Union. The currency is pegged to the Euro.
Since 2009, the IMF has worked closely with the government to institute reforms that have resulted in some improvement in budget transparency, but other problems remain. The government's additional spending in the run-up to the 2011 election worsened CAR's fiscal situation. In 2012, the World Bank approved $125 million in funding for transport infrastructure and regional trade, focused on the route between CAR's capital and the port of Douala in Cameroon. In July 2016, the IMF approved a three-year extended credit facility valued at $116 million; in mid-2017, the IMF completed a review of CAR’s fiscal performance and broadly approved of the government’s management, although issues with revenue collection, weak government capacity, and transparency remain. The World Bank in late 2016 approved a $20 million grant to restore basic fiscal management, improve transparency, and assist with economic recovery.
Participation in the Kimberley Process, a commitment to remove conflict diamonds from the global supply chain, led to a partially lifted the ban on diamond exports from CAR in 2015, but persistent insecurity is likely to constrain real GDP growth.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": { @@ -987,10 +987,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,193 (2018)" + "text": "2,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2018 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1029,7 +1029,7 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "499 (2019) Data available for 2019 only." + "text": "499 (2019 est.) Data available for 2019 only." }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "0.01 (2019 est.) less than 1" @@ -1111,6 +1111,9 @@ "note": "note - in 2019-2021, CAR created three Mixed Special Security units (Unités Spéciales Mixtes de Sécurité or USMS), regionally based battalion-sized units comprised of about 40% government and 60% rebel soldiers that are intended to provide security along transportation corridors and at mining sites; the units are intended to be transitional in nature with a scheduled deployment time of two years" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.8% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.8% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1122,9 +1125,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.4% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $40 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.6% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $40 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/cv.json b/africa/cv.json index 066a87f6..8e6ab84e 100644 --- a/africa/cv.json +++ b/africa/cv.json @@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Cabo Verde’s economy depends on development aid, foreign investment, remittances, and tourism. The economy is service-oriented with commerce, transport, tourism, and public services accounting for about three-fourths of GDP. Tourism is the mainstay of the economy and depends on conditions in the euro-zone countries. Cabo Verde annually runs a high trade deficit financed by foreign aid and remittances from its large pool of emigrants; remittances as a share of GDP are one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Although about 40% of the population lives in rural areas, the share of food production in GDP is low. The island economy suffers from a poor natural resource base, including serious water shortages, exacerbated by cycles of long-term drought, and poor soil for growing food on several of the islands, requiring it to import most of what it consumes. The fishing potential, mostly lobster and tuna, is not fully exploited.
Economic reforms are aimed at developing the private sector and attracting foreign investment to diversify the economy and mitigate high unemployment. The government’s elevated debt levels have limited its capacity to finance any shortfalls.
" + "text": "Cabo Verde’s economy depends on development aid, foreign investment, remittances, and tourism. The economy is service-oriented with commerce, transport, tourism, and public services accounting for about three-fourths of GDP. Tourism is the mainstay of the economy and depends on conditions in the euro-zone countries. Cabo Verde annually runs a high trade deficit financed by foreign aid and remittances from its large pool of emigrants; remittances as a share of GDP are one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Although about 40% of the population lives in rural areas, the share of food production in GDP is low. The island economy suffers from a poor natural resource base, including serious water shortages, exacerbated by cycles of long-term drought, and poor soil for growing food on several of the islands, requiring it to import most of what it consumes. The fishing potential, mostly lobster and tuna, is not fully exploited.
Economic reforms are aimed at developing the private sector and attracting foreign investment to diversify the economy and mitigate high unemployment. The government’s elevated debt levels have limited its capacity to finance any shortfalls.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -945,10 +945,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "57,668 (2020)" + "text": "57,668 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "10.37 (2020 est.)" + "text": "10 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -987,10 +987,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "24,839 (2021)" + "text": "24,839 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "4.47 (2021 est.)" + "text": "5 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1064,6 +1064,9 @@ "text": "Cabo Verdean Armed Forces (FACV): Army (also called the National Guard, GN; includes a small air component), Cabo Verde Coast Guard (Guardia Costeira de Cabo Verde, GCCV) (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "0.5% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "0.5% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1075,9 +1078,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "0.5% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $20 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "0.6% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $20 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/dj.json b/africa/dj.json index ab0ab532..6eaec09b 100644 --- a/africa/dj.json +++ b/africa/dj.json @@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Djibouti's economy is based on service activities connected with the country's strategic location as a deepwater port on the Red Sea. Three-fourths of Djibouti's inhabitants live in the capital city; the remainder are mostly nomadic herders. Scant rainfall and less than 4% arable land limits crop production to small quantities of fruits and vegetables, and most food must be imported.
Djibouti provides services as both a transit port for the region and an international transshipment and refueling center. Imports, exports, and reexports represent 70% of port activity at Djibouti's container terminal. Reexports consist primarily of coffee from landlocked neighbor Ethiopia. Djibouti has few natural resources and little industry. The nation is, therefore, heavily dependent on foreign assistance to support its balance of payments and to finance development projects. An official unemployment rate of nearly 40% - with youth unemployment near 80% - continues to be a major problem. Inflation was a modest 3% in 2014-2017, due to low international food prices and a decline in electricity tariffs.
Djibouti’s reliance on diesel-generated electricity and imported food and water leave average consumers vulnerable to global price shocks, though in mid-2015 Djibouti passed new legislation to liberalize the energy sector. The government has emphasized infrastructure development for transportation and energy and Djibouti – with the help of foreign partners, particularly China – has begun to increase and modernize its port capacity. In 2017, Djibouti opened two of the largest projects in its history, the Doraleh Port and Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railway, funded by China as part of the \"Belt and Road Initiative,\" which will increase the country’s ability to capitalize on its strategic location.
" + "text": "Djibouti's economy is based on service activities connected with the country's strategic location as a deepwater port on the Red Sea. Three-fourths of Djibouti's inhabitants live in the capital city; the remainder are mostly nomadic herders. Scant rainfall and less than 4% arable land limits crop production to small quantities of fruits and vegetables, and most food must be imported.
Djibouti provides services as both a transit port for the region and an international transshipment and refueling center. Imports, exports, and reexports represent 70% of port activity at Djibouti's container terminal. Reexports consist primarily of coffee from landlocked neighbor Ethiopia. Djibouti has few natural resources and little industry. The nation is, therefore, heavily dependent on foreign assistance to support its balance of payments and to finance development projects. An official unemployment rate of nearly 40% - with youth unemployment near 80% - continues to be a major problem. Inflation was a modest 3% in 2014-2017, due to low international food prices and a decline in electricity tariffs.
Djibouti’s reliance on diesel-generated electricity and imported food and water leave average consumers vulnerable to global price shocks, though in mid-2015 Djibouti passed new legislation to liberalize the energy sector. The government has emphasized infrastructure development for transportation and energy and Djibouti – with the help of foreign partners, particularly China – has begun to increase and modernize its port capacity. In 2017, Djibouti opened two of the largest projects in its history, the Doraleh Port and Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railway, funded by China as part of the \"Belt and Road Initiative,\" which will increase the country’s ability to capitalize on its strategic location.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -960,10 +960,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "38,866 (2020)" + "text": "38,866 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "3.93 (2020 est.)" + "text": "4 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1002,10 +1002,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "25,053 (2021)" + "text": "25,053 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "2.54 (2021 est.)" + "text": "3 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/africa/eg.json b/africa/eg.json index ea42b0a1..6fe5e112 100644 --- a/africa/eg.json +++ b/africa/eg.json @@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Occupying the northeast corner of the African continent, Egypt is bisected by the highly fertile Nile valley where most economic activity takes place. Egypt's economy was highly centralized during the rule of former President Gamal Abdel NASSER but opened up considerably under former Presidents Anwar EL-SADAT and Mohamed Hosni MUBARAK. Agriculture, hydrocarbons, manufacturing, tourism, and other service sectors drove the country’s relatively diverse economic activity.
Despite Egypt’s mixed record for attracting foreign investment over the past two decades, poor living conditions and limited job opportunities have contributed to public discontent. These socioeconomic pressures were a major factor leading to the January 2011 revolution that ousted MUBARAK. The uncertain political, security, and policy environment since 2011 has restricted economic growth and failed to alleviate persistent unemployment, especially among the young.
In late 2016, persistent dollar shortages and waning aid from its Gulf allies led Cairo to turn to the IMF for a 3-year, $12 billion loan program. To secure the deal, Cairo floated its currency, introduced new taxes, and cut energy subsidies - all of which pushed inflation above 30% for most of 2017, a high that had not been seen in a generation. Since the currency float, foreign investment in Egypt’s high interest treasury bills has risen exponentially, boosting both dollar availability and central bank reserves. Cairo will be challenged to obtain foreign and local investment in manufacturing and other sectors without a sustained effort to implement a range of business reforms.
" + "text": "Occupying the northeast corner of the African continent, Egypt is bisected by the highly fertile Nile valley where most economic activity takes place. Egypt's economy was highly centralized during the rule of former President Gamal Abdel NASSER but opened up considerably under former Presidents Anwar EL-SADAT and Mohamed Hosni MUBARAK. Agriculture, hydrocarbons, manufacturing, tourism, and other service sectors drove the country’s relatively diverse economic activity.
Despite Egypt’s mixed record for attracting foreign investment over the past two decades, poor living conditions and limited job opportunities have contributed to public discontent. These socioeconomic pressures were a major factor leading to the January 2011 revolution that ousted MUBARAK. The uncertain political, security, and policy environment since 2011 has restricted economic growth and failed to alleviate persistent unemployment, especially among the young.
In late 2016, persistent dollar shortages and waning aid from its Gulf allies led Cairo to turn to the IMF for a 3-year, $12 billion loan program. To secure the deal, Cairo floated its currency, introduced new taxes, and cut energy subsidies - all of which pushed inflation above 30% for most of 2017, a high that had not been seen in a generation. Since the currency float, foreign investment in Egypt’s high interest treasury bills has risen exponentially, boosting both dollar availability and central bank reserves. Cairo will be challenged to obtain foreign and local investment in manufacturing and other sectors without a sustained effort to implement a range of business reforms.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1032,10 +1032,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "9,858,331 (2020)" + "text": "9,858,331 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "9.63 (2020 est.)" + "text": "10 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1074,10 +1074,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "9,349,469 (2021)" + "text": "9,349,469 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "9.14 (2021 est.)" + "text": "9 (2020 est.)" } }, "Communications - note": { @@ -1199,6 +1199,9 @@ "note": "note(s) - the Public Security Sector Police are responsible for law enforcement nationwide; the Central Security Force protects infrastructure and is responsible for crowd control; the National Security Sector is responsible for internal security threats and counterterrorism along with other security services; in addition to its external defense duties, the EAF also has a mandate to assist police in protecting vital infrastructure during a state of emergency; military personnel were granted full arrest authority in 2011 but normally only use this authority during states of emergency and “periods of significant turmoil”" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.3% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.3% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1210,9 +1213,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.6% of GDP (2017) (approximately $16.7 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.8% of GDP (2016) (approximately $17.5 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { @@ -1244,7 +1244,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "70,022 (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (mid-year 2021); 140,789 (Syria), 52,003 (Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 20,713 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 20,927 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 15,484 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 9,891 (Yemen) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,807 (Iraq) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,765 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)" + "text": "70,022 (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (mid-year 2021); 141,303 (Syria), 52,446 (Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 20,970 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 21,105 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 15,585 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 10,025 (Yemen) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,815 (Iraq) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,802 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "7 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/africa/ek.json b/africa/ek.json index 007510f5..7b70a2b1 100644 --- a/africa/ek.json +++ b/africa/ek.json @@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ }, "Capital": { "name": { - "text": "Malabo; note - a new capital of Cuidad de la Paz (formerly referred to as Oyala) is being built on the mainland near Djibloho; Malabo is on the island of Bioko" + "text": "Malabo; note - a new capital of Ciudad de la Paz (formerly referred to as Oyala) is being built on the mainland near Djibloho; Malabo is on the island of Bioko" }, "geographic coordinates": { "text": "3 45 N, 8 47 E" @@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ "text": "UTC+1 (6 hours ahead of Washington, DC, during Standard Time)" }, "etymology": { - "text": "named after Malabo Lopelo Melaka (1837–1937), the last king of the Bubi, the ethnic group indigenous to the island of Bioko; the name of the new capital, Cuidad de la Paz, translates to \"City of Peace\" in Spanish" + "text": "named after Malabo Lopelo Melaka (1837–1937), the last king of the Bubi, the ethnic group indigenous to the island of Bioko; the name of the new capital, Ciudad de la Paz, translates to \"City of Peace\" in Spanish" } }, "Administrative divisions": { @@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Exploitation of oil and gas deposits, beginning in the 1990s, has driven economic growth in Equatorial Guinea; a recent rebasing of GDP resulted in an upward revision of the size of the economy by approximately 30%. Forestry and farming are minor components of GDP. Although preindependence Equatorial Guinea counted on cocoa production for hard currency earnings, the neglect of the rural economy since independence has diminished the potential for agriculture-led growth. Subsistence farming is the dominant form of livelihood. Declining revenue from hydrocarbon production, high levels of infrastructure expenditures, lack of economic diversification, and corruption have pushed the economy into decline in recent years and limited improvements in the general population’s living conditions. Equatorial Guinea’s real GDP growth has been weak in recent years, averaging -0.5% per year from 2010 to 2014, because of a declining hydrocarbon sector. Inflation remained very low in 2016, down from an average of 4% in 2014.
As a middle income country, Equatorial Guinea is now ineligible for most low-income World Bank and the IMF funding. The government has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency and misuse of oil revenues and has attempted to address this issue by working toward compliance with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. US foreign assistance to Equatorial Guinea is limited in part because of US restrictions pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.
Equatorial Guinea hosted two economic diversification symposia in 2014 that focused on attracting investment in five sectors: agriculture and animal ranching, fishing, mining and petrochemicals, tourism, and financial services. Undeveloped mineral resources include gold, zinc, diamonds, columbite-tantalite, and other base metals. In 2017 Equatorial Guinea signed a preliminary agreement with Ghana to sell liquefied natural gas (LNG); as oil production wanes, the government believes LNG could provide a boost to revenues, but it will require large investments and long lead times to develop.
" + "text": "Exploitation of oil and gas deposits, beginning in the 1990s, has driven economic growth in Equatorial Guinea; a recent rebasing of GDP resulted in an upward revision of the size of the economy by approximately 30%. Forestry and farming are minor components of GDP. Although preindependence Equatorial Guinea counted on cocoa production for hard currency earnings, the neglect of the rural economy since independence has diminished the potential for agriculture-led growth. Subsistence farming is the dominant form of livelihood. Declining revenue from hydrocarbon production, high levels of infrastructure expenditures, lack of economic diversification, and corruption have pushed the economy into decline in recent years and limited improvements in the general population’s living conditions. Equatorial Guinea’s real GDP growth has been weak in recent years, averaging -0.5% per year from 2010 to 2014, because of a declining hydrocarbon sector. Inflation remained very low in 2016, down from an average of 4% in 2014.
As a middle income country, Equatorial Guinea is now ineligible for most low-income World Bank and the IMF funding. The government has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency and misuse of oil revenues and has attempted to address this issue by working toward compliance with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. US foreign assistance to Equatorial Guinea is limited in part because of US restrictions pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.
Equatorial Guinea hosted two economic diversification symposia in 2014 that focused on attracting investment in five sectors: agriculture and animal ranching, fishing, mining and petrochemicals, tourism, and financial services. Undeveloped mineral resources include gold, zinc, diamonds, columbite-tantalite, and other base metals. In 2017 Equatorial Guinea signed a preliminary agreement with Ghana to sell liquefied natural gas (LNG); as oil production wanes, the government believes LNG could provide a boost to revenues, but it will require large investments and long lead times to develop.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -922,10 +922,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "10,848 (2018)" + "text": "11,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2018 est.) less than 1" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -964,10 +964,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "1,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.07 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.07 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, diff --git a/africa/er.json b/africa/er.json index efecdf5c..b6e551b0 100644 --- a/africa/er.json +++ b/africa/er.json @@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Since formal independence from Ethiopia in 1993, Eritrea has faced many economic problems, including lack of financial resources and chronic drought. Eritrea has a command economy under the control of the sole political party, the People's Front for Democracy and Justice. Like the economies of many African nations, a large share of the population - nearly 80% in Eritrea - is engaged in subsistence agriculture, but the sector only produces a small share of the country's total output. Mining accounts for the lion's share of output.
The government has strictly controlled the use of foreign currency by limiting access and availability; new regulations in 2013 aimed at relaxing currency controls have had little economic effect. Few large private enterprises exist in Eritrea and most operate in conjunction with government partners, including a number of large international mining ventures, which began production in 2013. In late 2015, the Government of Eritrea introduced a new currency, retaining the name nakfa, and restricted the amount of hard currency individuals could withdraw from banks per month. The changeover has resulted in exchange fluctuations and the scarcity of hard currency available in the market.
While reliable statistics on Eritrea are difficult to obtain, erratic rainfall and the large percentage of the labor force tied up in military service continue to interfere with agricultural production and economic development. Eritrea's harvests generally cannot meet the food needs of the country without supplemental grain purchases. Copper, potash, and gold production are likely to continue to drive limited economic growth and government revenue over the next few years, but military spending will continue to compete with development and investment plans.
" + "text": "Since formal independence from Ethiopia in 1993, Eritrea has faced many economic problems, including lack of financial resources and chronic drought. Eritrea has a command economy under the control of the sole political party, the People's Front for Democracy and Justice. Like the economies of many African nations, a large share of the population - nearly 80% in Eritrea - is engaged in subsistence agriculture, but the sector only produces a small share of the country's total output. Mining accounts for the lion's share of output.
The government has strictly controlled the use of foreign currency by limiting access and availability; new regulations in 2013 aimed at relaxing currency controls have had little economic effect. Few large private enterprises exist in Eritrea and most operate in conjunction with government partners, including a number of large international mining ventures, which began production in 2013. In late 2015, the Government of Eritrea introduced a new currency, retaining the name nakfa, and restricted the amount of hard currency individuals could withdraw from banks per month. The changeover has resulted in exchange fluctuations and the scarcity of hard currency available in the market.
While reliable statistics on Eritrea are difficult to obtain, erratic rainfall and the large percentage of the labor force tied up in military service continue to interfere with agricultural production and economic development. Eritrea's harvests generally cannot meet the food needs of the country without supplemental grain purchases. Copper, potash, and gold production are likely to continue to drive limited economic growth and government revenue over the next few years, but military spending will continue to compete with development and investment plans.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2017": { @@ -925,10 +925,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "66,170 (2017)" + "text": "66,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.94 (2018 est.)" + "text": "2 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -967,10 +967,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "5,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "5,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.14 (2021 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0.14 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, diff --git a/africa/et.json b/africa/et.json index a13b1f0d..ed0626d6 100644 --- a/africa/et.json +++ b/africa/et.json @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ } }, "Ethnic groups": { - "text": "Oromo 35.8%, Amhara 24.1%, Somali 7.2%, Tigray 5.7%, Sidama 4.1%, Gamo-Goffa-Dawuro 2.8%, Guragie 2.6%, Welaita 2.3%, Afar 2.2%, Silte 1.3%, Kefficho 1.2%, other 10.8% (2022 est.)" + "text": "Oromo 35.8%, Amhara 24.1%, Somali 7.2%, Tigray 5.7%, Sidama 4.1%, Guragie 2.6%, Welaita 2.3%, Afar 2.2%, Silte 1.3%, Kefficho 1.2%, other 13.5% (2022 est.)" }, "Languages": { "Languages": { @@ -734,7 +734,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Ethiopia - the second most populous country in Africa - is a one-party state with a planned economy. For more than a decade before 2016, GDP grew at a rate between 8% and 11% annually – one of the fastest growing states among the 188 IMF member countries. This growth was driven by government investment in infrastructure, as well as sustained progress in the agricultural and service sectors. More than 70% of Ethiopia’s population is still employed in the agricultural sector, but services have surpassed agriculture as the principal source of GDP.
Ethiopia has the lowest level of income-inequality in Africa and one of the lowest in the world, with a Gini coefficient comparable to that of the Scandinavian countries. Yet despite progress toward eliminating extreme poverty, Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the world, due both to rapid population growth and a low starting base. Changes in rainfall associated with world-wide weather patterns resulted in the worst drought in 30 years in 2015-16, creating food insecurity for millions of Ethiopians.
The state is heavily engaged in the economy. Ongoing infrastructure projects include power production and distribution, roads, rails, airports and industrial parks. Key sectors are state-owned, including telecommunications, banking and insurance, and power distribution. Under Ethiopia's constitution, the state owns all land and provides long-term leases to tenants. Title rights in urban areas, particularly Addis Ababa, are poorly regulated, and subject to corruption.
Ethiopia’s foreign exchange earnings are led by the services sector - primarily the state-run Ethiopian Airlines - followed by exports of several commodities. While coffee remains the largest foreign exchange earner, Ethiopia is diversifying exports, and commodities such as gold, sesame, khat, livestock and horticulture products are becoming increasingly important. Manufacturing represented less than 8% of total exports in 2016, but manufacturing exports should increase in future years due to a growing international presence.
The banking, insurance, telecommunications, and micro-credit industries are restricted to domestic investors, but Ethiopia has attracted roughly $8.5 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI), mostly from China, Turkey, India and the EU; US FDI is $567 million. Investment has been primarily in infrastructure, construction, agriculture/horticulture, agricultural processing, textiles, leather and leather products.
To support industrialization in sectors where Ethiopia has a comparative advantage, such as textiles and garments, leather goods, and processed agricultural products, Ethiopia plans to increase installed power generation capacity by 8,320 MW, up from a capacity of 2,000 MW, by building three more major dams and expanding to other sources of renewable energy. In 2017, the government devalued the birr by 15% to increase exports and alleviate a chronic foreign currency shortage in the country.
" + "text": "Ethiopia - the second most populous country in Africa - is a one-party state with a planned economy. For more than a decade before 2016, GDP grew at a rate between 8% and 11% annually – one of the fastest growing states among the 188 IMF member countries. This growth was driven by government investment in infrastructure, as well as sustained progress in the agricultural and service sectors. More than 70% of Ethiopia’s population is still employed in the agricultural sector, but services have surpassed agriculture as the principal source of GDP.
Ethiopia has the lowest level of income-inequality in Africa and one of the lowest in the world, with a Gini coefficient comparable to that of the Scandinavian countries. Yet despite progress toward eliminating extreme poverty, Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the world, due both to rapid population growth and a low starting base. Changes in rainfall associated with world-wide weather patterns resulted in the worst drought in 30 years in 2015-16, creating food insecurity for millions of Ethiopians.
The state is heavily engaged in the economy. Ongoing infrastructure projects include power production and distribution, roads, rails, airports and industrial parks. Key sectors are state-owned, including telecommunications, banking and insurance, and power distribution. Under Ethiopia's constitution, the state owns all land and provides long-term leases to tenants. Title rights in urban areas, particularly Addis Ababa, are poorly regulated, and subject to corruption.
Ethiopia’s foreign exchange earnings are led by the services sector - primarily the state-run Ethiopian Airlines - followed by exports of several commodities. While coffee remains the largest foreign exchange earner, Ethiopia is diversifying exports, and commodities such as gold, sesame, khat, livestock and horticulture products are becoming increasingly important. Manufacturing represented less than 8% of total exports in 2016, but manufacturing exports should increase in future years due to a growing international presence.
The banking, insurance, telecommunications, and micro-credit industries are restricted to domestic investors, but Ethiopia has attracted roughly $8.5 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI), mostly from China, Turkey, India and the EU; US FDI is $567 million. Investment has been primarily in infrastructure, construction, agriculture/horticulture, agricultural processing, textiles, leather and leather products.
To support industrialization in sectors where Ethiopia has a comparative advantage, such as textiles and garments, leather goods, and processed agricultural products, Ethiopia plans to increase installed power generation capacity by 8,320 MW, up from a capacity of 2,000 MW, by building three more major dams and expanding to other sources of renewable energy. In 2017, the government devalued the birr by 15% to increase exports and alleviate a chronic foreign currency shortage in the country.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1068,10 +1068,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1.14 million (2018)" + "text": "1.252 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.04 (2018 est.)" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1110,10 +1110,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "212,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "212,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.18 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.18 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1206,6 +1206,9 @@ "note": "note(s) - in January 2020 the Ethiopian Government announced it had re-established a navy, which was disbanded in 1996; in March 2019 Ethiopia signed a defense cooperation agreement with France which stipulated that France would support the establishment of an Ethiopian navy, which will reportedly be based out of DjiboutiThe government has invested in the agriculture sector because three-quarters of the population depends on the sector for its livelihood and agriculture provides for about one-third of GDP, making The Gambia largely reliant on sufficient rainfall. The agricultural sector has untapped potential - less than half of arable land is cultivated and agricultural productivity is low. Small-scale manufacturing activity features the processing of cashews, groundnuts, fish, and hides. The Gambia's reexport trade accounts for almost 80% of goods exports and China has been its largest trade partner for both exports and imports for several years.
The Gambia has sparse natural resource deposits. It relies heavily on remittances from workers overseas and tourist receipts. Remittance inflows to The Gambia amount to about one-fifth of the country’s GDP. The Gambia's location on the ocean and proximity to Europe has made it one of the most frequented tourist destinations in West Africa, boosted by private sector investments in eco-tourism and facilities. Tourism normally brings in about 20% of GDP, but it suffered in 2014 from tourists’ fears of Ebola virus in neighboring West African countries. Unemployment and underemployment remain high.
Economic progress depends on sustained bilateral and multilateral aid, on responsible government economic management, and on continued technical assistance from multilateral and bilateral donors. International donors and lenders were concerned about the quality of fiscal management under the administration of former President Yahya JAMMEH, who reportedly stole hundreds of millions of dollars of the country’s funds during his 22 years in power, but anticipate significant improvements under the new administration of President Adama BARROW, who assumed power in early 2017. As of April 2017, the IMF, the World Bank, the European Union, and the African Development Bank were all negotiating with the new government of The Gambia to provide financial support in the coming months to ease the country’s financial crisis.
The country faces a limited availability of foreign exchange, weak agricultural output, a border closure with Senegal, a slowdown in tourism, high inflation, a large fiscal deficit, and a high domestic debt burden that has crowded out private sector investment and driven interest rates to new highs. The government has committed to taking steps to reduce the deficit, including through expenditure caps, debt consolidation, and reform of state-owned enterprises.
" + "text": "The government has invested in the agriculture sector because three-quarters of the population depends on the sector for its livelihood and agriculture provides for about one-third of GDP, making The Gambia largely reliant on sufficient rainfall. The agricultural sector has untapped potential - less than half of arable land is cultivated and agricultural productivity is low. Small-scale manufacturing activity features the processing of cashews, groundnuts, fish, and hides. The Gambia's reexport trade accounts for almost 80% of goods exports and China has been its largest trade partner for both exports and imports for several years.
The Gambia has sparse natural resource deposits. It relies heavily on remittances from workers overseas and tourist receipts. Remittance inflows to The Gambia amount to about one-fifth of the country’s GDP. The Gambia's location on the ocean and proximity to Europe has made it one of the most frequented tourist destinations in West Africa, boosted by private sector investments in eco-tourism and facilities. Tourism normally brings in about 20% of GDP, but it suffered in 2014 from tourists’ fears of Ebola virus in neighboring West African countries. Unemployment and underemployment remain high.
Economic progress depends on sustained bilateral and multilateral aid, on responsible government economic management, and on continued technical assistance from multilateral and bilateral donors. International donors and lenders were concerned about the quality of fiscal management under the administration of former President Yahya JAMMEH, who reportedly stole hundreds of millions of dollars of the country’s funds during his 22 years in power, but anticipate significant improvements under the new administration of President Adama BARROW, who assumed power in early 2017. As of April 2017, the IMF, the World Bank, the European Union, and the African Development Bank were all negotiating with the new government of The Gambia to provide financial support in the coming months to ease the country’s financial crisis.
The country faces a limited availability of foreign exchange, weak agricultural output, a border closure with Senegal, a slowdown in tourism, high inflation, a large fiscal deficit, and a high domestic debt burden that has crowded out private sector investment and driven interest rates to new highs. The government has committed to taking steps to reduce the deficit, including through expenditure caps, debt consolidation, and reform of state-owned enterprises.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -995,10 +995,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "44,000 (2018)" + "text": "60,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.93 (2018 est.)" + "text": "2 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1037,10 +1037,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "5,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "5,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.21 (2021 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0.21 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1105,6 +1105,9 @@ "text": "Gambia Armed Forces: the Gambian National Army (GNA; includes a small air wing), Navy, Republican National Guard (responsible for VIP protection, riot control, and presidential security) (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "0.8% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "0.8% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1116,9 +1119,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "0.7% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $20 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "0.8% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $20 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/gb.json b/africa/gb.json index e9109916..67b09e73 100644 --- a/africa/gb.json +++ b/africa/gb.json @@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Gabon enjoys a per capita income four times that of most Sub-Saharan African nations, but because of high income inequality, a large proportion of the population remains poor. Gabon relied on timber and manganese exports until oil was discovered offshore in the early 1970s. From 2010 to 2016, oil accounted for approximately 80% of Gabon’s exports, 45% of its GDP, and 60% of its state budget revenues.
Gabon faces fluctuating international prices for its oil, timber, and manganese exports. A rebound of oil prices from 2001 to 2013 helped growth, but declining production, as some fields passed their peak production, has hampered Gabon from fully realizing potential gains. GDP grew nearly 6% per year over the 2010-14 period, but slowed significantly from 2014 to just 1% in 2017 as oil prices declined. Low oil prices also weakened government revenue and negatively affected the trade and current account balances. In the wake of lower revenue, Gabon signed a 3-year agreement with the IMF in June 2017.
Despite an abundance of natural wealth, poor fiscal management and over-reliance on oil has stifled the economy. Power cuts and water shortages are frequent. Gabon is reliant on imports and the government heavily subsidizes commodities, including food, but will be hard pressed to tamp down public frustration with unemployment and corruption.
" + "text": "Gabon enjoys a per capita income four times that of most Sub-Saharan African nations, but because of high income inequality, a large proportion of the population remains poor. Gabon relied on timber and manganese exports until oil was discovered offshore in the early 1970s. From 2010 to 2016, oil accounted for approximately 80% of Gabon’s exports, 45% of its GDP, and 60% of its state budget revenues.
Gabon faces fluctuating international prices for its oil, timber, and manganese exports. A rebound of oil prices from 2001 to 2013 helped growth, but declining production, as some fields passed their peak production, has hampered Gabon from fully realizing potential gains. GDP grew nearly 6% per year over the 2010-14 period, but slowed significantly from 2014 to just 1% in 2017 as oil prices declined. Low oil prices also weakened government revenue and negatively affected the trade and current account balances. In the wake of lower revenue, Gabon signed a 3-year agreement with the IMF in June 2017.
Despite an abundance of natural wealth, poor fiscal management and over-reliance on oil has stifled the economy. Power cuts and water shortages are frequent. Gabon is reliant on imports and the government heavily subsidizes commodities, including food, but will be hard pressed to tamp down public frustration with unemployment and corruption.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -978,10 +978,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "25,428 (2020)" + "text": "25,428 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.14 (2020 est.)" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1020,10 +1020,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "44,607 (2021)" + "text": "44,607 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "2 (2021)" + "text": "2 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1125,6 +1125,9 @@ "text": "Gabonese Defense Forces (Forces de Defense Gabonaise): Land Forces (Army), Navy, Air Forces, National Gendarmerie; Republican Guard (land forces under direct presidential control) (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.7% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.8% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1136,9 +1139,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.8% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $480 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.5% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $400 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/gh.json b/africa/gh.json index eb75a4e1..f37e6352 100644 --- a/africa/gh.json +++ b/africa/gh.json @@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Ghana has a market-based economy with relatively few policy barriers to trade and investment in comparison with other countries in the region, and Ghana is endowed with natural resources. Ghana's economy was strengthened by a quarter century of relatively sound management, a competitive business environment, and sustained reductions in poverty levels, but in recent years has suffered the consequences of loose fiscal policy, high budget and current account deficits, and a depreciating currency.
Agriculture accounts for about 20% of GDP and employs more than half of the workforce, mainly small landholders. Gold, oil, and cocoa exports, and individual remittances, are major sources of foreign exchange. Expansion of Ghana’s nascent oil industry has boosted economic growth, but the fall in oil prices since 2015 reduced by half Ghana’s oil revenue. Production at Jubilee, Ghana's first commercial offshore oilfield, began in mid-December 2010. Production from two more fields, TEN and Sankofa, started in 2016 and 2017 respectively. The country’s first gas processing plant at Atuabo is also producing natural gas from the Jubilee field, providing power to several of Ghana’s thermal power plants.
As of 2018, key economic concerns facing the government include the lack of affordable electricity, lack of a solid domestic revenue base, and the high debt burden. The AKUFO-ADDO administration has made some progress by committing to fiscal consolidation, but much work is still to be done. Ghana signed a $920 million extended credit facility with the IMF in April 2015 to help it address its growing economic crisis. The IMF fiscal targets require Ghana to reduce the deficit by cutting subsidies, decreasing the bloated public sector wage bill, strengthening revenue administration, boosting tax revenues, and improving the health of Ghana’s banking sector. Priorities for the new administration include rescheduling some of Ghana’s $31 billion debt, stimulating economic growth, reducing inflation, and stabilizing the currency. Prospects for new oil and gas production and follow through on tighter fiscal management are likely to help Ghana’s economy in 2018.
" + "text": "Ghana has a market-based economy with relatively few policy barriers to trade and investment in comparison with other countries in the region, and Ghana is endowed with natural resources. Ghana's economy was strengthened by a quarter century of relatively sound management, a competitive business environment, and sustained reductions in poverty levels, but in recent years has suffered the consequences of loose fiscal policy, high budget and current account deficits, and a depreciating currency.
Agriculture accounts for about 20% of GDP and employs more than half of the workforce, mainly small landholders. Gold, oil, and cocoa exports, and individual remittances, are major sources of foreign exchange. Expansion of Ghana’s nascent oil industry has boosted economic growth, but the fall in oil prices since 2015 reduced by half Ghana’s oil revenue. Production at Jubilee, Ghana's first commercial offshore oilfield, began in mid-December 2010. Production from two more fields, TEN and Sankofa, started in 2016 and 2017 respectively. The country’s first gas processing plant at Atuabo is also producing natural gas from the Jubilee field, providing power to several of Ghana’s thermal power plants.
As of 2018, key economic concerns facing the government include the lack of affordable electricity, lack of a solid domestic revenue base, and the high debt burden. The AKUFO-ADDO administration has made some progress by committing to fiscal consolidation, but much work is still to be done. Ghana signed a $920 million extended credit facility with the IMF in April 2015 to help it address its growing economic crisis. The IMF fiscal targets require Ghana to reduce the deficit by cutting subsidies, decreasing the bloated public sector wage bill, strengthening revenue administration, boosting tax revenues, and improving the health of Ghana’s banking sector. Priorities for the new administration include rescheduling some of Ghana’s $31 billion debt, stimulating economic growth, reducing inflation, and stabilizing the currency. Prospects for new oil and gas production and follow through on tighter fiscal management are likely to help Ghana’s economy in 2018.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1028,10 +1028,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "307,668 (2020)" + "text": "307,668 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1070,10 +1070,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "78,371 (2021) Total fixed broadband subscriptions from Vodafone 62,284; AirtelTigo 700; MTN 14,038; Mainone 111; Simba Fibre 41; K-Net 310; Tizeti 810; Sactis Ghana 45; Orange business 22; Vodafone" + "text": "78,371 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.25 (2021 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0.25 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1169,20 +1169,20 @@ "text": "Ghana Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "0.5% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "0.4% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2019": { - "text": "0.4% of GDP (2019) (approximately $360 million)" + "text": "0.4% of GDP (2019 est.) (approximately $360 million)" }, "Military Expenditures 2018": { - "text": "0.3% of GDP (2018) (approximately $330 million)" + "text": "0.3% of GDP (2018 est.) (approximately $330 million)" }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { - "text": "0.3% of GDP (2017) (approximately $300 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "0.3% of GDP (2016) (approximately $300 million)" + "text": "0.3% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $300 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/gv.json b/africa/gv.json index 89841f09..5dcf3411 100644 --- a/africa/gv.json +++ b/africa/gv.json @@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Guinea is a poor country of approximately 12.9 million people in 2016 that possesses the world's largest reserves of bauxite and largest untapped high-grade iron ore reserves, as well as gold and diamonds. In addition, Guinea has fertile soil, ample rainfall, and is the source of several West African rivers, including the Senegal, Niger, and Gambia. Guinea's hydro potential is enormous and the country could be a major exporter of electricity. The country also has tremendous agriculture potential. Gold, bauxite, and diamonds are Guinea’s main exports. International investors have shown interest in Guinea's unexplored mineral reserves, which have the potential to propel Guinea's future growth.
Following the death of long-term President Lansana CONTE in 2008 and the coup that followed, international donors, including the G-8, the IMF, and the World Bank, significantly curtailed their development programs in Guinea. However, the IMF approved a 3-year Extended Credit Facility arrangement in 2012, following the December 2010 presidential elections. In September 2012, Guinea achieved Heavily Indebted Poor Countries completion point status. Future access to international assistance and investment will depend on the government’s ability to be transparent, combat corruption, reform its banking system, improve its business environment, and build infrastructure. In April 2013, the government amended its mining code to reduce taxes and royalties. In 2014, Guinea complied with requirements of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative by publishing its mining contracts. Guinea completed its program with the IMF in October 2016 even though some targeted reforms have been delayed. Currently Guinea is negotiating a new IMF program which will be based on Guinea’s new five-year economic plan, focusing on the development of higher value-added products, including from the agro-business sector and development of the rural economy.
Political instability, a reintroduction of the Ebola virus epidemic, low international commodity prices, and an enduring legacy of corruption, inefficiency, and lack of government transparency are factors that could impact Guinea’s future growth. Economic recovery will be a long process while the government adjusts to lower inflows of international donor aid following the surge of Ebola-related emergency support. Ebola stalled promising economic growth in the 2014-15 period and impeded several projects, such as offshore oil exploration and the Simandou iron ore project. The economy, however, grew by 6.6% in 2016 and 6.7% in 2017, mainly due to growth from bauxite mining and thermal energy generation as well as the resiliency of the agricultural sector. The 240-megawatt Kaleta Dam, inaugurated in September 2015, has expanded access to electricity for residents of Conakry. An combined with fears of Ebola virus, continue to undermine Guinea's economic viability.
Guinea’s iron ore industry took a hit in 2016 when investors in the Simandou iron ore project announced plans to divest from the project. In 2017, agriculture output and public investment boosted economic growth, while the mining sector continued to play a prominent role in economic performance.
Successive governments have failed to address the country's crumbling infrastructure. Guinea suffers from chronic electricity shortages; poor roads, rail lines and bridges; and a lack of access to clean water - all of which continue to plague economic development. The present government, led by President Alpha CONDE, is working to create an environment to attract foreign investment and hopes to have greater participation from western countries and firms in Guinea's economic development.
" + "text": "Guinea is a poor country of approximately 12.9 million people in 2016 that possesses the world's largest reserves of bauxite and largest untapped high-grade iron ore reserves, as well as gold and diamonds. In addition, Guinea has fertile soil, ample rainfall, and is the source of several West African rivers, including the Senegal, Niger, and Gambia. Guinea's hydro potential is enormous and the country could be a major exporter of electricity. The country also has tremendous agriculture potential. Gold, bauxite, and diamonds are Guinea’s main exports. International investors have shown interest in Guinea's unexplored mineral reserves, which have the potential to propel Guinea's future growth.
Following the death of long-term President Lansana CONTE in 2008 and the coup that followed, international donors, including the G-8, the IMF, and the World Bank, significantly curtailed their development programs in Guinea. However, the IMF approved a 3-year Extended Credit Facility arrangement in 2012, following the December 2010 presidential elections. In September 2012, Guinea achieved Heavily Indebted Poor Countries completion point status. Future access to international assistance and investment will depend on the government’s ability to be transparent, combat corruption, reform its banking system, improve its business environment, and build infrastructure. In April 2013, the government amended its mining code to reduce taxes and royalties. In 2014, Guinea complied with requirements of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative by publishing its mining contracts. Guinea completed its program with the IMF in October 2016 even though some targeted reforms have been delayed. Currently Guinea is negotiating a new IMF program which will be based on Guinea’s new five-year economic plan, focusing on the development of higher value-added products, including from the agro-business sector and development of the rural economy.
Political instability, a reintroduction of the Ebola virus epidemic, low international commodity prices, and an enduring legacy of corruption, inefficiency, and lack of government transparency are factors that could impact Guinea’s future growth. Economic recovery will be a long process while the government adjusts to lower inflows of international donor aid following the surge of Ebola-related emergency support. Ebola stalled promising economic growth in the 2014-15 period and impeded several projects, such as offshore oil exploration and the Simandou iron ore project. The economy, however, grew by 6.6% in 2016 and 6.7% in 2017, mainly due to growth from bauxite mining and thermal energy generation as well as the resiliency of the agricultural sector. The 240-megawatt Kaleta Dam, inaugurated in September 2015, has expanded access to electricity for residents of Conakry. An combined with fears of Ebola virus, continue to undermine Guinea's economic viability.
Guinea’s iron ore industry took a hit in 2016 when investors in the Simandou iron ore project announced plans to divest from the project. In 2017, agriculture output and public investment boosted economic growth, while the mining sector continued to play a prominent role in economic performance.
Successive governments have failed to address the country's crumbling infrastructure. Guinea suffers from chronic electricity shortages; poor roads, rail lines and bridges; and a lack of access to clean water - all of which continue to plague economic development. The present government, led by President Alpha CONDE, is working to create an environment to attract foreign investment and hopes to have greater participation from western countries and firms in Guinea's economic development.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1032,7 +1032,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "0 (2018)" + "text": "0 (2018 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "0 (2018 est.)" @@ -1074,10 +1074,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "1,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.01 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.01 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1160,6 +1160,9 @@ "note": "note - the National Gendarmerie is overseen by the Ministry of Defense, while the National Police is under the Ministry of Security; the Gendarmerie and National Police share responsibility for internal security, but only the Gendarmerie can arrest police or military officials" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.5% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.4% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1171,9 +1174,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.8% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $260 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.9% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $240 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/iv.json b/africa/iv.json index c5609ff8..5854b252 100644 --- a/africa/iv.json +++ b/africa/iv.json @@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "For the last 5 years Cote d'Ivoire's growth rate has been among the highest in the world. Cote d'Ivoire is heavily dependent on agriculture and related activities, which engage roughly two-thirds of the population. Cote d'Ivoire is the world's largest producer and exporter of cocoa beans and a significant producer and exporter of coffee and palm oil. Consequently, the economy is highly sensitive to fluctuations in international prices for these products and to climatic conditions. Cocoa, oil, and coffee are the country's top export revenue earners, but the country has targeted agricultural processing of cocoa, cashews, mangoes, and other commodities as a high priority. Mining gold and exporting electricity are growing industries outside agriculture.
Following the end of more than a decade of civil conflict in 2011, Cote d’Ivoire has experienced a boom in foreign investment and economic growth. In June 2012, the IMF and the World Bank announced $4.4 billion in debt relief for Cote d'Ivoire under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.
" + "text": "For the last 5 years Cote d'Ivoire's growth rate has been among the highest in the world. Cote d'Ivoire is heavily dependent on agriculture and related activities, which engage roughly two-thirds of the population. Cote d'Ivoire is the world's largest producer and exporter of cocoa beans and a significant producer and exporter of coffee and palm oil. Consequently, the economy is highly sensitive to fluctuations in international prices for these products and to climatic conditions. Cocoa, oil, and coffee are the country's top export revenue earners, but the country has targeted agricultural processing of cocoa, cashews, mangoes, and other commodities as a high priority. Mining gold and exporting electricity are growing industries outside agriculture.
Following the end of more than a decade of civil conflict in 2011, Cote d’Ivoire has experienced a boom in foreign investment and economic growth. In June 2012, the IMF and the World Bank announced $4.4 billion in debt relief for Cote d'Ivoire under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1032,7 +1032,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "264,073 (2020)" + "text": "264,073 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "1 (2020 est.)" @@ -1074,10 +1074,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "260,097 (2021)" + "text": "260,097 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.99 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.99 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1184,6 +1184,9 @@ "text": "Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (Forces Armees de Cote d'Ivoire, FACI; aka Republican Forces of Ivory Coast, FRCI): Army (Armee de Terre), Navy (Marine Nationale), Cote Air Force (Force Aerienne Cote), Special Forces (Forces Speciale); National Gendarmerie (under the Ministry of Defense); National Police (under the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection); Coordination Center for Operational Decisions (a mix of police, gendarmerie, and FACI personnel for assisting police in providing security in some large cities) (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.1% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.1% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1195,9 +1198,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.1% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $720 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.2% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $720 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/ke.json b/africa/ke.json index 53e9e948..cedb6028 100644 --- a/africa/ke.json +++ b/africa/ke.json @@ -701,7 +701,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Kenya is the economic, financial, and transport hub of East Africa. Kenya’s real GDP growth has averaged over 5% for the last decade. Since 2014, Kenya has been ranked as a lower middle income country because its per capita GDP crossed a World Bank threshold. While Kenya has a growing entrepreneurial middle class and steady growth, its economic development has been impaired by weak governance and corruption. Although reliable numbers are hard to find, unemployment and under-employment are extremely high, and could be near 40% of the population. In 2013, the country adopted a devolved system of government with the creation of 47 counties, and is in the process of devolving state revenues and responsibilities to the counties.
Agriculture remains the backbone of the Kenyan economy, contributing one-third of GDP. About 75% of Kenya’s population of roughly 48.5 million work at least part-time in the agricultural sector, including livestock and pastoral activities. Over 75% of agricultural output is from small-scale, rain-fed farming or livestock production. Tourism also holds a significant place in Kenya’s economy. In spite of political turmoil throughout the second half of 2017, tourism was up 20%, showcasing the strength of this sector. Kenya has long been a target of terrorist activity and has struggled with instability along its northeastern borders. Some high visibility terrorist attacks during 2013-2015 (e.g., at Nairobi’s Westgate Mall and Garissa University) affected the tourism industry severely, but the sector rebounded strongly in 2016-2017 and appears poised to continue growing.
Inadequate infrastructure continues to hamper Kenya’s efforts to improve its annual growth so that it can meaningfully address poverty and unemployment. The KENYATTA administration has been successful in courting external investment for infrastructure development. International financial institutions and donors remain important to Kenya's growth and development, but Kenya has also successfully raised capital in the global bond market issuing its first sovereign bond offering in mid-2014, with a second occurring in February 2018. The first phase of a Chinese-financed and constructed standard gauge railway connecting Mombasa and Nairobi opened in May 2017.
In 2016 the government was forced to take over three small and undercapitalized banks when underlying weaknesses were exposed. The government also enacted legislation that limits interest rates banks can charge on loans and set a rate that banks must pay their depositors. This measure led to a sharp shrinkage of credit in the economy. A prolonged election cycle in 2017 hurt the economy, drained government resources, and slowed GDP growth. Drought-like conditions in parts of the country pushed 2017 inflation above 8%, but the rate had fallen to 4.5% in February 2018.
The economy, however, is well placed to resume its decade-long 5%-6% growth rate. While fiscal deficits continue to pose risks in the medium term, other economic indicators, including foreign exchange reserves, interest rates, current account deficits, remittances and FDI are positive. The credit and drought-related impediments were temporary. Now In his second term, President KENYATTA has pledged to make economic growth and development a centerpiece of his second administration, focusing on his \"Big Four\" initiatives of universal healthcare, food security, affordable housing, and expansion of manufacturing.
" + "text": "Kenya is the economic, financial, and transport hub of East Africa. Kenya’s real GDP growth has averaged over 5% for the last decade. Since 2014, Kenya has been ranked as a lower middle income country because its per capita GDP crossed a World Bank threshold. While Kenya has a growing entrepreneurial middle class and steady growth, its economic development has been impaired by weak governance and corruption. Although reliable numbers are hard to find, unemployment and under-employment are extremely high, and could be near 40% of the population. In 2013, the country adopted a devolved system of government with the creation of 47 counties, and is in the process of devolving state revenues and responsibilities to the counties.
Agriculture remains the backbone of the Kenyan economy, contributing one-third of GDP. About 75% of Kenya’s population of roughly 48.5 million work at least part-time in the agricultural sector, including livestock and pastoral activities. Over 75% of agricultural output is from small-scale, rain-fed farming or livestock production. Tourism also holds a significant place in Kenya’s economy. In spite of political turmoil throughout the second half of 2017, tourism was up 20%, showcasing the strength of this sector. Kenya has long been a target of terrorist activity and has struggled with instability along its northeastern borders. Some high visibility terrorist attacks during 2013-2015 (e.g., at Nairobi’s Westgate Mall and Garissa University) affected the tourism industry severely, but the sector rebounded strongly in 2016-2017 and appears poised to continue growing.
Inadequate infrastructure continues to hamper Kenya’s efforts to improve its annual growth so that it can meaningfully address poverty and unemployment. The KENYATTA administration has been successful in courting external investment for infrastructure development. International financial institutions and donors remain important to Kenya's growth and development, but Kenya has also successfully raised capital in the global bond market issuing its first sovereign bond offering in mid-2014, with a second occurring in February 2018. The first phase of a Chinese-financed and constructed standard gauge railway connecting Mombasa and Nairobi opened in May 2017.
In 2016 the government was forced to take over three small and undercapitalized banks when underlying weaknesses were exposed. The government also enacted legislation that limits interest rates banks can charge on loans and set a rate that banks must pay their depositors. This measure led to a sharp shrinkage of credit in the economy. A prolonged election cycle in 2017 hurt the economy, drained government resources, and slowed GDP growth. Drought-like conditions in parts of the country pushed 2017 inflation above 8%, but the rate had fallen to 4.5% in February 2018.
The economy, however, is well placed to resume its decade-long 5%-6% growth rate. While fiscal deficits continue to pose risks in the medium term, other economic indicators, including foreign exchange reserves, interest rates, current account deficits, remittances and FDI are positive. The credit and drought-related impediments were temporary. Now In his second term, President KENYATTA has pledged to make economic growth and development a centerpiece of his second administration, focusing on his \"Big Four\" initiatives of universal healthcare, food security, affordable housing, and expansion of manufacturing.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1041,10 +1041,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "66,646 (2020)" + "text": "66,646 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1080,10 +1080,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "674,191 (2021)" + "text": "674,191 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.25 (2021)" + "text": "1.3 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1195,8 +1195,11 @@ "note": "note - the National Police Service maintains internal security and reports to the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government; it includes a paramilitary General Service Unit; the Kenya Coast Guard Service (established 2018) is under the Ministry of Interior, but led by a military officer and comprised of personnel from the military, as well as the National Police Service, intelligence services, and other government agencies" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.2% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { - "text": "1.2% of GDP (2020)" + "text": "1.2% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2019": { "text": "1.2% of GDP (2019) (approximately $1.21 billion)" @@ -1206,9 +1209,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.4% of GDP (2017) (approximately $1.19 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.4% of GDP (2016) (approximately $1.16 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/li.json b/africa/li.json index 49529ba9..b792d231 100644 --- a/africa/li.json +++ b/africa/li.json @@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Liberia is a low-income country that relies heavily on foreign assistance and remittances from the diaspora. It is richly endowed with water, mineral resources, forests, and a climate favorable to agriculture. Its principal exports are iron ore, rubber, diamonds, and gold. Palm oil and cocoa are emerging as new export products. The government has attempted to revive raw timber extraction and is encouraging oil exploration.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, civil war and government mismanagement destroyed much of Liberia's economy, especially infrastructure in and around the capital. Much of the conflict was fueled by control over Liberia’s natural resources. With the conclusion of fighting and the installation of a democratically elected government in 2006, businesses that had fled the country began to return. The country achieved high growth during the period 2010-13 due to favorable world prices for its commodities. However, during the 2014-2015 Ebola crisis, the economy declined and many foreign-owned businesses departed with their capital and expertise. The epidemic forced the government to divert scarce resources to combat the spread of the virus, reducing funds available for needed public investment. The cost of addressing the Ebola epidemic coincided with decreased economic activity reducing government revenue, although higher donor support significantly offset this loss. During the same period, global commodities prices for key exports fell and have yet to recover to pre-Ebola levels.
In 2017, gold was a key driver of growth, as a new mining project began its first full year of production; iron ore exports are also increased as Arcelor Mittal opened new mines at Mount Gangra. The completion of the rehabilitation of the Mount Coffee Hydroelectric Dam increased electricity production to support ongoing and future economic activity, although electricity tariffs remain high relative to other countries in the region and transmission infrastructure is limited. Presidential and legislative elections in October 2017 generated election-related spending pressures.
Revitalizing the economy in the future will depend on economic diversification, increasing investment and trade, higher global commodity prices, sustained foreign aid and remittances, development of infrastructure and institutions, combating corruption, and maintaining political stability and security.
" + "text": "Liberia is a low-income country that relies heavily on foreign assistance and remittances from the diaspora. It is richly endowed with water, mineral resources, forests, and a climate favorable to agriculture. Its principal exports are iron ore, rubber, diamonds, and gold. Palm oil and cocoa are emerging as new export products. The government has attempted to revive raw timber extraction and is encouraging oil exploration.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, civil war and government mismanagement destroyed much of Liberia's economy, especially infrastructure in and around the capital. Much of the conflict was fueled by control over Liberia’s natural resources. With the conclusion of fighting and the installation of a democratically elected government in 2006, businesses that had fled the country began to return. The country achieved high growth during the period 2010-13 due to favorable world prices for its commodities. However, during the 2014-2015 Ebola crisis, the economy declined and many foreign-owned businesses departed with their capital and expertise. The epidemic forced the government to divert scarce resources to combat the spread of the virus, reducing funds available for needed public investment. The cost of addressing the Ebola epidemic coincided with decreased economic activity reducing government revenue, although higher donor support significantly offset this loss. During the same period, global commodities prices for key exports fell and have yet to recover to pre-Ebola levels.
In 2017, gold was a key driver of growth, as a new mining project began its first full year of production; iron ore exports are also increased as Arcelor Mittal opened new mines at Mount Gangra. The completion of the rehabilitation of the Mount Coffee Hydroelectric Dam increased electricity production to support ongoing and future economic activity, although electricity tariffs remain high relative to other countries in the region and transmission infrastructure is limited. Presidential and legislative elections in October 2017 generated election-related spending pressures.
Revitalizing the economy in the future will depend on economic diversification, increasing investment and trade, higher global commodity prices, sustained foreign aid and remittances, development of infrastructure and institutions, combating corruption, and maintaining political stability and security.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -977,10 +977,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "8,000 (2018)" + "text": "6,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2018 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1019,10 +1019,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "13,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "13,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.26 (2021 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0.26 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1106,6 +1106,9 @@ "note": "note(s) - the AFL Air Wing was previously disbanded in 2005 and has been under development since 2019; the Liberian National Police and the Liberian Drug Enforcement Agency are under the Ministry of Justice" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "0.7% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "0.5% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1117,9 +1120,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "0.4% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $19 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "0.4% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $18 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/lt.json b/africa/lt.json index 9c4e1ea0..c0455b05 100644 --- a/africa/lt.json +++ b/africa/lt.json @@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Small, mountainous, and completely landlocked by South Africa, Lesotho depends on a narrow economic base of textile manufacturing, agriculture, remittances, and regional customs revenue. About three-fourths of the people live in rural areas and engage in animal herding and subsistence agriculture, although Lesotho produces less than 20% of the nation's demand for food. Agriculture is vulnerable to weather and climate variability.
Lesotho relies on South Africa for much of its economic activity; Lesotho imports 85% of the goods it consumes from South Africa, including most agricultural inputs. Households depend heavily on remittances from family members working in South Africa in mines, on farms, and as domestic workers, though mining employment has declined substantially since the 1990s. Lesotho is a member of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), and revenues from SACU accounted for roughly 26% of total GDP in 2016; however, SACU revenues are volatile and expected to decline over the next 5 years. Lesotho also gains royalties from the South African Government for water transferred to South Africa from a dam and reservoir system in Lesotho. However, the government continues to strengthen its tax system to reduce dependency on customs duties and other transfers.
The government maintains a large presence in the economy - government consumption accounted for about 26% of GDP in 2017. The government remains Lesotho's largest employer; in 2016, the government wage bill rose to 23% of GDP – the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Lesotho's largest private employer is the textile and garment industry - approximately 36,000 Basotho, mainly women, work in factories producing garments for export to South Africa and the US. Diamond mining in Lesotho has grown in recent years and accounted for nearly 35% of total exports in 2015. Lesotho managed steady GDP growth at an average of 4.5% from 2010 to 2014, dropping to about 2.5% in 2015-16, but poverty remains widespread around 57% of the total population.
" + "text": "Small, mountainous, and completely landlocked by South Africa, Lesotho depends on a narrow economic base of textile manufacturing, agriculture, remittances, and regional customs revenue. About three-fourths of the people live in rural areas and engage in animal herding and subsistence agriculture, although Lesotho produces less than 20% of the nation's demand for food. Agriculture is vulnerable to weather and climate variability.
Lesotho relies on South Africa for much of its economic activity; Lesotho imports 85% of the goods it consumes from South Africa, including most agricultural inputs. Households depend heavily on remittances from family members working in South Africa in mines, on farms, and as domestic workers, though mining employment has declined substantially since the 1990s. Lesotho is a member of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), and revenues from SACU accounted for roughly 26% of total GDP in 2016; however, SACU revenues are volatile and expected to decline over the next 5 years. Lesotho also gains royalties from the South African Government for water transferred to South Africa from a dam and reservoir system in Lesotho. However, the government continues to strengthen its tax system to reduce dependency on customs duties and other transfers.
The government maintains a large presence in the economy - government consumption accounted for about 26% of GDP in 2017. The government remains Lesotho's largest employer; in 2016, the government wage bill rose to 23% of GDP – the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Lesotho's largest private employer is the textile and garment industry - approximately 36,000 Basotho, mainly women, work in factories producing garments for export to South Africa and the US. Diamond mining in Lesotho has grown in recent years and accounted for nearly 35% of total exports in 2015. Lesotho managed steady GDP growth at an average of 4.5% from 2010 to 2014, dropping to about 2.5% in 2015-16, but poverty remains widespread around 57% of the total population.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -991,10 +991,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "11,574 (2020)" + "text": "11,574 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1033,10 +1033,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "5,060 (2021)" + "text": "5,060 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.24 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.24 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1092,6 +1092,9 @@ "note": "note - the Lesotho Mounted Police Service is responsible for internal security and reports to the Minister of Police and Public Safety" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.5% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.6% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1103,9 +1106,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "2.2% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $70 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.9% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $65 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/ly.json b/africa/ly.json index 1085e82e..649ddb6f 100644 --- a/africa/ly.json +++ b/africa/ly.json @@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Libya's economy, almost entirely dependent on oil and gas exports, has struggled since 2014 given security and political instability, disruptions in oil production, and decline in global oil prices. The Libyan dinar has lost much of its value since 2014 and the resulting gap between official and black market exchange rates has spurred the growth of a shadow economy and contributed to inflation. The country suffers from widespread power outages, caused by shortages of fuel for power generation. Living conditions, including access to clean drinking water, medical services, and safe housing have all declined since 2011. Oil production in 2017 reached a five-year high, driving GDP growth, with daily average production rising to 879,000 barrels per day. However, oil production levels remain below the average pre-Revolution highs of 1.6 million barrels per day.
The Central Bank of Libya continued to pay government salaries to a majority of the Libyan workforce and to fund subsidies for fuel and food, resulting in an estimated budget deficit of about 17% of GDP in 2017. Low consumer confidence in the banking sector and the economy as a whole has driven a severe liquidity shortage.
" + "text": "Libya's economy, almost entirely dependent on oil and gas exports, has struggled since 2014 given security and political instability, disruptions in oil production, and decline in global oil prices. The Libyan dinar has lost much of its value since 2014 and the resulting gap between official and black market exchange rates has spurred the growth of a shadow economy and contributed to inflation. The country suffers from widespread power outages, caused by shortages of fuel for power generation. Living conditions, including access to clean drinking water, medical services, and safe housing have all declined since 2011. Oil production in 2017 reached a five-year high, driving GDP growth, with daily average production rising to 879,000 barrels per day. However, oil production levels remain below the average pre-Revolution highs of 1.6 million barrels per day.
The Central Bank of Libya continued to pay government salaries to a majority of the Libyan workforce and to fund subsidies for fuel and food, resulting in an estimated budget deficit of about 17% of GDP in 2017. Low consumer confidence in the banking sector and the economy as a whole has driven a severe liquidity shortage.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -922,10 +922,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1.576 million (2018)" + "text": "1.576 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "23.95 (2018 est.)" + "text": "23 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -964,10 +964,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "33,200 (2021 est.)" + "text": "332,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "4.83 (2021 est.)" + "text": "5 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/africa/ma.json b/africa/ma.json index 22fbf9ed..a4625825 100644 --- a/africa/ma.json +++ b/africa/ma.json @@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Madagascar is a mostly unregulated economy with many untapped natural resources, but no capital markets, a weak judicial system, poorly enforced contracts, and rampant government corruption. The country faces challenges to improve education, healthcare, and the environment to boost long-term economic growth. Agriculture, including fishing and forestry, is a mainstay of the economy, accounting for more than one-fourth of GDP and employing roughly 80% of the population. Deforestation and erosion, aggravated by bushfires, slash-and-burn clearing techniques, and the use of firewood as the primary source of fuel, are serious concerns to the agriculture dependent economy.
After discarding socialist economic policies in the mid-1990s, Madagascar followed a World Bank- and IMF-led policy of privatization and liberalization until a 2009 coup d’état led many nations, including the United States, to suspend non-humanitarian aid until a democratically-elected president was inaugurated in 2014. The pre-coup strategy had placed the country on a slow and steady growth path from an extremely low starting point. Exports of apparel boomed after gaining duty-free access to the US market in 2000 under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); however, Madagascar's failure to comply with the requirements of the AGOA led to the termination of the country's duty-free access in January 2010, a sharp fall in textile production, a loss of more than 100,000 jobs, and a GDP drop of nearly 11%.
Madagascar regained AGOA access in January 2015 and ensuing growth has been slow and fragile. Madagascar produces around 80% of the world’s vanilla and its reliance on this commodity for most of its foreign exchange is a significant source of vulnerability. Economic reforms have been modest and the country’s financial sector remains weak, limiting the use of monetary policy to control inflation. An ongoing IMF program aims to strengthen financial and investment management capacity.
" + "text": "Madagascar is a mostly unregulated economy with many untapped natural resources, but no capital markets, a weak judicial system, poorly enforced contracts, and rampant government corruption. The country faces challenges to improve education, healthcare, and the environment to boost long-term economic growth. Agriculture, including fishing and forestry, is a mainstay of the economy, accounting for more than one-fourth of GDP and employing roughly 80% of the population. Deforestation and erosion, aggravated by bushfires, slash-and-burn clearing techniques, and the use of firewood as the primary source of fuel, are serious concerns to the agriculture dependent economy.
After discarding socialist economic policies in the mid-1990s, Madagascar followed a World Bank- and IMF-led policy of privatization and liberalization until a 2009 coup d’état led many nations, including the United States, to suspend non-humanitarian aid until a democratically-elected president was inaugurated in 2014. The pre-coup strategy had placed the country on a slow and steady growth path from an extremely low starting point. Exports of apparel boomed after gaining duty-free access to the US market in 2000 under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); however, Madagascar's failure to comply with the requirements of the AGOA led to the termination of the country's duty-free access in January 2010, a sharp fall in textile production, a loss of more than 100,000 jobs, and a GDP drop of nearly 11%.
Madagascar regained AGOA access in January 2015 and ensuing growth has been slow and fragile. Madagascar produces around 80% of the world’s vanilla and its reliance on this commodity for most of its foreign exchange is a significant source of vulnerability. Economic reforms have been modest and the country’s financial sector remains weak, limiting the use of monetary policy to control inflation. An ongoing IMF program aims to strengthen financial and investment management capacity.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1004,10 +1004,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "69,046 (2018)" + "text": "69,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2018 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1046,10 +1046,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "32,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "32,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.12 (2021 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0.12 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1146,6 +1146,9 @@ "note": "note - the National Gendarmerie is responsible for maintaining law and order in rural areas at the village level, protecting government facilities, and operating a maritime police contingent; the National Police is responsible for maintaining law and order in urban areas" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "0.7% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "0.7% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1157,9 +1160,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "0.5% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $120 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "0.5% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $120 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/mi.json b/africa/mi.json index d55ab745..20b4fa17 100644 --- a/africa/mi.json +++ b/africa/mi.json @@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Landlocked Malawi ranks among the world's least developed countries. The country’s economic performance has historically been constrained by policy inconsistency, macroeconomic instability, poor infrastructure, rampant corruption, high population growth, and poor health and education outcomes that limit labor productivity. The economy is predominately agricultural with about 80% of the population living in rural areas. Agriculture accounts for about one-third of GDP and 80% of export revenues. The performance of the tobacco sector is key to short-term growth as tobacco accounts for more than half of exports, although Malawi is looking to diversify away from tobacco to other cash crops.
The economy depends on substantial inflows of economic assistance from the IMF, the World Bank, and individual donor nations. Donors halted direct budget support from 2013 to 2016 because of concerns about corruption and fiscal carelessness, but the World Bank resumed budget support in May 2017. In 2006, Malawi was approved for relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program but recent increases in domestic borrowing mean that debt servicing in 2016 exceeded the levels prior to HIPC debt relief.
Heavily dependent on rain-fed agriculture, with corn being the staple crop, Malawi’s economy was hit hard by the El Nino-driven drought in 2015 and 2016, and now faces threat from the fall armyworm. The drought also slowed economic activity, led to two consecutive years of declining economic growth, and contributed to high inflation rates. Depressed food prices over 2017 led to a significant drop in inflation (from an average of 21.7% in 2016 to 12.3% in 2017), with a similar drop in interest rates.
" + "text": "Landlocked Malawi ranks among the world's least developed countries. The country’s economic performance has historically been constrained by policy inconsistency, macroeconomic instability, poor infrastructure, rampant corruption, high population growth, and poor health and education outcomes that limit labor productivity. The economy is predominately agricultural with about 80% of the population living in rural areas. Agriculture accounts for about one-third of GDP and 80% of export revenues. The performance of the tobacco sector is key to short-term growth as tobacco accounts for more than half of exports, although Malawi is looking to diversify away from tobacco to other cash crops.
The economy depends on substantial inflows of economic assistance from the IMF, the World Bank, and individual donor nations. Donors halted direct budget support from 2013 to 2016 because of concerns about corruption and fiscal carelessness, but the World Bank resumed budget support in May 2017. In 2006, Malawi was approved for relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program but recent increases in domestic borrowing mean that debt servicing in 2016 exceeded the levels prior to HIPC debt relief.
Heavily dependent on rain-fed agriculture, with corn being the staple crop, Malawi’s economy was hit hard by the El Nino-driven drought in 2015 and 2016, and now faces threat from the fall armyworm. The drought also slowed economic activity, led to two consecutive years of declining economic growth, and contributed to high inflation rates. Depressed food prices over 2017 led to a significant drop in inflation (from an average of 21.7% in 2016 to 12.3% in 2017), with a similar drop in interest rates.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1019,10 +1019,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "12,465 (2020)" + "text": "12,465 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1061,10 +1061,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "12,255 (2021)" + "text": "12,255 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.06 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.06 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1153,6 +1153,9 @@ "note": "note - the Malawi Police Service is under the Ministry of Homeland Security" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "0.9% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "0.9% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1164,9 +1167,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "0.7% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $60 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "0.6% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $50 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/ml.json b/africa/ml.json index 231b5b7d..5e55c6f5 100644 --- a/africa/ml.json +++ b/africa/ml.json @@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Among the 25 poorest countries in the world, landlocked Mali depends on gold mining and agricultural exports for revenue. The country's fiscal status fluctuates with gold and agricultural commodity prices and the harvest; cotton and gold exports make up around 80% of export earnings. Mali remains dependent on foreign aid.
Economic activity is largely confined to the riverine area irrigated by the Niger River; about 65% of Mali’s land area is desert or semidesert. About 10% of the population is nomadic and about 80% of the labor force is engaged in farming and fishing. Industrial activity is concentrated on processing farm commodities. The government subsidizes the production of cereals to decrease the country’s dependence on imported foodstuffs and to reduce its vulnerability to food price shocks.
Mali is developing its iron ore extraction industry to diversify foreign exchange earnings away from gold, but the pace will depend on global price trends. Although the political coup in 2012 slowed Mali’s growth, the economy has since bounced back, with GDP growth above 5% in 2014-17, although physical insecurity, high population growth, corruption, weak infrastructure, and low levels of human capital continue to constrain economic development. Higher rainfall helped to boost cotton output in 2017, and the country’s 2017 budget increased spending more than 10%, much of which was devoted to infrastructure and agriculture. Corruption and political turmoil are strong downside risks in 2018 and beyond.
" + "text": "Among the 25 poorest countries in the world, landlocked Mali depends on gold mining and agricultural exports for revenue. The country's fiscal status fluctuates with gold and agricultural commodity prices and the harvest; cotton and gold exports make up around 80% of export earnings. Mali remains dependent on foreign aid.
Economic activity is largely confined to the riverine area irrigated by the Niger River; about 65% of Mali’s land area is desert or semidesert. About 10% of the population is nomadic and about 80% of the labor force is engaged in farming and fishing. Industrial activity is concentrated on processing farm commodities. The government subsidizes the production of cereals to decrease the country’s dependence on imported foodstuffs and to reduce its vulnerability to food price shocks.
Mali is developing its iron ore extraction industry to diversify foreign exchange earnings away from gold, but the pace will depend on global price trends. Although the political coup in 2012 slowed Mali’s growth, the economy has since bounced back, with GDP growth above 5% in 2014-17, although physical insecurity, high population growth, corruption, weak infrastructure, and low levels of human capital continue to constrain economic development. Higher rainfall helped to boost cotton output in 2017, and the country’s 2017 budget increased spending more than 10%, much of which was devoted to infrastructure and agriculture. Corruption and political turmoil are strong downside risks in 2018 and beyond.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1030,10 +1030,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "281,638 (2020)" + "text": "281,638 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.39 (2020 est.)" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1072,10 +1072,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "243,806 (2021)" + "text": "243,806 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.2 (2021)" + "text": "1.2 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1155,6 +1155,9 @@ "note": "note(s) - the Gendarmerie and the National Guard are under the authority of the Ministry of Defense and Veterans Affairs (Ministere De La Defense Et Des Anciens Combattants, MDAC), but operational control is shared between the MDAC and the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil ProtectionMorocco has capitalized on its proximity to Europe and relatively low labor costs to work towards building a diverse, open, market-oriented economy. Key sectors of the economy include agriculture, tourism, aerospace, automotive, phosphates, textiles, apparel, and subcomponents. Morocco has increased investment in its port, transportation, and industrial infrastructure to position itself as a center and broker for business throughout Africa. Industrial development strategies and infrastructure improvements - most visibly illustrated by a new port and free trade zone near Tangier - are improving Morocco's competitiveness.
In the 1980s, Morocco was a heavily indebted country before pursuing austerity measures and pro-market reforms, overseen by the IMF. Since taking the throne in 1999, King MOHAMMED VI has presided over a stable economy marked by steady growth, low inflation, and gradually falling unemployment, although poor harvests and economic difficulties in Europe contributed to an economic slowdown. To boost exports, Morocco entered into a bilateral Free Trade Agreement with the US in 2006 and an Advanced Status agreement with the EU in 2008. In late 2014, Morocco eliminated subsidies for gasoline, diesel, and fuel oil, dramatically reducing outlays that weighed on the country’s budget and current account. Subsidies on butane gas and certain food products remain in place. Morocco also seeks to expand its renewable energy capacity with a goal of making renewable more than 50% of installed electricity generation capacity by 2030.
Despite Morocco's economic progress, the country suffers from high unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy, particularly in rural areas. Key economic challenges for Morocco include reforming the education system and the judiciary.
" + "text": "Morocco has capitalized on its proximity to Europe and relatively low labor costs to work towards building a diverse, open, market-oriented economy. Key sectors of the economy include agriculture, tourism, aerospace, automotive, phosphates, textiles, apparel, and subcomponents. Morocco has increased investment in its port, transportation, and industrial infrastructure to position itself as a center and broker for business throughout Africa. Industrial development strategies and infrastructure improvements - most visibly illustrated by a new port and free trade zone near Tangier - are improving Morocco's competitiveness.
In the 1980s, Morocco was a heavily indebted country before pursuing austerity measures and pro-market reforms, overseen by the IMF. Since taking the throne in 1999, King MOHAMMED VI has presided over a stable economy marked by steady growth, low inflation, and gradually falling unemployment, although poor harvests and economic difficulties in Europe contributed to an economic slowdown. To boost exports, Morocco entered into a bilateral Free Trade Agreement with the US in 2006 and an Advanced Status agreement with the EU in 2008. In late 2014, Morocco eliminated subsidies for gasoline, diesel, and fuel oil, dramatically reducing outlays that weighed on the country’s budget and current account. Subsidies on butane gas and certain food products remain in place. Morocco also seeks to expand its renewable energy capacity with a goal of making renewable more than 50% of installed electricity generation capacity by 2030.
Despite Morocco's economic progress, the country suffers from high unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy, particularly in rural areas. Key economic challenges for Morocco include reforming the education system and the judiciary.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1044,10 +1044,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,357,286 (2020)" + "text": "2,357,286 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "6.39 (2020 est.)" + "text": "6 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1086,10 +1086,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "2,102,434 (2021)" + "text": "2,102,434 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "5.7 (2021)" + "text": "6 (2020 est.)" } }, "Communications - note": { @@ -1201,6 +1201,9 @@ "note": "note(s) - the National Police manages internal law enforcement in cities; the Royal Gendarmerie is responsible for law enforcement in rural regions and on national highwaysMauritania's economy is dominated by extractive industries (oil and mines), fisheries, livestock, agriculture, and services. Half the population still depends on farming and raising livestock, even though many nomads and subsistence farmers were forced into the cities by recurrent droughts in the 1970s, 1980s, 2000s, and 2017. Recently, GDP growth has been driven largely by foreign investment in the mining and oil sectors.
Mauritania's extensive mineral resources include iron ore, gold, copper, gypsum, and phosphate rock, and exploration is ongoing for tantalum, uranium, crude oil, and natural gas. Extractive commodities make up about three-quarters of Mauritania's total exports, subjecting the economy to price swings in world commodity markets. Mining is also a growing source of government revenue, rising from 13% to 30% of total revenue from 2006 to 2014. The nation's coastal waters are among the richest fishing areas in the world, and fishing accounts for about 15% of budget revenues, 45% of foreign currency earnings. Mauritania processes a total of 1,800,000 tons of fish per year, but overexploitation by foreign and national fleets threaten the sustainability of this key source of revenue.
The economy is highly sensitive to international food and extractive commodity prices. Other risks to Mauritania's economy include its recurring droughts, dependence on foreign aid and investment, and insecurity in neighboring Mali, as well as significant shortages of infrastructure, institutional capacity, and human capital. In December 2017, Mauritania and the IMF agreed to a three year agreement under the Extended Credit Facility to foster economic growth, maintain macroeconomic stability, and reduce poverty. Investment in agriculture and infrastructure are the largest components of the country’s public expenditures.
" + "text": "Mauritania's economy is dominated by extractive industries (oil and mines), fisheries, livestock, agriculture, and services. Half the population still depends on farming and raising livestock, even though many nomads and subsistence farmers were forced into the cities by recurrent droughts in the 1970s, 1980s, 2000s, and 2017. Recently, GDP growth has been driven largely by foreign investment in the mining and oil sectors.
Mauritania's extensive mineral resources include iron ore, gold, copper, gypsum, and phosphate rock, and exploration is ongoing for tantalum, uranium, crude oil, and natural gas. Extractive commodities make up about three-quarters of Mauritania's total exports, subjecting the economy to price swings in world commodity markets. Mining is also a growing source of government revenue, rising from 13% to 30% of total revenue from 2006 to 2014. The nation's coastal waters are among the richest fishing areas in the world, and fishing accounts for about 15% of budget revenues, 45% of foreign currency earnings. Mauritania processes a total of 1,800,000 tons of fish per year, but overexploitation by foreign and national fleets threaten the sustainability of this key source of revenue.
The economy is highly sensitive to international food and extractive commodity prices. Other risks to Mauritania's economy include its recurring droughts, dependence on foreign aid and investment, and insecurity in neighboring Mali, as well as significant shortages of infrastructure, institutional capacity, and human capital. In December 2017, Mauritania and the IMF agreed to a three year agreement under the Extended Credit Facility to foster economic growth, maintain macroeconomic stability, and reduce poverty. Investment in agriculture and infrastructure are the largest components of the country’s public expenditures.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1028,10 +1028,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "62,099 (2020)" + "text": "62,099 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.34 (2020 est.)" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1070,10 +1070,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "18,457 (2021)" + "text": "18,457 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.4 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.4 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1167,6 +1167,9 @@ "note": "note(s) - the Gendarmerie is responsible for maintaining civil order around metropolitan areas and providing law enforcement services in rural areas; the National Guard performs a limited police function in keeping with its peacetime role of providing security at government facilities, to include prisons; the General Group for Road Safety maintains security on roads and operates checkpoints throughout the country" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "2.4% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "2.5% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1178,9 +1181,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "2.3% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $440 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "2.5% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $420 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/mz.json b/africa/mz.json index 3b08b0d4..525fa121 100644 --- a/africa/mz.json +++ b/africa/mz.json @@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "At independence in 1975, Mozambique was one of the world's poorest countries. Socialist policies, economic mismanagement, and a brutal civil war from 1977 to 1992 further impoverished the country. In 1987, the government embarked on a series of macroeconomic reforms designed to stabilize the economy. These steps, combined with donor assistance and with political stability since the multi-party elections in 1994, propelled the country’s GDP, in purchasing power parity terms, from $4 billion in 1993 to about $37 billion in 2017. Fiscal reforms, including the introduction of a value-added tax and reform of the customs service, have improved the government's revenue collection abilities. In spite of these gains, about half the population remains below the poverty line and subsistence agriculture continues to employ the vast majority of the country's work force.
Mozambique's once substantial foreign debt was reduced through forgiveness and rescheduling under the IMF's Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Enhanced HIPC initiatives. However, in 2016, information surfaced revealing that the Mozambican Government was responsible for over $2 billion in government-backed loans secured between 2012-14 by state-owned defense and security companies without parliamentary approval or national budget inclusion; this prompted the IMF and international donors to halt direct budget support to the Government of Mozambique. An international audit was performed on Mozambique’s debt in 2016-17, but debt restructuring and resumption of donor support have yet to occur.
Mozambique grew at an average annual rate of 6%-8% in the decade leading up to 2015, one of Africa's strongest performances, but the sizable external debt burden, donor withdrawal, elevated inflation, and currency depreciation contributed to slower growth in 2016-17.
Two major International consortiums, led by American companies ExxonMobil and Anadarko, are seeking approval to develop massive natural gas deposits off the coast of Cabo Delgado province, in what has the potential to become the largest infrastructure project in Africa. . The government predicts sales of liquefied natural gas from these projects could generate several billion dollars in revenues annually sometime after 2022.
" + "text": "At independence in 1975, Mozambique was one of the world's poorest countries. Socialist policies, economic mismanagement, and a brutal civil war from 1977 to 1992 further impoverished the country. In 1987, the government embarked on a series of macroeconomic reforms designed to stabilize the economy. These steps, combined with donor assistance and with political stability since the multi-party elections in 1994, propelled the country’s GDP, in purchasing power parity terms, from $4 billion in 1993 to about $37 billion in 2017. Fiscal reforms, including the introduction of a value-added tax and reform of the customs service, have improved the government's revenue collection abilities. In spite of these gains, about half the population remains below the poverty line and subsistence agriculture continues to employ the vast majority of the country's work force.
Mozambique's once substantial foreign debt was reduced through forgiveness and rescheduling under the IMF's Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Enhanced HIPC initiatives. However, in 2016, information surfaced revealing that the Mozambican Government was responsible for over $2 billion in government-backed loans secured between 2012-14 by state-owned defense and security companies without parliamentary approval or national budget inclusion; this prompted the IMF and international donors to halt direct budget support to the Government of Mozambique. An international audit was performed on Mozambique’s debt in 2016-17, but debt restructuring and resumption of donor support have yet to occur.
Mozambique grew at an average annual rate of 6%-8% in the decade leading up to 2015, one of Africa's strongest performances, but the sizable external debt burden, donor withdrawal, elevated inflation, and currency depreciation contributed to slower growth in 2016-17.
Two major International consortiums, led by American companies ExxonMobil and Anadarko, are seeking approval to develop massive natural gas deposits off the coast of Cabo Delgado province, in what has the potential to become the largest infrastructure project in Africa. . The government predicts sales of liquefied natural gas from these projects could generate several billion dollars in revenues annually sometime after 2022.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1035,10 +1035,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "80,791 (2019)" + "text": "89,016 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2019 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1077,10 +1077,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "70,000 (2021)" + "text": "70,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.22 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.22 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1189,6 +1189,9 @@ "note": "note - the FADM and other security forces are referred to collectively as the Defense and Security Forces (DFS)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.2% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.1% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1200,9 +1203,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "0.9% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $170 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "0.9% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $170 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/ng.json b/africa/ng.json index 8631d676..de233a68 100644 --- a/africa/ng.json +++ b/africa/ng.json @@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Niger is a landlocked, Sub-Saharan nation, whose economy centers on subsistence crops, livestock, and some of the world's largest uranium deposits. Agriculture contributes approximately 40% of GDP and provides livelihood for over 80% of the population. The UN ranked Niger as the second least developed country in the world in 2016 due to multiple factors such as food insecurity, lack of industry, high population growth, a weak educational sector, and few prospects for work outside of subsistence farming and herding.
Since 2011 public debt has increased due to efforts to scale-up public investment, particularly that related to infrastructure, as well as due to increased security spending. The government relies on foreign donor resources for a large portion of its fiscal budget. The economy in recent years has been hurt by terrorist activity near its uranium mines and by instability in Mali and in the Diffa region of the country; concerns about security have resulted in increased support from regional and international partners on defense. Low uranium prices, demographics, and security expenditures may continue to put pressure on the government’s finances.
The Government of Niger plans to exploit oil, gold, coal, and other mineral resources to sustain future growth. Although Niger has sizable reserves of oil, the prolonged drop in oil prices has reduced profitability. Food insecurity and drought remain perennial problems for Niger, and the government plans to invest more in irrigation. Niger’s three-year $131 million IMF Extended Credit Facility (ECF) agreement for the years 2012-15 was extended until the end of 2016. In February 2017, the IMF approved a new 3-year $134 million ECF. In June 2017, The World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) granted Niger $1 billion over three years for IDA18, a program to boost the country’s development and alleviate poverty. A $437 million Millennium Challenge Account compact for Niger, commencing in FY18, will focus on large-scale irrigation infrastructure development and community-based, climate-resilient agriculture, while promoting sustainable increases in agricultural productivity and sales.
Formal private sector investment needed for economic diversification and growth remains a challenge, given the country’s limited domestic markets, access to credit, and competitiveness. Although President ISSOUFOU is courting foreign investors, including those from the US, as of April 2017, there were no US firms operating in Niger. In November 2017, the National Assembly passed the 2018 Finance Law that was geared towards raising government revenues and moving away from international support.
" + "text": "Niger is a landlocked, Sub-Saharan nation, whose economy centers on subsistence crops, livestock, and some of the world's largest uranium deposits. Agriculture contributes approximately 40% of GDP and provides livelihood for over 80% of the population. The UN ranked Niger as the second least developed country in the world in 2016 due to multiple factors such as food insecurity, lack of industry, high population growth, a weak educational sector, and few prospects for work outside of subsistence farming and herding.
Since 2011 public debt has increased due to efforts to scale-up public investment, particularly that related to infrastructure, as well as due to increased security spending. The government relies on foreign donor resources for a large portion of its fiscal budget. The economy in recent years has been hurt by terrorist activity near its uranium mines and by instability in Mali and in the Diffa region of the country; concerns about security have resulted in increased support from regional and international partners on defense. Low uranium prices, demographics, and security expenditures may continue to put pressure on the government’s finances.
The Government of Niger plans to exploit oil, gold, coal, and other mineral resources to sustain future growth. Although Niger has sizable reserves of oil, the prolonged drop in oil prices has reduced profitability. Food insecurity and drought remain perennial problems for Niger, and the government plans to invest more in irrigation. Niger’s three-year $131 million IMF Extended Credit Facility (ECF) agreement for the years 2012-15 was extended until the end of 2016. In February 2017, the IMF approved a new 3-year $134 million ECF. In June 2017, The World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) granted Niger $1 billion over three years for IDA18, a program to boost the country’s development and alleviate poverty. A $437 million Millennium Challenge Account compact for Niger, commencing in FY18, will focus on large-scale irrigation infrastructure development and community-based, climate-resilient agriculture, while promoting sustainable increases in agricultural productivity and sales.
Formal private sector investment needed for economic diversification and growth remains a challenge, given the country’s limited domestic markets, access to credit, and competitiveness. Although President ISSOUFOU is courting foreign investors, including those from the US, as of April 2017, there were no US firms operating in Niger. In November 2017, the National Assembly passed the 2018 Finance Law that was geared towards raising government revenues and moving away from international support.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1031,10 +1031,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "114,352 (2018)" + "text": "58,000 (2020)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2018 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1073,10 +1073,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "12,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "12,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.05 (2021 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0.05 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1160,8 +1160,11 @@ "note": "note - the Gendarmerie is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and has primary responsibility for rural security; the National Guard is responsible for domestic security and the protection of high-level officials and government buildings" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.8% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { - "text": "2.1% of GDP (2020 est.)" + "text": "2% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2019": { "text": "1.7% of GDP (2019 est.) (approximately $260 million)" @@ -1171,9 +1174,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "2% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $270 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.6% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $210 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { @@ -1205,7 +1205,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "187,146 (Nigeria), 61,534 (Mali) (2022)" + "text": "187,148 (Nigeria), 61,534 (Mali) (2022)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "264,257 (includes the regions of Diffa, Tillaberi, and Tahoua; unknown how many of the 11,000 people displaced by clashes between government forces and the Tuareg militant group, Niger Movement for Justice, in 2007 are still displaced; inter-communal violence; Boko Haram attacks in southern Niger, 2015) (2022)" diff --git a/africa/ni.json b/africa/ni.json index 4161d6be..67f03a32 100644 --- a/africa/ni.json +++ b/africa/ni.json @@ -718,7 +718,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Nigeria is Sub Saharan Africa’s largest economy and relies heavily on oil as its main source of foreign exchange earnings and government revenues. Following the 2008-09 global financial crises, the banking sector was effectively recapitalized and regulation enhanced. Since then, Nigeria’s economic growth has been driven by growth in agriculture, telecommunications, and services. Economic diversification and strong growth have not translated into a significant decline in poverty levels; over 62% of Nigeria's over 180 million people still live in extreme poverty.
Despite its strong fundamentals, oil-rich Nigeria has been hobbled by inadequate power supply, lack of infrastructure, delays in the passage of legislative reforms, an inefficient property registration system, restrictive trade policies, an inconsistent regulatory environment, a slow and ineffective judicial system, unreliable dispute resolution mechanisms, insecurity, and pervasive corruption. Regulatory constraints and security risks have limited new investment in oil and natural gas, and Nigeria's oil production had been contracting every year since 2012 until a slight rebound in 2017.
President BUHARI, elected in March 2015, has established a cabinet of economic ministers that includes several technocrats, and he has announced plans to increase transparency, diversify the economy away from oil, and improve fiscal management, but has taken a primarily protectionist approach that favors domestic producers at the expense of consumers. President BUHARI ran on an anti-corruption platform, and has made some headway in alleviating corruption, such as implementation of a Treasury Single Account that allows the government to better manage its resources and a more transparent government payroll and personnel system that eliminated duplicate and \"ghost workers.\" The government also is working to develop stronger public-private partnerships for roads, agriculture, and power.
Nigeria entered recession in 2016 as a result of lower oil prices and production, exacerbated by militant attacks on oil and gas infrastructure in the Niger Delta region, coupled with detrimental economic policies, including foreign exchange restrictions. GDP growth turned positive in 2017 as oil prices recovered and output stabilized.
" + "text": "Nigeria is Sub Saharan Africa’s largest economy and relies heavily on oil as its main source of foreign exchange earnings and government revenues. Following the 2008-09 global financial crises, the banking sector was effectively recapitalized and regulation enhanced. Since then, Nigeria’s economic growth has been driven by growth in agriculture, telecommunications, and services. Economic diversification and strong growth have not translated into a significant decline in poverty levels; over 62% of Nigeria's over 180 million people still live in extreme poverty.
Despite its strong fundamentals, oil-rich Nigeria has been hobbled by inadequate power supply, lack of infrastructure, delays in the passage of legislative reforms, an inefficient property registration system, restrictive trade policies, an inconsistent regulatory environment, a slow and ineffective judicial system, unreliable dispute resolution mechanisms, insecurity, and pervasive corruption. Regulatory constraints and security risks have limited new investment in oil and natural gas, and Nigeria's oil production had been contracting every year since 2012 until a slight rebound in 2017.
President BUHARI, elected in March 2015, has established a cabinet of economic ministers that includes several technocrats, and he has announced plans to increase transparency, diversify the economy away from oil, and improve fiscal management, but has taken a primarily protectionist approach that favors domestic producers at the expense of consumers. President BUHARI ran on an anti-corruption platform, and has made some headway in alleviating corruption, such as implementation of a Treasury Single Account that allows the government to better manage its resources and a more transparent government payroll and personnel system that eliminated duplicate and \"ghost workers.\" The government also is working to develop stronger public-private partnerships for roads, agriculture, and power.
Nigeria entered recession in 2016 as a result of lower oil prices and production, exacerbated by militant attacks on oil and gas infrastructure in the Niger Delta region, coupled with detrimental economic policies, including foreign exchange restrictions. GDP growth turned positive in 2017 as oil prices recovered and output stabilized.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1058,10 +1058,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "107,031 (2020)" + "text": "107,031 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1100,10 +1100,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "65,313 (2021)" + "text": "65,313 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.03 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.03 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1221,8 +1221,11 @@ "text": "Nigerian Armed Forces: Army, Navy (includes Coast Guard), Air Force; Ministry of Interior: Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC, a paramilitary agency commissioned to assist the military in the management of threats to internal security, including attacks and natural disasters) (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "0.7% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { - "text": "0.6% of GDP (2020)" + "text": "0.6% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2019": { "text": "0.5% of GDP (2019) (approximately $3.53 billion)" @@ -1232,9 +1235,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "0.5% of GDP (2017) (approximately $3.42 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "0.4% of GDP (2016) (approximately $3.05 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/od.json b/africa/od.json index 682b0960..b6a7ce5a 100644 --- a/africa/od.json +++ b/africa/od.json @@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Industry and infrastructure in landlocked South Sudan are severely underdeveloped and poverty is widespread, following several decades of civil war with Sudan. Continued fighting within the new nation is disrupting what remains of the economy. The vast majority of the population is dependent on subsistence agriculture and humanitarian assistance. Property rights are insecure and price signals are weak, because markets are not well-organized.
South Sudan has little infrastructure – about 10,000 kilometers of roads, but just 2% of them paved. Electricity is produced mostly by costly diesel generators, and indoor plumbing and potable water are scarce, so less than 2% of the population has access to electricity. About 90% of consumed goods, capital, and services are imported from neighboring countries – mainly Uganda, Kenya and Sudan. Chinese investment plays a growing role in the infrastructure and energy sectors.
Nevertheless, South Sudan does have abundant natural resources. South Sudan holds one of the richest agricultural areas in Africa, with fertile soils and abundant water supplies. Currently the region supports 10-20 million head of cattle. At independence in 2011, South Sudan produced nearly three-fourths of former Sudan's total oil output of nearly a half million barrels per day. The Government of South Sudan relies on oil for the vast majority of its budget revenues, although oil production has fallen sharply since independence. South Sudan is one of the most oil-dependent countries in the world, with 98% of the government’s annual operating budget and 80% of its gross domestic product (GDP) derived from oil. Oil is exported through a pipeline that runs to refineries and shipping facilities at Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The economy of South Sudan will remain linked to Sudan for some time, given the existing oil infrastructure. The outbreak of conflict in December 2013, combined with falling crude oil production and prices, meant that GDP fell significantly between 2014 and 2017. Since the second half of 2017 oil production has risen, and is currently about 130,000 barrels per day.
Poverty and food insecurity has risen due to displacement of people caused by the conflict. With famine spreading, 66% of the population in South Sudan is living on less than about $2 a day, up from 50.6% in 2009, according to the World Bank. About 80% of the population lives in rural areas, with agriculture, forestry and fishing providing the livelihood for a majority of the households. Much of rural sector activity is focused on low-input, low-output subsistence agriculture.
South Sudan is burdened by considerable debt because of increased military spending and high levels of government corruption. Economic mismanagement is prevalent. Civil servants, including police and the military, are not paid on time, creating incentives to engage in looting and banditry. South Sudan has received more than $11 billion in foreign aid since 2005, largely from the US, the UK, and the EU. Inflation peaked at over 800% per year in October 2016 but dropped to 118% in 2017. The government has funded its expenditures by borrowing from the central bank and foreign sources, using forward sales of oil as collateral. The central bank’s decision to adopt a managed floating exchange rate regime in December 2015 triggered a 97% depreciation of the currency and spawned a growing black market.
Long-term challenges include rooting out public sector corruption, improving agricultural productivity, alleviating poverty and unemployment, improving fiscal transparency - particularly in regard to oil revenues, taming inflation, improving government revenues, and creating a rules-based business environment.
" + "text": "Industry and infrastructure in landlocked South Sudan are severely underdeveloped and poverty is widespread, following several decades of civil war with Sudan. Continued fighting within the new nation is disrupting what remains of the economy. The vast majority of the population is dependent on subsistence agriculture and humanitarian assistance. Property rights are insecure and price signals are weak, because markets are not well-organized.
South Sudan has little infrastructure – about 10,000 kilometers of roads, but just 2% of them paved. Electricity is produced mostly by costly diesel generators, and indoor plumbing and potable water are scarce, so less than 2% of the population has access to electricity. About 90% of consumed goods, capital, and services are imported from neighboring countries – mainly Uganda, Kenya and Sudan. Chinese investment plays a growing role in the infrastructure and energy sectors.
Nevertheless, South Sudan does have abundant natural resources. South Sudan holds one of the richest agricultural areas in Africa, with fertile soils and abundant water supplies. Currently the region supports 10-20 million head of cattle. At independence in 2011, South Sudan produced nearly three-fourths of former Sudan's total oil output of nearly a half million barrels per day. The Government of South Sudan relies on oil for the vast majority of its budget revenues, although oil production has fallen sharply since independence. South Sudan is one of the most oil-dependent countries in the world, with 98% of the government’s annual operating budget and 80% of its gross domestic product (GDP) derived from oil. Oil is exported through a pipeline that runs to refineries and shipping facilities at Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The economy of South Sudan will remain linked to Sudan for some time, given the existing oil infrastructure. The outbreak of conflict in December 2013, combined with falling crude oil production and prices, meant that GDP fell significantly between 2014 and 2017. Since the second half of 2017 oil production has risen, and is currently about 130,000 barrels per day.
Poverty and food insecurity has risen due to displacement of people caused by the conflict. With famine spreading, 66% of the population in South Sudan is living on less than about $2 a day, up from 50.6% in 2009, according to the World Bank. About 80% of the population lives in rural areas, with agriculture, forestry and fishing providing the livelihood for a majority of the households. Much of rural sector activity is focused on low-input, low-output subsistence agriculture.
South Sudan is burdened by considerable debt because of increased military spending and high levels of government corruption. Economic mismanagement is prevalent. Civil servants, including police and the military, are not paid on time, creating incentives to engage in looting and banditry. South Sudan has received more than $11 billion in foreign aid since 2005, largely from the US, the UK, and the EU. Inflation peaked at over 800% per year in October 2016 but dropped to 118% in 2017. The government has funded its expenditures by borrowing from the central bank and foreign sources, using forward sales of oil as collateral. The central bank’s decision to adopt a managed floating exchange rate regime in December 2015 triggered a 97% depreciation of the currency and spawned a growing black market.
Long-term challenges include rooting out public sector corruption, improving agricultural productivity, alleviating poverty and unemployment, improving fiscal transparency - particularly in regard to oil revenues, taming inflation, improving government revenues, and creating a rules-based business environment.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2017": { @@ -878,7 +878,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "less than 1" + "text": "(2018 est.) less than 1" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "(2018 est.) less than 1" @@ -920,10 +920,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "200 (2020)" + "text": "200 (2019 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2019 est.)" } } }, @@ -1009,8 +1009,11 @@ "note": "note - numerous irregular/militia forces operate in the country with official knowledge" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "2% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { - "text": "2.3% of GDP (2020 est.)" + "text": "2% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2019": { "text": "3.1% of GDP (2019 est.) (approximately $1.62 billion)" @@ -1020,9 +1023,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "2.1% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $660 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "4.4% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $1.0 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/pu.json b/africa/pu.json index f86bc06b..4acfd031 100644 --- a/africa/pu.json +++ b/africa/pu.json @@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Guinea-Bissau is highly dependent on subsistence agriculture, cashew nut exports, and foreign assistance. Two out of three Bissau-Guineans remain below the absolute poverty line. The legal economy is based on cashews and fishing. Illegal logging and trafficking in narcotics also play significant roles. The combination of limited economic prospects, weak institutions, and favorable geography have made this West African country a way station for drugs bound for Europe.
Guinea-Bissau has substantial potential for development of mineral resources, including phosphates, bauxite, and mineral sands. Offshore oil and gas exploration has begun. The country’s climate and soil make it feasible to grow a wide range of cash crops, fruit, vegetables, and tubers; however, cashews generate more than 80% of export receipts and are the main source of income for many rural communities.
The government was deposed in August 2015, and since then, a political stalemate has resulted in weak governance and reduced donor support.
The country is participating in a three-year, IMF extended credit facility program that was suspended because of a planned bank bailout. The program was renewed in 2017, but the major donors of direct budget support (the EU, World Bank, and African Development Bank) have halted their programs indefinitely. Diversification of the economy remains a key policy goal, but Guinea-Bissau’s poor infrastructure and business climate will constrain this effort.
" + "text": "Guinea-Bissau is highly dependent on subsistence agriculture, cashew nut exports, and foreign assistance. Two out of three Bissau-Guineans remain below the absolute poverty line. The legal economy is based on cashews and fishing. Illegal logging and trafficking in narcotics also play significant roles. The combination of limited economic prospects, weak institutions, and favorable geography have made this West African country a way station for drugs bound for Europe.
Guinea-Bissau has substantial potential for development of mineral resources, including phosphates, bauxite, and mineral sands. Offshore oil and gas exploration has begun. The country’s climate and soil make it feasible to grow a wide range of cash crops, fruit, vegetables, and tubers; however, cashews generate more than 80% of export receipts and are the main source of income for many rural communities.
The government was deposed in August 2015, and since then, a political stalemate has resulted in weak governance and reduced donor support.
The country is participating in a three-year, IMF extended credit facility program that was suspended because of a planned bank bailout. The program was renewed in 2017, but the major donors of direct budget support (the EU, World Bank, and African Development Bank) have halted their programs indefinitely. Diversification of the economy remains a key policy goal, but Guinea-Bissau’s poor infrastructure and business climate will constrain this effort.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "0 (2018)" + "text": "0 (2018 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "0 (2018 est.)" @@ -966,10 +966,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "2,383 (2021)" + "text": "2,383 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.12 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.12 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1041,6 +1041,9 @@ "note": "note - the Public Order Police is responsible for maintaining law and order, while the Judicial Police, under the Ministry of Justice, has primary responsibility for investigating drug trafficking, terrorism, and other transnational crimes" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.8% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.7% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1052,9 +1055,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.7% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $45 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.6% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $40 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/rw.json b/africa/rw.json index b7489762..13e5ec11 100644 --- a/africa/rw.json +++ b/africa/rw.json @@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Rwanda is a rural, agrarian country with agriculture accounting for about 63% of export earnings, and with some mineral and agro-processing. Population density is high but, with the exception of the capital Kigali, is not concentrated in large cities – its 12 million people are spread out on a small amount of land (smaller than the state of Maryland). Tourism, minerals, coffee, and tea are Rwanda's main sources of foreign exchange. Despite Rwanda's fertile ecosystem, food production often does not keep pace with demand, requiring food imports. Energy shortages, instability in neighboring states, and lack of adequate transportation linkages to other countries continue to handicap private sector growth.
The 1994 genocide decimated Rwanda's fragile economic base, severely impoverished the population, particularly women, and temporarily stalled the country's ability to attract private and external investment. However, Rwanda has made substantial progress in stabilizing and rehabilitating its economy well beyond pre-1994 levels. GDP has rebounded with an average annual growth of 6%-8% since 2003 and inflation has been reduced to single digits. In 2015, 39% of the population lived below the poverty line, according to government statistics, compared to 57% in 2006.
The government has embraced an expansionary fiscal policy to reduce poverty by improving education, infrastructure, and foreign and domestic investment. Rwanda consistently ranks well for ease of doing business and transparency.
The Rwandan Government is seeking to become a regional leader in information and communication technologies and aims to reach middle-income status by 2020 by leveraging the service industry. In 2012, Rwanda completed the first modern Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Kigali. The SEZ seeks to attract investment in all sectors, but specifically in agribusiness, information and communications, trade and logistics, mining, and construction. In 2016, the government launched an online system to give investors information about public land and its suitability for agricultural development.
" + "text": "Rwanda is a rural, agrarian country with agriculture accounting for about 63% of export earnings, and with some mineral and agro-processing. Population density is high but, with the exception of the capital Kigali, is not concentrated in large cities – its 12 million people are spread out on a small amount of land (smaller than the state of Maryland). Tourism, minerals, coffee, and tea are Rwanda's main sources of foreign exchange. Despite Rwanda's fertile ecosystem, food production often does not keep pace with demand, requiring food imports. Energy shortages, instability in neighboring states, and lack of adequate transportation linkages to other countries continue to handicap private sector growth.
The 1994 genocide decimated Rwanda's fragile economic base, severely impoverished the population, particularly women, and temporarily stalled the country's ability to attract private and external investment. However, Rwanda has made substantial progress in stabilizing and rehabilitating its economy well beyond pre-1994 levels. GDP has rebounded with an average annual growth of 6%-8% since 2003 and inflation has been reduced to single digits. In 2015, 39% of the population lived below the poverty line, according to government statistics, compared to 57% in 2006.
The government has embraced an expansionary fiscal policy to reduce poverty by improving education, infrastructure, and foreign and domestic investment. Rwanda consistently ranks well for ease of doing business and transparency.
The Rwandan Government is seeking to become a regional leader in information and communication technologies and aims to reach middle-income status by 2020 by leveraging the service industry. In 2012, Rwanda completed the first modern Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Kigali. The SEZ seeks to attract investment in all sectors, but specifically in agribusiness, information and communications, trade and logistics, mining, and construction. In 2016, the government launched an online system to give investors information about public land and its suitability for agricultural development.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -999,10 +999,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "11,671 (2020)" + "text": "11,671 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1041,10 +1041,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "17,685 (2021)" + "text": "17,685 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.14 (2021 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0.14 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1118,6 +1118,9 @@ "text": "Rwanda Defense Force (RDF): Rwanda Army (Rwanda Land Force), Rwanda Air Force (Force Aerienne Rwandaise, FAR), Rwanda Reserve Force, Special Units (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.4% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.3% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1129,9 +1132,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.2% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $190 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.2% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $180 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { @@ -1156,7 +1156,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "77,288 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) 48,125 (Burundi) (2022)" + "text": "77,288 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) 48,070 (Burundi) (2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "9,500 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/africa/se.json b/africa/se.json index a70048a6..80e460c6 100644 --- a/africa/se.json +++ b/africa/se.json @@ -930,10 +930,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "18,882 (2020)" + "text": "18,882 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "19.2 (2020 est.)" + "text": "19 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -972,10 +972,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "34,966 (2021)" + "text": "34,966 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "35.55 (2021)" + "text": "36 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1061,20 +1061,20 @@ "note": "note - the military reports to the president, who acts as minister of defense " }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.5% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.6% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2019": { - "text": "1.3% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "1.3% of GDP (2019 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2018": { - "text": "1.4% of GDP (2018)" + "text": "1.4% of GDP (2018 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { - "text": "1.5% of GDP (2017)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.4% of GDP (2016)" + "text": "1.5% of GDP (2017 est.)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/sf.json b/africa/sf.json index 4c2357a3..ac4438af 100644 --- a/africa/sf.json +++ b/africa/sf.json @@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "South Africa is a middle-income emerging market with an abundant supply of natural resources; well-developed financial, legal, communications, energy, and transport sectors; and a stock exchange that is Africa’s largest and among the top 20 in the world.
Economic growth has decelerated in recent years, slowing to an estimated 0.7% in 2017. Unemployment, poverty, and inequality - among the highest in the world - remain a challenge. Official unemployment is roughly 27% of the workforce, and runs significantly higher among black youth. Even though the country's modern infrastructure supports a relatively efficient distribution of goods to major urban centers throughout the region, unstable electricity supplies retard growth. Eskom, the state-run power company, is building three new power stations and is installing new power demand management programs to improve power grid reliability but has been plagued with accusations of mismanagement and corruption and faces an increasingly high debt burden.
South Africa's economic policy has focused on controlling inflation while empowering a broader economic base; however, the country faces structural constraints that also limit economic growth, such as skills shortages, declining global competitiveness, and frequent work stoppages due to strike action. The government faces growing pressure from urban constituencies to improve the delivery of basic services to low-income areas, to increase job growth, and to provide university level-education at affordable prices. Political infighting among South Africa’s ruling party and the volatility of the rand risks economic growth. International investors are concerned about the country’s long-term economic stability; in late 2016, most major international credit ratings agencies downgraded South Africa’s international debt to junk bond status.
" + "text": "South Africa is a middle-income emerging market with an abundant supply of natural resources; well-developed financial, legal, communications, energy, and transport sectors; and a stock exchange that is Africa’s largest and among the top 20 in the world.
Economic growth has decelerated in recent years, slowing to an estimated 0.7% in 2017. Unemployment, poverty, and inequality - among the highest in the world - remain a challenge. Official unemployment is roughly 27% of the workforce, and runs significantly higher among black youth. Even though the country's modern infrastructure supports a relatively efficient distribution of goods to major urban centers throughout the region, unstable electricity supplies retard growth. Eskom, the state-run power company, is building three new power stations and is installing new power demand management programs to improve power grid reliability but has been plagued with accusations of mismanagement and corruption and faces an increasingly high debt burden.
South Africa's economic policy has focused on controlling inflation while empowering a broader economic base; however, the country faces structural constraints that also limit economic growth, such as skills shortages, declining global competitiveness, and frequent work stoppages due to strike action. The government faces growing pressure from urban constituencies to improve the delivery of basic services to low-income areas, to increase job growth, and to provide university level-education at affordable prices. Political infighting among South Africa’s ruling party and the volatility of the rand risks economic growth. International investors are concerned about the country’s long-term economic stability; in late 2016, most major international credit ratings agencies downgraded South Africa’s international debt to junk bond status.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1032,10 +1032,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,098,802 (2020)" + "text": "2,098,802 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "3.54 (2020 est.)" + "text": "4 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1074,10 +1074,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,303,057 (2021)" + "text": "1,303,057 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "2.2 (2021)" + "text": "2 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/africa/sg.json b/africa/sg.json index 94d6cdeb..521bd9ee 100644 --- a/africa/sg.json +++ b/africa/sg.json @@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Senegal’s economy is driven by mining, construction, tourism, fisheries and agriculture, which are the primary sources of employment in rural areas. The country's key export industries include phosphate mining, fertilizer production, agricultural products and commercial fishing and Senegal is also working on oil exploration projects. It relies heavily on donor assistance, remittances and foreign direct investment. Senegal reached a growth rate of 7% in 2017, due in part to strong performance in agriculture despite erratic rainfall.
President Macky SALL, who was elected in March 2012 under a reformist policy agenda, inherited an economy with high energy costs, a challenging business environment, and a culture of overspending. President SALL unveiled an ambitious economic plan, the Emerging Senegal Plan (ESP), which aims to implement priority economic reforms and investment projects to increase economic growth while preserving macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability. Bureaucratic bottlenecks and a challenging business climate are among the perennial challenges that may slow the implementation of this plan.
Senegal receives technical support from the IMF under a Policy Support Instrument (PSI) to assist with implementation of the ESP. The PSI implementation continues to be satisfactory as concluded by the IMF’s fifth review in December 2017. Financial markets have signaled confidence in Senegal through successful Eurobond issuances in 2014, 2017, and 2018.
The government is focusing on 19 projects under the ESP to continue The government’s goal under the ESP is structural transformation of the economy. Key projects include the Thiès-Touba Highway, the new international airport opened in December 2017, and upgrades to energy infrastructure. The cost of electricity is a chief constraint for Senegal’s development. Electricity prices in Senegal are among the highest in the world. Power Africa, a US presidential initiative led by USAID, supports Senegal’s plans to improve reliability and increase generating capacity.
" + "text": "Senegal’s economy is driven by mining, construction, tourism, fisheries and agriculture, which are the primary sources of employment in rural areas. The country's key export industries include phosphate mining, fertilizer production, agricultural products and commercial fishing and Senegal is also working on oil exploration projects. It relies heavily on donor assistance, remittances and foreign direct investment. Senegal reached a growth rate of 7% in 2017, due in part to strong performance in agriculture despite erratic rainfall.
President Macky SALL, who was elected in March 2012 under a reformist policy agenda, inherited an economy with high energy costs, a challenging business environment, and a culture of overspending. President SALL unveiled an ambitious economic plan, the Emerging Senegal Plan (ESP), which aims to implement priority economic reforms and investment projects to increase economic growth while preserving macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability. Bureaucratic bottlenecks and a challenging business climate are among the perennial challenges that may slow the implementation of this plan.
Senegal receives technical support from the IMF under a Policy Support Instrument (PSI) to assist with implementation of the ESP. The PSI implementation continues to be satisfactory as concluded by the IMF’s fifth review in December 2017. Financial markets have signaled confidence in Senegal through successful Eurobond issuances in 2014, 2017, and 2018.
The government is focusing on 19 projects under the ESP to continue The government’s goal under the ESP is structural transformation of the economy. Key projects include the Thiès-Touba Highway, the new international airport opened in December 2017, and upgrades to energy infrastructure. The cost of electricity is a chief constraint for Senegal’s development. Electricity prices in Senegal are among the highest in the world. Power Africa, a US presidential initiative led by USAID, supports Senegal’s plans to improve reliability and increase generating capacity.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1032,10 +1032,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "207,592 (2019)" + "text": "228,774 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.27 (2019 est.)" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1074,10 +1074,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "153,813 (2021)" + "text": "153,813 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.92 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.92 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1177,8 +1177,11 @@ "note": "note - the National Police operates in major cities, while the Gendarmerie primarily operates outside urban areas" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.7% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { - "text": "1.5% of GDP (2020)" + "text": "1.5% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2019": { "text": "1.5% of GDP (2019 est.) (approximately $490 million)" @@ -1188,9 +1191,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.5% of GDP (2017) (approximately $430 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.4% of GDP (2016) (approximately $400 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/sh.json b/africa/sh.json index e10bf0b3..d3a0ac16 100644 --- a/africa/sh.json +++ b/africa/sh.json @@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "3,000 (2018)" + "text": "3,000 (2018 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "49.93 (2018 est.)" @@ -702,10 +702,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "1,000 (2018 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "16.64 (2021 est.)" + "text": "17 (2020 est.)" } }, "Communications - note": { diff --git a/africa/sl.json b/africa/sl.json index b31a6b2e..b33ab0f6 100644 --- a/africa/sl.json +++ b/africa/sl.json @@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Sierra Leone is extremely poor and nearly half of the working-age population engages in subsistence agriculture. The country possesses substantial mineral, agricultural, and fishery resources, but it is still recovering from a civil war that destroyed most institutions before ending in the early 2000s.
In recent years, economic growth has been driven by mining - particularly iron ore. The country’s principal exports are iron ore, diamonds, and rutile, and the economy is vulnerable to fluctuations in international prices. Until 2014, the government had relied on external assistance to support its budget, but it was gradually becoming more independent. The Ebola outbreak of 2014 and 2015, combined with falling global commodities prices, caused a significant contraction of economic activity in all areas. While the World Health Organization declared an end to the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone in November 2015, low commodity prices in 2015-2016 contributed to the country’s biggest fiscal shortfall since 2001. In 2017, increased iron ore exports, together with the end of the Ebola epidemic, supported a resumption of economic growth.
Continued economic growth will depend on rising commodities prices and increased efforts to diversify the sources of growth. Non-mining activities will remain constrained by inadequate infrastructure, such as power and roads, even though power sector projects may provide some additional electricity capacity in the near term. Pervasive corruption and undeveloped human capital will continue to deter foreign investors. Sustained international donor support in the near future will partially offset these fiscal constraints.
" + "text": "Sierra Leone is extremely poor and nearly half of the working-age population engages in subsistence agriculture. The country possesses substantial mineral, agricultural, and fishery resources, but it is still recovering from a civil war that destroyed most institutions before ending in the early 2000s.
In recent years, economic growth has been driven by mining - particularly iron ore. The country’s principal exports are iron ore, diamonds, and rutile, and the economy is vulnerable to fluctuations in international prices. Until 2014, the government had relied on external assistance to support its budget, but it was gradually becoming more independent. The Ebola outbreak of 2014 and 2015, combined with falling global commodities prices, caused a significant contraction of economic activity in all areas. While the World Health Organization declared an end to the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone in November 2015, low commodity prices in 2015-2016 contributed to the country’s biggest fiscal shortfall since 2001. In 2017, increased iron ore exports, together with the end of the Ebola epidemic, supported a resumption of economic growth.
Continued economic growth will depend on rising commodities prices and increased efforts to diversify the sources of growth. Non-mining activities will remain constrained by inadequate infrastructure, such as power and roads, even though power sector projects may provide some additional electricity capacity in the near term. Pervasive corruption and undeveloped human capital will continue to deter foreign investors. Sustained international donor support in the near future will partially offset these fiscal constraints.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "189 (2020)" + "text": "189 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "0 (2020 est.)" @@ -1108,6 +1108,9 @@ "text": "Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF): operates under a Joint Force Command with Land Forces, Maritime Forces, and an Air Wing (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "0.3% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "0.3% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1119,9 +1122,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "0.3% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $40 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "0.4% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $45 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/so.json b/africa/so.json index 998bc932..b4042579 100644 --- a/africa/so.json +++ b/africa/so.json @@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Despite the lack of effective national governance, Somalia maintains an informal economy largely based on livestock, remittance/money transfer companies, and telecommunications. Somalia's government lacks the ability to collect domestic revenue and external debt – mostly in arrears – was estimated at about 77% of GDP in 2017.
Agriculture is the most important sector, with livestock normally accounting for about 40% of GDP and more than 50% of export earnings. Nomads and semi-pastoralists, who are dependent upon livestock for their livelihood, make up a large portion of the population. Economic activity is estimated to have increased by 2.4% in 2017 because of growth in the agriculture, construction and telecommunications sector. Somalia's small industrial sector, based on the processing of agricultural products, has largely been looted and the machinery sold as scrap metal.
In recent years, Somalia's capital city, Mogadishu, has witnessed the development of the city's first gas stations, supermarkets, and airline flights to Turkey since the collapse of central authority in 1991. Mogadishu's main market offers a variety of goods from food to electronic gadgets. Hotels continue to operate and are supported with private-security militias. Formalized economic growth has yet to expand outside of Mogadishu and a few regional capitals, and within the city, security concerns dominate business. Telecommunication firms provide wireless services in most major cities and offer the lowest international call rates on the continent. In the absence of a formal banking sector, money transfer/remittance services have sprouted throughout the country, handling up to $1.6 billion in remittances annually, although international concerns over the money transfers into Somalia continues to threaten these services’ ability to operate in Western nations. In 2017, Somalia elected a new president and collected a record amount of foreign aid and investment, a positive sign for economic recovery.
" + "text": "Despite the lack of effective national governance, Somalia maintains an informal economy largely based on livestock, remittance/money transfer companies, and telecommunications. Somalia's government lacks the ability to collect domestic revenue and external debt – mostly in arrears – was estimated at about 77% of GDP in 2017.
Agriculture is the most important sector, with livestock normally accounting for about 40% of GDP and more than 50% of export earnings. Nomads and semi-pastoralists, who are dependent upon livestock for their livelihood, make up a large portion of the population. Economic activity is estimated to have increased by 2.4% in 2017 because of growth in the agriculture, construction and telecommunications sector. Somalia's small industrial sector, based on the processing of agricultural products, has largely been looted and the machinery sold as scrap metal.
In recent years, Somalia's capital city, Mogadishu, has witnessed the development of the city's first gas stations, supermarkets, and airline flights to Turkey since the collapse of central authority in 1991. Mogadishu's main market offers a variety of goods from food to electronic gadgets. Hotels continue to operate and are supported with private-security militias. Formalized economic growth has yet to expand outside of Mogadishu and a few regional capitals, and within the city, security concerns dominate business. Telecommunication firms provide wireless services in most major cities and offer the lowest international call rates on the continent. In the absence of a formal banking sector, money transfer/remittance services have sprouted throughout the country, handling up to $1.6 billion in remittances annually, although international concerns over the money transfers into Somalia continues to threaten these services’ ability to operate in Western nations. In 2017, Somalia elected a new president and collected a record amount of foreign aid and investment, a positive sign for economic recovery.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -909,10 +909,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "74,800 (2018)" + "text": "91,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0 (2018 est.)" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -951,10 +951,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "119,000 (2021)" + "text": "119,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.75 (2021 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0.75 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, diff --git a/africa/su.json b/africa/su.json index 29b41498..b83d889b 100644 --- a/africa/su.json +++ b/africa/su.json @@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "129,408 (2020)" + "text": "129,408 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" @@ -1052,10 +1052,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "28,782 (2021)" + "text": "28,782 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.07 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.07 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1210,7 +1210,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "799,545 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 128,996 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 93,482 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers), 73,335 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 28,023 (Central African Republic) (2022)" + "text": "803,634 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 128,996 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 93,482 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers), 73,335 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 28,028 (Central African Republic) (2022)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "2,276,000 (civil war 1983-2005; ongoing conflict in Darfur region; government and rebel fighting along South Sudan border; inter-tribal clashes) (2020)" diff --git a/africa/to.json b/africa/to.json index 0db96f8c..7d84166d 100644 --- a/africa/to.json +++ b/africa/to.json @@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Togo has enjoyed a period of steady economic growth fueled by political stability and a concerted effort by the government to modernize the country’s commercial infrastructure, but discontent with President Faure GNASSINGBE has led to a rapid rise in protests, creating downside risks. The country completed an ambitious large-scale infrastructure improvement program, including new principal roads, a new airport terminal, and a new seaport. The economy depends heavily on both commercial and subsistence agriculture, providing employment for around 60% of the labor force. Some basic foodstuffs must still be imported. Cocoa, coffee, and cotton and other agricultural products generate about 20% of export earnings with cotton being the most important cash crop. Togo is among the world's largest producers of phosphate and seeks to develop its carbonate phosphate reserves, which provide more than 20% of export earnings.
Supported by the World Bank and the IMF, the government's decade-long effort to implement economic reform measures, encourage foreign investment, and bring revenues in line with expenditures has moved slowly. Togo completed its IMF Extended Credit Facility in 2011 and reached a Heavily Indebted Poor Country debt relief completion point in 2010 at which 95% of the country's debt was forgiven. Togo continues to work with the IMF on structural reforms, and in January 2017, the IMF signed an Extended Credit Facility arrangement consisting of a three-year $238 million loan package. Progress depends on follow through on privatization, increased transparency in government financial operations, progress toward legislative elections, and continued support from foreign donors.
Togo’s 2017 economic growth probably remained steady at 5.0%, largely driven by infusions of foreign aid, infrastructure investment in its port and mineral industry, and improvements in the business climate. Foreign direct investment inflows have slowed in recent years.
" + "text": "Togo has enjoyed a period of steady economic growth fueled by political stability and a concerted effort by the government to modernize the country’s commercial infrastructure, but discontent with President Faure GNASSINGBE has led to a rapid rise in protests, creating downside risks. The country completed an ambitious large-scale infrastructure improvement program, including new principal roads, a new airport terminal, and a new seaport. The economy depends heavily on both commercial and subsistence agriculture, providing employment for around 60% of the labor force. Some basic foodstuffs must still be imported. Cocoa, coffee, and cotton and other agricultural products generate about 20% of export earnings with cotton being the most important cash crop. Togo is among the world's largest producers of phosphate and seeks to develop its carbonate phosphate reserves, which provide more than 20% of export earnings.
Supported by the World Bank and the IMF, the government's decade-long effort to implement economic reform measures, encourage foreign investment, and bring revenues in line with expenditures has moved slowly. Togo completed its IMF Extended Credit Facility in 2011 and reached a Heavily Indebted Poor Country debt relief completion point in 2010 at which 95% of the country's debt was forgiven. Togo continues to work with the IMF on structural reforms, and in January 2017, the IMF signed an Extended Credit Facility arrangement consisting of a three-year $238 million loan package. Progress depends on follow through on privatization, increased transparency in government financial operations, progress toward legislative elections, and continued support from foreign donors.
Togo’s 2017 economic growth probably remained steady at 5.0%, largely driven by infusions of foreign aid, infrastructure investment in its port and mineral industry, and improvements in the business climate. Foreign direct investment inflows have slowed in recent years.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1018,10 +1018,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "46,499 (2020)" + "text": "46,499 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1060,10 +1060,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "52,706 (2021) DSL, dedicated internet line, Wimax, WLL, FTTH" + "text": "52,706 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.64 (2021 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0.64 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1157,6 +1157,9 @@ "note": "note - the Gendarmerie falls under the Ministry of Defense but also reports to the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection on many matters involving law enforcement and internal security" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.8% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "2% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1168,9 +1171,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.9% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $130 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.8% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $120 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/tp.json b/africa/tp.json index 2f33f8f0..37d6b0c3 100644 --- a/africa/tp.json +++ b/africa/tp.json @@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The economy of São Tomé and Príncipe is small, based mainly on agricultural production, and, since independence in 1975, increasingly dependent on the export of cocoa beans. Cocoa production has substantially declined in recent years because of drought and mismanagement. Sao Tome depends heavily on imports of food, fuels, most manufactured goods, and consumer goods, and changes in commodity prices affect the country’s inflation rate. Maintaining control of inflation, fiscal discipline, and increasing flows of foreign direct investment into the nascent oil sector are major economic problems facing the country. In recent years the government has attempted to reduce price controls and subsidies. In 2017, several business-related laws were enacted that aim to improve the business climate.
São Tomé and Príncipe has had difficulty servicing its external debt and has relied heavily on concessional aid and debt rescheduling. In April 2011, the country completed a Threshold Country Program with The Millennium Challenge Corporation to help increase tax revenues, reform customs, and improve the business environment. In 2016, Sao Tome and Portugal signed a five-year cooperation agreement worth approximately $64 million, some of which will be provided as loans. In 2017, China and São Tomé signed a mutual cooperation agreement in areas such as infrastructure, health, and agriculture worth approximately $146 million over five years.
Considerable potential exists for development of tourism, and the government has taken steps to expand tourist facilities in recent years. Potential also exists for the development of petroleum resources in São Tomé and Príncipe's territorial waters in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea, some of which are being jointly developed in a 60-40 split with Nigeria, but production is at least several years off.
Volatile aid and investment inflows have limited growth, and poverty remains high. Restricteded capacity at the main port increases the periodic risk of shortages of consumer goods. Contract enforcement in the country’s judicial system is difficult. The IMF in late 2016 expressed concern about vulnerabilities in the country’s banking sector, although the country plans some austerity measures in line with IMF recommendations under their three year extended credit facility. Deforestation, coastal erosion, poor waste management, and misuse of natural resources also are challenging issues.
" + "text": "The economy of São Tomé and Príncipe is small, based mainly on agricultural production, and, since independence in 1975, increasingly dependent on the export of cocoa beans. Cocoa production has substantially declined in recent years because of drought and mismanagement. Sao Tome depends heavily on imports of food, fuels, most manufactured goods, and consumer goods, and changes in commodity prices affect the country’s inflation rate. Maintaining control of inflation, fiscal discipline, and increasing flows of foreign direct investment into the nascent oil sector are major economic problems facing the country. In recent years the government has attempted to reduce price controls and subsidies. In 2017, several business-related laws were enacted that aim to improve the business climate.
São Tomé and Príncipe has had difficulty servicing its external debt and has relied heavily on concessional aid and debt rescheduling. In April 2011, the country completed a Threshold Country Program with The Millennium Challenge Corporation to help increase tax revenues, reform customs, and improve the business environment. In 2016, Sao Tome and Portugal signed a five-year cooperation agreement worth approximately $64 million, some of which will be provided as loans. In 2017, China and São Tomé signed a mutual cooperation agreement in areas such as infrastructure, health, and agriculture worth approximately $146 million over five years.
Considerable potential exists for development of tourism, and the government has taken steps to expand tourist facilities in recent years. Potential also exists for the development of petroleum resources in São Tomé and Príncipe's territorial waters in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea, some of which are being jointly developed in a 60-40 split with Nigeria, but production is at least several years off.
Volatile aid and investment inflows have limited growth, and poverty remains high. Restricteded capacity at the main port increases the periodic risk of shortages of consumer goods. Contract enforcement in the country’s judicial system is difficult. The IMF in late 2016 expressed concern about vulnerabilities in the country’s banking sector, although the country plans some austerity measures in line with IMF recommendations under their three year extended credit facility. Deforestation, coastal erosion, poor waste management, and misuse of natural resources also are challenging issues.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -965,10 +965,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,720 (2020)" + "text": "2,790 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.24 (2020 est.)" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1007,10 +1007,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "2,512 (2021)" + "text": "2,512 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.15 (2021)" + "text": "1.15 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/africa/ts.json b/africa/ts.json index a2d6c2d3..941ada01 100644 --- a/africa/ts.json +++ b/africa/ts.json @@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ }, "Constitution": { "history": { - "text": "several previous; latest approved by Constituent Assembly 26 January 2014, signed by the president, prime minister, and Constituent Assembly speaker 27 January 2014; note - in mid-December 2021 President Kais SAIED announced that a constitutional referendum would be held in late July 2022" + "text": "history: several previous; latest approved by Constituent Assembly 26 January 2014, signed by the president, prime minister, and Constituent Assembly speaker on 27 January 2014; note - in September 2021, President Kais SAIED issued a decree granting him certain executive, legislative, and judiciary powers, and the authority to rule by decree, but allowed continued implementation of the preamble and chapters one and two of the Constitution, which guarantee rights and freedoms; in mid-December 202, SAIED announced that a constitutional referendum would be held on 25 July 2022
" }, "amendments": { "text": "proposed by the president of the republic or by one third of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People membership; following review by the Constitutional Court, approval to proceed requires an absolute majority vote by the Assembly and final passage requires a two-thirds majority vote by the Assembly; the president can opt to submit an amendment to a referendum, which requires an absolute majority of votes cast for passage" @@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ }, "Legislative branch": { "description": { - "text": "note: on 25 July 2021, President SAIED suspended indefinitely the AssemblyTunisia's economy – structurally designed to favor vested interests – faced an array of challenges exposed by the 2008 global financial crisis that helped precipitate the 2011 Arab Spring revolution. After the revolution and a series of terrorist attacks, including on the country’s tourism sector, barriers to economic inclusion continued to add to slow economic growth and high unemployment.
Following an ill-fated experiment with socialist economic policies in the 1960s, Tunisia focused on bolstering exports, foreign investment, and tourism, all of which have become central to the country's economy. Key exports now include textiles and apparel, food products, petroleum products, chemicals, and phosphates, with about 80% of exports bound for Tunisia's main economic partner, the EU. Tunisia's strategy, coupled with investments in education and infrastructure, fueled decades of 4-5% annual GDP growth and improved living standards. Former President Zine el Abidine BEN ALI (1987-2011) continued these policies, but as his reign wore on cronyism and corruption stymied economic performance, unemployment rose, and the informal economy grew. Tunisia’s economy became less and less inclusive. These grievances contributed to the January 2011 overthrow of BEN ALI, further depressing Tunisia's economy as tourism and investment declined sharply.
Tunisia’s government remains under pressure to boost economic growth quickly to mitigate chronic socio-economic challenges, especially high levels of youth unemployment, which has persisted since the 2011 revolution. Successive terrorist attacks against the tourism sector and worker strikes in the phosphate sector, which combined account for nearly 15% of GDP, slowed growth from 2015 to 2017. Tunis is seeking increased foreign investment and working with the IMF through an Extended Fund Facility agreement to fix fiscal deficiencies.
" + "text": "Tunisia's economy – structurally designed to favor vested interests – faced an array of challenges exposed by the 2008 global financial crisis that helped precipitate the 2011 Arab Spring revolution. After the revolution and a series of terrorist attacks, including on the country’s tourism sector, barriers to economic inclusion continued to add to slow economic growth and high unemployment.
Following an ill-fated experiment with socialist economic policies in the 1960s, Tunisia focused on bolstering exports, foreign investment, and tourism, all of which have become central to the country's economy. Key exports now include textiles and apparel, food products, petroleum products, chemicals, and phosphates, with about 80% of exports bound for Tunisia's main economic partner, the EU. Tunisia's strategy, coupled with investments in education and infrastructure, fueled decades of 4-5% annual GDP growth and improved living standards. Former President Zine el Abidine BEN ALI (1987-2011) continued these policies, but as his reign wore on cronyism and corruption stymied economic performance, unemployment rose, and the informal economy grew. Tunisia’s economy became less and less inclusive. These grievances contributed to the January 2011 overthrow of BEN ALI, further depressing Tunisia's economy as tourism and investment declined sharply.
Tunisia’s government remains under pressure to boost economic growth quickly to mitigate chronic socio-economic challenges, especially high levels of youth unemployment, which has persisted since the 2011 revolution. Successive terrorist attacks against the tourism sector and worker strikes in the phosphate sector, which combined account for nearly 15% of GDP, slowed growth from 2015 to 2017. Tunis is seeking increased foreign investment and working with the IMF through an Extended Fund Facility agreement to fix fiscal deficiencies.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -981,10 +981,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1,533,273 (2020)" + "text": "1,533,273 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "12.97 (2020 est.)" + "text": "13 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1023,10 +1023,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,334,059 (2021)" + "text": "1,334,059 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "11.29 (2021)" + "text": "11 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1126,8 +1126,11 @@ "note": "note - the National Police has primary responsibility for law enforcement in the major cities, while the National Guard (gendarmerie) oversees border security and patrols smaller towns and rural areas" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "3% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { - "text": "2.9% of GDP (2020 est.)" + "text": "3% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2019": { "text": "3.8% of GDP (2019 est.) (approximately $2.81 billion)" @@ -1137,9 +1140,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "4% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $2.81 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "4.4% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $2.95 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/tz.json b/africa/tz.json index 3ab3ed50..16cc86cd 100644 --- a/africa/tz.json +++ b/africa/tz.json @@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Tanzania has achieved high growth rates based on its vast natural resource wealth and tourism with GDP growth in 2009-17 averaging 6%-7% per year. Dar es Salaam used fiscal stimulus measures and easier monetary policies to lessen the impact of the global recession and in general, benefited from low oil prices. Tanzania has largely completed its transition to a market economy, though the government retains a presence in sectors such as telecommunications, banking, energy, and mining.
The economy depends on agriculture, which accounts for slightly less than one-quarter of GDP and employs about 65% of the work force, although gold production in recent years has increased to about 35% of exports. All land in Tanzania is owned by the government, which can lease land for up to 99 years. Proposed reforms to allow for land ownership, particularly foreign land ownership, remain unpopular.
The financial sector in Tanzania has expanded in recent years and foreign-owned banks account for about 48% of the banking industry's total assets. Competition among foreign commercial banks has resulted in significant improvements in the efficiency and quality of financial services, though interest rates are still relatively high, reflecting high fraud risk. Banking reforms have helped increase private-sector growth and investment.
The World Bank, the IMF, and bilateral donors have provided funds to rehabilitate Tanzania's aging infrastructure, including rail and port, which provide important trade links for inland countries. In 2013, Tanzania completed the world's largest Millennium Challenge Compact (MCC) grant, worth $698 million, but in late 2015, the MCC Board of Directors deferred a decision to renew Tanzania’s eligibility because of irregularities in voting in Zanzibar and concerns over the government's use of a controversial cybercrime bill.
The new government elected in 2015 has developed an ambitious development agenda focused on creating a better business environment through improved infrastructure, access to financing, and education progress, but implementing budgets remains challenging for the government. Recent policy moves by President MAGUFULI are aimed at protecting domestic industry and have caused concern among foreign investors.
" + "text": "Tanzania has achieved high growth rates based on its vast natural resource wealth and tourism with GDP growth in 2009-17 averaging 6%-7% per year. Dar es Salaam used fiscal stimulus measures and easier monetary policies to lessen the impact of the global recession and in general, benefited from low oil prices. Tanzania has largely completed its transition to a market economy, though the government retains a presence in sectors such as telecommunications, banking, energy, and mining.
The economy depends on agriculture, which accounts for slightly less than one-quarter of GDP and employs about 65% of the work force, although gold production in recent years has increased to about 35% of exports. All land in Tanzania is owned by the government, which can lease land for up to 99 years. Proposed reforms to allow for land ownership, particularly foreign land ownership, remain unpopular.
The financial sector in Tanzania has expanded in recent years and foreign-owned banks account for about 48% of the banking industry's total assets. Competition among foreign commercial banks has resulted in significant improvements in the efficiency and quality of financial services, though interest rates are still relatively high, reflecting high fraud risk. Banking reforms have helped increase private-sector growth and investment.
The World Bank, the IMF, and bilateral donors have provided funds to rehabilitate Tanzania's aging infrastructure, including rail and port, which provide important trade links for inland countries. In 2013, Tanzania completed the world's largest Millennium Challenge Compact (MCC) grant, worth $698 million, but in late 2015, the MCC Board of Directors deferred a decision to renew Tanzania’s eligibility because of irregularities in voting in Zanzibar and concerns over the government's use of a controversial cybercrime bill.
The new government elected in 2015 has developed an ambitious development agenda focused on creating a better business environment through improved infrastructure, access to financing, and education progress, but implementing budgets remains challenging for the government. Recent policy moves by President MAGUFULI are aimed at protecting domestic industry and have caused concern among foreign investors.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1040,10 +1040,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "72,469 (2020)" + "text": "72,469 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1082,10 +1082,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,135,608 (2021)" + "text": "1,135,608 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.9 (2021 est.)" + "text": "2 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1198,6 +1198,9 @@ "note": "note - the National Building Army is a paramilitary organization under the Defense Forces that provides 6 months of military and vocational training to individuals as part of their 2 years of public service; after completion of training, some graduates join the regular Defense Forces while the remainder become part of the People's (or Citizen's) Militia" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.1% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.2% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1209,9 +1212,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $690 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.1% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $690 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { @@ -1245,7 +1245,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "127,009 (Burundi), 80,599 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2022)" + "text": "127,104 (Burundi), 80,599 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2022)" } }, "Trafficking in persons": { diff --git a/africa/ug.json b/africa/ug.json index 50dece53..1eed57ba 100644 --- a/africa/ug.json +++ b/africa/ug.json @@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Uganda has substantial natural resources, including fertile soils, regular rainfall, substantial reserves of recoverable oil, and small deposits of copper, gold, and other minerals. Agriculture is one of the most important sectors of the economy, employing 72% of the work force. The country’s export market suffered a major slump following the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan, but has recovered lately, largely due to record coffee harvests, which account for 16% of exports, and increasing gold exports, which account for 10% of exports. Uganda has a small industrial sector that is dependent on imported inputs such as refined oil and heavy equipment. Overall, productivity is hampered by a number of supply-side constraints, including insufficient infrastructure, lack of modern technology in agriculture, and corruption.
Uganda’s economic growth has slowed since 2016 as government spending and public debt has grown. Uganda’s budget is dominated by energy and road infrastructure spending, while Uganda relies on donor support for long-term drivers of growth, including agriculture, health, and education. The largest infrastructure projects are externally financed through concessional loans, but at inflated costs. As a result, debt servicing for these loans is expected to rise.
Oil revenues and taxes are expected to become a larger source of government funding as oil production starts in the next three to 10 years. Over the next three to five years, foreign investors are planning to invest $9 billion in production facilities projects, $4 billion in an export pipeline, as well as in a $2-3 billion refinery to produce petroleum products for the domestic and East African Community markets. Furthermore, the government is looking to build several hundred million dollars’ worth of highway projects to the oil region.
Uganda faces many economic challenges. Instability in South Sudan has led to a sharp increase in Sudanese refugees and is disrupting Uganda's main export market. Additional economic risks include: poor economic management, endemic corruption, and the government’s failure to invest adequately in the health, education, and economic opportunities for a burgeoning young population. Uganda has one of the lowest electrification rates in Africa - only 22% of Ugandans have access to electricity, dropping to 10% in rural areas.
" + "text": "Uganda has substantial natural resources, including fertile soils, regular rainfall, substantial reserves of recoverable oil, and small deposits of copper, gold, and other minerals. Agriculture is one of the most important sectors of the economy, employing 72% of the work force. The country’s export market suffered a major slump following the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan, but has recovered lately, largely due to record coffee harvests, which account for 16% of exports, and increasing gold exports, which account for 10% of exports. Uganda has a small industrial sector that is dependent on imported inputs such as refined oil and heavy equipment. Overall, productivity is hampered by a number of supply-side constraints, including insufficient infrastructure, lack of modern technology in agriculture, and corruption.
Uganda’s economic growth has slowed since 2016 as government spending and public debt has grown. Uganda’s budget is dominated by energy and road infrastructure spending, while Uganda relies on donor support for long-term drivers of growth, including agriculture, health, and education. The largest infrastructure projects are externally financed through concessional loans, but at inflated costs. As a result, debt servicing for these loans is expected to rise.
Oil revenues and taxes are expected to become a larger source of government funding as oil production starts in the next three to 10 years. Over the next three to five years, foreign investors are planning to invest $9 billion in production facilities projects, $4 billion in an export pipeline, as well as in a $2-3 billion refinery to produce petroleum products for the domestic and East African Community markets. Furthermore, the government is looking to build several hundred million dollars’ worth of highway projects to the oil region.
Uganda faces many economic challenges. Instability in South Sudan has led to a sharp increase in Sudanese refugees and is disrupting Uganda's main export market. Additional economic risks include: poor economic management, endemic corruption, and the government’s failure to invest adequately in the health, education, and economic opportunities for a burgeoning young population. Uganda has one of the lowest electrification rates in Africa - only 22% of Ugandans have access to electricity, dropping to 10% in rural areas.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1032,7 +1032,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "90,774 (2020)" + "text": "90,774 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" @@ -1074,10 +1074,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "58,594 (2021)" + "text": "58,594 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.13 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.13 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1166,6 +1166,9 @@ "note": "note - in 2018, President MUSEVENI created a volunteer force of Local Defense Units under the military to beef up local security in designated parts of the country" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "2.5% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "2.5% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1177,9 +1180,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.2% of GDP (2017) (approximately $610 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.3% of GDP (2016) (approximately $620 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/uv.json b/africa/uv.json index 2f7f2605..9061a994 100644 --- a/africa/uv.json +++ b/africa/uv.json @@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Burkina Faso is a poor, landlocked country that depends on adequate rainfall. Irregular patterns of rainfall, poor soil, and the lack of adequate communications and other infrastructure contribute to the economy’s vulnerability to external shocks. About 80% of the population is engaged in subsistence farming and cotton is the main cash crop. The country has few natural resources and a weak industrial base.
Cotton and gold are Burkina Faso’s key exports - gold has accounted for about three-quarters of the country’s total export revenues. Burkina Faso’s economic growth and revenue depends largely on production levels and global prices for the two commodities. The country has seen an upswing in gold exploration, production, and exports.
In 2016, the government adopted a new development strategy, set forth in the 2016-2020 National Plan for Economic and Social Development, that aims to reduce poverty, build human capital, and to satisfy basic needs. A new three-year IMF program (2018-2020), approved in 2018, will allow the government to reduce the budget deficit and preserve critical spending on social services and priority public investments.
While the end of the political crisis has allowed Burkina Faso’s economy to resume positive growth, the country’s fragile security situation could put these gains at risk. Political insecurity in neighboring Mali, unreliable energy supplies, and poor transportation links pose long-term challenges.
" + "text": "Burkina Faso is a poor, landlocked country that depends on adequate rainfall. Irregular patterns of rainfall, poor soil, and the lack of adequate communications and other infrastructure contribute to the economy’s vulnerability to external shocks. About 80% of the population is engaged in subsistence farming and cotton is the main cash crop. The country has few natural resources and a weak industrial base.
Cotton and gold are Burkina Faso’s key exports - gold has accounted for about three-quarters of the country’s total export revenues. Burkina Faso’s economic growth and revenue depends largely on production levels and global prices for the two commodities. The country has seen an upswing in gold exploration, production, and exports.
In 2016, the government adopted a new development strategy, set forth in the 2016-2020 National Plan for Economic and Social Development, that aims to reduce poverty, build human capital, and to satisfy basic needs. A new three-year IMF program (2018-2020), approved in 2018, will allow the government to reduce the budget deficit and preserve critical spending on social services and priority public investments.
While the end of the political crisis has allowed Burkina Faso’s economy to resume positive growth, the country’s fragile security situation could put these gains at risk. Political insecurity in neighboring Mali, unreliable energy supplies, and poor transportation links pose long-term challenges.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1015,10 +1015,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "75,039 (2020)" + "text": "75,039 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1057,10 +1057,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "13,979 (2021)" + "text": "13,979 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.07 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.1 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1139,8 +1139,11 @@ "note": "note - the National Gendarmerie officially reports to the Ministry of Defense, but usually operates in support of the Ministry of Security and the Ministry of Justice; Gendarmerie troops are typically integrated with Army forces in anti-terrorism operations; for example, Gendarmerie, Army, and police forces were combined to form a 1,500-member task force known as the Groupement des Forces Anti-Terroristes (GFAT) to address terrorist activities along the country's northern border in 2013" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "2.4% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { - "text": "2.5% of GDP (2020 est.)" + "text": "2.4% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2019": { "text": "2.2% of GDP (2019 est.) (approximately $450 million)" @@ -1150,9 +1153,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.4% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $260 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.2% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $200 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { @@ -1187,7 +1187,7 @@ "text": "24,756 (Mali) (2022)" }, "IDPs": { - "text": "1,814,283 (2022)
" + "text": "1,850,293 (2022)
" } } } diff --git a/africa/wa.json b/africa/wa.json index d817d210..d013833e 100644 --- a/africa/wa.json +++ b/africa/wa.json @@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Namibia’s economy is heavily dependent on the extraction and processing of minerals for export. Mining accounts for about 12.5% of GDP, but provides more than 50% of foreign exchange earnings. Rich alluvial diamond deposits make Namibia a primary source for gem-quality diamonds. Marine diamond mining is increasingly important as the terrestrial diamond supply has dwindled. The rising cost of mining diamonds, especially from the sea, combined with increased diamond production in Russia and China, has reduced profit margins. Namibian authorities have emphasized the need to add value to raw materials, do more in-country manufacturing, and exploit the services market, especially in the logistics and transportation sectors.
Namibia is one of the world’s largest producers of uranium. The Chinese-owned Husab uranium mine began producing uranium ore in 2017, and is expected to reach full production in August 2018 and produce 15 million pounds of uranium a year. Namibia also produces large quantities of zinc and is a smaller producer of gold and copper. Namibia's economy remains vulnerable to world commodity price fluctuations and drought.
Namibia normally imports about 50% of its cereal requirements; in drought years, food shortages are problematic in rural areas. A high per capita GDP, relative to the region, obscures one of the world's most unequal income distributions; the current government has prioritized exploring wealth redistribution schemes while trying to maintain a pro-business environment. GDP growth in 2017 slowed to about 1%, however, due to contractions in both the construction and mining sectors, as well as an ongoing drought. Growth is expected to recover modestly in 2018.
A five-year Millennium Challenge Corporation compact ended in September 2014. As an upper middle income country, Namibia is ineligible for a second compact. The Namibian economy is closely linked to South Africa with the Namibian dollar pegged one-to-one to the South African rand. Namibia receives 30%-40% of its revenues from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); volatility in the size of Namibia's annual SACU allotment and global mineral prices complicates budget planning.
" + "text": "Namibia’s economy is heavily dependent on the extraction and processing of minerals for export. Mining accounts for about 12.5% of GDP, but provides more than 50% of foreign exchange earnings. Rich alluvial diamond deposits make Namibia a primary source for gem-quality diamonds. Marine diamond mining is increasingly important as the terrestrial diamond supply has dwindled. The rising cost of mining diamonds, especially from the sea, combined with increased diamond production in Russia and China, has reduced profit margins. Namibian authorities have emphasized the need to add value to raw materials, do more in-country manufacturing, and exploit the services market, especially in the logistics and transportation sectors.
Namibia is one of the world’s largest producers of uranium. The Chinese-owned Husab uranium mine began producing uranium ore in 2017, and is expected to reach full production in August 2018 and produce 15 million pounds of uranium a year. Namibia also produces large quantities of zinc and is a smaller producer of gold and copper. Namibia's economy remains vulnerable to world commodity price fluctuations and drought.
Namibia normally imports about 50% of its cereal requirements; in drought years, food shortages are problematic in rural areas. A high per capita GDP, relative to the region, obscures one of the world's most unequal income distributions; the current government has prioritized exploring wealth redistribution schemes while trying to maintain a pro-business environment. GDP growth in 2017 slowed to about 1%, however, due to contractions in both the construction and mining sectors, as well as an ongoing drought. Growth is expected to recover modestly in 2018.
A five-year Millennium Challenge Corporation compact ended in September 2014. As an upper middle income country, Namibia is ineligible for a second compact. The Namibian economy is closely linked to South Africa with the Namibian dollar pegged one-to-one to the South African rand. Namibia receives 30%-40% of its revenues from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); volatility in the size of Namibia's annual SACU allotment and global mineral prices complicates budget planning.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1019,10 +1019,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "141,334 (2020)" + "text": "140,370 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "5.56 (2020 est.)" + "text": "6 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1061,10 +1061,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "71,063 (2021)" + "text": "71,063 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "2.8 (2021)" + "text": "3 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1160,6 +1160,9 @@ "text": "Namibian Defense Force (NDF): Army, Navy, Air ForceA small, landlocked kingdom, Eswatini is bordered in the north, west and south by the Republic of South Africa and by Mozambique in the east. Eswatini depends on South Africa for a majority of its exports and imports. Eswatini's currency is pegged to the South African rand, effectively relinquishing Eswatini's monetary policy to South Africa. The government is dependent on customs duties from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) for almost half of its revenue. Eswatini is a lower middle income country. As of 2017, more than one-quarter of the adult population was infected by HIV/AIDS; Eswatini has the world’s highest HIV prevalence rate, a financial strain and source of economic instability.
The manufacturing sector diversified in the 1980s and 1990s, but manufacturing has grown little in the last decade. Sugar and soft drink concentrate are the largest foreign exchange earners, although a drought in 2015-16 decreased sugar production and exports. Overgrazing, soil depletion, drought, and floods are persistent problems. Mining has declined in importance in recent years. Coal, gold, diamond, and quarry stone mines are small scale, and the only iron ore mine closed in 2014. With an estimated 28% unemployment rate, Eswatini's need to increase the number and size of small and medium enterprises and to attract foreign direct investment is acute.
Eswatini's national development strategy, which expires in 2022, prioritizes increases in infrastructure, agriculture production, and economic diversification, while aiming to reduce poverty and government spending. Eswatini's revenue from SACU receipts are likely to continue to decline as South Africa pushes for a new distribution scheme, making it harder for the government to maintain fiscal balance without introducing new sources of revenue.
" + "text": "A small, landlocked kingdom, Eswatini is bordered in the north, west and south by the Republic of South Africa and by Mozambique in the east. Eswatini depends on South Africa for a majority of its exports and imports. Eswatini's currency is pegged to the South African rand, effectively relinquishing Eswatini's monetary policy to South Africa. The government is dependent on customs duties from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) for almost half of its revenue. Eswatini is a lower middle income country. As of 2017, more than one-quarter of the adult population was infected by HIV/AIDS; Eswatini has the world’s highest HIV prevalence rate, a financial strain and source of economic instability.
The manufacturing sector diversified in the 1980s and 1990s, but manufacturing has grown little in the last decade. Sugar and soft drink concentrate are the largest foreign exchange earners, although a drought in 2015-16 decreased sugar production and exports. Overgrazing, soil depletion, drought, and floods are persistent problems. Mining has declined in importance in recent years. Coal, gold, diamond, and quarry stone mines are small scale, and the only iron ore mine closed in 2014. With an estimated 28% unemployment rate, Eswatini's need to increase the number and size of small and medium enterprises and to attract foreign direct investment is acute.
Eswatini's national development strategy, which expires in 2022, prioritizes increases in infrastructure, agriculture production, and economic diversification, while aiming to reduce poverty and government spending. Eswatini's revenue from SACU receipts are likely to continue to decline as South Africa pushes for a new distribution scheme, making it harder for the government to maintain fiscal balance without introducing new sources of revenue.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -970,10 +970,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "41,000 (2018)" + "text": "39,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "3.65 (2018 est.)" + "text": "3 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1012,10 +1012,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "12,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "12,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.03 (2021)" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1069,6 +1069,9 @@ "text": "Umbutfo Eswatini Defense Force (UEDF): Army (includes a small air wing) (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.7% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.8% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1080,9 +1083,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "2.1% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $140 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "2.2% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $150 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/za.json b/africa/za.json index 3f456050..afba8518 100644 --- a/africa/za.json +++ b/africa/za.json @@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Zambia had one of the world’s fastest growing economies for the ten years up to 2014, with real GDP growth averaging roughly 6.7% per annum, though growth slowed during the period 2015 to 2017, due to falling copper prices, reduced power generation, and depreciation of the kwacha. Zambia’s lack of economic diversification and dependency on copper as its sole major export makes it vulnerable to fluctuations in the world commodities market and prices turned downward in 2015 due to declining demand from China; Zambia was overtaken by the Democratic Republic of Congo as Africa’s largest copper producer. GDP growth picked up in 2017 as mineral prices rose.
Despite recent strong economic growth and its status as a lower middle-income country, widespread and extreme rural poverty and high unemployment levels remain significant problems, made worse by a high birth rate, a relatively high HIV/AIDS burden, by market-distorting agricultural and energy policies, and growing government debt. Zambia raised $7 billion from international investors by issuing separate sovereign bonds in 2012, 2014, and 2015. Concurrently, it issued over $4 billion in domestic debt and agreed to Chinese-financed infrastructure projects, significantly increasing the country’s public debt burden to more than 60% of GDP. The government has considered refinancing $3 billion worth of Eurobonds and significant Chinese loans to cut debt servicing costs.
" + "text": "Zambia had one of the world’s fastest growing economies for the ten years up to 2014, with real GDP growth averaging roughly 6.7% per annum, though growth slowed during the period 2015 to 2017, due to falling copper prices, reduced power generation, and depreciation of the kwacha. Zambia’s lack of economic diversification and dependency on copper as its sole major export makes it vulnerable to fluctuations in the world commodities market and prices turned downward in 2015 due to declining demand from China; Zambia was overtaken by the Democratic Republic of Congo as Africa’s largest copper producer. GDP growth picked up in 2017 as mineral prices rose.
Despite recent strong economic growth and its status as a lower middle-income country, widespread and extreme rural poverty and high unemployment levels remain significant problems, made worse by a high birth rate, a relatively high HIV/AIDS burden, by market-distorting agricultural and energy policies, and growing government debt. Zambia raised $7 billion from international investors by issuing separate sovereign bonds in 2012, 2014, and 2015. Concurrently, it issued over $4 billion in domestic debt and agreed to Chinese-financed infrastructure projects, significantly increasing the country’s public debt burden to more than 60% of GDP. The government has considered refinancing $3 billion worth of Eurobonds and significant Chinese loans to cut debt servicing costs.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1025,10 +1025,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "71,844 (2020)" + "text": "71,844 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1067,10 +1067,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "82,317 (2021)" + "text": "82,317 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.45 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.5 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1176,6 +1176,9 @@ "text": "Zambia Defense Force (ZDF): Zambia Army, Zambia Air Force, Zambia National Service (support organization that also does public work projects); Defense Force Medical Service; Ministry of Home Affairs: Zambia Police (includes a paramilitary battalion) (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.3% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.3% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1187,9 +1190,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.3% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $420 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.5% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $450 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/africa/zi.json b/africa/zi.json index d47be9ff..047a6ed6 100644 --- a/africa/zi.json +++ b/africa/zi.json @@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Zimbabwe's economy depends heavily on its mining and agriculture sectors. Following a contraction from 1998 to 2008, the economy recorded real growth of more than 10% per year in the period 2010-13, before falling below 3% in the period 2014-17, due to poor harvests, low diamond revenues, and decreased investment. Lower mineral prices, infrastructure and regulatory deficiencies, a poor investment climate, a large public and external debt burden, and extremely high government wage expenses impede the country’s economic performance.
Until early 2009, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) routinely printed money to fund the budget deficit, causing hyperinflation. Adoption of a multi-currency basket in early 2009 - which allowed currencies such as the Botswana pula, the South Africa rand, and the US dollar to be used locally - reduced inflation below 10% per year. In January 2015, as part of the government’s effort to boost trade and attract foreign investment, the RBZ announced that the Chinese renmimbi, Indian rupee, Australian dollar, and Japanese yen would be accepted as legal tender in Zimbabwe, though transactions were predominantly carried out in US dollars and South African rand until 2016, when the rand’s devaluation and instability led to near-exclusive use of the US dollar. The government in November 2016 began releasing bond notes, a parallel currency legal only in Zimbabwe which the government claims will have a one-to-one exchange ratio with the US dollar, to ease cash shortages. Bond notes began trading at a discount of up to 10% in the black market by the end of 2016.
Zimbabwe’s government entered a second Staff Monitored Program with the IMF in 2014 and undertook other measures to reengage with international financial institutions. Zimbabwe repaid roughly $108 million in arrears to the IMF in October 2016, but financial observers note that Zimbabwe is unlikely to gain new financing because the government has not disclosed how it plans to repay more than $1.7 billion in arrears to the World Bank and African Development Bank. International financial institutions want Zimbabwe to implement significant fiscal and structural reforms before granting new loans. Foreign and domestic investment continues to be hindered by the lack of land tenure and titling, the inability to repatriate dividends to investors overseas, and the lack of clarity regarding the government’s Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act.
" + "text": "Zimbabwe's economy depends heavily on its mining and agriculture sectors. Following a contraction from 1998 to 2008, the economy recorded real growth of more than 10% per year in the period 2010-13, before falling below 3% in the period 2014-17, due to poor harvests, low diamond revenues, and decreased investment. Lower mineral prices, infrastructure and regulatory deficiencies, a poor investment climate, a large public and external debt burden, and extremely high government wage expenses impede the country’s economic performance.
Until early 2009, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) routinely printed money to fund the budget deficit, causing hyperinflation. Adoption of a multi-currency basket in early 2009 - which allowed currencies such as the Botswana pula, the South Africa rand, and the US dollar to be used locally - reduced inflation below 10% per year. In January 2015, as part of the government’s effort to boost trade and attract foreign investment, the RBZ announced that the Chinese renmimbi, Indian rupee, Australian dollar, and Japanese yen would be accepted as legal tender in Zimbabwe, though transactions were predominantly carried out in US dollars and South African rand until 2016, when the rand’s devaluation and instability led to near-exclusive use of the US dollar. The government in November 2016 began releasing bond notes, a parallel currency legal only in Zimbabwe which the government claims will have a one-to-one exchange ratio with the US dollar, to ease cash shortages. Bond notes began trading at a discount of up to 10% in the black market by the end of 2016.
Zimbabwe’s government entered a second Staff Monitored Program with the IMF in 2014 and undertook other measures to reengage with international financial institutions. Zimbabwe repaid roughly $108 million in arrears to the IMF in October 2016, but financial observers note that Zimbabwe is unlikely to gain new financing because the government has not disclosed how it plans to repay more than $1.7 billion in arrears to the World Bank and African Development Bank. International financial institutions want Zimbabwe to implement significant fiscal and structural reforms before granting new loans. Foreign and domestic investment continues to be hindered by the lack of land tenure and titling, the inability to repatriate dividends to investors overseas, and the lack of clarity regarding the government’s Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1013,10 +1013,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "252,067 (2020)" + "text": "252,067 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.7 (2020 est.)" + "text": "2 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1055,10 +1055,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "203,461 (2021)" + "text": "203,461 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.37 (2021)" + "text": "1.4 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/antarctica/ay.json b/antarctica/ay.json index 2631c73d..f37de922 100644 --- a/antarctica/ay.json +++ b/antarctica/ay.json @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ "text": "the coldest, windiest, highest (on average), and driest continent; during summer, more solar radiation reaches the surface at the South Pole than is received at the Equator in an equivalent periodAntarctica map showing the continent and its major regions (Lands) surrounded by the Southern Ocean.
" + "text": "Map of Antarctica showing the continent and its major regions (Lands) surrounded by the Southern Ocean. Also shown are two of the US research stations, McMurdo and Amundsen-Scott, not shown is Palmer Station located on the Antarctic Peninsula.
" } }, "People and Society": { diff --git a/antarctica/fs.json b/antarctica/fs.json index 40a8526a..0e60f6a5 100644 --- a/antarctica/fs.json +++ b/antarctica/fs.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "In February 2007, the Iles Eparses became an integral part of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF). The Southern Lands are now divided into five administrative districts, two of which are archipelagos, Iles Crozet and Iles Kerguelen; the third is a district composed of two volcanic islands, Ile Saint-Paul and Ile Amsterdam; the fourth, Iles Eparses, consists of five scattered tropical islands around Madagascar. They contain no permanent inhabitants and are visited only by researchers studying the native fauna, scientists at the various scientific stations, fishermen, and military personnel. The fifth district is the Antarctic portion, which consists of \"Adelie Land,\" a thin slice of the Antarctic continent discovered and claimed by the French in 1840.
Ile Amsterdam: Discovered but not named in 1522 by the Spanish, the island subsequently received the appellation of Nieuw Amsterdam from a Dutchman; it was claimed by France in 1843. A short-lived attempt at cattle farming began in 1871. A French meteorological station established on the island in 1949 is still in use.;
Ile Saint Paul: Claimed by France since 1893, the island was a fishing industry center from 1843 to 1914. In 1928, a spiny lobster cannery was established, but when the company went bankrupt in 1931, seven workers were abandoned. Only two survived until 1934 when rescue finally arrived.;
Iles Crozet: A large archipelago formed from the Crozet Plateau, Iles Crozet is divided into two main groups: L'Occidental (the West), which includes Ile aux Cochons, Ilots des Apotres, Ile des Pingouins, and the reefs Brisants de l'Heroine; and L'Oriental (the East), which includes Ile d'Est and Ile de la Possession (the largest island of the Crozets). Discovered and claimed by France in 1772, the islands were used for seal hunting and as a base for whaling. Originally administered as a dependency of Madagascar, they became part of the TAAF in 1955.;
Iles Kerguelen: This island group, discovered in 1772, consists of one large island (Ile Kerguelen) and about 300 smaller islands. A permanent group of 50 to 100 scientists resides at the main base at Port-aux-Francais.;
Adelie Land: The only non-insular district of the TAAF is the Antarctic claim known as \"Adelie Land.\" The US Government does not recognize it as a French dependency.;
Bassas da India: A French possession since 1897, this atoll is a volcanic rock surrounded by reefs and is awash at high tide.;
Europa Island: This heavily wooded island has been a French possession since 1897; it is the site of a small military garrison that staffs a weather station.;
Glorioso Islands: A French possession since 1892, the Glorioso Islands are composed of two lushly vegetated coral islands (Ile Glorieuse and Ile du Lys) and three rock islets. A military garrison operates a weather and radio station on Ile Glorieuse.;
Juan de Nova Island: Named after a famous 15th-century Spanish navigator and explorer, the island has been a French possession since 1897. It has been exploited for its guano and phosphate. Presently a small military garrison oversees a meteorological station.;
Tromelin Island: First explored by the French in 1776, the island came under the jurisdiction of Reunion in 1814. At present, it serves as a sea turtle sanctuary and is the site of an important meteorological station.
" + "text": "In February 2007, the Iles Eparses became an integral part of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF). The Southern Lands are now divided into five administrative districts, two of which are archipelagos, Iles Crozet and Iles Kerguelen; the third is a district composed of two volcanic islands, Ile Saint-Paul and Ile Amsterdam; the fourth, Iles Eparses, consists of five scattered tropical islands around Madagascar. They contain no permanent inhabitants and are visited only by researchers studying the native fauna, scientists at the various scientific stations, fishermen, and military personnel. The fifth district is the Antarctic portion, which consists of \"Adelie Land,\" a thin slice of the Antarctic continent discovered and claimed by the French in 1840.
Ile Amsterdam: Discovered but not named in 1522 by the Spanish, the island subsequently received the appellation of Nieuw Amsterdam from a Dutchman; it was claimed by France in 1843. A short-lived attempt at cattle farming began in 1871. A French meteorological station established on the island in 1949 is still in use.;
Ile Saint Paul: Claimed by France since 1893, the island was a fishing industry center from 1843 to 1914. In 1928, a spiny lobster cannery was established, but when the company went bankrupt in 1931, seven workers were abandoned. Only two survived until 1934 when rescue finally arrived.;
Iles Crozet: A large archipelago formed from the Crozet Plateau, Iles Crozet is divided into two main groups: L'Occidental (the West), which includes Ile aux Cochons, Ilots des Apotres, Ile des Pingouins, and the reefs Brisants de l'Heroine; and L'Oriental (the East), which includes Ile d'Est and Ile de la Possession (the largest island of the Crozets). Discovered and claimed by France in 1772, the islands were used for seal hunting and as a base for whaling. Originally administered as a dependency of Madagascar, they became part of the TAAF in 1955.;
Iles Kerguelen: This island group, discovered in 1772, consists of one large island (Ile Kerguelen) and about 300 smaller islands. A permanent group of 50 to 100 scientists resides at the main base at Port-aux-Francais.;
Adelie Land: The only non-insular district of the TAAF is the Antarctic claim known as \"Adelie Land.\" The US Government does not recognize it as a French dependency.;
Bassas da India: A French possession since 1897, this atoll is a volcanic rock surrounded by reefs and is awash at high tide.;
Europa Island: This heavily wooded island has been a French possession since 1897; it is the site of a small military garrison that staffs a weather station.;
Glorioso Islands: A French possession since 1892, the Glorioso Islands are composed of two lushly vegetated coral islands (Ile Glorieuse and Ile du Lys) and three rock islets. A military garrison operates a weather and radio station on Ile Glorieuse.;
Juan de Nova Island: Named after a famous 15th-century Spanish navigator and explorer, the island has been a French possession since 1897. It has been exploited for its guano and phosphate. Presently a small military garrison oversees a meteorological station.;
Tromelin Island: First explored by the French in 1776, the island came under the jurisdiction of Reunion in 1814. At present, it serves as a sea turtle sanctuary and is the site of an important meteorological station.
" } }, "Geography": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/aq.json b/australia-oceania/aq.json index a74f4279..52da02d3 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/aq.json +++ b/australia-oceania/aq.json @@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "American Samoa s a traditional Polynesian economy in which more than 90% of the land is communally owned. Economic activity is strongly linked to the US with which American Samoa conducts most of its commerce. Tuna fishing and processing are the backbone of the private sector with processed fish products as the primary exports. The fish processing business accounted for 15.5% of employment in 2015.
In late September 2009, an earthquake and the resulting tsunami devastated American Samoa and nearby Samoa, disrupting transportation and power generation, and resulting in about 200 deaths. The US Federal Emergency Management Agency oversaw a relief program of nearly $25 million. Transfers from the US Government add substantially to American Samoa's economic well-being.
Attempts by the government to develop a larger and broader economy are restrained by Samoa's remote location, its limited transportation, and its devastating hurricanes. Tourism has some potential as a source of income and jobs.
" + "text": "American Samoa s a traditional Polynesian economy in which more than 90% of the land is communally owned. Economic activity is strongly linked to the US with which American Samoa conducts most of its commerce. Tuna fishing and processing are the backbone of the private sector with processed fish products as the primary exports. The fish processing business accounted for 15.5% of employment in 2015.
In late September 2009, an earthquake and the resulting tsunami devastated American Samoa and nearby Samoa, disrupting transportation and power generation, and resulting in about 200 deaths. The US Federal Emergency Management Agency oversaw a relief program of nearly $25 million. Transfers from the US Government add substantially to American Samoa's economic well-being.
Attempts by the government to develop a larger and broader economy are restrained by Samoa's remote location, its limited transportation, and its devastating hurricanes. Tourism has some potential as a source of income and jobs.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2016": { @@ -723,10 +723,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "10,000 (2018 est.)" + "text": "10,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "17.92 (2018 est.)" + "text": "18 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -734,7 +734,7 @@ "text": "2,250 (2009 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "3.8 (2009 est.)" + "text": "4 (2009 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/as.json b/australia-oceania/as.json index c86a3180..d787f709 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/as.json +++ b/australia-oceania/as.json @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ } }, "Natural resources": { - "text": "alumina, coal, iron ore, copper, tin, gold, silver, uranium, nickel, tungsten, rare earth elements, mineral sands, lead, zinc, diamonds, natural gas, petroleum; note - Australia is the world's largest net exporter of coal accounting for 29% of global coal exports" + "text": "alumina, coal, iron ore, copper, tin, gold, silver, uranium, nickel, tungsten, rare earth elements, mineral sands, lead, zinc, diamonds, opals, natural gas, petroleum; note - Australia is the world's largest net exporter of coal accounting for 29% of global coal exports; as well, Australia is by far the world's largest supplier of opals" }, "Land use": { "agricultural land": { @@ -663,7 +663,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Australia is an open market with minimal restrictions on imports of goods and services. The process of opening up has increased productivity, stimulated growth, and made the economy more flexible and dynamic. Australia plays an active role in the WTO, APEC, the G20, and other trade forums. Australia’s free trade agreement (FTA) with China entered into force in 2015, adding to existing FTAs with the Republic of Korea, Japan, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, and the US, and a regional FTA with ASEAN and New Zealand. Australia continues to negotiate bilateral agreements with Indonesia, as well as larger agreements with its Pacific neighbors and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and an Asia-wide Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership that includes the 10 ASEAN countries and China, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, and India.
Australia is a significant exporter of natural resources, energy, and food. Australia's abundant and diverse natural resources attract high levels of foreign investment and include extensive reserves of coal, iron, copper, gold, natural gas, uranium, and renewable energy sources. A series of major investments, such as the US$40 billion Gorgon Liquid Natural Gas Project, will significantly expand the resources sector.
For nearly two decades up till 2017, Australia had benefited from a dramatic surge in its terms of trade. As export prices increased faster than import prices, the economy experienced continuous growth, low unemployment, contained inflation, very low public debt, and a strong and stable financial system. Australia entered 2018 facing a range of growth constraints, principally driven by the sharp fall in global prices of key export commodities. Demand for resources and energy from Asia and especially China is growing at a slower pace and sharp drops in export prices have impacted growth.
" + "text": "Australia is an open market with minimal restrictions on imports of goods and services. The process of opening up has increased productivity, stimulated growth, and made the economy more flexible and dynamic. Australia plays an active role in the WTO, APEC, the G20, and other trade forums. Australia’s free trade agreement (FTA) with China entered into force in 2015, adding to existing FTAs with the Republic of Korea, Japan, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, and the US, and a regional FTA with ASEAN and New Zealand. Australia continues to negotiate bilateral agreements with Indonesia, as well as larger agreements with its Pacific neighbors and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and an Asia-wide Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership that includes the 10 ASEAN countries and China, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, and India.
Australia is a significant exporter of natural resources, energy, and food. Australia's abundant and diverse natural resources attract high levels of foreign investment and include extensive reserves of coal, iron, copper, gold, natural gas, uranium, and renewable energy sources. A series of major investments, such as the US$40 billion Gorgon Liquid Natural Gas Project, will significantly expand the resources sector.
For nearly two decades up till 2017, Australia had benefited from a dramatic surge in its terms of trade. As export prices increased faster than import prices, the economy experienced continuous growth, low unemployment, contained inflation, very low public debt, and a strong and stable financial system. Australia entered 2018 facing a range of growth constraints, principally driven by the sharp fall in global prices of key export commodities. Demand for resources and energy from Asia and especially China is growing at a slower pace and sharp drops in export prices have impacted growth.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -994,18 +994,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "6.2 million (2020)" + "text": "6.2 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "24.31 (2020 est.)" + "text": "24 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "27.454 million (2020)" + "text": "27.453 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "107.7 (2020 est.)" + "text": "108 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1036,10 +1036,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "9,099,619 (2021 est.) Total includes both NBN and non-NBN subscriptions." + "text": "9,099,619 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "35.68 (2021)" + "text": "36 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/bp.json b/australia-oceania/bp.json index e81b9199..b8409096 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/bp.json +++ b/australia-oceania/bp.json @@ -917,10 +917,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "7,104 (2019)" + "text": "7,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.06 (2019 est.)" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -959,10 +959,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "1,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.15 (2021 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0.15 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/cq.json b/australia-oceania/cq.json index 99df7988..652c78c9 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/cq.json +++ b/australia-oceania/cq.json @@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The economy of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands(CNMI) has been on the rebound in the last few years, mainly on the strength of its tourism industry. In 2016, the CNMI’s real GDP increased 28.6% over the previous year, following two years of relatively rapid growth in 2014 and 2015. Chinese and Korean tourists have supplanted Japanese tourists in the last few years. The Commonwealth is making a concerted effort to broaden its tourism by extending casino gambling from the small Islands of Tinian and Rota to the main Island of Saipan, its political and commercial center. Investment is concentrated on hotels and casinos in Saipan, the CNMI’s largest island and home to about 90% of its population.
Federal grants have also contributed to economic growth and stability. In 2016, federal grants amounted to $101.4 billion which made up 26% of the CNMI government’s total revenues. A small agriculture sector consists of cattle ranches and small farms producing coconuts, breadfruit, tomatoes, and melons.
Legislation is pending in the US Congress to extend the transition period to allow foreign workers to work in the CNMI on temporary visas.
" + "text": "The economy of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands(CNMI) has been on the rebound in the last few years, mainly on the strength of its tourism industry. In 2016, the CNMI’s real GDP increased 28.6% over the previous year, following two years of relatively rapid growth in 2014 and 2015. Chinese and Korean tourists have supplanted Japanese tourists in the last few years. The Commonwealth is making a concerted effort to broaden its tourism by extending casino gambling from the small Islands of Tinian and Rota to the main Island of Saipan, its political and commercial center. Investment is concentrated on hotels and casinos in Saipan, the CNMI’s largest island and home to about 90% of its population.
Federal grants have also contributed to economic growth and stability. In 2016, federal grants amounted to $101.4 billion which made up 26% of the CNMI government’s total revenues. A small agriculture sector consists of cattle ranches and small farms producing coconuts, breadfruit, tomatoes, and melons.
Legislation is pending in the US Congress to extend the transition period to allow foreign workers to work in the CNMI on temporary visas.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2016": { @@ -682,10 +682,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "22,000 (2018)" + "text": "20,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "39.44 (2018 est.)" + "text": "35 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/cw.json b/australia-oceania/cw.json index 04ced110..0949e44c 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/cw.json +++ b/australia-oceania/cw.json @@ -746,10 +746,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "6,576 (2018)" + "text": "6,576 (2018 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "37.56 (2018 est.)" + "text": "38 (2018 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -788,10 +788,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "3,000 (2021)" + "text": "2,700 (2018 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "17.08 (2021)" + "text": "15 (2018 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/fj.json b/australia-oceania/fj.json index 4283e6a8..99787e47 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/fj.json +++ b/australia-oceania/fj.json @@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Fiji, endowed with forest, mineral, and fish resources, is one of the most developed and connected of the Pacific island economies. Earnings from the tourism industry, with an estimated 842,884 tourists visiting in 2017, and remittances from Fijian’s working abroad are the country’s largest foreign exchange earners.
Bottled water exports to the US is Fiji’s largest domestic export. Fiji's sugar sector remains a significant industry and a major export, but crops and one of the sugar mills suffered damage during Cyclone Winston in 2016. Fiji’s trade imbalance continues to widen with increased imports and sluggish performance of domestic exports.
The return to parliamentary democracy and successful elections in September 2014 improved investor confidence, but increasing bureaucratic regulation, new taxes, and lack of consultation with relevant stakeholders brought four consecutive years of decline for Fiji on the World Bank Ease of Doing Business index. Private sector investment in 2017 approached 20% of GDP, compared to 13% in 2013.
" + "text": "Fiji, endowed with forest, mineral, and fish resources, is one of the most developed and connected of the Pacific island economies. Earnings from the tourism industry, with an estimated 842,884 tourists visiting in 2017, and remittances from Fijian’s working abroad are the country’s largest foreign exchange earners.
Bottled water exports to the US is Fiji’s largest domestic export. Fiji's sugar sector remains a significant industry and a major export, but crops and one of the sugar mills suffered damage during Cyclone Winston in 2016. Fiji’s trade imbalance continues to widen with increased imports and sluggish performance of domestic exports.
The return to parliamentary democracy and successful elections in September 2014 improved investor confidence, but increasing bureaucratic regulation, new taxes, and lack of consultation with relevant stakeholders brought four consecutive years of decline for Fiji on the World Bank Ease of Doing Business index. Private sector investment in 2017 approached 20% of GDP, compared to 13% in 2013.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -964,10 +964,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "76,522 (2018)" + "text": "48,510 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "8.66 (2018 est.)" + "text": "5 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1006,10 +1006,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "23,062 (2021)" + "text": "23,062 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "2.57 (2021)" + "text": "3 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/fm.json b/australia-oceania/fm.json index d7fe05fe..f18c268f 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/fm.json +++ b/australia-oceania/fm.json @@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Economic activity consists largely of subsistence farming and fishing, and government, which employs two-thirds of the adult working population and receives funding largely - 58% in 2013 – from Compact of Free Association assistance provided by the US. The islands have few commercially valuable mineral deposits. The potential for tourism is limited by isolation, lack of adequate facilities, and limited internal air and water transportation.
Under the terms of the original Compact, the US provided $1.3 billion in grants and aid from 1986 to 2001. The US and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) negotiated a second (amended) Compact agreement in 2002-03 that took effect in 2004. The amended Compact runs for a 20-year period to 2023; during which the US will provide roughly $2.1 billion to the FSM. The amended Compact also develops a trust fund for the FSM that will provide a comparable income stream beyond 2024 when Compact grants end.
The country's medium-term economic outlook appears fragile because of dependence on US assistance and lackluster performance of its small and stagnant private sector.
" + "text": "Economic activity consists largely of subsistence farming and fishing, and government, which employs two-thirds of the adult working population and receives funding largely - 58% in 2013 – from Compact of Free Association assistance provided by the US. The islands have few commercially valuable mineral deposits. The potential for tourism is limited by isolation, lack of adequate facilities, and limited internal air and water transportation.
Under the terms of the original Compact, the US provided $1.3 billion in grants and aid from 1986 to 2001. The US and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) negotiated a second (amended) Compact agreement in 2002-03 that took effect in 2004. The amended Compact runs for a 20-year period to 2023; during which the US will provide roughly $2.1 billion to the FSM. The amended Compact also develops a trust fund for the FSM that will provide a comparable income stream beyond 2024 when Compact grants end.
The country's medium-term economic outlook appears fragile because of dependence on US assistance and lackluster performance of its small and stagnant private sector.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": { @@ -867,10 +867,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "6,947 (2018)" + "text": "7,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "6.23 (2018 est.)" + "text": "6 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -909,10 +909,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "6,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "6,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "5.52 (2021 est.)" + "text": "5 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/fp.json b/australia-oceania/fp.json index 25a890f7..870737b2 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/fp.json +++ b/australia-oceania/fp.json @@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Since 1962, when France stationed military personnel in the region, French Polynesia has changed from a subsistence agricultural economy to one in which a high proportion of the work force is either employed by the military or supports the tourist industry. With the halt of French nuclear testing in 1996, the military contribution to the economy fell sharply.
After growing at an average yearly rate of 4.2% from 1997-2007, the economic and financial crisis in 2008 marked French Polynesia’s entry into recession. However, since 2014, French Polynesia has shown signs of recovery. Business turnover reached 1.8% year-on-year in September 2016, tourism increased 1.8% in 2015, and GDP grew 2.0% in 2015.
French Polynesia’s tourism-dominated service sector accounted for 85% of total value added for the economy in 2012. Tourism employs 17% of the workforce. Pearl farming is the second biggest industry, accounting for 54% of exports in 2015; however, the output has decreased to 12.5 tons – the lowest level since 2008. A small manufacturing sector predominantly processes commodities from French Polynesia’s primary sector - 8% of total economy in 2012 - including agriculture and fishing.
France has agreed to finance infrastructure, marine businesses, and cultural and ecological sites at roughly $80 million per year between 2015 and 2020. Japan, the US, and China are French Polynesia’s three largest trade partners.
" + "text": "Since 1962, when France stationed military personnel in the region, French Polynesia has changed from a subsistence agricultural economy to one in which a high proportion of the work force is either employed by the military or supports the tourist industry. With the halt of French nuclear testing in 1996, the military contribution to the economy fell sharply.
After growing at an average yearly rate of 4.2% from 1997-2007, the economic and financial crisis in 2008 marked French Polynesia’s entry into recession. However, since 2014, French Polynesia has shown signs of recovery. Business turnover reached 1.8% year-on-year in September 2016, tourism increased 1.8% in 2015, and GDP grew 2.0% in 2015.
French Polynesia’s tourism-dominated service sector accounted for 85% of total value added for the economy in 2012. Tourism employs 17% of the workforce. Pearl farming is the second biggest industry, accounting for 54% of exports in 2015; however, the output has decreased to 12.5 tons – the lowest level since 2008. A small manufacturing sector predominantly processes commodities from French Polynesia’s primary sector - 8% of total economy in 2012 - including agriculture and fishing.
France has agreed to finance infrastructure, marine businesses, and cultural and ecological sites at roughly $80 million per year between 2015 and 2020. Japan, the US, and China are French Polynesia’s three largest trade partners.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2017": { @@ -819,10 +819,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "60,123 (2018)" + "text": "94,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "32.51 (2018 est.)" + "text": "33 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -861,10 +861,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "64,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "64,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "22.78 (2021)" + "text": "23 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/gq.json b/australia-oceania/gq.json index 45e44f34..4f17ecce 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/gq.json +++ b/australia-oceania/gq.json @@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "US national defense spending is the main driver of Guam’s economy, followed closely by tourism and other services. Guam serves as a forward US base for the Western Pacific and is home to thousands of American military personnel. Total federal spending (defense and non-defense) amounted to $1.988 billion in 2016, or 34.2 of Guam’s GDP. Of that total, federal grants and cover-over payments amounted to $3444.1 million in 2016, or 35.8% of Guam’s total revenues for the fiscal year. In 2016, Guam’s economy grew 0.3%. Despite slow growth, Guam’s economy has been stable over the last decade. National defense spending cushions the island’s economy against fluctuations in tourism. Service exports, mainly spending by foreign tourists in Guam, amounted to over $1 billion for the first time in 2016, or 17.8% of GDP." + "text": "US national defense spending is the main driver of Guam’s economy, followed closely by tourism and other services. Guam serves as a forward US base for the Western Pacific and is home to thousands of American military personnel. Total federal spending (defense and non-defense) amounted to $1.988 billion in 2016, or 34.2 of Guam’s GDP. Of that total, federal grants and cover-over payments amounted to $3444.1 million in 2016, or 35.8% of Guam’s total revenues for the fiscal year. In 2016, Guam’s economy grew 0.3%. Despite slow growth, Guam’s economy has been stable over the last decade. National defense spending cushions the island’s economy against fluctuations in tourism. Service exports, mainly spending by foreign tourists in Guam, amounted to over $1 billion for the first time in 2016, or 17.8% of GDP." }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2016": { @@ -770,10 +770,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "68,000 (2018)" + "text": "70,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "42.01 (2018 est.)" + "text": "41 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -812,10 +812,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "3,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "3,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.78 (2021)" + "text": "2 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/kr.json b/australia-oceania/kr.json index 03ed57b8..eb9d2bf2 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/kr.json +++ b/australia-oceania/kr.json @@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "A remote country of 33 scattered coral atolls, Kiribati has few natural resources and is one of the least developed Pacific Island countries. Commercially viable phosphate deposits were exhausted by the time of independence from the United Kingdom in 1979. Earnings from fishing licenses and seafarer remittances are important sources of income. Although the number of seafarers employed declined due to changes in global shipping demands, remittances are expected to improve with more overseas temporary and seasonal work opportunities for Kiribati nationals.
Economic development is constrained by a shortage of skilled workers, weak infrastructure, and remoteness from international markets. The public sector dominates economic activity, with ongoing capital projects in infrastructure including road rehabilitation, water and sanitation projects, and renovations to the international airport, spurring some growth. Public debt increased from 23% of GDP at the end of 2015 to 25.8% in 2016.
Kiribati is dependent on foreign aid, which was estimated to have contributed over 32.7% in 2016 to the government’s finances. The country’s sovereign fund, the Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund (RERF), which is held offshore, had an estimated balance of $855.5 million in late July 2016. The RERF seeks to avoid exchange rate risk by holding investments in more than 20 currencies, including the Australian dollar, US dollar, the Japanese yen, and the Euro. Drawdowns from the RERF helped finance the government’s annual budget.
" + "text": "A remote country of 33 scattered coral atolls, Kiribati has few natural resources and is one of the least developed Pacific Island countries. Commercially viable phosphate deposits were exhausted by the time of independence from the United Kingdom in 1979. Earnings from fishing licenses and seafarer remittances are important sources of income. Although the number of seafarers employed declined due to changes in global shipping demands, remittances are expected to improve with more overseas temporary and seasonal work opportunities for Kiribati nationals.
Economic development is constrained by a shortage of skilled workers, weak infrastructure, and remoteness from international markets. The public sector dominates economic activity, with ongoing capital projects in infrastructure including road rehabilitation, water and sanitation projects, and renovations to the international airport, spurring some growth. Public debt increased from 23% of GDP at the end of 2015 to 25.8% in 2016.
Kiribati is dependent on foreign aid, which was estimated to have contributed over 32.7% in 2016 to the government’s finances. The country’s sovereign fund, the Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund (RERF), which is held offshore, had an estimated balance of $855.5 million in late July 2016. The RERF seeks to avoid exchange rate risk by holding investments in more than 20 currencies, including the Australian dollar, US dollar, the Japanese yen, and the Euro. Drawdowns from the RERF helped finance the government’s annual budget.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -897,10 +897,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "33 (2020)" + "text": "33 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -939,10 +939,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "185 (2021)" + "text": "185 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.15 (2021 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0.2 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/nc.json b/australia-oceania/nc.json index 21b3d254..a18329d7 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nc.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nc.json @@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "New Caledonia has 11% of the world's nickel reserves, representing the second largest reserves on the planet. Only a small amount of the land is suitable for cultivation, and food accounts for about 20% of imports. In addition to nickel, substantial financial support from France - equal to more than 15% of GDP - and tourism are keys to the health of the economy.
With the gradual increase in the production of two new nickel plants in 2015, average production of metallurgical goods stood at a record level of 94 thousand tons. However, the sector is exposed to the high volatility of nickel prices, which have been in decline since 2016. In 2017, one of the three major mining firms on the island, Vale, put its operations up for sale, triggering concerns of layoffs ahead of the 2018 independence referendum.
" + "text": "New Caledonia has 11% of the world's nickel reserves, representing the second largest reserves on the planet. Only a small amount of the land is suitable for cultivation, and food accounts for about 20% of imports. In addition to nickel, substantial financial support from France - equal to more than 15% of GDP - and tourism are keys to the health of the economy.
With the gradual increase in the production of two new nickel plants in 2015, average production of metallurgical goods stood at a record level of 94 thousand tons. However, the sector is exposed to the high volatility of nickel prices, which have been in decline since 2016. In 2017, one of the three major mining firms on the island, Vale, put its operations up for sale, triggering concerns of layoffs ahead of the 2018 independence referendum.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2017": { @@ -833,10 +833,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "77,719 (2018)" + "text": "46,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "28.67 (2018 est.)" + "text": "16 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -875,10 +875,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "55,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "55,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "19.26 (2021 est.)" + "text": "19 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/ne.json b/australia-oceania/ne.json index 86f6582a..9ad1fe52 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ne.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ne.json @@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The economy suffers from the typical Pacific island problems of geographic isolation, few resources, and a small population. The agricultural sector consists mainly of subsistence gardening, although some cash crops are grown for export. Industry consists primarily of small factories for processing passion fruit, lime oil, honey, and coconut cream. The sale of postage stamps to foreign collectors is an important source of revenue.
Government expenditures regularly exceed revenues, and the shortfall is made up by critically needed grants from New Zealand that are used to pay wages to public employees. Economic aid allocation from New Zealand in FY13/14 was US$10.1 million. Niue has cut government expenditures by reducing the public service by almost half.
The island in recent years has suffered a serious loss of population because of emigration to New Zealand. Efforts to increase GDP include the promotion of tourism and financial services, although the International Banking Repeal Act of 2002 resulted in the termination of all offshore banking licenses.
" + "text": "The economy suffers from the typical Pacific island problems of geographic isolation, few resources, and a small population. The agricultural sector consists mainly of subsistence gardening, although some cash crops are grown for export. Industry consists primarily of small factories for processing passion fruit, lime oil, honey, and coconut cream. The sale of postage stamps to foreign collectors is an important source of revenue.
Government expenditures regularly exceed revenues, and the shortfall is made up by critically needed grants from New Zealand that are used to pay wages to public employees. Economic aid allocation from New Zealand in FY13/14 was US$10.1 million. Niue has cut government expenditures by reducing the public service by almost half.
The island in recent years has suffered a serious loss of population because of emigration to New Zealand. Efforts to increase GDP include the promotion of tourism and financial services, although the International Banking Repeal Act of 2002 resulted in the termination of all offshore banking licenses.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2003": { @@ -669,10 +669,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1,000 (2018)" + "text": "1,000 (2018 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "61.77 (2018)" + "text": "62 (2018 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/nh.json b/australia-oceania/nh.json index 29fe1eb6..4b44575c 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nh.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nh.json @@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "This South Pacific island economy is based primarily on small-scale agriculture, which provides a living for about two thirds of the population. Fishing, offshore financial services, and tourism, with more than 330,000 visitors in 2017, are other mainstays of the economy. Tourism has struggled after Efate, the most populous and most popular island for tourists, was damaged by Tropical Cyclone Pam in 2015. Ongoing infrastructure difficulties at Port Vila’s Bauerfield Airport have caused air travel disruptions, further hampering tourism numbers. Australia and New Zealand are the main source of tourists and foreign aid. A small light industry sector caters to the local market. Tax revenues come mainly from import duties. Mineral deposits are negligible; the country has no known petroleum deposits.
Economic development is hindered by dependence on relatively few commodity exports, vulnerability to natural disasters, and long distances from main markets and between constituent islands. In response to foreign concerns, the government has promised to tighten regulation of its offshore financial center.
Since 2002, the government has stepped up efforts to boost tourism through improved air connections, resort development, and cruise ship facilities. Agriculture, especially livestock farming, is a second target for growth.
" + "text": "This South Pacific island economy is based primarily on small-scale agriculture, which provides a living for about two thirds of the population. Fishing, offshore financial services, and tourism, with more than 330,000 visitors in 2017, are other mainstays of the economy. Tourism has struggled after Efate, the most populous and most popular island for tourists, was damaged by Tropical Cyclone Pam in 2015. Ongoing infrastructure difficulties at Port Vila’s Bauerfield Airport have caused air travel disruptions, further hampering tourism numbers. Australia and New Zealand are the main source of tourists and foreign aid. A small light industry sector caters to the local market. Tax revenues come mainly from import duties. Mineral deposits are negligible; the country has no known petroleum deposits.
Economic development is hindered by dependence on relatively few commodity exports, vulnerability to natural disasters, and long distances from main markets and between constituent islands. In response to foreign concerns, the government has promised to tighten regulation of its offshore financial center.
Since 2002, the government has stepped up efforts to boost tourism through improved air connections, resort development, and cruise ship facilities. Agriculture, especially livestock farming, is a second target for growth.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -914,10 +914,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "3,472 (2020)" + "text": "3,472 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.13 (2020 est.)" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -956,10 +956,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "2,785 (2021)" + "text": "2,785 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.91 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.9 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/nr.json b/australia-oceania/nr.json index 9cdd9ee8..3a228ee7 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nr.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nr.json @@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Revenues of this tiny island - a coral atoll with a land area of 21 square kilometers - traditionally have come from exports of phosphates. Few other resources exist, with most necessities being imported, mainly from Australia, its former occupier and later major source of support. Primary reserves of phosphates were exhausted and mining ceased in 2006, but mining of a deeper layer of \"secondary phosphate\" in the interior of the island began the following year. The secondary phosphate deposits may last another 30 years. Earnings from Nauru’s export of phosphate remains an important source of income. Few comprehensive statistics on the Nauru economy exist; estimates of Nauru's GDP vary widely.
The rehabilitation of mined land and the replacement of income from phosphates are serious long-term problems. In anticipation of the exhaustion of Nauru's phosphate deposits, substantial amounts of phosphate income were invested in trust funds to help cushion the transition and provide for Nauru's economic future.
Although revenue sources for government are limited, the opening of the Australian Regional Processing Center for asylum seekers since 2012 has sparked growth in the economy. Revenue derived from fishing licenses under the \"vessel day scheme\" has also boosted government income. Housing, hospitals, and other capital plant are deteriorating. The cost to Australia of keeping the Nauruan government and economy afloat continues to climb.
" + "text": "Revenues of this tiny island - a coral atoll with a land area of 21 square kilometers - traditionally have come from exports of phosphates. Few other resources exist, with most necessities being imported, mainly from Australia, its former occupier and later major source of support. Primary reserves of phosphates were exhausted and mining ceased in 2006, but mining of a deeper layer of \"secondary phosphate\" in the interior of the island began the following year. The secondary phosphate deposits may last another 30 years. Earnings from Nauru’s export of phosphate remains an important source of income. Few comprehensive statistics on the Nauru economy exist; estimates of Nauru's GDP vary widely.
The rehabilitation of mined land and the replacement of income from phosphates are serious long-term problems. In anticipation of the exhaustion of Nauru's phosphate deposits, substantial amounts of phosphate income were invested in trust funds to help cushion the transition and provide for Nauru's economic future.
Although revenue sources for government are limited, the opening of the Australian Regional Processing Center for asylum seekers since 2012 has sparked growth in the economy. Revenue derived from fishing licenses under the \"vessel day scheme\" has also boosted government income. Housing, hospitals, and other capital plant are deteriorating. The cost to Australia of keeping the Nauruan government and economy afloat continues to climb.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": { @@ -836,10 +836,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "0 (2018 est.)" + "text": "1,900 (2009 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0 (2018 est.)" + "text": "19 (2009 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -878,10 +878,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "950 (2010)" + "text": "950 (2010 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "9.5 (2010)" + "text": "10 (2010 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/nz.json b/australia-oceania/nz.json index c0327fb5..cad6f282 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nz.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nz.json @@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Over the past 40 years, the government has transformed New Zealand from an agrarian economy, dependent on concessionary British market access, to a more industrialized, free market economy that can compete globally. This dynamic growth has boosted real incomes, but left behind some at the bottom of the ladder and broadened and deepened the technological capabilities of the industrial sector.
Per capita income rose for 10 consecutive years until 2007 in purchasing power parity terms, but fell in 2008-09. Debt-driven consumer spending drove robust growth in the first half of the decade, fueling a large balance of payments deficit that posed a challenge for policymakers. Inflationary pressures caused the central bank to raise its key rate steadily from January 2004 until it was among the highest in the OECD in 2007 and 2008. The higher rate attracted international capital inflows, which strengthened the currency and housing market while aggravating the current account deficit. Rising house prices, especially in Auckland, have become a political issue in recent years, as well as a policy challenge in 2016 and 2017, as the ability to afford housing has declined for many.
Expanding New Zealand’s network of free trade agreements remains a top foreign policy priority. New Zealand was an early promoter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and was the second country to ratify the agreement in May 2017. Following the United States’ withdrawal from the TPP in January 2017, on 10 November 2017 the remaining 11 countries agreed on the core elements of a modified agreement, which they renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). In November 2016, New Zealand opened negotiations to upgrade its FTA with China; China is one of New Zealand’s most important trading partners.
" + "text": "Over the past 40 years, the government has transformed New Zealand from an agrarian economy, dependent on concessionary British market access, to a more industrialized, free market economy that can compete globally. This dynamic growth has boosted real incomes, but left behind some at the bottom of the ladder and broadened and deepened the technological capabilities of the industrial sector.
Per capita income rose for 10 consecutive years until 2007 in purchasing power parity terms, but fell in 2008-09. Debt-driven consumer spending drove robust growth in the first half of the decade, fueling a large balance of payments deficit that posed a challenge for policymakers. Inflationary pressures caused the central bank to raise its key rate steadily from January 2004 until it was among the highest in the OECD in 2007 and 2008. The higher rate attracted international capital inflows, which strengthened the currency and housing market while aggravating the current account deficit. Rising house prices, especially in Auckland, have become a political issue in recent years, as well as a policy challenge in 2016 and 2017, as the ability to afford housing has declined for many.
Expanding New Zealand’s network of free trade agreements remains a top foreign policy priority. New Zealand was an early promoter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and was the second country to ratify the agreement in May 2017. Following the United States’ withdrawal from the TPP in January 2017, on 10 November 2017 the remaining 11 countries agreed on the core elements of a modified agreement, which they renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). In November 2016, New Zealand opened negotiations to upgrade its FTA with China; China is one of New Zealand’s most important trading partners.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -968,10 +968,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1.76 million (2018)" + "text": "858,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "37.11 (2018 est.)" + "text": "18 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1010,10 +1010,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,764,984 (2021)" + "text": "1,764,984 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "36.6 (2021)" + "text": "37 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/ps.json b/australia-oceania/ps.json index 3837950d..b2209350 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ps.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ps.json @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The economy is dominated by tourism, fishing, and subsistence agriculture. Government is a major employer of the work force relying on financial assistance from the US under the Compact of Free Association (Compact) with the US that took effect after the end of the UN trusteeship on 1 October 1994. The US provided Palau with roughly $700 million in aid for the first 15 years following commencement of the Compact in 1994 in return for unrestricted access to its land and waterways for strategic purposes. The population enjoys a per capita income roughly double that of the Philippines and much of Micronesia.
Business and leisure tourist arrivals reached a record 167,966 in 2015, a 14.4% increase over the previous year, but fell to 138,408 in 2016. Long-run prospects for tourism have been bolstered by the expansion of air travel in the Pacific, the rising prosperity of industrial East Asia, and the willingness of foreigners to finance infrastructure development. Proximity to Guam, the region's major destination for tourists from East Asia, and a regionally competitive tourist infrastructure enhance Palau's advantage as a destination.
" + "text": "The economy is dominated by tourism, fishing, and subsistence agriculture. Government is a major employer of the work force relying on financial assistance from the US under the Compact of Free Association (Compact) with the US that took effect after the end of the UN trusteeship on 1 October 1994. The US provided Palau with roughly $700 million in aid for the first 15 years following commencement of the Compact in 1994 in return for unrestricted access to its land and waterways for strategic purposes. The population enjoys a per capita income roughly double that of the Philippines and much of Micronesia.
Business and leisure tourist arrivals reached a record 167,966 in 2015, a 14.4% increase over the previous year, but fell to 138,408 in 2016. Long-run prospects for tourism have been bolstered by the expansion of air travel in the Pacific, the rising prosperity of industrial East Asia, and the willingness of foreigners to finance infrastructure development. Proximity to Guam, the region's major destination for tourists from East Asia, and a regionally competitive tourist infrastructure enhance Palau's advantage as a destination.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": { @@ -835,10 +835,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "7,204 (2018)" + "text": "8,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "40.78 (2018 est.)" + "text": "44 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -877,10 +877,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,224 (2015)" + "text": "1,224 (2015 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "6.93 (2015)" + "text": "7 (2015 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/rm.json b/australia-oceania/rm.json index c810d06c..4ce146c2 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/rm.json +++ b/australia-oceania/rm.json @@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "US assistance and lease payments for the use of Kwajalein Atoll as a US military base are the mainstay of this small island country. Agricultural production, primarily subsistence, is concentrated on small farms; the most important commercial crops are coconuts and breadfruit. Industry is limited to handicrafts, tuna processing, and copra. Tourism holds some potential. The islands and atolls have few natural resources, and imports exceed exports.
The Marshall Islands received roughly $1 billion in aid from the US during the period 1986-2001 under the original Compact of Free Association (Compact). In 2002 and 2003, the US and the Marshall Islands renegotiated the Compact's financial package for a 20-year period, 2004 to 2024. Under the amended Compact, the Marshall Islands will receive roughly $1.5 billion in direct US assistance. Under the amended Compact, the US and Marshall Islands are also jointly funding a Trust Fund for the people of the Marshall Islands that will provide an income stream beyond 2024, when direct Compact aid ends.
" + "text": "US assistance and lease payments for the use of Kwajalein Atoll as a US military base are the mainstay of this small island country. Agricultural production, primarily subsistence, is concentrated on small farms; the most important commercial crops are coconuts and breadfruit. Industry is limited to handicrafts, tuna processing, and copra. Tourism holds some potential. The islands and atolls have few natural resources, and imports exceed exports.
The Marshall Islands received roughly $1 billion in aid from the US during the period 1986-2001 under the original Compact of Free Association (Compact). In 2002 and 2003, the US and the Marshall Islands renegotiated the Compact's financial package for a 20-year period, 2004 to 2024. Under the amended Compact, the Marshall Islands will receive roughly $1.5 billion in direct US assistance. Under the amended Compact, the US and Marshall Islands are also jointly funding a Trust Fund for the people of the Marshall Islands that will provide an income stream beyond 2024, when direct Compact aid ends.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": { @@ -919,10 +919,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,361 (2018)" + "text": "2,361 (2018 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "4.13 (2018 est.)" + "text": "4 (2018 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -961,10 +961,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "1,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.69 (2021 est.)" + "text": "1.7 (2020 est.)" } }, "Communications - note": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/tl.json b/australia-oceania/tl.json index cdd0132c..d9575353 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/tl.json +++ b/australia-oceania/tl.json @@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Tokelau's small size (three villages), isolation, and lack of resources greatly restrain economic development and confine agriculture to the subsistence level. The principal sources of revenue are from sales of copra, postage stamps, souvenir coins, and handicrafts. Money is also remitted to families from relatives in New Zealand.
The people rely heavily on aid from New Zealand - about $15 million annually in FY12/13 and FY13/14 - to maintain public services. New Zealand's support amounts to 80% of Tokelau's recurrent government budget. An international trust fund, currently worth nearly $32 million, was established in 2004 by New Zealand to provide Tokelau an independent source of revenue.
" + "text": "Tokelau's small size (three villages), isolation, and lack of resources greatly restrain economic development and confine agriculture to the subsistence level. The principal sources of revenue are from sales of copra, postage stamps, souvenir coins, and handicrafts. Money is also remitted to families from relatives in New Zealand.
The people rely heavily on aid from New Zealand - about $15 million annually in FY12/13 and FY13/14 - to maintain public services. New Zealand's support amounts to 80% of Tokelau's recurrent government budget. An international trust fund, currently worth nearly $32 million, was established in 2004 by New Zealand to provide Tokelau an independent source of revenue.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2017": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/tn.json b/australia-oceania/tn.json index b9430b32..2f39eceb 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/tn.json +++ b/australia-oceania/tn.json @@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Tonga has a small, open island economy and is the last constitutional monarchy among the Pacific Island countries. It has a narrow export base in agricultural goods. Squash, vanilla beans, and yams are the main crops. Agricultural exports, including fish, make up two-thirds of total exports. Tourism is the second-largest source of hard currency earnings following remittances. Tonga had 53,800 visitors in 2015. The country must import a high proportion of its food, mainly from New Zealand.
The country remains dependent on external aid and remittances from overseas Tongans to offset its trade deficit. The government is emphasizing the development of the private sector, encouraging investment, and is committing increased funds for health care and education. Tonga's English-speaking and educated workforce offers a viable labor market, and the tropical climate provides fertile soil. Renewable energy and deep-sea mining also offer opportunities for investment.
Tonga has a reasonably sound basic infrastructure and well developed social services. But the government faces high unemployment among the young, moderate inflation, pressures for democratic reform, and rising civil service expenditures.
" + "text": "Tonga has a small, open island economy and is the last constitutional monarchy among the Pacific Island countries. It has a narrow export base in agricultural goods. Squash, vanilla beans, and yams are the main crops. Agricultural exports, including fish, make up two-thirds of total exports. Tourism is the second-largest source of hard currency earnings following remittances. Tonga had 53,800 visitors in 2015. The country must import a high proportion of its food, mainly from New Zealand.
The country remains dependent on external aid and remittances from overseas Tongans to offset its trade deficit. The government is emphasizing the development of the private sector, encouraging investment, and is committing increased funds for health care and education. Tonga's English-speaking and educated workforce offers a viable labor market, and the tropical climate provides fertile soil. Renewable energy and deep-sea mining also offer opportunities for investment.
Tonga has a reasonably sound basic infrastructure and well developed social services. But the government faces high unemployment among the young, moderate inflation, pressures for democratic reform, and rising civil service expenditures.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": { @@ -947,10 +947,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "6,637 (2019)" + "text": "7,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "6.35 (2019 est.)" + "text": "7 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -989,10 +989,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "5,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "5,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "4.73 (2021 est.)" + "text": "5 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/tv.json b/australia-oceania/tv.json index 74daafd3..ff416b58 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/tv.json +++ b/australia-oceania/tv.json @@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Tuvalu consists of a densely populated, scattered group of nine coral atolls with poor soil. Only eight of the atolls are inhabited. It is one of the smallest countries in the world, with its highest point at 4.6 meters above sea level. The country is isolated, almost entirely dependent on imports, particularly of food and fuel, and vulnerable to climate change and rising sea levels, which pose significant challenges to development.
The public sector dominates economic activity. Tuvalu has few natural resources, except for its fisheries. Earnings from fish exports and fishing licenses for Tuvalu’s territorial waters are a significant source of government revenue. In 2013, revenue from fishing licenses doubled and totaled more than 45% of GDP.
Official aid from foreign development partners has also increased. Tuvalu has substantial assets abroad. The Tuvalu Trust Fund, an international trust fund established in 1987 by development partners, has grown to $104 million (A$141 million) in 2014 and is an important cushion for meeting shortfalls in the government's budget. While remittances are another substantial source of income, the value of remittances has declined since the 2008-09 global financial crisis, but has stabilized at nearly $4 million per year. The financial impact of climate change and the cost of climate related adaptation projects is one of many concerns for the nation.
" + "text": "Tuvalu consists of a densely populated, scattered group of nine coral atolls with poor soil. Only eight of the atolls are inhabited. It is one of the smallest countries in the world, with its highest point at 4.6 meters above sea level. The country is isolated, almost entirely dependent on imports, particularly of food and fuel, and vulnerable to climate change and rising sea levels, which pose significant challenges to development.
The public sector dominates economic activity. Tuvalu has few natural resources, except for its fisheries. Earnings from fish exports and fishing licenses for Tuvalu’s territorial waters are a significant source of government revenue. In 2013, revenue from fishing licenses doubled and totaled more than 45% of GDP.
Official aid from foreign development partners has also increased. Tuvalu has substantial assets abroad. The Tuvalu Trust Fund, an international trust fund established in 1987 by development partners, has grown to $104 million (A$141 million) in 2014 and is an important cushion for meeting shortfalls in the government's budget. While remittances are another substantial source of income, the value of remittances has declined since the 2008-09 global financial crisis, but has stabilized at nearly $4 million per year. The financial impact of climate change and the cost of climate related adaptation projects is one of many concerns for the nation.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -801,10 +801,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,000 (2018)" + "text": "2,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "17.59 (2018 est.)" + "text": "17 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -846,7 +846,7 @@ "text": "450 (2017 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "3.96 (2017 est.)" + "text": "4 (2017 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/wf.json b/australia-oceania/wf.json index 2c66d685..990c2ae2 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/wf.json +++ b/australia-oceania/wf.json @@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The economy is limited to traditional subsistence agriculture, with about 80% of labor force earnings coming from agriculture (coconuts and vegetables), livestock (mostly pigs), and fishing. However, roughly 70% of the labor force is employed in the public sector, although only about a third of the population is in salaried employment.
Revenues come from French Government subsidies, licensing of fishing rights to Japan and South Korea, import taxes, and remittances from expatriate workers in New Caledonia. France directly finances the public sector and health-care and education services. It also provides funding for key development projects in a range of areas, including infrastructure, economic development, environmental management, and health-care facilities.
A key concern for Wallis and Futuna is an aging population with consequent economic development issues. Very few people aged 18-30 live on the islands due to the limited formal employment opportunities. Improving job creation is a current priority for the territorial government.
" + "text": "The economy is limited to traditional subsistence agriculture, with about 80% of labor force earnings coming from agriculture (coconuts and vegetables), livestock (mostly pigs), and fishing. However, roughly 70% of the labor force is employed in the public sector, although only about a third of the population is in salaried employment.
Revenues come from French Government subsidies, licensing of fishing rights to Japan and South Korea, import taxes, and remittances from expatriate workers in New Caledonia. France directly finances the public sector and health-care and education services. It also provides funding for key development projects in a range of areas, including infrastructure, economic development, environmental management, and health-care facilities.
A key concern for Wallis and Futuna is an aging population with consequent economic development issues. Very few people aged 18-30 live on the islands due to the limited formal employment opportunities. Improving job creation is a current priority for the territorial government.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2004": { @@ -634,10 +634,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "3,132 (2017)" + "text": "3,132 (2018 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "25.38 (2018 est.)" + "text": "25 (2018 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/ws.json b/australia-oceania/ws.json index 4d3734f2..bf796645 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ws.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ws.json @@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The economy of Samoa has traditionally been dependent on development aid, family remittances from overseas, tourism, agriculture, and fishing. It has a nominal GDP of $844 million. Agriculture, including fishing, furnishes 90% of exports, featuring fish, coconut oil, nonu products, and taro. The manufacturing sector mainly processes agricultural products. Industry accounts for nearly 22% of GDP while employing less than 6% of the work force. The service sector accounts for nearly two-thirds of GDP and employs approximately 50% of the labor force. Tourism is an expanding sector accounting for 25% of GDP; 132,000 tourists visited the islands in 2013.
The country is vulnerable to devastating storms. In September 2009, an earthquake and the resulting tsunami severely damaged Samoa and nearby American Samoa, disrupting transportation and power generation, and resulting in about 200 deaths. In December 2012, extensive flooding and wind damage from Tropical Cyclone Evan killed four people, displaced over 6,000, and damaged or destroyed an estimated 1,500 homes on Samoa's Upolu Island.
The Samoan Government has called for deregulation of the country's financial sector, encouragement of investment, and continued fiscal discipline, while at the same time protecting the environment. Foreign reserves are relatively healthy and inflation is low, but external debt is approximately 45% of GDP. Samoa became the 155th member of the WTO in May 2012, and graduated from least developed country status in January 2014.
" + "text": "The economy of Samoa has traditionally been dependent on development aid, family remittances from overseas, tourism, agriculture, and fishing. It has a nominal GDP of $844 million. Agriculture, including fishing, furnishes 90% of exports, featuring fish, coconut oil, nonu products, and taro. The manufacturing sector mainly processes agricultural products. Industry accounts for nearly 22% of GDP while employing less than 6% of the work force. The service sector accounts for nearly two-thirds of GDP and employs approximately 50% of the labor force. Tourism is an expanding sector accounting for 25% of GDP; 132,000 tourists visited the islands in 2013.
The country is vulnerable to devastating storms. In September 2009, an earthquake and the resulting tsunami severely damaged Samoa and nearby American Samoa, disrupting transportation and power generation, and resulting in about 200 deaths. In December 2012, extensive flooding and wind damage from Tropical Cyclone Evan killed four people, displaced over 6,000, and damaged or destroyed an estimated 1,500 homes on Samoa's Upolu Island.
The Samoan Government has called for deregulation of the country's financial sector, encouragement of investment, and continued fiscal discipline, while at the same time protecting the environment. Foreign reserves are relatively healthy and inflation is low, but external debt is approximately 45% of GDP. Samoa became the 155th member of the WTO in May 2012, and graduated from least developed country status in January 2014.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -938,10 +938,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "8,454 (2018)" + "text": "6,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "4.33 (2018 est.)" + "text": "3 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -980,10 +980,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,692 (2021 est.)" + "text": "1,692 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.85 (2021 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0.85 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json index 1adab5f9..bd7fac14 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json @@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Accion21 [Miguel MANSUR]Tourism, petroleum bunkering, hospitality, and financial and business services are the mainstays of the small open Aruban economy.
Tourism accounts for a majority of economic activity; as of 2017, over 2 million tourists visited Aruba annually, with the large majority (80-85%) of those from the US. The rapid growth of the tourism sector has resulted in a substantial expansion of other activities. Construction continues to boom, especially in the hospitality sector.
Aruba is heavily dependent on imports and is making efforts to expand exports to improve its trade balance. Almost all consumer and capital goods are imported, with the US, the Netherlands, and Panama being the major suppliers.
In 2016, Citgo Petroleum Corporation, an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Petroleos de Venezuela SA, and the Government of Aruba signed an agreement to restart Valero Energy Corp.'s former 235,000-b/d refinery. Tourism and related industries have continued to grow, and the Aruban Government is working to attract more diverse industries. Aruba's banking sector continues to be a strong sector; unemployment has significantly decreased.
" + "text": "Tourism, petroleum bunkering, hospitality, and financial and business services are the mainstays of the small open Aruban economy.
Tourism accounts for a majority of economic activity; as of 2017, over 2 million tourists visited Aruba annually, with the large majority (80-85%) of those from the US. The rapid growth of the tourism sector has resulted in a substantial expansion of other activities. Construction continues to boom, especially in the hospitality sector.
Aruba is heavily dependent on imports and is making efforts to expand exports to improve its trade balance. Almost all consumer and capital goods are imported, with the US, the Netherlands, and Panama being the major suppliers.
In 2016, Citgo Petroleum Corporation, an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Petroleos de Venezuela SA, and the Government of Aruba signed an agreement to restart Valero Energy Corp.'s former 235,000-b/d refinery. Tourism and related industries have continued to grow, and the Aruban Government is working to attract more diverse industries. Aruba's banking sector continues to be a strong sector; unemployment has significantly decreased.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2017": { @@ -815,18 +815,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "35,000 (2018)" + "text": "35,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "33.54 (2018 est.)" + "text": "33 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "141,000 (2018)" + "text": "141,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "135.1 (2018 est.)" + "text": "132 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -857,10 +857,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "19,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "19,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "17.8 (2021)" + "text": "18 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json index 42a54267..3dda514b 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ "text": "443 sq km (Antigua 280 sq km; Barbuda 161 sq km)" }, "land": { - "text": "442.6 sq km" + "text": "443 sq km" }, "water": { "text": "0 sq km" @@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Tourism continues to dominate Antigua and Barbuda's economy, accounting for nearly 60% of GDP and 40% of investment. The dual-island nation's agricultural production is focused on the domestic market and constrained by a limited water supply and a labor shortage stemming from the lure of higher wages in tourism and construction. Manufacturing comprises enclave-type assembly for export with major products being bedding, handicrafts, and electronic components.
Like other countries in the region, Antigua's economy was severely hit by effects of the global economic recession in 2009. The country suffered from the collapse of its largest private sector employer, a steep decline in tourism, a rise in debt, and a sharp economic contraction between 2009 and 2011. Antigua has not yet returned to its pre-crisis growth levels. Barbuda suffered significant damages after hurricanes Irma and Maria passed through the Caribbean in 2017.
Prospects for economic growth in the medium term will continue to depend on tourist arrivals from the US, Canada, and Europe and could be disrupted by potential damage from natural disasters. The new government, elected in 2014 and led by Prime Minister Gaston Browne, continues to face significant fiscal challenges. The government places some hope in a new Citizenship by Investment Program, to both reduce public debt levels and spur growth, and a resolution of a WTO dispute with the US.
" + "text": "Tourism continues to dominate Antigua and Barbuda's economy, accounting for nearly 60% of GDP and 40% of investment. The dual-island nation's agricultural production is focused on the domestic market and constrained by a limited water supply and a labor shortage stemming from the lure of higher wages in tourism and construction. Manufacturing comprises enclave-type assembly for export with major products being bedding, handicrafts, and electronic components.
Like other countries in the region, Antigua's economy was severely hit by effects of the global economic recession in 2009. The country suffered from the collapse of its largest private sector employer, a steep decline in tourism, a rise in debt, and a sharp economic contraction between 2009 and 2011. Antigua has not yet returned to its pre-crisis growth levels. Barbuda suffered significant damages after hurricanes Irma and Maria passed through the Caribbean in 2017.
Prospects for economic growth in the medium term will continue to depend on tourist arrivals from the US, Canada, and Europe and could be disrupted by potential damage from natural disasters. The new government, elected in 2014 and led by Prime Minister Gaston Browne, continues to face significant fiscal challenges. The government places some hope in a new Citizenship by Investment Program, to both reduce public debt levels and spur growth, and a resolution of a WTO dispute with the US.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -856,18 +856,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "24,000 (2018 est.)" + "text": "27,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "25.15 (2018 est.)" + "text": "28 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "184,000 (2018)" + "text": "184,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "192.8 (2019 est.)" + "text": "188 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -898,10 +898,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "8,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "8,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "8.17 (2021)" + "text": "8 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json index b9c3c4dd..463c3c52 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json @@ -664,18 +664,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "6,000 (2018)" + "text": "6,000 (2018 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "42.02 (2018 est.)" + "text": "42 (2018 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "26,000 (2018)" + "text": "26,000 (2018 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "182.09 (2019 est.)" + "text": "182 (2018 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -706,10 +706,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "5,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "5,000 (2018 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "33.33 (2021)" + "text": "35 (2018 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json index d84b80c0..45b65214 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json @@ -931,18 +931,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "128,043 (2019)" + "text": "128,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "44.61 (2019 est.)" + "text": "45 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "329,326 (2019)" + "text": "295,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "114.7 (2019 est.)" + "text": "103 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -973,10 +973,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "128,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "128,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "44.54 (2021)" + "text": "45 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1027,6 +1027,9 @@ "text": "Barbados Defense Force: The Barbados Regiment, The Barbados Coast Guard (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "0.9% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "0.9% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1038,9 +1041,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "0.8% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $40 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "0.8% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $40 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json index 620be99b..73a6a132 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "Lucayan Indians inhabited the islands when Christopher COLUMBUS first set foot in the New World on San Salvador in 1492. British settlement of the islands began in 1647; the islands became a colony in 1783. Piracy thrived in the 17th and 18th centuries because of The Bahamas close proximity to shipping lanes. Since attaining independence from the UK in 1973, The Bahamas has prospered through tourism, international banking, and investment management, which comprise up to 85% of GDP. Because of its proximity to the US - the nearest Bahamian landmass being only 80 km (50 mi) from Florida - the country is a major transshipment point for illicit trafficking, particularly to the US mainland, as well as Europe. US law enforcement agencies cooperate closely with The Bahamas, and the US Coast Guard assists Bahamian authorities in coastal defense through Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, or OPBAT." + "text": "Lucayan Indians inhabited the islands when Christopher COLUMBUS first set foot in the New World on San Salvador in 1492. British settlement of the islands began in 1647; the islands became a colony in 1783. Piracy thrived in the 17th and 18th centuries because of The Bahamas close proximity to shipping lanes. Since attaining independence from the UK in 1973, The Bahamas has prospered through tourism, international banking, and investment management, which comprise up to 85% of GDP. Because of its proximity to the US - the nearest Bahamian landmass being only 80 km (50 mi) from Florida - the country is a major transshipment point for illicit trafficking, particularly to the US mainland, as well as Europe. US law enforcement agencies cooperate closely with The Bahamas, and the US Coast Guard assists Bahamian authorities in maritime security and law enforcement through Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, or OPBAT." } }, "Geography": { @@ -869,18 +869,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "91,129 (2019)" + "text": "91,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "23.4 (2019 est.)" + "text": "23 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "425,507 (2019)" + "text": "466,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "109.3 (2019 est.)" + "text": "119 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -911,10 +911,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "83,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "83,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "21.11 (2021)" + "text": "21 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json index 6313082f..e5efaeb1 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json @@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Tourism is the number one foreign exchange earner in this small economy, followed by exports of sugar, bananas, citrus, marine products, and crude oil.
The government's expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, initiated in September 1998, led to GDP growth averaging nearly 4% in 1999-2007, but GPD growth has averaged only 2.1% from 2007-2016, with 2.5% growth estimated for 2017. Belize’s dependence on energy imports makes it susceptible to energy price shocks.
Although Belize has the third highest per capita income in Central America, the average income figure masks a huge income disparity between rich and poor, and a key government objective remains reducing poverty and inequality with the help of international donors. High unemployment, a growing trade deficit and heavy foreign debt burden continue to be major concerns. Belize faces continued pressure from rising sovereign debt, and a growing trade imbalance.
" + "text": "Tourism is the number one foreign exchange earner in this small economy, followed by exports of sugar, bananas, citrus, marine products, and crude oil.
The government's expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, initiated in September 1998, led to GDP growth averaging nearly 4% in 1999-2007, but GPD growth has averaged only 2.1% from 2007-2016, with 2.5% growth estimated for 2017. Belize’s dependence on energy imports makes it susceptible to energy price shocks.
Although Belize has the third highest per capita income in Central America, the average income figure masks a huge income disparity between rich and poor, and a key government objective remains reducing poverty and inequality with the help of international donors. High unemployment, a growing trade deficit and heavy foreign debt burden continue to be major concerns. Belize faces continued pressure from rising sovereign debt, and a growing trade imbalance.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -952,18 +952,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "18,500 (2019)" + "text": "19,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "4.74 (2019 est.)" + "text": "5 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "254,919 (2019)" + "text": "264,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "65.3 (2019 est.)" + "text": "66 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -994,10 +994,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "36,000 (2021)" + "text": "36,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "9.05 (2021)" + "text": "9 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1085,6 +1085,9 @@ "text": "Belize Defense Force (BDF): Army, Air Wing; Belize Coast Guard (independent from the BDF, but under the Ministry of Defense) (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.3% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.5% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1096,9 +1099,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.4% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $30 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.3% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $30 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json index 8c5610bf..00a3f184 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json @@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "With no direct taxation, the islands are a thriving offshore financial center. More than 65,000 companies were registered in the Cayman Islands as of 2017, including more than 280 banks, 700 insurers, and 10,500 mutual funds. A stock exchange was opened in 1997. Nearly 90% of the islands' food and consumer goods must be imported. The Caymanians enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of Switzerland.
Tourism is also a mainstay, accounting for about 70% of GDP and 75% of foreign currency earnings. The tourist industry is aimed at the luxury market and caters mainly to visitors from North America. Total tourist arrivals exceeded 2.1 million in 2016, with more than three-quarters from the US.
" + "text": "With no direct taxation, the islands are a thriving offshore financial center. More than 65,000 companies were registered in the Cayman Islands as of 2017, including more than 280 banks, 700 insurers, and 10,500 mutual funds. A stock exchange was opened in 1997. Nearly 90% of the islands' food and consumer goods must be imported. The Caymanians enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of Switzerland.
Tourism is also a mainstay, accounting for about 70% of GDP and 75% of foreign currency earnings. The tourist industry is aimed at the luxury market and caters mainly to visitors from North America. Total tourist arrivals exceeded 2.1 million in 2016, with more than three-quarters from the US.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": { @@ -774,10 +774,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "34,768 (2018)" + "text": "36,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "54.85 (2018 est.)" + "text": "55 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -816,10 +816,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "3,200 (2021 est.)" + "text": "3,200 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "48.69 (2021)" + "text": "49 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json index 66eb0205..3bf19f2b 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json @@ -672,7 +672,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Since 2010, Costa Rica has enjoyed strong and stable economic growth - 3.8% in 2017. Exports of bananas, coffee, sugar, and beef are the backbone of its commodity exports. Various industrial and processed agricultural products have broadened exports in recent years, as have high value-added goods, including medical devices. Costa Rica's impressive biodiversity also makes it a key destination for ecotourism.
Foreign investors remain attracted by the country's political stability and relatively high education levels, as well as the incentives offered in the free-trade zones; Costa Rica has attracted one of the highest levels of foreign direct investment per capita in Latin America. The US-Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), which became effective for Costa Rica in 2009, helped increase foreign direct investment in key sectors of the economy, including insurance and telecommunication. However, poor infrastructure, high energy costs, a complex bureaucracy, weak investor protection, and uncertainty of contract enforcement impede greater investment.
Costa Rica’s economy also faces challenges due to a rising fiscal deficit, rising public debt, and relatively low levels of domestic revenue. Poverty has remained around 20-25% for nearly 20 years, and the government’s strong social safety net has eroded due to increased constraints on its expenditures. Costa Rica’s credit rating was downgraded from stable to negative in 2015 and again in 2017, upping pressure on lending rates - which could hurt small business, on the budget deficit - which could hurt infrastructure development, and on the rate of return on investment - which could soften foreign direct investment (FDI). Unlike the rest of Central America, Costa Rica is not highly dependent on remittances - which represented just 1 % of GDP in 2016, but instead relies on FDI - which accounted for 5.1% of GDP.
" + "text": "Since 2010, Costa Rica has enjoyed strong and stable economic growth - 3.8% in 2017. Exports of bananas, coffee, sugar, and beef are the backbone of its commodity exports. Various industrial and processed agricultural products have broadened exports in recent years, as have high value-added goods, including medical devices. Costa Rica's impressive biodiversity also makes it a key destination for ecotourism.
Foreign investors remain attracted by the country's political stability and relatively high education levels, as well as the incentives offered in the free-trade zones; Costa Rica has attracted one of the highest levels of foreign direct investment per capita in Latin America. The US-Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), which became effective for Costa Rica in 2009, helped increase foreign direct investment in key sectors of the economy, including insurance and telecommunication. However, poor infrastructure, high energy costs, a complex bureaucracy, weak investor protection, and uncertainty of contract enforcement impede greater investment.
Costa Rica’s economy also faces challenges due to a rising fiscal deficit, rising public debt, and relatively low levels of domestic revenue. Poverty has remained around 20-25% for nearly 20 years, and the government’s strong social safety net has eroded due to increased constraints on its expenditures. Costa Rica’s credit rating was downgraded from stable to negative in 2015 and again in 2017, upping pressure on lending rates - which could hurt small business, on the budget deficit - which could hurt infrastructure development, and on the rate of return on investment - which could soften foreign direct investment (FDI). Unlike the rest of Central America, Costa Rica is not highly dependent on remittances - which represented just 1 % of GDP in 2016, but instead relies on FDI - which accounted for 5.1% of GDP.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1001,10 +1001,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "559,882 (2020)" + "text": "559,882 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "10.99 (2020 est.)" + "text": "11 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1043,10 +1043,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "992,725 (2021)" + "text": "992,725 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "19.49 (2021)" + "text": "20 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1142,8 +1142,11 @@ "note": "note - Costa Rica's armed forces were constitutionally abolished in 1949" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "0.7% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { - "text": "0.7% of GDP (2020)" + "text": "0.7% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2019": { "text": "0.7% of GDP (2019) (approximately $630 million)" @@ -1153,9 +1156,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "0.7% of GDP (2017) (approximately $600 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "0.7% of GDP (2016) (approximately $580 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json index 65ff3e9a..973f301c 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json @@ -967,10 +967,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1,502,230 (2020)" + "text": "1,502,230 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "13.26 (2020 est.)" + "text": "13 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1010,10 +1010,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "231,654 (2021)" + "text": "231,654 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "2.05 (2021)" + "text": "2 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json index 2e0d5bf9..39f0ee43 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "Dominica was the last of the Caribbean islands to be colonized by Europeans due chiefly to the fierce resistance of the native Caribs. France ceded possession to Great Britain in 1763, which colonized the island in 1805. Slavery ended in 1833 and in 1835 the first three men of African descent were elected to the legislative assembly of Dominica. In 1871, Dominica became part first of the British Leeward Islands and then the British Windward Islands until 1958. In 1967 Dominica became an associated state of the UK, and formally took responsibility for its internal affairs. In 1980, two years after independence, Dominica's fortunes improved when a corrupt and tyrannical administration was replaced by that of Mary Eugenia CHARLES, the first female prime minister in the Caribbean, who remained in office for 15 years. On 18 September 2017, Hurricane Maria passed over the island causing extensive damage to structures, roads, communications, and the power supply, and largely destroying critical agricultural areas." + "text": "Dominica was the last of the Caribbean islands to be colonized by Europeans due chiefly to the fierce resistance of the native Caribs. France ceded possession to Great Britain in 1763, which colonized the island in 1805. Slavery ended in 1833 and in 1835 the first three men of African descent were elected to the legislative assembly of Dominica. In 1871, Dominica became part first of the British Leeward Islands and then the British Windward Islands until 1958. In 1967 Dominica became an associated state of the UK, and formally took responsibility for its internal affairs. In 1980, two years after independence, Dominica's fortunes improved when a corrupt and tyrannical administration was replaced by that of Mary Eugenia CHARLES, the first female prime minister in the Caribbean, who remained in office for 15 years. On 18 September 2017, Hurricane Maria passed over the island, causing extensive damage to structures, roads, communications, and the power supply, and largely destroying critical agricultural areas." } }, "Geography": { @@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The Dominican economy was dependent on agriculture - primarily bananas - in years past, but increasingly has been driven by tourism, as the government seeks to promote Dominica as an \"ecotourism\" destination. However, Hurricane Maria, which passed through the island in September 2017, destroyed much of the country’s agricultural sector and caused damage to all of the country’s transportation and physical infrastructure. Before Hurricane Maria, the government had attempted to foster an offshore financial industry and planned to sign agreements with the private sector to develop geothermal energy resources. At a time when government finances are fragile, the government’s focus has been to get the country back in shape to service cruise ships. The economy contracted in 2015 and recovered to positive growth in 2016 due to a recovery of agriculture and tourism. Dominica suffers from high debt levels, which increased from 67% of GDP in 2010 to 77% in 2016. Dominica is one of five countries in the East Caribbean that have citizenship by investment programs whereby foreigners can obtain passports for a fee and revenue from this contribute to government budgets." + "text": "The Dominican economy was dependent on agriculture - primarily bananas - in years past, but increasingly has been driven by tourism, as the government seeks to promote Dominica as an \"ecotourism\" destination. However, Hurricane Maria, which passed through the island in September 2017, destroyed much of the country’s agricultural sector and caused damage to all of the country’s transportation and physical infrastructure. Before Hurricane Maria, the government had attempted to foster an offshore financial industry and planned to sign agreements with the private sector to develop geothermal energy resources. At a time when government finances are fragile, the government’s focus has been to get the country back in shape to service cruise ships. The economy contracted in 2015 and recovered to positive growth in 2016 due to a recovery of agriculture and tourism. Dominica suffers from high debt levels, which increased from 67% of GDP in 2010 to 77% in 2016. Dominica is one of five countries in the East Caribbean that have citizenship by investment programs whereby foreigners can obtain passports for a fee and revenue from this contribute to government budgets." }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -821,10 +821,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,660 (2018)" + "text": "1,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "3.71 (2018 est.)" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -863,10 +863,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "11,514 (2021)" + "text": "16,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "22.23 (2021)" + "text": "22 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json index 28ea63ab..303a437c 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json @@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The Dominican Republic was for most of its history primarily an exporter of sugar, coffee, and tobacco, but over the last three decades the economy has become more diversified as the service sector has overtaken agriculture as the economy's largest employer, due to growth in construction, tourism, and free trade zones. The mining sector has also played a greater role in the export market since late 2012 with the commencement of the extraction phase of the Pueblo Viejo Gold and Silver mine, one of the largest gold mines in the world.
For the last 20 years, the Dominican Republic has been one of the fastest growing economies in Latin America. The economy rebounded from the global recession in 2010-16, and the fiscal situation is improving. A tax reform package passed in November 2012, a reduction in government spending, and lower energy costs helped to narrow the central government budget deficit from 6.6% of GDP in 2012 to 2.6% in 2016, and public debt is declining. Marked income inequality, high unemployment, and underemployment remain important long-term challenges; the poorest half of the population receives less than one-fifth of GDP, while the richest 10% enjoys nearly 40% of GDP.
The economy is highly dependent upon the US, the destination for approximately half of exports and the source of 40% of imports. Remittances from the US amount to about 7% of GDP, equivalent to about a third of exports and two-thirds of tourism receipts. The Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement came into force in March 2007, boosting investment and manufacturing exports.
" + "text": "The Dominican Republic was for most of its history primarily an exporter of sugar, coffee, and tobacco, but over the last three decades the economy has become more diversified as the service sector has overtaken agriculture as the economy's largest employer, due to growth in construction, tourism, and free trade zones. The mining sector has also played a greater role in the export market since late 2012 with the commencement of the extraction phase of the Pueblo Viejo Gold and Silver mine, one of the largest gold mines in the world.
For the last 20 years, the Dominican Republic has been one of the fastest growing economies in Latin America. The economy rebounded from the global recession in 2010-16, and the fiscal situation is improving. A tax reform package passed in November 2012, a reduction in government spending, and lower energy costs helped to narrow the central government budget deficit from 6.6% of GDP in 2012 to 2.6% in 2016, and public debt is declining. Marked income inequality, high unemployment, and underemployment remain important long-term challenges; the poorest half of the population receives less than one-fifth of GDP, while the richest 10% enjoys nearly 40% of GDP.
The economy is highly dependent upon the US, the destination for approximately half of exports and the source of 40% of imports. Remittances from the US amount to about 7% of GDP, equivalent to about a third of exports and two-thirds of tourism receipts. The Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement came into force in March 2007, boosting investment and manufacturing exports.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1012,10 +1012,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1,155,493 (2020)" + "text": "1,155,493 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "10.65 (2020 est.)" + "text": "11 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1054,10 +1054,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,031,858 (2021)" + "text": "1,031,858 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "9.51 (2021)" + "text": "10 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1166,6 +1166,9 @@ "note": "note(s) - in addition to the military, the Ministry of Armed Forces directs the Airport Security Authority and Civil Aviation, Port Security Authority, the Tourist Security Corps, and Border Security Corps; the National Police (Policia Nacional) are under the Ministry of Interior" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "0.7% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "0.8% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1177,9 +1180,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "0.6% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $1.2 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "0.6% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $1.11 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json index e10d169f..4a54bdd2 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json @@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The smallest country in Central America geographically, El Salvador has the fourth largest economy in the region. With the global recession, real GDP contracted in 2009 and economic growth has since remained low, averaging less than 2% from 2010 to 2014, but recovered somewhat in 2015-17 with an average annual growth rate of 2.4%. Remittances accounted for approximately 18% of GDP in 2017 and were received by about a third of all households.
In 2006, El Salvador was the first country to ratify the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement, which has bolstered the export of processed foods, sugar, and ethanol, and supported investment in the apparel sector amid increased Asian competition. In September 2015, El Salvador kicked off a five-year $277 million second compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation - a US Government agency aimed at stimulating economic growth and reducing poverty - to improve El Salvador's competitiveness and productivity in international markets.
The Salvadoran Government maintained fiscal discipline during reconstruction and rebuilding following earthquakes in 2001 and hurricanes in 1998 and 2005, but El Salvador's public debt, estimated at 59.3% of GDP in 2017, has been growing over the last several years.
" + "text": "The smallest country in Central America geographically, El Salvador has the fourth largest economy in the region. With the global recession, real GDP contracted in 2009 and economic growth has since remained low, averaging less than 2% from 2010 to 2014, but recovered somewhat in 2015-17 with an average annual growth rate of 2.4%. Remittances accounted for approximately 18% of GDP in 2017 and were received by about a third of all households.
In 2006, El Salvador was the first country to ratify the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement, which has bolstered the export of processed foods, sugar, and ethanol, and supported investment in the apparel sector amid increased Asian competition. In September 2015, El Salvador kicked off a five-year $277 million second compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation - a US Government agency aimed at stimulating economic growth and reducing poverty - to improve El Salvador's competitiveness and productivity in international markets.
The Salvadoran Government maintained fiscal discipline during reconstruction and rebuilding following earthquakes in 2001 and hurricanes in 1998 and 2005, but El Salvador's public debt, estimated at 59.3% of GDP in 2017, has been growing over the last several years.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -991,10 +991,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "893,630 (2019)" + "text": "894,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "13.85 (2019 est.)" + "text": "14 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1033,10 +1033,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "586,000 (2021)" + "text": "586,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "9.03 (2021 est.)" + "text": "9 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1142,6 +1142,9 @@ "note": "note - in 2016, El Salvador created a 1,000-strong combined Army commando and special police unit to combat criminal gang violence" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.2% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.2% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1153,9 +1156,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1% of GDP (2017) (approximately $500 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1% of GDP (2016) (approximately $470 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json index 1b09970c..2075a044 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "Carib Indians inhabited Grenada when Christopher COLUMBUS discovered the island in 1498, but it remained uncolonized for more than a century. The French settled Grenada in the 17th century, established sugar estates, and imported large numbers of African slaves. Britain took the island in 1762 and vigorously expanded sugar production. In the 19th century, cacao eventually surpassed sugar as the main export crop; in the 20th century, nutmeg became the leading export. In 1967, Britain gave Grenada autonomy over its internal affairs. Full independence was attained in 1974 making Grenada one of the smallest independent countries in the Western Hemisphere. In 1979, a leftist New Jewel Movement seized power under Maurice BISHOP ushering in the Grenada Revolution. On 19 October 1983, factions within the revolutionary government overthrew and killed BISHOP and members of his party. Six days later the island was invaded by US forces and those of six other Caribbean nations, which quickly captured the ringleaders and their hundreds of Cuban advisers. The rule of law was restored and democratic elections were reinstituted the following year and have continued since then." + "text": "Carib Indians inhabited Grenada when Christopher COLUMBUS landed on the island in 1498, but it remained uncolonized for more than a century. The French settled Grenada in the 17th century, established sugar estates, and imported large numbers of African slaves. Britain took the island in 1762 and vigorously expanded sugar production. In the 19th century, cacao eventually surpassed sugar as the main export crop; in the 20th century, nutmeg became the leading export. In 1967, Britain gave Grenada autonomy over its internal affairs. Full independence was attained in 1974, making Grenada one of the smallest independent countries in the Western Hemisphere. In 1979, a leftist New Jewel Movement seized power under Maurice BISHOP, ushering in the Grenada Revolution. On 19 October 1983, factions within the revolutionary government overthrew and killed BISHOP and members of his party. Six days later, the island was invaded by US forces and those of six other Caribbean nations, which quickly captured the ringleaders and their hundreds of Cuban advisers. The rule of law was restored, and democratic elections were reinstituted the following year and have continued since then." } }, "Geography": { @@ -490,13 +490,13 @@ }, "Legislative branch": { "description": { - "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:Grenada relies on tourism and revenue generated by St. George’s University - a private university offering degrees in medicine, veterinary medicine, public health, the health sciences, nursing, arts and sciences, and business - as its main source of foreign exchange. In the past two years the country expanded its sources of revenue, including from selling passports under its citizenship by investment program. These projects produced a resurgence in the construction and manufacturing sectors of the economy.
In 2017, Grenada experienced its fifth consecutive year of growth and the government successfully marked the completion of its five-year structural adjustment program that included among other things austerity measures, increased tax revenue and debt restructuring. Public debt-to-GDP was reduced from 100% of GDP in 2013 to 71.8% in 2017.
" + "text": "Grenada relies on tourism and revenue generated by St. George’s University - a private university offering degrees in medicine, veterinary medicine, public health, the health sciences, nursing, arts and sciences, and business - as its main source of foreign exchange. In the past two years the country expanded its sources of revenue, including from selling passports under its citizenship by investment program. These projects produced a resurgence in the construction and manufacturing sectors of the economy.
In 2017, Grenada experienced its fifth consecutive year of growth and the government successfully marked the completion of its five-year structural adjustment program that included among other things austerity measures, increased tax revenue and debt restructuring. Public debt-to-GDP was reduced from 100% of GDP in 2013 to 71.8% in 2017.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -874,10 +874,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "32,491 (2018)" + "text": "16,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "29.3 (2018 est.)" + "text": "14 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -916,10 +916,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "32,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "32,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "28.44 (2021)" + "text": "28 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json index ed1b07df..40f84bc7 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json @@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Guatemala is the most populous country in Central America with a GDP per capita roughly half the average for Latin America and the Caribbean. The agricultural sector accounts for 13.5% of GDP and 31% of the labor force; key agricultural exports include sugar, coffee, bananas, and vegetables. Guatemala is the top remittance recipient in Central America as a result of Guatemala's large expatriate community in the US. These inflows are a primary source of foreign income, equivalent to two-thirds of the country's exports and about a tenth of its GDP.
The 1996 peace accords, which ended 36 years of civil war, removed a major obstacle to foreign investment, and Guatemala has since pursued important reforms and macroeconomic stabilization. The Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) entered into force in July 2006, spurring increased investment and diversification of exports, with the largest increases in ethanol and non-traditional agricultural exports. While CAFTA-DR has helped improve the investment climate, concerns over security, the lack of skilled workers, and poor infrastructure continue to hamper foreign direct investment.
The distribution of income remains highly unequal with the richest 20% of the population accounting for more than 51% of Guatemala's overall consumption. More than half of the population is below the national poverty line, and 23% of the population lives in extreme poverty. Poverty among indigenous groups, which make up more than 40% of the population, averages 79%, with 40% of the indigenous population living in extreme poverty. Nearly one-half of Guatemala's children under age five are chronically malnourished, one of the highest malnutrition rates in the world.
" + "text": "Guatemala is the most populous country in Central America with a GDP per capita roughly half the average for Latin America and the Caribbean. The agricultural sector accounts for 13.5% of GDP and 31% of the labor force; key agricultural exports include sugar, coffee, bananas, and vegetables. Guatemala is the top remittance recipient in Central America as a result of Guatemala's large expatriate community in the US. These inflows are a primary source of foreign income, equivalent to two-thirds of the country's exports and about a tenth of its GDP.
The 1996 peace accords, which ended 36 years of civil war, removed a major obstacle to foreign investment, and Guatemala has since pursued important reforms and macroeconomic stabilization. The Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) entered into force in July 2006, spurring increased investment and diversification of exports, with the largest increases in ethanol and non-traditional agricultural exports. While CAFTA-DR has helped improve the investment climate, concerns over security, the lack of skilled workers, and poor infrastructure continue to hamper foreign direct investment.
The distribution of income remains highly unequal with the richest 20% of the population accounting for more than 51% of Guatemala's overall consumption. More than half of the population is below the national poverty line, and 23% of the population lives in extreme poverty. Poverty among indigenous groups, which make up more than 40% of the population, averages 79%, with 40% of the indigenous population living in extreme poverty. Nearly one-half of Guatemala's children under age five are chronically malnourished, one of the highest malnutrition rates in the world.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1011,10 +1011,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,272,467 (2020)" + "text": "2,272,467 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "12.68 (2020 est.)" + "text": "13 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1053,10 +1053,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "612,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "612,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "3.42 (2021)" + "text": "3 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1165,6 +1165,9 @@ "text": "Army of Guatemala (Ejercito de Guatemala): Land Forces (Fuerzas de Tierra), Naval Forces (Fuerza de Mar), and Air Force (Fuerza de Aire); Ministry of Interior: National Civil Police (Policia Nacional Civil; includes paramilitary units) (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "0.4% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "0.4% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1176,9 +1179,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "0.4% of GDP (2017) (approximately $460 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "0.4% of GDP (2016) (approximately $500 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json index 40150dbb..96465b13 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json @@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ }, "Legislative branch": { "description": { - "text": "bicameral legislature or le Corps l'egislatif ou le Parlement consists of:Haiti is a free market economy with low labor costs and tariff-free access to the US for many of its exports. Two-fifths of all Haitians depend on the agricultural sector, mainly small-scale subsistence farming, which remains vulnerable to damage from frequent natural disasters. Poverty, corruption, vulnerability to natural disasters, and low levels of education for much of the population represent some of the most serious impediments to Haiti’s economic growth. Remittances are the primary source of foreign exchange, equivalent to more than a quarter of GDP, and nearly double the combined value of Haitian exports and foreign direct investment.
Currently the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with close to 60% of the population living under the national poverty line, Haiti’s GDP growth rose to 5.5% in 2011 as the Haitian economy began recovering from the devastating January 2010 earthquake that destroyed much of its capital city, Port-au-Prince, and neighboring areas. However, growth slowed to below 2% in 2015 and 2016 as political uncertainty, drought conditions, decreasing foreign aid, and the depreciation of the national currency took a toll on investment and economic growth. Hurricane Matthew, the fiercest Caribbean storm in nearly a decade, made landfall in Haiti on 4 October 2016, with 140 mile-per-hour winds, creating a new humanitarian emergency. An estimated 2.1 million people were affected by the category 4 storm, which caused extensive damage to crops, houses, livestock, and infrastructure across Haiti’s southern peninsula.
US economic engagement under the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) and the 2008 Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act (HOPE II) have contributed to an increase in apparel exports and investment by providing duty-free access to the US. The Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act of 2010 extended the CBTPA and HOPE II until 2020, while the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 extended trade benefits provided to Haiti in the HOPE and HELP Acts through September 2025. Apparel sector exports in 2016 reached approximately $850 million and account for over 90% of Haitian exports and more than 10% of the GDP.
Investment in Haiti is hampered by the difficulty of doing business and weak infrastructure, including access to electricity. Haiti's outstanding external debt was cancelled by donor countries following the 2010 earthquake, but has since risen to $2.6 billion as of December 2017, the majority of which is owed to Venezuela under the PetroCaribe program. Although the government has increased its revenue collection, it continues to rely on formal international economic assistance for fiscal sustainability, with over 20% of its annual budget coming from foreign aid or direct budget support.
" + "text": "Haiti is a free market economy with low labor costs and tariff-free access to the US for many of its exports. Two-fifths of all Haitians depend on the agricultural sector, mainly small-scale subsistence farming, which remains vulnerable to damage from frequent natural disasters. Poverty, corruption, vulnerability to natural disasters, and low levels of education for much of the population represent some of the most serious impediments to Haiti’s economic growth. Remittances are the primary source of foreign exchange, equivalent to more than a quarter of GDP, and nearly double the combined value of Haitian exports and foreign direct investment.
Currently the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with close to 60% of the population living under the national poverty line, Haiti’s GDP growth rose to 5.5% in 2011 as the Haitian economy began recovering from the devastating January 2010 earthquake that destroyed much of its capital city, Port-au-Prince, and neighboring areas. However, growth slowed to below 2% in 2015 and 2016 as political uncertainty, drought conditions, decreasing foreign aid, and the depreciation of the national currency took a toll on investment and economic growth. Hurricane Matthew, the fiercest Caribbean storm in nearly a decade, made landfall in Haiti on 4 October 2016, with 140 mile-per-hour winds, creating a new humanitarian emergency. An estimated 2.1 million people were affected by the category 4 storm, which caused extensive damage to crops, houses, livestock, and infrastructure across Haiti’s southern peninsula.
US economic engagement under the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) and the 2008 Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act (HOPE II) have contributed to an increase in apparel exports and investment by providing duty-free access to the US. The Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act of 2010 extended the CBTPA and HOPE II until 2020, while the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 extended trade benefits provided to Haiti in the HOPE and HELP Acts through September 2025. Apparel sector exports in 2016 reached approximately $850 million and account for over 90% of Haitian exports and more than 10% of the GDP.
Investment in Haiti is hampered by the difficulty of doing business and weak infrastructure, including access to electricity. Haiti's outstanding external debt was cancelled by donor countries following the 2010 earthquake, but has since risen to $2.6 billion as of December 2017, the majority of which is owed to Venezuela under the PetroCaribe program. Although the government has increased its revenue collection, it continues to rely on formal international economic assistance for fiscal sustainability, with over 20% of its annual budget coming from foreign aid or direct budget support.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -966,10 +966,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "5,952 (2019)" + "text": "6,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2019 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1008,10 +1008,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "31,100 (2021 est.)" + "text": "31,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.27 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.27 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, @@ -1081,8 +1081,11 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "the Haitian Armed Forces (FAdH), disbanded in 1995, began to be reconstituted in 2017 to assist with natural disaster relief, border security, and combating transnational crime; it established an Army command in 2018; the small Coast Guard is not part of the military, but rather the Haitian National Police (2021)", - "note": "note - the National Police has a paramilitary, rapid-response unit known as the Motorized Intervention Unit or BIM" + "text": "the Haitian Armed Forces (FAdH), disbanded in 1995, began to be reconstituted in 2017 to assist with natural disaster relief, border security, and combating transnational crime; it established an Army command in 2018 (2021)", + "note": "note - the National Police has a number of specialized units, including a coast guard, a presidential guard, and a paramilitary rapid-response Motorized Intervention Unit or BIM
" + }, + "Military expenditures": { + "text": "not available" }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { "text": "the FAdH has approximately 500 troops (the force is planned to eventually have around 5,000 personnel); approximately 16,000 National Police (2021)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json index 00701e52..ebfb19af 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json @@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ }, "Diplomatic representation from the US": { "chief of mission": { - "text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Colleen A. HOEY (since August 2019)" + "text": "Ambassador Laura F. DOGU (since 12 April 2022)" }, "embassy": { "text": "Avenida La Paz, Tegucigalpa M.D.C." @@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "
Honduras, the second poorest country in Central America, suffers from extraordinarily unequal distribution of income, as well as high underemployment. While historically dependent on the export of bananas and coffee, Honduras has diversified its export base to include apparel and automobile wire harnessing.
Honduras’s economy depends heavily on US trade and remittances. The US-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement came into force in 2006 and has helped foster foreign direct investment, but physical and political insecurity, as well as crime and perceptions of corruption, may deter potential investors; about 15% of foreign direct investment is from US firms.
The economy registered modest economic growth of 3.1%-4.0% from 2010 to 2017, insufficient to improve living standards for the nearly 65% of the population in poverty. In 2017, Honduras faced rising public debt, but its economy has performed better than expected due to low oil prices and improved investor confidence. Honduras signed a three-year standby arrangement with the IMF in December 2014, aimed at easing Honduras’s poor fiscal position.
" + "text": "Honduras, the second poorest country in Central America, suffers from extraordinarily unequal distribution of income, as well as high underemployment. While historically dependent on the export of bananas and coffee, Honduras has diversified its export base to include apparel and automobile wire harnessing.
Honduras’s economy depends heavily on US trade and remittances. The US-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement came into force in 2006 and has helped foster foreign direct investment, but physical and political insecurity, as well as crime and perceptions of corruption, may deter potential investors; about 15% of foreign direct investment is from US firms.
The economy registered modest economic growth of 3.1%-4.0% from 2010 to 2017, insufficient to improve living standards for the nearly 65% of the population in poverty. In 2017, Honduras faced rising public debt, but its economy has performed better than expected due to low oil prices and improved investor confidence. Honduras signed a three-year standby arrangement with the IMF in December 2014, aimed at easing Honduras’s poor fiscal position.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1007,10 +1007,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "531,763 (2020)" + "text": "531,763 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "5.37 (2020 est.)" + "text": "5 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1049,10 +1049,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "396,916 (2021)" + "text": "396,916 (2020)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "4.01 (2021 est.)" + "text": "4 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1154,6 +1154,9 @@ "note": "note - the PMOP was created in 2013 as part of an effort by the Honduran Government to expand the military’s role in law enforcement alongside the Honduran National Police (HNP), particularly against narcotics trafficking and organized crime; since its creation, the PMOP’s role in internal security has expanded; it was used against election protesters in 2017, for example, and it has been accused of human rights violations; as of 2021, the PMOP was composed of 8 battalions of military personnel (approximately 5,000 troops) who have undergone some police training; it reported to military authorities but conducts operations sanctioned by both civilian security officials and military leaders" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.6% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.6% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1165,9 +1168,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.7% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $510 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.7% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $470 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json index 5675ee01..97d370a7 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "The island - discovered by Christopher COLUMBUS in 1494 - was settled by the Spanish early in the 16th century. The native Taino, who had inhabited Jamaica for centuries, were gradually exterminated and replaced by African slaves. England seized the island in 1655 and established a plantation economy based on sugar, cocoa, and coffee. The abolition of slavery in 1834 freed a quarter million slaves, many of whom became small farmers. Jamaica gradually increased its independence from Britain. In 1958 it joined other British Caribbean colonies in forming the Federation of the West Indies. Jamaica withdrew from the Federation in 1961 and gained full independence in 1962. Deteriorating economic conditions during the 1970s led to recurrent violence as rival gangs affiliated with the major political parties evolved into powerful organized crime networks involved in international drug smuggling and money laundering. Violent crime, drug trafficking, and poverty pose significant challenges to the government today. Nonetheless, many rural and resort areas remain relatively safe and contribute substantially to the economy." + "text": "The island - discovered by Christopher COLUMBUS in 1494 - was settled by the Spanish early in the 16th century. The native Taino, who had inhabited Jamaica for centuries, were gradually exterminated and replaced by African slaves. England seized the island in 1655 and established a plantation economy based on sugar, cocoa, and coffee. The abolition of slavery in 1834 freed a quarter million slaves, many of whom became small farmers. Jamaica gradually increased its independence from Britain. In 1958 it joined other British Caribbean colonies in forming the Federation of the West Indies. Jamaica withdrew from the Federation in 1961 and gained full independence in 1962. Deteriorating economic conditions during the 1970s led to recurrent violence as rival gangs affiliated with the major political parties evolved into powerful organized crime networks involved in international drug smuggling and money laundering. Violent crime, drug trafficking, corruption, the COVID-19 pandemic, and poverty pose significant challenges to the government today. Nonetheless, many rural and resort areas remain relatively safe and contribute substantially to the economy." } }, "Geography": { @@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Jamaica Labor Party or JLP [Andrew Michael HOLNESS]Jamaica Labor Party or JLP [Andrew Michael HOLNESS]
People's National Party or PNP [Mark GOLDING]
United Independents' Congress or UIC [Joseph PATTERSON]
Jamaica Progressive Party or JPP [Gilbert EDWARDS]
The Jamaican economy is heavily dependent on services, which accounts for more than 70% of GDP. The country derives most of its foreign exchange from tourism, remittances, and bauxite/alumina. Earnings from remittances and tourism each account for 14% and 20% of GDP, while bauxite/alumina exports have declined to less than 5% of GDP.
Jamaica's economy has grown on average less than 1% a year for the last three decades and many impediments remain to growth: a bloated public sector which crowds out spending on important projects; high crime and corruption; red-tape; and a high debt-to-GDP ratio. Jamaica, however, has made steady progress in reducing its debt-to-GDP ratio from a high of almost 150% in 2012 to less than 110% in 2017, in close collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The current IMF Stand-By Agreement requires Jamaica to produce an annual primary surplus of 7%, in an attempt to reduce its debt burden below 60% by 2025.
Economic growth reached 1.6% in 2016, but declined to 0.9% in 2017 after intense rainfall, demonstrating the vulnerability of the economy to weather-related events. The HOLNESS administration therefore faces the difficult prospect of maintaining fiscal discipline to reduce the debt load while simultaneously implementing growth inducing policies and attacking a serious crime problem. High unemployment exacerbates the crime problem, including gang violence fueled by advanced fee fraud (lottery scamming) and the drug trade.
" + "text": "The Jamaican economy is heavily dependent on services, which accounts for more than 70% of GDP. The country derives most of its foreign exchange from tourism, remittances, and bauxite/alumina. Earnings from remittances and tourism each account for 14% and 20% of GDP, while bauxite/alumina exports have declined to less than 5% of GDP.
Jamaica's economy has grown on average less than 1% a year for the last three decades and many impediments remain to growth: a bloated public sector which crowds out spending on important projects; high crime and corruption; red-tape; and a high debt-to-GDP ratio. Jamaica, however, has made steady progress in reducing its debt-to-GDP ratio from a high of almost 150% in 2012 to less than 110% in 2017, in close collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The current IMF Stand-By Agreement requires Jamaica to produce an annual primary surplus of 7%, in an attempt to reduce its debt burden below 60% by 2025.
Economic growth reached 1.6% in 2016, but declined to 0.9% in 2017 after intense rainfall, demonstrating the vulnerability of the economy to weather-related events. The HOLNESS administration therefore faces the difficult prospect of maintaining fiscal discipline to reduce the debt load while simultaneously implementing growth inducing policies and attacking a serious crime problem. High unemployment exacerbates the crime problem, including gang violence fueled by advanced fee fraud (lottery scamming) and the drug trade.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -957,10 +957,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "436,249 (2020)" + "text": "436,249 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "14.73 (2020 est.)" + "text": "15 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -999,10 +999,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "385,603 (2021)" + "text": "385,603 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "13.02 (2021)" + "text": "13 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1079,6 +1079,9 @@ "note": "note - both the JDF and JCF are under the Ministry of National Security" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.4% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.7% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1090,9 +1093,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $190 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "0.9% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $180 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json index 156ebb3c..f1a90c77 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json @@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Severe volcanic activity, which began in July 1995, has put a damper on this small, open economy. A catastrophic eruption in June 1997 closed the airport and seaports, causing further economic and social dislocation. Two-thirds of the 12,000 inhabitants fled the island. Some began to return in 1998 but lack of housing limited the number. The agriculture sector continued to be affected by the lack of suitable land for farming and the destruction of crops.
Prospects for the economy depend largely on developments in relation to the volcanic activity and on public sector construction activity. Half of the island remains uninhabitable. In January 2013, the EU announced the disbursement of a $55.2 million aid package to Montserrat in order to boost the country's economic recovery, with a specific focus on public finance management, public sector reform, and prudent economic management. Montserrat is tied to the EU through the UK. Although the UK is leaving the EU, Montserrat’s aid will not be affected as Montserrat maintains a direct agreement with the EU regarding aid.
" + "text": "Severe volcanic activity, which began in July 1995, has put a damper on this small, open economy. A catastrophic eruption in June 1997 closed the airport and seaports, causing further economic and social dislocation. Two-thirds of the 12,000 inhabitants fled the island. Some began to return in 1998 but lack of housing limited the number. The agriculture sector continued to be affected by the lack of suitable land for farming and the destruction of crops.
Prospects for the economy depend largely on developments in relation to the volcanic activity and on public sector construction activity. Half of the island remains uninhabitable. In January 2013, the EU announced the disbursement of a $55.2 million aid package to Montserrat in order to boost the country's economic recovery, with a specific focus on public finance management, public sector reform, and prudent economic management. Montserrat is tied to the EU through the UK. Although the UK is leaving the EU, Montserrat’s aid will not be affected as Montserrat maintains a direct agreement with the EU regarding aid.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2011": { @@ -731,10 +731,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "3,000 (2018)" + "text": "3,000 (2018 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "60.4 (2018 est.)" + "text": "60 (2018 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -773,10 +773,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "3,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "2,700 (2018 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "60.1 (2021 est.)" + "text": "55 (2018 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json index 0bdbc6fe..68fae84e 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json @@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Nicaragua, the poorest country in Central America and the second poorest in the Western Hemisphere, has widespread underemployment and poverty. GDP growth of 4.5% in 2017 was insufficient to make a significant difference. Textiles and agriculture combined account for nearly 50% of Nicaragua's exports. Beef, coffee, and gold are Nicaragua’s top three export commodities.
The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement has been in effect since April 2006 and has expanded export opportunities for many Nicaraguan agricultural and manufactured goods.
In 2013, the government granted a 50-year concession with the option for an additional 50 years to a newly formed Chinese-run company to finance and build an inter-oceanic canal and related projects, at an estimated cost of $50 billion. The canal construction has not started.
" + "text": "Nicaragua, the poorest country in Central America and the second poorest in the Western Hemisphere, has widespread underemployment and poverty. GDP growth of 4.5% in 2017 was insufficient to make a significant difference. Textiles and agriculture combined account for nearly 50% of Nicaragua's exports. Beef, coffee, and gold are Nicaragua’s top three export commodities.
The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement has been in effect since April 2006 and has expanded export opportunities for many Nicaraguan agricultural and manufactured goods.
In 2013, the government granted a 50-year concession with the option for an additional 50 years to a newly formed Chinese-run company to finance and build an inter-oceanic canal and related projects, at an estimated cost of $50 billion. The canal construction has not started.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -996,10 +996,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "210,981 (2020)" + "text": "210,981 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "3.18 (2020 est.)" + "text": "3 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1038,10 +1038,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "290,351 (2021)" + "text": "290,351 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "4.38 (2021)" + "text": "4 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1130,6 +1130,9 @@ "note": "note - both the military and the police report directly to the president" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "0.6% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "0.6% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1141,9 +1144,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "0.6% of GDP (2017) (approximately $190 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "0.5% of GDP (2016) (approximately $170 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json index 2abf85f9..16ff1eea 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json @@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Panama's dollar-based economy rests primarily on a well-developed services sector that accounts for more than three-quarters of GDP. Services include operating the Panama Canal, logistics, banking, the Colon Free Trade Zone, insurance, container ports, flagship registry, and tourism and Panama is a center for offshore banking. Panama's transportation and logistics services sectors, along with infrastructure development projects, have boosted economic growth; however, public debt surpassed $37 billion in 2016 because of excessive government spending and public works projects. The US-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement was approved by Congress and signed into law in October 2011, and entered into force in October 2012.
Future growth will be bolstered by the Panama Canal expansion project that began in 2007 and was completed in 2016 at a cost of $5.3 billion - about 10-15% of current GDP. The expansion project more than doubled the Canal's capacity, enabling it to accommodate high-capacity vessels such as tankers and neopanamax vessels that are too large to traverse the existing canal. The US and China are the top users of the Canal.
Strong economic performance has not translated into broadly shared prosperity, as Panama has the second worst income distribution in Latin America. About one-fourth of the population lives in poverty; however, from 2006 to 2012 poverty was reduced by 10 percentage points.
" + "text": "Panama's dollar-based economy rests primarily on a well-developed services sector that accounts for more than three-quarters of GDP. Services include operating the Panama Canal, logistics, banking, the Colon Free Trade Zone, insurance, container ports, flagship registry, and tourism and Panama is a center for offshore banking. Panama's transportation and logistics services sectors, along with infrastructure development projects, have boosted economic growth; however, public debt surpassed $37 billion in 2016 because of excessive government spending and public works projects. The US-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement was approved by Congress and signed into law in October 2011, and entered into force in October 2012.
Future growth will be bolstered by the Panama Canal expansion project that began in 2007 and was completed in 2016 at a cost of $5.3 billion - about 10-15% of current GDP. The expansion project more than doubled the Canal's capacity, enabling it to accommodate high-capacity vessels such as tankers and neopanamax vessels that are too large to traverse the existing canal. The US and China are the top users of the Canal.
Strong economic performance has not translated into broadly shared prosperity, as Panama has the second worst income distribution in Latin America. About one-fourth of the population lives in poverty; however, from 2006 to 2012 poverty was reduced by 10 percentage points.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1005,10 +1005,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "616,698 (2020)" + "text": "649,156 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "14.29 (2020 est.)" + "text": "15 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1047,10 +1047,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "562,413 (2021 est.)" + "text": "562,413 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "13.03 (2021 est.)" + "text": "13 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1151,6 +1151,9 @@ "note": "note - the PNP includes paramilitary special forces units for counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions; in addition to its 3 regionally-based border security brigades, SENAFRONT includes a special forces brigade, which is comprised of special forces, counternarcotics, maritime, and rapid reaction units" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.4% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.4% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1162,9 +1165,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.2% of GDP (2017) (approximately $1.32 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.3% of GDP (2016) (approximately $1.28 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/rn.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/rn.json index 3a3d8891..a62e2606 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/rn.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/rn.json @@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The economy of Saint Martin centers on tourism with 85% of the labor force engaged in this sector. Over one million visitors come to the island each year with most arriving through the Princess Juliana International Airport in Sint Maarten. The financial sector is also important to Saint Martin’s economy as it facilitates financial mediation for its thriving tourism sector. No significant agriculture and limited local fishing means that almost all food must be imported. Energy resources and manufactured goods are also imported, primarily from Mexico and the US. Saint Martin is reported to have one of the highest per capita income in the Caribbean. As with the rest of the Caribbean, Saint Martin’s financial sector is having to deal with losing correspondent banking relationships.
In September 2017, Hurricane Irma destroyed 95% of the French side of Saint Martin. Along the coastline of Marigot, the nerve center of the economy, the storm wiped out restaurants, shops, banks and open-air markets impacting more than 36,000 inhabitants.
" + "text": "The economy of Saint Martin centers on tourism with 85% of the labor force engaged in this sector. Over one million visitors come to the island each year with most arriving through the Princess Juliana International Airport in Sint Maarten. The financial sector is also important to Saint Martin’s economy as it facilitates financial mediation for its thriving tourism sector. No significant agriculture and limited local fishing means that almost all food must be imported. Energy resources and manufactured goods are also imported, primarily from Mexico and the US. Saint Martin is reported to have one of the highest per capita income in the Caribbean. As with the rest of the Caribbean, Saint Martin’s financial sector is having to deal with losing correspondent banking relationships.
In September 2017, Hurricane Irma destroyed 95% of the French side of Saint Martin. Along the coastline of Marigot, the nerve center of the economy, the storm wiped out restaurants, shops, banks and open-air markets impacting more than 36,000 inhabitants.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2005": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json index e5cc36cf..b1efe958 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json @@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Puerto Rico had one of the most dynamic economies in the Caribbean region until 2006; however, growth has been negative for each of the last 11 years. The downturn coincided with the phaseout of tax preferences that had led US firms to invest heavily in the Commonwealth since the 1950s, and a steep rise in the price of oil, which generates most of the island's electricity.
Diminished job opportunities prompted a sharp rise in outmigration, as many Puerto Ricans sought jobs on the US mainland. Unemployment reached 16% in 2011, but declined to 11.5% in December 2017. US minimum wage laws apply in Puerto Rico, hampering job expansion. Per capita income is about two-thirds that of the US mainland.
The industrial sector greatly exceeds agriculture as the locus of economic activity and income. Tourism has traditionally been an important source of income with estimated arrivals of more than 3.6 million tourists in 2008. Puerto Rico's merchandise trade surplus is exceptionally strong, with exports nearly 50% greater than imports, and its current account surplus about 10% of GDP.
Closing the budget deficit while restoring economic growth and employment remain the central concerns of the government. The gap between revenues and expenditures amounted to 0.6% of GDP in 2016, although analysts believe that not all expenditures have been accounted for in the budget and a better accounting of costs would yield an overall deficit of roughly 5% of GDP. Public debt remained steady at 92.5% of GDP in 2017, about $17,000 per person, or nearly three times the per capita debt of the State of Connecticut, the highest in the US. Much of that debt was issued by state-run schools and public corporations, including water and electric utilities. In June 2015, Governor Alejandro GARCIA Padilla announced that the island could not pay back at least $73 billion in debt and that it would seek a deal with its creditors.
Hurricane Maria hit Puerto Rico square on in September 2017, causing electrical power outages to 90% of the territory, as well as extensive loss of housing and infrastructure and contamination of potable water. Despite massive efforts, more than 40% of the territory remained without electricity as of yearend 2017. As a result of the destruction, many Puerto Ricans have emigrated to the US mainland.
" + "text": "Puerto Rico had one of the most dynamic economies in the Caribbean region until 2006; however, growth has been negative for each of the last 11 years. The downturn coincided with the phaseout of tax preferences that had led US firms to invest heavily in the Commonwealth since the 1950s, and a steep rise in the price of oil, which generates most of the island's electricity.
Diminished job opportunities prompted a sharp rise in outmigration, as many Puerto Ricans sought jobs on the US mainland. Unemployment reached 16% in 2011, but declined to 11.5% in December 2017. US minimum wage laws apply in Puerto Rico, hampering job expansion. Per capita income is about two-thirds that of the US mainland.
The industrial sector greatly exceeds agriculture as the locus of economic activity and income. Tourism has traditionally been an important source of income with estimated arrivals of more than 3.6 million tourists in 2008. Puerto Rico's merchandise trade surplus is exceptionally strong, with exports nearly 50% greater than imports, and its current account surplus about 10% of GDP.
Closing the budget deficit while restoring economic growth and employment remain the central concerns of the government. The gap between revenues and expenditures amounted to 0.6% of GDP in 2016, although analysts believe that not all expenditures have been accounted for in the budget and a better accounting of costs would yield an overall deficit of roughly 5% of GDP. Public debt remained steady at 92.5% of GDP in 2017, about $17,000 per person, or nearly three times the per capita debt of the State of Connecticut, the highest in the US. Much of that debt was issued by state-run schools and public corporations, including water and electric utilities. In June 2015, Governor Alejandro GARCIA Padilla announced that the island could not pay back at least $73 billion in debt and that it would seek a deal with its creditors.
Hurricane Maria hit Puerto Rico square on in September 2017, causing electrical power outages to 90% of the territory, as well as extensive loss of housing and infrastructure and contamination of potable water. Despite massive efforts, more than 40% of the territory remained without electricity as of yearend 2017. As a result of the destruction, many Puerto Ricans have emigrated to the US mainland.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -847,10 +847,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "711,512 (2020)" + "text": "711,512 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "24.87 (2020 est.)" + "text": "25 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -889,10 +889,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "671,284 (2021)" + "text": "671,284 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "23.46 (2021)" + "text": "24 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json index 6cb6d269..c67cfa9c 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json @@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ "text": "Ambassador Dr. Thelma Patricia PHILLIP-BROWNE (since 28 January 2016)" }, "chancery": { - "text": "3216 New Mexico Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20016" + "text": "1203 19th St. NW, 5th Floor, Washington, DC 20036" }, "telephone": { "text": "[1] (202) 686-2636" @@ -534,6 +534,9 @@ "FAX": { "text": "[1] (202) 686-5740" }, + "email address and website": { + "text": "info@embskn.com" + }, "consulate(s) general": { "text": "Los Angeles, New York" } @@ -569,7 +572,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The economy of Saint Kitts and Nevis depends on tourism; since the 1970s, tourism has replaced sugar as the economy’s traditional mainstay. Roughly 200,000 tourists visited the islands in 2009, but reduced tourism arrivals and foreign investment led to an economic contraction in the 2009-2013 period, and the economy returned to growth only in 2014. Like other tourist destinations in the Caribbean, Saint Kitts and Nevis is vulnerable to damage from natural disasters and shifts in tourism demand.
Following the 2005 harvest, the government closed the sugar industry after several decades of losses. To compensate for lost jobs, the government has embarked on a program to diversify the agricultural sector and to stimulate other sectors of the economy, such as export-oriented manufacturing and offshore banking. The government has made notable progress in reducing its public debt, from 154% of GDP in 2011 to 83% in 2013, although it still faces one of the highest levels in the world, largely attributable to public enterprise losses. Saint Kitts and Nevis is among other countries in the Caribbean that supplement their economic activity through economic citizenship programs, whereby foreigners can obtain citizenship from Saint Kitts and Nevis by investing there.
" + "text": "The economy of Saint Kitts and Nevis depends on tourism; since the 1970s, tourism has replaced sugar as the economy’s traditional mainstay. Roughly 200,000 tourists visited the islands in 2009, but reduced tourism arrivals and foreign investment led to an economic contraction in the 2009-2013 period, and the economy returned to growth only in 2014. Like other tourist destinations in the Caribbean, Saint Kitts and Nevis is vulnerable to damage from natural disasters and shifts in tourism demand.
Following the 2005 harvest, the government closed the sugar industry after several decades of losses. To compensate for lost jobs, the government has embarked on a program to diversify the agricultural sector and to stimulate other sectors of the economy, such as export-oriented manufacturing and offshore banking. The government has made notable progress in reducing its public debt, from 154% of GDP in 2011 to 83% in 2013, although it still faces one of the highest levels in the world, largely attributable to public enterprise losses. Saint Kitts and Nevis is among other countries in the Caribbean that supplement their economic activity through economic citizenship programs, whereby foreigners can obtain citizenship from Saint Kitts and Nevis by investing there.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -649,7 +652,7 @@ } }, "Agricultural products": { - "text": "coconuts, tropical fruit, roots/tubers nes, vegetables, sweet potatoes, pulses, watermelons, carrots/turnips, eggs, tomatoes" + "text": "coconuts, tropical fruit, roots/tubers, vegetables, sweet potatoes, pulses, watermelons, carrots/turnips, eggs, tomatoes" }, "Industries": { "text": "tourism, cotton, salt, copra, clothing, footwear, beverages" @@ -850,10 +853,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "17,293 (2018)" + "text": "15,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "33.23 (2018 est.)" + "text": "28 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -892,10 +895,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "30,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "30,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "56.39 (2021 est.)" + "text": "56 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json index 4c264615..14dfecc7 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ "text": "Black/African descent 85.3%, mixed 10.9%, East Indian 2.2%, other 1.6%, unspecified 0.1% (2010 est.)" }, "Languages": { - "text": "English (official), French patois" + "text": "English (official), Saint Lucian Creole" }, "Religions": { "text": "Roman Catholic 61.5%, Protestant 25.5% (includes Seventh Day Adventist 10.4%, Pentecostal 8.9%, Baptist 2.2%, Anglican 1.6%, Church of God 1.5%, other Protestant 0.9%), other Christian 3.4% (includes Evangelical 2.3% and Jehovah's Witness 1.1%), Rastafarian 1.9%, other 0.4%, none 5.9%, unspecified 1.4% (2010 est.)" @@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ "etymology": { "text": "named after Saint LUCY of Syracuse by French sailors who were shipwrecked on the island on 13 December 1502, the saint's feast day; Saint Lucia is the only country named specifically after a woman" }, - "note": "note: pronounced saynt-looshya" + "note": "note: pronounced saynt-looshuh" }, "Government type": { "text": "parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy; a Commonwealth realm" @@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The island nation has been able to attract foreign business and investment, especially in its offshore banking and tourism industries. Tourism is Saint Lucia's main source of jobs and income - accounting for 65% of GDP - and the island's main source of foreign exchange earnings. The manufacturing sector is the most diverse in the Eastern Caribbean area. Crops such as bananas, mangos, and avocados continue to be grown for export, but St. Lucia's once solid banana industry has been devastated by strong competition.
Saint Lucia is vulnerable to a variety of external shocks, including volatile tourism receipts, natural disasters, and dependence on foreign oil. Furthermore, high public debt - 77% of GDP in 2012 - and high debt servicing obligations constrain the CHASTANET administration's ability to respond to adverse external shocks.
St. Lucia has experienced anemic growth since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, largely because of a slowdown in tourism - airlines cut back on their routes to St. Lucia in 2012. Also, St. Lucia introduced a value added tax in 2012 of 15%, becoming the last country in the Eastern Caribbean to do so. In 2013, the government introduced a National Competitiveness and Productivity Council to address St. Lucia's high public wages and lack of productivity.
" + "text": "The island nation has been able to attract foreign business and investment, especially in its offshore banking and tourism industries. Tourism is Saint Lucia's main source of jobs and income - accounting for 65% of GDP - and the island's main source of foreign exchange earnings. The manufacturing sector is the most diverse in the Eastern Caribbean area. Crops such as bananas, mangos, and avocados continue to be grown for export, but St. Lucia's once solid banana industry has been devastated by strong competition.
Saint Lucia is vulnerable to a variety of external shocks, including volatile tourism receipts, natural disasters, and dependence on foreign oil. Furthermore, high public debt - 77% of GDP in 2012 - and high debt servicing obligations constrain the CHASTANET administration's ability to respond to adverse external shocks.
St. Lucia has experienced anemic growth since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, largely because of a slowdown in tourism - airlines cut back on their routes to St. Lucia in 2012. Also, St. Lucia introduced a value added tax in 2012 of 15%, becoming the last country in the Eastern Caribbean to do so. In 2013, the government introduced a National Competitiveness and Productivity Council to address St. Lucia's high public wages and lack of productivity.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -897,10 +897,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "36,469 (2018)" + "text": "38,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "20.05 (2018 est.)" + "text": "21 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -939,10 +939,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "33,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "33,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "17.97 (2021 est.)" + "text": "18 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/tb.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/tb.json index 6c877416..bbebdf50 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/tb.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/tb.json @@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The economy of Saint Barthelemy is based upon high-end tourism and duty-free luxury commerce, serving visitors primarily from North America. The luxury hotels and villas host 70,000 visitors each year with another 130,000 arriving by boat. The relative isolation and high cost of living inhibits mass tourism. The construction and public sectors also enjoy significant investment in support of tourism. With limited fresh water resources, all food must be imported, as must all energy resources and most manufactured goods. The tourism sector creates a strong employment demand and attracts labor from Brazil and Portugal. The country’s currency is the euro." + "text": "The economy of Saint Barthelemy is based upon high-end tourism and duty-free luxury commerce, serving visitors primarily from North America. The luxury hotels and villas host 70,000 visitors each year with another 130,000 arriving by boat. The relative isolation and high cost of living inhibits mass tourism. The construction and public sectors also enjoy significant investment in support of tourism. With limited fresh water resources, all food must be imported, as must all energy resources and most manufactured goods. The tourism sector creates a strong employment demand and attracts labor from Brazil and Portugal. The country’s currency is the euro." }, "Exports - partners": { "text": "France 60%, Germany 27% (2019)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json index 14720554..5dafeb01 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json @@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ }, "Legislative branch": { "description": { - "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:Trinidad and Tobago relies on its energy sector for much of its economic activity, and has one of the highest per capita incomes in Latin America. Economic growth between 2000 and 2007 averaged slightly over 8% per year, significantly above the regional average of about 3.7% for that same period; however, GDP has slowed down since then, contracting during 2009-12, making small gains in 2013 and contracting again in 2014-17. Trinidad and Tobago is buffered by considerable foreign reserves and a sovereign wealth fund that equals about one-and-a-half times the national budget, but the country is still in a recession and the government faces the dual challenge of gas shortages and a low price environment. Large-scale energy projects in the last quarter of 2017 are helping to mitigate the gas shortages.
Energy production and downstream industrial use dominate the economy. Oil and gas typically account for about 40% of GDP and 80% of exports but less than 5% of employment. Trinidad and Tobago is home to one of the largest natural gas liquefaction facilities in the Western Hemisphere. The country produces about nine times more natural gas than crude oil on an energy equivalent basis with gas contributing about two-thirds of energy sector government revenue. The US is the country’s largest trading partner, accounting for 28% of its total imports and 48% of its exports.
Economic diversification is a longstanding government talking point, and Trinidad and Tobago has much potential due to its stable, democratic government and its educated, English speaking workforce. The country is also a regional financial center with a well-regulated and stable financial system. Other sectors the Government of Trinidad and Tobago has targeted for increased investment and projected growth include tourism, agriculture, information and communications technology, and shipping. Unfortunately, a host of other factors, including low labor productivity, inefficient government bureaucracy, and corruption, have hampered economic development.
" + "text": "Trinidad and Tobago relies on its energy sector for much of its economic activity, and has one of the highest per capita incomes in Latin America. Economic growth between 2000 and 2007 averaged slightly over 8% per year, significantly above the regional average of about 3.7% for that same period; however, GDP has slowed down since then, contracting during 2009-12, making small gains in 2013 and contracting again in 2014-17. Trinidad and Tobago is buffered by considerable foreign reserves and a sovereign wealth fund that equals about one-and-a-half times the national budget, but the country is still in a recession and the government faces the dual challenge of gas shortages and a low price environment. Large-scale energy projects in the last quarter of 2017 are helping to mitigate the gas shortages.
Energy production and downstream industrial use dominate the economy. Oil and gas typically account for about 40% of GDP and 80% of exports but less than 5% of employment. Trinidad and Tobago is home to one of the largest natural gas liquefaction facilities in the Western Hemisphere. The country produces about nine times more natural gas than crude oil on an energy equivalent basis with gas contributing about two-thirds of energy sector government revenue. The US is the country’s largest trading partner, accounting for 28% of its total imports and 48% of its exports.
Economic diversification is a longstanding government talking point, and Trinidad and Tobago has much potential due to its stable, democratic government and its educated, English speaking workforce. The country is also a regional financial center with a well-regulated and stable financial system. Other sectors the Government of Trinidad and Tobago has targeted for increased investment and projected growth include tourism, agriculture, information and communications technology, and shipping. Unfortunately, a host of other factors, including low labor productivity, inefficient government bureaucracy, and corruption, have hampered economic development.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -920,7 +920,7 @@ "text": "323,905 (2020)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "23.14 (2020 est.)" + "text": "23 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -959,10 +959,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "376,771 (2021)" + "text": "376,771 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "26.92 (2021)" + "text": "27 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json index c67bef6f..b6c9232e 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json @@ -704,10 +704,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "4,000 (2018)" + "text": "4,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "11.12 (2018 est.)" + "text": "10 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json index 738dc31b..ff6d3bfd 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "The original Arawak Indian settlers who arrived on the island from South America in about 1000, were largely enslaved by the Spanish early in the 16th century and forcibly relocated to other colonies where labor was needed. Curacao was seized by the Dutch from the Spanish in 1634. Once the center of the Caribbean slave trade, Curacao was hard hit economically by the abolition of slavery in 1863. Its prosperity (and that of neighboring Aruba) was restored in the early 20th century with the construction of the Isla Refineria to service the newly discovered Venezuelan oil fields. In 1954, Curacao and several other Dutch Caribbean possessions were reorganized as the Netherlands Antilles, part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In referenda in 2005 and 2009, the citizens of Curacao voted to become a self-governing country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The change in status became effective in October 2010 with the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles." + "text": "The original Arawak Indian settlers who arrived on the island from South America in about 1000, were largely enslaved by the Spanish early in the 16th century and forcibly relocated to other colonies where labor was needed. Curacao was seized by the Dutch from the Spanish in 1634. Once the center of the Caribbean slave trade, Curacao was hard hit economically by the abolition of slavery in 1863. Its prosperity (and that of neighboring Aruba) was restored in the early 20th century with the construction of the Isla Refineria to service the newly discovered Venezuelan oil fields. In 1954, Curacao and several other Dutch Caribbean colonies were reorganized as the Netherlands Antilles, part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In referenda in 2005 and 2009, the citizens of Curacao voted to become a self-governing country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The change in status became effective in October 2010 with the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles." } }, "Geography": { @@ -752,10 +752,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "53,500 (2019)" + "text": "54,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "32.74 (2019 est.)" + "text": "33 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -794,10 +794,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "55,000 (2021)" + "text": "55,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "33.52 (2021)" + "text": "34 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json index 796007dd..5550925f 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "Resistance by native Caribs prevented colonization on Saint Vincent until 1719. Disputed between France and the UK for most of the 18th century, the island was ceded to the latter in 1783. The British prized Saint Vincent due to its fertile soil, which allowed for thriving slave-run plantations of sugar, coffee, indigo, tobacco, cotton, and cocoa. In 1834, the British abolished slavery. Immigration of indentured servants eased the ensuing labor shortage, as did subsequent Portuguese immigrants from Madeira and East Indian laborers. Conditions remained harsh for both former slaves and immigrant agricultural workers, however, as depressed world sugar prices kept the economy stagnant until the early 1900s. The economy then went into a period of decline with many landowners abandoning their estates and leaving the land to be cultivated by liberated slaves. Between 1960 and 1962, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was a separate administrative unit of the Federation of the West Indies. Autonomy was granted in 1969 and independence in 1979." + "text": "Resistance by native Caribs prevented colonization on Saint Vincent until 1719. Disputed between France and the UK for most of the 18th century, the island was ceded to the latter in 1783. The British prized Saint Vincent due to its fertile soil, which allowed for thriving slave-run plantations of sugar, coffee, indigo, tobacco, cotton, and cocoa. In 1834, the British abolished slavery. Immigration of indentured servants eased the ensuing labor shortage, as did subsequent Portuguese immigrants from Madeira and East Indian laborers. Conditions remained harsh for both former slaves and immigrant agricultural workers, however, as depressed world sugar prices kept the economy stagnant until the early 1900s. The economy then went into a period of decline with many landowners abandoning their estates and leaving the land to be cultivated by liberated slaves. Between 1960 and 1962, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was a separate administrative unit of the Federation of the West Indies. Autonomy was granted in 1969 and independence in 1979. In April 2021, the explosive eruption of the La Soufrière volcano in the north of Saint Vincent destroyed much of Saint Vincent’s most productive agricultural lands. Unlike most of its tourism-dependent neighbors, the Vincentian economy is primarily agricultural. The US provided $4.7 million in humanitarian support after the eruption." } }, "Geography": { @@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Success of the economy hinges upon seasonal variations in agriculture, tourism, and construction activity, as well as remittances. Much of the workforce is employed in banana production and tourism. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is home to a small offshore banking sector and continues to fully adopt international regulatory standards.
This lower-middle-income country remains vulnerable to natural and external shocks. The economy has shown some signs of recovery due to increased tourist arrivals, falling oil prices and renewed growth in the construction sector. The much anticipated international airport opened in early 2017 with hopes for increased airlift and tourism activity. The government's ability to invest in social programs and respond to external shocks is constrained by its high public debt burden, which was 67% of GDP at the end of 2013.
" + "text": "Success of the economy hinges upon seasonal variations in agriculture, tourism, and construction activity, as well as remittances. Much of the workforce is employed in banana production and tourism. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is home to a small offshore banking sector and continues to fully adopt international regulatory standards.
This lower-middle-income country remains vulnerable to natural and external shocks. The economy has shown some signs of recovery due to increased tourist arrivals, falling oil prices and renewed growth in the construction sector. The much anticipated international airport opened in early 2017 with hopes for increased airlift and tourism activity. The government's ability to invest in social programs and respond to external shocks is constrained by its high public debt burden, which was 67% of GDP at the end of 2013.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -848,10 +848,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "12,483 (2020)" + "text": "12,483 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "11.25 (2020 est.)" + "text": "11 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -890,10 +890,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "24,733 (2020)" + "text": "24,733 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "22.29 (2020)" + "text": "22 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json index 8a0a4c1a..8e276d66 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json @@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The economy, one of the most stable and prosperous in the Caribbean, is highly dependent on tourism, which generates an estimated 45% of the national income. More than 934,000 tourists, mainly from the US, visited the islands in 2008. Because of traditionally close links with the US Virgin Islands, the British Virgin Islands has used the US dollar as its currency since 1959.
Livestock raising is the most important agricultural activity; poor soils limit the islands' ability to meet domestic food requirements.
In the mid-1980s, the government began offering offshore registration to companies wishing to incorporate in the islands, and incorporation fees now generate substantial revenues. Roughly 400,000 companies were on the offshore registry by yearend 2000. The adoption of a comprehensive insurance law in late 1994, which provides a blanket of confidentiality with regulated statutory gateways for investigation of criminal offenses, made the British Virgin Islands even more attractive to international business.
" + "text": "The economy, one of the most stable and prosperous in the Caribbean, is highly dependent on tourism, which generates an estimated 45% of the national income. More than 934,000 tourists, mainly from the US, visited the islands in 2008. Because of traditionally close links with the US Virgin Islands, the British Virgin Islands has used the US dollar as its currency since 1959.
Livestock raising is the most important agricultural activity; poor soils limit the islands' ability to meet domestic food requirements.
In the mid-1980s, the government began offering offshore registration to companies wishing to incorporate in the islands, and incorporation fees now generate substantial revenues. Roughly 400,000 companies were on the offshore registry by yearend 2000. The adoption of a comprehensive insurance law in late 1994, which provides a blanket of confidentiality with regulated statutory gateways for investigation of criminal offenses, made the British Virgin Islands even more attractive to international business.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2017": { @@ -714,10 +714,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "7,311 (2019)" + "text": "7,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "24.35 (2019 est.)" + "text": "23 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -756,10 +756,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "6,738 (2021)" + "text": "6,738 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "22.29 (2021)" + "text": "22 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json index 20c7ae44..cb741de3 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json @@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Tourism, trade, other services, and rum production are the primary economic activities of the US Virgin Islands (USVI), accounting for most of its GDP and employment. The USVI receives between 2.5 and 3 million tourists a year, mostly from visiting cruise ships. The islands are vulnerable to damage from storms, as evidenced by the destruction from two major hurricanes in 2017. Recovery and rebuilding have continued, but full recovery from these back-to-back hurricanes is years away. The USVI government estimates it will need $7.5 billion, almost twice the territory’s GDP, to rebuild the territory.
The agriculture sector is small and most food is imported. In 2016, government spending (both federal and territorial together) accounted for about 27% of GDP while exports of goods and services, including spending by tourists, accounted for nearly 47%. Federal programs and grants, including rum tax cover-over totaling $482.3 million in 2016, contributed 32.2% of the territory’s total revenues. The economy picked up 0.9% in 2016 and had appeared to be progressing before the 2017 hurricanes severely damaged the territory’s infrastructure and the economy.
" + "text": "Tourism, trade, other services, and rum production are the primary economic activities of the US Virgin Islands (USVI), accounting for most of its GDP and employment. The USVI receives between 2.5 and 3 million tourists a year, mostly from visiting cruise ships. The islands are vulnerable to damage from storms, as evidenced by the destruction from two major hurricanes in 2017. Recovery and rebuilding have continued, but full recovery from these back-to-back hurricanes is years away. The USVI government estimates it will need $7.5 billion, almost twice the territory’s GDP, to rebuild the territory.
The agriculture sector is small and most food is imported. In 2016, government spending (both federal and territorial together) accounted for about 27% of GDP while exports of goods and services, including spending by tourists, accounted for nearly 47%. Federal programs and grants, including rum tax cover-over totaling $482.3 million in 2016, contributed 32.2% of the territory’s total revenues. The economy picked up 0.9% in 2016 and had appeared to be progressing before the 2017 hurricanes severely damaged the territory’s infrastructure and the economy.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2016": { @@ -730,10 +730,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "76,000 (2018)" + "text": "76,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "72.41 (2017 est.)" + "text": "73 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { diff --git a/central-asia/kg.json b/central-asia/kg.json index 5ce30624..28dd64ce 100644 --- a/central-asia/kg.json +++ b/central-asia/kg.json @@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Kyrgyzstan is a landlocked, mountainous, lower middle income country with an economy dominated by minerals extraction, agriculture, and reliance on remittances from citizens working abroad. Cotton, wool, and meat are the main agricultural products, although only cotton is exported in any quantity. Other exports include gold, mercury, uranium, natural gas, and - in some years - electricity. The country has sought to attract foreign investment to expand its export base, including construction of hydroelectric dams, but a difficult investment climate and an ongoing legal battle with a Canadian firm over the joint ownership structure of the nation’s largest gold mine deter potential investors. Remittances from Kyrgyz migrant workers, predominantly in Russia and Kazakhstan, are equivalent to more than one-quarter of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP.
Following independence, Kyrgyzstan rapidly implemented market reforms, such as improving the regulatory system and instituting land reform. In 1998, Kyrgyzstan was the first Commonwealth of Independent States country to be accepted into the World Trade Organization. The government has privatized much of its ownership shares in public enterprises. Despite these reforms, the country suffered a severe drop in production in the early 1990s and has again faced slow growth in recent years as the global financial crisis and declining oil prices have dampened economies across Central Asia. The Kyrgyz government remains dependent on foreign donor support to finance its annual budget deficit of approximately 3 to 5% of GDP.
Kyrgyz leaders hope the country’s August 2015 accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) will bolster trade and investment, but slowing economies in Russia and China and low commodity prices continue to hamper economic growth. Large-scale trade and investment pledged by Kyrgyz leaders has been slow to develop. Many Kyrgyz entrepreneurs and politicians complain that non-tariff measures imposed by other EAEU member states are hurting certain sectors of the Kyrgyz economy, such as meat and dairy production, in which they have comparative advantage. Since acceding to the EAEU, the Kyrgyz Republic has continued harmonizing its laws and regulations to meet EAEU standards, though many local entrepreneurs believe this process as disjointed and incomplete. Kyrgyzstan’s economic development continues to be hampered by corruption, lack of administrative transparency, lack of diversity in domestic industries, and difficulty attracting foreign aid and investment.
" + "text": "Kyrgyzstan is a landlocked, mountainous, lower middle income country with an economy dominated by minerals extraction, agriculture, and reliance on remittances from citizens working abroad. Cotton, wool, and meat are the main agricultural products, although only cotton is exported in any quantity. Other exports include gold, mercury, uranium, natural gas, and - in some years - electricity. The country has sought to attract foreign investment to expand its export base, including construction of hydroelectric dams, but a difficult investment climate and an ongoing legal battle with a Canadian firm over the joint ownership structure of the nation’s largest gold mine deter potential investors. Remittances from Kyrgyz migrant workers, predominantly in Russia and Kazakhstan, are equivalent to more than one-quarter of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP.
Following independence, Kyrgyzstan rapidly implemented market reforms, such as improving the regulatory system and instituting land reform. In 1998, Kyrgyzstan was the first Commonwealth of Independent States country to be accepted into the World Trade Organization. The government has privatized much of its ownership shares in public enterprises. Despite these reforms, the country suffered a severe drop in production in the early 1990s and has again faced slow growth in recent years as the global financial crisis and declining oil prices have dampened economies across Central Asia. The Kyrgyz government remains dependent on foreign donor support to finance its annual budget deficit of approximately 3 to 5% of GDP.
Kyrgyz leaders hope the country’s August 2015 accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) will bolster trade and investment, but slowing economies in Russia and China and low commodity prices continue to hamper economic growth. Large-scale trade and investment pledged by Kyrgyz leaders has been slow to develop. Many Kyrgyz entrepreneurs and politicians complain that non-tariff measures imposed by other EAEU member states are hurting certain sectors of the Kyrgyz economy, such as meat and dairy production, in which they have comparative advantage. Since acceding to the EAEU, the Kyrgyz Republic has continued harmonizing its laws and regulations to meet EAEU standards, though many local entrepreneurs believe this process as disjointed and incomplete. Kyrgyzstan’s economic development continues to be hampered by corruption, lack of administrative transparency, lack of diversity in domestic industries, and difficulty attracting foreign aid and investment.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -988,10 +988,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "298,855 (2019)" + "text": "299,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "4.66 (2019 est.)" + "text": "5 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1030,10 +1030,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "289,000 (2022)" + "text": "289,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "4.43 (2022)" + "text": "4 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-asia/kz.json b/central-asia/kz.json index cb827fc5..80b80133 100644 --- a/central-asia/kz.json +++ b/central-asia/kz.json @@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Kazakhstan's vast hydrocarbon and mineral reserves form the backbone of its economy. Geographically the largest of the former Soviet republics, excluding Russia, Kazakhstan, g possesses substantial fossil fuel reserves and other minerals and metals, such as uranium, copper, and zinc. It also has a large agricultural sector featuring livestock and grain. The government realizes that its economy suffers from an overreliance on oil and extractive industries and has made initial attempts to diversify its economy by targeting sectors like transport, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, petrochemicals and food processing for greater development and investment. It also adopted a Subsoil Code in December 2017 with the aim of increasing exploration and investment in the hydrocarbon, and particularly mining, sectors.
Kazakhstan's oil production and potential is expanding rapidly. A $36.8 billion expansion of Kazakhstan’s premiere Tengiz oil field by Chevron-led Tengizchevroil should be complete in 2022. Meanwhile, the super-giant Kashagan field finally launched production in October 2016 after years of delay and an estimated $55 billion in development costs. Kazakhstan’s total oil production in 2017 climbed 10.5%.
Kazakhstan is landlocked and depends on Russia to export its oil to Europe. It also exports oil directly to China. In 2010, Kazakhstan joined Russia and Belarus to establish a Customs Union in an effort to boost foreign investment and improve trade. The Customs Union evolved into a Single Economic Space in 2012 and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in January 2015. Supported by rising commodity prices, Kazakhstan’s exports to EAEU countries increased 30.2% in 2017. Imports from EAEU countries grew by 24.1%.
The economic downturn of its EAEU partner, Russia, and the decline in global commodity prices from 2014 to 2016 contributed to an economic slowdown in Kazakhstan. In 2014, Kazakhstan devalued its currency, the tenge, and announced a stimulus package to cope with its economic challenges. In the face of further decline in the ruble, oil prices, and the regional economy, Kazakhstan announced in 2015 it would replace its currency band with a floating exchange rate, leading to a sharp fall in the value of the tenge. Since reaching a low of 391 to the dollar in January 2016, the tenge has modestly appreciated, helped by somewhat higher oil prices. While growth slowed to about 1% in both 2015 and 2016, a moderate recovery in oil prices, relatively stable inflation and foreign exchange rates, and the start of production at Kashagan helped push 2017 GDP growth to 4%.
Despite some positive institutional and legislative changes in the last several years, investors remain concerned about corruption, bureaucracy, and arbitrary law enforcement, especially at the regional and municipal levels. An additional concern is the condition of the country’s banking sector, which suffers from poor asset quality and a lack of transparency. Investors also question the potentially negative effects on the economy of a contested presidential succession as Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan NAZARBAYEV, turned 77 in 2017.
" + "text": "Kazakhstan's vast hydrocarbon and mineral reserves form the backbone of its economy. Geographically the largest of the former Soviet republics, excluding Russia, Kazakhstan, g possesses substantial fossil fuel reserves and other minerals and metals, such as uranium, copper, and zinc. It also has a large agricultural sector featuring livestock and grain. The government realizes that its economy suffers from an overreliance on oil and extractive industries and has made initial attempts to diversify its economy by targeting sectors like transport, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, petrochemicals and food processing for greater development and investment. It also adopted a Subsoil Code in December 2017 with the aim of increasing exploration and investment in the hydrocarbon, and particularly mining, sectors.
Kazakhstan's oil production and potential is expanding rapidly. A $36.8 billion expansion of Kazakhstan’s premiere Tengiz oil field by Chevron-led Tengizchevroil should be complete in 2022. Meanwhile, the super-giant Kashagan field finally launched production in October 2016 after years of delay and an estimated $55 billion in development costs. Kazakhstan’s total oil production in 2017 climbed 10.5%.
Kazakhstan is landlocked and depends on Russia to export its oil to Europe. It also exports oil directly to China. In 2010, Kazakhstan joined Russia and Belarus to establish a Customs Union in an effort to boost foreign investment and improve trade. The Customs Union evolved into a Single Economic Space in 2012 and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in January 2015. Supported by rising commodity prices, Kazakhstan’s exports to EAEU countries increased 30.2% in 2017. Imports from EAEU countries grew by 24.1%.
The economic downturn of its EAEU partner, Russia, and the decline in global commodity prices from 2014 to 2016 contributed to an economic slowdown in Kazakhstan. In 2014, Kazakhstan devalued its currency, the tenge, and announced a stimulus package to cope with its economic challenges. In the face of further decline in the ruble, oil prices, and the regional economy, Kazakhstan announced in 2015 it would replace its currency band with a floating exchange rate, leading to a sharp fall in the value of the tenge. Since reaching a low of 391 to the dollar in January 2016, the tenge has modestly appreciated, helped by somewhat higher oil prices. While growth slowed to about 1% in both 2015 and 2016, a moderate recovery in oil prices, relatively stable inflation and foreign exchange rates, and the start of production at Kashagan helped push 2017 GDP growth to 4%.
Despite some positive institutional and legislative changes in the last several years, investors remain concerned about corruption, bureaucracy, and arbitrary law enforcement, especially at the regional and municipal levels. An additional concern is the condition of the country’s banking sector, which suffers from poor asset quality and a lack of transparency. Investors also question the potentially negative effects on the economy of a contested presidential succession as Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan NAZARBAYEV, turned 77 in 2017.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1002,10 +1002,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,616,500 (2020)" + "text": "3.091 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "16.55 (2020 est.)" + "text": "16 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1044,10 +1044,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "2,620,400 (2022)" + "text": "2,620,400 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "13.96 (2022)" + "text": "14 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-asia/rs.json b/central-asia/rs.json index 80ffaeb4..01a94292 100644 --- a/central-asia/rs.json +++ b/central-asia/rs.json @@ -718,7 +718,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Russia has undergone significant changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union, moving from a centrally planned economy towards a more market-based system. Both economic growth and reform have stalled in recent years, however, and Russia remains a predominantly statist economy with a high concentration of wealth in officials' hands. Economic reforms in the 1990s privatized most industry, with notable exceptions in the energy, transportation, banking, and defense-related sectors. The protection of property rights is still weak, and the state continues to interfere in the free operation of the private sector.
Russia is one of the world's leading producers of oil and natural gas, and is also a top exporter of metals such as steel and primary aluminum. Russia is heavily dependent on the movement of world commodity prices as reliance on commodity exports makes it vulnerable to boom and bust cycles that follow the volatile swings in global prices. The economy, which had averaged 7% growth during the 1998-2008 period as oil prices rose rapidly, has seen diminishing growth rates since then due to the exhaustion of Russia’s commodity-based growth model.
A combination of falling oil prices, international sanctions, and structural limitations pushed Russia into a deep recession in 2015, with GDP falling by close to 2.8%. The downturn continued through 2016, with GDP contracting another 0.2%, but was reversed in 2017 as world demand picked up. Government support for import substitution has increased recently in an effort to diversify the economy away from extractive industries.
" + "text": "Russia has undergone significant changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union, moving from a centrally planned economy towards a more market-based system. Both economic growth and reform have stalled in recent years, however, and Russia remains a predominantly statist economy with a high concentration of wealth in officials' hands. Economic reforms in the 1990s privatized most industry, with notable exceptions in the energy, transportation, banking, and defense-related sectors. The protection of property rights is still weak, and the state continues to interfere in the free operation of the private sector.
Russia is one of the world's leading producers of oil and natural gas, and is also a top exporter of metals such as steel and primary aluminum. Russia is heavily dependent on the movement of world commodity prices as reliance on commodity exports makes it vulnerable to boom and bust cycles that follow the volatile swings in global prices. The economy, which had averaged 7% growth during the 1998-2008 period as oil prices rose rapidly, has seen diminishing growth rates since then due to the exhaustion of Russia’s commodity-based growth model.
A combination of falling oil prices, international sanctions, and structural limitations pushed Russia into a deep recession in 2015, with GDP falling by close to 2.8%. The downturn continued through 2016, with GDP contracting another 0.2%, but was reversed in 2017 as world demand picked up. Government support for import substitution has increased recently in an effort to diversify the economy away from extractive industries.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1053,10 +1053,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "27,674,128 (2019)" + "text": "25,892,405 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "18.97 (2019 est.)" + "text": "18 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1095,10 +1095,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "33,893,305 (2022)" + "text": "33,893,305 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "23.23 (2022)" + "text": "23 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "739,418 (Ukraine) (as of 8 May 2022)" + "text": "838,434 (Ukraine) (as of 15 May 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "56,960 (mid-year 2021); note - Russia's stateless population consists of Roma, Meskhetian Turks, and ex-Soviet citizens from the former republics; between 2003 and 2010 more than 600,000 stateless people were naturalized; most Meskhetian Turks, followers of Islam with origins in Georgia, fled or were evacuated from Uzbekistan after a 1989 pogrom and have lived in Russia for more than the required five-year residency period; they continue to be denied registration for citizenship and basic rights by local Krasnodar Krai authorities on the grounds that they are temporary illegal migrants" diff --git a/central-asia/ti.json b/central-asia/ti.json index 3d25faa0..fb44f480 100644 --- a/central-asia/ti.json +++ b/central-asia/ti.json @@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Tajikistan is a poor, mountainous country with an economy dominated by minerals extraction, metals processing, agriculture, and reliance on remittances from citizens working abroad. Mineral resources include silver, gold, uranium, antimony, tungsten, and coal. Industry consists mainly of small obsolete factories in food processing and light industry, substantial hydropower facilities, and a large aluminum plant - currently operating well below its capacity. The 1992-97 civil war severely damaged an already weak economic infrastructure and caused a sharp decline in industrial and agricultural production. Today, Tajikistan is the poorest among the former Soviet republics. Because less than 7% of the land area is arable and cotton is the predominant crop, Tajikistan imports approximately 70% of its food.
Since the end of the civil war, the country has pursued half-hearted reforms and privatizations in the economic sphere, but its poor business climate remains a hindrance to attracting foreign investment. Some experts estimate the value of narcotics transiting Tajikistan is equivalent to 30%-50% of GDP.
Because of a lack of employment opportunities in Tajikistan, more than one million Tajik citizens work abroad - roughly 90% in Russia - supporting families back home through remittances that in 2017 were equivalent to nearly 35% of GDP. Tajikistan’s large remittances from migrant workers in Russia exposes it to monetary shocks. Tajikistan often delays devaluation of its currency for fear of inflationary pressures on food and other consumables. Recent slowdowns in the Russian and Chinese economies, low commodity prices, and currency fluctuations have hampered economic growth. The dollar value of remittances from Russia to Tajikistan dropped by almost 65% in 2015, and the government spent almost $500 million in 2016 to bail out the country’s still troubled banking sector.
Tajikistan’s growing public debt – currently about 50% of GDP – could result in financial difficulties. Remittances from Russia increased in 2017, however, bolstering the economy somewhat. China owns about 50% of Tajikistan’s outstanding debt. Tajikistan has borrowed heavily to finance investment in the country’s vast hydropower potential. In 2016, Tajikistan contracted with the Italian firm Salini Impregilo to build the Roghun dam over a 13-year period for $3.9 billion. A 2017 Eurobond has largely funded Roghun’s first phase, after which sales from Roghun’s output are expected to fund the rest of its construction. The government has not ruled out issuing another Eurobond to generate auxiliary funding for its second phase.
" + "text": "Tajikistan is a poor, mountainous country with an economy dominated by minerals extraction, metals processing, agriculture, and reliance on remittances from citizens working abroad. Mineral resources include silver, gold, uranium, antimony, tungsten, and coal. Industry consists mainly of small obsolete factories in food processing and light industry, substantial hydropower facilities, and a large aluminum plant - currently operating well below its capacity. The 1992-97 civil war severely damaged an already weak economic infrastructure and caused a sharp decline in industrial and agricultural production. Today, Tajikistan is the poorest among the former Soviet republics. Because less than 7% of the land area is arable and cotton is the predominant crop, Tajikistan imports approximately 70% of its food.
Since the end of the civil war, the country has pursued half-hearted reforms and privatizations in the economic sphere, but its poor business climate remains a hindrance to attracting foreign investment. Some experts estimate the value of narcotics transiting Tajikistan is equivalent to 30%-50% of GDP.
Because of a lack of employment opportunities in Tajikistan, more than one million Tajik citizens work abroad - roughly 90% in Russia - supporting families back home through remittances that in 2017 were equivalent to nearly 35% of GDP. Tajikistan’s large remittances from migrant workers in Russia exposes it to monetary shocks. Tajikistan often delays devaluation of its currency for fear of inflationary pressures on food and other consumables. Recent slowdowns in the Russian and Chinese economies, low commodity prices, and currency fluctuations have hampered economic growth. The dollar value of remittances from Russia to Tajikistan dropped by almost 65% in 2015, and the government spent almost $500 million in 2016 to bail out the country’s still troubled banking sector.
Tajikistan’s growing public debt – currently about 50% of GDP – could result in financial difficulties. Remittances from Russia increased in 2017, however, bolstering the economy somewhat. China owns about 50% of Tajikistan’s outstanding debt. Tajikistan has borrowed heavily to finance investment in the country’s vast hydropower potential. In 2016, Tajikistan contracted with the Italian firm Salini Impregilo to build the Roghun dam over a 13-year period for $3.9 billion. A 2017 Eurobond has largely funded Roghun’s first phase, after which sales from Roghun’s output are expected to fund the rest of its construction. The government has not ruled out issuing another Eurobond to generate auxiliary funding for its second phase.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -980,10 +980,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "479,000 (2018)" + "text": "502,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "5.39 (2018 est.)" + "text": "5 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1022,10 +1022,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "6,000 (2022)" + "text": "6,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.06 (2022) less than 1" + "text": "0.06 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, diff --git a/central-asia/tx.json b/central-asia/tx.json index 344cf31d..ccc46a01 100644 --- a/central-asia/tx.json +++ b/central-asia/tx.json @@ -945,10 +945,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "682,000 (2018)" + "text": "717,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "11.85 (2018 est.)" + "text": "12 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -987,10 +987,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "10,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "10,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.17 (2021 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0.17 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, diff --git a/central-asia/uz.json b/central-asia/uz.json index 752ce715..d8417fe3 100644 --- a/central-asia/uz.json +++ b/central-asia/uz.json @@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Uzbekistan is a doubly landlocked country in which 51% of the population lives in urban settlements; the agriculture-rich Fergana Valley, in which Uzbekistan’s eastern borders are situated, has been counted among the most densely populated parts of Central Asia. Since its independence in September 1991, the government has largely maintained its Soviet-style command economy with subsidies and tight controls on production, prices, and access to foreign currency. Despite ongoing efforts to diversify crops, Uzbek agriculture remains largely centered on cotton; Uzbekistan is the world's fifth-largest cotton exporter and seventh-largest producer. Uzbekistan's growth has been driven primarily by state-led investments, and export of natural gas, gold, and cotton provides a significant share of foreign exchange earnings.
Recently, lower global commodity prices and economic slowdowns in neighboring Russia and China have hurt Uzbekistan's trade and investment and worsened its foreign currency shortage. Aware of the need to improve the investment climate, the government is taking incremental steps to reform the business sector and address impediments to foreign investment in the country. Since the death of first President Islam KARIMOV and election of President Shavkat MIRZIYOYEV, emphasis on such initiatives and government efforts to improve the private sector have increased. In the past, Uzbek authorities accused US and other foreign companies operating in Uzbekistan of violating Uzbek laws and have frozen and seized their assets.
As a part of its economic reform efforts, the Uzbek Government is looking to expand opportunities for small and medium enterprises and prioritizes increasing foreign direct investment. In September 2017, the government devalued the official currency rate by almost 50% and announced the loosening of currency restrictions to eliminate the currency black market, increase access to hard currency, and boost investment.
" + "text": "Uzbekistan is a doubly landlocked country in which 51% of the population lives in urban settlements; the agriculture-rich Fergana Valley, in which Uzbekistan’s eastern borders are situated, has been counted among the most densely populated parts of Central Asia. Since its independence in September 1991, the government has largely maintained its Soviet-style command economy with subsidies and tight controls on production, prices, and access to foreign currency. Despite ongoing efforts to diversify crops, Uzbek agriculture remains largely centered on cotton; Uzbekistan is the world's fifth-largest cotton exporter and seventh-largest producer. Uzbekistan's growth has been driven primarily by state-led investments, and export of natural gas, gold, and cotton provides a significant share of foreign exchange earnings.
Recently, lower global commodity prices and economic slowdowns in neighboring Russia and China have hurt Uzbekistan's trade and investment and worsened its foreign currency shortage. Aware of the need to improve the investment climate, the government is taking incremental steps to reform the business sector and address impediments to foreign investment in the country. Since the death of first President Islam KARIMOV and election of President Shavkat MIRZIYOYEV, emphasis on such initiatives and government efforts to improve the private sector have increased. In the past, Uzbek authorities accused US and other foreign companies operating in Uzbekistan of violating Uzbek laws and have frozen and seized their assets.
As a part of its economic reform efforts, the Uzbek Government is looking to expand opportunities for small and medium enterprises and prioritizes increasing foreign direct investment. In September 2017, the government devalued the official currency rate by almost 50% and announced the loosening of currency restrictions to eliminate the currency black market, increase access to hard currency, and boost investment.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -959,10 +959,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "3,550,069 (2020)" + "text": "3,550,069 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "10.61 (2020 est.)" + "text": "11 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1001,10 +1001,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "4,820,009 (2022)" + "text": "4,820,009 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "14.4 (2022)" + "text": "14 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json index ea882300..14e3f512 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json @@ -1028,10 +1028,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "520,863 (2018)" + "text": "523,951 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2018 est.) less than 1" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1070,10 +1070,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "688,185 (2021)" + "text": "688,185 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.27 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "1.3 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json index 4b6706e1..a6825924 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "The Sultanate of Brunei's influence peaked between the 15th and 17th centuries when its control extended over coastal areas of northwest Borneo and the southern Philippines. Brunei subsequently entered a period of decline brought on by internal strife over royal succession, colonial expansion of European powers, and piracy. In 1888, Brunei became a British protectorate; independence was achieved in 1984. The same family has ruled Brunei for over six centuries. Brunei benefits from extensive petroleum and natural gas fields, the source of one of the highest per capita GDPs in the world. In 2017, Brunei celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Sultan Hassanal BOLKIAH’s accession to the throne." + "text": "The Sultanate of Brunei's influence peaked between the 15th and 17th centuries when its control extended over coastal areas of northwest Borneo and the southern Philippines. Brunei subsequently entered a period of decline brought on by internal strife over royal succession, colonial expansion of European powers, and piracy. In 1888, Brunei became a British protectorate; independence was achieved in 1984. The same family has ruled Brunei for over six centuries. Brunei benefits from extensive petroleum and natural gas fields, the source of one of the highest per capita GDPs in the world. In 2017, Brunei celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Sultan Hassanal BOLKIAH’s accession to the throne." } }, "Geography": { @@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Brunei is an energy-rich sultanate on the northern coast of Borneo in Southeast Asia. Brunei boasts a well-educated, largely English-speaking population; excellent infrastructure; and a stable government intent on attracting foreign investment. Crude oil and natural gas production account for approximately 65% of GDP and 95% of exports, with Japan as the primary export market.
Per capita GDP is among the highest in the world, and substantial income from overseas investment supplements income from domestic hydrocarbon production. Bruneian citizens pay no personal income taxes, and the government provides free medical services and free education through the university level.
The Bruneian Government wants to diversify its economy away from hydrocarbon exports to other industries such as information and communications technology and halal manufacturing, permissible under Islamic law. Brunei’s trade increased in 2016 and 2017, following its regional economic integration in the ASEAN Economic Community, and the expected ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.
" + "text": "Brunei is an energy-rich sultanate on the northern coast of Borneo in Southeast Asia. Brunei boasts a well-educated, largely English-speaking population; excellent infrastructure; and a stable government intent on attracting foreign investment. Crude oil and natural gas production account for approximately 65% of GDP and 95% of exports, with Japan as the primary export market.
Per capita GDP is among the highest in the world, and substantial income from overseas investment supplements income from domestic hydrocarbon production. Bruneian citizens pay no personal income taxes, and the government provides free medical services and free education through the university level.
The Bruneian Government wants to diversify its economy away from hydrocarbon exports to other industries such as information and communications technology and halal manufacturing, permissible under Islamic law. Brunei’s trade increased in 2016 and 2017, following its regional economic integration in the ASEAN Economic Community, and the expected ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -918,10 +918,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "103,885 (2020)" + "text": "103,885 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "23.75 (2020 est.)" + "text": "24 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -960,10 +960,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "71,078 (2021)" + "text": "71,078 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "16.25 (2021)" + "text": "16 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json index 6723a31a..b7379e75 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json @@ -1016,10 +1016,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "56,445 (2019)" + "text": "55,603 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2019 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1058,10 +1058,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "233,732 (2021) Slowly increase as focus is on mobile internet" + "text": "233,732 (2020 est.) Slowly increase as focus is on mobile internet" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.4 (2021 est.)" + "text": "1.4 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json index 8cbb5f05..30dac60e 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json @@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Since the late 1970s, China has moved from a closed, centrally planned system to a more market-oriented one that plays a major global role. China has implemented reforms in a gradualist fashion, resulting in efficiency gains that have contributed to a more than tenfold increase in GDP since 1978. Reforms began with the phaseout of collectivized agriculture, and expanded to include the gradual liberalization of prices, fiscal decentralization, increased autonomy for state enterprises, growth of the private sector, development of stock markets and a modern banking system, and opening to foreign trade and investment. China continues to pursue an industrial policy, state support of key sectors, and a restrictive investment regime. From 2013 to 2017, China had one of the fastest growing economies in the world, averaging slightly more than 7% real growth per year. Measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis that adjusts for price differences, China in 2017 stood as the largest economy in the world, surpassing the US in 2014 for the first time in modern history. China became the world's largest exporter in 2010, and the largest trading nation in 2013. Still, China's per capita income is below the world average.
In July 2005 moved to an exchange rate system that references a basket of currencies. From mid-2005 to late 2008, the renminbi (RMB) appreciated more than 20% against the US dollar, but the exchange rate remained virtually pegged to the dollar from the onset of the global financial crisis until June 2010, when Beijing announced it would resume a gradual appreciation. From 2013 until early 2015, the renminbi held steady against the dollar, but it depreciated 13% from mid-2015 until end-2016 amid strong capital outflows; in 2017 the RMB resumed appreciating against the dollar – roughly 7% from end-of-2016 to end-of-2017. In 2015, the People’s Bank of China announced it would continue to carefully push for full convertibility of the renminbi, after the currency was accepted as part of the IMF’s special drawing rights basket. However, since late 2015 the Chinese Government has strengthened capital controls and oversight of overseas investments to better manage the exchange rate and maintain financial stability.
The Chinese Government faces numerous economic challenges including: (a) reducing its high domestic savings rate and correspondingly low domestic household consumption; (b) managing its high corporate debt burden to maintain financial stability; (c) controlling off-balance sheet local government debt used to finance infrastructure stimulus; (d) facilitating higher-wage job opportunities for the aspiring middle class, including rural migrants and college graduates, while maintaining competitiveness; (e) dampening speculative investment in the real estate sector without sharply slowing the economy; (f) reducing industrial overcapacity; and (g) raising productivity growth rates through the more efficient allocation of capital and state-support for innovation. Economic development has progressed further in coastal provinces than in the interior, and by 2016 more than 169.3 million migrant workers and their dependents had relocated to urban areas to find work. One consequence of China’s population control policy known as the \"one-child policy\" - which was relaxed in 2016 to permit all families to have two children - is that China is now one of the most rapidly aging countries in the world. Deterioration in the environment - notably air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the water table, especially in the North - is another long-term problem. China continues to lose arable land because of erosion and urbanization. The Chinese Government is seeking to add energy production capacity from sources other than coal and oil, focusing on natural gas, nuclear, and clean energy development. In 2016, China ratified the Paris Agreement, a multilateral agreement to combat climate change, and committed to peak its carbon dioxide emissions between 2025 and 2030.
The government's 13th Five-Year Plan, unveiled in March 2016, emphasizes the need to increase innovation and boost domestic consumption to make the economy less dependent on government investment, exports, and heavy industry. However, China has made more progress on subsidizing innovation than rebalancing the economy. Beijing has committed to giving the market a more decisive role in allocating resources, but the Chinese Government’s policies continue to favor state-owned enterprises and emphasize stability. Chinese leaders in 2010 pledged to double China’s GDP by 2020, and the 13th Five Year Plan includes annual economic growth targets of at least 6.5% through 2020 to achieve that goal. In recent years, China has renewed its support for state-owned enterprises in sectors considered important to \"economic security,\" explicitly looking to foster globally competitive industries. Chinese leaders also have undermined some market-oriented reforms by reaffirming the \"dominant\" role of the state in the economy, a stance that threatens to discourage private initiative and make the economy less efficient over time. The slight acceleration in economic growth in 2017—the first such uptick since 2010—gives Beijing more latitude to pursue its economic reforms, focusing on financial sector deleveraging and its Supply-Side Structural Reform agenda, first announced in late 2015.
" + "text": "Since the late 1970s, China has moved from a closed, centrally planned system to a more market-oriented one that plays a major global role. China has implemented reforms in a gradualist fashion, resulting in efficiency gains that have contributed to a more than tenfold increase in GDP since 1978. Reforms began with the phaseout of collectivized agriculture, and expanded to include the gradual liberalization of prices, fiscal decentralization, increased autonomy for state enterprises, growth of the private sector, development of stock markets and a modern banking system, and opening to foreign trade and investment. China continues to pursue an industrial policy, state support of key sectors, and a restrictive investment regime. From 2013 to 2017, China had one of the fastest growing economies in the world, averaging slightly more than 7% real growth per year. Measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis that adjusts for price differences, China in 2017 stood as the largest economy in the world, surpassing the US in 2014 for the first time in modern history. China became the world's largest exporter in 2010, and the largest trading nation in 2013. Still, China's per capita income is below the world average.
In July 2005 moved to an exchange rate system that references a basket of currencies. From mid-2005 to late 2008, the renminbi (RMB) appreciated more than 20% against the US dollar, but the exchange rate remained virtually pegged to the dollar from the onset of the global financial crisis until June 2010, when Beijing announced it would resume a gradual appreciation. From 2013 until early 2015, the renminbi held steady against the dollar, but it depreciated 13% from mid-2015 until end-2016 amid strong capital outflows; in 2017 the RMB resumed appreciating against the dollar – roughly 7% from end-of-2016 to end-of-2017. In 2015, the People’s Bank of China announced it would continue to carefully push for full convertibility of the renminbi, after the currency was accepted as part of the IMF’s special drawing rights basket. However, since late 2015 the Chinese Government has strengthened capital controls and oversight of overseas investments to better manage the exchange rate and maintain financial stability.
The Chinese Government faces numerous economic challenges including: (a) reducing its high domestic savings rate and correspondingly low domestic household consumption; (b) managing its high corporate debt burden to maintain financial stability; (c) controlling off-balance sheet local government debt used to finance infrastructure stimulus; (d) facilitating higher-wage job opportunities for the aspiring middle class, including rural migrants and college graduates, while maintaining competitiveness; (e) dampening speculative investment in the real estate sector without sharply slowing the economy; (f) reducing industrial overcapacity; and (g) raising productivity growth rates through the more efficient allocation of capital and state-support for innovation. Economic development has progressed further in coastal provinces than in the interior, and by 2016 more than 169.3 million migrant workers and their dependents had relocated to urban areas to find work. One consequence of China’s population control policy known as the \"one-child policy\" - which was relaxed in 2016 to permit all families to have two children - is that China is now one of the most rapidly aging countries in the world. Deterioration in the environment - notably air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the water table, especially in the North - is another long-term problem. China continues to lose arable land because of erosion and urbanization. The Chinese Government is seeking to add energy production capacity from sources other than coal and oil, focusing on natural gas, nuclear, and clean energy development. In 2016, China ratified the Paris Agreement, a multilateral agreement to combat climate change, and committed to peak its carbon dioxide emissions between 2025 and 2030.
The government's 13th Five-Year Plan, unveiled in March 2016, emphasizes the need to increase innovation and boost domestic consumption to make the economy less dependent on government investment, exports, and heavy industry. However, China has made more progress on subsidizing innovation than rebalancing the economy. Beijing has committed to giving the market a more decisive role in allocating resources, but the Chinese Government’s policies continue to favor state-owned enterprises and emphasize stability. Chinese leaders in 2010 pledged to double China’s GDP by 2020, and the 13th Five Year Plan includes annual economic growth targets of at least 6.5% through 2020 to achieve that goal. In recent years, China has renewed its support for state-owned enterprises in sectors considered important to \"economic security,\" explicitly looking to foster globally competitive industries. Chinese leaders also have undermined some market-oriented reforms by reaffirming the \"dominant\" role of the state in the economy, a stance that threatens to discourage private initiative and make the economy less efficient over time. The slight acceleration in economic growth in 2017—the first such uptick since 2010—gives Beijing more latitude to pursue its economic reforms, focusing on financial sector deleveraging and its Supply-Side Structural Reform agenda, first announced in late 2015.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1036,10 +1036,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "181.908 million (2020)" + "text": "181.908 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "12.64 (2020 est.)" + "text": "13 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1077,10 +1077,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "483,549,500 (2021)" + "text": "483,549,500 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "33.6 (2021)" + "text": "34 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json index 2930178b..cb9dc4a2 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json @@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Hong Kong has a free market economy, highly dependent on international trade and finance - the value of goods and services trade, including the sizable share of reexports, is about four times GDP. Hong Kong has no tariffs on imported goods, and it levies excise duties on only four commodities, whether imported or produced locally: hard alcohol, tobacco, oil, and methyl alcohol. There are no quotas or dumping laws. Hong Kong continues to link its currency closely to the US dollar, maintaining an arrangement established in 1983.
Excess liquidity, low interest rates and a tight housing supply have caused Hong Kong property prices to rise rapidly. The lower and middle-income segments of the population increasingly find housing unaffordable.
Hong Kong's open economy has left it exposed to the global economic situation. Its continued reliance on foreign trade and investment makes it vulnerable to renewed global financial market volatility or a slowdown in the global economy.
Mainland China has long been Hong Kong's largest trading partner, accounting for about half of Hong Kong's total trade by value. Hong Kong's natural resources are limited, and food and raw materials must be imported. As a result of China's easing of travel restrictions, the number of mainland tourists to the territory surged from 4.5 million in 2001 to 47.3 million in 2014, outnumbering visitors from all other countries combined. After peaking in 2014, overall tourist arrivals dropped 2.5% in 2015 and 4.5% in 2016. The tourism sector rebounded in 2017, with visitor arrivals rising 3.2% to 58.47 million. Travelers from Mainland China totaled 44.45 million, accounting for 76% of the total.
The Hong Kong Government is promoting the Special Administrative Region (SAR) as the preferred business hub for renminbi (RMB) internationalization. Hong Kong residents are allowed to establish RMB-denominated savings accounts, RMB-denominated corporate and Chinese government bonds have been issued in Hong Kong, RMB trade settlement is allowed, and investment schemes such as the Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (RQFII) Program was first launched in Hong Kong. Offshore RMB activities experienced a setback, however, after the People’s Bank of China changed the way it set the central parity rate in August 2015. RMB deposits in Hong Kong fell from 1.0 trillion RMB at the end of 2014 to 559 billion RMB at the end of 2017, while RMB trade settlement handled by banks in Hong Kong also shrank from 6.8 trillion RMB in 2015 to 3.9 trillion RMB in 2017.
Hong Kong has also established itself as the premier stock market for Chinese firms seeking to list abroad. In 2015, mainland Chinese companies constituted about 50% of the firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and accounted for about 66% of the exchange's market capitalization.
During the past decade, as Hong Kong's manufacturing industry moved to the mainland, its service industry has grown rapidly. In 2014, Hong Kong and China signed a new agreement on achieving basic liberalization of trade in services in Guangdong Province under the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), adopted in 2003 to forge closer ties between Hong Kong and the mainland. The new measures, which took effect in March 2015, cover a negative list and a most-favored treatment provision. On the basis of the Guangdong Agreement, the Agreement on Trade in Services signed in November 2015 further enhanced liberalization, including extending the implementation of the majority of Guangdong pilot liberalization measures to the whole Mainland, reducing the restrictive measures in the negative list, and adding measures in the positive lists for cross-border services as well as cultural and telecommunications services. In June 2017, the Investment Agreement and the Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation (Ecotech Agreement) were signed under the framework of CEPA.
Hong Kong’s economic integration with the mainland continues to be most evident in the banking and finance sector. Initiatives like the Hong Kong-Shanghai Stock Connect, the Hong Kong- Shenzhen Stock Connect the Mutual Recognition of Funds, and the Bond Connect scheme are all important steps towards opening up the Mainland’s capital markets and have reinforced Hong Kong’s role as China’s leading offshore RMB market. Additional connect schemes such as ETF Connect (for exchange-traded fund products) are also under exploration by Hong Kong authorities. In 2017, Chief Executive Carrie LAM announced plans to increase government spending on research and development, education, and technological innovation with the aim of spurring continued economic growth through greater sector diversification.
" + "text": "Hong Kong has a free market economy, highly dependent on international trade and finance - the value of goods and services trade, including the sizable share of reexports, is about four times GDP. Hong Kong has no tariffs on imported goods, and it levies excise duties on only four commodities, whether imported or produced locally: hard alcohol, tobacco, oil, and methyl alcohol. There are no quotas or dumping laws. Hong Kong continues to link its currency closely to the US dollar, maintaining an arrangement established in 1983.
Excess liquidity, low interest rates and a tight housing supply have caused Hong Kong property prices to rise rapidly. The lower and middle-income segments of the population increasingly find housing unaffordable.
Hong Kong's open economy has left it exposed to the global economic situation. Its continued reliance on foreign trade and investment makes it vulnerable to renewed global financial market volatility or a slowdown in the global economy.
Mainland China has long been Hong Kong's largest trading partner, accounting for about half of Hong Kong's total trade by value. Hong Kong's natural resources are limited, and food and raw materials must be imported. As a result of China's easing of travel restrictions, the number of mainland tourists to the territory surged from 4.5 million in 2001 to 47.3 million in 2014, outnumbering visitors from all other countries combined. After peaking in 2014, overall tourist arrivals dropped 2.5% in 2015 and 4.5% in 2016. The tourism sector rebounded in 2017, with visitor arrivals rising 3.2% to 58.47 million. Travelers from Mainland China totaled 44.45 million, accounting for 76% of the total.
The Hong Kong Government is promoting the Special Administrative Region (SAR) as the preferred business hub for renminbi (RMB) internationalization. Hong Kong residents are allowed to establish RMB-denominated savings accounts, RMB-denominated corporate and Chinese government bonds have been issued in Hong Kong, RMB trade settlement is allowed, and investment schemes such as the Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (RQFII) Program was first launched in Hong Kong. Offshore RMB activities experienced a setback, however, after the People’s Bank of China changed the way it set the central parity rate in August 2015. RMB deposits in Hong Kong fell from 1.0 trillion RMB at the end of 2014 to 559 billion RMB at the end of 2017, while RMB trade settlement handled by banks in Hong Kong also shrank from 6.8 trillion RMB in 2015 to 3.9 trillion RMB in 2017.
Hong Kong has also established itself as the premier stock market for Chinese firms seeking to list abroad. In 2015, mainland Chinese companies constituted about 50% of the firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and accounted for about 66% of the exchange's market capitalization.
During the past decade, as Hong Kong's manufacturing industry moved to the mainland, its service industry has grown rapidly. In 2014, Hong Kong and China signed a new agreement on achieving basic liberalization of trade in services in Guangdong Province under the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), adopted in 2003 to forge closer ties between Hong Kong and the mainland. The new measures, which took effect in March 2015, cover a negative list and a most-favored treatment provision. On the basis of the Guangdong Agreement, the Agreement on Trade in Services signed in November 2015 further enhanced liberalization, including extending the implementation of the majority of Guangdong pilot liberalization measures to the whole Mainland, reducing the restrictive measures in the negative list, and adding measures in the positive lists for cross-border services as well as cultural and telecommunications services. In June 2017, the Investment Agreement and the Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation (Ecotech Agreement) were signed under the framework of CEPA.
Hong Kong’s economic integration with the mainland continues to be most evident in the banking and finance sector. Initiatives like the Hong Kong-Shanghai Stock Connect, the Hong Kong- Shenzhen Stock Connect the Mutual Recognition of Funds, and the Bond Connect scheme are all important steps towards opening up the Mainland’s capital markets and have reinforced Hong Kong’s role as China’s leading offshore RMB market. Additional connect schemes such as ETF Connect (for exchange-traded fund products) are also under exploration by Hong Kong authorities. In 2017, Chief Executive Carrie LAM announced plans to increase government spending on research and development, education, and technological innovation with the aim of spurring continued economic growth through greater sector diversification.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -879,10 +879,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "3,934,129 (2020)" + "text": "3,900,599 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "52.48 (2020 est.)" + "text": "52 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -921,10 +921,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "2,885,586 (2021 est.) Figure as of March 2021. From January 2019 onwards, the statistics are compiled in terms of the number of \"access lines\" provided by ISPs, while it was in terms of the number of \"registered customer accounts\" prior to that." + "text": "2,885,586 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "38.49 (2021 est.)" + "text": "39 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/id.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/id.json index aab90235..a53c6d76 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/id.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/id.json @@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Indonesia, the largest economy in Southeast Asia, has seen a slowdown in growth since 2012, mostly due to the end of the commodities export boom. During the global financial crisis, Indonesia outperformed its regional neighbors and joined China and India as the only G20 members posting growth. Indonesia’s annual budget deficit is capped at 3% of GDP, and the Government of Indonesia lowered its debt-to-GDP ratio from a peak of 100% shortly after the Asian financial crisis in 1999 to 34% today. In May 2017 Standard & Poor’s became the last major ratings agency to upgrade Indonesia’s sovereign credit rating to investment grade.
Poverty and unemployment, inadequate infrastructure, corruption, a complex regulatory environment, and unequal resource distribution among its regions are still part of Indonesia’s economic landscape. President Joko WIDODO - elected in July 2014 – seeks to develop Indonesia’s maritime resources and pursue other infrastructure development, including significantly increasing its electrical power generation capacity. Fuel subsidies were significantly reduced in early 2015, a move which has helped the government redirect its spending to development priorities. Indonesia, with the nine other ASEAN members, will continue to move towards participation in the ASEAN Economic Community, though full implementation of economic integration has not yet materialized.
" + "text": "Indonesia, the largest economy in Southeast Asia, has seen a slowdown in growth since 2012, mostly due to the end of the commodities export boom. During the global financial crisis, Indonesia outperformed its regional neighbors and joined China and India as the only G20 members posting growth. Indonesia’s annual budget deficit is capped at 3% of GDP, and the Government of Indonesia lowered its debt-to-GDP ratio from a peak of 100% shortly after the Asian financial crisis in 1999 to 34% today. In May 2017 Standard & Poor’s became the last major ratings agency to upgrade Indonesia’s sovereign credit rating to investment grade.
Poverty and unemployment, inadequate infrastructure, corruption, a complex regulatory environment, and unequal resource distribution among its regions are still part of Indonesia’s economic landscape. President Joko WIDODO - elected in July 2014 – seeks to develop Indonesia’s maritime resources and pursue other infrastructure development, including significantly increasing its electrical power generation capacity. Fuel subsidies were significantly reduced in early 2015, a move which has helped the government redirect its spending to development priorities. Indonesia, with the nine other ASEAN members, will continue to move towards participation in the ASEAN Economic Community, though full implementation of economic integration has not yet materialized.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1041,10 +1041,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "9,186,370 (2020)" + "text": "9,662,135 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "3.36 (2020 est.)" + "text": "4 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1083,10 +1083,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "11,722,218 (2021)" + "text": "11,722,218 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "4.29 (2021 est.)" + "text": "4 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json index 36e77272..db50ffe4 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ } }, "Natural resources": { - "text": "negligible mineral resources, fish, note, with virtually no natural energy resources, Japan is the world's largest importer of coal and liquefied natural gas, as well as the second largest importer of oil" + "text": "negligible mineral resources, fish; note - with virtually no natural energy resources, Japan is the world's largest importer of coal and liquefied natural gas, as well as the second largest importer of oil" }, "Land use": { "agricultural land": { @@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ }, "Diplomatic representation from the US": { "chief of mission": { - "text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Raymond GREENE (since 17 July 2021)" + "text": "Ambassador Rahm EMANUEL (since 25 March 2022)" }, "embassy": { "text": "1-10-5 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-8420" @@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Over the past 70 years, government-industry cooperation, a strong work ethic, mastery of high technology, and a comparatively small defense allocation (slightly less than 1% of GDP) have helped Japan develop an advanced economy. Two notable characteristics of the post-World War II economy were the close interlocking structures of manufacturers, suppliers, and distributors, known as keiretsu, and the guarantee of lifetime employment for a substantial portion of the urban labor force. Both features have significantly eroded under the dual pressures of global competition and domestic demographic change.
Measured on a purchasing power parity basis that adjusts for price differences, Japan in 2017 stood as the fourth-largest economy in the world after first-place China, which surpassed Japan in 2001, and third-place India, which edged out Japan in 2012. For three postwar decades, overall real economic growth was impressive - averaging 10% in the 1960s, 5% in the 1970s, and 4% in the 1980s. Growth slowed markedly in the 1990s, averaging just 1.7%, largely because of the aftereffects of inefficient investment and the collapse of an asset price bubble in the late 1980s, which resulted in several years of economic stagnation as firms sought to reduce excess debt, capital, and labor. Modest economic growth continued after 2000, but the economy has fallen into recession four times since 2008.
Japan enjoyed an uptick in growth since 2013, supported by Prime Minister Shinzo ABE’s \"Three Arrows\" economic revitalization agenda - dubbed \"Abenomics\" - of monetary easing, \"flexible\" fiscal policy, and structural reform. Led by the Bank of Japan’s aggressive monetary easing, Japan is making modest progress in ending deflation, but demographic decline – a low birthrate and an aging, shrinking population – poses a major long-term challenge for the economy. The government currently faces the quandary of balancing its efforts to stimulate growth and institute economic reforms with the need to address its sizable public debt, which stands at 235% of GDP. To help raise government revenue, Japan adopted legislation in 2012 to gradually raise the consumption tax rate. However, the first such increase, in April 2014, led to a sharp contraction, so Prime Minister ABE has twice postponed the next increase, which is now scheduled for October 2019. Structural reforms to unlock productivity are seen as central to strengthening the economy in the long-run.
Scarce in critical natural resources, Japan has long been dependent on imported energy and raw materials. After the complete shutdown of Japan’s nuclear reactors following the earthquake and tsunami disaster in 2011, Japan's industrial sector has become even more dependent than before on imported fossil fuels. However, ABE’s government is seeking to restart nuclear power plants that meet strict new safety standards and is emphasizing nuclear energy’s importance as a base-load electricity source. In August 2015, Japan successfully restarted one nuclear reactor at the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant in Kagoshima prefecture, and several other reactors around the country have since resumed operations; however, opposition from local governments has delayed several more restarts that remain pending. Reforms of the electricity and gas sectors, including full liberalization of Japan’s energy market in April 2016 and gas market in April 2017, constitute an important part of Prime Minister Abe’s economic program.
Under the Abe Administration, Japan’s government sought to open the country’s economy to greater foreign competition and create new export opportunities for Japanese businesses, including by joining 11 trading partners in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Japan became the first country to ratify the TPP in December 2016, but the United States signaled its withdrawal from the agreement in January 2017. In November 2017 the remaining 11 countries agreed on the core elements of a modified agreement, which they renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Japan also reached agreement with the European Union on an Economic Partnership Agreement in July 2017, and is likely seek to ratify both agreements in the Diet this year.
" + "text": "Over the past 70 years, government-industry cooperation, a strong work ethic, mastery of high technology, and a comparatively small defense allocation (slightly less than 1% of GDP) have helped Japan develop an advanced economy. Two notable characteristics of the post-World War II economy were the close interlocking structures of manufacturers, suppliers, and distributors, known as keiretsu, and the guarantee of lifetime employment for a substantial portion of the urban labor force. Both features have significantly eroded under the dual pressures of global competition and domestic demographic change.
Measured on a purchasing power parity basis that adjusts for price differences, Japan in 2017 stood as the fourth-largest economy in the world after first-place China, which surpassed Japan in 2001, and third-place India, which edged out Japan in 2012. For three postwar decades, overall real economic growth was impressive - averaging 10% in the 1960s, 5% in the 1970s, and 4% in the 1980s. Growth slowed markedly in the 1990s, averaging just 1.7%, largely because of the aftereffects of inefficient investment and the collapse of an asset price bubble in the late 1980s, which resulted in several years of economic stagnation as firms sought to reduce excess debt, capital, and labor. Modest economic growth continued after 2000, but the economy has fallen into recession four times since 2008.
Japan enjoyed an uptick in growth since 2013, supported by Prime Minister Shinzo ABE’s \"Three Arrows\" economic revitalization agenda - dubbed \"Abenomics\" - of monetary easing, \"flexible\" fiscal policy, and structural reform. Led by the Bank of Japan’s aggressive monetary easing, Japan is making modest progress in ending deflation, but demographic decline – a low birthrate and an aging, shrinking population – poses a major long-term challenge for the economy. The government currently faces the quandary of balancing its efforts to stimulate growth and institute economic reforms with the need to address its sizable public debt, which stands at 235% of GDP. To help raise government revenue, Japan adopted legislation in 2012 to gradually raise the consumption tax rate. However, the first such increase, in April 2014, led to a sharp contraction, so Prime Minister ABE has twice postponed the next increase, which is now scheduled for October 2019. Structural reforms to unlock productivity are seen as central to strengthening the economy in the long-run.
Scarce in critical natural resources, Japan has long been dependent on imported energy and raw materials. After the complete shutdown of Japan’s nuclear reactors following the earthquake and tsunami disaster in 2011, Japan's industrial sector has become even more dependent than before on imported fossil fuels. However, ABE’s government is seeking to restart nuclear power plants that meet strict new safety standards and is emphasizing nuclear energy’s importance as a base-load electricity source. In August 2015, Japan successfully restarted one nuclear reactor at the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant in Kagoshima prefecture, and several other reactors around the country have since resumed operations; however, opposition from local governments has delayed several more restarts that remain pending. Reforms of the electricity and gas sectors, including full liberalization of Japan’s energy market in April 2016 and gas market in April 2017, constitute an important part of Prime Minister Abe’s economic program.
Under the Abe Administration, Japan’s government sought to open the country’s economy to greater foreign competition and create new export opportunities for Japanese businesses, including by joining 11 trading partners in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Japan became the first country to ratify the TPP in December 2016, but the United States signaled its withdrawal from the agreement in January 2017. In November 2017 the remaining 11 countries agreed on the core elements of a modified agreement, which they renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Japan also reached agreement with the European Union on an Economic Partnership Agreement in July 2017, and is likely seek to ratify both agreements in the Diet this year.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": { @@ -987,10 +987,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "62,252,837 (2020)" + "text": "61,978,594 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "49.22 (2020 est.)" + "text": "49 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1029,10 +1029,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "44,000,791 (2021) Total does not equal the sum of subscriptions by speed since it included subscriptions with unknown speed." + "text": "44,000,791 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "34.79 (2021)" + "text": "35 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json index 57e68f75..8b164a58 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json @@ -852,10 +852,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1,183,806" + "text": "1.18 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "4.64 (2019 est.)" + "text": "5 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json index 45ef0d7d..68f13349 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json @@ -539,10 +539,10 @@ }, "Executive branch": { "chief of state": { - "text": "President YOON Suk-yeol (since 10 May 2022); the president is both chief of state and head of government; Prime Minister KIM Boo-kyum (since 14 May 2021) serves as the principal executive assistant to the president, similar to the role of a vice president (note - President YOON has nominated HAN Duck-soo to the role of prime minister)" + "text": "President YOON Suk Yeol (since 10 May 2022); the president is both chief of state and head of government; Prime Minister KIM Boo-kyum (since 14 May 2021) serves as the principal executive assistant to the president, similar to the role of a vice president (note - President YOON has nominated HAN Duck-soo to the role of prime minister)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "President YOON Suk-yeol (since 10 May 2022)" + "text": "President YOON Suk Yeol (since 10 May 2022)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "State Council appointed by the president on the prime minister's recommendation" @@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "After emerging from the 1950-53 war with North Korea, South Korea emerged as one of the 20th century’s most remarkable economic success stories, becoming a developed, globally connected, high-technology society within decades. In the 1960s, GDP per capita was comparable with levels in the poorest countries in the world. In 2004, South Korea's GDP surpassed one trillion dollars.
Beginning in the 1960s under President PARK Chung-hee, the government promoted the import of raw materials and technology, encouraged saving and investment over consumption, kept wages low, and directed resources to export-oriented industries that remain important to the economy to this day. Growth surged under these policies, and frequently reached double-digits in the 1960s and 1970s. Growth gradually moderated in the 1990s as the economy matured, but remained strong enough to propel South Korea into the ranks of the advanced economies of the OECD by 1997. These policies also led to the emergence of family-owned chaebol conglomerates such as Daewoo, Hyundai, and Samsung, which retained their dominant positions even as the government loosened its grip on the economy amid the political changes of the 1980s and 1990s.
The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 hit South Korea’s companies hard because of their excessive reliance on short-term borrowing, and GDP ultimately plunged by 7% in 1998. South Korea tackled difficult economic reforms following the crisis, including restructuring some chaebols, increasing labor market flexibility, and opening up to more foreign investment and imports. These steps lead to a relatively rapid economic recovery. South Korea also began expanding its network of free trade agreements to help bolster exports, and has since implemented 16 free trade agreements covering 58 countries—including the United State and China—that collectively cover more than three-quarters of global GDP.
In 2017, the election of President MOON Jae-in brought a surge in consumer confidence, in part, because of his successful efforts to increase wages and government spending. These factors combined with an uptick in export growth to drive real GDP growth to more than 3%, despite disruptions in South Korea’s trade with China over the deployment of a US missile defense system in South Korea.
In 2018 and beyond, South Korea will contend with gradually slowing economic growth - in the 2-3% range - not uncommon for advanced economies. This could be partially offset by efforts to address challenges arising from its rapidly aging population, inflexible labor market, continued dominance of the chaebols, and heavy reliance on exports rather than domestic consumption. Socioeconomic problems also persist, and include rising inequality, poverty among the elderly, high youth unemployment, long working hours, low worker productivity, and corruption.
" + "text": "After emerging from the 1950-53 war with North Korea, South Korea emerged as one of the 20th century’s most remarkable economic success stories, becoming a developed, globally connected, high-technology society within decades. In the 1960s, GDP per capita was comparable with levels in the poorest countries in the world. In 2004, South Korea's GDP surpassed one trillion dollars.
Beginning in the 1960s under President PARK Chung-hee, the government promoted the import of raw materials and technology, encouraged saving and investment over consumption, kept wages low, and directed resources to export-oriented industries that remain important to the economy to this day. Growth surged under these policies, and frequently reached double-digits in the 1960s and 1970s. Growth gradually moderated in the 1990s as the economy matured, but remained strong enough to propel South Korea into the ranks of the advanced economies of the OECD by 1997. These policies also led to the emergence of family-owned chaebol conglomerates such as Daewoo, Hyundai, and Samsung, which retained their dominant positions even as the government loosened its grip on the economy amid the political changes of the 1980s and 1990s.
The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 hit South Korea’s companies hard because of their excessive reliance on short-term borrowing, and GDP ultimately plunged by 7% in 1998. South Korea tackled difficult economic reforms following the crisis, including restructuring some chaebols, increasing labor market flexibility, and opening up to more foreign investment and imports. These steps lead to a relatively rapid economic recovery. South Korea also began expanding its network of free trade agreements to help bolster exports, and has since implemented 16 free trade agreements covering 58 countries—including the United State and China—that collectively cover more than three-quarters of global GDP.
In 2017, the election of President MOON Jae-in brought a surge in consumer confidence, in part, because of his successful efforts to increase wages and government spending. These factors combined with an uptick in export growth to drive real GDP growth to more than 3%, despite disruptions in South Korea’s trade with China over the deployment of a US missile defense system in South Korea.
In 2018 and beyond, South Korea will contend with gradually slowing economic growth - in the 2-3% range - not uncommon for advanced economies. This could be partially offset by efforts to address challenges arising from its rapidly aging population, inflexible labor market, continued dominance of the chaebols, and heavy reliance on exports rather than domestic consumption. Socioeconomic problems also persist, and include rising inequality, poverty among the elderly, high youth unemployment, long working hours, low worker productivity, and corruption.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -986,10 +986,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "23,858,239 (2020)" + "text": "23,858,239 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "46.54 (2020 est.)" + "text": "47 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1028,10 +1028,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "22,327,182 (2021)" + "text": "22,327,182 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "43.55 (2021)" + "text": "44 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/la.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/la.json index ce16cf13..b3b29a3f 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/la.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/la.json @@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The government of Laos, one of the few remaining one-party communist states, began decentralizing control and encouraging private enterprise in 1986. Economic growth averaged more than 6% per year in the period 1988-2008, and Laos' growth has more recently been amongst the fastest in Asia, averaging more than 7% per year for most of the last decade.
Nevertheless, Laos remains a country with an underdeveloped infrastructure, particularly in rural areas. It has a basic, but improving, road system, and limited external and internal land-line telecommunications. Electricity is available to 83% of the population. Agriculture, dominated by rice cultivation in lowland areas, accounts for about 20% of GDP and 73% of total employment. Recently, the country has faced a persistent current account deficit, falling foreign currency reserves, and growing public debt.
Laos' economy is heavily dependent on capital-intensive natural resource exports. The economy has benefited from high-profile foreign direct investment in hydropower dams along the Mekong River, copper and gold mining, logging, and construction, although some projects in these industries have drawn criticism for their environmental impacts.
Laos gained Normal Trade Relations status with the US in 2004 and applied for Generalized System of Preferences trade benefits in 2013 after being admitted to the World Trade Organization earlier in the year. Laos held the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2016. Laos is in the process of implementing a value-added tax system. The government appears committed to raising the country's profile among foreign investors and has developed special economic zones replete with generous tax incentives, but a limited labor pool, a small domestic market, and corruption remain impediments to investment. Laos also has ongoing problems with the business environment, including onerous registration requirements, a gap between legislation and implementation, and unclear or conflicting regulations.
" + "text": "The government of Laos, one of the few remaining one-party communist states, began decentralizing control and encouraging private enterprise in 1986. Economic growth averaged more than 6% per year in the period 1988-2008, and Laos' growth has more recently been amongst the fastest in Asia, averaging more than 7% per year for most of the last decade.
Nevertheless, Laos remains a country with an underdeveloped infrastructure, particularly in rural areas. It has a basic, but improving, road system, and limited external and internal land-line telecommunications. Electricity is available to 83% of the population. Agriculture, dominated by rice cultivation in lowland areas, accounts for about 20% of GDP and 73% of total employment. Recently, the country has faced a persistent current account deficit, falling foreign currency reserves, and growing public debt.
Laos' economy is heavily dependent on capital-intensive natural resource exports. The economy has benefited from high-profile foreign direct investment in hydropower dams along the Mekong River, copper and gold mining, logging, and construction, although some projects in these industries have drawn criticism for their environmental impacts.
Laos gained Normal Trade Relations status with the US in 2004 and applied for Generalized System of Preferences trade benefits in 2013 after being admitted to the World Trade Organization earlier in the year. Laos held the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2016. Laos is in the process of implementing a value-added tax system. The government appears committed to raising the country's profile among foreign investors and has developed special economic zones replete with generous tax incentives, but a limited labor pool, a small domestic market, and corruption remain impediments to investment. Laos also has ongoing problems with the business environment, including onerous registration requirements, a gap between legislation and implementation, and unclear or conflicting regulations.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -999,10 +999,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1,490,831 (2019)" + "text": "1.491 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "20.79 (2019 est.)" + "text": "20 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1041,10 +1041,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "128,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "128,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.76 (2021 est.)" + "text": "1.8 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json index f3e063af..3aed68ac 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json @@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Since opening up its locally-controlled casino industry to foreign competition in 2001, Macau has attracted tens of billions of dollars in foreign investment, transforming the territory into one of the world's largest gaming centers. Macau's gaming and tourism businesses were fueled by China's decision to relax travel restrictions on Chinese citizens wishing to visit Macau. In 2016, Macau's gaming-related taxes accounted for more than 76% of total government revenue.
Macau's economy slowed dramatically in 2009 as a result of the global economic slowdown, but strong growth resumed in the 2010-13 period, largely on the back of tourism from mainland China and the gaming sectors. In 2015, this city of 646,800 hosted nearly 30.7 million visitors. Almost 67% came from mainland China. Macau's traditional manufacturing industry has slowed greatly since the termination of the Multi-Fiber Agreement in 2005. Services export — primarily gaming — increasingly has driven Macau’s economic performance. Mainland China’s anti-corruption campaign brought Macau’s gambling boom to a halt in 2014, with spending in casinos contracting 34.3% in 2015. As a result, Macau's inflation-adjusted GDP contracted 21.5% in 2015 and another 2.1% in 2016 - down from double-digit expansion rates in the period 2010-13 - but the economy recovered handsomely in 2017.
Macau continues to face the challenges of managing its growing casino industry, risks from money-laundering activities, and the need to diversify the economy away from heavy dependence on gaming revenues. Macau's currency, the pataca, is closely tied to the Hong Kong dollar, which is also freely accepted in the territory.
" + "text": "Since opening up its locally-controlled casino industry to foreign competition in 2001, Macau has attracted tens of billions of dollars in foreign investment, transforming the territory into one of the world's largest gaming centers. Macau's gaming and tourism businesses were fueled by China's decision to relax travel restrictions on Chinese citizens wishing to visit Macau. In 2016, Macau's gaming-related taxes accounted for more than 76% of total government revenue.
Macau's economy slowed dramatically in 2009 as a result of the global economic slowdown, but strong growth resumed in the 2010-13 period, largely on the back of tourism from mainland China and the gaming sectors. In 2015, this city of 646,800 hosted nearly 30.7 million visitors. Almost 67% came from mainland China. Macau's traditional manufacturing industry has slowed greatly since the termination of the Multi-Fiber Agreement in 2005. Services export — primarily gaming — increasingly has driven Macau’s economic performance. Mainland China’s anti-corruption campaign brought Macau’s gambling boom to a halt in 2014, with spending in casinos contracting 34.3% in 2015. As a result, Macau's inflation-adjusted GDP contracted 21.5% in 2015 and another 2.1% in 2016 - down from double-digit expansion rates in the period 2010-13 - but the economy recovered handsomely in 2017.
Macau continues to face the challenges of managing its growing casino industry, risks from money-laundering activities, and the need to diversify the economy away from heavy dependence on gaming revenues. Macau's currency, the pataca, is closely tied to the Hong Kong dollar, which is also freely accepted in the territory.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -814,10 +814,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "123,469 (2018)" + "text": "110,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "19.55 (2018 est.)" + "text": "17 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -856,10 +856,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "208,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "208,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "32.03 (2021 est.)" + "text": "32 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json index 98386956..a1ab0048 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json @@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Foreign direct investment in Mongolia's extractive industries – which are based on extensive deposits of copper, gold, coal, molybdenum, fluorspar, uranium, tin, and tungsten - has transformed Mongolia's landlocked economy from its traditional dependence on herding and agriculture. Exports now account for more than 40% of GDP. Mongolia depends on China for more than 60% of its external trade - China receives some 90% of Mongolia's exports and supplies Mongolia with more than one-third of its imports. Mongolia also relies on Russia for 90% of its energy supplies, leaving it vulnerable to price increases. Remittances from Mongolians working abroad, particularly in South Korea, are significant.
Soviet assistance, at its height one-third of GDP, disappeared almost overnight in 1990 and 1991 at the time of the dismantlement of the USSR. The following decade saw Mongolia endure both deep recession, because of political inaction, and natural disasters, as well as strong economic growth, because of market reforms and extensive privatization of the formerly state-run economy. The country opened a fledgling stock exchange in 1991. Mongolia joined the WTO in 1997 and seeks to expand its participation in regional economic and trade regimes.
Growth averaged nearly 9% per year in 2004-08 largely because of high copper prices globally and new gold production. By late 2008, Mongolia was hit by the global financial crisis and Mongolia's real economy contracted 1.3% in 2009. In early 2009, the IMF reached a $236 million Stand-by Arrangement with Mongolia and it emerged from the crisis with a stronger banking sector and better fiscal management. In October 2009, Mongolia passed long-awaited legislation on an investment agreement to develop the Oyu Tolgoi (OT) mine, among the world's largest untapped copper-gold deposits. However, a dispute with foreign investors developing OT called into question the attractiveness of Mongolia as a destination for foreign investment. This caused a severe drop in FDI, and a slowing economy, leading to the dismissal of Prime Minister Norovyn ALTANKHUYAG in November 2014. The economy had grown more than 10% per year between 2011 and 2013 - largely on the strength of commodity exports and high government spending - before slowing to 7.8% in 2014, and falling to the 2% level in 2015. Growth rebounded from a brief 1.6% contraction in the third quarter of 2016 to 5.8% during the first three quarters of 2017, largely due to rising commodity prices.
The May 2015 agreement with Rio Tinto to restart the OT mine and the subsequent $4.4 billion finance package signing in December 2015 stemmed the loss of investor confidence. The current government has made restoring investor trust and reviving the economy its top priority, but has failed to invigorate the economy in the face of the large drop-off in foreign direct investment, mounting external debt, and a sizeable budget deficit. Mongolia secured a $5.5 billion financial assistance package from the IMF and a host of international creditors in May 2017, which is expected to improve Mongolia’s long-term fiscal and economic stability as long as Ulaanbaatar can advance the agreement’s difficult contingent reforms, such as consolidating the government’s off-balance sheet liabilities and rehabilitating the Mongolian banking sector.
" + "text": "Foreign direct investment in Mongolia's extractive industries – which are based on extensive deposits of copper, gold, coal, molybdenum, fluorspar, uranium, tin, and tungsten - has transformed Mongolia's landlocked economy from its traditional dependence on herding and agriculture. Exports now account for more than 40% of GDP. Mongolia depends on China for more than 60% of its external trade - China receives some 90% of Mongolia's exports and supplies Mongolia with more than one-third of its imports. Mongolia also relies on Russia for 90% of its energy supplies, leaving it vulnerable to price increases. Remittances from Mongolians working abroad, particularly in South Korea, are significant.
Soviet assistance, at its height one-third of GDP, disappeared almost overnight in 1990 and 1991 at the time of the dismantlement of the USSR. The following decade saw Mongolia endure both deep recession, because of political inaction, and natural disasters, as well as strong economic growth, because of market reforms and extensive privatization of the formerly state-run economy. The country opened a fledgling stock exchange in 1991. Mongolia joined the WTO in 1997 and seeks to expand its participation in regional economic and trade regimes.
Growth averaged nearly 9% per year in 2004-08 largely because of high copper prices globally and new gold production. By late 2008, Mongolia was hit by the global financial crisis and Mongolia's real economy contracted 1.3% in 2009. In early 2009, the IMF reached a $236 million Stand-by Arrangement with Mongolia and it emerged from the crisis with a stronger banking sector and better fiscal management. In October 2009, Mongolia passed long-awaited legislation on an investment agreement to develop the Oyu Tolgoi (OT) mine, among the world's largest untapped copper-gold deposits. However, a dispute with foreign investors developing OT called into question the attractiveness of Mongolia as a destination for foreign investment. This caused a severe drop in FDI, and a slowing economy, leading to the dismissal of Prime Minister Norovyn ALTANKHUYAG in November 2014. The economy had grown more than 10% per year between 2011 and 2013 - largely on the strength of commodity exports and high government spending - before slowing to 7.8% in 2014, and falling to the 2% level in 2015. Growth rebounded from a brief 1.6% contraction in the third quarter of 2016 to 5.8% during the first three quarters of 2017, largely due to rising commodity prices.
The May 2015 agreement with Rio Tinto to restart the OT mine and the subsequent $4.4 billion finance package signing in December 2015 stemmed the loss of investor confidence. The current government has made restoring investor trust and reviving the economy its top priority, but has failed to invigorate the economy in the face of the large drop-off in foreign direct investment, mounting external debt, and a sizeable budget deficit. Mongolia secured a $5.5 billion financial assistance package from the IMF and a host of international creditors in May 2017, which is expected to improve Mongolia’s long-term fiscal and economic stability as long as Ulaanbaatar can advance the agreement’s difficult contingent reforms, such as consolidating the government’s off-balance sheet liabilities and rehabilitating the Mongolian banking sector.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1005,10 +1005,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "160,153 (2020)" + "text": "160,153 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "4.89 (2020 est.)" + "text": "5 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1047,10 +1047,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "307,166 (2021) Excl. terrestrial fixed wireless and satellite broadband subscriptions." + "text": "307,166 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "9.37 (2021)" + "text": "9 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json index b5ebd677..e023aea5 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json @@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Malaysia, an upper middle-income country, has transformed itself since the 1970s from a producer of raw materials into a multi-sector economy. Under current Prime Minister NAJIB, Malaysia is attempting to achieve high-income status by 2020 and to move further up the value-added production chain by attracting investments in high technology, knowledge-based industries and services. NAJIB's Economic Transformation Program is a series of projects and policy measures intended to accelerate the country's economic growth. The government has also taken steps to liberalize some services sub-sectors. Malaysia is vulnerable to a fall in world commodity prices or a general slowdown in global economic activity.
The NAJIB administration is continuing efforts to boost domestic demand and reduce the economy's dependence on exports. Domestic demand continues to anchor economic growth, supported mainly by private consumption, which accounts for 53% of GDP. Nevertheless, exports - particularly of electronics, oil and gas, and palm oil - remain a significant driver of the economy. In 2015, gross exports of goods and services were equivalent to 73% of GDP. The oil and gas sector supplied about 22% of government revenue in 2015, down significantly from prior years amid a decline in commodity prices and diversification of government revenues. Malaysia has embarked on a fiscal reform program aimed at achieving a balanced budget by 2020, including rationalization of subsidies and the 2015 introduction of a 6% value added tax. Sustained low commodity prices throughout the period not only strained government finances, but also shrunk Malaysia’s current account surplus and weighed heavily on the Malaysian ringgit, which was among the region’s worst performing currencies during 2013-17. The ringgit hit new lows following the US presidential election amid a broader selloff of emerging market assets.
Bank Negara Malaysia (the central bank) maintains adequate foreign exchange reserves; a well-developed regulatory regime has limited Malaysia's exposure to riskier financial instruments, although it remains vulnerable to volatile global capital flows. In order to increase Malaysia’s competitiveness, Prime Minister NAJIB raised possible revisions to the special economic and social preferences accorded to ethnic Malays under the New Economic Policy of 1970, but retreated in 2013 after he encountered significant opposition from Malay nationalists and other vested interests. In September 2013 NAJIB launched the new Bumiputra Economic Empowerment Program, policies that favor and advance the economic condition of ethnic Malays.
Malaysia signed the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement in February 2016, although the future of the TPP remains unclear following the US withdrawal from the agreement. Along with nine other ASEAN members, Malaysia established the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015, which aims to advance regional economic integration.
" + "text": "Malaysia, an upper middle-income country, has transformed itself since the 1970s from a producer of raw materials into a multi-sector economy. Under current Prime Minister NAJIB, Malaysia is attempting to achieve high-income status by 2020 and to move further up the value-added production chain by attracting investments in high technology, knowledge-based industries and services. NAJIB's Economic Transformation Program is a series of projects and policy measures intended to accelerate the country's economic growth. The government has also taken steps to liberalize some services sub-sectors. Malaysia is vulnerable to a fall in world commodity prices or a general slowdown in global economic activity.
The NAJIB administration is continuing efforts to boost domestic demand and reduce the economy's dependence on exports. Domestic demand continues to anchor economic growth, supported mainly by private consumption, which accounts for 53% of GDP. Nevertheless, exports - particularly of electronics, oil and gas, and palm oil - remain a significant driver of the economy. In 2015, gross exports of goods and services were equivalent to 73% of GDP. The oil and gas sector supplied about 22% of government revenue in 2015, down significantly from prior years amid a decline in commodity prices and diversification of government revenues. Malaysia has embarked on a fiscal reform program aimed at achieving a balanced budget by 2020, including rationalization of subsidies and the 2015 introduction of a 6% value added tax. Sustained low commodity prices throughout the period not only strained government finances, but also shrunk Malaysia’s current account surplus and weighed heavily on the Malaysian ringgit, which was among the region’s worst performing currencies during 2013-17. The ringgit hit new lows following the US presidential election amid a broader selloff of emerging market assets.
Bank Negara Malaysia (the central bank) maintains adequate foreign exchange reserves; a well-developed regulatory regime has limited Malaysia's exposure to riskier financial instruments, although it remains vulnerable to volatile global capital flows. In order to increase Malaysia’s competitiveness, Prime Minister NAJIB raised possible revisions to the special economic and social preferences accorded to ethnic Malays under the New Economic Policy of 1970, but retreated in 2013 after he encountered significant opposition from Malay nationalists and other vested interests. In September 2013 NAJIB launched the new Bumiputra Economic Empowerment Program, policies that favor and advance the economic condition of ethnic Malays.
Malaysia signed the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement in February 2016, although the future of the TPP remains unclear following the US withdrawal from the agreement. Along with nine other ASEAN members, Malaysia established the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015, which aims to advance regional economic integration.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1004,10 +1004,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "7,467,900 (2020)" + "text": "7,467,900 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "23.07 (2020 est.)" + "text": "23 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1046,10 +1046,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "3,358,800 (2021)" + "text": "3,358,800 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "10.38 (2021 est.)" + "text": "10 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json index 9f6c92b7..8c37a731 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json @@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Papua New Guinea (PNG) is richly endowed with natural resources, but exploitation has been hampered by rugged terrain, land tenure issues, and the high cost of developing infrastructure. The economy has a small formal sector, focused mainly on the export of those natural resources, and an informal sector, employing the majority of the population. Agriculture provides a subsistence livelihood for 85% of the people. The global financial crisis had little impact because of continued foreign demand for PNG's commodities.
Mineral deposits, including copper, gold, and oil, account for nearly two-thirds of export earnings. Natural gas reserves amount to an estimated 155 billion cubic meters. Following construction of a $19 billion liquefied natural gas (LNG) project, PNG LNG, a consortium led by ExxonMobil, began exporting liquefied natural gas to Asian markets in May 2014. The project was delivered on time and only slightly above budget. The success of the project has encouraged other companies to look at similar LNG projects. French supermajor Total is hopes to begin construction on the Papua LNG project by 2020. Due to lower global commodity prices, resource revenues of all types have fallen dramatically. PNG’s government has recently been forced to adjust spending levels downward.
Numerous challenges still face the government of Peter O'NEILL, including providing physical security for foreign investors, regaining investor confidence, restoring integrity to state institutions, promoting economic efficiency by privatizing moribund state institutions, and maintaining good relations with Australia, its former colonial ruler. Other socio-cultural challenges could upend the economy including chronic law and order and land tenure issues. In August, 2017, PNG launched its first-ever national trade policy, PNG Trade Policy 2017-2032. The policy goal is to maximize trade and investment by increasing exports, to reduce imports, and to increase foreign direct investment (FDI).
" + "text": "Papua New Guinea (PNG) is richly endowed with natural resources, but exploitation has been hampered by rugged terrain, land tenure issues, and the high cost of developing infrastructure. The economy has a small formal sector, focused mainly on the export of those natural resources, and an informal sector, employing the majority of the population. Agriculture provides a subsistence livelihood for 85% of the people. The global financial crisis had little impact because of continued foreign demand for PNG's commodities.
Mineral deposits, including copper, gold, and oil, account for nearly two-thirds of export earnings. Natural gas reserves amount to an estimated 155 billion cubic meters. Following construction of a $19 billion liquefied natural gas (LNG) project, PNG LNG, a consortium led by ExxonMobil, began exporting liquefied natural gas to Asian markets in May 2014. The project was delivered on time and only slightly above budget. The success of the project has encouraged other companies to look at similar LNG projects. French supermajor Total is hopes to begin construction on the Papua LNG project by 2020. Due to lower global commodity prices, resource revenues of all types have fallen dramatically. PNG’s government has recently been forced to adjust spending levels downward.
Numerous challenges still face the government of Peter O'NEILL, including providing physical security for foreign investors, regaining investor confidence, restoring integrity to state institutions, promoting economic efficiency by privatizing moribund state institutions, and maintaining good relations with Australia, its former colonial ruler. Other socio-cultural challenges could upend the economy including chronic law and order and land tenure issues. In August, 2017, PNG launched its first-ever national trade policy, PNG Trade Policy 2017-2032. The policy goal is to maximize trade and investment by increasing exports, to reduce imports, and to increase foreign direct investment (FDI).
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -969,10 +969,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "158,000 (2018)" + "text": "166,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.87 (2018 est.)" + "text": "2 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1011,10 +1011,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "21,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "21,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.23 (2021 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0.23 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json index 6f078db8..72775252 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json @@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The economy has been relatively resilient to global economic shocks due to less exposure to troubled international securities, lower dependence on exports, relatively resilient domestic consumption, large remittances from about 10 million overseas Filipino workers and migrants, and a rapidly expanding services industry. During 2017, the current account balance fell into the negative range, the first time since the 2008 global financial crisis, in part due to an ambitious new infrastructure spending program announced this year. However, international reserves remain at comfortable levels and the banking system is stable.
Efforts to improve tax administration and expenditures management have helped ease the Philippines' debt burden and tight fiscal situation. The Philippines received investment-grade credit ratings on its sovereign debt under the former AQUINO administration and has had little difficulty financing its budget deficits. However, weak absorptive capacity and implementation bottlenecks have prevented the government from maximizing its expenditure plans. Although it has improved, the low tax-to-GDP ratio remains a constraint to supporting increasingly higher spending levels and sustaining high and inclusive growth over the longer term.
Economic growth has accelerated, averaging over 6% per year from 2011 to 2017, compared with 4.5% under the MACAPAGAL-ARROYO government; and competitiveness rankings have improved. Although 2017 saw a new record year for net foreign direct investment inflows, FDI to the Philippines has continued to lag regional peers, in part because the Philippine constitution and other laws limit foreign investment and restrict foreign ownership in important activities/sectors - such as land ownership and public utilities.
Although the economy grew at a rapid pace under the AQUINO government, challenges to achieving more inclusive growth remain. Wealth is concentrated in the hands of the rich. The unemployment rate declined from 7.3% to 5.7% between 2010 and 2017; while there has been some improvement, underemployment remains high at around 17% to 18% of the employed population. At least 40% of the employed work in the informal sector. Poverty afflicts more than a fifth of the total population but is as high as 75% in some areas of the southern Philippines. More than 60% of the poor reside in rural areas, where the incidence of poverty (about 30%) is more severe - a challenge to raising rural farm and non-farm incomes. Continued efforts are needed to improve governance, the judicial system, the regulatory environment, the infrastructure, and the overall ease of doing business.
2016 saw the election of President Rodrigo DUTERTE, who has pledged to make inclusive growth and poverty reduction his top priority. DUTERTE believes that illegal drug use, crime and corruption are key barriers to economic development. The administration wants to reduce the poverty rate to 17% and graduate the economy to upper-middle income status by the end of President DUTERTE’s term in 2022. Key themes under the government’s Ten-Point Socioeconomic Agenda include continuity of macroeconomic policy, tax reform, higher investments in infrastructure and human capital development, and improving competitiveness and the overall ease of doing business. The administration sees infrastructure shortcomings as a key barrier to sustained economic growth and has pledged to spend $165 billion on infrastructure by 2022. Although the final outcome has yet to be seen, the current administration is shepherding legislation for a comprehensive tax reform program to raise revenues for its ambitious infrastructure spending plan and to promote a more equitable and efficient tax system. However, the need to finance rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in the southern region of Mindanao following the 2017 Marawi City siege may compete with other spending on infrastructure.
" + "text": "The economy has been relatively resilient to global economic shocks due to less exposure to troubled international securities, lower dependence on exports, relatively resilient domestic consumption, large remittances from about 10 million overseas Filipino workers and migrants, and a rapidly expanding services industry. During 2017, the current account balance fell into the negative range, the first time since the 2008 global financial crisis, in part due to an ambitious new infrastructure spending program announced this year. However, international reserves remain at comfortable levels and the banking system is stable.
Efforts to improve tax administration and expenditures management have helped ease the Philippines' debt burden and tight fiscal situation. The Philippines received investment-grade credit ratings on its sovereign debt under the former AQUINO administration and has had little difficulty financing its budget deficits. However, weak absorptive capacity and implementation bottlenecks have prevented the government from maximizing its expenditure plans. Although it has improved, the low tax-to-GDP ratio remains a constraint to supporting increasingly higher spending levels and sustaining high and inclusive growth over the longer term.
Economic growth has accelerated, averaging over 6% per year from 2011 to 2017, compared with 4.5% under the MACAPAGAL-ARROYO government; and competitiveness rankings have improved. Although 2017 saw a new record year for net foreign direct investment inflows, FDI to the Philippines has continued to lag regional peers, in part because the Philippine constitution and other laws limit foreign investment and restrict foreign ownership in important activities/sectors - such as land ownership and public utilities.
Although the economy grew at a rapid pace under the AQUINO government, challenges to achieving more inclusive growth remain. Wealth is concentrated in the hands of the rich. The unemployment rate declined from 7.3% to 5.7% between 2010 and 2017; while there has been some improvement, underemployment remains high at around 17% to 18% of the employed population. At least 40% of the employed work in the informal sector. Poverty afflicts more than a fifth of the total population but is as high as 75% in some areas of the southern Philippines. More than 60% of the poor reside in rural areas, where the incidence of poverty (about 30%) is more severe - a challenge to raising rural farm and non-farm incomes. Continued efforts are needed to improve governance, the judicial system, the regulatory environment, the infrastructure, and the overall ease of doing business.
2016 saw the election of President Rodrigo DUTERTE, who has pledged to make inclusive growth and poverty reduction his top priority. DUTERTE believes that illegal drug use, crime and corruption are key barriers to economic development. The administration wants to reduce the poverty rate to 17% and graduate the economy to upper-middle income status by the end of President DUTERTE’s term in 2022. Key themes under the government’s Ten-Point Socioeconomic Agenda include continuity of macroeconomic policy, tax reform, higher investments in infrastructure and human capital development, and improving competitiveness and the overall ease of doing business. The administration sees infrastructure shortcomings as a key barrier to sustained economic growth and has pledged to spend $165 billion on infrastructure by 2022. Although the final outcome has yet to be seen, the current administration is shepherding legislation for a comprehensive tax reform program to raise revenues for its ambitious infrastructure spending plan and to promote a more equitable and efficient tax system. However, the need to finance rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in the southern region of Mindanao following the 2017 Marawi City siege may compete with other spending on infrastructure.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1030,10 +1030,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "4,255,808 (2019)" + "text": "4,731,196 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "3.94 (2019 est.)" + "text": "4 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1072,10 +1072,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "7,936,574 (2021)" + "text": "7,936,574 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "7.24 (2021)" + "text": "7 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json index f30565e2..0731b6a9 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json @@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Singapore has a highly developed and successful free-market economy. It enjoys an open and corruption-free environment, stable prices, and a per capita GDP higher than that of most developed countries. Unemployment is very low. The economy depends heavily on exports, particularly of electronics, petroleum products, chemicals, medical and optical devices, pharmaceuticals, and on Singapore’s vibrant transportation, business, and financial services sectors.
The economy contracted 0.6% in 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis, but has continued to grow since 2010. Growth from 2012-2017 was slower than during the previous decade, a result of slowing structural growth - as Singapore reached high-income levels - and soft global demand for exports. Growth recovered to 3.6% in 2017 with a strengthening global economy.
The government is attempting to restructure Singapore’s economy to reduce its dependence on foreign labor, raise productivity growth, and increase wages amid slowing labor force growth and an aging population. Singapore has attracted major investments in advanced manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, and medical technology production and will continue efforts to strengthen its position as Southeast Asia's leading financial and technology hub. Singapore is a signatory of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and a party to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations with nine other ASEAN members plus Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand. In 2015, Singapore formed, with the other ASEAN members, the ASEAN Economic Community.
" + "text": "Singapore has a highly developed and successful free-market economy. It enjoys an open and corruption-free environment, stable prices, and a per capita GDP higher than that of most developed countries. Unemployment is very low. The economy depends heavily on exports, particularly of electronics, petroleum products, chemicals, medical and optical devices, pharmaceuticals, and on Singapore’s vibrant transportation, business, and financial services sectors.
The economy contracted 0.6% in 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis, but has continued to grow since 2010. Growth from 2012-2017 was slower than during the previous decade, a result of slowing structural growth - as Singapore reached high-income levels - and soft global demand for exports. Growth recovered to 3.6% in 2017 with a strengthening global economy.
The government is attempting to restructure Singapore’s economy to reduce its dependence on foreign labor, raise productivity growth, and increase wages amid slowing labor force growth and an aging population. Singapore has attracted major investments in advanced manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, and medical technology production and will continue efforts to strengthen its position as Southeast Asia's leading financial and technology hub. Singapore is a signatory of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and a party to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations with nine other ASEAN members plus Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand. In 2015, Singapore formed, with the other ASEAN members, the ASEAN Economic Community.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -985,10 +985,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1,891,600 (2020)" + "text": "1.891 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "32.33 (2020 est.)" + "text": "32 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1027,10 +1027,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,509,700 (2021)" + "text": "1,509,700 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "25.81 (2021)" + "text": "26 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json index 8b79e5d5..e89b2d6b 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json @@ -1034,10 +1034,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "5.003 million (2020)" + "text": "5.003 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "7.17 (2020 est.)" + "text": "7 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1076,10 +1076,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "11,478,265 (2021)" + "text": "11,478,265 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "16.44 (2021 est.)" + "text": "16 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json index d9e41cc9..d37b06f8 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json @@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Since independence in 1999, Timor-Leste has faced great challenges in rebuilding its infrastructure, strengthening the civil administration, and generating jobs for young people entering the work force. The development of offshore oil and gas resources has greatly supplemented government revenues. This technology-intensive industry, however, has done little to create jobs in part because there are no production facilities in Timor-Leste. Gas is currently piped to Australia for processing, but Timor-Leste has expressed interest in developing a domestic processing capability.
In June 2005, the National Parliament unanimously approved the creation of the Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund to serve as a repository for all petroleum revenues and to preserve the value of Timor-Leste's petroleum wealth for future generations. The Fund held assets of $16 billion, as of mid-2016. Oil accounts for over 90% of government revenues, and the drop in the price of oil in 2014-16 has led to concerns about the long-term sustainability of government spending. Timor-Leste compensated for the decline in price by exporting more oil. The Ministry of Finance maintains that the Petroleum Fund is sufficient to sustain government operations for the foreseeable future.
Annual government budget expenditures increased markedly between 2009 and 2012 but dropped significantly through 2016. Historically, the government failed to spend as much as its budget allowed. The government has focused significant resources on basic infrastructure, including electricity and roads, but limited experience in procurement and infrastructure building has hampered these projects. The underlying economic policy challenge the country faces remains how best to use oil-and-gas wealth to lift the non-oil economy onto a higher growth path and to reduce poverty.
" + "text": "Since independence in 1999, Timor-Leste has faced great challenges in rebuilding its infrastructure, strengthening the civil administration, and generating jobs for young people entering the work force. The development of offshore oil and gas resources has greatly supplemented government revenues. This technology-intensive industry, however, has done little to create jobs in part because there are no production facilities in Timor-Leste. Gas is currently piped to Australia for processing, but Timor-Leste has expressed interest in developing a domestic processing capability.
In June 2005, the National Parliament unanimously approved the creation of the Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund to serve as a repository for all petroleum revenues and to preserve the value of Timor-Leste's petroleum wealth for future generations. The Fund held assets of $16 billion, as of mid-2016. Oil accounts for over 90% of government revenues, and the drop in the price of oil in 2014-16 has led to concerns about the long-term sustainability of government spending. Timor-Leste compensated for the decline in price by exporting more oil. The Ministry of Finance maintains that the Petroleum Fund is sufficient to sustain government operations for the foreseeable future.
Annual government budget expenditures increased markedly between 2009 and 2012 but dropped significantly through 2016. Historically, the government failed to spend as much as its budget allowed. The government has focused significant resources on basic infrastructure, including electricity and roads, but limited experience in procurement and infrastructure building has hampered these projects. The underlying economic policy challenge the country faces remains how best to use oil-and-gas wealth to lift the non-oil economy onto a higher growth path and to reduce poverty.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,012 (2020)" + "text": "2,012 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" @@ -995,10 +995,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "75 (2021)" + "text": "75 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.01 (2021 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0.01 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json index 5af90bb3..3af11a0b 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json @@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Taiwan has a dynamic capitalist economy that is driven largely by industrial manufacturing, and especially exports of electronics, machinery, and petrochemicals. This heavy dependence on exports exposes the economy to fluctuations in global demand. Taiwan's diplomatic isolation, low birth rate, rapidly aging population, and increasing competition from China and other Asia Pacific markets are other major long-term challenges.
Following the landmark Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed with China in June 2010, Taiwan in July 2013 signed a free trade deal with New Zealand - Taipei’s first-ever with a country with which it does not maintain diplomatic relations - and, in November of that year, inked a trade pact with Singapore. However, follow-on components of the ECFA, including a signed agreement on trade in services and negotiations on trade in goods and dispute resolution, have stalled. In early 2014, the government bowed to public demand and proposed a new law governing the oversight of cross-Strait agreements, before any additional deals with China are implemented; the legislature has yet to vote on such legislation, leaving the future of ECFA uncertain. President TSAI since taking office in May 2016 has promoted greater economic integration with South and Southeast Asia through the New Southbound Policy initiative and has also expressed interest in Taiwan joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership as well as bilateral trade deals with partners such as the US. These overtures have likely played a role in increasing Taiwan’s total exports, which rose 11% during the first half of 2017, buoyed by strong demand for semiconductors.
Taiwan's total fertility rate of just over one child per woman is among the lowest in the world, raising the prospect of future labor shortages, falling domestic demand, and declining tax revenues. Taiwan's population is aging quickly, with the number of people over 65 expected to account for nearly 20% of the island's total population by 2025.
The island runs a trade surplus with many economies, including China and the US, and its foreign reserves are the world's fifth largest, behind those of China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland. In 2006, China overtook the US to become Taiwan's second-largest source of imports after Japan. China is also the island's number one destination for foreign direct investment. Taiwan since 2009 has gradually loosened rules governing Chinese investment and has also secured greater market access for its investors on the mainland. In August 2012, the Taiwan Central Bank signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on cross-Strait currency settlement with its Chinese counterpart. The MOU allows for the direct settlement of Chinese renminbi (RMB) and the New Taiwan dollar across the Strait, which has helped Taiwan develop into a local RMB hub.
Closer economic links with the mainland bring opportunities for Taiwan’s economy but also pose challenges as political differences remain unresolved and China’s economic growth is slowing. President TSAI’s administration has made little progress on the domestic economic issues that loomed large when she was elected, including concerns about stagnant wages, high housing prices, youth unemployment, job security, and financial security in retirement. TSAI has made more progress on boosting trade with South and Southeast Asia, which may help insulate Taiwan’s economy from a fall in mainland demand should China’s growth slow in 2018.
" + "text": "Taiwan has a dynamic capitalist economy that is driven largely by industrial manufacturing, and especially exports of electronics, machinery, and petrochemicals. This heavy dependence on exports exposes the economy to fluctuations in global demand. Taiwan's diplomatic isolation, low birth rate, rapidly aging population, and increasing competition from China and other Asia Pacific markets are other major long-term challenges.
Following the landmark Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed with China in June 2010, Taiwan in July 2013 signed a free trade deal with New Zealand - Taipei’s first-ever with a country with which it does not maintain diplomatic relations - and, in November of that year, inked a trade pact with Singapore. However, follow-on components of the ECFA, including a signed agreement on trade in services and negotiations on trade in goods and dispute resolution, have stalled. In early 2014, the government bowed to public demand and proposed a new law governing the oversight of cross-Strait agreements, before any additional deals with China are implemented; the legislature has yet to vote on such legislation, leaving the future of ECFA uncertain. President TSAI since taking office in May 2016 has promoted greater economic integration with South and Southeast Asia through the New Southbound Policy initiative and has also expressed interest in Taiwan joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership as well as bilateral trade deals with partners such as the US. These overtures have likely played a role in increasing Taiwan’s total exports, which rose 11% during the first half of 2017, buoyed by strong demand for semiconductors.
Taiwan's total fertility rate of just over one child per woman is among the lowest in the world, raising the prospect of future labor shortages, falling domestic demand, and declining tax revenues. Taiwan's population is aging quickly, with the number of people over 65 expected to account for nearly 20% of the island's total population by 2025.
The island runs a trade surplus with many economies, including China and the US, and its foreign reserves are the world's fifth largest, behind those of China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland. In 2006, China overtook the US to become Taiwan's second-largest source of imports after Japan. China is also the island's number one destination for foreign direct investment. Taiwan since 2009 has gradually loosened rules governing Chinese investment and has also secured greater market access for its investors on the mainland. In August 2012, the Taiwan Central Bank signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on cross-Strait currency settlement with its Chinese counterpart. The MOU allows for the direct settlement of Chinese renminbi (RMB) and the New Taiwan dollar across the Strait, which has helped Taiwan develop into a local RMB hub.
Closer economic links with the mainland bring opportunities for Taiwan’s economy but also pose challenges as political differences remain unresolved and China’s economic growth is slowing. President TSAI’s administration has made little progress on the domestic economic issues that loomed large when she was elected, including concerns about stagnant wages, high housing prices, youth unemployment, job security, and financial security in retirement. TSAI has made more progress on boosting trade with South and Southeast Asia, which may help insulate Taiwan’s economy from a fall in mainland demand should China’s growth slow in 2018.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": { @@ -842,10 +842,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "12,750,429 (2020)" + "text": "12,971,900 (2019 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "53.54 (2020 est.)" + "text": "55 (2019 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -884,10 +884,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "6,049,909 (2021)" + "text": "5,831,470 (2019 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "25.4 (2021)" + "text": "25 (2019 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json index 3ed1089f..9aed1b80 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json @@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Vietnam is a densely populated developing country that has been transitioning since 1986 from the rigidities of a centrally planned, highly agrarian economy to a more industrial and market based economy, and it has raised incomes substantially. Vietnam exceeded its 2017 GDP growth target of 6.7% with growth of 6.8%, primarily due to unexpected increases in domestic demand, and strong manufacturing exports.
Vietnam has a young population, stable political system, commitment to sustainable growth, relatively low inflation, stable currency, strong FDI inflows, and strong manufacturing sector. In addition, the country is committed to continuing its global economic integration. Vietnam joined the WTO in January 2007 and concluded several free trade agreements in 2015-16, including the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (which the EU has not yet ratified), the Korean Free Trade Agreement, and the Eurasian Economic Union Free Trade Agreement. In 2017, Vietnam successfully chaired the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Conference with its key priorities including inclusive growth, innovation, strengthening small and medium enterprises, food security, and climate change. Seeking to diversify its opportunities, Vietnam also signed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Transpacific Partnership in 2018 and continued to pursue the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
To continue its trajectory of strong economic growth, the government acknowledges the need to spark a ‘second wave’ of reforms, including reforming state-owned-enterprises, reducing red tape, increasing business sector transparency, reducing the level of non-performing loans in the banking sector, and increasing financial sector transparency. Vietnam’s public debt to GDP ratio is nearing the government mandated ceiling of 65%.
In 2016, Vietnam cancelled its civilian nuclear energy development program, citing public concerns about safety and the high cost of the program; it faces growing pressure on energy infrastructure. Overall, the country’s infrastructure fails to meet the needs of an expanding middle class. Vietnam has demonstrated a commitment to sustainable growth over the last several years, but despite the recent speed-up in economic growth the government remains cautious about the risk of external shocks.
" + "text": "Vietnam is a densely populated developing country that has been transitioning since 1986 from the rigidities of a centrally planned, highly agrarian economy to a more industrial and market based economy, and it has raised incomes substantially. Vietnam exceeded its 2017 GDP growth target of 6.7% with growth of 6.8%, primarily due to unexpected increases in domestic demand, and strong manufacturing exports.
Vietnam has a young population, stable political system, commitment to sustainable growth, relatively low inflation, stable currency, strong FDI inflows, and strong manufacturing sector. In addition, the country is committed to continuing its global economic integration. Vietnam joined the WTO in January 2007 and concluded several free trade agreements in 2015-16, including the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (which the EU has not yet ratified), the Korean Free Trade Agreement, and the Eurasian Economic Union Free Trade Agreement. In 2017, Vietnam successfully chaired the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Conference with its key priorities including inclusive growth, innovation, strengthening small and medium enterprises, food security, and climate change. Seeking to diversify its opportunities, Vietnam also signed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Transpacific Partnership in 2018 and continued to pursue the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
To continue its trajectory of strong economic growth, the government acknowledges the need to spark a ‘second wave’ of reforms, including reforming state-owned-enterprises, reducing red tape, increasing business sector transparency, reducing the level of non-performing loans in the banking sector, and increasing financial sector transparency. Vietnam’s public debt to GDP ratio is nearing the government mandated ceiling of 65%.
In 2016, Vietnam cancelled its civilian nuclear energy development program, citing public concerns about safety and the high cost of the program; it faces growing pressure on energy infrastructure. Overall, the country’s infrastructure fails to meet the needs of an expanding middle class. Vietnam has demonstrated a commitment to sustainable growth over the last several years, but despite the recent speed-up in economic growth the government remains cautious about the risk of external shocks.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1010,10 +1010,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "3,205,775 (2020)" + "text": "3,205,775 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "3.29 (2020 est.)" + "text": "3 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1052,10 +1052,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "16,699,249 (2021)" + "text": "16,699,249 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "17.16 (2021)" + "text": "17 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/al.json b/europe/al.json index 37913997..6b297866 100644 --- a/europe/al.json +++ b/europe/al.json @@ -997,18 +997,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "223,469 (2020)" + "text": "223,469 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "7.77 (2020 est.)" + "text": "8 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,618,880 (2021)" + "text": "2,618,880 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "91 (2021)" + "text": "91 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1039,10 +1039,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "508,937 (2022)" + "text": "508,937 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "17.68 (2022)" + "text": "18 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/an.json b/europe/an.json index 2556a482..5c071bc0 100644 --- a/europe/an.json +++ b/europe/an.json @@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Andorra has a developed economy and a free market, with per capita income above the European average and above the level of its neighbors, Spain and France. The country has developed a sophisticated infrastructure including a one-of-a-kind micro-fiber-optic network for the entire country. Tourism, retail sales, and finance comprise more than three-quarters of GDP. Duty-free shopping for some products and the country’s summer and winter resorts attract millions of visitors annually. Andorra uses the euro and is effectively subject to the monetary policy of the European Central Bank. Andorra's comparative advantage as a tax haven eroded when the borders of neighboring France and Spain opened and the government eased bank secrecy laws under pressure from the EU and OECD.
Agricultural production is limited - only about 5% of the land is arable - and most food has to be imported, making the economy vulnerable to changes in fuel and food prices. The principal livestock is sheep. Manufacturing output and exports consist mainly of perfumes and cosmetic products, products of the printing industry, electrical machinery and equipment, clothing, tobacco products, and furniture. Andorra is a member of the EU Customs Union and is treated as an EU member for trade in manufactured goods (no tariffs) and as a non-EU member for agricultural products.
To provide incentives for growth and diversification in the economy, the Andorran government began sweeping economic reforms in 2006. The Parliament approved three laws to complement the first phase of economic openness: on companies (October 2007), on business accounting (December 2007), and on foreign investment (April 2008 and June 2012). From 2011 to 2015, the Parliament also approved direct taxes in the form of taxes on corporations, on individual incomes of residents and non-residents, and on capital gains, savings, and economic activities. These regulations aim to establish a transparent, modern, and internationally comparable regulatory framework, in order to attract foreign investment and businesses that offer higher value added.
" + "text": "Andorra has a developed economy and a free market, with per capita income above the European average and above the level of its neighbors, Spain and France. The country has developed a sophisticated infrastructure including a one-of-a-kind micro-fiber-optic network for the entire country. Tourism, retail sales, and finance comprise more than three-quarters of GDP. Duty-free shopping for some products and the country’s summer and winter resorts attract millions of visitors annually. Andorra uses the euro and is effectively subject to the monetary policy of the European Central Bank. Andorra's comparative advantage as a tax haven eroded when the borders of neighboring France and Spain opened and the government eased bank secrecy laws under pressure from the EU and OECD.
Agricultural production is limited - only about 5% of the land is arable - and most food has to be imported, making the economy vulnerable to changes in fuel and food prices. The principal livestock is sheep. Manufacturing output and exports consist mainly of perfumes and cosmetic products, products of the printing industry, electrical machinery and equipment, clothing, tobacco products, and furniture. Andorra is a member of the EU Customs Union and is treated as an EU member for trade in manufactured goods (no tariffs) and as a non-EU member for agricultural products.
To provide incentives for growth and diversification in the economy, the Andorran government began sweeping economic reforms in 2006. The Parliament approved three laws to complement the first phase of economic openness: on companies (October 2007), on business accounting (December 2007), and on foreign investment (April 2008 and June 2012). From 2011 to 2015, the Parliament also approved direct taxes in the form of taxes on corporations, on individual incomes of residents and non-residents, and on capital gains, savings, and economic activities. These regulations aim to establish a transparent, modern, and internationally comparable regulatory framework, in order to attract foreign investment and businesses that offer higher value added.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2015": { @@ -816,18 +816,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "39,657 (2019)" + "text": "40,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "51.41 (2019 est.)" + "text": "52 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "87,909 (2019)" + "text": "94,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "114 (2019 est.)" + "text": "122 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -858,10 +858,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "37,000 (2022 est.)" + "text": "37,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "47.89 (2022)" + "text": "48 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/au.json b/europe/au.json index 27736776..0d4806dc 100644 --- a/europe/au.json +++ b/europe/au.json @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Austria is a well-developed market economy with skilled labor force and high standard of living. It is closely tied to other EU economies, especially Germany's, but also the US’, its third-largest trade partner. Its economy features a large service sector, a sound industrial sector, and a small, but highly developed agricultural sector.
Austrian economic growth strengthen in 2017, with a 2.9% increase in GDP. Austrian exports, accounting for around 60% of the GDP, were up 8.2% in 2017. Austria’s unemployment rate fell by 0.3% to 5.5%, which is low by European standards, but still at its second highest rate since the end of World War II, driven by an increased number of refugees and EU migrants entering the labor market.
Austria's fiscal position compares favorably with other euro-zone countries. The budget deficit stood at a low 0.7% of GDP in 2017 and public debt declined again to 78.4% of GDP in 2017, after reaching a post-war high 84.6% in 2015. The Austrian government has announced it plans to balance the fiscal budget in 2019. Several external risks, such as Austrian banks' exposure to Central and Eastern Europe, the refugee crisis, and continued unrest in Russia/Ukraine, eased in 2017, but are still a factor for the Austrian economy. Exposure to the Russian banking sector and a deep energy relationship with Russia present additional risks.
Austria elected a new pro-business government in October 2017 that campaigned on promises to reduce bureaucracy, improve public sector efficiency, reduce labor market protections, and provide positive investment incentives.
" + "text": "Austria is a well-developed market economy with skilled labor force and high standard of living. It is closely tied to other EU economies, especially Germany's, but also the US’, its third-largest trade partner. Its economy features a large service sector, a sound industrial sector, and a small, but highly developed agricultural sector.
Austrian economic growth strengthen in 2017, with a 2.9% increase in GDP. Austrian exports, accounting for around 60% of the GDP, were up 8.2% in 2017. Austria’s unemployment rate fell by 0.3% to 5.5%, which is low by European standards, but still at its second highest rate since the end of World War II, driven by an increased number of refugees and EU migrants entering the labor market.
Austria's fiscal position compares favorably with other euro-zone countries. The budget deficit stood at a low 0.7% of GDP in 2017 and public debt declined again to 78.4% of GDP in 2017, after reaching a post-war high 84.6% in 2015. The Austrian government has announced it plans to balance the fiscal budget in 2019. Several external risks, such as Austrian banks' exposure to Central and Eastern Europe, the refugee crisis, and continued unrest in Russia/Ukraine, eased in 2017, but are still a factor for the Austrian economy. Exposure to the Russian banking sector and a deep energy relationship with Russia present additional risks.
Austria elected a new pro-business government in October 2017 that campaigned on promises to reduce bureaucracy, improve public sector efficiency, reduce labor market protections, and provide positive investment incentives.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -981,18 +981,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "3,786,725 (2020)" + "text": "3,786,725 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "42.04 (2020 est.)" + "text": "42 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "10,682,294 (2020)" + "text": "10,717,445 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "118.6 (2020 est.)" + "text": "119 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1023,10 +1023,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "2.606 million (2021)" + "text": "2.606 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "28.93 (2021 est.)" + "text": "29 (2020 est.)" } }, "Communications - note": { diff --git a/europe/be.json b/europe/be.json index 69f911fa..565a5aed 100644 --- a/europe/be.json +++ b/europe/be.json @@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Belgium’s central geographic location and highly developed transport network have helped develop a well-diversified economy, with a broad mix of transport, services, manufacturing, and high tech. Service and high-tech industries are concentrated in the northern Flanders region while the southern region of Wallonia is home to industries like coal and steel manufacturing. Belgium is completely reliant on foreign sources of fossil fuels, and the planned closure of its seven nuclear plants by 2025 should increase its dependence on foreign energy. Its role as a regional logistical hub makes its economy vulnerable to shifts in foreign demand, particularly with EU trading partners. Roughly three-quarters of Belgium's trade is with other EU countries, and the port of Zeebrugge conducts almost half its trade with the United Kingdom alone, leaving Belgium’s economy vulnerable to the outcome of negotiations on the UK’s exit from the EU.
Belgium’s GDP grew by 1.7% in 2017 and the budget deficit was 1.5% of GDP. Unemployment stood at 7.3%, however the unemployment rate is lower in Flanders than Wallonia, 4.4% compared to 9.4%, because of industrial differences between the regions. The economy largely recovered from the March 2016 terrorist attacks that mainly impacted the Brussels region tourist and hospitality industry. Prime Minister Charles MICHEL's center-right government has pledged to further reduce the deficit in response to EU pressure to decrease Belgium's high public debt of about 104% of GDP, but such efforts would also dampen economic growth. In addition to restrained public spending, low wage growth and higher inflation promise to curtail a more robust recovery in private consumption.
The government has pledged to pursue a reform program to improve Belgium’s competitiveness, including changes to labor market rules and welfare benefits. These changes have generally made Belgian wages more competitive regionally, but have raised tensions with trade unions, which have called for extended strikes. In 2017, Belgium approved a tax reform plan to ease corporate rates from 33% to 29% by 2018 and down to 25% by 2020. The tax plan also included benefits for innovation and SMEs, intended to spur competitiveness and private investment.
" + "text": "Belgium’s central geographic location and highly developed transport network have helped develop a well-diversified economy, with a broad mix of transport, services, manufacturing, and high tech. Service and high-tech industries are concentrated in the northern Flanders region while the southern region of Wallonia is home to industries like coal and steel manufacturing. Belgium is completely reliant on foreign sources of fossil fuels, and the planned closure of its seven nuclear plants by 2025 should increase its dependence on foreign energy. Its role as a regional logistical hub makes its economy vulnerable to shifts in foreign demand, particularly with EU trading partners. Roughly three-quarters of Belgium's trade is with other EU countries, and the port of Zeebrugge conducts almost half its trade with the United Kingdom alone, leaving Belgium’s economy vulnerable to the outcome of negotiations on the UK’s exit from the EU.
Belgium’s GDP grew by 1.7% in 2017 and the budget deficit was 1.5% of GDP. Unemployment stood at 7.3%, however the unemployment rate is lower in Flanders than Wallonia, 4.4% compared to 9.4%, because of industrial differences between the regions. The economy largely recovered from the March 2016 terrorist attacks that mainly impacted the Brussels region tourist and hospitality industry. Prime Minister Charles MICHEL's center-right government has pledged to further reduce the deficit in response to EU pressure to decrease Belgium's high public debt of about 104% of GDP, but such efforts would also dampen economic growth. In addition to restrained public spending, low wage growth and higher inflation promise to curtail a more robust recovery in private consumption.
The government has pledged to pursue a reform program to improve Belgium’s competitiveness, including changes to labor market rules and welfare benefits. These changes have generally made Belgian wages more competitive regionally, but have raised tensions with trade unions, which have called for extended strikes. In 2017, Belgium approved a tax reform plan to ease corporate rates from 33% to 29% by 2018 and down to 25% by 2020. The tax plan also included benefits for innovation and SMEs, intended to spur competitiveness and private investment.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -969,18 +969,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "3,634,639 (2020)" + "text": "3,634,639 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "31.36 (2020 est.)" + "text": "31 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "11,529,728 (2020)" + "text": "11,529,728 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "99.48 (2020 est.)" + "text": "99 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1011,10 +1011,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "4,734,210 (2021)" + "text": "4,734,210 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "40.85 (2021)" + "text": "41 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/bk.json b/europe/bk.json index 7ed68d38..0e7dad7f 100644 --- a/europe/bk.json +++ b/europe/bk.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "Bosnia and Herzegovina declared sovereignty in October 1991 and independence from the former Yugoslavia on 3 March 1992 after a referendum boycotted by ethnic Serbs. The Bosnian Serbs - supported by neighboring Serbia and Montenegro - responded with armed resistance aimed at partitioning the republic along ethnic lines and joining Serb-held areas to form a \"Greater Serbia.\" In March 1994, Bosniaks and Croats reduced the number of warring factions from three to two by signing an agreement creating a joint Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 21 November 1995, in Dayton, Ohio, the warring parties initialed a peace agreement that ended three years of interethnic civil strife (the final agreement was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995).
The Dayton Peace Accords retained Bosnia and Herzegovina's international boundaries and created a multiethnic and democratic government charged with conducting foreign, diplomatic, and fiscal policy. Also recognized was a second tier of government composed of two entities roughly equal in size: the predominantly Bosniak-Bosnian Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the predominantly Bosnian Serb-led Republika Srpska (RS). The Federation and RS governments are responsible for overseeing most government functions. Additionally, the Dayton Accords established the Office of the High Representative to oversee the implementation of the civilian aspects of the agreement. The Peace Implementation Council at its conference in Bonn in 1997 also gave the High Representative the authority to impose legislation and remove officials, the so-called \"Bonn Powers.\" An original NATO-led international peacekeeping force (IFOR) of 60,000 troops assembled in 1995 was succeeded over time by a smaller, NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). In 2004, European Union peacekeeping troops (EUFOR) replaced SFOR. Currently, EUFOR deploys around 600 troops in theater in a security assistance and training capacity.
" + "text": "Bosnia and Herzegovina declared sovereignty in October 1991 and independence from the former Yugoslavia on 3 March 1992 after a referendum boycotted by ethnic Serbs. The Bosnian Serbs - supported by neighboring Serbia and Montenegro - responded with armed resistance aimed at partitioning the republic along ethnic lines and joining Serb-held areas to form a \"Greater Serbia.\" In March 1994, Bosniaks and Croats reduced the number of warring factions from three to two by signing an agreement creating a joint Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 21 November 1995, in Dayton, Ohio, the warring parties initialed a peace agreement that ended three years of interethnic civil strife (the final agreement was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995).
The Dayton Peace Accords retained Bosnia and Herzegovina's international boundaries and created a multiethnic and democratic government charged with conducting foreign, diplomatic, and fiscal policy. Also recognized was a second tier of government composed of two entities roughly equal in size: the predominantly Bosniak-Bosnian Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the predominantly Bosnian Serb-led Republika Srpska (RS). The Federation and RS governments are responsible for overseeing most government functions. Additionally, the Dayton Accords established the Office of the High Representative to oversee the implementation of the civilian aspects of the agreement. The Peace Implementation Council at its conference in Bonn in 1997 also gave the High Representative the authority to impose legislation and remove officials, the so-called \"Bonn Powers.\" An original NATO-led international peacekeeping force (IFOR) of 60,000 troops assembled in 1995 was succeeded over time by a smaller, NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). In 2004, European Union peacekeeping troops (EUFOR) replaced SFOR. Currently, EUFOR deploys around 600 troops in theater in a security assistance and training capacity.
" } }, "Geography": { @@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Bosnia and Herzegovina has a transitional economy with limited market reforms. The economy relies heavily on the export of metals, energy, textiles, and furniture as well as on remittances and foreign aid. A highly decentralized government hampers economic policy coordination and reform, while excessive bureaucracy and a segmented market discourage foreign investment. The economy is among the least competitive in the region. Foreign banks, primarily from Austria and Italy, control much of the banking sector, though the largest bank is a private domestic one. The konvertibilna marka (convertible mark) - the national currency introduced in 1998 - is pegged to the euro through a currency board arrangement, which has maintained confidence in the currency and has facilitated reliable trade links with European partners. Bosnia and Herzegovina became a full member of the Central European Free Trade Agreement in September 2007. In 2016, Bosnia began a three-year IMF loan program, but it has struggled to meet the economic reform benchmarks required to receive all funding installments.
Bosnia and Herzegovina's private sector is growing slowly, but foreign investment dropped sharply after 2007 and remains low. High unemployment remains the most serious macroeconomic problem. Successful implementation of a value-added tax in 2006 provided a steady source of revenue for the government and helped rein in gray-market activity, though public perceptions of government corruption and misuse of taxpayer money has encouraged a large informal economy to persist. National-level statistics have improved over time, but a large share of economic activity remains unofficial and unrecorded.
Bosnia and Herzegovina's top economic priorities are: acceleration of integration into the EU; strengthening the fiscal system; public administration reform; World Trade Organization membership; and securing economic growth by fostering a dynamic, competitive private sector.
" + "text": "Bosnia and Herzegovina has a transitional economy with limited market reforms. The economy relies heavily on the export of metals, energy, textiles, and furniture as well as on remittances and foreign aid. A highly decentralized government hampers economic policy coordination and reform, while excessive bureaucracy and a segmented market discourage foreign investment. The economy is among the least competitive in the region. Foreign banks, primarily from Austria and Italy, control much of the banking sector, though the largest bank is a private domestic one. The konvertibilna marka (convertible mark) - the national currency introduced in 1998 - is pegged to the euro through a currency board arrangement, which has maintained confidence in the currency and has facilitated reliable trade links with European partners. Bosnia and Herzegovina became a full member of the Central European Free Trade Agreement in September 2007. In 2016, Bosnia began a three-year IMF loan program, but it has struggled to meet the economic reform benchmarks required to receive all funding installments.
Bosnia and Herzegovina's private sector is growing slowly, but foreign investment dropped sharply after 2007 and remains low. High unemployment remains the most serious macroeconomic problem. Successful implementation of a value-added tax in 2006 provided a steady source of revenue for the government and helped rein in gray-market activity, though public perceptions of government corruption and misuse of taxpayer money has encouraged a large informal economy to persist. National-level statistics have improved over time, but a large share of economic activity remains unofficial and unrecorded.
Bosnia and Herzegovina's top economic priorities are: acceleration of integration into the EU; strengthening the fiscal system; public administration reform; World Trade Organization membership; and securing economic growth by fostering a dynamic, competitive private sector.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -981,12 +981,12 @@ "text": "706,135 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "21.52 (2020 est.)" + "text": "22 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "3,509,674 (2020)" + "text": "3,509,674 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "107 (2020 est.)" @@ -1020,10 +1020,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "770,424 (2021)" + "text": "770,424 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "23.48 (2021 est.)" + "text": "24 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1167,7 +1167,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "149 (mid-year 2021)" }, - "note": "note: 89,389 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-April 2022)" + "note": "note: 89,773 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-May 2022)" }, "Trafficking in persons": { "current situation": { diff --git a/europe/bo.json b/europe/bo.json index 7c2b8dd8..c3ecb813 100644 --- a/europe/bo.json +++ b/europe/bo.json @@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "As part of the former Soviet Union, Belarus had a relatively well-developed industrial base, but it is now outdated, inefficient, and dependent on subsidized Russian energy and preferential access to Russian markets. The country’s agricultural base is largely dependent on government subsidies. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, an initial burst of economic reforms included privatization of state enterprises, creation of private property rights, and the acceptance of private entrepreneurship, but by 1994 the reform effort dissipated. About 80% of industry remains in state hands, and foreign investment has virtually disappeared. Several businesses have been renationalized. State-owned entities account for 70-75% of GDP, and state banks make up 75% of the banking sector.
Economic output declined for several years following the break-up of the Soviet Union, but revived in the mid-2000s. Belarus has only small reserves of crude oil and imports crude oil and natural gas from Russia at subsidized, below market, prices. Belarus derives export revenue by refining Russian crude and selling it at market prices. Russia and Belarus have had serious disagreements over prices and quantities for Russian energy. Beginning in early 2016, Russia claimed Belarus began accumulating debt – reaching $740 million by April 2017 – for paying below the agreed price for Russian natural gas and Russia cut back its export of crude oil as a result of the debt. In April 2017, Belarus agreed to pay its gas debt and Russia restored the flow of crude.
New non-Russian foreign investment has been limited in recent years, largely because of an unfavorable financial climate. In 2011, a financial crisis lead to a nearly three-fold devaluation of the Belarusian ruble. The Belarusian economy has continued to struggle under the weight of high external debt servicing payments and a trade deficit. In mid-December 2014, the devaluation of the Russian ruble triggered a near 40% devaluation of the Belarusian ruble.
Belarus’s economy stagnated between 2012 and 2016, widening productivity and income gaps between Belarus and neighboring countries. Budget revenues dropped because of falling global prices on key Belarusian export commodities. Since 2015, the Belarusian government has tightened its macro-economic policies, allowed more flexibility to its exchange rate, taken some steps towards price liberalization, and reduced subsidized government lending to state-owned enterprises. Belarus returned to modest growth in 2017, largely driven by improvement of external conditions and Belarus issued sovereign debt for the first time since 2011, which provided the country with badly-needed liquidity, and issued $600 million worth of Eurobonds in February 2018, predominantly to US and British investors.
" + "text": "As part of the former Soviet Union, Belarus had a relatively well-developed industrial base, but it is now outdated, inefficient, and dependent on subsidized Russian energy and preferential access to Russian markets. The country’s agricultural base is largely dependent on government subsidies. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, an initial burst of economic reforms included privatization of state enterprises, creation of private property rights, and the acceptance of private entrepreneurship, but by 1994 the reform effort dissipated. About 80% of industry remains in state hands, and foreign investment has virtually disappeared. Several businesses have been renationalized. State-owned entities account for 70-75% of GDP, and state banks make up 75% of the banking sector.
Economic output declined for several years following the break-up of the Soviet Union, but revived in the mid-2000s. Belarus has only small reserves of crude oil and imports crude oil and natural gas from Russia at subsidized, below market, prices. Belarus derives export revenue by refining Russian crude and selling it at market prices. Russia and Belarus have had serious disagreements over prices and quantities for Russian energy. Beginning in early 2016, Russia claimed Belarus began accumulating debt – reaching $740 million by April 2017 – for paying below the agreed price for Russian natural gas and Russia cut back its export of crude oil as a result of the debt. In April 2017, Belarus agreed to pay its gas debt and Russia restored the flow of crude.
New non-Russian foreign investment has been limited in recent years, largely because of an unfavorable financial climate. In 2011, a financial crisis lead to a nearly three-fold devaluation of the Belarusian ruble. The Belarusian economy has continued to struggle under the weight of high external debt servicing payments and a trade deficit. In mid-December 2014, the devaluation of the Russian ruble triggered a near 40% devaluation of the Belarusian ruble.
Belarus’s economy stagnated between 2012 and 2016, widening productivity and income gaps between Belarus and neighboring countries. Budget revenues dropped because of falling global prices on key Belarusian export commodities. Since 2015, the Belarusian government has tightened its macro-economic policies, allowed more flexibility to its exchange rate, taken some steps towards price liberalization, and reduced subsidized government lending to state-owned enterprises. Belarus returned to modest growth in 2017, largely driven by improvement of external conditions and Belarus issued sovereign debt for the first time since 2011, which provided the country with badly-needed liquidity, and issued $600 million worth of Eurobonds in February 2018, predominantly to US and British investors.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -992,18 +992,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "4,406,585 (2020)" + "text": "4,406,560 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "46.63 (2020 est.)" + "text": "47 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "11,704,084 (2020)" + "text": "11,704,084 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "123.9 (2020 est.)" + "text": "124 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1034,10 +1034,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "3,255,552 (2022)" + "text": "3,255,552 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "34.45 (2022 est.)" + "text": "35 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1181,7 +1181,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "26,985 (Ukraine) (as of 9 May 2022)" + "text": "27,308 (Ukraine) (as of 11 May 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "6,104 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/bu.json b/europe/bu.json index 8cda62e9..889e2e29 100644 --- a/europe/bu.json +++ b/europe/bu.json @@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Bulgaria, a former communist country that entered the EU in 2007, has an open economy that historically has demonstrated strong growth, but its per-capita income remains the lowest among EU members and its reliance on energy imports and foreign demand for its exports makes its growth sensitive to external market conditions.
The government undertook significant structural economic reforms in the 1990s to move the economy from a centralized, planned economy to a more liberal, market-driven economy. These reforms included privatization of state-owned enterprises, liberalization of trade, and strengthening of the tax system - changes that initially caused some economic hardships but later helped to attract investment, spur growth, and make gradual improvements to living conditions. From 2000 through 2008, Bulgaria maintained robust, average annual real GDP growth in excess of 6%, which was followed by a deep recession in 2009 as the financial crisis caused domestic demand, exports, capital inflows and industrial production to contract, prompting the government to rein in spending. Real GDP growth remained slow - less than 2% annually - until 2015, when demand from EU countries for Bulgarian exports, plus an inflow of EU development funds, boosted growth to more than 3%. In recent years, strong domestic demand combined with low international energy prices have contributed to Bulgaria’s economic growth approaching 4% and have also helped to ease inflation. Bulgaria’s prudent public financial management contributed to budget surpluses both in 2016 and 2017.
Bulgaria is heavily reliant on energy imports from Russia, a potential vulnerability, and is a participant in EU-backed efforts to diversify regional natural gas supplies. In late 2016, the Bulgarian Government provided funding to Bulgaria’s National Electric Company to cover the $695 million compensation owed to Russian nuclear equipment manufacturer Atomstroyexport for the cancellation of the Belene Nuclear Power Plant project, which the Bulgarian Government terminated in 2012. As of early 2018, the government was floating the possibility of resurrecting the Belene project. The natural gas market, dominated by state-owned Bulgargaz, is also almost entirely supplied by Russia. Infrastructure projects such as the Inter-Connector Greece-Bulgaria and Inter-Connector Bulgaria-Serbia, which would enable Bulgaria to have access to non-Russian gas, have either stalled or made limited progress. In 2016, the Bulgarian Government established the State eGovernment Agency. This new agency is responsible for the electronic governance, coordinating national policies with the EU, and strengthening cybersecurity.
Despite a favorable investment regime, including low, flat corporate income taxes, significant challenges remain. Corruption in public administration, a weak judiciary, low productivity, lack of transparency in public procurements, and the presence of organized crime continue to hamper the country's investment climate and economic prospects.
" + "text": "Bulgaria, a former communist country that entered the EU in 2007, has an open economy that historically has demonstrated strong growth, but its per-capita income remains the lowest among EU members and its reliance on energy imports and foreign demand for its exports makes its growth sensitive to external market conditions.
The government undertook significant structural economic reforms in the 1990s to move the economy from a centralized, planned economy to a more liberal, market-driven economy. These reforms included privatization of state-owned enterprises, liberalization of trade, and strengthening of the tax system - changes that initially caused some economic hardships but later helped to attract investment, spur growth, and make gradual improvements to living conditions. From 2000 through 2008, Bulgaria maintained robust, average annual real GDP growth in excess of 6%, which was followed by a deep recession in 2009 as the financial crisis caused domestic demand, exports, capital inflows and industrial production to contract, prompting the government to rein in spending. Real GDP growth remained slow - less than 2% annually - until 2015, when demand from EU countries for Bulgarian exports, plus an inflow of EU development funds, boosted growth to more than 3%. In recent years, strong domestic demand combined with low international energy prices have contributed to Bulgaria’s economic growth approaching 4% and have also helped to ease inflation. Bulgaria’s prudent public financial management contributed to budget surpluses both in 2016 and 2017.
Bulgaria is heavily reliant on energy imports from Russia, a potential vulnerability, and is a participant in EU-backed efforts to diversify regional natural gas supplies. In late 2016, the Bulgarian Government provided funding to Bulgaria’s National Electric Company to cover the $695 million compensation owed to Russian nuclear equipment manufacturer Atomstroyexport for the cancellation of the Belene Nuclear Power Plant project, which the Bulgarian Government terminated in 2012. As of early 2018, the government was floating the possibility of resurrecting the Belene project. The natural gas market, dominated by state-owned Bulgargaz, is also almost entirely supplied by Russia. Infrastructure projects such as the Inter-Connector Greece-Bulgaria and Inter-Connector Bulgaria-Serbia, which would enable Bulgaria to have access to non-Russian gas, have either stalled or made limited progress. In 2016, the Bulgarian Government established the State eGovernment Agency. This new agency is responsible for the electronic governance, coordinating national policies with the EU, and strengthening cybersecurity.
Despite a favorable investment regime, including low, flat corporate income taxes, significant challenges remain. Corruption in public administration, a weak judiciary, low productivity, lack of transparency in public procurements, and the presence of organized crime continue to hamper the country's investment climate and economic prospects.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -993,10 +993,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "872,323 (2020)" + "text": "872,757 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "12.55 (2020 est.)" + "text": "13 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1035,10 +1035,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "2,115,053 (2021) Information provided by 91,03% of the undertakings. Dedicated access included." + "text": "2,115,053 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "30.44 (2021)" + "text": "30 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "1,143 (mid-year 2021)" }, - "note": "note: 72,606 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-February 2022); Bulgaria is predominantly a transit country" + "note": "note: 74,107 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-March 2022); Bulgaria is predominantly a transit country" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "source country for amphetamine tablets" diff --git a/europe/cy.json b/europe/cy.json index 85494b5a..f67bae06 100644 --- a/europe/cy.json +++ b/europe/cy.json @@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The area of the Republic of Cyprus under government control has a market economy dominated by a services sector that accounts for more than four-fifths of GDP. Tourism, finance, shipping, and real estate have traditionally been the most important services. Cyprus has been a member of the EU since May 2004 and adopted the euro as its national currency in January 2008.
During the first five years of EU membership, the Cyprus economy grew at an average rate of about 4%, with unemployment between 2004 and 2008 averaging about 4%. However, the economy tipped into recession in 2009 as the ongoing global financial crisis and resulting low demand hit the tourism and construction sectors. An overextended banking sector with excessive exposure to Greek debt added to the contraction. Cyprus’ biggest two banks were among the largest holders of Greek bonds in Europe and had a substantial presence in Greece through bank branches and subsidiaries. Following numerous downgrades of its credit rating, Cyprus lost access to international capital markets in May 2011. In July 2012, Cyprus became the fifth euro-zone government to request an economic bailout program from the European Commission, European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund - known collectively as the \"Troika.\"
Shortly after the election of President Nikos ANASTASIADES in February 2013, Cyprus reached an agreement with the Troika on a $13 billion bailout that triggered a two-week bank closure and the imposition of capital controls that remained partially in place until April 2015. Cyprus' two largest banks merged and the combined entity was recapitalized through conversion of some large bank deposits to shares and imposition of losses on bank bondholders. As with other EU countries, the Troika conditioned the bailout on passing financial and structural reforms and privatizing state-owned enterprises. Despite downsizing and restructuring, the Cypriot financial sector remains burdened by the largest stock of non-performing loans in the euro zone, equal to nearly half of all loans. Since the bailout, Cyprus has received positive appraisals by the Troika and outperformed fiscal targets but has struggled to overcome political opposition to bailout-mandated legislation, particularly regarding privatizations. The rate of non-performing loans (NPLs) is still very high at around 49%, and growth would accelerate if Cypriot banks could increase the pace of resolution of the NPLs.
In October 2013, a US-Israeli consortium completed preliminary appraisals of hydrocarbon deposits in Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which estimated gross mean reserves of about 130 billion cubic meters. Though exploration continues in Cyprus’ EEZ, no additional commercially exploitable reserves have been identified. Developing offshore hydrocarbon resources remains a critical component of the government’s economic recovery efforts, but development has been delayed as a result of regional developments and disagreements about exploitation methods.
" + "text": "The area of the Republic of Cyprus under government control has a market economy dominated by a services sector that accounts for more than four-fifths of GDP. Tourism, finance, shipping, and real estate have traditionally been the most important services. Cyprus has been a member of the EU since May 2004 and adopted the euro as its national currency in January 2008.
During the first five years of EU membership, the Cyprus economy grew at an average rate of about 4%, with unemployment between 2004 and 2008 averaging about 4%. However, the economy tipped into recession in 2009 as the ongoing global financial crisis and resulting low demand hit the tourism and construction sectors. An overextended banking sector with excessive exposure to Greek debt added to the contraction. Cyprus’ biggest two banks were among the largest holders of Greek bonds in Europe and had a substantial presence in Greece through bank branches and subsidiaries. Following numerous downgrades of its credit rating, Cyprus lost access to international capital markets in May 2011. In July 2012, Cyprus became the fifth euro-zone government to request an economic bailout program from the European Commission, European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund - known collectively as the \"Troika.\"
Shortly after the election of President Nikos ANASTASIADES in February 2013, Cyprus reached an agreement with the Troika on a $13 billion bailout that triggered a two-week bank closure and the imposition of capital controls that remained partially in place until April 2015. Cyprus' two largest banks merged and the combined entity was recapitalized through conversion of some large bank deposits to shares and imposition of losses on bank bondholders. As with other EU countries, the Troika conditioned the bailout on passing financial and structural reforms and privatizing state-owned enterprises. Despite downsizing and restructuring, the Cypriot financial sector remains burdened by the largest stock of non-performing loans in the euro zone, equal to nearly half of all loans. Since the bailout, Cyprus has received positive appraisals by the Troika and outperformed fiscal targets but has struggled to overcome political opposition to bailout-mandated legislation, particularly regarding privatizations. The rate of non-performing loans (NPLs) is still very high at around 49%, and growth would accelerate if Cypriot banks could increase the pace of resolution of the NPLs.
In October 2013, a US-Israeli consortium completed preliminary appraisals of hydrocarbon deposits in Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which estimated gross mean reserves of about 130 billion cubic meters. Though exploration continues in Cyprus’ EEZ, no additional commercially exploitable reserves have been identified. Developing offshore hydrocarbon resources remains a critical component of the government’s economic recovery efforts, but development has been delayed as a result of regional developments and disagreements about exploitation methods.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -993,10 +993,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "311,439 (2020)" + "text": "311,439 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "35.07 (2020 est.)" + "text": "35 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1035,10 +1035,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "332,080 (2021)" + "text": "332,080 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "37.4 (2021 est.)" + "text": "37 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "66 (mid-year 2021)" }, - "note": "note: 35,683 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-March 2022)" + "note": "note: 37,550 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-April 2022)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "vulnerable to money laundering from illegal drugs
" diff --git a/europe/da.json b/europe/da.json index 495e628e..35690d04 100644 --- a/europe/da.json +++ b/europe/da.json @@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "
This thoroughly modern market economy features advanced industry with world-leading firms in pharmaceuticals, maritime shipping, and renewable energy, and a high-tech agricultural sector. Danes enjoy a high standard of living, and the Danish economy is characterized by extensive government welfare measures and an equitable distribution of income. An aging population will be a long-term issue.
Denmark’s small open economy is highly dependent on foreign trade, and the government strongly supports trade liberalization. Denmark is a net exporter of food, oil, and gas and enjoys a comfortable balance of payments surplus, but depends on imports of raw materials for the manufacturing sector.
Denmark is a member of the EU but not the eurozone. Despite previously meeting the criteria to join the European Economic and Monetary Union, Denmark has negotiated an opt-out with the EU and is not required to adopt the euro.
Denmark is experiencing a modest economic expansion. The economy grew by 2.0% in 2016 and 2.1% in 2017. The expansion is expected to decline slightly in 2018. Unemployment stood at 5.5% in 2017, based on the national labor survey. The labor market was tight in 2017, with corporations experiencing some difficulty finding appropriately-skilled workers to fill billets. The Danish Government offers extensive programs to train unemployed persons to work in sectors that need qualified workers.
Denmark maintained a healthy budget surplus for many years up to 2008, but the global financial crisis swung the budget balance into deficit. Since 2014 the balance has shifted between surplus and deficit. In 2017 there was a surplus of 1.0%. The government projects a lower deficit in 2018 and 2019 of 0.7%, and public debt (EMU debt) as a share of GDP is expected to decline to 35.6% in 2018 and 34.8% in 2019. The Danish Government plans to address increasing municipal, public housing and integration spending in 2018.
" + "text": "This thoroughly modern market economy features advanced industry with world-leading firms in pharmaceuticals, maritime shipping, and renewable energy, and a high-tech agricultural sector. Danes enjoy a high standard of living, and the Danish economy is characterized by extensive government welfare measures and an equitable distribution of income. An aging population will be a long-term issue.
Denmark’s small open economy is highly dependent on foreign trade, and the government strongly supports trade liberalization. Denmark is a net exporter of food, oil, and gas and enjoys a comfortable balance of payments surplus, but depends on imports of raw materials for the manufacturing sector.
Denmark is a member of the EU but not the eurozone. Despite previously meeting the criteria to join the European Economic and Monetary Union, Denmark has negotiated an opt-out with the EU and is not required to adopt the euro.
Denmark is experiencing a modest economic expansion. The economy grew by 2.0% in 2016 and 2.1% in 2017. The expansion is expected to decline slightly in 2018. Unemployment stood at 5.5% in 2017, based on the national labor survey. The labor market was tight in 2017, with corporations experiencing some difficulty finding appropriately-skilled workers to fill billets. The Danish Government offers extensive programs to train unemployed persons to work in sectors that need qualified workers.
Denmark maintained a healthy budget surplus for many years up to 2008, but the global financial crisis swung the budget balance into deficit. Since 2014 the balance has shifted between surplus and deficit. In 2017 there was a surplus of 1.0%. The government projects a lower deficit in 2018 and 2019 of 0.7%, and public debt (EMU debt) as a share of GDP is expected to decline to 35.6% in 2018 and 34.8% in 2019. The Danish Government plans to address increasing municipal, public housing and integration spending in 2018.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -968,10 +968,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "937,469 (2020)" + "text": "734,436 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "16.19 (2020 est.)" + "text": "13 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1010,10 +1010,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "2,590,282 (2021)" + "text": "2,590,282 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "44.72 (2021)" + "text": "45 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/ee.json b/europe/ee.json index e65d81f5..b6941153 100644 --- a/europe/ee.json +++ b/europe/ee.json @@ -747,10 +747,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "165,475,641" + "text": "160,149,025 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2019 est.) 36.78" + "text": "36 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -777,10 +777,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "158,303,562" + "text": "163,772,540 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2019 est.) 35.19" + "text": "37 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/ei.json b/europe/ei.json index e411f0ee..cb84aa95 100644 --- a/europe/ei.json +++ b/europe/ei.json @@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Ireland is a small, modern, trade-dependent economy. It was among the initial group of 12 EU nations that began circulating the euro on 1 January 2002. GDP growth averaged 6% in 1995-2007, but economic activity dropped sharply during the world financial crisis and the subsequent collapse of its domestic property market and construction industry during 2008-11. Faced with sharply reduced revenues and a burgeoning budget deficit from efforts to stabilize its fragile banking sector, the Irish Government introduced the first in a series of draconian budgets in 2009. These measures were not sufficient to stabilize Ireland’s public finances. In 2010, the budget deficit reached 32.4% of GDP - the world's largest deficit, as a percentage of GDP. In late 2010, the former COWEN government agreed to a $92 billion loan package from the EU and IMF to help Dublin recapitalize Ireland’s banking sector and avoid defaulting on its sovereign debt. In March 2011, the KENNY government intensified austerity measures to meet the deficit targets under Ireland's EU-IMF bailout program.
In late 2013, Ireland formally exited its EU-IMF bailout program, benefiting from its strict adherence to deficit-reduction targets and success in refinancing a large amount of banking-related debt. In 2014, the economy rapidly picked up. In late 2014, the government introduced a fiscally neutral budget, marking the end of the austerity program. Continued growth of tax receipts has allowed the government to lower some taxes and increase public spending while keeping to its deficit-reduction targets. In 2015, GDP growth exceeded 26%. The magnitude of the increase reflected one-off statistical revisions, multinational corporate restructurings in intellectual property, and the aircraft leasing sector, rather than real gains in the domestic economy, which was still growing. Growth moderated to around 4.1% in 2017, but the recovering economy assisted lowering the deficit to 0.6% of GDP.
In the wake of the collapse of the construction sector and the downturn in consumer spending and business investment during the 2008-11 economic crisis, the export sector, dominated by foreign multinationals, has become an even more important component of Ireland's economy. Ireland’s low corporation tax of 12.5% and a talented pool of high-tech laborers have been some of the key factors in encouraging business investment. Loose tax residency requirements made Ireland a common destination for international firms seeking to pay less tax or, in the case of U.S. multinationals, defer taxation owed to the United States. In 2014, amid growing international pressure, the Irish government announced it would phase in more stringent tax laws, effectively closing a commonly used loophole. The Irish economy continued to grow in 2017 and is forecast to do so through 2019, supported by a strong export sector, robust job growth, and low inflation, to the point that the Government must now address concerns about overheating and potential loss of competitiveness. The greatest risks to the economy are the UK’s scheduled departure from the European Union (\"Brexit\") in March 2019, possible changes to international taxation policies that could affect Ireland’s revenues, and global trade pressures.
" + "text": "Ireland is a small, modern, trade-dependent economy. It was among the initial group of 12 EU nations that began circulating the euro on 1 January 2002. GDP growth averaged 6% in 1995-2007, but economic activity dropped sharply during the world financial crisis and the subsequent collapse of its domestic property market and construction industry during 2008-11. Faced with sharply reduced revenues and a burgeoning budget deficit from efforts to stabilize its fragile banking sector, the Irish Government introduced the first in a series of draconian budgets in 2009. These measures were not sufficient to stabilize Ireland’s public finances. In 2010, the budget deficit reached 32.4% of GDP - the world's largest deficit, as a percentage of GDP. In late 2010, the former COWEN government agreed to a $92 billion loan package from the EU and IMF to help Dublin recapitalize Ireland’s banking sector and avoid defaulting on its sovereign debt. In March 2011, the KENNY government intensified austerity measures to meet the deficit targets under Ireland's EU-IMF bailout program.
In late 2013, Ireland formally exited its EU-IMF bailout program, benefiting from its strict adherence to deficit-reduction targets and success in refinancing a large amount of banking-related debt. In 2014, the economy rapidly picked up. In late 2014, the government introduced a fiscally neutral budget, marking the end of the austerity program. Continued growth of tax receipts has allowed the government to lower some taxes and increase public spending while keeping to its deficit-reduction targets. In 2015, GDP growth exceeded 26%. The magnitude of the increase reflected one-off statistical revisions, multinational corporate restructurings in intellectual property, and the aircraft leasing sector, rather than real gains in the domestic economy, which was still growing. Growth moderated to around 4.1% in 2017, but the recovering economy assisted lowering the deficit to 0.6% of GDP.
In the wake of the collapse of the construction sector and the downturn in consumer spending and business investment during the 2008-11 economic crisis, the export sector, dominated by foreign multinationals, has become an even more important component of Ireland's economy. Ireland’s low corporation tax of 12.5% and a talented pool of high-tech laborers have been some of the key factors in encouraging business investment. Loose tax residency requirements made Ireland a common destination for international firms seeking to pay less tax or, in the case of U.S. multinationals, defer taxation owed to the United States. In 2014, amid growing international pressure, the Irish government announced it would phase in more stringent tax laws, effectively closing a commonly used loophole. The Irish economy continued to grow in 2017 and is forecast to do so through 2019, supported by a strong export sector, robust job growth, and low inflation, to the point that the Government must now address concerns about overheating and potential loss of competitiveness. The greatest risks to the economy are the UK’s scheduled departure from the European Union (\"Brexit\") in March 2019, possible changes to international taxation policies that could affect Ireland’s revenues, and global trade pressures.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -956,7 +956,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1,678,651 (2020)" + "text": "1,678,651 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "34 (2020 est.)" @@ -998,10 +998,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,516,473 (2021)" + "text": "1,516,473 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "30.71 (2021)" + "text": "31 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/en.json b/europe/en.json index 576eb0dd..baf70c12 100644 --- a/europe/en.json +++ b/europe/en.json @@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Estonia, a member of the EU since 2004 and the euro zone since 2011, has a modern market-based economy and one of the higher per capita income levels in Central Europe and the Baltic region, but its economy is highly dependent on trade, leaving it vulnerable to external shocks. Estonia's successive governments have pursued a free market, pro-business economic agenda, and sound fiscal policies that have resulted in balanced budgets and the lowest debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU.
The economy benefits from strong electronics and telecommunications sectors and strong trade ties with Finland, Sweden, Germany, and Russia. The economy’s 4.9% GDP growth in 2017 was the fastest in the past six years, leaving the Estonian economy in its best position since the financial crisis 10 years ago. For the first time in many years, labor productivity increased faster than labor costs in 2017. Inflation also rose in 2017 to 3.5% alongside increased global prices for food and energy, which make up a large share of Estonia’s consumption.
Estonia is challenged by a shortage of labor, both skilled and unskilled, although the government has amended its immigration law to allow easier hiring of highly qualified foreign workers, and wage growth that outpaces productivity gains. The government is also pursuing efforts to boost productivity growth with a focus on innovations that emphasize technology start-ups and e-commerce.
" + "text": "Estonia, a member of the EU since 2004 and the euro zone since 2011, has a modern market-based economy and one of the higher per capita income levels in Central Europe and the Baltic region, but its economy is highly dependent on trade, leaving it vulnerable to external shocks. Estonia's successive governments have pursued a free market, pro-business economic agenda, and sound fiscal policies that have resulted in balanced budgets and the lowest debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU.
The economy benefits from strong electronics and telecommunications sectors and strong trade ties with Finland, Sweden, Germany, and Russia. The economy’s 4.9% GDP growth in 2017 was the fastest in the past six years, leaving the Estonian economy in its best position since the financial crisis 10 years ago. For the first time in many years, labor productivity increased faster than labor costs in 2017. Inflation also rose in 2017 to 3.5% alongside increased global prices for food and energy, which make up a large share of Estonia’s consumption.
Estonia is challenged by a shortage of labor, both skilled and unskilled, although the government has amended its immigration law to allow easier hiring of highly qualified foreign workers, and wage growth that outpaces productivity gains. The government is also pursuing efforts to boost productivity growth with a focus on innovations that emphasize technology start-ups and e-commerce.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -989,10 +989,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "304,728 (2020)" + "text": "304,728 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "22.97 (2020 est.)" + "text": "23 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1031,10 +1031,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "415,610 (2022)" + "text": "415,610 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "31.33 (2022)" + "text": "31 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/ez.json b/europe/ez.json index d00802e2..66fc9c8e 100644 --- a/europe/ez.json +++ b/europe/ez.json @@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Czechia is a prosperous market economy that boasts one of the highest GDP growth rates and lowest unemployment levels in the EU, but its dependence on exports makes economic growth vulnerable to contractions in external demand. Czechia’s exports comprise some 80% of GDP and largely consist of automobiles, the country’s single largest industry. Czechia acceded to the EU in 2004 but has yet to join the euro-zone. While the flexible koruna helps Czechia weather external shocks, it was one of the world’s strongest performing currencies in 2017, appreciating approximately 16% relative to the US dollar after the central bank (Czech National Bank - CNB) ended its cap on the currency’s value in early April 2017, which it had maintained since November 2013. The CNB hiked rates in August and November 2017 - the first rate changes in nine years - to address rising inflationary pressures brought by strong economic growth and a tight labor market.
Since coming to power in 2014, the new government has undertaken some reforms to try to reduce corruption, attract investment, and improve social welfare programs, which could help increase the government’s revenues and improve living conditions for Czechs. The government introduced in December 2016 an online tax reporting system intended to reduce tax evasion and increase revenues. The government also plans to remove labor market rigidities to improve the business climate, bring procurement procedures in line with EU best practices, and boost wages. The country's low unemployment rate has led to steady increases in salaries, and the government is facing pressure from businesses to allow greater migration of qualified workers, at least from Ukraine and neighboring Central European countries.
Long-term challenges include dealing with a rapidly aging population, a shortage of skilled workers, a lagging education system, funding an unsustainable pension and health care system, and diversifying away from manufacturing and toward a more high-tech, services-based, knowledge economy.
" + "text": "Czechia is a prosperous market economy that boasts one of the highest GDP growth rates and lowest unemployment levels in the EU, but its dependence on exports makes economic growth vulnerable to contractions in external demand. Czechia’s exports comprise some 80% of GDP and largely consist of automobiles, the country’s single largest industry. Czechia acceded to the EU in 2004 but has yet to join the euro-zone. While the flexible koruna helps Czechia weather external shocks, it was one of the world’s strongest performing currencies in 2017, appreciating approximately 16% relative to the US dollar after the central bank (Czech National Bank - CNB) ended its cap on the currency’s value in early April 2017, which it had maintained since November 2013. The CNB hiked rates in August and November 2017 - the first rate changes in nine years - to address rising inflationary pressures brought by strong economic growth and a tight labor market.
Since coming to power in 2014, the new government has undertaken some reforms to try to reduce corruption, attract investment, and improve social welfare programs, which could help increase the government’s revenues and improve living conditions for Czechs. The government introduced in December 2016 an online tax reporting system intended to reduce tax evasion and increase revenues. The government also plans to remove labor market rigidities to improve the business climate, bring procurement procedures in line with EU best practices, and boost wages. The country's low unemployment rate has led to steady increases in salaries, and the government is facing pressure from businesses to allow greater migration of qualified workers, at least from Ukraine and neighboring Central European countries.
Long-term challenges include dealing with a rapidly aging population, a shortage of skilled workers, a lagging education system, funding an unsustainable pension and health care system, and diversifying away from manufacturing and toward a more high-tech, services-based, knowledge economy.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -981,10 +981,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1,316,316 (2020)" + "text": "1,335,224 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "12.29 (2020 est.)" + "text": "12 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1023,10 +1023,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "3,845,426 (2022)" + "text": "3,845,426 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "35.91 (2022)" + "text": "36 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/fi.json b/europe/fi.json index f83c19c3..5b4cfb06 100644 --- a/europe/fi.json +++ b/europe/fi.json @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Finland has a highly industrialized, largely free-market economy with per capita GDP almost as high as that of Austria and the Netherlands and slightly above that of Germany and Belgium. Trade is important, with exports accounting for over one-third of GDP in recent years. The government is open to, and actively takes steps to attract, foreign direct investment.
Finland is historically competitive in manufacturing, particularly in the wood, metals, engineering, telecommunications, and electronics industries. Finland excels in export of technology as well as promotion of startups in the information and communications technology, gaming, cleantech, and biotechnology sectors. Except for timber and several minerals, Finland depends on imports of raw materials, energy, and some components for manufactured goods. Because of the cold climate, agricultural development is limited to maintaining self-sufficiency in basic products. Forestry, an important export industry, provides a secondary occupation for the rural population.
Finland had been one of the best performing economies within the EU before 2009 and its banks and financial markets avoided the worst of global financial crisis. However, the world slowdown hit exports and domestic demand hard in that year, causing Finland’s economy to contract from 2012 to 2014. The recession affected general government finances and the debt ratio. The economy returned to growth in 2016, posting a 1.9% GDP increase before growing an estimated 3.3% in 2017, supported by a strong increase in investment, private consumption, and net exports. Finnish economists expect GDP to grow a rate of 2-3% in the next few years.
Finland's main challenges will be reducing high labor costs and boosting demand for its exports. In June 2016, the government enacted a Competitiveness Pact aimed at reducing labor costs, increasing hours worked, and introducing more flexibility into the wage bargaining system. As a result, wage growth was nearly flat in 2017. The Government was also seeking to reform the health care system and social services. In the long term, Finland must address a rapidly aging population and decreasing productivity in traditional industries that threaten competitiveness, fiscal sustainability, and economic growth.
" + "text": "Finland has a highly industrialized, largely free-market economy with per capita GDP almost as high as that of Austria and the Netherlands and slightly above that of Germany and Belgium. Trade is important, with exports accounting for over one-third of GDP in recent years. The government is open to, and actively takes steps to attract, foreign direct investment.
Finland is historically competitive in manufacturing, particularly in the wood, metals, engineering, telecommunications, and electronics industries. Finland excels in export of technology as well as promotion of startups in the information and communications technology, gaming, cleantech, and biotechnology sectors. Except for timber and several minerals, Finland depends on imports of raw materials, energy, and some components for manufactured goods. Because of the cold climate, agricultural development is limited to maintaining self-sufficiency in basic products. Forestry, an important export industry, provides a secondary occupation for the rural population.
Finland had been one of the best performing economies within the EU before 2009 and its banks and financial markets avoided the worst of global financial crisis. However, the world slowdown hit exports and domestic demand hard in that year, causing Finland’s economy to contract from 2012 to 2014. The recession affected general government finances and the debt ratio. The economy returned to growth in 2016, posting a 1.9% GDP increase before growing an estimated 3.3% in 2017, supported by a strong increase in investment, private consumption, and net exports. Finnish economists expect GDP to grow a rate of 2-3% in the next few years.
Finland's main challenges will be reducing high labor costs and boosting demand for its exports. In June 2016, the government enacted a Competitiveness Pact aimed at reducing labor costs, increasing hours worked, and introducing more flexibility into the wage bargaining system. As a result, wage growth was nearly flat in 2017. The Government was also seeking to reform the health care system and social services. In the long term, Finland must address a rapidly aging population and decreasing productivity in traditional industries that threaten competitiveness, fiscal sustainability, and economic growth.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -982,10 +982,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "225,000 (2020)" + "text": "225,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "4.06 (2020 est.)" + "text": "4 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1025,10 +1025,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1.846 million (2021)" + "text": "1.846 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "33.32 (2021)" + "text": "33 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/fo.json b/europe/fo.json index 353695a4..e96a3f4e 100644 --- a/europe/fo.json +++ b/europe/fo.json @@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The Faroese economy has experienced a period of significant growth since 2011, due to higher fish prices and increased salmon farming and catches in the pelagic fisheries. Fishing has been the main source of income for the Faroe Islands since the late 19th century, but dependence on fishing makes the economy vulnerable to price fluctuations. Nominal GDP, measured in current prices, grew 5.6% in 2015 and 6.8% in 2016. GDP growth was forecast at 6.2% in 2017, slowing to 0.5% in 2018, due to lower fisheries quotas, higher oil prices and fewer farmed salmon combined with lower salmon prices. The fisheries sector accounts for about 97% of exports, and half of GDP. Unemployment is low, estimated at 2.1% in early 2018. Aided by an annual subsidy from Denmark, which amounts to about 11% of Faroese GDP , Faroese have a standard of living equal to that of Denmark. The Faroe Islands have bilateral free trade agreements with the EU, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey.
For the first time in 8 years, the Faroe Islands managed to generate a public budget surplus in 2016, a trend which continued in 2017. The local government intends to use this to reduce public debt, which reached 38% of GDP in 2015. A fiscal sustainability analysis of the Faroese economy shows that a long-term tightening of fiscal policy of 5% of GDP is required for fiscal sustainability.
Increasing public infrastructure investments are likely to lead to continued growth in the short term, and the Faroese economy is becoming somewhat more diversified. Growing industries include financial services, petroleum-related businesses, shipping, maritime manufacturing services, civil aviation, IT, telecommunications, and tourism.
" + "text": "The Faroese economy has experienced a period of significant growth since 2011, due to higher fish prices and increased salmon farming and catches in the pelagic fisheries. Fishing has been the main source of income for the Faroe Islands since the late 19th century, but dependence on fishing makes the economy vulnerable to price fluctuations. Nominal GDP, measured in current prices, grew 5.6% in 2015 and 6.8% in 2016. GDP growth was forecast at 6.2% in 2017, slowing to 0.5% in 2018, due to lower fisheries quotas, higher oil prices and fewer farmed salmon combined with lower salmon prices. The fisheries sector accounts for about 97% of exports, and half of GDP. Unemployment is low, estimated at 2.1% in early 2018. Aided by an annual subsidy from Denmark, which amounts to about 11% of Faroese GDP , Faroese have a standard of living equal to that of Denmark. The Faroe Islands have bilateral free trade agreements with the EU, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey.
For the first time in 8 years, the Faroe Islands managed to generate a public budget surplus in 2016, a trend which continued in 2017. The local government intends to use this to reduce public debt, which reached 38% of GDP in 2015. A fiscal sustainability analysis of the Faroese economy shows that a long-term tightening of fiscal policy of 5% of GDP is required for fiscal sustainability.
Increasing public infrastructure investments are likely to lead to continued growth in the short term, and the Faroese economy is becoming somewhat more diversified. Growing industries include financial services, petroleum-related businesses, shipping, maritime manufacturing services, civil aviation, IT, telecommunications, and tourism.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2014": { @@ -768,10 +768,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "15,341 (2020)" + "text": "15,341 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "31.4 (2020 est.)" + "text": "31 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -810,10 +810,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "18,443 (2021)" + "text": "18,443 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "37.74 (2021)" + "text": "38 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/fr.json b/europe/fr.json index e28d1cab..9b011db1 100644 --- a/europe/fr.json +++ b/europe/fr.json @@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ "text": "President Emmanuel MACRON (since 14 May 2017)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Prime Minister Jean CASTEX (since 3 July 2020)" + "text": "Prime Minister Élisabeth BORNE (since 16 May 2022)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Council of Ministers appointed by the president at the suggestion of the prime minister" @@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The French economy is diversified across all sectors. The government has partially or fully privatized many large companies, including Air France, France Telecom, Renault, and Thales. However, the government maintains a strong presence in some sectors, particularly power, public transport, and defense industries. France is the most visited country in the world with 89 million foreign tourists in 2017. France's leaders remain committed to a capitalism in which they maintain social equity by means of laws, tax policies, and social spending that mitigate economic inequality.
France's real GDP grew by 1.9% in 2017, up from 1.2% the year before. The unemployment rate (including overseas territories) increased from 7.8% in 2008 to 10.2% in 2015, before falling to 9.0% in 2017. Youth unemployment in metropolitan France decreased from 24.6% in the fourth quarter of 2014 to 20.6% in the fourth quarter of 2017.
France’s public finances have historically been strained by high spending and low growth. In 2017, the budget deficit improved to 2.7% of GDP, bringing it in compliance with the EU-mandated 3% deficit target. Meanwhile, France's public debt rose from 89.5% of GDP in 2012 to 97% in 2017.
Since entering office in May 2017, President Emmanuel MACRON launched a series of economic reforms to improve competitiveness and boost economic growth. President MACRON campaigned on reforming France’s labor code and in late 2017 implemented a range of reforms to increase flexibility in the labor market by making it easier for firms to hire and fire and simplifying negotiations between employers and employees. In addition to labor reforms, President MACRON’s 2018 budget cuts public spending, taxes, and social security contributions to spur private investment and increase purchasing power. The government plans to gradually reduce corporate tax rate for businesses from 33.3% to 25% by 2022.
" + "text": "The French economy is diversified across all sectors. The government has partially or fully privatized many large companies, including Air France, France Telecom, Renault, and Thales. However, the government maintains a strong presence in some sectors, particularly power, public transport, and defense industries. France is the most visited country in the world with 89 million foreign tourists in 2017. France's leaders remain committed to a capitalism in which they maintain social equity by means of laws, tax policies, and social spending that mitigate economic inequality.
France's real GDP grew by 1.9% in 2017, up from 1.2% the year before. The unemployment rate (including overseas territories) increased from 7.8% in 2008 to 10.2% in 2015, before falling to 9.0% in 2017. Youth unemployment in metropolitan France decreased from 24.6% in the fourth quarter of 2014 to 20.6% in the fourth quarter of 2017.
France’s public finances have historically been strained by high spending and low growth. In 2017, the budget deficit improved to 2.7% of GDP, bringing it in compliance with the EU-mandated 3% deficit target. Meanwhile, France's public debt rose from 89.5% of GDP in 2012 to 97% in 2017.
Since entering office in May 2017, President Emmanuel MACRON launched a series of economic reforms to improve competitiveness and boost economic growth. President MACRON campaigned on reforming France’s labor code and in late 2017 implemented a range of reforms to increase flexibility in the labor market by making it easier for firms to hire and fire and simplifying negotiations between employers and employees. In addition to labor reforms, President MACRON’s 2018 budget cuts public spending, taxes, and social security contributions to spur private investment and increase purchasing power. The government plans to gradually reduce corporate tax rate for businesses from 33.3% to 25% by 2022.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1025,10 +1025,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "37.759 million (2020)" + "text": "37.759 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "57.85 (2020 est.)" + "text": "58 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1070,10 +1070,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "30.627 million (2021)" + "text": "30.627 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "46.92 (2021)" + "text": "47 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/gi.json b/europe/gi.json index 8b4b4afe..704b2950 100644 --- a/europe/gi.json +++ b/europe/gi.json @@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Self-sufficient Gibraltar benefits from an extensive shipping trade, offshore banking, and its position as an international conference center. Tax rates are low to attract foreign investment. The British military presence has been sharply reduced and now contributes about 7% to the local economy, compared with 60% in 1984. In recent years, Gibraltar has seen major structural change from a public to a private sector economy, but changes in government spending still have a major impact on the level of employment.
The financial sector, tourism (over 11 million visitors in 2012), gaming revenues, shipping services fees, and duties on consumer goods also generate revenue. The financial sector, tourism, and the shipping sector contribute 30%, 30%, and 25%, respectively, of GDP. Telecommunications, e-commerce, and e-gaming account for the remaining 15%.
" + "text": "Self-sufficient Gibraltar benefits from an extensive shipping trade, offshore banking, and its position as an international conference center. Tax rates are low to attract foreign investment. The British military presence has been sharply reduced and now contributes about 7% to the local economy, compared with 60% in 1984. In recent years, Gibraltar has seen major structural change from a public to a private sector economy, but changes in government spending still have a major impact on the level of employment.
The financial sector, tourism (over 11 million visitors in 2012), gaming revenues, shipping services fees, and duties on consumer goods also generate revenue. The financial sector, tourism, and the shipping sector contribute 30%, 30%, and 25%, respectively, of GDP. Telecommunications, e-commerce, and e-gaming account for the remaining 15%.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2014": { @@ -678,10 +678,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "16,968 (2019)" + "text": "17,041 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "50.35 (2019 est.)" + "text": "51 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -719,10 +719,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "21,009 (2021)" + "text": "21,009 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "62.36 (2021)" + "text": "62 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/gk.json b/europe/gk.json index 56eb07d7..de17a388 100644 --- a/europe/gk.json +++ b/europe/gk.json @@ -611,10 +611,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "33,940 (2022)" + "text": "25,336 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "54 (2022)" + "text": "40 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/gm.json b/europe/gm.json index 9105e0e2..01e0ebc5 100644 --- a/europe/gm.json +++ b/europe/gm.json @@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Alliance '90/Greens [Annalena BAERBOCK and Robert HABECK]The German economy - the fifth largest economy in the world in PPP terms and Europe's largest - is a leading exporter of machinery, vehicles, chemicals, and household equipment. Germany benefits from a highly skilled labor force, but, like its Western European neighbors, faces significant demographic challenges to sustained long-term growth. Low fertility rates and a large increase in net immigration are increasing pressure on the country's social welfare system and necessitate structural reforms.
Reforms launched by the government of Chancellor Gerhard SCHROEDER (1998-2005), deemed necessary to address chronically high unemployment and low average growth, contributed to strong economic growth and falling unemployment. These advances, as well as a government subsidized, reduced working hour scheme, help explain the relatively modest increase in unemployment during the 2008-09 recession - the deepest since World War II. The German Government introduced a minimum wage in 2015 that increased to $9.79 (8.84 euros) in January 2017.
Stimulus and stabilization efforts initiated in 2008 and 2009 and tax cuts introduced in Chancellor Angela MERKEL's second term increased Germany's total budget deficit - including federal, state, and municipal - to 4.1% in 2010, but slower spending and higher tax revenues reduced the deficit to 0.8% in 2011 and in 2017 Germany reached a budget surplus of 0.7%. A constitutional amendment approved in 2009 limits the federal government to structural deficits of no more than 0.35% of GDP per annum as of 2016, though the target was already reached in 2012.
Following the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, Chancellor Angela MERKEL announced in May 2011 that eight of the country's 17 nuclear reactors would be shut down immediately and the remaining plants would close by 2022. Germany plans to replace nuclear power largely with renewable energy, which accounted for 29.5% of gross electricity consumption in 2016, up from 9% in 2000. Before the shutdown of the eight reactors, Germany relied on nuclear power for 23% of its electricity generating capacity and 46% of its base-load electricity production.
The German economy suffers from low levels of investment, and a government plan to invest 15 billion euros during 2016-18, largely in infrastructure, is intended to spur needed private investment. Domestic consumption, investment, and exports are likely to drive German GDP growth in 2018, and the country’s budget and trade surpluses are likely to remain high.
" + "text": "The German economy - the fifth largest economy in the world in PPP terms and Europe's largest - is a leading exporter of machinery, vehicles, chemicals, and household equipment. Germany benefits from a highly skilled labor force, but, like its Western European neighbors, faces significant demographic challenges to sustained long-term growth. Low fertility rates and a large increase in net immigration are increasing pressure on the country's social welfare system and necessitate structural reforms.
Reforms launched by the government of Chancellor Gerhard SCHROEDER (1998-2005), deemed necessary to address chronically high unemployment and low average growth, contributed to strong economic growth and falling unemployment. These advances, as well as a government subsidized, reduced working hour scheme, help explain the relatively modest increase in unemployment during the 2008-09 recession - the deepest since World War II. The German Government introduced a minimum wage in 2015 that increased to $9.79 (8.84 euros) in January 2017.
Stimulus and stabilization efforts initiated in 2008 and 2009 and tax cuts introduced in Chancellor Angela MERKEL's second term increased Germany's total budget deficit - including federal, state, and municipal - to 4.1% in 2010, but slower spending and higher tax revenues reduced the deficit to 0.8% in 2011 and in 2017 Germany reached a budget surplus of 0.7%. A constitutional amendment approved in 2009 limits the federal government to structural deficits of no more than 0.35% of GDP per annum as of 2016, though the target was already reached in 2012.
Following the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, Chancellor Angela MERKEL announced in May 2011 that eight of the country's 17 nuclear reactors would be shut down immediately and the remaining plants would close by 2022. Germany plans to replace nuclear power largely with renewable energy, which accounted for 29.5% of gross electricity consumption in 2016, up from 9% in 2000. Before the shutdown of the eight reactors, Germany relied on nuclear power for 23% of its electricity generating capacity and 46% of its base-load electricity production.
The German economy suffers from low levels of investment, and a government plan to invest 15 billion euros during 2016-18, largely in infrastructure, is intended to spur needed private investment. Domestic consumption, investment, and exports are likely to drive German GDP growth in 2018, and the country’s budget and trade surpluses are likely to remain high.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1001,10 +1001,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "38.3 million (2020)" + "text": "38.3 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "45.71 (2020 est.)" + "text": "46 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1043,10 +1043,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "36,215,303 (2021)" + "text": "36,215,303 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "43.22 (2021)" + "text": "43 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/gr.json b/europe/gr.json index 0aac2445..770b086d 100644 --- a/europe/gr.json +++ b/europe/gr.json @@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Greece has a capitalist economy with a public sector accounting for about 40% of GDP and with per capita GDP about two-thirds that of the leading euro-zone economies. Tourism provides 18% of GDP. Immigrants make up nearly one-fifth of the work force, mainly in agricultural and unskilled jobs. Greece is a major beneficiary of EU aid, equal to about 3.3% of annual GDP.
The Greek economy averaged growth of about 4% per year between 2003 and 2007, but the economy went into recession in 2009 as a result of the world financial crisis, tightening credit conditions, and Athens' failure to address a growing budget deficit. By 2013, the economy had contracted 26%, compared with the pre-crisis level of 2007. Greece met the EU's Growth and Stability Pact budget deficit criterion of no more than 3% of GDP in 2007-08, but violated it in 2009, when the deficit reached 15% of GDP. Deteriorating public finances, inaccurate and misreported statistics, and consistent underperformance on reforms prompted major credit rating agencies to downgrade Greece's international debt rating in late 2009 and led the country into a financial crisis. Under intense pressure from the EU and international market participants, the government accepted a bailout program that called on Athens to cut government spending, decrease tax evasion, overhaul the civil-service, health-care, and pension systems, and reform the labor and product markets. Austerity measures reduced the deficit to 1.3% in 2017. Successive Greek governments, however, failed to push through many of the most unpopular reforms in the face of widespread political opposition, including from the country's powerful labor unions and the general public.
In April 2010, a leading credit agency assigned Greek debt its lowest possible credit rating, and in May 2010, the IMF and euro-zone governments provided Greece emergency short- and medium-term loans worth $147 billion so that the country could make debt repayments to creditors. Greece, however, struggled to meet the targets set by the EU and the IMF, especially after Eurostat - the EU's statistical office - revised upward Greece's deficit and debt numbers for 2009 and 2010. European leaders and the IMF agreed in October 2011 to provide Athens a second bailout package of $169 billion. The second deal called for holders of Greek government bonds to write down a significant portion of their holdings to try to alleviate Greece’s government debt burden. However, Greek banks, saddled with a significant portion of sovereign debt, were adversely affected by the write down and $60 billion of the second bailout package was set aside to ensure the banking system was adequately capitalized.
In 2014, the Greek economy began to turn the corner on the recession. Greece achieved three significant milestones: balancing the budget - not including debt repayments; issuing government debt in financial markets for the first time since 2010; and generating 0.7% GDP growth — the first economic expansion since 2007.
Despite the nascent recovery, widespread discontent with austerity measures helped propel the far-left Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) party into government in national legislative elections in January 2015. Between January and July 2015, frustrations grew between the SYRIZA-led government and Greece’s EU and IMF creditors over the implementation of bailout measures and disbursement of funds. The Greek government began running up significant arrears to suppliers, while Greek banks relied on emergency lending, and Greece’s future in the euro zone was called into question. To stave off a collapse of the banking system, Greece imposed capital controls in June 2015, then became the first developed nation to miss a loan payment to the IMF, rattling international financial markets. Unable to reach an agreement with creditors, Prime Minister Alexios TSIPRAS held a nationwide referendum on 5 July on whether to accept the terms of Greece’s bailout, campaigning for the ultimately successful \"no\" vote. The TSIPRAS government subsequently agreed, however, to a new $96 billion bailout in order to avert Greece’s exit from the monetary bloc. On 20 August 2015, Greece signed its third bailout, allowing it to cover significant debt payments to its EU and IMF creditors and to ensure the banking sector retained access to emergency liquidity. The TSIPRAS government — which retook office on 20 September 2015 after calling new elections in late August — successfully secured disbursal of two delayed tranches of bailout funds. Despite the economic turmoil, Greek GDP did not contract as sharply as feared, boosted in part by a strong tourist season.
In 2017, Greece saw improvements in GDP and unemployment. Unfinished economic reforms, a massive non-performing loan problem, and ongoing uncertainty regarding the political direction of the country hold the economy back. Some estimates put Greece’s black market at 20- to 25% of GDP, as more people have stopped reporting their income to avoid paying taxes that, in some cases, have risen to 70% of an individual’s gross income.
" + "text": "Greece has a capitalist economy with a public sector accounting for about 40% of GDP and with per capita GDP about two-thirds that of the leading euro-zone economies. Tourism provides 18% of GDP. Immigrants make up nearly one-fifth of the work force, mainly in agricultural and unskilled jobs. Greece is a major beneficiary of EU aid, equal to about 3.3% of annual GDP.
The Greek economy averaged growth of about 4% per year between 2003 and 2007, but the economy went into recession in 2009 as a result of the world financial crisis, tightening credit conditions, and Athens' failure to address a growing budget deficit. By 2013, the economy had contracted 26%, compared with the pre-crisis level of 2007. Greece met the EU's Growth and Stability Pact budget deficit criterion of no more than 3% of GDP in 2007-08, but violated it in 2009, when the deficit reached 15% of GDP. Deteriorating public finances, inaccurate and misreported statistics, and consistent underperformance on reforms prompted major credit rating agencies to downgrade Greece's international debt rating in late 2009 and led the country into a financial crisis. Under intense pressure from the EU and international market participants, the government accepted a bailout program that called on Athens to cut government spending, decrease tax evasion, overhaul the civil-service, health-care, and pension systems, and reform the labor and product markets. Austerity measures reduced the deficit to 1.3% in 2017. Successive Greek governments, however, failed to push through many of the most unpopular reforms in the face of widespread political opposition, including from the country's powerful labor unions and the general public.
In April 2010, a leading credit agency assigned Greek debt its lowest possible credit rating, and in May 2010, the IMF and euro-zone governments provided Greece emergency short- and medium-term loans worth $147 billion so that the country could make debt repayments to creditors. Greece, however, struggled to meet the targets set by the EU and the IMF, especially after Eurostat - the EU's statistical office - revised upward Greece's deficit and debt numbers for 2009 and 2010. European leaders and the IMF agreed in October 2011 to provide Athens a second bailout package of $169 billion. The second deal called for holders of Greek government bonds to write down a significant portion of their holdings to try to alleviate Greece’s government debt burden. However, Greek banks, saddled with a significant portion of sovereign debt, were adversely affected by the write down and $60 billion of the second bailout package was set aside to ensure the banking system was adequately capitalized.
In 2014, the Greek economy began to turn the corner on the recession. Greece achieved three significant milestones: balancing the budget - not including debt repayments; issuing government debt in financial markets for the first time since 2010; and generating 0.7% GDP growth — the first economic expansion since 2007.
Despite the nascent recovery, widespread discontent with austerity measures helped propel the far-left Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) party into government in national legislative elections in January 2015. Between January and July 2015, frustrations grew between the SYRIZA-led government and Greece’s EU and IMF creditors over the implementation of bailout measures and disbursement of funds. The Greek government began running up significant arrears to suppliers, while Greek banks relied on emergency lending, and Greece’s future in the euro zone was called into question. To stave off a collapse of the banking system, Greece imposed capital controls in June 2015, then became the first developed nation to miss a loan payment to the IMF, rattling international financial markets. Unable to reach an agreement with creditors, Prime Minister Alexios TSIPRAS held a nationwide referendum on 5 July on whether to accept the terms of Greece’s bailout, campaigning for the ultimately successful \"no\" vote. The TSIPRAS government subsequently agreed, however, to a new $96 billion bailout in order to avert Greece’s exit from the monetary bloc. On 20 August 2015, Greece signed its third bailout, allowing it to cover significant debt payments to its EU and IMF creditors and to ensure the banking sector retained access to emergency liquidity. The TSIPRAS government — which retook office on 20 September 2015 after calling new elections in late August — successfully secured disbursal of two delayed tranches of bailout funds. Despite the economic turmoil, Greek GDP did not contract as sharply as feared, boosted in part by a strong tourist season.
In 2017, Greece saw improvements in GDP and unemployment. Unfinished economic reforms, a massive non-performing loan problem, and ongoing uncertainty regarding the political direction of the country hold the economy back. Some estimates put Greece’s black market at 20- to 25% of GDP, as more people have stopped reporting their income to avoid paying taxes that, in some cases, have risen to 70% of an individual’s gross income.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -985,10 +985,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "4,743,310 (2020)" + "text": "5,028,332 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "45.51 (2020 est.)" + "text": "48 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1027,10 +1027,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "4,257,026 (2021)" + "text": "4,257,026 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "40.84 (2021 est.)" + "text": "41 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "5,552 (mid-year 2021)" }, - "note": "note: 1,216,443 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-April 2022); as of the end of February 2022, Greece hosted an estimated 161,419 refugees and asylum seekers" + "note": "note: 1,216,633 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-May 2022); as of the end of February 2022, Greece hosted an estimated 161,419 refugees and asylum seekers" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "a gateway to Europe for traffickers smuggling cannabis products and heroin from the Middle East and Southwest Asia to the West and precursor chemicals to the East; some South American cocaine transits or is consumed in Greece; money laundering related to drug trafficking and organized crime" diff --git a/europe/hr.json b/europe/hr.json index 7898cdb5..c806b98d 100644 --- a/europe/hr.json +++ b/europe/hr.json @@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Though still one of the wealthiest of the former Yugoslav republics, Croatia’s economy suffered badly during the 1991-95 war. The country's output during that time collapsed, and Croatia missed the early waves of investment in Central and Eastern Europe that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall. Between 2000 and 2007, however, Croatia's economic fortunes began to improve with moderate but steady GDP growth between 4% and 6%, led by a rebound in tourism and credit-driven consumer spending. Inflation over the same period remained tame and the currency, the kuna, stable.
Croatia experienced an abrupt slowdown in the economy in 2008; economic growth was stagnant or negative in each year between 2009 and 2014, but has picked up since the third quarter of 2014, ending 2017 with an average of 2.8% growth. Challenges remain including uneven regional development, a difficult investment climate, an inefficient judiciary, and loss of educated young professionals seeking higher salaries elsewhere in the EU. In 2016, Croatia revised its tax code to stimulate growth from domestic consumption and foreign investment. Income tax reduction began in 2017, and in 2018 various business costs were removed from income tax calculations. At the start of 2018, the government announced its economic reform plan, slated for implementation in 2019.
Tourism is one of the main pillars of the Croatian economy, comprising 19.6% of Croatia’s GDP. Croatia is working to become a regional energy hub, and is undertaking plans to open a floating liquefied natural gas (LNG) regasification terminal by the end of 2019 or early in 2020 to import LNG for re-distribution in southeast Europe.
Croatia joined the EU on July 1, 2013, following a decade-long accession process. Croatia has developed a plan for Eurozone accession, and the government projects Croatia will adopt the Euro by 2024. In 2017, the Croatian government decreased public debt to 78% of GDP, from an all-time high of 84% in 2014, and realized a 0.8% budget surplus - the first surplus since independence in 1991. The government has also sought to accelerate privatization of non-strategic assets with mixed success. Croatia’s economic recovery is still somewhat fragile; Croatia’s largest private company narrowly avoided collapse in 2017, thanks to a capital infusion from an American investor. Restructuring is ongoing, and projected to finish by mid-July 2018.
" + "text": "Though still one of the wealthiest of the former Yugoslav republics, Croatia’s economy suffered badly during the 1991-95 war. The country's output during that time collapsed, and Croatia missed the early waves of investment in Central and Eastern Europe that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall. Between 2000 and 2007, however, Croatia's economic fortunes began to improve with moderate but steady GDP growth between 4% and 6%, led by a rebound in tourism and credit-driven consumer spending. Inflation over the same period remained tame and the currency, the kuna, stable.
Croatia experienced an abrupt slowdown in the economy in 2008; economic growth was stagnant or negative in each year between 2009 and 2014, but has picked up since the third quarter of 2014, ending 2017 with an average of 2.8% growth. Challenges remain including uneven regional development, a difficult investment climate, an inefficient judiciary, and loss of educated young professionals seeking higher salaries elsewhere in the EU. In 2016, Croatia revised its tax code to stimulate growth from domestic consumption and foreign investment. Income tax reduction began in 2017, and in 2018 various business costs were removed from income tax calculations. At the start of 2018, the government announced its economic reform plan, slated for implementation in 2019.
Tourism is one of the main pillars of the Croatian economy, comprising 19.6% of Croatia’s GDP. Croatia is working to become a regional energy hub, and is undertaking plans to open a floating liquefied natural gas (LNG) regasification terminal by the end of 2019 or early in 2020 to import LNG for re-distribution in southeast Europe.
Croatia joined the EU on July 1, 2013, following a decade-long accession process. Croatia has developed a plan for Eurozone accession, and the government projects Croatia will adopt the Euro by 2024. In 2017, the Croatian government decreased public debt to 78% of GDP, from an all-time high of 84% in 2014, and realized a 0.8% budget surplus - the first surplus since independence in 1991. The government has also sought to accelerate privatization of non-strategic assets with mixed success. Croatia’s economic recovery is still somewhat fragile; Croatia’s largest private company narrowly avoided collapse in 2017, thanks to a capital infusion from an American investor. Restructuring is ongoing, and projected to finish by mid-July 2018.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1010,10 +1010,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1,300,105 (2020)" + "text": "1,299,329 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "31.67 (2020 est.)" + "text": "32 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1052,10 +1052,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,030,973 (2021)" + "text": "1,030,973 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "25.11 (2021)" + "text": "25 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1204,7 +1204,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "2,910 (mid-year 2021)" }, - "note": "note: 739,306 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-March 2022); flows slowed considerably in 2017; Croatia is predominantly a transit country and hosts about 340 asylum seekers as of the end of June 2018" + "note": "note: 741,049 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-April 2022)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "drug trafficking groups are major players in the procurement and transportation of of large quantities of cocaine destined for European markets
" diff --git a/europe/hu.json b/europe/hu.json index 300af631..293da71c 100644 --- a/europe/hu.json +++ b/europe/hu.json @@ -1007,10 +1007,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,970,347 (2020)" + "text": "2,970,347 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "30.75 (2020 est.)" + "text": "31 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1049,10 +1049,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "3,265,308 (2022)" + "text": "3,265,308 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "33.8 (2022 est.)" + "text": "34 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1203,7 +1203,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "572,760 (Ukraine) (as of 9 May 2022)" + "text": "605,628 (Ukraine) (as of 15 May 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "130 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/ic.json b/europe/ic.json index bda362be..faf6f5f6 100644 --- a/europe/ic.json +++ b/europe/ic.json @@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "
Iceland's economy combines a capitalist structure and free-market principles with an extensive welfare system. Except for a brief period during the 2008 crisis, Iceland has in recent years achieved high growth, low unemployment, and a remarkably even distribution of income. Iceland's economy has been diversifying into manufacturing and service industries in the last decade, particularly within the fields of tourism, software production, and biotechnology. Abundant geothermal and hydropower sources have attracted substantial foreign investment in the aluminum sector, boosted economic growth, and sparked some interest from high-tech firms looking to establish data centers using cheap green energy.
Tourism, aluminum smelting, and fishing are the pillars of the economy. For decades the Icelandic economy depended heavily on fisheries, but tourism has now surpassed fishing and aluminum as Iceland’s main export industry. Tourism accounted for 8.6% of Iceland’s GDP in 2016, and 39% of total exports of merchandise and services. From 2010 to 2017, the number of tourists visiting Iceland increased by nearly 400%. Since 2010, tourism has become a main driver of Icelandic economic growth, with the number of tourists reaching 4.5 times the Icelandic population in 2016. Iceland remains sensitive to fluctuations in world prices for its main exports, and to fluctuations in the exchange rate of the Icelandic Krona.
Following the privatization of the banking sector in the early 2000s, domestic banks expanded aggressively in foreign markets, and consumers and businesses borrowed heavily in foreign currencies. Worsening global financial conditions throughout 2008 resulted in a sharp depreciation of the krona vis-a-vis other major currencies. The foreign exposure of Icelandic banks, whose loans and other assets totaled nearly nine times the country's GDP, became unsustainable. Iceland's three largest banks collapsed in late 2008. GDP fell 6.8% in 2009, and unemployment peaked at 9.4% in February 2009. Three new banks were established to take over the domestic assets of the collapsed banks. Two of them have majority ownership by the state, which intends to re-privatize them.
Since the collapse of Iceland's financial sector, government economic priorities have included stabilizing the krona, implementing capital controls, reducing Iceland's high budget deficit, containing inflation, addressing high household debt, restructuring the financial sector, and diversifying the economy. Capital controls were lifted in March 2017, but some financial protections, such as reserve requirements for specified investments connected to new inflows of foreign currency, remain in place.
" + "text": "Iceland's economy combines a capitalist structure and free-market principles with an extensive welfare system. Except for a brief period during the 2008 crisis, Iceland has in recent years achieved high growth, low unemployment, and a remarkably even distribution of income. Iceland's economy has been diversifying into manufacturing and service industries in the last decade, particularly within the fields of tourism, software production, and biotechnology. Abundant geothermal and hydropower sources have attracted substantial foreign investment in the aluminum sector, boosted economic growth, and sparked some interest from high-tech firms looking to establish data centers using cheap green energy.
Tourism, aluminum smelting, and fishing are the pillars of the economy. For decades the Icelandic economy depended heavily on fisheries, but tourism has now surpassed fishing and aluminum as Iceland’s main export industry. Tourism accounted for 8.6% of Iceland’s GDP in 2016, and 39% of total exports of merchandise and services. From 2010 to 2017, the number of tourists visiting Iceland increased by nearly 400%. Since 2010, tourism has become a main driver of Icelandic economic growth, with the number of tourists reaching 4.5 times the Icelandic population in 2016. Iceland remains sensitive to fluctuations in world prices for its main exports, and to fluctuations in the exchange rate of the Icelandic Krona.
Following the privatization of the banking sector in the early 2000s, domestic banks expanded aggressively in foreign markets, and consumers and businesses borrowed heavily in foreign currencies. Worsening global financial conditions throughout 2008 resulted in a sharp depreciation of the krona vis-a-vis other major currencies. The foreign exposure of Icelandic banks, whose loans and other assets totaled nearly nine times the country's GDP, became unsustainable. Iceland's three largest banks collapsed in late 2008. GDP fell 6.8% in 2009, and unemployment peaked at 9.4% in February 2009. Three new banks were established to take over the domestic assets of the collapsed banks. Two of them have majority ownership by the state, which intends to re-privatize them.
Since the collapse of Iceland's financial sector, government economic priorities have included stabilizing the krona, implementing capital controls, reducing Iceland's high budget deficit, containing inflation, addressing high household debt, restructuring the financial sector, and diversifying the economy. Capital controls were lifted in March 2017, but some financial protections, such as reserve requirements for specified investments connected to new inflows of foreign currency, remain in place.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -952,10 +952,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "107,032 (2020)" + "text": "107,032 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "31.37 (2020 est.)" + "text": "31 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -994,10 +994,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "141,816 (2021)" + "text": "141,816 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "41.56 (2021 est.)" + "text": "42 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/im.json b/europe/im.json index ddbb5d59..bce52d23 100644 --- a/europe/im.json +++ b/europe/im.json @@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Financial services, manufacturing, and tourism are key sectors of the economy. The government offers low taxes and other incentives to high-technology companies and financial institutions to locate on the island; this has paid off in expanding employment opportunities in high-income industries. As a result, agriculture and fishing, once the mainstays of the economy, have declined in their contributions to GDP. The Isle of Man also attracts online gambling sites and the film industry. Online gambling sites provided about 10% of the islands income in 2014. The Isle of Man currently enjoys free access to EU markets and trade is mostly with the UK. The Isle of Man’s trade relationship with the EU derives from the United Kingdom’s EU membership and will need to be renegotiated in light of the United Kingdom’s decision to withdraw from the bloc. A transition period is expected to allow the free movement of goods and agricultural products to the EU until the end of 2020 or until a new settlement is negotiated." + "text": "Financial services, manufacturing, and tourism are key sectors of the economy. The government offers low taxes and other incentives to high-technology companies and financial institutions to locate on the island; this has paid off in expanding employment opportunities in high-income industries. As a result, agriculture and fishing, once the mainstays of the economy, have declined in their contributions to GDP. The Isle of Man also attracts online gambling sites and the film industry. Online gambling sites provided about 10% of the islands income in 2014. The Isle of Man currently enjoys free access to EU markets and trade is mostly with the UK. The Isle of Man’s trade relationship with the EU derives from the United Kingdom’s EU membership and will need to be renegotiated in light of the United Kingdom’s decision to withdraw from the bloc. A transition period is expected to allow the free movement of goods and agricultural products to the EU until the end of 2020 or until a new settlement is negotiated." }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2015": { diff --git a/europe/it.json b/europe/it.json index 79cdeeb2..1e02618f 100644 --- a/europe/it.json +++ b/europe/it.json @@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Italy’s economy comprises a developed industrial north, dominated by private companies, and a less-developed, highly subsidized, agricultural south, with a legacy of unemployment and underdevelopment. The Italian economy is driven in large part by the manufacture of high-quality consumer goods produced by small and medium-sized enterprises, many of them family-owned. Italy also has a sizable underground economy, which by some estimates accounts for as much as 17% of GDP. These activities are most common within the agriculture, construction, and service sectors.
Italy is the third-largest economy in the euro zone, but its exceptionally high public debt and structural impediments to growth have rendered it vulnerable to scrutiny by financial markets. Public debt has increased steadily since 2007, reaching 131% of GDP in 2017. Investor concerns about Italy and the broader euro-zone crisis eased in 2013, bringing down Italy's borrowing costs on sovereign government debt from euro-era records. The government still faces pressure from investors and European partners to sustain its efforts to address Italy's longstanding structural economic problems, including labor market inefficiencies, a sluggish judicial system, and a weak banking sector. Italy’s economy returned to modest growth in late 2014 for the first time since 2011. In 2015-16, Italy’s economy grew at about 1% each year, and in 2017 growth accelerated to 1.5% of GDP. In 2017, overall unemployment was 11.4%, but youth unemployment remained high at 37.1%. GDP growth is projected to slow slightly in 2018.
" + "text": "Italy’s economy comprises a developed industrial north, dominated by private companies, and a less-developed, highly subsidized, agricultural south, with a legacy of unemployment and underdevelopment. The Italian economy is driven in large part by the manufacture of high-quality consumer goods produced by small and medium-sized enterprises, many of them family-owned. Italy also has a sizable underground economy, which by some estimates accounts for as much as 17% of GDP. These activities are most common within the agriculture, construction, and service sectors.
Italy is the third-largest economy in the euro zone, but its exceptionally high public debt and structural impediments to growth have rendered it vulnerable to scrutiny by financial markets. Public debt has increased steadily since 2007, reaching 131% of GDP in 2017. Investor concerns about Italy and the broader euro-zone crisis eased in 2013, bringing down Italy's borrowing costs on sovereign government debt from euro-era records. The government still faces pressure from investors and European partners to sustain its efforts to address Italy's longstanding structural economic problems, including labor market inefficiencies, a sluggish judicial system, and a weak banking sector. Italy’s economy returned to modest growth in late 2014 for the first time since 2011. In 2015-16, Italy’s economy grew at about 1% each year, and in 2017 growth accelerated to 1.5% of GDP. In 2017, overall unemployment was 11.4%, but youth unemployment remained high at 37.1%. GDP growth is projected to slow slightly in 2018.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1001,10 +1001,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "19,430,559 (2020)" + "text": "19,607,341 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "32.14 (2020 est.)" + "text": "32 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1043,10 +1043,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "18,128,787 (2021)" + "text": "18,128,787 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "29.98 (2021)" + "text": "30 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "3,000 (mid-year 2021)" }, - "note": "note: 601,011 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-April 2022)" + "note": "note: 603,001 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-May 2022)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "important gateway for drug trafficking; organized crime groups allied with Colombian and Spanish groups trafficking cocaine to Europe" diff --git a/europe/je.json b/europe/je.json index aa81ee55..00eef18e 100644 --- a/europe/je.json +++ b/europe/je.json @@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Jersey's economy is based on international financial services, agriculture, and tourism. In 2016, the financial services sector accounted for about 41% of the island's output. Agriculture represented about 1% of Jersey’s economy in 2016. Potatoes are an important export crop, shipped mostly to the UK. The Jersey breed of dairy cattle originated on the island and is known worldwide. The dairy industry remains important to the island with approximately $8.8 million gallons of milk produced in 2015. Tourism accounts for a significant portion of Jersey’s economy, with more than 700,000 total visitors in 2015. Living standards come close to those of the UK. All raw material and energy requirements are imported as well as a large share of Jersey's food needs. Light taxes and death duties make the island a popular offshore financial center. Jersey maintains its relationship with the EU through the UK. Therefore, in light of the UK’s decision to leave the EU, Jersey will also need to renegotiate its ties to the EU." + "text": "Jersey's economy is based on international financial services, agriculture, and tourism. In 2016, the financial services sector accounted for about 41% of the island's output. Agriculture represented about 1% of Jersey’s economy in 2016. Potatoes are an important export crop, shipped mostly to the UK. The Jersey breed of dairy cattle originated on the island and is known worldwide. The dairy industry remains important to the island with approximately $8.8 million gallons of milk produced in 2015. Tourism accounts for a significant portion of Jersey’s economy, with more than 700,000 total visitors in 2015. Living standards come close to those of the UK. All raw material and energy requirements are imported as well as a large share of Jersey's food needs. Light taxes and death duties make the island a popular offshore financial center. Jersey maintains its relationship with the EU through the UK. Therefore, in light of the UK’s decision to leave the EU, Jersey will also need to renegotiate its ties to the EU." }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2016": { @@ -641,10 +641,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "48,310 (2020 est.)" + "text": "48,310 (2019 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "45 (2020 est.)" + "text": "44 (2019 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -683,10 +683,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "39,699 (2020) NA" + "text": "39,699 (2020 est.) NA" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "36.8 (2020) NA" + "text": "37 (2020 est.) NA" } } }, diff --git a/europe/kv.json b/europe/kv.json index b495f927..6e3040f4 100644 --- a/europe/kv.json +++ b/europe/kv.json @@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Kosovo's economy has shown progress in transitioning to a market-based system and maintaining macroeconomic stability, but it is still highly dependent on the international community and the diaspora for financial and technical assistance. Remittances from the diaspora - located mainly in Germany, Switzerland, and the Nordic countries - are estimated to account for about 17% of GDP and international donor assistance accounts for approximately 10% of GDP. With international assistance, Kosovo has been able to privatize a majority of its state-owned enterprises.
Kosovo's citizens are the second poorest in Europe, after Moldova, with a per capita GDP (PPP) of $10,400 in 2017. An unemployment rate of 33%, and a youth unemployment rate near 60%, in a country where the average age is 26, encourages emigration and fuels a significant informal, unreported economy. Most of Kosovo's population lives in rural towns outside of the capital, Pristina. Inefficient, near-subsistence farming is common - the result of small plots, limited mechanization, and a lack of technical expertise. Kosovo enjoys lower labor costs than the rest of the region. However, high levels of corruption, little contract enforcement, and unreliable electricity supply have discouraged potential investors. The official currency of Kosovo is the euro, but the Serbian dinar is also used illegally in Serb majority communities. Kosovo's tie to the euro has helped keep core inflation low.
Minerals and metals production - including lignite, lead, zinc, nickel, chrome, aluminum, magnesium, and a wide variety of construction materials - once the backbone of industry, has declined because of aging equipment and insufficient investment, problems exacerbated by competing and unresolved ownership claims of Kosovo’s largest mines. A limited and unreliable electricity supply is a major impediment to economic development. The US Government is cooperating with the Ministry of Economic Development (MED) and the World Bank to conclude a commercial tender for the construction of Kosovo C, a new lignite-fired power plant that would leverage Kosovo’s large lignite reserves. MED also has plans for the rehabilitation of an older bituminous-fired power plant, Kosovo B, and the development of a coal mine that could supply both plants.
In June 2009, Kosovo joined the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the Central Europe Free Trade Area (CEFTA) in 2006, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 2012, and the Council of Europe Development Bank in 2013. In 2016, Kosovo implemented the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) negotiations with the EU, focused on trade liberalization. In 2014, nearly 60% of customs duty-eligible imports into Kosovo were EU goods. In August 2015, as part of its EU-facilitated normalization process with Serbia, Kosovo signed agreements on telecommunications and energy distribution, but disagreements over who owns economic assets, such as the Trepca mining conglomerate, within Kosovo continue.
Kosovo experienced its first federal budget deficit in 2012, when government expenditures climbed sharply. In May 2014, the government introduced a 25% salary increase for public sector employees and an equal increase in certain social benefits. Central revenues could not sustain these increases, and the government was forced to reduce its planned capital investments. The government, led by Prime Minister MUSTAFA - a trained economist - recently made several changes to its fiscal policy, expanding the list of duty-free imports, decreasing the Value Added Tax (VAT) for basic food items and public utilities, and increasing the VAT for all other goods.
While Kosovo’s economy continued to make progress, unemployment has not been reduced, nor living standards raised, due to lack of economic reforms and investment.
" + "text": "Kosovo's economy has shown progress in transitioning to a market-based system and maintaining macroeconomic stability, but it is still highly dependent on the international community and the diaspora for financial and technical assistance. Remittances from the diaspora - located mainly in Germany, Switzerland, and the Nordic countries - are estimated to account for about 17% of GDP and international donor assistance accounts for approximately 10% of GDP. With international assistance, Kosovo has been able to privatize a majority of its state-owned enterprises.
Kosovo's citizens are the second poorest in Europe, after Moldova, with a per capita GDP (PPP) of $10,400 in 2017. An unemployment rate of 33%, and a youth unemployment rate near 60%, in a country where the average age is 26, encourages emigration and fuels a significant informal, unreported economy. Most of Kosovo's population lives in rural towns outside of the capital, Pristina. Inefficient, near-subsistence farming is common - the result of small plots, limited mechanization, and a lack of technical expertise. Kosovo enjoys lower labor costs than the rest of the region. However, high levels of corruption, little contract enforcement, and unreliable electricity supply have discouraged potential investors. The official currency of Kosovo is the euro, but the Serbian dinar is also used illegally in Serb majority communities. Kosovo's tie to the euro has helped keep core inflation low.
Minerals and metals production - including lignite, lead, zinc, nickel, chrome, aluminum, magnesium, and a wide variety of construction materials - once the backbone of industry, has declined because of aging equipment and insufficient investment, problems exacerbated by competing and unresolved ownership claims of Kosovo’s largest mines. A limited and unreliable electricity supply is a major impediment to economic development. The US Government is cooperating with the Ministry of Economic Development (MED) and the World Bank to conclude a commercial tender for the construction of Kosovo C, a new lignite-fired power plant that would leverage Kosovo’s large lignite reserves. MED also has plans for the rehabilitation of an older bituminous-fired power plant, Kosovo B, and the development of a coal mine that could supply both plants.
In June 2009, Kosovo joined the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the Central Europe Free Trade Area (CEFTA) in 2006, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 2012, and the Council of Europe Development Bank in 2013. In 2016, Kosovo implemented the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) negotiations with the EU, focused on trade liberalization. In 2014, nearly 60% of customs duty-eligible imports into Kosovo were EU goods. In August 2015, as part of its EU-facilitated normalization process with Serbia, Kosovo signed agreements on telecommunications and energy distribution, but disagreements over who owns economic assets, such as the Trepca mining conglomerate, within Kosovo continue.
Kosovo experienced its first federal budget deficit in 2012, when government expenditures climbed sharply. In May 2014, the government introduced a 25% salary increase for public sector employees and an equal increase in certain social benefits. Central revenues could not sustain these increases, and the government was forced to reduce its planned capital investments. The government, led by Prime Minister MUSTAFA - a trained economist - recently made several changes to its fiscal policy, expanding the list of duty-free imports, decreasing the Value Added Tax (VAT) for basic food items and public utilities, and increasing the VAT for all other goods.
While Kosovo’s economy continued to make progress, unemployment has not been reduced, nor living standards raised, due to lack of economic reforms and investment.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -877,10 +877,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "117,317" + "text": "383,763 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "6.11 (2019 est.)" + "text": "6 (2019 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1017,7 +1017,7 @@ "IDPs": { "text": "16,000 (primarily ethnic Serbs displaced during the 1998-1999 war fearing reprisals from the majority ethnic-Albanian population; a smaller number of ethnic Serbs, Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians fled their homes in 2,004 as a result of violence) (2020)" }, - "note": "note: 7,767 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-March 2022)" + "note": "note: 7,794 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-April 2022)" } } } \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/europe/lg.json b/europe/lg.json index 94b73c15..19f93f90 100644 --- a/europe/lg.json +++ b/europe/lg.json @@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Latvia is a small, open economy with exports contributing more than half of GDP. Due to its geographical location, transit services are highly-developed, along with timber and wood-processing, agriculture and food products, and manufacturing of machinery and electronics industries. Corruption continues to be an impediment to attracting foreign direct investment and Latvia's low birth rate and decreasing population are major challenges to its long-term economic vitality.
Latvia's economy experienced GDP growth of more than 10% per year during 2006-07, but entered a severe recession in 2008 as a result of an unsustainable current account deficit and large debt exposure amid the slowing world economy. Triggered by the collapse of the second largest bank, GDP plunged by more than 14% in 2009 and, despite strong growth since 2011, the economy took until 2017 return to pre-crisis levels in real terms. Strong investment and consumption, the latter stoked by rising wages, helped the economy grow by more than 4% in 2017, while inflation rose to 3%. Continued gains in competitiveness and investment will be key to maintaining economic growth, especially in light of unfavorable demographic trends, including the emigration of skilled workers, and one of the highest levels of income inequality in the EU.
In the wake of the 2008-09 crisis, the IMF, EU, and other international donors provided substantial financial assistance to Latvia as part of an agreement to defend the currency's peg to the euro in exchange for the government's commitment to stringent austerity measures. The IMF/EU program successfully concluded in December 2011, although, the austerity measures imposed large social costs. The majority of companies, banks, and real estate have been privatized, although the state still holds sizable stakes in a few large enterprises, including 80% ownership of the Latvian national airline. Latvia officially joined the World Trade Organization in February 1999 and the EU in May 2004. Latvia also joined the euro zone in 2014 and the OECD in 2016.
" + "text": "Latvia is a small, open economy with exports contributing more than half of GDP. Due to its geographical location, transit services are highly-developed, along with timber and wood-processing, agriculture and food products, and manufacturing of machinery and electronics industries. Corruption continues to be an impediment to attracting foreign direct investment and Latvia's low birth rate and decreasing population are major challenges to its long-term economic vitality.
Latvia's economy experienced GDP growth of more than 10% per year during 2006-07, but entered a severe recession in 2008 as a result of an unsustainable current account deficit and large debt exposure amid the slowing world economy. Triggered by the collapse of the second largest bank, GDP plunged by more than 14% in 2009 and, despite strong growth since 2011, the economy took until 2017 return to pre-crisis levels in real terms. Strong investment and consumption, the latter stoked by rising wages, helped the economy grow by more than 4% in 2017, while inflation rose to 3%. Continued gains in competitiveness and investment will be key to maintaining economic growth, especially in light of unfavorable demographic trends, including the emigration of skilled workers, and one of the highest levels of income inequality in the EU.
In the wake of the 2008-09 crisis, the IMF, EU, and other international donors provided substantial financial assistance to Latvia as part of an agreement to defend the currency's peg to the euro in exchange for the government's commitment to stringent austerity measures. The IMF/EU program successfully concluded in December 2011, although, the austerity measures imposed large social costs. The majority of companies, banks, and real estate have been privatized, although the state still holds sizable stakes in a few large enterprises, including 80% ownership of the Latvian national airline. Latvia officially joined the World Trade Organization in February 1999 and the EU in May 2004. Latvia also joined the euro zone in 2014 and the OECD in 2016.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -992,10 +992,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "211,849 (2020)" + "text": "211,849 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "11.23 (2020 est.)" + "text": "11 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1034,10 +1034,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "490,569 (2022)" + "text": "490,569 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "26.01 (2022)" + "text": "26 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/lh.json b/europe/lh.json index ba62064c..7680d15c 100644 --- a/europe/lh.json +++ b/europe/lh.json @@ -118,18 +118,18 @@ } }, "Ethnic groups": { - "text": "Lithuanian 84.1%, Polish 6.6%, Russian 5.8%, Belarusian 1.2%, other 1.1%, unspecified 1.2% (2011 est.)" + "text": "Lithuanian 84.6%, Polish 6.5%, Russian 5%, Belarusian 1%, other 1.1%, unspecified 1.8% (2021 est.)" }, "Languages": { "Languages": { - "text": "Lithuanian (official) 82%, Russian 8%, Polish 5.6%, other 0.9%, unspecified 3.5% (2011 est.)" + "text": "Lithuanian (official) 85.3%, Russian 6.8%, Polish 5.1%, other 1.1%, two mother tongues 1.7%% (2021 est.)" }, "major-language sample(s)": { "text": "After the country declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1990, Lithuania faced an initial dislocation that is typical during transitions from a planned economy to a free-market economy. Macroeconomic stabilization policies, including privatization of most state-owned enterprises, and a strong commitment to a currency board arrangement led to an open and rapidly growing economy and rising consumer demand. Foreign investment and EU funding aided in the transition. Lithuania joined the WTO in May 2001, the EU in May 2004, and the euro zone in January 2015, and is now working to complete the OECD accession roadmap it received in July 2015. In 2017, joined the OECD Working Group on Bribery, an important step in the OECD accession process.
The Lithuanian economy was severely hit by the 2008-09 global financial crisis, but it has rebounded and become one of the fastest growing in the EU. Increases in exports, investment, and wage growth that supported consumption helped the economy grow by 3.6% in 2017. In 2015, Russia was Lithuania’s largest trading partner, followed by Poland, Germany, and Latvia; goods and services trade between the US and Lithuania totaled $2.2 billion. Lithuania opened a self-financed liquefied natural gas terminal in January 2015, providing the first non-Russian supply of natural gas to the Baltic States and reducing Lithuania’s dependence on Russian gas from 100% to approximately 30% in 2016.
Lithuania’s ongoing recovery hinges on improving the business environment, especially by liberalizing labor laws, and improving competitiveness and export growth, the latter hampered by economic slowdowns in the EU and Russia. In addition, a steady outflow of young and highly educated people is causing a shortage of skilled labor, which, combined with a rapidly aging population, could stress public finances and constrain long-term growth.
" + "text": "After the country declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1990, Lithuania faced an initial dislocation that is typical during transitions from a planned economy to a free-market economy. Macroeconomic stabilization policies, including privatization of most state-owned enterprises, and a strong commitment to a currency board arrangement led to an open and rapidly growing economy and rising consumer demand. Foreign investment and EU funding aided in the transition. Lithuania joined the WTO in May 2001, the EU in May 2004, and the euro zone in January 2015, and is now working to complete the OECD accession roadmap it received in July 2015. In 2017, joined the OECD Working Group on Bribery, an important step in the OECD accession process.
The Lithuanian economy was severely hit by the 2008-09 global financial crisis, but it has rebounded and become one of the fastest growing in the EU. Increases in exports, investment, and wage growth that supported consumption helped the economy grow by 3.6% in 2017. In 2015, Russia was Lithuania’s largest trading partner, followed by Poland, Germany, and Latvia; goods and services trade between the US and Lithuania totaled $2.2 billion. Lithuania opened a self-financed liquefied natural gas terminal in January 2015, providing the first non-Russian supply of natural gas to the Baltic States and reducing Lithuania’s dependence on Russian gas from 100% to approximately 30% in 2016.
Lithuania’s ongoing recovery hinges on improving the business environment, especially by liberalizing labor laws, and improving competitiveness and export growth, the latter hampered by economic slowdowns in the EU and Russia. In addition, a steady outflow of young and highly educated people is causing a shortage of skilled labor, which, combined with a rapidly aging population, could stress public finances and constrain long-term growth.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1003,10 +1003,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "322,108 (2020)" + "text": "322,108 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "11.83 (2020 est.)" + "text": "12 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1045,10 +1045,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "796,814 (2022)" + "text": "796,814 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "29.27 (2022)" + "text": "29 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/lo.json b/europe/lo.json index 1086cece..fe4627e5 100644 --- a/europe/lo.json +++ b/europe/lo.json @@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Slovakia’s economy suffered from a slow start in the first years after its separation from the Czech Republic in 1993, due to the country’s authoritarian leadership and high levels of corruption, but economic reforms implemented after 1998 have placed Slovakia on a path of strong growth. With a population of 5.4 million, the Slovak Republic has a small, open economy driven mainly by automobile and electronics exports, which account for more than 80% of GDP. Slovakia joined the EU in 2004 and the euro zone in 2009. The country’s banking sector is sound and predominantly foreign owned.
Slovakia has been a regional FDI champion for several years, attractive due to a relatively low-cost yet skilled labor force, and a favorable geographic location in the heart of Central Europe. Exports and investment have been key drivers of Slovakia’s robust growth in recent years. The unemployment rate fell to historical lows in 2017, and rising wages fueled increased consumption, which played a more prominent role in 2017 GDP growth. A favorable outlook for the Eurozone suggests continued strong growth prospects for Slovakia during the next few years, although inflation is also expected to pick up.
Among the most pressing domestic issues potentially threatening the attractiveness of the Slovak market are shortages in the qualified labor force, persistent corruption issues, and an inadequate judiciary, as well as a slow transition to an innovation-based economy. The energy sector in particular is characterized by unpredictable regulatory oversight and high costs, in part driven by government interference in regulated tariffs. Moreover, the government’s attempts to maintain low household energy prices could harm the profitability of domestic energy firms while undercutting energy efficiency initiatives.
" + "text": "Slovakia’s economy suffered from a slow start in the first years after its separation from the Czech Republic in 1993, due to the country’s authoritarian leadership and high levels of corruption, but economic reforms implemented after 1998 have placed Slovakia on a path of strong growth. With a population of 5.4 million, the Slovak Republic has a small, open economy driven mainly by automobile and electronics exports, which account for more than 80% of GDP. Slovakia joined the EU in 2004 and the euro zone in 2009. The country’s banking sector is sound and predominantly foreign owned.
Slovakia has been a regional FDI champion for several years, attractive due to a relatively low-cost yet skilled labor force, and a favorable geographic location in the heart of Central Europe. Exports and investment have been key drivers of Slovakia’s robust growth in recent years. The unemployment rate fell to historical lows in 2017, and rising wages fueled increased consumption, which played a more prominent role in 2017 GDP growth. A favorable outlook for the Eurozone suggests continued strong growth prospects for Slovakia during the next few years, although inflation is also expected to pick up.
Among the most pressing domestic issues potentially threatening the attractiveness of the Slovak market are shortages in the qualified labor force, persistent corruption issues, and an inadequate judiciary, as well as a slow transition to an innovation-based economy. The energy sector in particular is characterized by unpredictable regulatory oversight and high costs, in part driven by government interference in regulated tariffs. Moreover, the government’s attempts to maintain low household energy prices could harm the profitability of domestic energy firms while undercutting energy efficiency initiatives.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -967,10 +967,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "616,148 (2020)" + "text": "648,462 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "11.29 (2020 est.)" + "text": "12 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1009,10 +1009,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,701,561 (2022)" + "text": "1,701,561 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "31.17 (2022)" + "text": "31 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1142,7 +1142,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "404,463 (Ukraine) (as of 9 May 2022)" + "text": "421,662 (Ukraine) (as of 15 May 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "1,532 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/ls.json b/europe/ls.json index 4f9f79da..0ff4baef 100644 --- a/europe/ls.json +++ b/europe/ls.json @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ } }, "Ethnic groups": { - "text": "Liechtensteiner 65.8%, Swiss 9.6%, Austrian 5.9%, German 4.4%, Italian 3.1%, other 11.2% (2019 est.)", + "text": "Liechtensteiner 65.5%, Swiss 9.6%, Austrian 6%, German 4.5%, Italian 3.1%, other 11.4% (2020 est.)", "note": "note: data represent population by nationality" }, "Languages": { @@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Despite its small size and lack of natural resources, Liechtenstein has developed into a prosperous, highly industrialized, free-enterprise economy with a vital financial services sector and one of the highest per capita income levels in the world. The Liechtenstein economy is widely diversified with a large number of small and medium-sized businesses, particularly in the services sector. Low business taxes - a flat tax of 12.5% on income is applied - and easy incorporation rules have induced many holding companies to establish nominal offices in Liechtenstein, providing 30% of state revenues.
The country participates in a customs union with Switzerland and uses the Swiss franc as its national currency. It imports more than 90% of its energy requirements. Liechtenstein has been a member of the European Economic Area (an organization serving as a bridge between the European Free Trade Association and the EU) since May 1995. The government is working to harmonize its economic policies with those of an integrated EU. As of 2015, 54% of Liechtenstein’s workforce consisted of cross-border commuters, largely from Austria, Germany, and Switzerland.
Since 2008, Liechtenstein has faced renewed international pressure - particularly from Germany and the US - to improve transparency in its banking and tax systems. In December 2008, Liechtenstein signed a Tax Information Exchange Agreement with the US. Upon Liechtenstein's conclusion of 12 bilateral information-sharing agreements, the OECD in October 2009 removed the principality from its \"grey list\" of countries that had yet to implement the organization's Model Tax Convention. By the end of 2010, Liechtenstein had signed 25 Tax Information Exchange Agreements or Double Tax Agreements. In 2011, Liechtenstein joined the Schengen area, which allows passport-free travel across 26 European countries. In 2015, Liechtenstein and the EU agreed to clamp down on tax fraud and evasion and in 2018 will start automatically exchanging information on the bank accounts of each other’s residents.
" + "text": "Despite its small size and lack of natural resources, Liechtenstein has developed into a prosperous, highly industrialized, free-enterprise economy with a vital financial services sector and one of the highest per capita income levels in the world. The Liechtenstein economy is widely diversified with a large number of small and medium-sized businesses, particularly in the services sector. Low business taxes - a flat tax of 12.5% on income is applied - and easy incorporation rules have induced many holding companies to establish nominal offices in Liechtenstein, providing 30% of state revenues.
The country participates in a customs union with Switzerland and uses the Swiss franc as its national currency. It imports more than 90% of its energy requirements. Liechtenstein has been a member of the European Economic Area (an organization serving as a bridge between the European Free Trade Association and the EU) since May 1995. The government is working to harmonize its economic policies with those of an integrated EU. As of 2015, 54% of Liechtenstein’s workforce consisted of cross-border commuters, largely from Austria, Germany, and Switzerland.
Since 2008, Liechtenstein has faced renewed international pressure - particularly from Germany and the US - to improve transparency in its banking and tax systems. In December 2008, Liechtenstein signed a Tax Information Exchange Agreement with the US. Upon Liechtenstein's conclusion of 12 bilateral information-sharing agreements, the OECD in October 2009 removed the principality from its \"grey list\" of countries that had yet to implement the organization's Model Tax Convention. By the end of 2010, Liechtenstein had signed 25 Tax Information Exchange Agreements or Double Tax Agreements. In 2011, Liechtenstein joined the Schengen area, which allows passport-free travel across 26 European countries. In 2015, Liechtenstein and the EU agreed to clamp down on tax fraud and evasion and in 2018 will start automatically exchanging information on the bank accounts of each other’s residents.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2014": { @@ -749,10 +749,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "12,723 (2020)" + "text": "12,607 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "33.37 (2020 est.)" + "text": "33 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -791,10 +791,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "18,050 (2021)" + "text": "18,050 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "47.34 (2021)" + "text": "47 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/lu.json b/europe/lu.json index 158a8186..dc910537 100644 --- a/europe/lu.json +++ b/europe/lu.json @@ -114,14 +114,14 @@ } }, "Ethnic groups": { - "text": "Luxembourger 51.1%, Portuguese 15.7%, French 7.5%, Italian 3.6%, Belgian 3.3%, German 2.1%, Spanish 1.1%, British 1%, other 14.6% (2019 est.)", + "text": "Luxembourger 52.9%, Portuguese 14.5%, French 7.6%, Italian 3.7%, Belgian 3%, German 2%, Spanish 1.3%, Romania 1%, other 14% (2022 est.)", "note": "note: data represent population by nationality" }, "Languages": { "text": "Luxembourgish (official administrative and judicial language and national language (spoken vernacular)) 55.8%, Portuguese 15.7%, French (official administrative, judicial, and legislative language) 12.1%, German (official administrative and judicial language) 3.1%, Italian 2.9%, English 2.1%, other 8.4% (2011 est.)" }, "Religions": { - "text": "Christian (predominantly Roman Catholic) 70.6%, Muslim 2.3%, other (includes Buddhist, folk religions, Hindu, Jewish) 0.4%, unaffiliated 26.7%% (2020 est.)" + "text": "Christian (predominantly Roman Catholic) 70.6%, Muslim 2.3%, other (includes Buddhist, folk religions, Hindu, Jewish) 0.4%, unaffiliated 26.7% (2020 est.)" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "This small, stable, high-income economy has historically featured solid growth, low inflation, and low unemployment. Luxembourg, the only Grand Duchy in the world, is a landlocked country in northwestern Europe surrounded by Belgium, France, and Germany. Despite its small landmass and small population, Luxembourg is the fifth-wealthiest country in the world when measured on a gross domestic product (PPP) per capita basis. Luxembourg has one of the highest current account surpluses as a share of GDP in the euro zone, and it maintains a healthy budgetary position, with a 2017 surplus of 0.5% of GDP, and the lowest public debt level in the region.
Since 2002, Luxembourg’s government has proactively implemented policies and programs to support economic diversification and to attract foreign direct investment. The government focused on key innovative industries that showed promise for supporting economic growth: logistics, information and communications technology (ICT); health technologies, including biotechnology and biomedical research; clean energy technologies, and more recently, space technology and financial services technologies. The economy has evolved and flourished, posting strong GDP growth of 3.4% in 2017, far outpacing the European average of 1.8%.
Luxembourg remains a financial powerhouse – the financial sector accounts for more than 35% of GDP - because of the exponential growth of the investment fund sector through the launch and development of cross-border funds (UCITS) in the 1990s. Luxembourg is the world’s second-largest investment fund asset domicile, after the US, with $4 trillion of assets in custody in financial institutions.
Luxembourg has lost some of its advantage as a favorable tax location because of OECD and EU pressure, as well as the \"LuxLeaks\" scandal, which revealed advantageous tax treatments offered to foreign corporations. In 2015, the government’s compliance with EU requirements to implement automatic exchange of tax information on savings accounts - thus ending banking secrecy - has constricted banking activity. Likewise, changes to the way EU members collect taxes from e-commerce has cut Luxembourg’s sales tax revenues, requiring the government to raise additional levies and to reduce some direct social benefits as part of the tax reform package of 2017. The tax reform package also included reductions in the corporate tax rate and increases in deductions for families, both intended to increase purchasing power and increase competitiveness.
" + "text": "This small, stable, high-income economy has historically featured solid growth, low inflation, and low unemployment. Luxembourg, the only Grand Duchy in the world, is a landlocked country in northwestern Europe surrounded by Belgium, France, and Germany. Despite its small landmass and small population, Luxembourg is the fifth-wealthiest country in the world when measured on a gross domestic product (PPP) per capita basis. Luxembourg has one of the highest current account surpluses as a share of GDP in the euro zone, and it maintains a healthy budgetary position, with a 2017 surplus of 0.5% of GDP, and the lowest public debt level in the region.
Since 2002, Luxembourg’s government has proactively implemented policies and programs to support economic diversification and to attract foreign direct investment. The government focused on key innovative industries that showed promise for supporting economic growth: logistics, information and communications technology (ICT); health technologies, including biotechnology and biomedical research; clean energy technologies, and more recently, space technology and financial services technologies. The economy has evolved and flourished, posting strong GDP growth of 3.4% in 2017, far outpacing the European average of 1.8%.
Luxembourg remains a financial powerhouse – the financial sector accounts for more than 35% of GDP - because of the exponential growth of the investment fund sector through the launch and development of cross-border funds (UCITS) in the 1990s. Luxembourg is the world’s second-largest investment fund asset domicile, after the US, with $4 trillion of assets in custody in financial institutions.
Luxembourg has lost some of its advantage as a favorable tax location because of OECD and EU pressure, as well as the \"LuxLeaks\" scandal, which revealed advantageous tax treatments offered to foreign corporations. In 2015, the government’s compliance with EU requirements to implement automatic exchange of tax information on savings accounts - thus ending banking secrecy - has constricted banking activity. Likewise, changes to the way EU members collect taxes from e-commerce has cut Luxembourg’s sales tax revenues, requiring the government to raise additional levies and to reduce some direct social benefits as part of the tax reform package of 2017. The tax reform package also included reductions in the corporate tax rate and increases in deductions for families, both intended to increase purchasing power and increase competitiveness.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -953,10 +953,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "268,090 (2020)" + "text": "268,090 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "42.83 (2020 est.)" + "text": "43 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -995,10 +995,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "235,155 (2021)" + "text": "235,155 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "37.57 (2021)" + "text": "38 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/md.json b/europe/md.json index 5d522b7e..825835b1 100644 --- a/europe/md.json +++ b/europe/md.json @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Despite recent progress, Moldova remains one of the poorest countries in Europe. With a moderate climate and productive farmland, Moldova's economy relies heavily on its agriculture sector, featuring fruits, vegetables, wine, wheat, and tobacco. Moldova also depends on annual remittances of about $1.2 billion - almost 15% of GDP - from the roughly one million Moldovans working in Europe, Israel, Russia, and elsewhere.
With few natural energy resources, Moldova imports almost all of its energy supplies from Russia and Ukraine. Moldova's dependence on Russian energy is underscored by a more than $6 billion debt to Russian natural gas supplier Gazprom, largely the result of unreimbursed natural gas consumption in the breakaway region of Transnistria. Moldova and Romania inaugurated the Ungheni-Iasi natural gas interconnector project in August 2014. The 43-kilometer pipeline between Moldova and Romania, allows for both the import and export of natural gas. Several technical and regulatory delays kept gas from flowing into Moldova until March 2015. Romanian gas exports to Moldova are largely symbolic. In 2018, Moldova awarded a tender to Romanian Transgaz to construct a pipeline connecting Ungheni to Chisinau, bringing the gas to Moldovan population centers. Moldova also seeks to connect with the European power grid by 2022.
The government's stated goal of EU integration has resulted in some market-oriented progress. Moldova experienced better than expected economic growth in 2017, largely driven by increased consumption, increased revenue from agricultural exports, and improved tax collection. During fall 2014, Moldova signed an Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU (AA/DCFTA), connecting Moldovan products to the world’s largest market. The EU AA/DCFTA has contributed to significant growth in Moldova’s exports to the EU. In 2017, the EU purchased over 65% of Moldova’s exports, a major change from 20 years previously when the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) received over 69% of Moldova’s exports. A $1 billion asset-stripping heist of Moldovan banks in late 2014 delivered a significant shock to the economy in 2015; the subsequent bank bailout increased inflationary pressures and contributed to the depreciation of the leu and a minor recession. Moldova’s growth has also been hampered by endemic corruption, which limits business growth and deters foreign investment, and Russian restrictions on imports of Moldova’s agricultural products. The government’s push to restore stability and implement meaningful reform led to the approval in 2016 of a $179 million three-year IMF program focused on improving the banking and fiscal environments, along with additional assistance programs from the EU, World Bank, and Romania. Moldova received two IMF tranches in 2017, totaling over $42.5 million.
Over the longer term, Moldova's economy remains vulnerable to corruption, political uncertainty, weak administrative capacity, vested bureaucratic interests, energy import dependence, Russian political and economic pressure, heavy dependence on agricultural exports, and unresolved separatism in Moldova's Transnistria region.
" + "text": "Despite recent progress, Moldova remains one of the poorest countries in Europe. With a moderate climate and productive farmland, Moldova's economy relies heavily on its agriculture sector, featuring fruits, vegetables, wine, wheat, and tobacco. Moldova also depends on annual remittances of about $1.2 billion - almost 15% of GDP - from the roughly one million Moldovans working in Europe, Israel, Russia, and elsewhere.
With few natural energy resources, Moldova imports almost all of its energy supplies from Russia and Ukraine. Moldova's dependence on Russian energy is underscored by a more than $6 billion debt to Russian natural gas supplier Gazprom, largely the result of unreimbursed natural gas consumption in the breakaway region of Transnistria. Moldova and Romania inaugurated the Ungheni-Iasi natural gas interconnector project in August 2014. The 43-kilometer pipeline between Moldova and Romania, allows for both the import and export of natural gas. Several technical and regulatory delays kept gas from flowing into Moldova until March 2015. Romanian gas exports to Moldova are largely symbolic. In 2018, Moldova awarded a tender to Romanian Transgaz to construct a pipeline connecting Ungheni to Chisinau, bringing the gas to Moldovan population centers. Moldova also seeks to connect with the European power grid by 2022.
The government's stated goal of EU integration has resulted in some market-oriented progress. Moldova experienced better than expected economic growth in 2017, largely driven by increased consumption, increased revenue from agricultural exports, and improved tax collection. During fall 2014, Moldova signed an Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU (AA/DCFTA), connecting Moldovan products to the world’s largest market. The EU AA/DCFTA has contributed to significant growth in Moldova’s exports to the EU. In 2017, the EU purchased over 65% of Moldova’s exports, a major change from 20 years previously when the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) received over 69% of Moldova’s exports. A $1 billion asset-stripping heist of Moldovan banks in late 2014 delivered a significant shock to the economy in 2015; the subsequent bank bailout increased inflationary pressures and contributed to the depreciation of the leu and a minor recession. Moldova’s growth has also been hampered by endemic corruption, which limits business growth and deters foreign investment, and Russian restrictions on imports of Moldova’s agricultural products. The government’s push to restore stability and implement meaningful reform led to the approval in 2016 of a $179 million three-year IMF program focused on improving the banking and fiscal environments, along with additional assistance programs from the EU, World Bank, and Romania. Moldova received two IMF tranches in 2017, totaling over $42.5 million.
Over the longer term, Moldova's economy remains vulnerable to corruption, political uncertainty, weak administrative capacity, vested bureaucratic interests, energy import dependence, Russian political and economic pressure, heavy dependence on agricultural exports, and unresolved separatism in Moldova's Transnistria region.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -978,10 +978,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1,027,689 (2020)" + "text": "1,027,689 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "25.48 (2020 est.)" + "text": "25 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1020,10 +1020,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "719,001 (2022)" + "text": "719,001 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "17.82 (2022)" + "text": "18 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "457,066 (Ukraine) (as of 9 May 2022)" + "text": "463,348 (Ukraine) (as of 15 May 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "3,372 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/mj.json b/europe/mj.json index a00a4507..90d5f0a4 100644 --- a/europe/mj.json +++ b/europe/mj.json @@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Montenegro's economy is transitioning to a market system. Around 90% of Montenegrin state-owned companies have been privatized, including 100% of banking, telecommunications, and oil distribution. Tourism, which accounts for more than 20% of Montenegro’s GDP, brings in three times as many visitors as Montenegro’s total population every year. Several new luxury tourism complexes are in various stages of development along the coast, and a number are being offered in connection with nearby boating and yachting facilities. In addition to tourism, energy and agriculture are considered two distinct pillars of the economy. Only 20% of Montenegro’s hydropower potential is utilized. Montenegro plans to become a net energy exporter, and the construction of an underwater cable to Italy, which will be completed by the end of 2018, will help meet its goal.
Montenegro uses the euro as its domestic currency, though it is not an official member of the euro zone. In January 2007, Montenegro joined the World Bank and IMF, and in December 2011, the WTO. Montenegro began negotiations to join the EU in 2012, having met the conditions set down by the European Council, which called on Montenegro to take steps to fight corruption and organized crime.
The government recognizes the need to remove impediments in order to remain competitive and open the economy to foreign investors. Net foreign direct investment in 2017 reached $848 million and investment per capita is one of the highest in Europe, due to a low corporate tax rate. The biggest foreign investors in Montenegro in 2017 were Norway, Russia, Italy, Azerbaijan and Hungary.
Montenegro is currently planning major overhauls of its road and rail networks, and possible expansions of its air transportation system. In 2014, the Government of Montenegro selected two Chinese companies to construct a 41 km-long section of the country’s highway system, which will become part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Cheaper borrowing costs have stimulated Montenegro’s growing debt, which currently sits at 65.9% of GDP, with a forecast, absent fiscal consolidation, to increase to 80% once the repayment to China’s Ex/Im Bank of a €800 million highway loan begins in 2019. Montenegro first instituted a value-added tax (VAT) in April 2003, and introduced differentiated VAT rates of 17% and 7% (for tourism) in January 2006. The Montenegrin Government increased the non-tourism Value Added Tax (VAT) rate to 21% as of January 2018, with the goal of reducing its public debt.
" + "text": "Montenegro's economy is transitioning to a market system. Around 90% of Montenegrin state-owned companies have been privatized, including 100% of banking, telecommunications, and oil distribution. Tourism, which accounts for more than 20% of Montenegro’s GDP, brings in three times as many visitors as Montenegro’s total population every year. Several new luxury tourism complexes are in various stages of development along the coast, and a number are being offered in connection with nearby boating and yachting facilities. In addition to tourism, energy and agriculture are considered two distinct pillars of the economy. Only 20% of Montenegro’s hydropower potential is utilized. Montenegro plans to become a net energy exporter, and the construction of an underwater cable to Italy, which will be completed by the end of 2018, will help meet its goal.
Montenegro uses the euro as its domestic currency, though it is not an official member of the euro zone. In January 2007, Montenegro joined the World Bank and IMF, and in December 2011, the WTO. Montenegro began negotiations to join the EU in 2012, having met the conditions set down by the European Council, which called on Montenegro to take steps to fight corruption and organized crime.
The government recognizes the need to remove impediments in order to remain competitive and open the economy to foreign investors. Net foreign direct investment in 2017 reached $848 million and investment per capita is one of the highest in Europe, due to a low corporate tax rate. The biggest foreign investors in Montenegro in 2017 were Norway, Russia, Italy, Azerbaijan and Hungary.
Montenegro is currently planning major overhauls of its road and rail networks, and possible expansions of its air transportation system. In 2014, the Government of Montenegro selected two Chinese companies to construct a 41 km-long section of the country’s highway system, which will become part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Cheaper borrowing costs have stimulated Montenegro’s growing debt, which currently sits at 65.9% of GDP, with a forecast, absent fiscal consolidation, to increase to 80% once the repayment to China’s Ex/Im Bank of a €800 million highway loan begins in 2019. Montenegro first instituted a value-added tax (VAT) in April 2003, and introduced differentiated VAT rates of 17% and 7% (for tourism) in January 2006. The Montenegrin Government increased the non-tourism Value Added Tax (VAT) rate to 21% as of January 2018, with the goal of reducing its public debt.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1020,10 +1020,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "191,768 (2020)" + "text": "191,768 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "30.53 (2020 est.)" + "text": "31 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1062,10 +1062,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "184,176 (2021)" + "text": "184,176 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "29.32 (2021)" + "text": "29 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "458 (mid-year 2021)" }, - "note": "note: 21,274 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-April 2022)" + "note": "note: 21,385 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-May 2022)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "drug trafficking groups are major players in the procurement and transportation of large quantities of cocaine destined for European markets
" diff --git a/europe/mk.json b/europe/mk.json index 1be35a9c..889a268b 100644 --- a/europe/mk.json +++ b/europe/mk.json @@ -982,10 +982,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "400,454" + "text": "415,390 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "19.22 (2019 est.)" + "text": "20 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1024,10 +1024,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "475,569 (2021)" + "text": "475,569 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "22.83 (2021 est.)" + "text": "23 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1135,7 +1135,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "553 (mid-year 2021)" }, - "note": "note: 530,200 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-March 2022)" + "note": "note: 531,497 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-April 2022)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "major transshipment point for Southwest Asian heroin and hashish; minor transit point for South American cocaine destined for Europe; although not a financial center and most criminal activity is thought to be domestic, money laundering is a problem due to a mostly cash-based economy and weak enforcement" diff --git a/europe/mn.json b/europe/mn.json index 3c3fb230..4aa0c308 100644 --- a/europe/mn.json +++ b/europe/mn.json @@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Monaco, bordering France on the Mediterranean coast, is a popular resort, attracting tourists to its casino and pleasant climate. The principality also is a banking center and has successfully sought to diversify into services and small, high-value-added, nonpolluting industries. The state retains monopolies in a number of sectors, including tobacco, the telephone network, and the postal service. Living standards are high, roughly comparable to those in prosperous French metropolitan areas.
The state has no income tax and low business taxes and thrives as a tax haven both for individuals who have established residence and for foreign companies that have set up businesses and offices. Monaco, however, is not a tax-free shelter; it charges nearly 20% value-added tax, collects stamp duties, and companies face a 33% tax on profits unless they can show that three-quarters of profits are generated within the principality. Monaco was formally removed from the OECD's \"grey list\" of uncooperative tax jurisdictions in late 2009, but continues to face international pressure to abandon its banking secrecy laws and help combat tax evasion. In October 2014, Monaco officially became the 84th jurisdiction participating in the OECD’s Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, an effort to combat offshore tax avoidance and evasion.
Monaco's reliance on tourism and banking for its economic growth has left it vulnerable to downturns in France and other European economies which are the principality's main trade partners. In 2009, Monaco's GDP fell by 11.5% as the euro-zone crisis precipitated a sharp drop in tourism and retail activity and home sales. A modest recovery ensued in 2010 and intensified in 2013, with GDP growth of more than 9%, but Monaco's economic prospects remain uncertain.
" + "text": "Monaco, bordering France on the Mediterranean coast, is a popular resort, attracting tourists to its casino and pleasant climate. The principality also is a banking center and has successfully sought to diversify into services and small, high-value-added, nonpolluting industries. The state retains monopolies in a number of sectors, including tobacco, the telephone network, and the postal service. Living standards are high, roughly comparable to those in prosperous French metropolitan areas.
The state has no income tax and low business taxes and thrives as a tax haven both for individuals who have established residence and for foreign companies that have set up businesses and offices. Monaco, however, is not a tax-free shelter; it charges nearly 20% value-added tax, collects stamp duties, and companies face a 33% tax on profits unless they can show that three-quarters of profits are generated within the principality. Monaco was formally removed from the OECD's \"grey list\" of uncooperative tax jurisdictions in late 2009, but continues to face international pressure to abandon its banking secrecy laws and help combat tax evasion. In October 2014, Monaco officially became the 84th jurisdiction participating in the OECD’s Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, an effort to combat offshore tax avoidance and evasion.
Monaco's reliance on tourism and banking for its economic growth has left it vulnerable to downturns in France and other European economies which are the principality's main trade partners. In 2009, Monaco's GDP fell by 11.5% as the euro-zone crisis precipitated a sharp drop in tourism and retail activity and home sales. A modest recovery ensued in 2010 and intensified in 2013, with GDP growth of more than 9%, but Monaco's economic prospects remain uncertain.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2015": { @@ -750,10 +750,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "43,706 (2020)" + "text": "43,706 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "111.4 (2020 est.)" + "text": "111 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -792,10 +792,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "20,877 (2021)" + "text": "20,877 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "53.2 (2021)" + "text": "53 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/mt.json b/europe/mt.json index 9a2d85db..5c265a08 100644 --- a/europe/mt.json +++ b/europe/mt.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "With a civilization that dates back thousands of years, Malta boasts some of the oldest megalithic sites in the world. Situated in the center of the Mediterranean, Malta’s islands have long served as a strategic military asset, with the islands at various times having come under control of the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Moors, Normans, Sicilians, Spanish, Knights of St. John, and the French. Most recently a British colony (since 1814), Malta gained its independence in 1964 and declared itself a republic ten years later. While under British rule, the island staunchly supported the UK through both world wars. Since about the mid-1980s, the island has transformed itself into a freight transshipment point, a financial center, and a tourist destination while its key industries moved toward more service-oriented activities. Malta became an EU member in May 2004 and began using the euro as currency in 2008." + "text": "With a civilization that dates back thousands of years, Malta boasts some of the oldest megalithic sites in the world. Situated in the center of the Mediterranean, Malta’s islands have long served as a strategic military asset, with the islands at various times having come under control of the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Moors, Normans, Sicilians, Spanish, Knights of St. John, and the French. Most recently a British colony (since 1814), Malta gained its independence in 1964 and declared itself a republic ten years later. While under British rule, the island staunchly supported the UK through both world wars. Since about the mid-1980s, the island has transformed itself into a freight transshipment point, a financial center, and a tourist destination while its key industries moved toward more service-oriented activities. Malta became an EU member in May 2004 and began using the euro as currency in 2008." } }, "Geography": { @@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Malta’s free market economy – the smallest economy in the euro-zone – relies heavily on trade in both goods and services, principally with Europe. Malta produces less than a quarter of its food needs, has limited fresh water supplies, and has few domestic energy sources. Malta's economy is dependent on foreign trade, manufacturing, and tourism. Malta joined the EU in 2004 and adopted the euro on 1 January 2008.
Malta has weathered the euro-zone crisis better than most EU member states due to a low debt-to-GDP ratio and financially sound banking sector. It maintains one of the lowest unemployment rates in Europe, and growth has fully recovered since the 2009 recession. In 2014 through 2016, Malta led the euro zone in growth, expanding more than 4.5% per year.
Malta’s services sector continues to grow, with sustained growth in the financial services and online gaming sectors. Advantageous tax schemes remained attractive to foreign investors, though EU discussions of anti-tax avoidance measures have raised concerns among Malta’s financial services and insurance providers, as the measures could have a significant impact on those sectors. The tourism sector also continued to grow, with 2016 showing record-breaking numbers of both air and cruise passenger arrivals.
Malta’s GDP growth remains strong and is supported by a strong labor market. The government has implemented new programs, including free childcare, to encourage increased labor participation. The high cost of borrowing and small labor market remain potential constraints to future economic growth. Increasingly, other EU and European migrants are relocating to Malta for employment, though wages have remained low compared to other European countries. Inflation remains low.
" + "text": "Malta’s free market economy – the smallest economy in the euro-zone – relies heavily on trade in both goods and services, principally with Europe. Malta produces less than a quarter of its food needs, has limited fresh water supplies, and has few domestic energy sources. Malta's economy is dependent on foreign trade, manufacturing, and tourism. Malta joined the EU in 2004 and adopted the euro on 1 January 2008.
Malta has weathered the euro-zone crisis better than most EU member states due to a low debt-to-GDP ratio and financially sound banking sector. It maintains one of the lowest unemployment rates in Europe, and growth has fully recovered since the 2009 recession. In 2014 through 2016, Malta led the euro zone in growth, expanding more than 4.5% per year.
Malta’s services sector continues to grow, with sustained growth in the financial services and online gaming sectors. Advantageous tax schemes remained attractive to foreign investors, though EU discussions of anti-tax avoidance measures have raised concerns among Malta’s financial services and insurance providers, as the measures could have a significant impact on those sectors. The tourism sector also continued to grow, with 2016 showing record-breaking numbers of both air and cruise passenger arrivals.
Malta’s GDP growth remains strong and is supported by a strong labor market. The government has implemented new programs, including free childcare, to encourage increased labor participation. The high cost of borrowing and small labor market remain potential constraints to future economic growth. Increasingly, other EU and European migrants are relocating to Malta for employment, though wages have remained low compared to other European countries. Inflation remains low.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "256,838" + "text": "259,456 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "59 (2020 est.)" @@ -1004,10 +1004,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "213,419 (2021)" + "text": "213,419 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "48.33 (2021)" + "text": "48 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1121,7 +1121,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "11 (mid-year 2021)" }, - "note": "note: 8,119 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals by sea (January 2015-December 2021)" + "note": "note: 8,120 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals by sea (January 2015-April 2022)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "minor transshipment point for hashish from North Africa to Western Europe" diff --git a/europe/nl.json b/europe/nl.json index fdfa6a33..ff0398c5 100644 --- a/europe/nl.json +++ b/europe/nl.json @@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The Netherlands, the sixth-largest economy in the European Union, plays an important role as a European transportation hub, with a consistently high trade surplus, stable industrial relations, and low unemployment. Industry focuses on food processing, chemicals, petroleum refining, and electrical machinery. A highly mechanized agricultural sector employs only 2% of the labor force but provides large surpluses for food-processing and underpins the country’s status as the world’s second largest agricultural exporter.
The Netherlands is part of the euro zone, and as such, its monetary policy is controlled by the European Central Bank. The Dutch financial sector is highly concentrated, with four commercial banks possessing over 80% of banking assets, and is four times the size of Dutch GDP.
In 2008, during the financial crisis, the government budget deficit hit 5.3% of GDP. Following a protracted recession from 2009 to 2013, during which unemployment doubled to 7.4% and household consumption contracted for four consecutive years, economic growth began inching forward in 2014. Since 2010, Prime Minister Mark RUTTE’s government has implemented significant austerity measures to improve public finances and has instituted broad structural reforms in key policy areas, including the labor market, the housing sector, the energy market, and the pension system. In 2017, the government budget returned to a surplus of 0.7% of GDP, with economic growth of 3.2%, and GDP per capita finally surpassed pre-crisis levels. The fiscal policy announced by the new government in the 2018-2021 coalition plans for increases in government consumption and public investment, fueling domestic demand and household consumption and investment. The new government’s policy also plans to increase demand for workers in the public and private sector, forecasting a further decline in the unemployment rate, which hit 4.8% in 2017.
" + "text": "The Netherlands, the sixth-largest economy in the European Union, plays an important role as a European transportation hub, with a consistently high trade surplus, stable industrial relations, and low unemployment. Industry focuses on food processing, chemicals, petroleum refining, and electrical machinery. A highly mechanized agricultural sector employs only 2% of the labor force but provides large surpluses for food-processing and underpins the country’s status as the world’s second largest agricultural exporter.
The Netherlands is part of the euro zone, and as such, its monetary policy is controlled by the European Central Bank. The Dutch financial sector is highly concentrated, with four commercial banks possessing over 80% of banking assets, and is four times the size of Dutch GDP.
In 2008, during the financial crisis, the government budget deficit hit 5.3% of GDP. Following a protracted recession from 2009 to 2013, during which unemployment doubled to 7.4% and household consumption contracted for four consecutive years, economic growth began inching forward in 2014. Since 2010, Prime Minister Mark RUTTE’s government has implemented significant austerity measures to improve public finances and has instituted broad structural reforms in key policy areas, including the labor market, the housing sector, the energy market, and the pension system. In 2017, the government budget returned to a surplus of 0.7% of GDP, with economic growth of 3.2%, and GDP per capita finally surpassed pre-crisis levels. The fiscal policy announced by the new government in the 2018-2021 coalition plans for increases in government consumption and public investment, fueling domestic demand and household consumption and investment. The new government’s policy also plans to increase demand for workers in the public and private sector, forecasting a further decline in the unemployment rate, which hit 4.8% in 2017.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -988,10 +988,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "4.937 million (2020)" + "text": "4.937 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "28.81 (2020 est.)" + "text": "29 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1030,10 +1030,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "7,525,016 (2021)" + "text": "7,525,016 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "43.92 (2021)" + "text": "44 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/no.json b/europe/no.json index 43604263..573f0a76 100644 --- a/europe/no.json +++ b/europe/no.json @@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Norway has a stable economy with a vibrant private sector, a large state sector, and an extensive social safety net. Norway opted out of the EU during a referendum in November 1994. However, as a member of the European Economic Area, Norway partially participates in the EU’s single market and contributes sizably to the EU budget.
The country is richly endowed with natural resources such as oil and gas, fish, forests, and minerals. Norway is a leading producer and the world’s second largest exporter of seafood, after China. The government manages the country’s petroleum resources through extensive regulation. The petroleum sector provides about 9% of jobs, 12% of GDP, 13% of the state’s revenue, and 37% of exports, according to official national estimates. Norway is one of the world's leading petroleum exporters, although oil production is close to 50% below its peak in 2000. Gas production, conversely, has more than doubled since 2000. Although oil production is historically low, it rose in 2016 for the third consecutive year due to the higher production of existing oil fields and to new fields coming on stream. Norway’s domestic electricity production relies almost entirely on hydropower.
In anticipation of eventual declines in oil and gas production, Norway saves state revenue from petroleum sector activities in the world's largest sovereign wealth fund, valued at over $1 trillion at the end of 2017. To help balance the federal budget each year, the government follows a \"fiscal rule,\" which states that spending of revenues from petroleum and fund investments shall correspond to the expected real rate of return on the fund, an amount it estimates is sustainable over time. In February 2017, the government revised the expected rate of return for the fund downward from 4% to 3%.
After solid GDP growth in the 2004-07 period, the economy slowed in 2008, and contracted in 2009, before returning to modest, positive growth from 2010 to 2017. The Norwegian economy has been adjusting to lower energy prices, as demonstrated by growth in labor force participation and employment in 2017. GDP growth was about 1.5% in 2017, driven largely by domestic demand, which has been boosted by the rebound in the labor market and supportive fiscal policies. Economic growth is expected to remain constant or improve slightly in the next few years.
" + "text": "Norway has a stable economy with a vibrant private sector, a large state sector, and an extensive social safety net. Norway opted out of the EU during a referendum in November 1994. However, as a member of the European Economic Area, Norway partially participates in the EU’s single market and contributes sizably to the EU budget.
The country is richly endowed with natural resources such as oil and gas, fish, forests, and minerals. Norway is a leading producer and the world’s second largest exporter of seafood, after China. The government manages the country’s petroleum resources through extensive regulation. The petroleum sector provides about 9% of jobs, 12% of GDP, 13% of the state’s revenue, and 37% of exports, according to official national estimates. Norway is one of the world's leading petroleum exporters, although oil production is close to 50% below its peak in 2000. Gas production, conversely, has more than doubled since 2000. Although oil production is historically low, it rose in 2016 for the third consecutive year due to the higher production of existing oil fields and to new fields coming on stream. Norway’s domestic electricity production relies almost entirely on hydropower.
In anticipation of eventual declines in oil and gas production, Norway saves state revenue from petroleum sector activities in the world's largest sovereign wealth fund, valued at over $1 trillion at the end of 2017. To help balance the federal budget each year, the government follows a \"fiscal rule,\" which states that spending of revenues from petroleum and fund investments shall correspond to the expected real rate of return on the fund, an amount it estimates is sustainable over time. In February 2017, the government revised the expected rate of return for the fund downward from 4% to 3%.
After solid GDP growth in the 2004-07 period, the economy slowed in 2008, and contracted in 2009, before returning to modest, positive growth from 2010 to 2017. The Norwegian economy has been adjusting to lower energy prices, as demonstrated by growth in labor force participation and employment in 2017. GDP growth was about 1.5% in 2017, driven largely by domestic demand, which has been boosted by the rebound in the labor market and supportive fiscal policies. Economic growth is expected to remain constant or improve slightly in the next few years.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -970,10 +970,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "348,808 (2020)" + "text": "348,808 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "6.43 (2020 est.)" + "text": "6 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1012,10 +1012,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "2,387,661 (2021)" + "text": "2,387,661 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "44.04 (2021)" + "text": "44 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/pl.json b/europe/pl.json index 5b69d74f..6f51cb31 100644 --- a/europe/pl.json +++ b/europe/pl.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "Poland's history as a state began near the middle of the 10th century. By the mid-16th century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth ruled a vast tract of land in Central and Eastern Europe. During the 18th century, internal disorders weakened the nation, and in a series of agreements between 1772 and 1795, Russia, Prussia, and Austria partitioned Poland among themselves. Poland regained its independence in 1918 only to be overrun by Germany and the Soviet Union in World War II. It became a Soviet satellite state following the war. Labor turmoil in 1980 led to the formation of the independent trade union \"Solidarity\" that over time became a political force with over 10 million members. Free elections in 1989 and 1990 won Solidarity control of the parliament and the presidency, bringing the communist era to a close. A \"shock therapy\" program during the early 1990s enabled the country to transform its economy into one of the most robust in Central Europe. Poland joined NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004. " + "text": "Poland's history as a state began near the middle of the 10th century. By the mid-16th century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth ruled a vast tract of land in Central and Eastern Europe. During the 18th century, internal disorders weakened the nation, and in a series of agreements between 1772 and 1795, Russia, Prussia, and Austria partitioned Poland among themselves. Poland regained its independence in 1918 only to be overrun by Germany and the Soviet Union in World War II. It became a Soviet satellite state following the war. Labor turmoil in 1980 led to the formation of the independent trade union \"Solidarity\" that over time became a political force with over 10 million members. Free elections in 1989 and 1990 won Solidarity control of the parliament and the presidency, bringing the communist era to a close. A \"shock therapy\" program during the early 1990s enabled the country to transform its economy into one of the most robust in Central Europe. Poland joined NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004." } }, "Geography": { @@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Poland has the sixth-largest economy in the EU and has long had a reputation as a business-friendly country with largely sound macroeconomic policies. Since 1990, Poland has pursued a policy of economic liberalization. During the 2008-09 economic slowdown Poland was the only EU country to avoid a recession, in part because of the government’s loose fiscal policy combined with a commitment to rein in spending in the medium-term Poland is the largest recipient of EU development funds and their cyclical allocation can significantly impact the rate of economic growth.
The Polish economy performed well during the 2014-17 period, with the real GDP growth rate generally exceeding 3%, in part because of increases in government social spending that have helped to accelerate consumer-driven growth. However, since 2015, Poland has implemented new business restrictions and taxes on foreign-dominated economic sectors, including banking and insurance, energy, and healthcare, that have dampened investor sentiment and has increased the government’s ownership of some firms. The government reduced the retirement age in 2016 and has had mixed success in introducing new taxes and boosting tax compliance to offset the increased costs of social spending programs and relieve upward pressure on the budget deficit. Some credit ratings agencies estimate that Poland during the next few years is at risk of exceeding the EU’s 3%-of-GDP limit on budget deficits, possibly impacting its access to future EU funds. Poland’s economy is projected to perform well in the next few years in part because of an anticipated cyclical increase in the use of its EU development funds and continued, robust household spending.
Poland faces several systemic challenges, which include addressing some of the remaining deficiencies in its road and rail infrastructure, business environment, rigid labor code, commercial court system, government red tape, and burdensome tax system, especially for entrepreneurs. Additional long-term challenges include diversifying Poland’s energy mix, strengthening investments in innovation, research, and development, as well as stemming the outflow of educated young Poles to other EU member states, especially in light of a coming demographic contraction due to emigration, persistently low fertility rates, and the aging of the Solidarity-era baby boom generation.
" + "text": "Poland has the sixth-largest economy in the EU and has long had a reputation as a business-friendly country with largely sound macroeconomic policies. Since 1990, Poland has pursued a policy of economic liberalization. During the 2008-09 economic slowdown Poland was the only EU country to avoid a recession, in part because of the government’s loose fiscal policy combined with a commitment to rein in spending in the medium-term Poland is the largest recipient of EU development funds and their cyclical allocation can significantly impact the rate of economic growth.
The Polish economy performed well during the 2014-17 period, with the real GDP growth rate generally exceeding 3%, in part because of increases in government social spending that have helped to accelerate consumer-driven growth. However, since 2015, Poland has implemented new business restrictions and taxes on foreign-dominated economic sectors, including banking and insurance, energy, and healthcare, that have dampened investor sentiment and has increased the government’s ownership of some firms. The government reduced the retirement age in 2016 and has had mixed success in introducing new taxes and boosting tax compliance to offset the increased costs of social spending programs and relieve upward pressure on the budget deficit. Some credit ratings agencies estimate that Poland during the next few years is at risk of exceeding the EU’s 3%-of-GDP limit on budget deficits, possibly impacting its access to future EU funds. Poland’s economy is projected to perform well in the next few years in part because of an anticipated cyclical increase in the use of its EU development funds and continued, robust household spending.
Poland faces several systemic challenges, which include addressing some of the remaining deficiencies in its road and rail infrastructure, business environment, rigid labor code, commercial court system, government red tape, and burdensome tax system, especially for entrepreneurs. Additional long-term challenges include diversifying Poland’s energy mix, strengthening investments in innovation, research, and development, as well as stemming the outflow of educated young Poles to other EU member states, especially in light of a coming demographic contraction due to emigration, persistently low fertility rates, and the aging of the Solidarity-era baby boom generation.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1019,10 +1019,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "5,777,428 (2020)" + "text": "5,777,428 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "15.27 (2020 est.)" + "text": "15 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1061,10 +1061,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "8,369,218 (2022)" + "text": "8,369,218 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "22.11 (2022)" + "text": "22 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1233,7 +1233,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "9,870 (Russia) (2019); 3,234,036 (as of 9 May 2022)" + "text": "9,870 (Russia) (2019); 3,357,984 (as of 15 May 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "1,389 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/po.json b/europe/po.json index f08fa32b..71fb711f 100644 --- a/europe/po.json +++ b/europe/po.json @@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Portugal has become a diversified and increasingly service-based economy since joining the European Community - the EU's predecessor - in 1986. Over the following two decades, successive governments privatized many state-controlled firms and liberalized key areas of the economy, including the financial and telecommunications sectors. The country joined the Economic and Monetary Union in 1999 and began circulating the euro on 1 January 2002 along with 11 other EU members.
The economy grew by more than the EU average for much of the 1990s, but the rate of growth slowed in 2001-08. After the global financial crisis in 2008, Portugal’s economy contracted in 2009 and fell into recession from 2011 to 2013, as the government implemented spending cuts and tax increases to comply with conditions of an EU-IMF financial rescue package, signed in May 2011. Portugal successfully exited its EU-IMF program in May 2014, and its economic recovery gained traction in 2015 because of strong exports and a rebound in private consumption. GDP growth accelerated in 2016, and probably reached 2.5 % in 2017. Unemployment remained high, at 9.7% in 2017, but has improved steadily since peaking at 18% in 2013.
The center-left minority Socialist government has unwound some unpopular austerity measures while managing to remain within most EU fiscal targets. The budget deficit fell from 11.2% of GDP in 2010 to 1.8% in 2017, the country’s lowest since democracy was restored in 1974, and surpassing the EU and IMF projections of 3%. Portugal exited the EU’s excessive deficit procedure in mid-2017.
" + "text": "Portugal has become a diversified and increasingly service-based economy since joining the European Community - the EU's predecessor - in 1986. Over the following two decades, successive governments privatized many state-controlled firms and liberalized key areas of the economy, including the financial and telecommunications sectors. The country joined the Economic and Monetary Union in 1999 and began circulating the euro on 1 January 2002 along with 11 other EU members.
The economy grew by more than the EU average for much of the 1990s, but the rate of growth slowed in 2001-08. After the global financial crisis in 2008, Portugal’s economy contracted in 2009 and fell into recession from 2011 to 2013, as the government implemented spending cuts and tax increases to comply with conditions of an EU-IMF financial rescue package, signed in May 2011. Portugal successfully exited its EU-IMF program in May 2014, and its economic recovery gained traction in 2015 because of strong exports and a rebound in private consumption. GDP growth accelerated in 2016, and probably reached 2.5 % in 2017. Unemployment remained high, at 9.7% in 2017, but has improved steadily since peaking at 18% in 2013.
The center-left minority Socialist government has unwound some unpopular austerity measures while managing to remain within most EU fiscal targets. The budget deficit fell from 11.2% of GDP in 2010 to 1.8% in 2017, the country’s lowest since democracy was restored in 1974, and surpassing the EU and IMF projections of 3%. Portugal exited the EU’s excessive deficit procedure in mid-2017.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -985,10 +985,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "5,212,507 (2020)" + "text": "5,212,507 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "51.12 (2020 est.)" + "text": "51 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1027,10 +1027,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "4,160,795 (2021)" + "text": "4,160,795 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "40.81 (2021)" + "text": "41 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/ri.json b/europe/ri.json index cfd4b789..36deae64 100644 --- a/europe/ri.json +++ b/europe/ri.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was formed in 1918; its name was changed to Yugoslavia in 1929. Communist Partisans resisted the Axis occupation and division of Yugoslavia from 1941 to 1945 and fought nationalist opponents and collaborators as well. The military and political movement headed by Josip Broz \"TITO\" (Partisans) took full control of Yugoslavia when their domestic rivals and the occupiers were defeated in 1945. Although communists, TITO and his successors (Tito died in 1980) managed to steer their own path between the Warsaw Pact nations and the West for the next four and a half decades. In 1989, Slobodan MILOSEVIC became president of the Republic of Serbia and his ultranationalist calls for Serbian domination led to the violent breakup of Yugoslavia along ethnic lines. In 1991, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia declared independence, followed by Bosnia in 1992. The remaining republics of Serbia and Montenegro declared a new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in April 1992 and under MILOSEVIC's leadership, Serbia led various military campaigns to unite ethnic Serbs in neighboring republics into a \"Greater Serbia.\" These actions ultimately failed and, after international intervention, led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995.
MILOSEVIC retained control over Serbia and eventually became president of the FRY in 1997. In 1998, an ethnic Albanian insurgency in the formerly autonomous Serbian province of Kosovo provoked a Serbian counterinsurgency campaign that resulted in massacres and massive expulsions of ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo. The MILOSEVIC government's rejection of a proposed international settlement led to NATO's bombing of Serbia in the spring of 1999. Serbian military and police forces withdrew from Kosovo in June 1999, and the UN Security Council authorized an interim UN administration and a NATO-led security force in Kosovo. FRY elections in late 2000 led to the ouster of MILOSEVIC and the installation of democratic government. In 2003, the FRY became the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, a loose federation of the two republics. Widespread violence predominantly targeting ethnic Serbs in Kosovo in March 2004 led to more intense calls to address Kosovo's status, and the UN began facilitating status talks in 2006. In June 2006, Montenegro seceded from the federation and declared itself an independent nation. Serbia subsequently gave notice that it was the successor state to the union of Serbia and Montenegro.
In February 2008, after nearly two years of inconclusive negotiations, Kosovo declared itself independent of Serbia - an action Serbia refuses to recognize. At Serbia's request, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in October 2008 sought an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on whether Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence was in accordance with international law. In a ruling considered unfavorable to Serbia, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion in July 2010 stating that international law did not prohibit declarations of independence. In late 2010, Serbia agreed to an EU-drafted UNGA Resolution acknowledging the ICJ's decision and calling for a new round of talks between Serbia and Kosovo, this time on practical issues rather than Kosovo's status. Serbia and Kosovo signed the first agreement of principles governing the normalization of relations between the two countries in April 2013 and are in the process of implementing its provisions. In 2015, Serbia and Kosovo reached four additional agreements within the EU-led Brussels Dialogue framework. These included agreements on the Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities; telecommunications; energy production and distribution; and freedom of movement. President Aleksandar VUCIC has promoted an ambitious goal of Serbia joining the EU by 2025. Under his leadership as prime minister, in 2014 Serbia opened formal negotiations for accession.
" + "text": "The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was formed in 1918; its name was changed to Yugoslavia in 1929. Communist Partisans resisted the Axis occupation and division of Yugoslavia from 1941 to 1945 and fought nationalist opponents and collaborators as well. The military and political movement headed by Josip Broz \"TITO\" (Partisans) took full control of Yugoslavia when their domestic rivals and the occupiers were defeated in 1945. Although communists, TITO and his successors (Tito died in 1980) managed to steer their own path between the Warsaw Pact nations and the West for the next four and a half decades. In 1989, Slobodan MILOSEVIC became president of the Republic of Serbia and his ultranationalist calls for Serbian domination led to the violent breakup of Yugoslavia along ethnic lines. In 1991, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia declared independence, followed by Bosnia in 1992. The remaining republics of Serbia and Montenegro declared a new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in April 1992 and under MILOSEVIC's leadership, Serbia led various military campaigns to unite ethnic Serbs in neighboring republics into a \"Greater Serbia.\" These actions ultimately failed and, after international intervention, led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995.
MILOSEVIC retained control over Serbia and eventually became president of the FRY in 1997. In 1998, an ethnic Albanian insurgency in the formerly autonomous Serbian province of Kosovo provoked a Serbian counterinsurgency campaign that resulted in massacres and massive expulsions of ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo. The MILOSEVIC government's rejection of a proposed international settlement led to NATO's bombing of Serbia in the spring of 1999. Serbian military and police forces withdrew from Kosovo in June 1999, and the UN Security Council authorized an interim UN administration and a NATO-led security force in Kosovo. FRY elections in late 2000 led to the ouster of MILOSEVIC and the installation of democratic government. In 2003, the FRY became the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, a loose federation of the two republics. Widespread violence predominantly targeting ethnic Serbs in Kosovo in March 2004 led to more intense calls to address Kosovo's status, and the UN began facilitating status talks in 2006. In June 2006, Montenegro seceded from the federation and declared itself an independent nation. Serbia subsequently gave notice that it was the successor state to the union of Serbia and Montenegro.
In February 2008, after nearly two years of inconclusive negotiations, Kosovo declared itself independent of Serbia - an action Serbia refuses to recognize. At Serbia's request, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in October 2008 sought an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on whether Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence was in accordance with international law. In a ruling considered unfavorable to Serbia, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion in July 2010 stating that international law did not prohibit declarations of independence. In late 2010, Serbia agreed to an EU-drafted UNGA Resolution acknowledging the ICJ's decision and calling for a new round of talks between Serbia and Kosovo, this time on practical issues rather than Kosovo's status. Serbia and Kosovo signed the first agreement of principles governing the normalization of relations between the two countries in April 2013 and are in the process of implementing its provisions. In 2015, Serbia and Kosovo reached four additional agreements within the EU-led Brussels Dialogue framework. These included agreements on the Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities; telecommunications; energy production and distribution; and freedom of movement. President Aleksandar VUCIC has promoted an ambitious goal of Serbia joining the EU by 2025. Under his leadership as prime minister, in 2014 Serbia opened formal negotiations for accession.
" } }, "Geography": { @@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Serbia has a transitional economy largely dominated by market forces, but the state sector remains significant in certain areas. The economy relies on manufacturing and exports, driven largely by foreign investment. MILOSEVIC-era mismanagement of the economy, an extended period of international economic sanctions, civil war, and the damage to Yugoslavia's infrastructure and industry during the NATO airstrikes in 1999 left the economy worse off than it was in 1990. In 2015, Serbia’s GDP was 27.5% below where it was in 1989.
After former Federal Yugoslav President MILOSEVIC was ousted in September 2000, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition government implemented stabilization measures and embarked on a market reform program. Serbia renewed its membership in the IMF in December 2000 and rejoined the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Serbia has made progress in trade liberalization and enterprise restructuring and privatization, but many large enterprises - including the power utilities, telecommunications company, natural gas company, and others - remain state-owned. Serbia has made some progress towards EU membership, gaining candidate status in March 2012. In January 2014, Serbia's EU accession talks officially opened and, as of December 2017, Serbia had opened 12 negotiating chapters including one on foreign trade. Serbia's negotiations with the WTO are advanced, with the country's complete ban on the trade and cultivation of agricultural biotechnology products representing the primary remaining obstacle to accession. Serbia maintains a three-year Stand-by Arrangement with the IMF worth approximately $1.3 billion that is scheduled to end in February 2018. The government has shown progress implementing economic reforms, such as fiscal consolidation, privatization, and reducing public spending.
Unemployment in Serbia, while relatively low (16% in 2017) compared with its Balkan neighbors, remains significantly above the European average. Serbia is slowly implementing structural economic reforms needed to ensure the country's long-term prosperity. Serbia reduced its budget deficit to 1.7% of GDP and its public debt to 71% of GDP in 2017. Public debt had more than doubled between 2008 and 2015. Serbia's concerns about inflation and exchange-rate stability preclude the use of expansionary monetary policy.
Major economic challenges ahead include: stagnant household incomes; the need for private sector job creation; structural reforms of state-owned companies; strategic public sector reforms; and the need for new foreign direct investment. Other serious longer-term challenges include an inefficient judicial system, high levels of corruption, and an aging population. Factors favorable to Serbia's economic growth include the economic reforms it is undergoing as part of its EU accession process and IMF agreement, its strategic location, a relatively inexpensive and skilled labor force, and free trade agreements with the EU, Russia, Turkey, and countries that are members of the Central European Free Trade Agreement.
" + "text": "Serbia has a transitional economy largely dominated by market forces, but the state sector remains significant in certain areas. The economy relies on manufacturing and exports, driven largely by foreign investment. MILOSEVIC-era mismanagement of the economy, an extended period of international economic sanctions, civil war, and the damage to Yugoslavia's infrastructure and industry during the NATO airstrikes in 1999 left the economy worse off than it was in 1990. In 2015, Serbia’s GDP was 27.5% below where it was in 1989.
After former Federal Yugoslav President MILOSEVIC was ousted in September 2000, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition government implemented stabilization measures and embarked on a market reform program. Serbia renewed its membership in the IMF in December 2000 and rejoined the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Serbia has made progress in trade liberalization and enterprise restructuring and privatization, but many large enterprises - including the power utilities, telecommunications company, natural gas company, and others - remain state-owned. Serbia has made some progress towards EU membership, gaining candidate status in March 2012. In January 2014, Serbia's EU accession talks officially opened and, as of December 2017, Serbia had opened 12 negotiating chapters including one on foreign trade. Serbia's negotiations with the WTO are advanced, with the country's complete ban on the trade and cultivation of agricultural biotechnology products representing the primary remaining obstacle to accession. Serbia maintains a three-year Stand-by Arrangement with the IMF worth approximately $1.3 billion that is scheduled to end in February 2018. The government has shown progress implementing economic reforms, such as fiscal consolidation, privatization, and reducing public spending.
Unemployment in Serbia, while relatively low (16% in 2017) compared with its Balkan neighbors, remains significantly above the European average. Serbia is slowly implementing structural economic reforms needed to ensure the country's long-term prosperity. Serbia reduced its budget deficit to 1.7% of GDP and its public debt to 71% of GDP in 2017. Public debt had more than doubled between 2008 and 2015. Serbia's concerns about inflation and exchange-rate stability preclude the use of expansionary monetary policy.
Major economic challenges ahead include: stagnant household incomes; the need for private sector job creation; structural reforms of state-owned companies; strategic public sector reforms; and the need for new foreign direct investment. Other serious longer-term challenges include an inefficient judicial system, high levels of corruption, and an aging population. Factors favorable to Serbia's economic growth include the economic reforms it is undergoing as part of its EU accession process and IMF agreement, its strategic location, a relatively inexpensive and skilled labor force, and free trade agreements with the EU, Russia, Turkey, and countries that are members of the Central European Free Trade Agreement.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1015,10 +1015,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,572,169 (2020)" + "text": "2,572,254 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "37.43 (2020 est.)" + "text": "37 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1054,10 +1054,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,730,496 (2021)" + "text": "1,730,496 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "25.18 (2021)" + "text": "25 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1202,7 +1202,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "2,113 (includes stateless persons in Kosovo) (mid-year 2021)" }, - "note": "note: 828,876 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-April 2022); Serbia is predominantly a transit country and hosts an estimated 4,650 migrants and asylum seekers as of February 2022" + "note": "note: 830,610 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-May 2022); Serbia is predominantly a transit country and hosts an estimated 4,650 migrants and asylum seekers as of February 2022" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "drug trafficking groups are major players in the procurement and transportation of of large quantities of cocaine destined for European markets
" diff --git a/europe/ro.json b/europe/ro.json index 24e0d0d9..0daaa3cf 100644 --- a/europe/ro.json +++ b/europe/ro.json @@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Romania, which joined the EU on 1 January 2007, began the transition from communism in 1989 with a largely obsolete industrial base and a pattern of output unsuited to the country's needs. Romania's macroeconomic gains have only recently started to spur creation of a middle class and to address Romania's widespread poverty. Corruption and red tape continue to permeate the business environment.
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, Romania signed a $26 billion emergency assistance package from the IMF, the EU, and other international lenders, but GDP contracted until 2011. In March 2011, Romania and the IMF/EU/World Bank signed a 24-month precautionary standby agreement, worth $6.6 billion, to promote fiscal discipline, encourage progress on structural reforms, and strengthen financial sector stability; no funds were drawn. In September 2013, Romanian authorities and the IMF/EU agreed to a follow-on standby agreement, worth $5.4 billion, to continue with reforms. This agreement expired in September 2015, and no funds were drawn. Progress on structural reforms has been uneven, and the economy still is vulnerable to external shocks.
Economic growth rebounded in the 2013-17 period, driven by strong industrial exports, excellent agricultural harvests, and, more recently, expansionary fiscal policies in 2016-2017 that nearly quadrupled Bucharest’s annual fiscal deficit, from +0.8% of GDP in 2015 to -3% of GDP in 2016 and an estimated -3.4% in 2017. Industry outperformed other sectors of the economy in 2017. Exports remained an engine of economic growth, led by trade with the EU, which accounts for roughly 70% of Romania trade. Domestic demand was the major driver, due to tax cuts and large wage increases that began last year and are set to continue in 2018.
An aging population, emigration of skilled labor, significant tax evasion, insufficient health care, and an aggressive loosening of the fiscal package compromise Romania’s long-term growth and economic stability and are the economy's top vulnerabilities.
" + "text": "Romania, which joined the EU on 1 January 2007, began the transition from communism in 1989 with a largely obsolete industrial base and a pattern of output unsuited to the country's needs. Romania's macroeconomic gains have only recently started to spur creation of a middle class and to address Romania's widespread poverty. Corruption and red tape continue to permeate the business environment.
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, Romania signed a $26 billion emergency assistance package from the IMF, the EU, and other international lenders, but GDP contracted until 2011. In March 2011, Romania and the IMF/EU/World Bank signed a 24-month precautionary standby agreement, worth $6.6 billion, to promote fiscal discipline, encourage progress on structural reforms, and strengthen financial sector stability; no funds were drawn. In September 2013, Romanian authorities and the IMF/EU agreed to a follow-on standby agreement, worth $5.4 billion, to continue with reforms. This agreement expired in September 2015, and no funds were drawn. Progress on structural reforms has been uneven, and the economy still is vulnerable to external shocks.
Economic growth rebounded in the 2013-17 period, driven by strong industrial exports, excellent agricultural harvests, and, more recently, expansionary fiscal policies in 2016-2017 that nearly quadrupled Bucharest’s annual fiscal deficit, from +0.8% of GDP in 2015 to -3% of GDP in 2016 and an estimated -3.4% in 2017. Industry outperformed other sectors of the economy in 2017. Exports remained an engine of economic growth, led by trade with the EU, which accounts for roughly 70% of Romania trade. Domestic demand was the major driver, due to tax cuts and large wage increases that began last year and are set to continue in 2018.
An aging population, emigration of skilled labor, significant tax evasion, insufficient health care, and an aggressive loosening of the fiscal package compromise Romania’s long-term growth and economic stability and are the economy's top vulnerabilities.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -997,10 +997,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "3.025 million (2020)" + "text": "3.025 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "15.72 (2020 est.)" + "text": "16 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1039,10 +1039,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "5,684,782 (2021)" + "text": "5,684,782 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "29.55 (2021)" + "text": "30 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1197,7 +1197,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "883,655 (Ukraine) (as of 9 May 2022)" + "text": "919,574 (Ukraine) (as of 15 May 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "314 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/europe/si.json b/europe/si.json index 0ea9fbab..82559bc3 100644 --- a/europe/si.json +++ b/europe/si.json @@ -976,10 +976,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "704,909 (2020)" + "text": "704,909 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "33.91 (2020 est.)" + "text": "34 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1018,10 +1018,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "651,604 (2021)" + "text": "651,604 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "31.34 (2021)" + "text": "31 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1158,7 +1158,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "10 (2020)" }, - "note": "note: 537,923 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-March 2022)" + "note": "note: 538,973 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-April 2022)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "minor transit point for cocaine and Southwest Asian heroin bound for Western Europe, and for precursor chemicals" diff --git a/europe/sm.json b/europe/sm.json index ee9abbdf..cdb0e92a 100644 --- a/europe/sm.json +++ b/europe/sm.json @@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "San Marino's economy relies heavily on tourism, banking, and the manufacture and export of ceramics, clothing, fabrics, furniture, paints, spirits, tiles, and wine. The manufacturing and financial sectors account for more than half of San Marino's GDP. The per capita level of output and standard of living are comparable to those of the most prosperous regions of Italy.
San Marino's economy contracted considerably in the years since 2008, largely due to weakened demand from Italy - which accounts for nearly 90% of its export market - and financial sector consolidation. Difficulties in the banking sector, the global economic downturn, and the sizable decline in tax revenues all contributed to negative real GDP growth. The government adopted measures to counter the downturn, including subsidized credit to businesses and is seeking to shift its growth model away from a reliance on bank and tax secrecy. San Marino does not issue public debt securities; when necessary, it finances deficits by drawing down central bank deposits.
The economy benefits from foreign investment due to its relatively low corporate taxes and low taxes on interest earnings. The income tax rate is also very low, about one-third the average EU level. San Marino continues to work towards harmonizing its fiscal laws with EU and international standards. In September 2009, the OECD removed San Marino from its list of tax havens that have yet to fully adopt global tax standards, and in 2010 San Marino signed Tax Information Exchange Agreements with most major countries. In 2013, the San Marino Government signed a Double Taxation Agreement with Italy, but a referendum on EU membership failed to reach the quorum needed to bring it to a vote.
" + "text": "San Marino's economy relies heavily on tourism, banking, and the manufacture and export of ceramics, clothing, fabrics, furniture, paints, spirits, tiles, and wine. The manufacturing and financial sectors account for more than half of San Marino's GDP. The per capita level of output and standard of living are comparable to those of the most prosperous regions of Italy.
San Marino's economy contracted considerably in the years since 2008, largely due to weakened demand from Italy - which accounts for nearly 90% of its export market - and financial sector consolidation. Difficulties in the banking sector, the global economic downturn, and the sizable decline in tax revenues all contributed to negative real GDP growth. The government adopted measures to counter the downturn, including subsidized credit to businesses and is seeking to shift its growth model away from a reliance on bank and tax secrecy. San Marino does not issue public debt securities; when necessary, it finances deficits by drawing down central bank deposits.
The economy benefits from foreign investment due to its relatively low corporate taxes and low taxes on interest earnings. The income tax rate is also very low, about one-third the average EU level. San Marino continues to work towards harmonizing its fiscal laws with EU and international standards. In September 2009, the OECD removed San Marino from its list of tax havens that have yet to fully adopt global tax standards, and in 2010 San Marino signed Tax Information Exchange Agreements with most major countries. In 2013, the San Marino Government signed a Double Taxation Agreement with Italy, but a referendum on EU membership failed to reach the quorum needed to bring it to a vote.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": { @@ -814,10 +814,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "16,000 (2019)" + "text": "16,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "47.25 (2019 est.)" + "text": "47 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -856,10 +856,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "11,000 (2021)" + "text": "11,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "32.42 (2021)" + "text": "32 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/sp.json b/europe/sp.json index 0be7b4fc..85074c00 100644 --- a/europe/sp.json +++ b/europe/sp.json @@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "After a prolonged recession that began in 2008 in the wake of the global financial crisis, Spain marked the fourth full year of positive economic growth in 2017, with economic activity surpassing its pre-crisis peak, largely because of increased private consumption. The financial crisis of 2008 broke 16 consecutive years of economic growth for Spain, leading to an economic contraction that lasted until late 2013. In that year, the government successfully shored up its struggling banking sector - heavily exposed to the collapse of Spain’s real estate boom - with the help of an EU-funded restructuring and recapitalization program.
Until 2014, contraction in bank lending, fiscal austerity, and high unemployment constrained domestic consumption and investment. The unemployment rate rose from a low of about 8% in 2007 to more than 26% in 2013, but labor reforms prompted a modest reduction to 16.4% in 2017. High unemployment strained Spain's public finances, as spending on social benefits increased while tax revenues fell. Spain’s budget deficit peaked at 11.4% of GDP in 2010, but Spain gradually reduced the deficit to about 3.3% of GDP in 2017. Public debt has increased substantially – from 60.1% of GDP in 2010 to nearly 96.7% in 2017.
Strong export growth helped bring Spain's current account into surplus in 2013 for the first time since 1986 and sustain Spain’s economic growth. Increasing labor productivity and an internal devaluation resulting from moderating labor costs and lower inflation have improved Spain’s export competitiveness and generated foreign investor interest in the economy, restoring FDI flows.
In 2017, the Spanish Government’s minority status constrained its ability to implement controversial labor, pension, health care, tax, and education reforms. The European Commission expects the government to meet its 2017 budget deficit target and anticipates that expected economic growth in 2018 will help the government meet its deficit target. Spain’s borrowing costs are dramatically lower since their peak in mid-2012, and increased economic activity has generated a modest level of inflation, at 2% in 2017.
" + "text": "After a prolonged recession that began in 2008 in the wake of the global financial crisis, Spain marked the fourth full year of positive economic growth in 2017, with economic activity surpassing its pre-crisis peak, largely because of increased private consumption. The financial crisis of 2008 broke 16 consecutive years of economic growth for Spain, leading to an economic contraction that lasted until late 2013. In that year, the government successfully shored up its struggling banking sector - heavily exposed to the collapse of Spain’s real estate boom - with the help of an EU-funded restructuring and recapitalization program.
Until 2014, contraction in bank lending, fiscal austerity, and high unemployment constrained domestic consumption and investment. The unemployment rate rose from a low of about 8% in 2007 to more than 26% in 2013, but labor reforms prompted a modest reduction to 16.4% in 2017. High unemployment strained Spain's public finances, as spending on social benefits increased while tax revenues fell. Spain’s budget deficit peaked at 11.4% of GDP in 2010, but Spain gradually reduced the deficit to about 3.3% of GDP in 2017. Public debt has increased substantially – from 60.1% of GDP in 2010 to nearly 96.7% in 2017.
Strong export growth helped bring Spain's current account into surplus in 2013 for the first time since 1986 and sustain Spain’s economic growth. Increasing labor productivity and an internal devaluation resulting from moderating labor costs and lower inflation have improved Spain’s export competitiveness and generated foreign investor interest in the economy, restoring FDI flows.
In 2017, the Spanish Government’s minority status constrained its ability to implement controversial labor, pension, health care, tax, and education reforms. The European Commission expects the government to meet its 2017 budget deficit target and anticipates that expected economic growth in 2018 will help the government meet its deficit target. Spain’s borrowing costs are dramatically lower since their peak in mid-2012, and increased economic activity has generated a modest level of inflation, at 2% in 2017.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1009,10 +1009,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "19,455,779 (2020)" + "text": "19,455,658 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "41.61 (2020 est.)" + "text": "42 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1051,10 +1051,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "16,188,502 (2021)" + "text": "16,188,502 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "34.62 (2021)" + "text": "35 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1224,7 +1224,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "6,.92 (mid-year 2021)" }, - "note": "note: 257,630 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals, including Canary Islands (January 2015-April 2022)" + "note": "note: 258,339 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals, including Canary Islands (January 2015-May 2022)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "primary transit point in Europe for cocaine from South America and for hashish from Morocco; cocaine is shipped in raw or liquid form with mixed cargo to avoid detection; traffickers ship methamphetamine via express mail; increasing number of indoor cannabis grow operations; illegal labs cutting, mixing, and reconstituting cocaine, and heroin and methamphetamine labs; synthetic drugs, including ketamine and MDMA (ecstasy) transit from Spain to the United States" diff --git a/europe/sv.json b/europe/sv.json index f05a4991..149057d1 100644 --- a/europe/sv.json +++ b/europe/sv.json @@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Coal mining, tourism, and international research are Svalbard's major industries. Coal mining has historically been the dominant economic activity, and the Spitzbergen Treaty of 9 February 1920 gives the 45 countries that so far have ratified the treaty equal rights to exploit mineral deposits, subject to Norwegian regulation. Although US, UK, Dutch, and Swedish coal companies have mined in the past, the only companies still engaging in this are Norwegian and Russian. Low coal prices have forced the Norwegian coal company, Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani, to close one of its two mines and to considerably reduce the activity of the other. Since the 1990s, the tourism and hospitality industry has grown rapidly, and Svalbard now receives 60,000 visitors annually.
The settlements on Svalbard were established as company towns, and at their height in the 1950s, the Norwegian state-owned coal company supported nearly 1,000 jobs. Today, only about 300 people work in the mining industry.
Goods such as alcohol, tobacco, and vehicles, normally highly taxed on mainland Norway, are considerably cheaper in Svalbard in an effort by the Norwegian Government to entice more people to live on the Arctic archipelago. By law, Norway collects only enough taxes to pay for the needs of the local government; none of tax proceeds go to the central government.
" + "text": "Coal mining, tourism, and international research are Svalbard's major industries. Coal mining has historically been the dominant economic activity, and the Spitzbergen Treaty of 9 February 1920 gives the 45 countries that so far have ratified the treaty equal rights to exploit mineral deposits, subject to Norwegian regulation. Although US, UK, Dutch, and Swedish coal companies have mined in the past, the only companies still engaging in this are Norwegian and Russian. Low coal prices have forced the Norwegian coal company, Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani, to close one of its two mines and to considerably reduce the activity of the other. Since the 1990s, the tourism and hospitality industry has grown rapidly, and Svalbard now receives 60,000 visitors annually.
The settlements on Svalbard were established as company towns, and at their height in the 1950s, the Norwegian state-owned coal company supported nearly 1,000 jobs. Today, only about 300 people work in the mining industry.
Goods such as alcohol, tobacco, and vehicles, normally highly taxed on mainland Norway, are considerably cheaper in Svalbard in an effort by the Norwegian Government to entice more people to live on the Arctic archipelago. By law, Norway collects only enough taxes to pay for the needs of the local government; none of tax proceeds go to the central government.
" }, "Real GDP growth rate": { "text": "NA
" diff --git a/europe/sw.json b/europe/sw.json index 72fe8187..f7a4a0a3 100644 --- a/europe/sw.json +++ b/europe/sw.json @@ -972,10 +972,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1,624,271 (2020)" + "text": "1,478,610 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "16.08 (2020 est.)" + "text": "15 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1014,10 +1014,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "4,179,574 (2021)" + "text": "4,179,574 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "41.38 (2021)" + "text": "41 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/sz.json b/europe/sz.json index b7d06b32..40d4b695 100644 --- a/europe/sz.json +++ b/europe/sz.json @@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Switzerland, a country that espouses neutrality, is a prosperous and modern market economy with low unemployment, a highly skilled labor force, and a per capita GDP among the highest in the world. Switzerland's economy benefits from a highly developed service sector, led by financial services, and a manufacturing industry that specializes in high-technology, knowledge-based production. Its economic and political stability, transparent legal system, exceptional infrastructure, efficient capital markets, and low corporate tax rates also make Switzerland one of the world's most competitive economies.
The Swiss have brought their economic practices largely into conformity with the EU's to gain access to the Union’s Single Market and enhance the country’s international competitiveness. Some trade protectionism remains, however, particularly for its small agricultural sector. The fate of the Swiss economy is tightly linked to that of its neighbors in the euro zone, which purchases half of Swiss exports. The global financial crisis of 2008 and resulting economic downturn in 2009 stalled demand for Swiss exports and put Switzerland into a recession. During this period, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) implemented a zero-interest rate policy to boost the economy, as well as to prevent appreciation of the franc, and Switzerland's economy began to recover in 2010.
The sovereign debt crises unfolding in neighboring euro-zone countries, however, coupled with economic instability in Russia and other Eastern European economies drove up demand for the Swiss franc by investors seeking a safehaven currency. In January 2015, the SNB abandoned the Swiss franc’s peg to the euro, roiling global currency markets and making active SNB intervention a necessary hallmark of present-day Swiss monetary policy. The independent SNB has upheld its zero interest rate policy and conducted major market interventions to prevent further appreciation of the Swiss franc, but parliamentarians have urged it to do more to weaken the currency. The franc's strength has made Swiss exports less competitive and weakened the country's growth outlook; GDP growth fell below 2% per year from 2011 through 2017.
In recent years, Switzerland has responded to increasing pressure from neighboring countries and trading partners to reform its banking secrecy laws, by agreeing to conform to OECD regulations on administrative assistance in tax matters, including tax evasion. The Swiss Government has also renegotiated its double taxation agreements with numerous countries, including the US, to incorporate OECD standards.
" + "text": "Switzerland, a country that espouses neutrality, is a prosperous and modern market economy with low unemployment, a highly skilled labor force, and a per capita GDP among the highest in the world. Switzerland's economy benefits from a highly developed service sector, led by financial services, and a manufacturing industry that specializes in high-technology, knowledge-based production. Its economic and political stability, transparent legal system, exceptional infrastructure, efficient capital markets, and low corporate tax rates also make Switzerland one of the world's most competitive economies.
The Swiss have brought their economic practices largely into conformity with the EU's to gain access to the Union’s Single Market and enhance the country’s international competitiveness. Some trade protectionism remains, however, particularly for its small agricultural sector. The fate of the Swiss economy is tightly linked to that of its neighbors in the euro zone, which purchases half of Swiss exports. The global financial crisis of 2008 and resulting economic downturn in 2009 stalled demand for Swiss exports and put Switzerland into a recession. During this period, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) implemented a zero-interest rate policy to boost the economy, as well as to prevent appreciation of the franc, and Switzerland's economy began to recover in 2010.
The sovereign debt crises unfolding in neighboring euro-zone countries, however, coupled with economic instability in Russia and other Eastern European economies drove up demand for the Swiss franc by investors seeking a safehaven currency. In January 2015, the SNB abandoned the Swiss franc’s peg to the euro, roiling global currency markets and making active SNB intervention a necessary hallmark of present-day Swiss monetary policy. The independent SNB has upheld its zero interest rate policy and conducted major market interventions to prevent further appreciation of the Swiss franc, but parliamentarians have urged it to do more to weaken the currency. The franc's strength has made Swiss exports less competitive and weakened the country's growth outlook; GDP growth fell below 2% per year from 2011 through 2017.
In recent years, Switzerland has responded to increasing pressure from neighboring countries and trading partners to reform its banking secrecy laws, by agreeing to conform to OECD regulations on administrative assistance in tax matters, including tax evasion. The Swiss Government has also renegotiated its double taxation agreements with numerous countries, including the US, to incorporate OECD standards.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -986,10 +986,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2.952 million (2020)" + "text": "3,071,296 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "34.11 (2020 est.)" + "text": "35 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1028,10 +1028,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "4,028,238 (2021)" + "text": "4,028,238 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "46.54 (2021)" + "text": "47 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/uk.json b/europe/uk.json index 765908f9..ce9740aa 100644 --- a/europe/uk.json +++ b/europe/uk.json @@ -985,10 +985,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "32.078 million (2020)" + "text": "32.037 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "47.25 (2020 est.)" + "text": "47 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1027,10 +1027,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "27,330,297 (2021)" + "text": "27,330,297 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "40.26 (2021)" + "text": "40 (2020 est.)" } }, "Communications - note": { diff --git a/europe/up.json b/europe/up.json index 7396ac28..c9cb6a89 100644 --- a/europe/up.json +++ b/europe/up.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "Ukraine was the center of the first eastern Slavic state, Kyivan Rus, which during the 10th and 11th centuries was the largest and most powerful state in Europe. Weakened by internecine quarrels and Mongol invasions, Kyivan Rus was incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and eventually into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The cultural and religious legacy of Kyivan Rus laid the foundation for Ukrainian nationalism through subsequent centuries. A new Ukrainian state, the Cossack Hetmanate, was established during the mid-17th century after an uprising against the Poles. Despite continuous Muscovite pressure, the Hetmanate managed to remain autonomous for well over 100 years. During the latter part of the 18th century, most Ukrainian ethnographic territory was absorbed by the Russian Empire. Following the collapse of czarist Russia in 1917, Ukraine achieved a short-lived period of independence (1917-20), but was reconquered and endured a brutal Soviet rule that engineered two forced famines (1921-22 and 1932-33) in which over 8 million died. In World War II, German and Soviet armies were responsible for 7 to 8 million more deaths. Although Ukraine achieved independence in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR, democracy and prosperity remained elusive as the legacy of state control and endemic corruption stalled efforts at economic reform, privatization, and civil liberties.
A peaceful mass protest referred to as the \"Orange Revolution\" in the closing months of 2004 forced the authorities to overturn a rigged presidential election and to allow a new internationally monitored vote that swept into power a reformist slate under Viktor YUSHCHENKO. Subsequent internal squabbles in the YUSHCHENKO camp allowed his rival Viktor YANUKOVYCH to stage a comeback in parliamentary (Rada) elections, become prime minister in August 2006, and be elected president in February 2010. In October 2012, Ukraine held Rada elections, widely criticized by Western observers as flawed due to use of government resources to favor ruling party candidates, interference with media access, and harassment of opposition candidates. President YANUKOVYCH's backtracking on a trade and cooperation agreement with the EU in November 2013 - in favor of closer economic ties with Russia - and subsequent use of force against students, civil society activists, and other civilians in favor of the agreement led to a three-month protest occupation of Kyiv's central square. The government's use of violence to break up the protest camp in February 2014 led to all out pitched battles, scores of deaths, international condemnation, a failed political deal, and the president's abrupt departure for Russia. New elections in the spring allowed pro-West president Petro POROSHENKO to assume office in June 2014; he was succeeded by Volodymyr ZELENSKY in May 2019.
Shortly after YANUKOVYCH's departure in late February 2014, Russian President PUTIN ordered the invasion of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula falsely claiming the action was to protect ethnic Russians living there. Two weeks later, a \"referendum\" was held regarding the integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation. The \"referendum\" was condemned as illegitimate by the Ukrainian Government, the EU, the US, and the UN General Assembly (UNGA). In response to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, 100 members of the UN passed UNGA resolution 68/262, rejecting the \"referendum\" as baseless and invalid and confirming the sovereignty, political independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. In mid-2014, Russia began supplying proxies in two of Ukraine's eastern provinces with manpower, funding, and materiel driving an armed conflict with the Ukrainian Government that continues to this day. Representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and the unrecognized Russian proxy republics signed the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum in September 2014 to end the conflict. However, this agreement failed to stop the fighting or find a political solution. In a renewed attempt to alleviate ongoing clashes, leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany negotiated a follow-on Package of Measures in February 2015 to implement the Minsk agreements. Representatives from Ukraine, Russia, the unrecognized Russian proxy republics, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe also meet regularly to facilitate implementation of the peace deal. By early 2022, more than 14,000 civilians were killed or wounded as a result of the Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine.
On 24 February 2022, Russia escalated its conflict with Ukraine by invading the country on several fronts in what has become the largest conventional military attack on a sovereign state in Europe since World War II. The invasion has received near universal international condemnation and many countries have imposed sanctions on Russia and also supplied humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. The invasion has also created Europe's largest refugee crisis since World War II. As of 10 May, approximately 5.98 million people had fled Ukraine, and nearly 8.03 million people were internally displaced as of 3 May. More than 7,170 civilian casualties had been reported, as of 9 May.
" + "text": "
Ukraine was the center of the first eastern Slavic state, Kyivan Rus, which during the 10th and 11th centuries was the largest and most powerful state in Europe. Weakened by internecine quarrels and Mongol invasions, Kyivan Rus was incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and eventually into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The cultural and religious legacy of Kyivan Rus laid the foundation for Ukrainian nationalism through subsequent centuries. A new Ukrainian state, the Cossack Hetmanate, was established during the mid-17th century after an uprising against the Poles. Despite continuous Muscovite pressure, the Hetmanate managed to remain autonomous for well over 100 years. During the latter part of the 18th century, most Ukrainian ethnographic territory was absorbed by the Russian Empire. Following the collapse of czarist Russia in 1917, Ukraine achieved a short-lived period of independence (1917-20), but was reconquered and endured a brutal Soviet rule that engineered two forced famines (1921-22 and 1932-33) in which over 8 million died. In World War II, German and Soviet armies were responsible for 7 to 8 million more deaths. Although Ukraine achieved independence in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR, democracy and prosperity remained elusive as the legacy of state control and endemic corruption stalled efforts at economic reform, privatization, and civil liberties.
A peaceful mass protest referred to as the \"Orange Revolution\" in the closing months of 2004 forced the authorities to overturn a rigged presidential election and to allow a new internationally monitored vote that swept into power a reformist slate under Viktor YUSHCHENKO. Subsequent internal squabbles in the YUSHCHENKO camp allowed his rival Viktor YANUKOVYCH to stage a comeback in parliamentary (Rada) elections, become prime minister in August 2006, and be elected president in February 2010. In October 2012, Ukraine held Rada elections, widely criticized by Western observers as flawed due to use of government resources to favor ruling party candidates, interference with media access, and harassment of opposition candidates. President YANUKOVYCH's backtracking on a trade and cooperation agreement with the EU in November 2013 - in favor of closer economic ties with Russia - and subsequent use of force against students, civil society activists, and other civilians in favor of the agreement led to a three-month protest occupation of Kyiv's central square. The government's use of violence to break up the protest camp in February 2014 led to all out pitched battles, scores of deaths, international condemnation, a failed political deal, and the president's abrupt departure for Russia. New elections in the spring allowed pro-West president Petro POROSHENKO to assume office in June 2014; he was succeeded by Volodymyr ZELENSKY in May 2019.
Shortly after YANUKOVYCH's departure in late February 2014, Russian President PUTIN ordered the invasion of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula falsely claiming the action was to protect ethnic Russians living there. Two weeks later, a \"referendum\" was held regarding the integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation. The \"referendum\" was condemned as illegitimate by the Ukrainian Government, the EU, the US, and the UN General Assembly (UNGA). In response to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, 100 members of the UN passed UNGA resolution 68/262, rejecting the \"referendum\" as baseless and invalid and confirming the sovereignty, political independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. In mid-2014, Russia began supplying proxies in two of Ukraine's eastern provinces with manpower, funding, and materiel driving an armed conflict with the Ukrainian Government that continues to this day. Representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and the unrecognized Russian proxy republics signed the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum in September 2014 to end the conflict. However, this agreement failed to stop the fighting or find a political solution. In a renewed attempt to alleviate ongoing clashes, leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany negotiated a follow-on Package of Measures in February 2015 to implement the Minsk agreements. Representatives from Ukraine, Russia, the unrecognized Russian proxy republics, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe also meet regularly to facilitate implementation of the peace deal. By early 2022, more than 14,000 civilians were killed or wounded as a result of the Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine.
On 24 February 2022, Russia escalated its conflict with Ukraine by invading the country on several fronts in what has become the largest conventional military attack on a sovereign state in Europe since World War II. The invasion has received near universal international condemnation, and many countries have imposed sanctions on Russia and also supplied humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. The invasion has also created Europe's largest refugee crisis since World War II. As of 16 May, approximately 6.27 million people had fled Ukraine, and nearly 8.03 million people were internally displaced as of 3 May. At least 7,060 civilian casualties had been reported, as of 10 May.
" } }, "Geography": { @@ -1006,10 +1006,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "3,314,263 (2020)" + "text": "3,314,263 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "7.94 (2020 est.)" + "text": "8 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1048,10 +1048,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "7,769,401 (2022)" + "text": "7,769,401 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "18.62 (2022)" + "text": "19 (2020 est.)" } }, "Communications - note": { diff --git a/europe/vt.json b/europe/vt.json index 044636a9..56d9aff0 100644 --- a/europe/vt.json +++ b/europe/vt.json @@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "
The Holy See is supported financially by a variety of sources, including investments, real estate income, and donations from Catholic individuals, dioceses, and institutions; these help fund the Roman Curia (Vatican bureaucracy), diplomatic missions, and media outlets. Moreover, an annual collection taken up in dioceses and from direct donations go to a non-budgetary fund, known as Peter's Pence, which is used directly by the pope for charity, disaster relief, and aid to churches in developing nations.
The separate Vatican City State budget includes the Vatican museums and post office and is supported financially by the sale of stamps, coins, medals, and tourist mementos as well as fees for admission to museums and publication sales. Revenues increased between 2010 and 2011 because of expanded operating hours and a growing number of visitors. However, the Holy See did not escape the financial difficulties experienced by other European countries; in 2012, it started a spending review to determine where to cut costs to reverse its 2011 budget deficit of $20 million. The Holy See generated a modest surplus in 2012 before recording a $32 million deficit in 2013, driven primarily by the decreasing value of gold. The incomes and living standards of lay workers are comparable to those of counterparts who work in the city of Rome so most public expenditures go to wages and other personnel costs;. In February 2014, Pope FRANCIS created the Secretariat of the Economy to oversee financial and administrative operations of the Holy See, part of a broader campaign to reform the Holy See’s finances.
" + "text": "The Holy See is supported financially by a variety of sources, including investments, real estate income, and donations from Catholic individuals, dioceses, and institutions; these help fund the Roman Curia (Vatican bureaucracy), diplomatic missions, and media outlets. Moreover, an annual collection taken up in dioceses and from direct donations go to a non-budgetary fund, known as Peter's Pence, which is used directly by the pope for charity, disaster relief, and aid to churches in developing nations.
The separate Vatican City State budget includes the Vatican museums and post office and is supported financially by the sale of stamps, coins, medals, and tourist mementos as well as fees for admission to museums and publication sales. Revenues increased between 2010 and 2011 because of expanded operating hours and a growing number of visitors. However, the Holy See did not escape the financial difficulties experienced by other European countries; in 2012, it started a spending review to determine where to cut costs to reverse its 2011 budget deficit of $20 million. The Holy See generated a modest surplus in 2012 before recording a $32 million deficit in 2013, driven primarily by the decreasing value of gold. The incomes and living standards of lay workers are comparable to those of counterparts who work in the city of Rome so most public expenditures go to wages and other personnel costs;. In February 2014, Pope FRANCIS created the Secretariat of the Economy to oversee financial and administrative operations of the Holy See, part of a broader campaign to reform the Holy See’s finances.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "text": "NA
" diff --git a/middle-east/ae.json b/middle-east/ae.json index f0dfdb7f..a155b1bd 100644 --- a/middle-east/ae.json +++ b/middle-east/ae.json @@ -543,21 +543,21 @@ }, "Executive branch": { "chief of state": { - "text": "President KHALIFA bin Zayid Al-Nuhayan (since 2 November 2004), ruler of Abu Zaby (Abu Dhabi) (since 4 November 2004); Vice President and Prime Minister MUHAMMAD BIN RASHID Al-Maktoum (since 5 January 2006)" + "text": "President MUHAMMAD bin Rashid Al-Nuhayan (since 14 May 2022); Vice President MUHAMMAD bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (since 5 January 2006); note - MUHAMMAD bin Rashid Al-Nuhayan elected president by the Federal Supreme Council following the death of President KHALIFA bin Zayid Al-Nuhayan on 13 May" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Prime Minister Vice President MUHAMMAD BIN RASHID Al-Maktoum (since 5 January 2006); Deputy Prime Ministers SAIF bin Zayid Al-Nuhayyan, MANSUR bin Zayid Al-Nuhayan (both since 11 May 2009), and MAKTOUM bin Mohammed Al-Maktoum (since 25 September 2021)" + "text": "Prime Minister and Vice President MUHAMMAD bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (since 5 January 2006); Deputy Prime Ministers SAIF bin Zayid Al-Nuhayan, MANSUR bin Zayid Al-Nuhayan (both since 11 May 2009), and MAKTOUM bin Mohammed Al-Maktoum (since 25 September 2021)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Council of Ministers announced by the prime minister and approved by the president" }, "elections/appointments": { - "text": "president and vice president indirectly elected by the Federal Supreme Council - composed of the rulers of the 7 emirates - for a 5-year term (no term limits); election last held 3 November 2009 (next election NA); prime minister and deputy prime minister appointed by the president" + "text": "president and vice president indirectly elected by the Federal Supreme Council - composed of the rulers of the 7 emirates - for a 5-year term (no term limits); unscheduled election held on 14 May 2022, following the death of President KHALIFA bin Zayid Al-Nuhayan (next election NA); prime minister and deputy prime minister appointed by the president" }, "election results": { - "text": "KHALIFA bin Zayid Al-Nuhayyan reelected president; FSC vote NA" + "text": "MUHAMMAD bin Rashid Al-Nuhayan elected president; Federal Supreme Council vote NA" }, - "note": "note: there is also a Federal Supreme Council (FSC) composed of the 7 emirate rulers; the FSC is the highest constitutional authority in the UAE; establishes general policies and sanctions federal legislation; meets 4 times a year; Abu Zaby (Abu Dhabi) and Dubayy (Dubai) rulers have effective veto power" + "note": "note: there is also a Federal Supreme Council (FSC) composed of the 7 emirate rulers; the FSC is the highest constitutional authority in the UAE; establishes general policies and sanctions federal legislation; meets 4 times a year; Abu Zaby (Abu Dhabi) and Dubayy (Dubai) rulers have effective veto power; Vice President MUHAMMAD BIN RASHID Al-Maktoum assumed presidential responsibilities after the death of President KHALIFA bin Zayid Al-Nuhayan on 13 May 2022; under the constitution, MUHAMMAD BIN RASHID will serve as President until the FSC meets within 30 days to elect a new president" }, "Legislative branch": { "description": { @@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ }, "Diplomatic representation in the US": { "chief of mission": { - "text": "Ambassador Yusif bin Mani bin Said al-UTAYBA (since 28 July 2008)" + "text": "Ambassador Yousif Mana Saeed Ahmed ALOTAIBA (since 28 July 2008)" }, "chancery": { "text": "3522 International Court NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20008" @@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The UAE has an open economy with a high per capita income and a sizable annual trade surplus. Successful efforts at economic diversification have reduced the portion of GDP from the oil and gas sector to 30%.
Since the discovery of oil in the UAE nearly 60 years ago, the country has undergone a profound transformation from an impoverished region of small desert principalities to a modern state with a high standard of living. The government has increased spending on job creation and infrastructure expansion and is opening up utilities to greater private sector involvement. The country's free trade zones - offering 100% foreign ownership and zero taxes - are helping to attract foreign investors.
The global financial crisis of 2008-09, tight international credit, and deflated asset prices constricted the economy in 2009. UAE authorities tried to blunt the crisis by increasing spending and boosting liquidity in the banking sector. The crisis hit Dubai hardest, as it was heavily exposed to depressed real estate prices. Dubai lacked sufficient cash to meet its debt obligations, prompting global concern about its solvency and ultimately a $20 billion bailout from the UAE Central Bank and Abu Dhabi Government that was refinanced in March 2014.
The UAE’s dependence on oil is a significant long-term challenge, although the UAE is one of the most diversified countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Low oil prices have prompted the UAE to cut expenditures, including on some social programs, but the UAE has sufficient assets in its sovereign investment funds to cover its deficits. The government reduced fuel subsidies in August 2015, and introduced excise taxes (50% on sweetened carbonated beverages and 100% on energy drinks and tobacco) in October 2017. A five-percent value-added tax was introduced in January 2018. The UAE's strategic plan for the next few years focuses on economic diversification, promoting the UAE as a global trade and tourism hub, developing industry, and creating more job opportunities for nationals through improved education and increased private sector employment.
" + "text": "The UAE has an open economy with a high per capita income and a sizable annual trade surplus. Successful efforts at economic diversification have reduced the portion of GDP from the oil and gas sector to 30%.
Since the discovery of oil in the UAE nearly 60 years ago, the country has undergone a profound transformation from an impoverished region of small desert principalities to a modern state with a high standard of living. The government has increased spending on job creation and infrastructure expansion and is opening up utilities to greater private sector involvement. The country's free trade zones - offering 100% foreign ownership and zero taxes - are helping to attract foreign investors.
The global financial crisis of 2008-09, tight international credit, and deflated asset prices constricted the economy in 2009. UAE authorities tried to blunt the crisis by increasing spending and boosting liquidity in the banking sector. The crisis hit Dubai hardest, as it was heavily exposed to depressed real estate prices. Dubai lacked sufficient cash to meet its debt obligations, prompting global concern about its solvency and ultimately a $20 billion bailout from the UAE Central Bank and Abu Dhabi Government that was refinanced in March 2014.
The UAE’s dependence on oil is a significant long-term challenge, although the UAE is one of the most diversified countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Low oil prices have prompted the UAE to cut expenditures, including on some social programs, but the UAE has sufficient assets in its sovereign investment funds to cover its deficits. The government reduced fuel subsidies in August 2015, and introduced excise taxes (50% on sweetened carbonated beverages and 100% on energy drinks and tobacco) in October 2017. A five-percent value-added tax was introduced in January 2018. The UAE's strategic plan for the next few years focuses on economic diversification, promoting the UAE as a global trade and tourism hub, developing industry, and creating more job opportunities for nationals through improved education and increased private sector employment.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": { @@ -982,10 +982,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,380,866 (2020)" + "text": "2,380,866 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "24.07 (2020 est.)" + "text": "24 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1024,10 +1024,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "3,245,123 (2021)" + "text": "3,245,123 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "32.81 (2021 est.)" + "text": "33 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/middle-east/aj.json b/middle-east/aj.json index 40304e75..6cfd8bab 100644 --- a/middle-east/aj.json +++ b/middle-east/aj.json @@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Prior to the decline in global oil prices since 2014, Azerbaijan's high economic growth was attributable to rising energy exports and to some non-export sectors. Oil exports through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, the Baku-Novorossiysk, and the Baku-Supsa Pipelines remain the main economic driver, but efforts to boost Azerbaijan's gas production are underway. The expected completion of the geopolitically important Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) between Azerbaijan and Europe will open up another source of revenue from gas exports. First gas to Turkey through the SGC is expected in 2018 with project completion expected by 2020-21.
Declining oil prices caused a 3.1% contraction in GDP in 2016, and a 0.8% decline in 2017, highlighted by a sharp reduction in the construction sector. The economic decline was accompanied by higher inflation, a weakened banking sector, and two sharp currency devaluations in 2015. Azerbaijan’s financial sector continued to struggle. In May 2017, Baku allowed the majority state-owed International Bank of Azerbaijan (IBA), the nation’s largest bank, to default on some of its outstanding debt and file for restructuring in Azerbaijani courts; IBA also filed in US and UK bankruptcy courts to have its restructuring recognized in their respective jurisdictions.
Azerbaijan has made limited progress with market-based economic reforms. Pervasive public and private sector corruption and structural economic inefficiencies remain a drag on long-term growth, particularly in non-energy sectors. The government has, however, made efforts to combat corruption, particularly in customs and government services. Several other obstacles impede Azerbaijan's economic progress, including the need for more foreign investment in the non-energy sector and the continuing conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. While trade with Russia and the other former Soviet republics remains important, Azerbaijan has expanded trade with Turkey and Europe and is seeking new markets for non-oil/gas exports - mainly in the agricultural sector - with Gulf Cooperation Council member countries, the US, and others. It is also improving Baku airport and the Caspian Sea port of Alat for use as a regional transportation and logistics hub.
Long-term prospects depend on world oil prices, Azerbaijan's ability to develop export routes for its growing gas production, and its ability to improve the business environment and diversify the economy. In late 2016, the president approved a strategic roadmap for economic reforms that identified key non-energy segments of the economy for development, such as agriculture, logistics, information technology, and tourism. In October 2017, the long-awaited Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, stretching from the Azerbaijani capital to Kars in north-eastern Turkey, began limited service.
" + "text": "Prior to the decline in global oil prices since 2014, Azerbaijan's high economic growth was attributable to rising energy exports and to some non-export sectors. Oil exports through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, the Baku-Novorossiysk, and the Baku-Supsa Pipelines remain the main economic driver, but efforts to boost Azerbaijan's gas production are underway. The expected completion of the geopolitically important Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) between Azerbaijan and Europe will open up another source of revenue from gas exports. First gas to Turkey through the SGC is expected in 2018 with project completion expected by 2020-21.
Declining oil prices caused a 3.1% contraction in GDP in 2016, and a 0.8% decline in 2017, highlighted by a sharp reduction in the construction sector. The economic decline was accompanied by higher inflation, a weakened banking sector, and two sharp currency devaluations in 2015. Azerbaijan’s financial sector continued to struggle. In May 2017, Baku allowed the majority state-owed International Bank of Azerbaijan (IBA), the nation’s largest bank, to default on some of its outstanding debt and file for restructuring in Azerbaijani courts; IBA also filed in US and UK bankruptcy courts to have its restructuring recognized in their respective jurisdictions.
Azerbaijan has made limited progress with market-based economic reforms. Pervasive public and private sector corruption and structural economic inefficiencies remain a drag on long-term growth, particularly in non-energy sectors. The government has, however, made efforts to combat corruption, particularly in customs and government services. Several other obstacles impede Azerbaijan's economic progress, including the need for more foreign investment in the non-energy sector and the continuing conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. While trade with Russia and the other former Soviet republics remains important, Azerbaijan has expanded trade with Turkey and Europe and is seeking new markets for non-oil/gas exports - mainly in the agricultural sector - with Gulf Cooperation Council member countries, the US, and others. It is also improving Baku airport and the Caspian Sea port of Alat for use as a regional transportation and logistics hub.
Long-term prospects depend on world oil prices, Azerbaijan's ability to develop export routes for its growing gas production, and its ability to improve the business environment and diversify the economy. In late 2016, the president approved a strategic roadmap for economic reforms that identified key non-energy segments of the economy for development, such as agriculture, logistics, information technology, and tourism. In October 2017, the long-awaited Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, stretching from the Azerbaijani capital to Kars in north-eastern Turkey, began limited service.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -981,15 +981,15 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1,652,688 (2020)" + "text": "1,652,688 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "16.3 (2020 est.)" + "text": "16 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "10,344,300 (2020)" + "text": "10,344,300 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "102 (2020 est.)" @@ -1023,10 +1023,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,995,474 (2022)" + "text": "1,995,474 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "19.68 (2022)" + "text": "20 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/middle-east/am.json b/middle-east/am.json index 34a45ed7..6ed1409c 100644 --- a/middle-east/am.json +++ b/middle-east/am.json @@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Under the old Soviet central planning system, Armenia developed a modern industrial sector, supplying machine tools, textiles, and other manufactured goods to sister republics, in exchange for raw materials and energy. Armenia has since switched to small-scale agriculture and away from the large agro industrial complexes of the Soviet era. Armenia has only two open trade borders - Iran and Georgia - because its borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey have been closed since 1991 and 1993, respectively, as a result of Armenia's ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan over the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh region.
Armenia joined the World Trade Organization in January 2003. The government has made some improvements in tax and customs administration in recent years, but anti-corruption measures have been largely ineffective. Armenia will need to pursue additional economic reforms and strengthen the rule of law in order to raise its economic growth and improve economic competitiveness and employment opportunities, especially given its economic isolation from Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Armenia's geographic isolation, a narrow export base, and pervasive monopolies in important business sectors have made it particularly vulnerable to volatility in the global commodity markets and the economic challenges in Russia. Armenia is particularly dependent on Russian commercial and governmental support, as most key Armenian infrastructure is Russian-owned and/or managed, especially in the energy sector. Remittances from expatriates working in Russia are equivalent to about 12-14% of GDP. Armenia joined the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union in January 2015, but has remained interested in pursuing closer ties with the EU as well, signing a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU in November 2017. Armenia’s rising government debt is leading Yerevan to tighten its fiscal policies – the amount is approaching the debt to GDP ratio threshold set by national legislation.
" + "text": "Under the old Soviet central planning system, Armenia developed a modern industrial sector, supplying machine tools, textiles, and other manufactured goods to sister republics, in exchange for raw materials and energy. Armenia has since switched to small-scale agriculture and away from the large agro industrial complexes of the Soviet era. Armenia has only two open trade borders - Iran and Georgia - because its borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey have been closed since 1991 and 1993, respectively, as a result of Armenia's ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan over the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh region.
Armenia joined the World Trade Organization in January 2003. The government has made some improvements in tax and customs administration in recent years, but anti-corruption measures have been largely ineffective. Armenia will need to pursue additional economic reforms and strengthen the rule of law in order to raise its economic growth and improve economic competitiveness and employment opportunities, especially given its economic isolation from Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Armenia's geographic isolation, a narrow export base, and pervasive monopolies in important business sectors have made it particularly vulnerable to volatility in the global commodity markets and the economic challenges in Russia. Armenia is particularly dependent on Russian commercial and governmental support, as most key Armenian infrastructure is Russian-owned and/or managed, especially in the energy sector. Remittances from expatriates working in Russia are equivalent to about 12-14% of GDP. Armenia joined the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union in January 2015, but has remained interested in pursuing closer ties with the EU as well, signing a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU in November 2017. Armenia’s rising government debt is leading Yerevan to tighten its fiscal policies – the amount is approaching the debt to GDP ratio threshold set by national legislation.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -979,18 +979,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "427,539 (2020)" + "text": "427,539 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "14.43 (2020 est.)" + "text": "14 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "3,488,797 (2020)" + "text": "3,488,797 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "117.7 (2020 est.)" + "text": "118 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1021,10 +1021,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "430,407 (2022)" + "text": "430,407 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "14.52 (2022)" + "text": "15 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/middle-east/ba.json b/middle-east/ba.json index e57c7a95..b8135504 100644 --- a/middle-east/ba.json +++ b/middle-east/ba.json @@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Oil and natural gas play a dominant role in Bahrain’s economy. Despite the Government’s past efforts to diversify the economy, oil still comprises 85% of Bahraini budget revenues. In the last few years lower world energy prices have generated sizable budget deficits - about 10% of GDP in 2017 alone. Bahrain has few options for covering these deficits, with low foreign assets and fewer oil resources compared to its GCC neighbors. The three major US credit agencies downgraded Bahrain’s sovereign debt rating to \"junk\" status in 2016, citing persistently low oil prices and the government’s high debt levels. Nevertheless, Bahrain was able to raise about $4 billion by issuing foreign currency denominated debt in 2017.
Other major economic activities are production of aluminum - Bahrain's second biggest export after oil and gas –finance, and construction. Bahrain continues to seek new natural gas supplies as feedstock to support its expanding petrochemical and aluminum industries. In April 2018 Bahrain announced it had found a significant oil field off the country’s west coast, but is still assessing how much of the oil can be extracted profitably.
In addition to addressing its current fiscal woes, Bahraini authorities face the long-term challenge of boosting Bahrain’s regional competitiveness — especially regarding industry, finance, and tourism — and reconciling revenue constraints with popular pressure to maintain generous state subsidies and a large public sector. Since 2015, the government lifted subsidies on meat, diesel, kerosene, and gasoline and has begun to phase in higher prices for electricity and water. As part of its diversification plans, Bahrain implemented a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US in August 2006, the first FTA between the US and a Gulf state. It plans to introduce a Value Added Tax (VAT) by the end of 2018.
" + "text": "Oil and natural gas play a dominant role in Bahrain’s economy. Despite the Government’s past efforts to diversify the economy, oil still comprises 85% of Bahraini budget revenues. In the last few years lower world energy prices have generated sizable budget deficits - about 10% of GDP in 2017 alone. Bahrain has few options for covering these deficits, with low foreign assets and fewer oil resources compared to its GCC neighbors. The three major US credit agencies downgraded Bahrain’s sovereign debt rating to \"junk\" status in 2016, citing persistently low oil prices and the government’s high debt levels. Nevertheless, Bahrain was able to raise about $4 billion by issuing foreign currency denominated debt in 2017.
Other major economic activities are production of aluminum - Bahrain's second biggest export after oil and gas –finance, and construction. Bahrain continues to seek new natural gas supplies as feedstock to support its expanding petrochemical and aluminum industries. In April 2018 Bahrain announced it had found a significant oil field off the country’s west coast, but is still assessing how much of the oil can be extracted profitably.
In addition to addressing its current fiscal woes, Bahraini authorities face the long-term challenge of boosting Bahrain’s regional competitiveness — especially regarding industry, finance, and tourism — and reconciling revenue constraints with popular pressure to maintain generous state subsidies and a large public sector. Since 2015, the government lifted subsidies on meat, diesel, kerosene, and gasoline and has begun to phase in higher prices for electricity and water. As part of its diversification plans, Bahrain implemented a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US in August 2006, the first FTA between the US and a Gulf state. It plans to introduce a Value Added Tax (VAT) by the end of 2018.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -957,18 +957,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "266,659 (2020)" + "text": "274,106 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "15.67 (2020 est.)" + "text": "16 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1,748,672 (2020)" + "text": "1,748,672 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "102.8 (2020 est.)" + "text": "103 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -999,10 +999,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "148,928 (2021)" + "text": "148,928 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "8.75 (2021)" + "text": "9 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1077,6 +1077,9 @@ "note": "note(s) - the Royal Guard is officially under the command of the Army, but exercises considerable autonomy; the National Guard's primary mission is to guard critical infrastructure such as the airport and oil fields; while the Guard is under the Ministry of Interior, it reports directly to the king" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "3.6% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "4.2% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1088,9 +1091,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "4.2% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $2.18 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "4.7% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $2.25 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/middle-east/gg.json b/middle-east/gg.json index 4e943ed6..e97e728b 100644 --- a/middle-east/gg.json +++ b/middle-east/gg.json @@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Georgia's main economic activities include cultivation of agricultural products such as grapes, citrus fruits, and hazelnuts; mining of manganese, copper, and gold; and producing alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages, metals, machinery, and chemicals in small-scale industries. The country imports nearly all of its needed supplies of natural gas and oil products. It has sizeable hydropower capacity that now provides most of its electricity needs.
Georgia has overcome the chronic energy shortages and gas supply interruptions of the past by renovating hydropower plants and by increasingly relying on natural gas imports from Azerbaijan instead of from Russia. Construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the South Caucasus gas pipeline, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad are part of a strategy to capitalize on Georgia's strategic location between Europe and Asia and develop its role as a transit hub for gas, oil, and other goods.
Georgia's economy sustained GDP growth of more than 10% in 2006-07, based on strong inflows of foreign investment, remittances, and robust government spending. However, GDP growth slowed following the August 2008 conflict with Russia, and sank to negative 4% in 2009 as foreign direct investment and workers' remittances declined in the wake of the global financial crisis. The economy rebounded in the period 2010-17, but FDI inflows, the engine of Georgian economic growth prior to the 2008 conflict, have not recovered fully. Unemployment remains persistently high.
The country is pinning its hopes for faster growth on a continued effort to build up infrastructure, enhance support for entrepreneurship, simplify regulations, and improve professional education, in order to attract foreign investment and boost employment, with a focus on transportation projects, tourism, hydropower, and agriculture. Georgia had historically suffered from a chronic failure to collect tax revenues; however, since 2004 the government has simplified the tax code, increased tax enforcement, and cracked down on petty corruption, leading to higher revenues. The government has received high marks from the World Bank for improvements in business transparency. Since 2012, the Georgian Dream-led government has continued the previous administration's low-regulation, low-tax, free market policies, while modestly increasing social spending and amending the labor code to comply with International Labor Standards. In mid-2014, Georgia concluded an association agreement with the EU, paving the way to free trade and visa-free travel. In 2017, Georgia signed Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China as part of Tbilisi’s efforts to diversify its economic ties. Georgia is seeking to develop its Black Sea ports to further facilitate East-West trade.
" + "text": "Georgia's main economic activities include cultivation of agricultural products such as grapes, citrus fruits, and hazelnuts; mining of manganese, copper, and gold; and producing alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages, metals, machinery, and chemicals in small-scale industries. The country imports nearly all of its needed supplies of natural gas and oil products. It has sizeable hydropower capacity that now provides most of its electricity needs.
Georgia has overcome the chronic energy shortages and gas supply interruptions of the past by renovating hydropower plants and by increasingly relying on natural gas imports from Azerbaijan instead of from Russia. Construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the South Caucasus gas pipeline, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad are part of a strategy to capitalize on Georgia's strategic location between Europe and Asia and develop its role as a transit hub for gas, oil, and other goods.
Georgia's economy sustained GDP growth of more than 10% in 2006-07, based on strong inflows of foreign investment, remittances, and robust government spending. However, GDP growth slowed following the August 2008 conflict with Russia, and sank to negative 4% in 2009 as foreign direct investment and workers' remittances declined in the wake of the global financial crisis. The economy rebounded in the period 2010-17, but FDI inflows, the engine of Georgian economic growth prior to the 2008 conflict, have not recovered fully. Unemployment remains persistently high.
The country is pinning its hopes for faster growth on a continued effort to build up infrastructure, enhance support for entrepreneurship, simplify regulations, and improve professional education, in order to attract foreign investment and boost employment, with a focus on transportation projects, tourism, hydropower, and agriculture. Georgia had historically suffered from a chronic failure to collect tax revenues; however, since 2004 the government has simplified the tax code, increased tax enforcement, and cracked down on petty corruption, leading to higher revenues. The government has received high marks from the World Bank for improvements in business transparency. Since 2012, the Georgian Dream-led government has continued the previous administration's low-regulation, low-tax, free market policies, while modestly increasing social spending and amending the labor code to comply with International Labor Standards. In mid-2014, Georgia concluded an association agreement with the EU, paving the way to free trade and visa-free travel. In 2017, Georgia signed Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China as part of Tbilisi’s efforts to diversify its economic ties. Georgia is seeking to develop its Black Sea ports to further facilitate East-West trade.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -979,10 +979,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "378,498 (2020)" + "text": "387,698 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "9.49 (2020 est.)" + "text": "10 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1021,10 +1021,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "972,162 (2022)" + "text": "972,162 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "24.37 (2022)" + "text": "24 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/middle-east/gz.json b/middle-east/gz.json index 02d6fbfb..5b2cbbbd 100644 --- a/middle-east/gz.json +++ b/middle-east/gz.json @@ -637,10 +637,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "472,293 (includes the West Bank); (July 2016 est.)" + "text": "466,283 (2020 est.) includes the West Bank" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "9 (includes the West Bank); (July 2016 est.)" + "text": "9 (2020 est.) includes the West Bank" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -679,10 +679,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "320,500" + "text": "376,911 (2020 est.) includes the West Bank" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "14 (2016 est.)" + "text": "7 (2020 est.) includes the West Bank" }, "note": "note: includes West Bank" } diff --git a/middle-east/ir.json b/middle-east/ir.json index 22d6c078..0a4164e6 100644 --- a/middle-east/ir.json +++ b/middle-east/ir.json @@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Iran's economy is marked by statist policies, inefficiencies, and reliance on oil and gas exports, but Iran also possesses significant agricultural, industrial, and service sectors. The Iranian government directly owns and operates hundreds of state-owned enterprises and indirectly controls many companies affiliated with the country's security forces. Distortions - including corruption, price controls, subsidies, and a banking system holding billions of dollars of non-performing loans - weigh down the economy, undermining the potential for private-sector-led growth.
Private sector activity includes small-scale workshops, farming, some manufacturing, and services, in addition to medium-scale construction, cement production, mining, and metalworking. Significant informal market activity flourishes and corruption is widespread.
The lifting of most nuclear-related sanctions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in January 2016 sparked a restoration of Iran’s oil production and revenue that drove rapid GDP growth, but economic growth declined in 2017 as oil production plateaued. The economy continues to suffer from low levels of investment and declines in productivity since before the JCPOA, and from high levels of unemployment, especially among women and college-educated Iranian youth.
In May 2017, the re-election of President Hasan RUHANI generated widespread public expectations that the economic benefits of the JCPOA would expand and reach all levels of society. RUHANI will need to implement structural reforms that strengthen the banking sector and improve Iran’s business climate to attract foreign investment and encourage the growth of the private sector. Sanctions that are not related to Iran’s nuclear program remain in effect, and these—plus fears over the possible re-imposition of nuclear-related sanctions—will continue to deter foreign investors from engaging with Iran.
" + "text": "Iran's economy is marked by statist policies, inefficiencies, and reliance on oil and gas exports, but Iran also possesses significant agricultural, industrial, and service sectors. The Iranian government directly owns and operates hundreds of state-owned enterprises and indirectly controls many companies affiliated with the country's security forces. Distortions - including corruption, price controls, subsidies, and a banking system holding billions of dollars of non-performing loans - weigh down the economy, undermining the potential for private-sector-led growth.
Private sector activity includes small-scale workshops, farming, some manufacturing, and services, in addition to medium-scale construction, cement production, mining, and metalworking. Significant informal market activity flourishes and corruption is widespread.
The lifting of most nuclear-related sanctions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in January 2016 sparked a restoration of Iran’s oil production and revenue that drove rapid GDP growth, but economic growth declined in 2017 as oil production plateaued. The economy continues to suffer from low levels of investment and declines in productivity since before the JCPOA, and from high levels of unemployment, especially among women and college-educated Iranian youth.
In May 2017, the re-election of President Hasan RUHANI generated widespread public expectations that the economic benefits of the JCPOA would expand and reach all levels of society. RUHANI will need to implement structural reforms that strengthen the banking sector and improve Iran’s business climate to attract foreign investment and encourage the growth of the private sector. Sanctions that are not related to Iran’s nuclear program remain in effect, and these—plus fears over the possible re-imposition of nuclear-related sanctions—will continue to deter foreign investors from engaging with Iran.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -975,10 +975,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "29,093,587 (2020)" + "text": "29,093,587 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "34.64 (2020 est.)" + "text": "35 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1017,10 +1017,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "9,564,195 (2021)" + "text": "9,564,195 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "11.39 (2021)" + "text": "11 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1141,6 +1141,9 @@ "note": "note(s) - the Artesh Navy operates Iran’s larger warships and operates in the Gulf of Oman, the Caspian Sea, and deep waters in the region and beyond; the IRGC Navy has responsibility for the closer-in Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz; the Basij is a volunteer paramilitary group with local organizations across the country, which sometimes acts as an auxiliary law enforcement unit subordinate to Revolutionary Guard ground forces" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "2.3% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "2.1% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1152,9 +1155,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "3.4% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $31.2 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "3.1% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $29.2 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/middle-east/is.json b/middle-east/is.json index 43655b58..ea42041a 100644 --- a/middle-east/is.json +++ b/middle-east/is.json @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ } }, "Ethnic groups": { - "text": "Jewish 74.1% (of which Israel-born 78.1%, Europe/America/Oceania-born 15.2%, Africa-born 4.3%, Asia-born 2.4%), Arab 21%, other 4.9% (2019 est.)" + "text": "Jewish 74% (of which Israel-born 78.7%, Europe/America/Oceania-born 14.8%, Africa-born 4.2%, Asia-born 2.3%), Arab 21.1%, other 4.9% (2020 est.)" }, "Languages": { "Languages": { @@ -1017,10 +1017,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "3.08 million (2020)" + "text": "3.37 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "35.58 (2020 est.)" + "text": "39 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1059,10 +1059,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "2,602,079 (2021)" + "text": "2,602,079 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "30.06 (2021 est.)" + "text": "30 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1165,6 +1165,9 @@ "note": "note - the Border Police is a unit within the Israel Police with its own organizational and command structure; it works both independently as well as in cooperation with or in support of the Israel Police and the IDF" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "5% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "5% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1176,9 +1179,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "5.5% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $19.7 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "5.6% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $19.2 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/middle-east/iz.json b/middle-east/iz.json index 94ea8b20..49da8c74 100644 --- a/middle-east/iz.json +++ b/middle-east/iz.json @@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Iraq's GDP growth slowed to 1.1% in 2017, a marked decline compared to the previous two years as domestic consumption and investment fell because of civil violence and a sluggish oil market. The Iraqi Government received its third tranche of funding from its 2016 Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF in August 2017, which is intended to stabilize its finances by encouraging improved fiscal management, needed economic reform, and expenditure reduction. Additionally, in late 2017 Iraq received more than $1.4 billion in financing from international lenders, part of which was generated by issuing a $1 billion bond for reconstruction and rehabilitation in areas liberated from ISIL. Investment and key sector diversification are crucial components to Iraq’s long-term economic development and require a strengthened business climate with enhanced legal and regulatory oversight to bolster private-sector engagement. The overall standard of living depends on global oil prices, the central government passage of major policy reforms, a stable security environment post-ISIS, and the resolution of civil discord with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).
Iraq's largely state-run economy is dominated by the oil sector, which provides roughly 85% of government revenue and 80% of foreign exchange earnings, and is a major determinant of the economy's fortunes. Iraq's contracts with major oil companies have the potential to further expand oil exports and revenues, but Iraq will need to make significant upgrades to its oil processing, pipeline, and export infrastructure to enable these deals to reach their economic potential.
In 2017, Iraqi oil exports from northern fields were disrupted following a KRG referendum that resulted in the Iraqi Government reasserting federal control over disputed oil fields and energy infrastructure in Kirkuk. The Iraqi government and the KRG dispute the role of federal and regional authorities in the development and export of natural resources. In 2007, the KRG passed an oil law to develop IKR oil and gas reserves independent of the federal government. The KRG has signed about 50 contracts with foreign energy companies to develop its reserves, some of which lie in territories taken by Baghdad in October 2017. The KRG is able to unilaterally export oil from the fields it retains control of through its own pipeline to Turkey, which Baghdad claims is illegal. In the absence of a national hydrocarbons law, the two sides have entered into five provisional oil- and revenue-sharing deals since 2009, all of which collapsed.
Iraq is making slow progress enacting laws and developing the institutions needed to implement economic policy, and political reforms are still needed to assuage investors' concerns regarding the uncertain business climate. The Government of Iraq is eager to attract additional foreign direct investment, but it faces a number of obstacles, including a tenuous political system and concerns about security and societal stability. Rampant corruption, outdated infrastructure, insufficient essential services, skilled labor shortages, and antiquated commercial laws stifle investment and continue to constrain growth of private, nonoil sectors. Under the Iraqi constitution, some competencies relevant to the overall investment climate are either shared by the federal government and the regions or are devolved entirely to local governments. Investment in the IKR operates within the framework of the Kurdistan Region Investment Law (Law 4 of 2006) and the Kurdistan Board of Investment, which is designed to provide incentives to help economic development in areas under the authority of the KRG.
Inflation has remained under control since 2006. However, Iraqi leaders remain hard-pressed to translate macroeconomic gains into an improved standard of living for the Iraqi populace. Unemployment remains a problem throughout the country despite a bloated public sector. Overregulation has made it difficult for Iraqi citizens and foreign investors to start new businesses. Corruption and lack of economic reforms - such as restructuring banks and developing the private sector – have inhibited the growth of the private sector.
" + "text": "Iraq's GDP growth slowed to 1.1% in 2017, a marked decline compared to the previous two years as domestic consumption and investment fell because of civil violence and a sluggish oil market. The Iraqi Government received its third tranche of funding from its 2016 Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF in August 2017, which is intended to stabilize its finances by encouraging improved fiscal management, needed economic reform, and expenditure reduction. Additionally, in late 2017 Iraq received more than $1.4 billion in financing from international lenders, part of which was generated by issuing a $1 billion bond for reconstruction and rehabilitation in areas liberated from ISIL. Investment and key sector diversification are crucial components to Iraq’s long-term economic development and require a strengthened business climate with enhanced legal and regulatory oversight to bolster private-sector engagement. The overall standard of living depends on global oil prices, the central government passage of major policy reforms, a stable security environment post-ISIS, and the resolution of civil discord with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).
Iraq's largely state-run economy is dominated by the oil sector, which provides roughly 85% of government revenue and 80% of foreign exchange earnings, and is a major determinant of the economy's fortunes. Iraq's contracts with major oil companies have the potential to further expand oil exports and revenues, but Iraq will need to make significant upgrades to its oil processing, pipeline, and export infrastructure to enable these deals to reach their economic potential.
In 2017, Iraqi oil exports from northern fields were disrupted following a KRG referendum that resulted in the Iraqi Government reasserting federal control over disputed oil fields and energy infrastructure in Kirkuk. The Iraqi government and the KRG dispute the role of federal and regional authorities in the development and export of natural resources. In 2007, the KRG passed an oil law to develop IKR oil and gas reserves independent of the federal government. The KRG has signed about 50 contracts with foreign energy companies to develop its reserves, some of which lie in territories taken by Baghdad in October 2017. The KRG is able to unilaterally export oil from the fields it retains control of through its own pipeline to Turkey, which Baghdad claims is illegal. In the absence of a national hydrocarbons law, the two sides have entered into five provisional oil- and revenue-sharing deals since 2009, all of which collapsed.
Iraq is making slow progress enacting laws and developing the institutions needed to implement economic policy, and political reforms are still needed to assuage investors' concerns regarding the uncertain business climate. The Government of Iraq is eager to attract additional foreign direct investment, but it faces a number of obstacles, including a tenuous political system and concerns about security and societal stability. Rampant corruption, outdated infrastructure, insufficient essential services, skilled labor shortages, and antiquated commercial laws stifle investment and continue to constrain growth of private, nonoil sectors. Under the Iraqi constitution, some competencies relevant to the overall investment climate are either shared by the federal government and the regions or are devolved entirely to local governments. Investment in the IKR operates within the framework of the Kurdistan Region Investment Law (Law 4 of 2006) and the Kurdistan Board of Investment, which is designed to provide incentives to help economic development in areas under the authority of the KRG.
Inflation has remained under control since 2006. However, Iraqi leaders remain hard-pressed to translate macroeconomic gains into an improved standard of living for the Iraqi populace. Unemployment remains a problem throughout the country despite a bloated public sector. Overregulation has made it difficult for Iraqi citizens and foreign investors to start new businesses. Corruption and lack of economic reforms - such as restructuring banks and developing the private sector – have inhibited the growth of the private sector.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1008,10 +1008,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "4,166,461 (2020)" + "text": "2,699,758 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "10.36 (2020 est.)" + "text": "7 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1050,10 +1050,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "6,254,099 (2021)" + "text": "6,254,099 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "15.55 (2021)" + "text": "16 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1164,6 +1164,9 @@ "text": "Ministry of Defense: Iraqi Army, Army Aviation Command, Iraqi Navy, Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi Air Defense Command, Special Forces Command, Special Security Division (Green Zone protection)Jordan's economy is among the smallest in the Middle East, with insufficient supplies of water, oil, and other natural resources, underlying the government's heavy reliance on foreign assistance. Other economic challenges for the government include chronic high rates of unemployment and underemployment, budget and current account deficits, and government debt.
King ABDALLAH, during the first decade of the 2000s, implemented significant economic reforms, such as expanding foreign trade and privatizing state-owned companies that attracted foreign investment and contributed to average annual economic growth of 8% for 2004 through 2008. The global economic slowdown and regional turmoil contributed to slower growth from 2010 to 2017 - with growth averaging about 2.5% per year - and hurt export-oriented sectors, construction/real estate, and tourism. Since the onset of the civil war in Syria and resulting refugee crisis, one of Jordan’s most pressing socioeconomic challenges has been managing the influx of approximately 660,000 UN-registered refugees, more than 80% of whom live in Jordan’s urban areas. Jordan’s own official census estimated the refugee number at 1.3 million Syrians as of early 2016.
Jordan is nearly completely dependent on imported energy—mostly natural gas—and energy consistently makes up 25-30% of Jordan’s imports. To diversify its energy mix, Jordan has secured several contracts for liquefied and pipeline natural gas, developed several major renewables projects, and is currently exploring nuclear power generation and exploitation of abundant oil shale reserves. In August 2016, Jordan and the IMF agreed to a $723 million Extended Fund Facility that aims to build on the three-year, $2.1 billion IMF program that ended in August 2015 with the goal of helping Jordan correct budgetary and balance of payments imbalances.
" + "text": "Jordan's economy is among the smallest in the Middle East, with insufficient supplies of water, oil, and other natural resources, underlying the government's heavy reliance on foreign assistance. Other economic challenges for the government include chronic high rates of unemployment and underemployment, budget and current account deficits, and government debt.
King ABDALLAH, during the first decade of the 2000s, implemented significant economic reforms, such as expanding foreign trade and privatizing state-owned companies that attracted foreign investment and contributed to average annual economic growth of 8% for 2004 through 2008. The global economic slowdown and regional turmoil contributed to slower growth from 2010 to 2017 - with growth averaging about 2.5% per year - and hurt export-oriented sectors, construction/real estate, and tourism. Since the onset of the civil war in Syria and resulting refugee crisis, one of Jordan’s most pressing socioeconomic challenges has been managing the influx of approximately 660,000 UN-registered refugees, more than 80% of whom live in Jordan’s urban areas. Jordan’s own official census estimated the refugee number at 1.3 million Syrians as of early 2016.
Jordan is nearly completely dependent on imported energy—mostly natural gas—and energy consistently makes up 25-30% of Jordan’s imports. To diversify its energy mix, Jordan has secured several contracts for liquefied and pipeline natural gas, developed several major renewables projects, and is currently exploring nuclear power generation and exploitation of abundant oil shale reserves. In August 2016, Jordan and the IMF agreed to a $723 million Extended Fund Facility that aims to build on the three-year, $2.1 billion IMF program that ended in August 2015 with the goal of helping Jordan correct budgetary and balance of payments imbalances.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1003,10 +1003,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "391,486 (2020)" + "text": "391,486 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "3.84 (2020 est.)" + "text": "4 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1045,10 +1045,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "630,545 (2021)" + "text": "630,545 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "6.18 (2021)" + "text": "6 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1141,6 +1141,9 @@ "text": "Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF): Royal Jordanian Army (includes Special Operations Forces, Border Guards, Royal Guard), Royal Jordanian Air Force, Royal Jordanian Coast Guard; Ministry of Interior: Public Security Directorate (includes national police, the Gendarmerie, and the Civil Defense Directorate) (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "5% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "5% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1152,9 +1155,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "5.7% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $5.18 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "5.5% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $4.91 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { @@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "2,307,011 (Palestinian refugees) (2020); 674,268 (Syria), 66,665 (Iraq), 12,866 (Yemen), 6,013 Sudan (2021)" + "text": "2,307,011 (Palestinian refugees) (2020); 66,665 (Iraq), 12,866 (Yemen), 6,013 Sudan (2021); 674,458 (Syria) (2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "63 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/middle-east/ku.json b/middle-east/ku.json index caa39161..e9156ab4 100644 --- a/middle-east/ku.json +++ b/middle-east/ku.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "Kuwait has been ruled by the AL-SABAH dynasty since the 18th century. The threat of Ottoman invasion in 1899 prompted Amir Mubarak AL-SABAH to seek protection from Britain, ceding foreign and defense responsibility to Britain until 1961, when the country attained its independence. Kuwait was attacked and overrun by Iraq in August 1990. Following several weeks of aerial bombardment, a US-led UN coalition began a ground assault in February 1991 that liberated Kuwait in four days. In 1992, the Amir reconstituted the parliament that he had dissolved in 1986. Amid the 2010-11 uprisings and protests across the Arab world, stateless Arabs, known as Bidoon, staged small protests in early 2011 demanding citizenship, jobs, and other benefits available to Kuwaiti nationals. Other demographic groups, notably Islamists and Kuwaitis from tribal backgrounds, soon joined the growing protest movements, which culminated in late 2011 with the resignation of the prime minister amidst allegations of corruption. Demonstrations renewed in late 2012 in response to an amiri decree amending the electoral law that lessened the voting power of the tribal blocs.
An opposition coalition of Sunni Islamists, tribal populists, and some liberals, largely boycotted legislative elections in 2012 and 2013, which ushered in a legislature more amenable to the government's agenda. Faced with the prospect of painful subsidy cuts, oppositionists and independents actively participated in the November 2016 election, winning nearly half of the seats but a cohesive opposition alliance largely ceased to exist with the 2016 election and the opposition became increasingly factionalized. Since coming to power in 2006, the Amir has dissolved the National Assembly on seven occasions (the Constitutional Court annulled the Assembly elections in June 2012 and again in June 2013) and shuffled the cabinet over a dozen times, usually citing political stagnation and gridlock between the legislature and the government.
The current Amir, who assumed his role in 2020, launched a \"National Dialogue\" in September 2021 meant to resolve political gridlock. As part of the \"National Dialogue,\" the Amir pardoned several opposition figures who had been living in exile, and they returned to Kuwait. Legislative challenges remain, and the cabinet was reshuffled in March 2022.
Kuwait has been ruled by the AL-SABAH dynasty since the 18th century. The threat of Ottoman invasion in 1899 prompted Amir Mubarak AL-SABAH to seek protection from Britain, ceding foreign and defense responsibility to Britain until 1961, when the country attained its independence. Kuwait was attacked and overrun by Iraq in August 1990. Following several weeks of aerial bombardment, a US-led UN coalition began a ground assault in February 1991 that liberated Kuwait in four days. In 1992, the Amir reconstituted the parliament that he had dissolved in 1986. Amid the 2010-11 uprisings and protests across the Arab world, stateless Arabs, known as Bidoon, staged small protests in early 2011 demanding citizenship, jobs, and other benefits available to Kuwaiti nationals. Other demographic groups, notably Islamists and Kuwaitis from tribal backgrounds, soon joined the growing protest movements, which culminated in late 2011 with the resignation of the prime minister amidst allegations of corruption. Demonstrations renewed in late 2012 in response to an amiri decree amending the electoral law that lessened the voting power of the tribal blocs.
An opposition coalition of Sunni Islamists, tribal populists, and some liberals, largely boycotted legislative elections in 2012 and 2013, which ushered in a legislature more amenable to the government's agenda. Faced with the prospect of painful subsidy cuts, oppositionists and independents actively participated in the November 2016 election, winning nearly half of the seats but a cohesive opposition alliance largely ceased to exist with the 2016 election and the opposition became increasingly factionalized. Since coming to power in 2006, the Amir has dissolved the National Assembly on seven occasions (the Constitutional Court annulled the Assembly elections in June 2012 and again in June 2013) and shuffled the cabinet over a dozen times, usually citing political stagnation and gridlock between the legislature and the government.
The current Amir, who assumed his role in 2020, launched a \"National Dialogue\" in September 2021 meant to resolve political gridlock. As part of the \"National Dialogue,\" the Amir pardoned several opposition figures who had been living in exile, and they returned to Kuwait. Legislative challenges remain, and the cabinet was reshuffled in March 2022.
Kuwait has a geographically small, but wealthy, relatively open economy with crude oil reserves of about 102 billion barrels - more than 6% of world reserves. Kuwaiti officials plan to increase production to 4 million barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2020. Petroleum accounts for over half of GDP, 92% of export revenues, and 90% of government income.
With world oil prices declining, Kuwait realized a budget deficit in 2015 for the first time more than a decade; in 2016, the deficit grew to 16.5% of GDP. Kuwaiti authorities announced cuts to fuel subsidies in August 2016, provoking outrage among the public and National Assembly, and the Amir dissolved the government for the seventh time in ten years. In 2017 the deficit was reduced to 7.2% of GDP, and the government raised $8 billion by issuing international bonds. Despite Kuwait’s dependence on oil, the government has cushioned itself against the impact of lower oil prices, by saving annually at least 10% of government revenue in the Fund for Future Generations.
Kuwait has failed to diversify its economy or bolster the private sector, because of a poor business climate, a large public sector that employs about 74% of citizens, and an acrimonious relationship between the National Assembly and the executive branch that has stymied most economic reforms. The Kuwaiti Government has made little progress on its long-term economic development plan first passed in 2010. While the government planned to spend up to $104 billion over four years to diversify the economy, attract more investment, and boost private sector participation in the economy, many of the projects did not materialize because of an uncertain political situation or delays in awarding contracts. To increase non-oil revenues, the Kuwaiti Government in August 2017 approved draft bills supporting a Gulf Cooperation Council-wide value added tax scheduled to take effect in 2018.
" + "text": "Kuwait has a geographically small, but wealthy, relatively open economy with crude oil reserves of about 102 billion barrels - more than 6% of world reserves. Kuwaiti officials plan to increase production to 4 million barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2020. Petroleum accounts for over half of GDP, 92% of export revenues, and 90% of government income.
With world oil prices declining, Kuwait realized a budget deficit in 2015 for the first time more than a decade; in 2016, the deficit grew to 16.5% of GDP. Kuwaiti authorities announced cuts to fuel subsidies in August 2016, provoking outrage among the public and National Assembly, and the Amir dissolved the government for the seventh time in ten years. In 2017 the deficit was reduced to 7.2% of GDP, and the government raised $8 billion by issuing international bonds. Despite Kuwait’s dependence on oil, the government has cushioned itself against the impact of lower oil prices, by saving annually at least 10% of government revenue in the Fund for Future Generations.
Kuwait has failed to diversify its economy or bolster the private sector, because of a poor business climate, a large public sector that employs about 74% of citizens, and an acrimonious relationship between the National Assembly and the executive branch that has stymied most economic reforms. The Kuwaiti Government has made little progress on its long-term economic development plan first passed in 2010. While the government planned to spend up to $104 billion over four years to diversify the economy, attract more investment, and boost private sector participation in the economy, many of the projects did not materialize because of an uncertain political situation or delays in awarding contracts. To increase non-oil revenues, the Kuwaiti Government in August 2017 approved draft bills supporting a Gulf Cooperation Council-wide value added tax scheduled to take effect in 2018.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": { @@ -942,10 +942,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "583,463 (2020)" + "text": "583,463 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "13.66 (2020 est.)" + "text": "14 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -984,10 +984,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "73,948 (2021)" + "text": "73,948 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.73 (2021 est.)" + "text": "1.7 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1076,6 +1076,9 @@ "note": "note(s) - the Kuwait Emiri Guard Authority and the 25th Commando Brigade exercise independent command authority within the Kuwaiti Armed Forces, although activities such as training and equipment procurement are often coordinated with the other services; the Kuwaiti National Guard reports directly to the prime minister and amir and possesses an independent command structure, equipment inventory, and logistics corps separate from the Ministry of Defense, the regular armed services, and the Ministry of Interior" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "6.8% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "6.3% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1087,9 +1090,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "5.6% of GDP (2017) (approximately $10 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "5.9% of GDP (2016) (approximately $10.6 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/middle-east/le.json b/middle-east/le.json index fa72aa19..02e1fec9 100644 --- a/middle-east/le.json +++ b/middle-east/le.json @@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Lebanon has a free-market economy and a strong laissez-faire commercial tradition. The government does not restrict foreign investment; however, the investment climate suffers from red tape, corruption, arbitrary licensing decisions, complex customs procedures, high taxes, tariffs, and fees, archaic legislation, and inadequate intellectual property rights protection. The Lebanese economy is service-oriented; main growth sectors include banking and tourism.
The 1975-90 civil war seriously damaged Lebanon's economic infrastructure, cut national output by half, and derailed Lebanon's position as a Middle Eastern banking hub. Following the civil war, Lebanon rebuilt much of its war-torn physical and financial infrastructure by borrowing heavily, mostly from domestic banks, which saddled the government with a huge debt burden. Pledges of economic and financial reforms made at separate international donor conferences during the 2000s have mostly gone unfulfilled, including those made during the Paris III Donor Conference in 2007, following the July 2006 war. The \"CEDRE\" investment event hosted by France in April 2018 again rallied the international community to assist Lebanon with concessional financing and some grants for capital infrastructure improvements, conditioned upon long-delayed structural economic reforms in fiscal management, electricity tariffs, and transparent public procurement, among many others.
The Syria conflict cut off one of Lebanon's major markets and a transport corridor through the Levant. The influx of nearly one million registered and an estimated 300,000 unregistered Syrian refugees has increased social tensions and heightened competition for low-skill jobs and public services. Lebanon continues to face several long-term structural weaknesses that predate the Syria crisis, notably, weak infrastructure, poor service delivery, institutionalized corruption, and bureaucratic over-regulation. Chronic fiscal deficits have increased Lebanon’s debt-to-GDP ratio, the third highest in the world; most of the debt is held internally by Lebanese banks. These factors combined to slow economic growth to the 1-2% range in 2011-17, after four years of averaging 8% growth. Weak economic growth limits tax revenues, while the largest government expenditures remain debt servicing, salaries for government workers, and transfers to the electricity sector. These limitations constrain other government spending, limiting its ability to invest in necessary infrastructure improvements, such as water, electricity, and transportation. In early 2018, the Lebanese government signed long-awaited contract agreements with an international consortium for petroleum exploration and production as part of the country’s first offshore licensing round. Exploration is expected to begin in 2019.
" + "text": "Lebanon has a free-market economy and a strong laissez-faire commercial tradition. The government does not restrict foreign investment; however, the investment climate suffers from red tape, corruption, arbitrary licensing decisions, complex customs procedures, high taxes, tariffs, and fees, archaic legislation, and inadequate intellectual property rights protection. The Lebanese economy is service-oriented; main growth sectors include banking and tourism.
The 1975-90 civil war seriously damaged Lebanon's economic infrastructure, cut national output by half, and derailed Lebanon's position as a Middle Eastern banking hub. Following the civil war, Lebanon rebuilt much of its war-torn physical and financial infrastructure by borrowing heavily, mostly from domestic banks, which saddled the government with a huge debt burden. Pledges of economic and financial reforms made at separate international donor conferences during the 2000s have mostly gone unfulfilled, including those made during the Paris III Donor Conference in 2007, following the July 2006 war. The \"CEDRE\" investment event hosted by France in April 2018 again rallied the international community to assist Lebanon with concessional financing and some grants for capital infrastructure improvements, conditioned upon long-delayed structural economic reforms in fiscal management, electricity tariffs, and transparent public procurement, among many others.
The Syria conflict cut off one of Lebanon's major markets and a transport corridor through the Levant. The influx of nearly one million registered and an estimated 300,000 unregistered Syrian refugees has increased social tensions and heightened competition for low-skill jobs and public services. Lebanon continues to face several long-term structural weaknesses that predate the Syria crisis, notably, weak infrastructure, poor service delivery, institutionalized corruption, and bureaucratic over-regulation. Chronic fiscal deficits have increased Lebanon’s debt-to-GDP ratio, the third highest in the world; most of the debt is held internally by Lebanese banks. These factors combined to slow economic growth to the 1-2% range in 2011-17, after four years of averaging 8% growth. Weak economic growth limits tax revenues, while the largest government expenditures remain debt servicing, salaries for government workers, and transfers to the electricity sector. These limitations constrain other government spending, limiting its ability to invest in necessary infrastructure improvements, such as water, electricity, and transportation. In early 2018, the Lebanese government signed long-awaited contract agreements with an international consortium for petroleum exploration and production as part of the country’s first offshore licensing round. Exploration is expected to begin in 2019.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -980,10 +980,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "875,480 (2020)" + "text": "875,480 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "12.83 (2020 est.)" + "text": "13 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1022,10 +1022,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "432,070 (2021)" + "text": "432,070 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "6.33 (2021)" + "text": "6 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1126,9 +1126,6 @@ "note": "note(s) - the commander of the LAF is also the commander of the Army; the LAF patrols external borders, while official checkpoints are under the authority of Directorate for General Security" }, "Military expenditures": { - "Military Expenditures 2020": { - "text": "3% of GDP (2020 est.)" - }, "Military Expenditures 2019": { "text": "4.7% of GDP (2019 est.) (approximately $3.6 billion)" }, @@ -1140,6 +1137,9 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2016": { "text": "5.1% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $4.15 billion)" + }, + "Military Expenditures 2015": { + "text": "4.5% of GDP (2015 est.) (approximately $3.7 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/middle-east/mu.json b/middle-east/mu.json index 4e30ff6b..7ff0a02f 100644 --- a/middle-east/mu.json +++ b/middle-east/mu.json @@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Oman is heavily dependent on oil and gas resources, which can generate between and 68% and 85% of government revenue, depending on fluctuations in commodity prices. In 2016, low global oil prices drove Oman’s budget deficit to $13.8 billion, or approximately 20% of GDP, but the budget deficit is estimated to have reduced to 12% of GDP in 2017 as Oman reduced government subsidies. As of January 2018, Oman has sufficient foreign assets to support its currency’s fixed exchange rates. It is issuing debt to cover its deficit.
Oman is using enhanced oil recovery techniques to boost production, but it has simultaneously pursued a development plan that focuses on diversification, industrialization, and privatization, with the objective of reducing the oil sector's contribution to GDP. The key components of the government's diversification strategy are tourism, shipping and logistics, mining, manufacturing, and aquaculture.
Muscat also has notably focused on creating more Omani jobs to employ the rising number of nationals entering the workforce. However, high social welfare benefits - that had increased in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring - have made it impossible for the government to balance its budget in light of current oil prices. In response, Omani officials imposed austerity measures on its gasoline and diesel subsidies in 2016. These spending cuts have had only a moderate effect on the government’s budget, which is projected to again face a deficit of $7.8 billion in 2018.
" + "text": "Oman is heavily dependent on oil and gas resources, which can generate between and 68% and 85% of government revenue, depending on fluctuations in commodity prices. In 2016, low global oil prices drove Oman’s budget deficit to $13.8 billion, or approximately 20% of GDP, but the budget deficit is estimated to have reduced to 12% of GDP in 2017 as Oman reduced government subsidies. As of January 2018, Oman has sufficient foreign assets to support its currency’s fixed exchange rates. It is issuing debt to cover its deficit.
Oman is using enhanced oil recovery techniques to boost production, but it has simultaneously pursued a development plan that focuses on diversification, industrialization, and privatization, with the objective of reducing the oil sector's contribution to GDP. The key components of the government's diversification strategy are tourism, shipping and logistics, mining, manufacturing, and aquaculture.
Muscat also has notably focused on creating more Omani jobs to employ the rising number of nationals entering the workforce. However, high social welfare benefits - that had increased in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring - have made it impossible for the government to balance its budget in light of current oil prices. In response, Omani officials imposed austerity measures on its gasoline and diesel subsidies in 2016. These spending cuts have had only a moderate effect on the government’s budget, which is projected to again face a deficit of $7.8 billion in 2018.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": { @@ -952,10 +952,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "594,550 (2020)" + "text": "594,550 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "12.68 (2020 est.)" + "text": "13 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -994,10 +994,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "508,949 (2021)" + "text": "508,949 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "10.85 (2021 est.)" + "text": "11 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1100,6 +1100,9 @@ "text": "Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF): Royal Army of Oman (RAO), Royal Navy of Oman (RNO), Royal Air Force of Oman (RAFO), Royal Guard of Oman (RGO); Royal Oman Police (ROP): Civil Defense, Immigration, Customs, Royal Oman Police Coast Guard (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "8% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "11% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1111,9 +1114,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "12.3% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $12.7 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "13.9% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $14.2 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/middle-east/qa.json b/middle-east/qa.json index cfb61b27..41328a90 100644 --- a/middle-east/qa.json +++ b/middle-east/qa.json @@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Qatar’s oil and natural gas resources are the country’s main economic engine and government revenue source, driving Qatar’s high economic growth and per capita income levels, robust state spending on public entitlements, and booming construction spending, particularly as Qatar prepares to host the World Cup in 2022. Although the government has maintained high capital spending levels for ongoing infrastructure projects, low oil and natural gas prices in recent years have led the Qatari Government to tighten some spending to help stem its budget deficit.
Qatar’s reliance on oil and natural gas is likely to persist for the foreseeable future. Proved natural gas reserves exceed 25 trillion cubic meters - 13% of the world total and, among countries, third largest in the world. Proved oil reserves exceed 25 billion barrels, allowing production to continue at current levels for about 56 years. Despite the dominance of oil and natural gas, Qatar has made significant gains in strengthening non-oil sectors, such as manufacturing, construction, and financial services, leading non-oil GDP to steadily rise in recent years to just over half the total.
Following trade restriction imposed by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt in 2017, Qatar established new trade routes with other countries to maintain access to imports.
" + "text": "Qatar’s oil and natural gas resources are the country’s main economic engine and government revenue source, driving Qatar’s high economic growth and per capita income levels, robust state spending on public entitlements, and booming construction spending, particularly as Qatar prepares to host the World Cup in 2022. Although the government has maintained high capital spending levels for ongoing infrastructure projects, low oil and natural gas prices in recent years have led the Qatari Government to tighten some spending to help stem its budget deficit.
Qatar’s reliance on oil and natural gas is likely to persist for the foreseeable future. Proved natural gas reserves exceed 25 trillion cubic meters - 13% of the world total and, among countries, third largest in the world. Proved oil reserves exceed 25 billion barrels, allowing production to continue at current levels for about 56 years. Despite the dominance of oil and natural gas, Qatar has made significant gains in strengthening non-oil sectors, such as manufacturing, construction, and financial services, leading non-oil GDP to steadily rise in recent years to just over half the total.
Following trade restriction imposed by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt in 2017, Qatar established new trade routes with other countries to maintain access to imports.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -959,10 +959,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "454,701 (2020)" + "text": "454,701 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "15.78 (2020 est.)" + "text": "16 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1001,10 +1001,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "296,126 (2021)" + "text": "296,126 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "10.28 (2021)" + "text": "10 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1086,6 +1086,9 @@ "text": "Qatari Amiri Land Force (QALF, includes Emiri Guard), Qatari Amiri Navy (QAN, includes Coast Guard), Qatari Amiri Air Force (QAAF); Internal Security Forces: Mobile Gendarmerie (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "4% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "4% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1097,9 +1100,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "3.4% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $8.22 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "4.1% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $9.22 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/middle-east/sa.json b/middle-east/sa.json index e355e961..512789af 100644 --- a/middle-east/sa.json +++ b/middle-east/sa.json @@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Saudi Arabia has an oil-based economy with strong government controls over major economic activities. It possesses about 16% of the world's proven petroleum reserves, ranks as the largest exporter of petroleum, and plays a leading role in OPEC. The petroleum sector accounts for roughly 87% of budget revenues, 42% of GDP, and 90% of export earnings.
Saudi Arabia is encouraging the growth of the private sector in order to diversify its economy and to employ more Saudi nationals. Approximately 6 million foreign workers play an important role in the Saudi economy, particularly in the oil and service sectors; at the same time, however, Riyadh is struggling to reduce unemployment among its own nationals. Saudi officials are particularly focused on employing its large youth population.
In 2017, the Kingdom incurred a budget deficit estimated at 8.3% of GDP, which was financed by bond sales and drawing down reserves. Although the Kingdom can finance high deficits for several years by drawing down its considerable foreign assets or by borrowing, it has cut capital spending and reduced subsidies on electricity, water, and petroleum products and recently introduced a value-added tax of 5%. In January 2016, Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN announced that Saudi Arabia intends to list shares of its state-owned petroleum company, ARAMCO - another move to increase revenue and outside investment. The government has also looked at privatization and diversification of the economy more closely in the wake of a diminished oil market. Historically, Saudi Arabia has focused diversification efforts on power generation, telecommunications, natural gas exploration, and petrochemical sectors. More recently, the government has approached investors about expanding the role of the private sector in the health care, education and tourism industries. While Saudi Arabia has emphasized their goals of diversification for some time, current low oil prices may force the government to make more drastic changes ahead of their long-run timeline.
" + "text": "Saudi Arabia has an oil-based economy with strong government controls over major economic activities. It possesses about 16% of the world's proven petroleum reserves, ranks as the largest exporter of petroleum, and plays a leading role in OPEC. The petroleum sector accounts for roughly 87% of budget revenues, 42% of GDP, and 90% of export earnings.
Saudi Arabia is encouraging the growth of the private sector in order to diversify its economy and to employ more Saudi nationals. Approximately 6 million foreign workers play an important role in the Saudi economy, particularly in the oil and service sectors; at the same time, however, Riyadh is struggling to reduce unemployment among its own nationals. Saudi officials are particularly focused on employing its large youth population.
In 2017, the Kingdom incurred a budget deficit estimated at 8.3% of GDP, which was financed by bond sales and drawing down reserves. Although the Kingdom can finance high deficits for several years by drawing down its considerable foreign assets or by borrowing, it has cut capital spending and reduced subsidies on electricity, water, and petroleum products and recently introduced a value-added tax of 5%. In January 2016, Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN announced that Saudi Arabia intends to list shares of its state-owned petroleum company, ARAMCO - another move to increase revenue and outside investment. The government has also looked at privatization and diversification of the economy more closely in the wake of a diminished oil market. Historically, Saudi Arabia has focused diversification efforts on power generation, telecommunications, natural gas exploration, and petrochemical sectors. More recently, the government has approached investors about expanding the role of the private sector in the health care, education and tourism industries. While Saudi Arabia has emphasized their goals of diversification for some time, current low oil prices may force the government to make more drastic changes ahead of their long-run timeline.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -977,10 +977,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "5,749,058 (2020)" + "text": "5,749,058 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "16.51 (2020 est.)" + "text": "17 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1019,10 +1019,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "7,890,261 (2021)" + "text": "7,890,261 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "22.66 (2021 est.)" + "text": "23 (2020 est.)" } }, "Communications - note": { @@ -1138,7 +1138,7 @@ }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2021": { - "text": "5.7% of GDP (2021 est.)" + "text": "6% of GDP (2021 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "7.8% of GDP (2020 est.)" diff --git a/middle-east/sy.json b/middle-east/sy.json index 78f6a7c9..8238fd2d 100644 --- a/middle-east/sy.json +++ b/middle-east/sy.json @@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Syria's economy has deeply deteriorated amid the ongoing conflict that began in 2011, declining by more than 70% from 2010 to 2017. The government has struggled to fully address the effects of international sanctions, widespread infrastructure damage, diminished domestic consumption and production, reduced subsidies, and high inflation, which have caused dwindling foreign exchange reserves, rising budget and trade deficits, a decreasing value of the Syrian pound, and falling household purchasing power. In 2017, some economic indicators began to stabilize, including the exchange rate and inflation, but economic activity remains depressed and GDP almost certainly fell.
During 2017, the ongoing conflict and continued unrest and economic decline worsened the humanitarian crisis, necessitating high levels of international assistance, as more than 13 million people remain in need inside Syria, and the number of registered Syrian refugees increased from 4.8 million in 2016 to more than 5.4 million.
Prior to the turmoil, Damascus had begun liberalizing economic policies, including cutting lending interest rates, opening private banks, consolidating multiple exchange rates, raising prices on some subsidized items, and establishing the Damascus Stock Exchange, but the economy remains highly regulated. Long-run economic constraints include foreign trade barriers, declining oil production, high unemployment, rising budget deficits, increasing pressure on water supplies caused by heavy use in agriculture, industrial contaction, water pollution, and widespread infrastructure damage.
" + "text": "Syria's economy has deeply deteriorated amid the ongoing conflict that began in 2011, declining by more than 70% from 2010 to 2017. The government has struggled to fully address the effects of international sanctions, widespread infrastructure damage, diminished domestic consumption and production, reduced subsidies, and high inflation, which have caused dwindling foreign exchange reserves, rising budget and trade deficits, a decreasing value of the Syrian pound, and falling household purchasing power. In 2017, some economic indicators began to stabilize, including the exchange rate and inflation, but economic activity remains depressed and GDP almost certainly fell.
During 2017, the ongoing conflict and continued unrest and economic decline worsened the humanitarian crisis, necessitating high levels of international assistance, as more than 13 million people remain in need inside Syria, and the number of registered Syrian refugees increased from 4.8 million in 2016 to more than 5.4 million.
Prior to the turmoil, Damascus had begun liberalizing economic policies, including cutting lending interest rates, opening private banks, consolidating multiple exchange rates, raising prices on some subsidized items, and establishing the Damascus Stock Exchange, but the economy remains highly regulated. Long-run economic constraints include foreign trade barriers, declining oil production, high unemployment, rising budget deficits, increasing pressure on water supplies caused by heavy use in agriculture, industrial contaction, water pollution, and widespread infrastructure damage.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2015": { @@ -947,10 +947,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,892,515 (2020)" + "text": "2,857,193 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "16.53 (2020 est.)" + "text": "16 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -989,10 +989,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,549,356 (2021)" + "text": "1,549,356 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "8.85 (2021)" + "text": "9 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1152,7 +1152,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "160,000 (mid-year 2021); note - Syria's stateless population consists of Kurds and Palestinians; stateless persons are prevented from voting, owning land, holding certain jobs, receiving food subsidies or public healthcare, enrolling in public schools, or being legally married to Syrian citizens; in 1962, some 120,000 Syrian Kurds were stripped of their Syrian citizenship, rendering them and their descendants stateless; in 2011, the Syrian Government granted citizenship to thousands of Syrian Kurds as a means of appeasement; however, resolving the question of statelessness is not a priority given Syria's ongoing civil war" }, - "note": "note: the ongoing civil war has resulted in more than 5.7 million registered Syrian refugees - dispersed in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey - as of March 2022" + "note": "note: the ongoing civil war has resulted in more than 5.7 million registered Syrian refugees - dispersed in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey - as of May 2022" }, "Trafficking in persons": { "current situation": { diff --git a/middle-east/tu.json b/middle-east/tu.json index 7e3ea36a..17b7f785 100644 --- a/middle-east/tu.json +++ b/middle-east/tu.json @@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Turkey's largely free-market economy is driven by its industry and, increasingly, service sectors, although its traditional agriculture sector still accounts for about 25% of employment. The automotive, petrochemical, and electronics industries have risen in importance and surpassed the traditional textiles and clothing sectors within Turkey's export mix. However, the recent period of political stability and economic dynamism has given way to domestic uncertainty and security concerns, which are generating financial market volatility and weighing on Turkey’s economic outlook.
Current government policies emphasize populist spending measures and credit breaks, while implementation of structural economic reforms has slowed. The government is playing a more active role in some strategic sectors and has used economic institutions and regulators to target political opponents, undermining private sector confidence in the judicial system. Between July 2016 and March 2017, three credit ratings agencies downgraded Turkey’s sovereign credit ratings, citing concerns about the rule of law and the pace of economic reforms.
Turkey remains highly dependent on imported oil and gas but is pursuing energy relationships with a broader set of international partners and taking steps to increase use of domestic energy sources including renewables, nuclear, and coal. The joint Turkish-Azerbaijani Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline is moving forward to increase transport of Caspian gas to Turkey and Europe, and when completed will help diversify Turkey's sources of imported gas.
After Turkey experienced a severe financial crisis in 2001, Ankara adopted financial and fiscal reforms as part of an IMF program. The reforms strengthened the country's economic fundamentals and ushered in an era of strong growth, averaging more than 6% annually until 2008. An aggressive privatization program also reduced state involvement in basic industry, banking, transport, power generation, and communication. Global economic conditions and tighter fiscal policy caused GDP to contract in 2009, but Turkey's well-regulated financial markets and banking system helped the country weather the global financial crisis, and GDP growth rebounded to around 9% in 2010 and 2011, as exports and investment recovered following the crisis.
The growth of Turkish GDP since 2016 has revealed the persistent underlying imbalances in the Turkish economy. In particular, Turkey’s large current account deficit means it must rely on external investment inflows to finance growth, leaving the economy vulnerable to destabilizing shifts in investor confidence. Other troublesome trends include rising unemployment and inflation, which increased in 2017, given the Turkish lira’s continuing depreciation against the dollar. Although government debt remains low at about 30% of GDP, bank and corporate borrowing has almost tripled as a percent of GDP during the past decade, outpacing its emerging-market peers and prompting investor concerns about its long-term sustainability.
" + "text": "Turkey's largely free-market economy is driven by its industry and, increasingly, service sectors, although its traditional agriculture sector still accounts for about 25% of employment. The automotive, petrochemical, and electronics industries have risen in importance and surpassed the traditional textiles and clothing sectors within Turkey's export mix. However, the recent period of political stability and economic dynamism has given way to domestic uncertainty and security concerns, which are generating financial market volatility and weighing on Turkey’s economic outlook.
Current government policies emphasize populist spending measures and credit breaks, while implementation of structural economic reforms has slowed. The government is playing a more active role in some strategic sectors and has used economic institutions and regulators to target political opponents, undermining private sector confidence in the judicial system. Between July 2016 and March 2017, three credit ratings agencies downgraded Turkey’s sovereign credit ratings, citing concerns about the rule of law and the pace of economic reforms.
Turkey remains highly dependent on imported oil and gas but is pursuing energy relationships with a broader set of international partners and taking steps to increase use of domestic energy sources including renewables, nuclear, and coal. The joint Turkish-Azerbaijani Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline is moving forward to increase transport of Caspian gas to Turkey and Europe, and when completed will help diversify Turkey's sources of imported gas.
After Turkey experienced a severe financial crisis in 2001, Ankara adopted financial and fiscal reforms as part of an IMF program. The reforms strengthened the country's economic fundamentals and ushered in an era of strong growth, averaging more than 6% annually until 2008. An aggressive privatization program also reduced state involvement in basic industry, banking, transport, power generation, and communication. Global economic conditions and tighter fiscal policy caused GDP to contract in 2009, but Turkey's well-regulated financial markets and banking system helped the country weather the global financial crisis, and GDP growth rebounded to around 9% in 2010 and 2011, as exports and investment recovered following the crisis.
The growth of Turkish GDP since 2016 has revealed the persistent underlying imbalances in the Turkish economy. In particular, Turkey’s large current account deficit means it must rely on external investment inflows to finance growth, leaving the economy vulnerable to destabilizing shifts in investor confidence. Other troublesome trends include rising unemployment and inflation, which increased in 2017, given the Turkish lira’s continuing depreciation against the dollar. Although government debt remains low at about 30% of GDP, bank and corporate borrowing has almost tripled as a percent of GDP during the past decade, outpacing its emerging-market peers and prompting investor concerns about its long-term sustainability.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1019,10 +1019,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "12,448,604 (2020)" + "text": "12,448,604 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "14.76 (2020 est.)" + "text": "15 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1061,10 +1061,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "16,734,853 (2021)" + "text": "16,734,853 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "19.84 (2021)" + "text": "20 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1225,7 +1225,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "3,763,565 (Syria) (2022)" + "text": "3,762,889 (Syria) (2022)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "1.099 million (displaced from 1984-2005 because of fighting between the Kurdish PKK and Turkish military; most IDPs are Kurds from eastern and southeastern provinces; no information available on persons displaced by development projects) (2020)" diff --git a/middle-east/we.json b/middle-east/we.json index f8c9b94f..a1163414 100644 --- a/middle-east/we.json +++ b/middle-east/we.json @@ -797,10 +797,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "466,283 (2020 est.) (includes Gaza Strip) (2017 est.)" + "text": "466,283 (2020 est.) includes Gaza Strip" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "9 (2020 est.) (includes Gaza Strip) (2016 est.)" + "text": "9 (2020 est.) includes Gaza Strip" }, "note": "note: includes Gaza Strip" }, @@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ "text": "373,050 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "7.31 (2020 est.)" + "text": "7 (2020 est.)" }, "note": "note: includes Gaza Strip" } diff --git a/middle-east/ym.json b/middle-east/ym.json index 6dfb7f66..9d3cf745 100644 --- a/middle-east/ym.json +++ b/middle-east/ym.json @@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Yemen is a low-income country that faces difficult long-term challenges to stabilizing and growing its economy, and the current conflict has only exacerbated those issues. The ongoing war has halted Yemen’s exports, pressured the currency’s exchange rate, accelerated inflation, severely limited food and fuel imports, and caused widespread damage to infrastructure. The conflict has also created a severe humanitarian crisis - the world’s largest cholera outbreak currently at nearly 1 million cases, more than 7 million people at risk of famine, and more than 80% of the population in need of humanitarian assistance.
Prior to the start of the conflict in 2014, Yemen was highly dependent on declining oil and gas resources for revenue. Oil and gas earnings accounted for roughly 25% of GDP and 65% of government revenue. The Yemeni Government regularly faced annual budget shortfalls and tried to diversify the Yemeni economy through a reform program designed to bolster non-oil sectors of the economy and foreign investment. In July 2014, the government continued reform efforts by eliminating some fuel subsidies and in August 2014, the IMF approved a three-year, $570 million Extended Credit Facility for Yemen.
However, the conflict that began in 2014 stalled these reform efforts and ongoing fighting continues to accelerate the country’s economic decline. In September 2016, President HADI announced the move of the main branch of Central Bank of Yemen from Sanaa to Aden where his government could exert greater control over the central bank’s dwindling resources. Regardless of which group controls the main branch, the central bank system is struggling to function. Yemen’s Central Bank’s foreign reserves, which stood at roughly $5.2 billion prior to the conflict, have declined to negligible amounts. The Central Bank can no longer fully support imports of critical goods or the country’s exchange rate. The country also is facing a growing liquidity crisis and rising inflation. The private sector is hemorrhaging, with almost all businesses making substantial layoffs. Access to food and other critical commodities such as medical equipment is limited across the country due to security issues on the ground. The Social Welfare Fund, a cash transfer program for Yemen’s neediest, is no longer operational and has not made any disbursements since late 2014.
Yemen will require significant international assistance during and after the protracted conflict to stabilize its economy. Long-term challenges include a high population growth rate, high unemployment, declining water resources, and severe food scarcity.
" + "text": "Yemen is a low-income country that faces difficult long-term challenges to stabilizing and growing its economy, and the current conflict has only exacerbated those issues. The ongoing war has halted Yemen’s exports, pressured the currency’s exchange rate, accelerated inflation, severely limited food and fuel imports, and caused widespread damage to infrastructure. The conflict has also created a severe humanitarian crisis - the world’s largest cholera outbreak currently at nearly 1 million cases, more than 7 million people at risk of famine, and more than 80% of the population in need of humanitarian assistance.
Prior to the start of the conflict in 2014, Yemen was highly dependent on declining oil and gas resources for revenue. Oil and gas earnings accounted for roughly 25% of GDP and 65% of government revenue. The Yemeni Government regularly faced annual budget shortfalls and tried to diversify the Yemeni economy through a reform program designed to bolster non-oil sectors of the economy and foreign investment. In July 2014, the government continued reform efforts by eliminating some fuel subsidies and in August 2014, the IMF approved a three-year, $570 million Extended Credit Facility for Yemen.
However, the conflict that began in 2014 stalled these reform efforts and ongoing fighting continues to accelerate the country’s economic decline. In September 2016, President HADI announced the move of the main branch of Central Bank of Yemen from Sanaa to Aden where his government could exert greater control over the central bank’s dwindling resources. Regardless of which group controls the main branch, the central bank system is struggling to function. Yemen’s Central Bank’s foreign reserves, which stood at roughly $5.2 billion prior to the conflict, have declined to negligible amounts. The Central Bank can no longer fully support imports of critical goods or the country’s exchange rate. The country also is facing a growing liquidity crisis and rising inflation. The private sector is hemorrhaging, with almost all businesses making substantial layoffs. Access to food and other critical commodities such as medical equipment is limited across the country due to security issues on the ground. The Social Welfare Fund, a cash transfer program for Yemen’s neediest, is no longer operational and has not made any disbursements since late 2014.
Yemen will require significant international assistance during and after the protracted conflict to stabilize its economy. Long-term challenges include a high population growth rate, high unemployment, declining water resources, and severe food scarcity.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2017": { @@ -994,10 +994,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1.19 million (2018)" + "text": "1.24 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "4.28 (2018 est.)" + "text": "4 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1036,10 +1036,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "391,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "391,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.31 (2021 est.)" + "text": "1.3 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/north-america/bd.json b/north-america/bd.json index cfa6baca..34ce2d84 100644 --- a/north-america/bd.json +++ b/north-america/bd.json @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "International business, which consists primarily of insurance and other financial services, is the real bedrock of Bermuda's economy, consistently accounting for about 85% of the island's GDP. Tourism is the country’s second largest industry, accounting for about 5% of Bermuda's GDP but a much larger share of employment. Over 80% of visitors come from the US and the sector struggled in the wake of the global recession of 2008-09. Even the financial sector has lost roughly 5,000 high-paying expatriate jobs since 2008, weighing heavily on household consumption and retail sales. Bermuda must import almost everything. Agriculture and industry are limited due to the small size of the island.
Bermuda's economy returned to negative growth in 2016, reporting a contraction of 0.1% GDP, after growing by 0.6% in 2015. Unemployment reached 7% in 2016 and 2017, public debt is growing and exceeds $2.4 billion, and the government continues to work on attracting foreign investment. Still, Bermuda enjoys one of the highest per capita incomes in the world.
" + "text": "International business, which consists primarily of insurance and other financial services, is the real bedrock of Bermuda's economy, consistently accounting for about 85% of the island's GDP. Tourism is the country’s second largest industry, accounting for about 5% of Bermuda's GDP but a much larger share of employment. Over 80% of visitors come from the US and the sector struggled in the wake of the global recession of 2008-09. Even the financial sector has lost roughly 5,000 high-paying expatriate jobs since 2008, weighing heavily on household consumption and retail sales. Bermuda must import almost everything. Agriculture and industry are limited due to the small size of the island.
Bermuda's economy returned to negative growth in 2016, reporting a contraction of 0.1% GDP, after growing by 0.6% in 2015. Unemployment reached 7% in 2016 and 2017, public debt is growing and exceeds $2.4 billion, and the government continues to work on attracting foreign investment. Still, Bermuda enjoys one of the highest per capita incomes in the world.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": { @@ -851,18 +851,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "21,883 (2018)" + "text": "25,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "34.71 (2018 est.)" + "text": "40 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "64,997 (2018)" + "text": "68,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "103.1 (2019 est.)" + "text": "109 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -893,10 +893,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "23,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "23,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "36.93 (2021)" + "text": "37 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/north-america/ca.json b/north-america/ca.json index ba95e876..dad9d37c 100644 --- a/north-america/ca.json +++ b/north-america/ca.json @@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Canada resembles the US in its market-oriented economic system, pattern of production, and high living standards. Since World War II, the impressive growth of the manufacturing, mining, and service sectors has transformed the nation from a largely rural economy into one primarily industrial and urban. Canada has a large oil and natural gas sector with the majority of crude oil production derived from oil sands in the western provinces, especially Alberta. Canada now ranks third in the world in proved oil reserves behind Venezuela and Saudi Arabia and is the world’s seventh-largest oil producer.
TThe 1989 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (which includes Mexico) dramatically increased trade and economic integration between the US and Canada. Canada and the US enjoy the world’s most comprehensive bilateral trade and investment relationship, with goods and services trade totaling more than $680 billion in 2017, and two-way investment stocks of more than $800 billion. Over three-fourths of Canada’s merchandise exports are destined for the US each year. Canada is the largest foreign supplier of energy to the US, including oil, natural gas, and electric power, and a top source of US uranium imports.
Given its abundant natural resources, highly skilled labor force, and modern capital stock, Canada enjoyed solid economic growth from 1993 through 2007. The global economic crisis of 2007-08 moved the Canadian economy into sharp recession by late 2008, and Ottawa posted its first fiscal deficit in 2009 after 12 years of surplus. Canada's major banks emerged from the financial crisis of 2008-09 among the strongest in the world, owing to the financial sector's tradition of conservative lending practices and strong capitalization. Canada’s economy posted strong growth in 2017 at 3%, but most analysts are projecting Canada’s economic growth will drop back closer to 2% in 2018.
" + "text": "Canada resembles the US in its market-oriented economic system, pattern of production, and high living standards. Since World War II, the impressive growth of the manufacturing, mining, and service sectors has transformed the nation from a largely rural economy into one primarily industrial and urban. Canada has a large oil and natural gas sector with the majority of crude oil production derived from oil sands in the western provinces, especially Alberta. Canada now ranks third in the world in proved oil reserves behind Venezuela and Saudi Arabia and is the world’s seventh-largest oil producer.
TThe 1989 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (which includes Mexico) dramatically increased trade and economic integration between the US and Canada. Canada and the US enjoy the world’s most comprehensive bilateral trade and investment relationship, with goods and services trade totaling more than $680 billion in 2017, and two-way investment stocks of more than $800 billion. Over three-fourths of Canada’s merchandise exports are destined for the US each year. Canada is the largest foreign supplier of energy to the US, including oil, natural gas, and electric power, and a top source of US uranium imports.
Given its abundant natural resources, highly skilled labor force, and modern capital stock, Canada enjoyed solid economic growth from 1993 through 2007. The global economic crisis of 2007-08 moved the Canadian economy into sharp recession by late 2008, and Ottawa posted its first fiscal deficit in 2009 after 12 years of surplus. Canada's major banks emerged from the financial crisis of 2008-09 among the strongest in the world, owing to the financial sector's tradition of conservative lending practices and strong capitalization. Canada’s economy posted strong growth in 2017 at 3%, but most analysts are projecting Canada’s economic growth will drop back closer to 2% in 2018.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1006,10 +1006,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "13.926 million (2020)" + "text": "13.34 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "36.9 (2020 est.)" + "text": "35 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1048,10 +1048,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "15,825,813 (2021) Retail high-speed Internet access subs" + "text": "15,825,813 (2020 est.) Retail high-speed Internet access subs" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "41.93 (2021)" + "text": "42 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/north-america/gl.json b/north-america/gl.json index b06c99a2..659c9e3e 100644 --- a/north-america/gl.json +++ b/north-america/gl.json @@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Greenland’s economy depends on exports of shrimp and fish, and on a substantial subsidy from the Danish Government. Fish account for over 90% of its exports, subjecting the economy to price fluctuations. The subsidy from the Danish Government is budgeted to be about $535 million in 2017, more than 50% of government revenues, and 25% of GDP.
The economy is expanding after a period of decline. The economy contracted between 2012 and 2014, grew by 1.7% in 2015 and by 7.7%in 2016. The expansion has been driven by larger quotas for shrimp, the predominant Greenlandic export, and also by increased activity in the construction sector, especially in Nuuk, the capital. Private consumption and tourism also are contributing to GDP growth more than in previous years. Tourism in Greenland grew annually around 20% in 2015 and 2016, largely a result of increasing numbers of cruise lines now operating in Greenland's western and southern waters during the peak summer tourism season.
The public sector, including publicly owned enterprises and the municipalities, plays a dominant role in Greenland's economy. During the last decade the Greenland Self Rule Government pursued conservative fiscal and monetary policies, but public pressure has increased for better schools, health care, and retirement systems. The budget was in deficit in 2014 and 2016, but public debt remains low at about 5% of GDP. The government plans a balanced budget for the 2017–20 period.
Significant challenges face the island, including low levels of qualified labor, geographic dispersion, lack of industry diversification, the long-term sustainability of the public budget, and a declining population due to emigration. Hydrocarbon exploration has ceased with declining oil prices. The island has potential for natural resource exploitation with rare-earth, uranium, and iron ore mineral projects proposed, but a lack of infrastructure hinders development.
" + "text": "Greenland’s economy depends on exports of shrimp and fish, and on a substantial subsidy from the Danish Government. Fish account for over 90% of its exports, subjecting the economy to price fluctuations. The subsidy from the Danish Government is budgeted to be about $535 million in 2017, more than 50% of government revenues, and 25% of GDP.
The economy is expanding after a period of decline. The economy contracted between 2012 and 2014, grew by 1.7% in 2015 and by 7.7%in 2016. The expansion has been driven by larger quotas for shrimp, the predominant Greenlandic export, and also by increased activity in the construction sector, especially in Nuuk, the capital. Private consumption and tourism also are contributing to GDP growth more than in previous years. Tourism in Greenland grew annually around 20% in 2015 and 2016, largely a result of increasing numbers of cruise lines now operating in Greenland's western and southern waters during the peak summer tourism season.
The public sector, including publicly owned enterprises and the municipalities, plays a dominant role in Greenland's economy. During the last decade the Greenland Self Rule Government pursued conservative fiscal and monetary policies, but public pressure has increased for better schools, health care, and retirement systems. The budget was in deficit in 2014 and 2016, but public debt remains low at about 5% of GDP. The government plans a balanced budget for the 2017–20 period.
Significant challenges face the island, including low levels of qualified labor, geographic dispersion, lack of industry diversification, the long-term sustainability of the public budget, and a declining population due to emigration. Hydrocarbon exploration has ceased with declining oil prices. The island has potential for natural resource exploitation with rare-earth, uranium, and iron ore mineral projects proposed, but a lack of infrastructure hinders development.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2015": { @@ -824,10 +824,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "7,133 (2019)" + "text": "6,352 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "12.59 (2019 est.)" + "text": "11 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -866,10 +866,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "15,649 (2021)" + "text": "15,649 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "27.57 (2021)" + "text": "28 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/north-america/mx.json b/north-america/mx.json index 7c91a500..e674a9b7 100644 --- a/north-america/mx.json +++ b/north-america/mx.json @@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Mexico's $2.4 trillion economy – 11th largest in the world - has become increasingly oriented toward manufacturing since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force in 1994. Per capita income is roughly one-third that of the US; income distribution remains highly unequal.
Mexico has become the US' second-largest export market and third-largest source of imports. In 2017, two-way trade in goods and services exceeded $623 billion. Mexico has free trade agreements with 46 countries, putting more than 90% of its trade under free trade agreements. In 2012, Mexico formed the Pacific Alliance with Peru, Colombia, and Chile.
Mexico's current government, led by President Enrique PENA NIETO, has emphasized economic reforms, passing and implementing sweeping energy, financial, fiscal, and telecommunications reform legislation, among others, with the long-term aim to improve competitiveness and economic growth across the Mexican economy. Since 2015, Mexico has held public auctions of oil and gas exploration and development rights and for long-term electric power generation contracts. Mexico has also issued permits for private sector import, distribution, and retail sales of refined petroleum products in an effort to attract private investment into the energy sector and boost production.
Since 2013, Mexico’s economic growth has averaged 2% annually, falling short of private-sector expectations that President PENA NIETO’s sweeping reforms would bolster economic prospects. Growth is predicted to remain below potential given falling oil production, weak oil prices, structural issues such as low productivity, high inequality, a large informal sector employing over half of the workforce, weak rule of law, and corruption. Mexico’s economy remains vulnerable to uncertainty surrounding the future of NAFTA — because the United States is its top trading partner and the two countries share integrated supply chains — and to potential shifts in domestic policies following the inauguration of a new a president in December 2018.
" + "text": "Mexico's $2.4 trillion economy – 11th largest in the world - has become increasingly oriented toward manufacturing since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force in 1994. Per capita income is roughly one-third that of the US; income distribution remains highly unequal.
Mexico has become the US' second-largest export market and third-largest source of imports. In 2017, two-way trade in goods and services exceeded $623 billion. Mexico has free trade agreements with 46 countries, putting more than 90% of its trade under free trade agreements. In 2012, Mexico formed the Pacific Alliance with Peru, Colombia, and Chile.
Mexico's current government, led by President Enrique PENA NIETO, has emphasized economic reforms, passing and implementing sweeping energy, financial, fiscal, and telecommunications reform legislation, among others, with the long-term aim to improve competitiveness and economic growth across the Mexican economy. Since 2015, Mexico has held public auctions of oil and gas exploration and development rights and for long-term electric power generation contracts. Mexico has also issued permits for private sector import, distribution, and retail sales of refined petroleum products in an effort to attract private investment into the energy sector and boost production.
Since 2013, Mexico’s economic growth has averaged 2% annually, falling short of private-sector expectations that President PENA NIETO’s sweeping reforms would bolster economic prospects. Growth is predicted to remain below potential given falling oil production, weak oil prices, structural issues such as low productivity, high inequality, a large informal sector employing over half of the workforce, weak rule of law, and corruption. Mexico’s economy remains vulnerable to uncertainty surrounding the future of NAFTA — because the United States is its top trading partner and the two countries share integrated supply chains — and to potential shifts in domestic policies following the inauguration of a new a president in December 2018.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1063,10 +1063,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "23,800,105 (2020)" + "text": "24,500,456 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "18.46 (2020 est.)" + "text": "19 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1105,10 +1105,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "21,936,131 (2021)" + "text": "21,936,131 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "17.01 (2021)" + "text": "17 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1242,7 +1242,7 @@ "text": "0.8% of GDP (2021 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { - "text": "0.6% of GDP (2020)" + "text": "0.6% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2019": { "text": "0.5% of GDP (2019) (approximately $13.4 billion)" diff --git a/north-america/sb.json b/north-america/sb.json index 4ffd3651..c6d681a8 100644 --- a/north-america/sb.json +++ b/north-america/sb.json @@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The inhabitants have traditionally earned their livelihood by fishing and by servicing fishing fleets operating off the coast of Newfoundland. The economy has been declining, however, because of disputes with Canada over fishing quotas and a steady decline in the number of ships stopping at Saint Pierre. The services sector accounted for 86% of GDP in 2010, the last year data is available for. Government employment accounts for than 46% of the GDP, and 78% of the population is working age.
The government hopes an expansion of tourism will boost economic prospects. Fish farming, crab fishing, and agriculture are being developed to diversify the local economy. Recent test drilling for oil may pave the way for development of the energy sector. Trade is the second largest sector in terms of value added created, where it contributes significantly to economic activity. The extractive industries and energy sector is the third largest sector of activity in the archipelago, attributable in part to the construction of a new thermal power plant in 2015.
" + "text": "The inhabitants have traditionally earned their livelihood by fishing and by servicing fishing fleets operating off the coast of Newfoundland. The economy has been declining, however, because of disputes with Canada over fishing quotas and a steady decline in the number of ships stopping at Saint Pierre. The services sector accounted for 86% of GDP in 2010, the last year data is available for. Government employment accounts for than 46% of the GDP, and 78% of the population is working age.
The government hopes an expansion of tourism will boost economic prospects. Fish farming, crab fishing, and agriculture are being developed to diversify the local economy. Recent test drilling for oil may pave the way for development of the energy sector. Trade is the second largest sector in terms of value added created, where it contributes significantly to economic activity. The extractive industries and energy sector is the third largest sector of activity in the archipelago, attributable in part to the construction of a new thermal power plant in 2015.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2015": { @@ -697,10 +697,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "4,086" + "text": "4,800 (2015 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "75.55 (2019 est.)" + "text": "76 (2015 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { diff --git a/north-america/us.json b/north-america/us.json index a579c6a9..62789c07 100644 --- a/north-america/us.json +++ b/north-america/us.json @@ -978,10 +978,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "103.052 million (2020)" + "text": "101.526 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "31.13 (2020 est.)" + "text": "31 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1020,10 +1020,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "121.176 million (2021)" + "text": "121.176 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "36.61 (2021)" + "text": "37 (2020 est.)" } }, "Communications - note": { diff --git a/south-america/ar.json b/south-america/ar.json index d616f6f8..78efe1e9 100644 --- a/south-america/ar.json +++ b/south-america/ar.json @@ -593,10 +593,10 @@ "text": "bicameral National Congress or Congreso Nacional consists of:
Senate - percent of vote by bloc or party - NA; seats by bloc or party - JxC 14, FdT 9, VcV 1; composition (as of February 2022) - men 41, women 31, percent of women 43.1%
Chamber of Deputies - percent of vote by bloc or party - NA; seats by bloc or party - JxC 61, FdT 50, FIT-U 4, VcV 4, other 8; composition (as of February 2022) - men 142, women 115, percent of women 44.7%; note - total National Congress percent of women 44.4%
Senate - percent of vote by bloc or party - NA; seats by bloc or party - JxC 14, FdT 9, VcV 1; composition (as of February 2022) - JxC 33, FdT 35, other 4; men 41, women 31, percent of women 43.1%
Chamber of Deputies - percent of vote by bloc or party - NA; seats by bloc or party - JxC 61, FdT 50, FIT-U 4, VcV 4, other 8; composition (as of February 2022) - JxC 116, FdT 118, FIT-U 4, others 19; men 142, women 115, percent of women 44.7%; note - total National Congress percent of women 44.4%
" } }, "Judicial branch": { @@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Avanza Libertad or AL [Jose Luis ESPERT]
Civic Coalition ARI or CC-ARI [Elisa CARRIO]
Federal Consensus or CF [Roberto LAVAGNA, Juan Manuel URTUBEY]
Frente Civico por Santiago (Civic Front for Santiago) [Gerardo ZAMORA]
Frente de Izquierda (Workers' Left Front) or FIT-U (coalition of leftist parties in lower house) - (includes PTS, PO, and MST)
Frente de la Concordia Misionero (Front for the Renewal of Social Concord) or FRCS [Carlos Eduardo ROVIRA]
Frente de Todos (Everyone's Front) or FdT - (includes FR, La Campora, and PJ); note - ruling coalition since 2019; includes several national and provincial Peronist political parties
Generacion por un Encuentro Nacional (Generation for a National Encounter) or GEN [Margarita STOLBIZER]
Frente Renovador (Renewal Front) or FR [Sergio MASSA]
Hacemos por Cordoba (We do for Cordoba) or HC [Juan SCHIARETTI]
Juntos por el Cambio (Together for Change) or JxC - (includes CC-ARI, PRO, and UCR); note - primary opposition coalition since 2019
Juntos Somos Rio Negro (Together We Are Rio Negro) or JSRN
Justicialist Party or PJ [Alberto Angel FERNANDEZ]
La Campora [Maximo KIRCHNER]
La Libertad Avanza or LLA [Javier MILEI]
Movimiento Popular Neuquino (Neuquen People's Movement) or MPN [Omar GUTIERREZ]
Partido Socialista or PS [Rosario Monica FEIN]
Propuesta Republicana or PRO [Patricia BULLRICH]
Radical Civic Union or UCR [Alfredo CORNEJO]
Socialist Workers' Party or PTS [Nicolas DEL CANO]
Unidad Federal (coalition of provencial parties in the lower house) - (includes FRCS and JSRN)
Workers' Party or PO [Gabriel SOLANO]
Workers' Socialist Movement or MST [Alejandro BODART]
Vamos con Vos (Let's Go with You) or VcV [Florencio RANDAZZO]
Avanza Libertad or AL [Jose Luis ESPERT]
Civic Coalition ARI or CC-ARI [Elisa CARRIO, Maximiliano FERRARO]
Federal Consensus or CF [Roberto LAVAGNA, Juan Manuel URTUBEY]
Frente Civico por Santiago (Civic Front for Santiago) [Gerardo ZAMORA]
Frente de Izquierda (Workers' Left Front) or FIT-U [Nicolas DEL CANO / Miriam BREGMAN] (coalition of leftist parties in lower house and includes PTS, PO, and MST)
Frente de la Concordia Misionero (Front for the Renewal of Social Concord) or FRCS [Carlos Eduardo ROVIRA]
Frente de Todos (Everyone's Front) or FdT [Alberto FERNANDEZ] - (includes FR, La Campora, and PJ); note - ruling coalition since 2019; includes several national and provincial Peronist political parties
Generacion por un Encuentro Nacional (Generation for a National Encounter) or GEN [Margarita STOLBIZER]
Frente Renovador (Renewal Front) or FR [Sergio MASSA, Pablo MIROLO]
Hacemos por Cordoba (We do for Cordoba) or HC [Juan SCHIARETTI]
Juntos por el Cambio (Together for Change) or JxC - (includes CC-ARI, PRO, and UCR); note - primary opposition coalition since 2019
Juntos Somos Rio Negro (Together We Are Rio Negro) or JSRN [Alberto WERETILNECK]
Justicialist Party or PJ [Alberto Angel FERNANDEZ]
La Campora [Maximo KIRCHNER]
La Libertad Avanza or LLA [Javier MILEI]
Movimiento Popular Neuquino (Neuquen People's Movement) or MPN [Omar GUTIERREZ]
Partido Socialista or PS [Rosario Monica FEIN]
Propuesta Republicana or PRO [Patricia BULLRICH]
Radical Civic Union or UCR [Gerardo MORALES]
Socialist Workers' Party or PTS [Nicolas DEL CANO]
Unidad Federal (coalition of provencial parties in the lower house) - (includes FRCS and JSRN)
Workers' Party or PO [Gabriel SOLANO]
Workers' Socialist Movement or MST [Alejandro BODART]
Vamos con Vos (Let's Go with You) or VcV [Florencio RANDAZZO]
Argentina benefits from rich natural resources, a highly literate population, an export-oriented agricultural sector, and a diversified industrial base. Although one of the world's wealthiest countries 100 years ago, Argentina suffered during most of the 20th century from recurring economic crises, persistent fiscal and current account deficits, high inflation, mounting external debt, and capital flight.
Cristina FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER succeeded her husband as president in late 2007, and in 2008 the rapid economic growth of previous years slowed sharply as government policies held back exports and the world economy fell into recession. In 2010 the economy rebounded strongly, but slowed in late 2011 even as the government continued to rely on expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, which kept inflation in the double digits.
In order to deal with these problems, the government expanded state intervention in the economy: it nationalized the oil company YPF from Spain's Repsol, expanded measures to restrict imports, and further tightened currency controls in an effort to bolster foreign reserves and stem capital flight. Between 2011 and 2013, Central Bank foreign reserves dropped $21.3 billion from a high of $52.7 billion. In July 2014, Argentina and China agreed on an $11 billion currency swap; the Argentine Central Bank has received the equivalent of $3.2 billion in Chinese yuan, which it counts as international reserves.
With the election of President Mauricio MACRI in November 2015, Argentina began a historic political and economic transformation, as his administration took steps to liberalize the Argentine economy, lifting capital controls, floating the peso, removing export controls on some commodities, cutting some energy subsidies, and reforming the country’s official statistics. Argentina negotiated debt payments with holdout bond creditors, continued working with the IMF to shore up its finances, and returned to international capital markets in April 2016.
In 2017, Argentina’s economy emerged from recession with GDP growth of nearly 3.0%. The government passed important pension, tax, and fiscal reforms. And after years of international isolation, Argentina took on several international leadership roles, including hosting the World Economic Forum on Latin America and the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference, and is set to assume the presidency of the G-20 in 2018.
" + "text": "Argentina benefits from rich natural resources, a highly literate population, an export-oriented agricultural sector, and a diversified industrial base. Although one of the world's wealthiest countries 100 years ago, Argentina suffered during most of the 20th century from recurring economic crises, persistent fiscal and current account deficits, high inflation, mounting external debt, and capital flight.
Cristina FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER succeeded her husband as president in late 2007, and in 2008 the rapid economic growth of previous years slowed sharply as government policies held back exports and the world economy fell into recession. In 2010 the economy rebounded strongly, but slowed in late 2011 even as the government continued to rely on expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, which kept inflation in the double digits.
In order to deal with these problems, the government expanded state intervention in the economy: it nationalized the oil company YPF from Spain's Repsol, expanded measures to restrict imports, and further tightened currency controls in an effort to bolster foreign reserves and stem capital flight. Between 2011 and 2013, Central Bank foreign reserves dropped $21.3 billion from a high of $52.7 billion. In July 2014, Argentina and China agreed on an $11 billion currency swap; the Argentine Central Bank has received the equivalent of $3.2 billion in Chinese yuan, which it counts as international reserves.
With the election of President Mauricio MACRI in November 2015, Argentina began a historic political and economic transformation, as his administration took steps to liberalize the Argentine economy, lifting capital controls, floating the peso, removing export controls on some commodities, cutting some energy subsidies, and reforming the country’s official statistics. Argentina negotiated debt payments with holdout bond creditors, continued working with the IMF to shore up its finances, and returned to international capital markets in April 2016.
In 2017, Argentina’s economy emerged from recession with GDP growth of nearly 3.0%. The government passed important pension, tax, and fiscal reforms. And after years of international isolation, Argentina took on several international leadership roles, including hosting the World Economic Forum on Latin America and the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference, and is set to assume the presidency of the G-20 in 2018.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1022,23 +1022,23 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "7,356,165 (2020)" + "text": "7,356,165 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "16.28 (2020 est.)" + "text": "16 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "54,763,900 (2020)" + "text": "54,763,900 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "121.2 (2020 est.)" + "text": "121 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Argentina has one of the most vigorous mobile markets in Latin America; with additional operators in the market, mobile penetration fell in 2020 as incentives for multiple-SIM card ownership eased; LTE with tests of 5G; government plan to boost fixed broadband coverage nationally and declared TV, cable, and mobile services were essential public services; submarine system linking Sao Paolo and Rio De Janeiro with Buenos Aires is operational; national operator increased investment in Uruguay; importer of broadcasting equipment from China (2021)" + "text": "Argentina has one of the most developed mobile markets in Latin America; with additional operators in the market, mobile penetration fell in 2020 as incentives for multiple-SIM card ownership eased; LTE with tests of 5G; government plan to boost fixed broadband coverage nationally and declared TV, cable, and mobile services were essential public services; submarine system linking Sao Paolo and Rio De Janeiro with Buenos Aires is operational; national operator increased investment in Uruguay; importer of broadcasting equipment from China (2021)" }, "domestic": { "text": "roughly 16 per 100 fixed-line and 121 per 100 mobile-cellular; microwave radio relay, fiber-optic cable, and a domestic satellite system with 40 earth stations serve the trunk network (2020)" @@ -1064,10 +1064,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "9,571,562 (2021)" + "text": "9,571,562 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "21.18 (2021 est.)" + "text": "21 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/south-america/bl.json b/south-america/bl.json index d80694b9..a8e63120 100644 --- a/south-america/bl.json +++ b/south-america/bl.json @@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Bolivia is a resource rich country with strong growth attributed to captive markets for natural gas exports – to Brazil and Argentina. However, the country remains one of the least developed countries in Latin America because of state-oriented policies that deter investment.
Following an economic crisis during the early 1980s, reforms in the 1990s spurred private investment, stimulated economic growth, and cut poverty rates. The period 2003-05 was characterized by political instability, racial tensions, and violent protests against plans - subsequently abandoned - to export Bolivia's newly discovered natural gas reserves to large Northern Hemisphere markets. In 2005-06, the government passed hydrocarbon laws that imposed significantly higher royalties and required foreign firms then operating under risk-sharing contracts to surrender all production to the state energy company in exchange for a predetermined service fee; the laws engendered much public debate. High commodity prices between 2010 and 2014 sustained rapid growth and large trade surpluses with GDP growing 6.8% in 2013 and 5.4% in 2014. The global decline in oil prices that began in late 2014 exerted downward pressure on the price Bolivia receives for exported gas and resulted in lower GDP growth rates - 4.9% in 2015 and 4.3% in 2016 - and losses in government revenue as well as fiscal and trade deficits.
A lack of foreign investment in the key sectors of mining and hydrocarbons, along with conflict among social groups, pose challenges for the Bolivian economy. In 2015, President Evo MORALES expanded efforts to court international investment and boost Bolivia’s energy production capacity. MORALES passed an investment law and promised not to nationalize additional industries in an effort to improve the investment climate. In early 2016, the Government of Bolivia approved the 2016-2020 National Economic and Social Development Plan aimed at maintaining growth of 5% and reducing poverty.
" + "text": "Bolivia is a resource rich country with strong growth attributed to captive markets for natural gas exports – to Brazil and Argentina. However, the country remains one of the least developed countries in Latin America because of state-oriented policies that deter investment.
Following an economic crisis during the early 1980s, reforms in the 1990s spurred private investment, stimulated economic growth, and cut poverty rates. The period 2003-05 was characterized by political instability, racial tensions, and violent protests against plans - subsequently abandoned - to export Bolivia's newly discovered natural gas reserves to large Northern Hemisphere markets. In 2005-06, the government passed hydrocarbon laws that imposed significantly higher royalties and required foreign firms then operating under risk-sharing contracts to surrender all production to the state energy company in exchange for a predetermined service fee; the laws engendered much public debate. High commodity prices between 2010 and 2014 sustained rapid growth and large trade surpluses with GDP growing 6.8% in 2013 and 5.4% in 2014. The global decline in oil prices that began in late 2014 exerted downward pressure on the price Bolivia receives for exported gas and resulted in lower GDP growth rates - 4.9% in 2015 and 4.3% in 2016 - and losses in government revenue as well as fiscal and trade deficits.
A lack of foreign investment in the key sectors of mining and hydrocarbons, along with conflict among social groups, pose challenges for the Bolivian economy. In 2015, President Evo MORALES expanded efforts to court international investment and boost Bolivia’s energy production capacity. MORALES passed an investment law and promised not to nationalize additional industries in an effort to improve the investment climate. In early 2016, the Government of Bolivia approved the 2016-2020 National Economic and Social Development Plan aimed at maintaining growth of 5% and reducing poverty.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1031,18 +1031,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "598,082 (2020)" + "text": "598,082 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "5.12 (2020 est.)" + "text": "5 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "11,804,343 (2020)" + "text": "11,804,343 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "101.1 (2020 est.)" + "text": "101 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1073,10 +1073,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "931,918 (2021)" + "text": "931,918 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "7.98 (2021)" + "text": "8 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1186,8 +1186,11 @@ "note": "note - the National Police is part of the reserves for the Armed Forces" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.4% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { - "text": "1.3% of GDP (2020 est.)" + "text": "1.4% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2019": { "text": "1.4% of GDP (2019 est.) (approximately $980 million)" @@ -1197,9 +1200,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.5% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $1.01 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.6% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $970 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { @@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "12,100 (Venezuela) (2021)" + "text": "12,400 (Venezuela) (2022)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/south-america/br.json b/south-america/br.json index d4f80ea1..ee97079f 100644 --- a/south-america/br.json +++ b/south-america/br.json @@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Brazil is the eighth-largest economy in the world, but is recovering from a recession in 2015 and 2016 that ranks as the worst in the country’s history. In 2017, Brazil`s GDP grew 1%, inflation fell to historic lows of 2.9%, and the Central Bank lowered benchmark interest rates from 13.75% in 2016 to 7%.
The economy has been negatively affected by multiple corruption scandals involving private companies and government officials, including the impeachment and conviction of Former President Dilma ROUSSEFF in August 2016. Sanctions against the firms involved — some of the largest in Brazil — have limited their business opportunities, producing a ripple effect on associated businesses and contractors but creating opportunities for foreign companies to step into what had been a closed market.
The succeeding TEMER administration has implemented a series of fiscal and structural reforms to restore credibility to government finances. Congress approved legislation in December 2016 to cap public spending. Government spending growth had pushed public debt to 73.7% of GDP at the end of 2017, up from over 50% in 2012. The government also boosted infrastructure projects, such as oil and natural gas auctions, in part to raise revenues. Other economic reforms, proposed in 2016, aim to reduce barriers to foreign investment, and to improve labor conditions. Policies to strengthen Brazil’s workforce and industrial sector, such as local content requirements, have boosted employment, but at the expense of investment.
Brazil is a member of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), a trade bloc that includes Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay - Venezuela’s membership in the organization was suspended In August 2017. After the Asian and Russian financial crises, Mercosur adopted a protectionist stance to guard against exposure to volatile foreign markets and it currently is negotiating Free Trade Agreements with the European Union and Canada.
" + "text": "Brazil is the eighth-largest economy in the world, but is recovering from a recession in 2015 and 2016 that ranks as the worst in the country’s history. In 2017, Brazil`s GDP grew 1%, inflation fell to historic lows of 2.9%, and the Central Bank lowered benchmark interest rates from 13.75% in 2016 to 7%.
The economy has been negatively affected by multiple corruption scandals involving private companies and government officials, including the impeachment and conviction of Former President Dilma ROUSSEFF in August 2016. Sanctions against the firms involved — some of the largest in Brazil — have limited their business opportunities, producing a ripple effect on associated businesses and contractors but creating opportunities for foreign companies to step into what had been a closed market.
The succeeding TEMER administration has implemented a series of fiscal and structural reforms to restore credibility to government finances. Congress approved legislation in December 2016 to cap public spending. Government spending growth had pushed public debt to 73.7% of GDP at the end of 2017, up from over 50% in 2012. The government also boosted infrastructure projects, such as oil and natural gas auctions, in part to raise revenues. Other economic reforms, proposed in 2016, aim to reduce barriers to foreign investment, and to improve labor conditions. Policies to strengthen Brazil’s workforce and industrial sector, such as local content requirements, have boosted employment, but at the expense of investment.
Brazil is a member of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), a trade bloc that includes Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay - Venezuela’s membership in the organization was suspended In August 2017. After the Asian and Russian financial crises, Mercosur adopted a protectionist stance to guard against exposure to volatile foreign markets and it currently is negotiating Free Trade Agreements with the European Union and Canada.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1051,10 +1051,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "30,653,813 (2020)" + "text": "30,653,813 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "14.42 (2020 est.)" + "text": "14 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1093,10 +1093,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "36,344,670 (2021) The value presented includes subscriptions with speeds less than 256 kbit/s." + "text": "36,344,670 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "17.1 (2021 est.)" + "text": "17 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1228,6 +1228,9 @@ "text": "Brazilian Armed Forces: Brazilian Army (Exercito Brasileiro, EB), Brazilian Navy (Marinha do Brasil, MB, includes Naval Aviation (Aviacao Naval Brasileira) and Marine Corps (Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais)), Brazilian Air Force (Forca Aerea Brasileira, FAB) (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.3% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.3% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1239,9 +1242,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.4% of GDP (2017) (approximately $34.4 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.3% of GDP (2016) (approximately $32.1 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { @@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@ }, "Transnational Issues": { "Disputes - international": { - "text": "Brazil-Colombia: Contraband smuggling (narcotics and arms), illegal migration, trafficking in animals, plants, lumber, illegal exploitation of mineral resources, Colombian (FARC) insurgent incursions in the area remain problematic issues.
Brazil-Uruguay: The uncontested boundary dispute between Brazil and Uruguay over over Arroyo de la Invernada triangle and sovereignty over Isla Brsillera leaves the tripoint with Argentina in question. Smuggling of firearms and narcotics continues to be an issue along the Uruguay-Brazil border.
Brazil-Venezuela: Colombian-organized illegal narcotics and paramilitary activities penetrate Brazil's border region with Venezuela.
Brazil-Bolivia: The Roboré Accord of March 29, 1958 placed the long-disputed Isla Suárez/Ilha de Guajará-Mirim, a fluvial island on the Río Mamoré, between the two towns of Guajará-Mirim (Brazil) and Guayaramerin (Bolivia), under Bolivian administration but did not resolve the sovereignty dispute
Brazil-Colombia: Contraband smuggling (narcotics and arms), illegal migration, trafficking in animals, plants, lumber, illegal exploitation of mineral resources, Colombian (FARC) insurgent incursions in the area remain problematic issues.
Brazil-Uruguay: The uncontested boundary dispute between Brazil and Uruguay over over Arroyo de la Invernada triangle and sovereignty over Isla Brsillera leaves the tripoint with Argentina in question. Smuggling of firearms and narcotics continues to be an issue along the Uruguay-Brazil border.
Brazil-Venezuela: Colombian-organized illegal narcotics and paramilitary activities penetrate Brazil's border region with Venezuela.
Chile has a market-oriented economy characterized by a high level of foreign trade and a reputation for strong financial institutions and sound policy that have given it the strongest sovereign bond rating in South America. Exports of goods and services account for approximately one-third of GDP, with commodities making up some 60% of total exports. Copper is Chile’s top export and provides 20% of government revenue.
From 2003 through 2013, real growth averaged almost 5% per year, despite a slight contraction in 2009 that resulted from the global financial crisis. Growth slowed to an estimated 1.4% in 2017. A continued drop in copper prices prompted Chile to experience its third consecutive year of slow growth.
Chile deepened its longstanding commitment to trade liberalization with the signing of a free trade agreement with the US, effective 1 January 2004. Chile has 26 trade agreements covering 60 countries including agreements with the EU, Mercosur, China, India, South Korea, and Mexico. In May 2010, Chile signed the OECD Convention, becoming the first South American country to join the OECD. In October 2015, Chile signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, which was finalized as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and signed at a ceremony in Chile in March 2018.
The Chilean Government has generally followed a countercyclical fiscal policy, under which it accumulates surpluses in sovereign wealth funds during periods of high copper prices and economic growth, and generally allows deficit spending only during periods of low copper prices and growth. As of 31 October 2016, those sovereign wealth funds - kept mostly outside the country and separate from Central Bank reserves - amounted to more than $23.5 billion. Chile used these funds to finance fiscal stimulus packages during the 2009 economic downturn.
In 2014, then-President Michelle BACHELET introduced tax reforms aimed at delivering her campaign promise to fight inequality and to provide access to education and health care. The reforms are expected to generate additional tax revenues equal to 3% of Chile’s GDP, mostly by increasing corporate tax rates to OECD averages.
" + "text": "Chile has a market-oriented economy characterized by a high level of foreign trade and a reputation for strong financial institutions and sound policy that have given it the strongest sovereign bond rating in South America. Exports of goods and services account for approximately one-third of GDP, with commodities making up some 60% of total exports. Copper is Chile’s top export and provides 20% of government revenue.
From 2003 through 2013, real growth averaged almost 5% per year, despite a slight contraction in 2009 that resulted from the global financial crisis. Growth slowed to an estimated 1.4% in 2017. A continued drop in copper prices prompted Chile to experience its third consecutive year of slow growth.
Chile deepened its longstanding commitment to trade liberalization with the signing of a free trade agreement with the US, effective 1 January 2004. Chile has 26 trade agreements covering 60 countries including agreements with the EU, Mercosur, China, India, South Korea, and Mexico. In May 2010, Chile signed the OECD Convention, becoming the first South American country to join the OECD. In October 2015, Chile signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, which was finalized as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and signed at a ceremony in Chile in March 2018.
The Chilean Government has generally followed a countercyclical fiscal policy, under which it accumulates surpluses in sovereign wealth funds during periods of high copper prices and economic growth, and generally allows deficit spending only during periods of low copper prices and growth. As of 31 October 2016, those sovereign wealth funds - kept mostly outside the country and separate from Central Bank reserves - amounted to more than $23.5 billion. Chile used these funds to finance fiscal stimulus packages during the 2009 economic downturn.
In 2014, then-President Michelle BACHELET introduced tax reforms aimed at delivering her campaign promise to fight inequality and to provide access to education and health care. The reforms are expected to generate additional tax revenues equal to 3% of Chile’s GDP, mostly by increasing corporate tax rates to OECD averages.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -993,10 +993,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,567,938 (2020)" + "text": "2,567,938 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "13.43 (2020 est.)" + "text": "13 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1035,10 +1035,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "3,763,826 (2021)" + "text": "3,763,826 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "19.69 (2021)" + "text": "20 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1150,6 +1150,9 @@ "note": "note - Carabineros de Chile are responsible to both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.9% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "2% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1161,9 +1164,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "2% of GDP (2017) (approximately $7.1 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "2% of GDP (2016) (approximately $6.9 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/south-america/co.json b/south-america/co.json index f02598a3..4b266e0a 100644 --- a/south-america/co.json +++ b/south-america/co.json @@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Colombia heavily depends on energy and mining exports, making it vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices. Colombia is Latin America’s fourth largest oil producer and the world’s fourth largest coal producer, third largest coffee exporter, and second largest cut flowers exporter. Colombia’s economic development is hampered by inadequate infrastructure, poverty, narcotrafficking, and an uncertain security situation, in addition to dependence on primary commodities (goods that have little value-added from processing or labor inputs).
Colombia’s economy slowed in 2017 because of falling world market prices for oil and lower domestic oil production due to insurgent attacks on pipeline infrastructure. Although real GDP growth averaged 4.7% during the past decade, it fell to an estimated 1.8% in 2017. Declining oil prices also have contributed to reduced government revenues. In 2016, oil revenue dropped below 4% of the federal budget and likely remained below 4% in 2017. A Western credit rating agency in December 2017 downgraded Colombia’s sovereign credit rating to BBB-, because of weaker-than-expected growth and increasing external debt. Colombia has struggled to address local referendums against foreign investment, which have slowed its expansion, especially in the oil and mining sectors. Colombia’s FDI declined by 3% to $10.2 billion between January and September 2017.
Colombia has signed or is negotiating Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with more than a dozen countries; the US-Colombia FTA went into effect in May 2012. Colombia is a founding member of the Pacific Alliance—a regional trade block formed in 2012 by Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru to promote regional trade and economic integration. The Colombian government took steps in 2017 to address several bilateral trade irritants with the US, including those on truck scrappage, distilled spirits, pharmaceuticals, ethanol imports, and labor rights. Colombia hopes to accede to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
" + "text": "Colombia heavily depends on energy and mining exports, making it vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices. Colombia is Latin America’s fourth largest oil producer and the world’s fourth largest coal producer, third largest coffee exporter, and second largest cut flowers exporter. Colombia’s economic development is hampered by inadequate infrastructure, poverty, narcotrafficking, and an uncertain security situation, in addition to dependence on primary commodities (goods that have little value-added from processing or labor inputs).
Colombia’s economy slowed in 2017 because of falling world market prices for oil and lower domestic oil production due to insurgent attacks on pipeline infrastructure. Although real GDP growth averaged 4.7% during the past decade, it fell to an estimated 1.8% in 2017. Declining oil prices also have contributed to reduced government revenues. In 2016, oil revenue dropped below 4% of the federal budget and likely remained below 4% in 2017. A Western credit rating agency in December 2017 downgraded Colombia’s sovereign credit rating to BBB-, because of weaker-than-expected growth and increasing external debt. Colombia has struggled to address local referendums against foreign investment, which have slowed its expansion, especially in the oil and mining sectors. Colombia’s FDI declined by 3% to $10.2 billion between January and September 2017.
Colombia has signed or is negotiating Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with more than a dozen countries; the US-Colombia FTA went into effect in May 2012. Colombia is a founding member of the Pacific Alliance—a regional trade block formed in 2012 by Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru to promote regional trade and economic integration. The Colombian government took steps in 2017 to address several bilateral trade irritants with the US, including those on truck scrappage, distilled spirits, pharmaceuticals, ethanol imports, and labor rights. Colombia hopes to accede to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1030,10 +1030,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "7,248,026 (2020)" + "text": "7,248,026 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "14.24 (2020 est.)" + "text": "14 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1072,10 +1072,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "7,764,772 (2021)" + "text": "7,764,772 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "15.26 (2021 est.)" + "text": "15 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1196,6 +1196,9 @@ "text": "Military Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Militares de Colombia): National Army (Ejercito Nacional), Republic of Colombia Navy (Armada Republica de Colombia, ARC; includes Coast Guard), Colombian Air Force (Fuerza Aerea de Colombia, FAC); Colombian National Police (civilian force that is part of the Ministry of Defense) (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "3% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "3% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1207,9 +1210,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "3.2% of GDP (2017) (approximately $18.3 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "3.2% of GDP (2016) (approximately $17.8 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { @@ -1247,7 +1247,7 @@ "text": "1,842,390 (Venezuela) (economic and political crisis; includes Venezuelans who have claimed asylum, are recognized as refugees, or received alternative legal stay) (2022)" }, "IDPs": { - "text": "8,214,100 (conflict between government and illegal armed groups and drug traffickers since 1985) (2021)" + "text": "8,244,835 (conflict between government and illegal armed groups and drug traffickers since 1985) (2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "11 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/south-america/ec.json b/south-america/ec.json index f0736995..891f5184 100644 --- a/south-america/ec.json +++ b/south-america/ec.json @@ -599,10 +599,10 @@ }, "Judicial branch": { "highest courts": { - "text": "National Court of Justice or Corte Nacional de Justicia (consists of 21 judges, including the chief justice and organized into 5 specialized chambers); Constitutional Court or Corte Constitucional (consists of 9 judges)" + "text": "National Court of Justice or Corte Nacional de Justicia (consists of 21 judges, including the chief justice and organized into 5 specialized chambers); Constitutional Court or Corte Constitucional (consists of the court president and 8 judges)" }, "judge selection and term of office": { - "text": "justices of National Court of Justice elected by the Judiciary Council, a 9-member independent body of law professionals; judges elected for 9-year, non-renewable terms, with one-third of the membership renewed every 3 years; Constitutional Court judges appointed by the executive, legislative, and Citizen Participation branches of government; judges appointed for 9-year non-renewable terms with one-third of the membership renewed every 3 years" + "text": "candidates for the National Court of Justice evaluated and appointed justices by the Judicial Council, a 9-member independent body of law professionals; justices elected for 9-year, non-renewable terms, with one-third of the membership renewed every 3 years; candidates for the Constitutional Court evaluated and appointed judges by a 6-member independent body of law professionals; judges appointed for 4-year renewable terms" }, "subordinate courts": { "text": "provincial courts (one for each province except Galapagos); fiscal, criminal, and administrative tribunals; Election Dispute Settlement Courts; cantonal courts" @@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Ecuador is substantially dependent on its petroleum resources, which accounted for about a third of the country's export earnings in 2017. Remittances from overseas Ecuadorian are also important.
In 1999/2000, Ecuador's economy suffered from a banking crisis that lead to some reforms, including adoption of the US dollar as legal tender. Dollarization stabilized the economy, and positive growth returned in most of the years that followed. China has become Ecuador's largest foreign lender since 2008 and now accounts for 77.7% of the Ecuador’s bilateral debt. Various economic policies under the CORREA administration, such as an announcement in 2017 that Ecuador would terminate 13 bilateral investment treaties - including one with the US, generated economic uncertainty and discouraged private investment.
Faced with a 2013 trade deficit of $1.1 billion, Ecuador imposed tariff surcharges from 5% to 45% on an estimated 32% of imports. Ecuador’s economy fell into recession in 2015 and remained in recession in 2016. Declining oil prices and exports forced the CORREA administration to cut government oulays. Foreign investment in Ecuador is low as a result of the unstable regulatory environment and weak rule of law.
n April of 2017, Lenin MORENO was elected President of Ecuador by popular vote. His immediate challenge was to reengage the private sector to improve cash flow in the country. Ecuador’s economy returned to positive, but sluggish, growth. In early 2018, the MORENO administration held a public referendum on seven economic and political issues in a move counter to CORREA-administration policies, reduce corruption, strengthen democracy, and revive employment and the economy. The referendum resulted in repeal of taxes associated with recovery from the earthquake of 2016, reduced restrictions on metal mining in the Yasuni Intangible Zone - a protected area, and several political reforms.
" + "text": "Ecuador is substantially dependent on its petroleum resources, which accounted for about a third of the country's export earnings in 2017. Remittances from overseas Ecuadorian are also important.
In 1999/2000, Ecuador's economy suffered from a banking crisis that lead to some reforms, including adoption of the US dollar as legal tender. Dollarization stabilized the economy, and positive growth returned in most of the years that followed. China has become Ecuador's largest foreign lender since 2008 and now accounts for 77.7% of the Ecuador’s bilateral debt. Various economic policies under the CORREA administration, such as an announcement in 2017 that Ecuador would terminate 13 bilateral investment treaties - including one with the US, generated economic uncertainty and discouraged private investment.
Faced with a 2013 trade deficit of $1.1 billion, Ecuador imposed tariff surcharges from 5% to 45% on an estimated 32% of imports. Ecuador’s economy fell into recession in 2015 and remained in recession in 2016. Declining oil prices and exports forced the CORREA administration to cut government oulays. Foreign investment in Ecuador is low as a result of the unstable regulatory environment and weak rule of law.
n April of 2017, Lenin MORENO was elected President of Ecuador by popular vote. His immediate challenge was to reengage the private sector to improve cash flow in the country. Ecuador’s economy returned to positive, but sluggish, growth. In early 2018, the MORENO administration held a public referendum on seven economic and political issues in a move counter to CORREA-administration policies, reduce corruption, strengthen democracy, and revive employment and the economy. The referendum resulted in repeal of taxes associated with recovery from the earthquake of 2016, reduced restrictions on metal mining in the Yasuni Intangible Zone - a protected area, and several political reforms.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1016,10 +1016,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,063,044" + "text": "2,063,044 (2020)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "11.69 (2019 est.)" + "text": "12 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1058,10 +1058,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "2,371,297 (2021)" + "text": "2,371,297 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "13.44 (2021)" + "text": "13 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1174,6 +1174,9 @@ "note": "note - the National Police of Ecuador (Policía Nacional del Ecuador) is under the Ministry of Government" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "2% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "2.3% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1185,9 +1188,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "2.4% of GDP (2017) (approximately $3.1 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "2.5% of GDP (2016) (approximately $3.17 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { @@ -1213,7 +1213,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "508,935 (Venezuela) (economic and political crisis; includes Venezuelans who have claimed asylum, are recognized as refugees, or have received alternative legal stay), 65,854 (Colombia) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2021)" + "text": "65,854 (Colombia) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2021); 513,900 (Venezuela) (economic and political crisis; includes Venezuelans who have claimed asylum, are recognized as refugees, or have received alternative legal stay) (2022)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/south-america/fk.json b/south-america/fk.json index 12e7906b..9e048593 100644 --- a/south-america/fk.json +++ b/south-america/fk.json @@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The economy was formerly based on agriculture, mainly sheep farming, but fishing and tourism currently comprise the bulk of economic activity. In 1987, the government began selling fishing licenses to foreign trawlers operating within the Falkland Islands' exclusive fishing zone. These license fees net more than $40 million per year, which help support the island's health, education, and welfare system. The waters around the Falkland Islands are known for their squid, which account for around 75% of the annual 200,000-ton catch.
Dairy farming supports domestic consumption; crops furnish winter fodder. Foreign exchange earnings come from shipments of high-grade wool to the UK and from the sale of postage stamps and coins.
Tourism, especially ecotourism, is increasing rapidly, with about 69,000 visitors in 2009 and adds approximately $5.5 million to the Falkland’s annual GDP. The British military presence also provides a sizable economic boost. The islands are now self-financing except for defense.
In 1993, the British Geological Survey announced a 200-mile oil exploration zone around the islands, and early seismic surveys suggest substantial reserves capable of producing 500,000 barrels per day. Political tensions between the UK and Argentina remain high following the start of oil drilling activities in the waters. In May 2010 the first commercial oil discovery was made, signaling the potential for the development of a long term hydrocarbon industry in the Falkland Islands.
" + "text": "The economy was formerly based on agriculture, mainly sheep farming, but fishing and tourism currently comprise the bulk of economic activity. In 1987, the government began selling fishing licenses to foreign trawlers operating within the Falkland Islands' exclusive fishing zone. These license fees net more than $40 million per year, which help support the island's health, education, and welfare system. The waters around the Falkland Islands are known for their squid, which account for around 75% of the annual 200,000-ton catch.
Dairy farming supports domestic consumption; crops furnish winter fodder. Foreign exchange earnings come from shipments of high-grade wool to the UK and from the sale of postage stamps and coins.
Tourism, especially ecotourism, is increasing rapidly, with about 69,000 visitors in 2009 and adds approximately $5.5 million to the Falkland’s annual GDP. The British military presence also provides a sizable economic boost. The islands are now self-financing except for defense.
In 1993, the British Geological Survey announced a 200-mile oil exploration zone around the islands, and early seismic surveys suggest substantial reserves capable of producing 500,000 barrels per day. Political tensions between the UK and Argentina remain high following the start of oil drilling activities in the waters. In May 2010 the first commercial oil discovery was made, signaling the potential for the development of a long term hydrocarbon industry in the Falkland Islands.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2015": { @@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ "text": "2,000 (2018 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "65.19 (2018 est.)" + "text": "65 (2018 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -716,10 +716,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "1,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "32.59 (2021 est.)" + "text": "33 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/south-america/gy.json b/south-america/gy.json index 161a4d17..40c86ab9 100644 --- a/south-america/gy.json +++ b/south-america/gy.json @@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "The Guyanese economy exhibited moderate economic growth in recent years and is based largely on agriculture and extractive industries. The economy is heavily dependent upon the export of six commodities - sugar, gold, bauxite, shrimp, timber, and rice - which represent nearly 60% of the country's GDP and are highly susceptible to adverse weather conditions and fluctuations in commodity prices. Guyana closed or consolidated several sugar estates in 2017, reducing production of sugar to a forecasted 147,000 tons in 2018, less than half of 2017 production. Much of Guyana's growth in recent years has come from a surge in gold production. With a record-breaking 700,000 ounces of gold produced in 2016, Gold production in Guyana has offset the economic effects of declining sugar production. In January 2018, estimated 3.2 billion barrels of oil were found offshore and Guyana is scheduled to become a petroleum producer by March 2020.
Guyana's entrance into the Caricom Single Market and Economy in January 2006 broadened the country's export market, primarily in the raw materials sector. Guyana has experienced positive growth almost every year over the past decade. Inflation has been kept under control. Recent years have seen the government's stock of debt reduced significantly - with external debt now less than half of what it was in the early 1990s. Despite these improvements, the government is still juggling a sizable external debt against the urgent need for expanded public investment. In March 2007, the Inter-American Development Bank, Guyana's principal donor, canceled Guyana's nearly $470 million debt, equivalent to 21% of GDP, which along with other Highly Indebted Poor Country debt forgiveness, brought the debt-to-GDP ratio down from 183% in 2006 to 52% in 2017. Guyana had become heavily indebted as a result of the inward-looking, state-led development model pursued in the 1970s and 1980s. Chronic problems include a shortage of skilled labor and a deficient infrastructure.
" + "text": "The Guyanese economy exhibited moderate economic growth in recent years and is based largely on agriculture and extractive industries. The economy is heavily dependent upon the export of six commodities - sugar, gold, bauxite, shrimp, timber, and rice - which represent nearly 60% of the country's GDP and are highly susceptible to adverse weather conditions and fluctuations in commodity prices. Guyana closed or consolidated several sugar estates in 2017, reducing production of sugar to a forecasted 147,000 tons in 2018, less than half of 2017 production. Much of Guyana's growth in recent years has come from a surge in gold production. With a record-breaking 700,000 ounces of gold produced in 2016, Gold production in Guyana has offset the economic effects of declining sugar production. In January 2018, estimated 3.2 billion barrels of oil were found offshore and Guyana is scheduled to become a petroleum producer by March 2020.
Guyana's entrance into the Caricom Single Market and Economy in January 2006 broadened the country's export market, primarily in the raw materials sector. Guyana has experienced positive growth almost every year over the past decade. Inflation has been kept under control. Recent years have seen the government's stock of debt reduced significantly - with external debt now less than half of what it was in the early 1990s. Despite these improvements, the government is still juggling a sizable external debt against the urgent need for expanded public investment. In March 2007, the Inter-American Development Bank, Guyana's principal donor, canceled Guyana's nearly $470 million debt, equivalent to 21% of GDP, which along with other Highly Indebted Poor Country debt forgiveness, brought the debt-to-GDP ratio down from 183% in 2006 to 52% in 2017. Guyana had become heavily indebted as a result of the inward-looking, state-led development model pursued in the 1970s and 1980s. Chronic problems include a shortage of skilled labor and a deficient infrastructure.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -974,10 +974,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "135,795 (2018)" + "text": "125,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "17.52 (2018 est.)" + "text": "16 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1016,10 +1016,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "95,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "95,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "12.08 (2021)" + "text": "12 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1093,6 +1093,9 @@ "text": "the Guyana Defense Force is a unified force with ground, air, and coast guard components, as well as a militia (Guyana People's Militia) (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.2% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1104,9 +1107,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.2% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $80 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.1% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $75 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/south-america/ns.json b/south-america/ns.json index 1eb90ab2..d6614af7 100644 --- a/south-america/ns.json +++ b/south-america/ns.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "First explored by the Spaniards in the 16th century and then settled by the English in the mid-17th century, Suriname became a Dutch colony in 1667. With the abolition of African slavery in 1863, workers were brought in from India and Java. The Netherlands granted the colony independence in 1975. Five years later the civilian government was replaced by a military regime that soon declared Suriname a socialist republic. It continued to exert control through a succession of nominally civilian administrations until 1987, when international pressure finally forced a democratic election. In 1990, the military overthrew the civilian leadership, but a democratically elected government - a four-party coalition - returned to power in 1991. The coalition expanded to eight parties in 2005 and ruled until August 2010, when voters returned former military leader Desire BOUTERSE and his opposition coalition to power. President BOUTERSE was reelected unopposed in 2015." + "text": "First explored by the Spaniards in the 16th century and then settled by the English in the mid-17th century, Suriname became a Dutch colony in 1667. With the abolition of African slavery in 1863, workers were brought in from India and Java. The Netherlands granted the colony independence in 1975. Five years later the civilian government was replaced by a military regime that soon declared Suriname a socialist republic. It continued to exert control through a succession of nominally civilian administrations until 1987, when international pressure finally forced a democratic election. In 1990, the military overthrew the civilian leadership, but a democratically elected government - a four-party coalition - returned to power in 1991. The coalition expanded to eight parties in 2005 and ruled until August 2010, when voters returned former military leader Desire BOUTERSE and his opposition coalition to power. President BOUTERSE was reelected unopposed in 2015. Opposition parties campaigned hard against BOUTERSE in the lead up to the May 2020 elections, and in July 2020, a coalition led by Chandrikapersad SANTOKHI’s VHP and Ronnie Brunswijk’s ABOP was installed. The SANTOKHI government promised to tackle COVID-19, the economic crisis it inherited, and corruption." } }, "Geography": { @@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ }, "Diplomatic representation in the US": { "chief of mission": { - "text": "Ambassador Niermala Sakoentala BADRISING (since 21 July 2017)" + "text": "Ambassador Jan Marten Willem SCHALKWIJK (since 19 April 2022)" }, "chancery": { "text": "4301 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20008" @@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Suriname’s economy is dominated by the mining industry, with exports of oil and gold accounting for approximately 85% of exports and 27% of government revenues. This makes the economy highly vulnerable to mineral price volatility. The worldwide drop in international commodity prices and the cessation of alumina mining in Suriname significantly reduced government revenue and national income during the past few years. In November 2015, a major US aluminum company discontinued its mining activities in Suriname after 99 years of operation. Public sector revenues fell, together with exports, international reserves, employment, and private sector investment.
Economic growth declined annually from just under 5% in 2012 to -10.4% in 2016. In January 2011, the government devalued the currency by 20% and raised taxes to reduce the budget deficit. Suriname began instituting macro adjustments between September 2015 and 2016; these included another 20% currency devaluation in November 2015 and foreign currency interventions by the Central Bank until March 2016, after which time the Bank allowed the Surinamese dollar (SRD) to float. By December 2016, the SRD had lost 46% of its value against the dollar. Depreciation of the Surinamese dollar and increases in tariffs on electricity caused domestic prices in Suriname to rise 22.0% year-over-year by December 2017.
Suriname's economic prospects for the medium-term will depend on its commitment to responsible monetary and fiscal policies and on the introduction of structural reforms to liberalize markets and promote competition. The government's over-reliance on revenue from the extractive sector colors Suriname's economic outlook. Following two years of recession, the Fitch Credit Bureau reported a positive growth of 1.2% in 2017 and the World Bank predicted 2.2% growth in 2018. Inflation declined to 9%, down from 55% in 2016 , and increased gold production helped lift exports. Yet continued budget imbalances and a heavy debt and interest burden resulted in a debt-to-GDP ratio of 83% in September 2017. Purchasing power has fallen rapidly due to the devalued local currency. The government has announced its intention to pass legislation to introduce a new value-added tax in 2018. Without this and other measures to strengthen the country’s fiscal position, the government may face liquidity pressures.
" + "text": "Suriname’s economy is dominated by the mining industry, with exports of oil and gold accounting for approximately 85% of exports and 27% of government revenues. This makes the economy highly vulnerable to mineral price volatility. The worldwide drop in international commodity prices and the cessation of alumina mining in Suriname significantly reduced government revenue and national income during the past few years. In November 2015, a major US aluminum company discontinued its mining activities in Suriname after 99 years of operation. Public sector revenues fell, together with exports, international reserves, employment, and private sector investment.
Economic growth declined annually from just under 5% in 2012 to -10.4% in 2016. In January 2011, the government devalued the currency by 20% and raised taxes to reduce the budget deficit. Suriname began instituting macro adjustments between September 2015 and 2016; these included another 20% currency devaluation in November 2015 and foreign currency interventions by the Central Bank until March 2016, after which time the Bank allowed the Surinamese dollar (SRD) to float. By December 2016, the SRD had lost 46% of its value against the dollar. Depreciation of the Surinamese dollar and increases in tariffs on electricity caused domestic prices in Suriname to rise 22.0% year-over-year by December 2017.
Suriname's economic prospects for the medium-term will depend on its commitment to responsible monetary and fiscal policies and on the introduction of structural reforms to liberalize markets and promote competition. The government's over-reliance on revenue from the extractive sector colors Suriname's economic outlook. Following two years of recession, the Fitch Credit Bureau reported a positive growth of 1.2% in 2017 and the World Bank predicted 2.2% growth in 2018. Inflation declined to 9%, down from 55% in 2016 , and increased gold production helped lift exports. Yet continued budget imbalances and a heavy debt and interest burden resulted in a debt-to-GDP ratio of 83% in September 2017. Purchasing power has fallen rapidly due to the devalued local currency. The government has announced its intention to pass legislation to introduce a new value-added tax in 2018. Without this and other measures to strengthen the country’s fiscal position, the government may face liquidity pressures.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -982,10 +982,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "103,240 (2020)" + "text": "103,240 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "17.6 (2020 est.)" + "text": "18 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1024,10 +1024,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "92,270 (2021)" + "text": "92,270 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "15.73 (2021)" + "text": "16 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/south-america/pa.json b/south-america/pa.json index 3dcc0c95..2a1f6ea7 100644 --- a/south-america/pa.json +++ b/south-america/pa.json @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ }, "Languages": { "Languages": { - "text": "Spanish (official) and Guarani (official) 46.3%, only Guarani 34%, only Spanish 15.2%, other (includes Portuguese, German, other Indigenous languages) 4.1% , no response 0.4%; note - data represent predominant household language (2012 est.)" + "text": "Spanish (official) and Guarani (official) 46.3%, only Guarani 34%, only Spanish 15.2%, other (includes Portuguese, German, other Indigenous languages) 4.1%, no response 0.4%; note - data represent predominant household language (2012 est.)" }, "major-language sample(s)": { "text": "Landlocked Paraguay has a market economy distinguished by a large informal sector, featuring re-export of imported consumer goods to neighboring countries, as well as the activities of thousands of microenterprises and urban street vendors. A large percentage of the population, especially in rural areas, derives its living from agricultural activity, often on a subsistence basis. Because of the importance of the informal sector, accurate economic measures are difficult to obtain.
On a per capita basis, real income has grown steadily over the past five years as strong world demand for commodities, combined with high prices and favorable weather, supported Paraguay's commodity-based export expansion. Paraguay is the fifth largest soy producer in the world. Drought hit in 2008, reducing agricultural exports and slowing the economy even before the onset of the global recession. The economy fell 3.8% in 2009, as lower world demand and commodity prices caused exports to contract. Severe drought and outbreaks of hoof-and-mouth disease in 2012 led to a brief drop in beef and other agricultural exports. Since 2014, however, Paraguay’s economy has grown at a 4% average annual rate due to strong production and high global prices, at a time when other countries in the region have contracted.
The Paraguayan Government recognizes the need to diversify its economy and has taken steps in recent years to do so. In addition to looking for new commodity markets in the Middle East and Europe, Paraguayan officials have promoted the country’s low labor costs, cheap energy from its massive Itaipu Hydroelectric Dam, and single-digit tax rate on foreign firms. As a result, the number of factories operating in the country – mostly transplants from Brazil - has tripled since 2014.
Corruption, limited progress on structural reform, and deficient infrastructure are the main obstacles to long-term growth. Judicial corruption is endemic and is seen as the greatest barrier to attracting more foreign investment. Paraguay has been adverse to public debt throughout its history, but has recently sought to finance infrastructure improvements to attract foreign investment.
" + "text": "Landlocked Paraguay has a market economy distinguished by a large informal sector, featuring re-export of imported consumer goods to neighboring countries, as well as the activities of thousands of microenterprises and urban street vendors. A large percentage of the population, especially in rural areas, derives its living from agricultural activity, often on a subsistence basis. Because of the importance of the informal sector, accurate economic measures are difficult to obtain.
On a per capita basis, real income has grown steadily over the past five years as strong world demand for commodities, combined with high prices and favorable weather, supported Paraguay's commodity-based export expansion. Paraguay is the fifth largest soy producer in the world. Drought hit in 2008, reducing agricultural exports and slowing the economy even before the onset of the global recession. The economy fell 3.8% in 2009, as lower world demand and commodity prices caused exports to contract. Severe drought and outbreaks of hoof-and-mouth disease in 2012 led to a brief drop in beef and other agricultural exports. Since 2014, however, Paraguay’s economy has grown at a 4% average annual rate due to strong production and high global prices, at a time when other countries in the region have contracted.
The Paraguayan Government recognizes the need to diversify its economy and has taken steps in recent years to do so. In addition to looking for new commodity markets in the Middle East and Europe, Paraguayan officials have promoted the country’s low labor costs, cheap energy from its massive Itaipu Hydroelectric Dam, and single-digit tax rate on foreign firms. As a result, the number of factories operating in the country – mostly transplants from Brazil - has tripled since 2014.
Corruption, limited progress on structural reform, and deficient infrastructure are the main obstacles to long-term growth. Judicial corruption is endemic and is seen as the greatest barrier to attracting more foreign investment. Paraguay has been adverse to public debt throughout its history, but has recently sought to finance infrastructure improvements to attract foreign investment.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -999,10 +999,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "272,656 (2019)" + "text": "249,231 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "3.87 (2019 est.)" + "text": "3 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1041,10 +1041,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "562,369 (2021)" + "text": "562,369 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "7.88 (2021)" + "text": "8 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ "text": "1% of GDP (2021 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { - "text": "1% of GDP (2020)" + "text": "1% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2019": { "text": "1% of GDP (2019) (approximately $590 million)" @@ -1177,7 +1177,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "5,800 (Venezuela) (2021)" + "text": "5,900 (Venezuela) (2022)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/south-america/pe.json b/south-america/pe.json index be174820..6f65d842 100644 --- a/south-america/pe.json +++ b/south-america/pe.json @@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Peru's economy reflects its varied topography - an arid lowland coastal region, the central high sierra of the Andes, and the dense forest of the Amazon. A wide range of important mineral resources are found in the mountainous and coastal areas, and Peru's coastal waters provide excellent fishing grounds. Peru is the world's second largest producer of silver and copper.
The Peruvian economy grew by an average of 5.6% per year from 2009-13 with a stable exchange rate and low inflation. This growth was due partly to high international prices for Peru's metals and minerals exports, which account for 55% of the country's total exports. Growth slipped from 2014 to 2017, due to weaker world prices for these resources. Despite Peru's strong macroeconomic performance, dependence on minerals and metals exports and imported foodstuffs makes the economy vulnerable to fluctuations in world prices.
Peru's rapid expansion coupled with cash transfers and other programs have helped to reduce the national poverty rate by over 35 percentage points since 2004, but inequality persists and continued to pose a challenge for the Ollanta HUMALA administration, which championed a policy of social inclusion and a more equitable distribution of income. Poor infrastructure hinders the spread of growth to Peru's non-coastal areas. The HUMALA administration passed several economic stimulus packages in 2014 to bolster growth, including reforms to environmental regulations in order to spur investment in Peru’s lucrative mining sector, a move that was opposed by some environmental groups. However, in 2015, mining investment fell as global commodity prices remained low and social conflicts plagued the sector.
Peru's free trade policy continued under the HUMALA administration; since 2006, Peru has signed trade deals with the US, Canada, Singapore, China, Korea, Mexico, Japan, the EU, the European Free Trade Association, Chile, Thailand, Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, Honduras, concluded negotiations with Guatemala and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and begun trade talks with El Salvador, India, and Turkey. Peru also has signed a trade pact with Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, called the Pacific Alliance, that seeks integration of services, capital, investment and movement of people. Since the US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement entered into force in February 2009, total trade between Peru and the US has doubled. President Pedro Pablo KUCZYNSKI succeeded HUMALA in July 2016 and is focusing on economic reforms and free market policies aimed at boosting investment in Peru. Mining output increased significantly in 2016-17, which helped Peru attain one of the highest GDP growth rates in Latin America, and Peru should maintain strong growth in 2018. However, economic performance was depressed by delays in infrastructure mega-projects and the start of a corruption scandal associated with a Brazilian firm. Massive flooding in early 2017 also was a drag on growth, offset somewhat by additional public spending aimed at recovery efforts.
" + "text": "Peru's economy reflects its varied topography - an arid lowland coastal region, the central high sierra of the Andes, and the dense forest of the Amazon. A wide range of important mineral resources are found in the mountainous and coastal areas, and Peru's coastal waters provide excellent fishing grounds. Peru is the world's second largest producer of silver and copper.
The Peruvian economy grew by an average of 5.6% per year from 2009-13 with a stable exchange rate and low inflation. This growth was due partly to high international prices for Peru's metals and minerals exports, which account for 55% of the country's total exports. Growth slipped from 2014 to 2017, due to weaker world prices for these resources. Despite Peru's strong macroeconomic performance, dependence on minerals and metals exports and imported foodstuffs makes the economy vulnerable to fluctuations in world prices.
Peru's rapid expansion coupled with cash transfers and other programs have helped to reduce the national poverty rate by over 35 percentage points since 2004, but inequality persists and continued to pose a challenge for the Ollanta HUMALA administration, which championed a policy of social inclusion and a more equitable distribution of income. Poor infrastructure hinders the spread of growth to Peru's non-coastal areas. The HUMALA administration passed several economic stimulus packages in 2014 to bolster growth, including reforms to environmental regulations in order to spur investment in Peru’s lucrative mining sector, a move that was opposed by some environmental groups. However, in 2015, mining investment fell as global commodity prices remained low and social conflicts plagued the sector.
Peru's free trade policy continued under the HUMALA administration; since 2006, Peru has signed trade deals with the US, Canada, Singapore, China, Korea, Mexico, Japan, the EU, the European Free Trade Association, Chile, Thailand, Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, Honduras, concluded negotiations with Guatemala and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and begun trade talks with El Salvador, India, and Turkey. Peru also has signed a trade pact with Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, called the Pacific Alliance, that seeks integration of services, capital, investment and movement of people. Since the US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement entered into force in February 2009, total trade between Peru and the US has doubled. President Pedro Pablo KUCZYNSKI succeeded HUMALA in July 2016 and is focusing on economic reforms and free market policies aimed at boosting investment in Peru. Mining output increased significantly in 2016-17, which helped Peru attain one of the highest GDP growth rates in Latin America, and Peru should maintain strong growth in 2018. However, economic performance was depressed by delays in infrastructure mega-projects and the start of a corruption scandal associated with a Brazilian firm. Massive flooding in early 2017 also was a drag on growth, offset somewhat by additional public spending aimed at recovery efforts.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1047,10 +1047,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "3,082,040 (2018)" + "text": "2.47 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "9.8 (2018 est.)" + "text": "7 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1089,10 +1089,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "3.044 million (2021 est.)" + "text": "3.044 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "9.23 (2021 est.)" + "text": "9 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1213,6 +1213,9 @@ "text": "Joint Command of the Armed Forces of Peru (CCFFAA): Peruvian Army (Ejercito del Peru), Peruvian Navy (Marina de Guerra del Peru, MGP, includes naval infantry and Coast Guard), Air Force of Peru (Fuerza Aerea del Peru, FAP); Ministry of the Interior (Ministerio del Interior): Peruvian National Police (Policía Nacional del Perú, PNP) (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.1% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1.2% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1224,9 +1227,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "1.2% of GDP (2017) (approximately $3.86 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "1.3% of GDP (2016) (approximately $4.06 billion)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/south-america/uy.json b/south-america/uy.json index 9fb8937e..854e24fc 100644 --- a/south-america/uy.json +++ b/south-america/uy.json @@ -1003,10 +1003,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1,165,373 (2019)" + "text": "1,224,600 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "33.66 (2019 est.)" + "text": "35 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1045,10 +1045,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,063,701 (2021)" + "text": "1,063,701 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "30.62 (2021)" + "text": "31 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1183,7 +1183,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "17,500 (Venezuela) (economic and political crisis; includes Venezuelans who have claimed asylum or have received alternative legal stay) (2021)" + "text": "19,000 (Venezuela) (economic and political crisis; includes Venezuelans who have claimed asylum or have received alternative legal stay) (2022)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "5 (mid-year 2021)" diff --git a/south-america/ve.json b/south-america/ve.json index 3f64c5b7..a3b2d55a 100644 --- a/south-america/ve.json +++ b/south-america/ve.json @@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Venezuela remains highly dependent on oil revenues, which account for almost all export earnings and nearly half of the government’s revenue, despite a continued decline in oil production in 2017. In the absence of official statistics, foreign experts estimate that GDP contracted 12% in 2017, inflation exceeded 2000%, people faced widespread shortages of consumer goods and medicine, and the central bank's international reserves dwindled. In late 2017, Venezuela also entered selective default on some of its sovereign and state oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., (PDVSA) bonds. Domestic production and industry continues to severely underperform and the Venezuelan Government continues to rely on imports to meet its basic food and consumer goods needs.
Falling oil prices since 2014 have aggravated Venezuela’s economic crisis. Insufficient access to dollars, price controls, and rigid labor regulations have led some US and multinational firms to reduce or shut down their Venezuelan operations. Market uncertainty and PDVSA’s poor cash flow have slowed investment in the petroleum sector, resulting in a decline in oil production.
Under President Nicolas MADURO, the Venezuelan Government’s response to the economic crisis has been to increase state control over the economy and blame the private sector for shortages. MADURO has given authority for the production and distribution of basic goods to the military and to local socialist party member committees. The Venezuelan Government has maintained strict currency controls since 2003. The government has been unable to sustain its mechanisms for distributing dollars to the private sector, in part because it needed to withhold some foreign exchange reserves to make its foreign bond payments. As a result of price and currency controls, local industries have struggled to purchase production inputs necessary to maintain their operations or sell goods at a profit on the local market. Expansionary monetary policies and currency controls have created opportunities for arbitrage and corruption and fueled a rapid increase in black market activity.
" + "text": "Venezuela remains highly dependent on oil revenues, which account for almost all export earnings and nearly half of the government’s revenue, despite a continued decline in oil production in 2017. In the absence of official statistics, foreign experts estimate that GDP contracted 12% in 2017, inflation exceeded 2000%, people faced widespread shortages of consumer goods and medicine, and the central bank's international reserves dwindled. In late 2017, Venezuela also entered selective default on some of its sovereign and state oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., (PDVSA) bonds. Domestic production and industry continues to severely underperform and the Venezuelan Government continues to rely on imports to meet its basic food and consumer goods needs.
Falling oil prices since 2014 have aggravated Venezuela’s economic crisis. Insufficient access to dollars, price controls, and rigid labor regulations have led some US and multinational firms to reduce or shut down their Venezuelan operations. Market uncertainty and PDVSA’s poor cash flow have slowed investment in the petroleum sector, resulting in a decline in oil production.
Under President Nicolas MADURO, the Venezuelan Government’s response to the economic crisis has been to increase state control over the economy and blame the private sector for shortages. MADURO has given authority for the production and distribution of basic goods to the military and to local socialist party member committees. The Venezuelan Government has maintained strict currency controls since 2003. The government has been unable to sustain its mechanisms for distributing dollars to the private sector, in part because it needed to withhold some foreign exchange reserves to make its foreign bond payments. As a result of price and currency controls, local industries have struggled to purchase production inputs necessary to maintain their operations or sell goods at a profit on the local market. Expansionary monetary policies and currency controls have created opportunities for arbitrage and corruption and fueled a rapid increase in black market activity.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2018": { @@ -985,10 +985,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "5,276,274 (2020)" + "text": "5,251,182 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "18.55 (2020 est.)" + "text": "18 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1027,10 +1027,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "2,561,556 (2021)" + "text": "2,561,556 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "9.01 (2021 est.)" + "text": "9 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/south-asia/af.json b/south-asia/af.json index 78eda7e4..09587005 100644 --- a/south-asia/af.json +++ b/south-asia/af.json @@ -999,18 +999,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "134,636 (2019)" + "text": "145,787 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2019 est.) less than 1" + "text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "22,580,071 (2020)" + "text": "22,678,024 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "63.18 (2020)" + "text": "58 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1040,10 +1040,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "26,570 (2022)" + "text": "26,570 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.07 (2022)" + "text": "0.07 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, diff --git a/south-asia/bg.json b/south-asia/bg.json index fa486fd3..10bf6c02 100644 --- a/south-asia/bg.json +++ b/south-asia/bg.json @@ -1042,18 +1042,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "1,450,321 (2020)" + "text": "1,390,048 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "(2020 est.) less than 1" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "170,136,762 (2020)" + "text": "176,279,465 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "103.3 (2020 est.)" + "text": "107 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1084,10 +1084,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "10,052,819 (2021) Data through June 2021." + "text": "10,052,819 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "6.1 (2021)" + "text": "6 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1249,7 +1249,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "926,561 (Burma) (2022) (includes an estimated 769,623 Rohingya refugees who have fled conflict since 25 August 2017)" + "text": "925,380 (Burma) (2022) (includes an estimated 773,972 Rohingya refugees who have fled conflict since 25 August 2017)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "427,000 (conflict, development, human rights violations, religious persecution, natural disasters) (2020)" diff --git a/south-asia/bt.json b/south-asia/bt.json index 20f45bbc..67505d3a 100644 --- a/south-asia/bt.json +++ b/south-asia/bt.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "Following Britain’s victory in the 1865 Duar War, Britain and Bhutan signed the Treaty of Sinchulu, under which Bhutan would receive an annual subsidy in exchange for ceding land to British India. Ugyen WANGCHUCK - who had served as the de facto ruler of an increasingly unified Bhutan and had improved relations with the British toward the end of the 19th century - was named king in 1907. Three years later, a treaty was signed whereby the British agreed not to interfere in Bhutanese internal affairs, and Bhutan allowed Britain to direct its foreign affairs. Bhutan negotiated a similar arrangement with independent India in 1949. The Indo-Bhutanese Treaty of Friendship returned to Bhutan a small piece of the territory annexed by the British, formalized the annual subsidies the country received, and defined India's responsibilities in defense and foreign relations. Under a succession of modernizing monarchs beginning in the 1950s, Bhutan joined the UN in 1971 and slowly continued its engagement beyond its borders.
In 2005, King Jigme Singye WANGCHUCK unveiled the draft of Bhutan's first constitution - which introduced major democratic reforms - and held a national referendum for its approval. The King abdicated the throne in 2006 in favor of his son, Jigme Khesar Namgyel WANGCHUCK. In 2007, India and Bhutan renegotiated their treaty, eliminating the clause that stated that Bhutan would be \"guided by\" India in conducting its foreign policy, although Thimphu continues to coordinate closely with New Delhi. In 2008, Bhutan held its first parliamentary election in accordance with the constitution. Bhutan experienced a peaceful turnover of power following a parliamentary election in 2013, which resulted in the defeat of the incumbent party. In 2018, the incumbent party again lost the parliamentary election. Of the more than 100,000 ethnic Nepali - predominantly Lhotshampa - refugees who fled or were forced out of Bhutan in the 1990s, about 6,500 remain displaced in Nepal.
" + "text": "Following Britain’s victory in the 1865 Duar War, Britain and Bhutan signed the Treaty of Sinchulu, under which Bhutan would receive an annual subsidy in exchange for ceding land to British India. Ugyen WANGCHUCK - who had served as the de facto ruler of an increasingly unified Bhutan and had improved relations with the British toward the end of the 19th century - was named king in 1907. Three years later, a treaty was signed whereby the British agreed not to interfere in Bhutanese internal affairs, and Bhutan allowed Britain to direct its foreign affairs. Bhutan negotiated a similar arrangement with independent India in 1949. The Indo-Bhutanese Treaty of Friendship returned to Bhutan a small piece of the territory annexed by the British, formalized the annual subsidies the country received, and defined India's responsibilities in defense and foreign relations. Under a succession of modernizing monarchs beginning in the 1950s, Bhutan joined the UN in 1971 and slowly continued its engagement beyond its borders.
In 2005, King Jigme Singye WANGCHUCK unveiled the draft of Bhutan's first constitution - which introduced major democratic reforms - and held a national referendum for its approval. The King abdicated the throne in 2006 in favor of his son, Jigme Khesar Namgyel WANGCHUCK. In 2007, India and Bhutan renegotiated their treaty, eliminating the clause that stated that Bhutan would be \"guided by\" India in conducting its foreign policy, although Thimphu continues to coordinate closely with New Delhi. In 2008, Bhutan held its first parliamentary election in accordance with the constitution. Bhutan experienced a peaceful turnover of power following a parliamentary election in 2013, which resulted in the defeat of the incumbent party. In 2018, the incumbent party again lost the parliamentary election. Of the more than 100,000 ethnic Nepali - predominantly Lhotshampa - refugees who fled or were forced out of Bhutan in the 1990s, about 6,500 remain displaced in Nepal.
" } }, "Geography": { @@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Bhutan's small economy is based largely on hydropower, agriculture, and forestry, which provide the main livelihood for more than half the population. Because rugged mountains dominate the terrain and make the building of roads and other infrastructure difficult and expensive, industrial production is primarily of the cottage industry type. The economy is closely aligned with India's through strong trade and monetary links and is dependent on India for financial assistance and migrant laborers for development projects, especially for road construction. Bhutan signed a pact in December 2014 to expand duty-free trade with Bangladesh.
Multilateral development organizations administer most educational, social, and environment programs, and take into account the government's desire to protect the country's environment and cultural traditions. For example, the government is cautious in its expansion of the tourist sector, restricing visits to environmentally conscientious tourists. Complicated controls and uncertain policies in areas such as industrial licensing, trade, labor, and finance continue to hamper foreign investment.
Bhutan’s largest export - hydropower to India - could spur sustainable growth in the coming years if Bhutan resolves chronic delays in construction. Bhutan’s hydropower exports comprise 40% of total exports and 25% of the government’s total revenue. Bhutan currently taps only 6.5% of its 24,000-megawatt hydropower potential and is behind schedule in building 12 new hydropower dams with a combined capacity of 10,000 megawatts by 2020 in accordance with a deal signed in 2008 with India. The high volume of imported materials to build hydropower plants has expanded Bhutan's trade and current account deficits. Bhutan also signed a memorandum of understanding with Bangladesh and India in July 2017 to jointly construct a new hydropower plant for exporting electricity to Bangladesh.
" + "text": "Bhutan's small economy is based largely on hydropower, agriculture, and forestry, which provide the main livelihood for more than half the population. Because rugged mountains dominate the terrain and make the building of roads and other infrastructure difficult and expensive, industrial production is primarily of the cottage industry type. The economy is closely aligned with India's through strong trade and monetary links and is dependent on India for financial assistance and migrant laborers for development projects, especially for road construction. Bhutan signed a pact in December 2014 to expand duty-free trade with Bangladesh.
Multilateral development organizations administer most educational, social, and environment programs, and take into account the government's desire to protect the country's environment and cultural traditions. For example, the government is cautious in its expansion of the tourist sector, restricing visits to environmentally conscientious tourists. Complicated controls and uncertain policies in areas such as industrial licensing, trade, labor, and finance continue to hamper foreign investment.
Bhutan’s largest export - hydropower to India - could spur sustainable growth in the coming years if Bhutan resolves chronic delays in construction. Bhutan’s hydropower exports comprise 40% of total exports and 25% of the government’s total revenue. Bhutan currently taps only 6.5% of its 24,000-megawatt hydropower potential and is behind schedule in building 12 new hydropower dams with a combined capacity of 10,000 megawatts by 2020 in accordance with a deal signed in 2008 with India. The high volume of imported materials to build hydropower plants has expanded Bhutan's trade and current account deficits. Bhutan also signed a memorandum of understanding with Bangladesh and India in July 2017 to jointly construct a new hydropower plant for exporting electricity to Bangladesh.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -899,18 +899,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "22,987 (2020)" + "text": "22,987 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "2.98 (2020 est.)" + "text": "3 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "745,137 (2020)" + "text": "745,137 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "96.57 (2020 est.)" + "text": "97 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -941,10 +941,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "3,189 (2021)" + "text": "3,189 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "0.41 (2021) less than 1" + "text": "0.4 (2020 est.) less than 1" } } }, diff --git a/south-asia/ce.json b/south-asia/ce.json index 60a9dba8..a328fefa 100644 --- a/south-asia/ce.json +++ b/south-asia/ce.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "The first Sinhalese arrived in Sri Lanka late in the 6th century B.C., probably from northern India. Buddhism was introduced circa 250 B.C., and the first kingdoms developed at the cities of Anuradhapura (from circa 200 B.C. to circa A.D. 1000) and Polonnaruwa (from about 1070 to 1200). In the 14th century, a south Indian dynasty established a Tamil kingdom in northern Sri Lanka. The Portuguese controlled the coastal areas of the island in the 16th century followed by the Dutch in the 17th century. The island was ceded to the British in 1796, became a crown colony in 1802, and was formally united under British rule by 1815. As Ceylon, it became independent in 1948; its name was changed to Sri Lanka in 1972. Prevailing tensions between the Sinhalese majority and Tamil separatists erupted into war in July 1983. Fighting between the government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) continued for over a quarter century. Although Norway brokered peace negotiations that led to a ceasefire in 2002, the fighting slowly resumed and was again in full force by 2006. The government defeated the LTTE in May 2009.
During the post-conflict years under President Mahinda RAJAPAKSA, the government initiated infrastructure development projects, many of which were financed by loans from China. His regime faced significant allegations of human rights violations and a shrinking democratic space for civil society. In 2015, a new coalition government headed by President Maithripala SIRISENA of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and Prime Minister Ranil WICKREMESINGHE of the United National Party came to power with pledges to advance economic, governance, anti-corruption, reconciliation, justice, and accountability reforms. However, implementation of these reforms has been uneven. In October 2018, President SIRISENA attempted to oust Prime Minister WICKREMESINGHE, swearing in former President RAJAPAKSA as the new prime minister and issuing an order to dissolve the parliament and hold elections. This sparked a seven-week constitutional crisis that ended when the Supreme Court ruled SIRISENA’s actions unconstitutional, RAJAPAKSA resigned, and WICKREMESINGHE was reinstated. In November 2019, Gotabaya RAJAPAKSA won the presidential election and appointed his brother, Mahinda, prime minister. Since Gotabaya RAJAPAKSA’s election, there have been concerns about his administration’s commitment to pursuing justice, human rights, and accountability reforms, as well as the risks to foreign creditors that Sri Lanka faces given its ongoing economic crisis.
" + "text": "The first Sinhalese arrived in Sri Lanka late in the 6th century B.C., probably from northern India. Buddhism was introduced circa 250 B.C., and the first kingdoms developed at the cities of Anuradhapura (from circa 200 B.C. to circa A.D. 1000) and Polonnaruwa (from about 1070 to 1200). In the 14th century, a south Indian dynasty established a Tamil kingdom in northern Sri Lanka. The Portuguese controlled the coastal areas of the island in the 16th century followed by the Dutch in the 17th century. The island was ceded to the British in 1796, became a crown colony in 1802, and was formally united under British rule by 1815. As Ceylon, it became independent in 1948; its name was changed to Sri Lanka in 1972. Prevailing tensions between the Sinhalese majority and Tamil separatists erupted into war in July 1983. Fighting between the government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) continued for over a quarter century. Although Norway brokered peace negotiations that led to a ceasefire in 2002, the fighting slowly resumed and was again in full force by 2006. The government defeated the LTTE in May 2009.
During the post-conflict years under President Mahinda RAJAPAKSA, the government initiated infrastructure development projects, many of which were financed by loans from China. His regime faced significant allegations of human rights violations and a shrinking democratic space for civil society. In 2015, a new coalition government headed by President Maithripala SIRISENA of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and Prime Minister Ranil WICKREMESINGHE of the United National Party came to power with pledges to advance economic, governance, anti-corruption, reconciliation, justice, and accountability reforms. However, implementation of these reforms has been uneven. In October 2018, President SIRISENA attempted to oust Prime Minister WICKREMESINGHE, swearing in former President RAJAPAKSA as the new prime minister and issuing an order to dissolve the parliament and hold elections. This sparked a seven-week constitutional crisis that ended when the Supreme Court ruled SIRISENA’s actions unconstitutional, RAJAPAKSA resigned, and WICKREMESINGHE was reinstated. In November 2019, Gotabaya RAJAPAKSA won the presidential election and appointed his brother, Mahinda, prime minister. Since Gotabaya RAJAPAKSA’s election, there have been concerns about his administration’s commitment to pursuing justice, human rights, and accountability reforms, as well as the risks to foreign creditors that Sri Lanka faces given its ongoing economic crisis. A combination of factors including the impact of the worldwide COVID pandemic; severe shortages of food, medicine, and fuel; and power outages have triggered increasingly violent protests in Columbo. Longtime parliamentarian and former five-time prime minister, Ranil WICKREMESINGHE replaced Mahinda RAJAPASKA as prime-minister in mid-May 2022, with a mandate to resolve the country's economic problems.
" } }, "Geography": { @@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ }, "Executive branch": { "chief of state": { - "text": "President Gotabaya RAJAPAKSA (since 18 November 2019); note - the president is both chief of state and head of government; Prime Minister Mahinda RAJAPAKSA (since 21 November 2019)" + "text": "President Gotabaya RAJAPAKSA (since 18 November 2019); note - the president is both chief of state and head of government; Prime Minister Ranil WICKREMESINGHE (since 12 May 2022)" }, "head of government": { "text": "President Gotabaya RAJAPAKSA (since 18 November 2019)" @@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Sri Lanka is attempting to sustain economic growth while maintaining macroeconomic stability under the IMF program it began in 2016. The government's high debt payments and bloated civil service, which have contributed to historically high budget deficits, remain a concern. Government debt is about 79% of GDP and remains among the highest of the emerging markets. In the coming years, Sri Lanka will need to balance its elevated debt repayment schedule with its need to maintain adequate foreign exchange reserves.
In May 2016, Sri Lanka regained its preferential trade status under the European Union’s Generalized System of Preferences Plus, enabling many of its firms to export products, including its top export garments, tax free to the EU. In 2017, Parliament passed a new Inland Revenue Act in an effort to increase tax collection and broaden the tax base in response to recommendations made under its IMF program. In November 2017, the Financial Action Task Force on money laundering and terrorist financing listed Sri Lanka as non-compliant, but reported subsequently that Sri Lanka had made good progress in implementing an action plan to address deficiencies.
Tourism has experienced strong growth in the years since the resolution of the government's 26-year conflict with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In 2017, the government promulgated plans to transform the country into a knowledge-based, export-oriented Indian Ocean hub by 2025.
" + "text": "Sri Lanka is attempting to sustain economic growth while maintaining macroeconomic stability under the IMF program it began in 2016. The government's high debt payments and bloated civil service, which have contributed to historically high budget deficits, remain a concern. Government debt is about 79% of GDP and remains among the highest of the emerging markets. In the coming years, Sri Lanka will need to balance its elevated debt repayment schedule with its need to maintain adequate foreign exchange reserves.
In May 2016, Sri Lanka regained its preferential trade status under the European Union’s Generalized System of Preferences Plus, enabling many of its firms to export products, including its top export garments, tax free to the EU. In 2017, Parliament passed a new Inland Revenue Act in an effort to increase tax collection and broaden the tax base in response to recommendations made under its IMF program. In November 2017, the Financial Action Task Force on money laundering and terrorist financing listed Sri Lanka as non-compliant, but reported subsequently that Sri Lanka had made good progress in implementing an action plan to address deficiencies.
Tourism has experienced strong growth in the years since the resolution of the government's 26-year conflict with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In 2017, the government promulgated plans to transform the country into a knowledge-based, export-oriented Indian Ocean hub by 2025.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1008,10 +1008,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,428,957 (2020)" + "text": "2,607,868 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "11.34 (2020 est.)" + "text": "12 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1050,10 +1050,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1,781,530 (2021)" + "text": "1,781,530 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "8.32 (2021)" + "text": "8 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/south-asia/in.json b/south-asia/in.json index 9bc3d3ac..ed931f84 100644 --- a/south-asia/in.json +++ b/south-asia/in.json @@ -723,7 +723,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "India's diverse economy encompasses traditional village farming, modern agriculture, handicrafts, a wide range of modern industries, and a multitude of services. Slightly less than half of the workforce is in agriculture, but services are the major source of economic growth, accounting for nearly two-thirds of India's output but employing less than one-third of its labor force. India has capitalized on its large educated English-speaking population to become a major exporter of information technology services, business outsourcing services, and software workers. Nevertheless, per capita income remains below the world average. India is developing into an open-market economy, yet traces of its past autarkic policies remain. Economic liberalization measures, including industrial deregulation, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and reduced controls on foreign trade and investment, began in the early 1990s and served to accelerate the country's growth, which averaged nearly 7% per year from 1997 to 2017.
India's economic growth slowed in 2011 because of a decline in investment caused by high interest rates, rising inflation, and investor pessimism about the government's commitment to further economic reforms and about slow world growth. Investors’ perceptions of India improved in early 2014, due to a reduction of the current account deficit and expectations of post-election economic reform, resulting in a surge of inbound capital flows and stabilization of the rupee. Growth rebounded in 2014 through 2016. Despite a high growth rate compared to the rest of the world, India’s government-owned banks faced mounting bad debt, resulting in low credit growth. Rising macroeconomic imbalances in India and improving economic conditions in Western countries led investors to shift capital away from India, prompting a sharp depreciation of the rupee through 2016.
The economy slowed again in 2017, due to shocks of \"demonetizaton\" in 2016 and introduction of GST in 2017. Since the election, the government has passed an important goods and services tax bill and raised foreign direct investment caps in some sectors, but most economic reforms have focused on administrative and governance changes, largely because the ruling party remains a minority in India’s upper house of Parliament, which must approve most bills.
India has a young population and corresponding low dependency ratio, healthy savings and investment rates, and is increasing integration into the global economy. However, long-term challenges remain significant, including: India's discrimination against women and girls, an inefficient power generation and distribution system, ineffective enforcement of intellectual property rights, decades-long civil litigation dockets, inadequate transport and agricultural infrastructure, limited non-agricultural employment opportunities, high spending and poorly targeted subsidies, inadequate availability of quality basic and higher education, and accommodating rural-to-urban migration.
" + "text": "India's diverse economy encompasses traditional village farming, modern agriculture, handicrafts, a wide range of modern industries, and a multitude of services. Slightly less than half of the workforce is in agriculture, but services are the major source of economic growth, accounting for nearly two-thirds of India's output but employing less than one-third of its labor force. India has capitalized on its large educated English-speaking population to become a major exporter of information technology services, business outsourcing services, and software workers. Nevertheless, per capita income remains below the world average. India is developing into an open-market economy, yet traces of its past autarkic policies remain. Economic liberalization measures, including industrial deregulation, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and reduced controls on foreign trade and investment, began in the early 1990s and served to accelerate the country's growth, which averaged nearly 7% per year from 1997 to 2017.
India's economic growth slowed in 2011 because of a decline in investment caused by high interest rates, rising inflation, and investor pessimism about the government's commitment to further economic reforms and about slow world growth. Investors’ perceptions of India improved in early 2014, due to a reduction of the current account deficit and expectations of post-election economic reform, resulting in a surge of inbound capital flows and stabilization of the rupee. Growth rebounded in 2014 through 2016. Despite a high growth rate compared to the rest of the world, India’s government-owned banks faced mounting bad debt, resulting in low credit growth. Rising macroeconomic imbalances in India and improving economic conditions in Western countries led investors to shift capital away from India, prompting a sharp depreciation of the rupee through 2016.
The economy slowed again in 2017, due to shocks of \"demonetizaton\" in 2016 and introduction of GST in 2017. Since the election, the government has passed an important goods and services tax bill and raised foreign direct investment caps in some sectors, but most economic reforms have focused on administrative and governance changes, largely because the ruling party remains a minority in India’s upper house of Parliament, which must approve most bills.
India has a young population and corresponding low dependency ratio, healthy savings and investment rates, and is increasing integration into the global economy. However, long-term challenges remain significant, including: India's discrimination against women and girls, an inefficient power generation and distribution system, ineffective enforcement of intellectual property rights, decades-long civil litigation dockets, inadequate transport and agricultural infrastructure, limited non-agricultural employment opportunities, high spending and poorly targeted subsidies, inadequate availability of quality basic and higher education, and accommodating rural-to-urban migration.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1064,10 +1064,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "20,052,162 (2020)" + "text": "20,052,162 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.45 (2020 est.)" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1106,10 +1106,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "22.95 million (2020)" + "text": "22.95 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.66 (2020)" + "text": "2 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/south-asia/mv.json b/south-asia/mv.json index 0f2a09cd..51eefd50 100644 --- a/south-asia/mv.json +++ b/south-asia/mv.json @@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Maldives has quickly become a middle-income country, driven by the rapid growth of its tourism and fisheries sectors, but the country still contends with a large and growing fiscal deficit. Infrastructure projects, largely funded by China, could add significantly to debt levels. Political turmoil and the declaration of a state of emergency in February 2018 led to the issuance of travel warnings by several countries whose citizens visit Maldives in significant numbers, but the overall impact on tourism revenue was unclear.
In 2015, Maldives’ Parliament passed a constitutional amendment legalizing foreign ownership of land; foreign land-buyers must reclaim at least 70% of the desired land from the ocean and invest at least $1 billion in a construction project approved by Parliament.
Diversifying the economy beyond tourism and fishing, reforming public finance, increasing employment opportunities, and combating corruption, cronyism, and a growing drug problem are near-term challenges facing the government. Over the longer term, Maldivian authorities worry about the impact of erosion and possible global warming on their low-lying country; 80% of the area is 1 meter or less above sea level.
" + "text": "Maldives has quickly become a middle-income country, driven by the rapid growth of its tourism and fisheries sectors, but the country still contends with a large and growing fiscal deficit. Infrastructure projects, largely funded by China, could add significantly to debt levels. Political turmoil and the declaration of a state of emergency in February 2018 led to the issuance of travel warnings by several countries whose citizens visit Maldives in significant numbers, but the overall impact on tourism revenue was unclear.
In 2015, Maldives’ Parliament passed a constitutional amendment legalizing foreign ownership of land; foreign land-buyers must reclaim at least 70% of the desired land from the ocean and invest at least $1 billion in a construction project approved by Parliament.
Diversifying the economy beyond tourism and fishing, reforming public finance, increasing employment opportunities, and combating corruption, cronyism, and a growing drug problem are near-term challenges facing the government. Over the longer term, Maldivian authorities worry about the impact of erosion and possible global warming on their low-lying country; 80% of the area is 1 meter or less above sea level.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -923,10 +923,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "14,508 (2020)" + "text": "14,508 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "2.68 (2020 est.)" + "text": "3 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -965,10 +965,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "63,685 (2021)" + "text": "63,685 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "11.78 (2021 est.)" + "text": "12 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/south-asia/np.json b/south-asia/np.json index ce3a0a25..05e769fe 100644 --- a/south-asia/np.json +++ b/south-asia/np.json @@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Nepal is among the least developed countries in the world, with about one-quarter of its population living below the poverty line. Nepal is heavily dependent on remittances, which amount to as much as 30% of GDP. Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy, providing a livelihood for almost two-thirds of the population but accounting for less than a third of GDP. Industrial activity mainly involves the processing of agricultural products, including pulses, jute, sugarcane, tobacco, and grain.
Nepal has considerable scope for exploiting its potential in hydropower, with an estimated 42,000 MW of commercially feasible capacity. Nepal has signed trade and investment agreements with India, China, and other countries, but political uncertainty and a difficult business climate have hampered foreign investment. The United States and Nepal signed a $500 million Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact in September 2017 which will expand Nepal’s electricity infrastructure and help maintain transportation infrastructure.
Massive earthquakes struck Nepal in early 2015, which damaged or destroyed infrastructure and homes and set back economic development. Although political gridlock and lack of capacity have hindered post-earthquake recovery, government-led reconstruction efforts have progressively picked up speed, although many hard hit areas still have seen little assistance. Additional challenges to Nepal's growth include its landlocked geographic location, inconsistent electricity supply, and underdeveloped transportation infrastructure.
" + "text": "Nepal is among the least developed countries in the world, with about one-quarter of its population living below the poverty line. Nepal is heavily dependent on remittances, which amount to as much as 30% of GDP. Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy, providing a livelihood for almost two-thirds of the population but accounting for less than a third of GDP. Industrial activity mainly involves the processing of agricultural products, including pulses, jute, sugarcane, tobacco, and grain.
Nepal has considerable scope for exploiting its potential in hydropower, with an estimated 42,000 MW of commercially feasible capacity. Nepal has signed trade and investment agreements with India, China, and other countries, but political uncertainty and a difficult business climate have hampered foreign investment. The United States and Nepal signed a $500 million Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact in September 2017 which will expand Nepal’s electricity infrastructure and help maintain transportation infrastructure.
Massive earthquakes struck Nepal in early 2015, which damaged or destroyed infrastructure and homes and set back economic development. Although political gridlock and lack of capacity have hindered post-earthquake recovery, government-led reconstruction efforts have progressively picked up speed, although many hard hit areas still have seen little assistance. Additional challenges to Nepal's growth include its landlocked geographic location, inconsistent electricity supply, and underdeveloped transportation infrastructure.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -998,10 +998,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "799,368 (2018)" + "text": "726,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "2.85 (2018 est.)" + "text": "2 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1040,10 +1040,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "1.27 million (2021 est.)" + "text": "1.27 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "4.36 (2021 est.)" + "text": "4 (2020 est.)" } } }, @@ -1126,6 +1126,12 @@ "text": "Nepal Army (includes Air Wing); Nepal Armed Police Force (under the Ministry of Home Affairs; paramilitary force responsible for border and internal security, including counter-insurgency, and assisting the Army in the event of an external invasion) (2021)" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "1.3% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, + "Military Expenditures 2020": { + "text": "1.3% of GDP (2020 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2019": { "text": "2.1% of GDP (2019) (approximately $1.1 billion)" }, @@ -1134,12 +1140,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2017": { "text": "2.6% of GDP (2017) (approximately $1.12 billion)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "2.6% of GDP (2016) (approximately $990 million)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2015": { - "text": "2.4% of GDP (2015) (approximately $950 million)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/south-asia/pk.json b/south-asia/pk.json index ea83852f..52f2f2a0 100644 --- a/south-asia/pk.json +++ b/south-asia/pk.json @@ -713,7 +713,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "Decades of internal political disputes and low levels of foreign investment have led to underdevelopment in Pakistan. Pakistan has a large English-speaking population, with English-language skills less prevalent outside urban centers. Despite some progress in recent years in both security and energy, a challenging security environment, electricity shortages, and a burdensome investment climate have traditionally deterred investors. Agriculture accounts for one-fifth of output and two-fifths of employment. Textiles and apparel account for more than half of Pakistan's export earnings; Pakistan's failure to diversify its exports has left the country vulnerable to shifts in world demand. Pakistan’s GDP growth has gradually increased since 2012, and was 5.3% in 2017. Official unemployment was 6% in 2017, but this fails to capture the true picture, because much of the economy is informal and underemployment remains high. Human development continues to lag behind most of the region.
In 2013, Pakistan embarked on a $6.3 billion IMF Extended Fund Facility, which focused on reducing energy shortages, stabilizing public finances, increasing revenue collection, and improving its balance of payments position. The program concluded in September 2016. Although Pakistan missed several structural reform criteria, it restored macroeconomic stability, improved its credit rating, and boosted growth. The Pakistani rupee has remained relatively stable against the US dollar since 2015, though it declined about 10% between November 2017 and March 2018. Balance of payments concerns have reemerged, however, as a result of a significant increase in imports and weak export and remittance growth.
Pakistan must continue to address several longstanding issues, including expanding investment in education, healthcare, and sanitation; adapting to the effects of climate change and natural disasters; improving the country’s business environment; and widening the country’s tax base. Given demographic challenges, Pakistan’s leadership will be pressed to implement economic reforms, promote further development of the energy sector, and attract foreign investment to support sufficient economic growth necessary to employ its growing and rapidly urbanizing population, much of which is under the age of 25.
In an effort to boost development, Pakistan and China are implementing the \"China-Pakistan Economic Corridor\" (CPEC) with $60 billion in investments targeted towards energy and other infrastructure projects. Pakistan believes CPEC investments will enable growth rates of over 6% of GDP by laying the groundwork for increased exports. CPEC-related obligations, however, have raised IMF concern about Pakistan’s capital outflows and external financing needs over the medium term.
" + "text": "Decades of internal political disputes and low levels of foreign investment have led to underdevelopment in Pakistan. Pakistan has a large English-speaking population, with English-language skills less prevalent outside urban centers. Despite some progress in recent years in both security and energy, a challenging security environment, electricity shortages, and a burdensome investment climate have traditionally deterred investors. Agriculture accounts for one-fifth of output and two-fifths of employment. Textiles and apparel account for more than half of Pakistan's export earnings; Pakistan's failure to diversify its exports has left the country vulnerable to shifts in world demand. Pakistan’s GDP growth has gradually increased since 2012, and was 5.3% in 2017. Official unemployment was 6% in 2017, but this fails to capture the true picture, because much of the economy is informal and underemployment remains high. Human development continues to lag behind most of the region.
In 2013, Pakistan embarked on a $6.3 billion IMF Extended Fund Facility, which focused on reducing energy shortages, stabilizing public finances, increasing revenue collection, and improving its balance of payments position. The program concluded in September 2016. Although Pakistan missed several structural reform criteria, it restored macroeconomic stability, improved its credit rating, and boosted growth. The Pakistani rupee has remained relatively stable against the US dollar since 2015, though it declined about 10% between November 2017 and March 2018. Balance of payments concerns have reemerged, however, as a result of a significant increase in imports and weak export and remittance growth.
Pakistan must continue to address several longstanding issues, including expanding investment in education, healthcare, and sanitation; adapting to the effects of climate change and natural disasters; improving the country’s business environment; and widening the country’s tax base. Given demographic challenges, Pakistan’s leadership will be pressed to implement economic reforms, promote further development of the energy sector, and attract foreign investment to support sufficient economic growth necessary to employ its growing and rapidly urbanizing population, much of which is under the age of 25.
In an effort to boost development, Pakistan and China are implementing the \"China-Pakistan Economic Corridor\" (CPEC) with $60 billion in investments targeted towards energy and other infrastructure projects. Pakistan believes CPEC investments will enable growth rates of over 6% of GDP by laying the groundwork for increased exports. CPEC-related obligations, however, have raised IMF concern about Pakistan’s capital outflows and external financing needs over the medium term.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { @@ -1057,10 +1057,10 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,876,794 (2020)" + "text": "2,876,794 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.3 (2020 est.)" + "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { @@ -1099,10 +1099,10 @@ }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { - "text": "2,523,027 (2021)" + "text": "2,523,027 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "1.14 (2021 est.)" + "text": "1.1 (2020 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/world/xx.json b/world/xx.json index 2417f32e..9900e6a5 100644 --- a/world/xx.json +++ b/world/xx.json @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ }, "Terrain": { "Terrain": { - "text": "tremendous variation of terrain on each of the continents; check the World 'Elevation' entry for a compilation of terrain extremes; the world's ocean floors are marked by mid-ocean ridges while the ocean surfaces form a dynamic, continuously changing environment; check the 'Terrain' field and its 'major surface currents' and 'ocean zones' subfields under each of the five ocean (Arctic, Atlantic, Indian, Pacific, and Southern) entries for further information on oceanic environs" + "text": "tremendous variation of terrain on each of the continents; check the World 'Elevation' entry for a compilation of terrain extremes; the world's ocean floors are marked by mid-ocean ridges while the ocean surfaces form a dynamic, continuously changing environment; check the \"Terrain\" field and its 'major surface currents' and 'ocean zones' subfields under each of the five ocean (Arctic, Atlantic, Indian, Pacific, and Southern) entries for further information on oceanic environs" }, "Ten Cave Superlatives": { "text": "compiled from \"Geography - note(s)\" under various country entries where more details may be found