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africa/ag.json
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"Introduction": {
"Background": {
"text": "<p>Algeria has known many empires and dynasties starting with the ancient Numidians (3rd century B.C.), Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, over a dozen different Arab and Berber dynasties, Spaniards, and Ottoman Turks. It was under the latter that the Barbary pirates operated from North Africa and preyed on shipping beginning in roughly 1500, peaking in the early to mid-17th century, until finally subdued by the French capture of Algiers in 1830. The French southward conquest of the entirety of Algeria proceeded throughout the 19th century and was marked by many atrocities. The country was heavily colonized by the French in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A bloody eight-year struggle culminated in Algerian independence in 1962. <br><br>Algeria's primary political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), was established in 1954 as part of the struggle for independence and has since largely dominated politics, though is falling out of favor with the youth. The Government of Algeria in 1988 instituted a multi-party system in response to public unrest, but the surprising first round success of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the December 1991 legislative elections led the Algerian army to intervene and postpone the second round of elections to prevent what the secular elite feared would be an extremist-led government from assuming power. The army began a crackdown on the FIS that spurred FIS supporters to begin attacking government targets. Fighting escalated into an insurgency, which saw intense violence from 1992-98, resulting in over 100,000 deaths – many attributed to indiscriminate massacres of villagers by extremists. The government gained the upper hand by the late-1990s, and FIS’s armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, disbanded in January 2000. FIS membership is illegal.</p> <p>Former president Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA, with the backing of the military, won the presidency in 1999 in an election that was boycotted by several candidates protesting alleged fraud, and won subsequent elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014. Protests broke out across the country in late February 2019 against President BOUTEFLIKA’s decision to seek a fifth term. BOUTEFLIKA resigned in April 2019, and in December 2019, Algerians elected former Prime Minister Abdelmadjid TEBBOUNE as the country's new president. A longtime FLN member, TEBBOUNE ran for president as an independent. In 2020, Algeria held a constitutional referendum, which President TEBBOUNE enacted in January 2021. Subsequent reforms to the national electoral law introduced open list voting to curb corruption. The new law also eliminated gender quotas in Parliament, and the June 2021 legislative elections saw female representation plummet. Local elections took place in November 2021. The referendum, parliamentary elections, and local elections saw record low voter turnout. Since 2014, Algeria’s reliance on hydrocarbon revenues to fund the government and finance the large subsidies for the population has fallen under stress because of declining oil prices. </p>"
"text": "<p>Algeria has known many empires and dynasties starting with the ancient Numidians (3rd century B.C.), Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, over a dozen different Arab and Berber dynasties, Spaniards, and Ottoman Turks. It was under the latter that the Barbary pirates operated from North Africa and preyed on shipping beginning in roughly 1500, peaking in the early to mid-17th century, until finally subdued by the French capture of Algiers in 1830. The French southward conquest of the entirety of Algeria proceeded throughout the 19th century and was marked by many atrocities. The country was heavily colonized by the French in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A bloody eight-year struggle culminated in Algerian independence in 1962. <br><br>Algeria's primary political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), was established in 1954 as part of the struggle for independence and has since largely dominated politics, though is falling out of favor with the youth. The Government of Algeria in 1988 instituted a multi-party system in response to public unrest, but the surprising first round success of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the December 1991 legislative elections led the Algerian army to intervene and postpone the second round of elections to prevent what the secular elite feared would be an extremist-led government from assuming power. The army began a crackdown on the FIS that spurred FIS supporters to begin attacking government targets. Fighting escalated into an insurgency, which saw intense violence from 1992-98, resulting in over 100,000 deaths – many attributed to indiscriminate massacres of villagers by extremists. The government gained the upper hand by the late-1990s, and FIS’s armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, disbanded in January 2000. FIS membership is illegal.</p> <p>Former president Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA, with the backing of the military, won the presidency in 1999 in an election that was boycotted by several candidates protesting alleged fraud, and won subsequent elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014. Protests broke out across the country in late February 2019 against President BOUTEFLIKA’s decision to seek a fifth term. BOUTEFLIKA resigned in April 2019, and in December 2019, Algerians elected former Prime Minister Abdelmadjid TEBBOUNE as the country's new president. A longtime FLN member, TEBBOUNE ran for president as an independent. In 2020, Algeria held a constitutional referendum, which President TEBBOUNE enacted in January 2021. Subsequent reforms to the national electoral law introduced open list voting to curb corruption. The new law also eliminated gender quotas in Parliament, and the June 2021 legislative elections saw female representation plummet. Local elections took place in November 2021. The referendum, parliamentary elections, and local elections saw record low voter turnout. Since 2014, Algeria’s reliance on hydrocarbon revenues to fund the government and finance the large subsidies for the population has fallen under stress because of declining oil prices.</p>"
}
},
"Geography": {
@ -659,7 +659,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Algeria's economy remains dominated by the state, a legacy of the country's socialist post-independence development model. In recent years the Algerian Government has halted the privatization of state-owned industries and imposed restrictions on imports and foreign involvement in its economy, pursuing an explicit import substitution policy.</p><p></p><p>Hydrocarbons have long been the backbone of the economy, accounting for roughly 30% of GDP, 60% of budget revenues, and nearly 95% of export earnings. Algeria has the 10th-largest reserves of natural gas in the world - including the 3rd-largest reserves of shale gas - and is the 6th-largest gas exporter. It ranks 16th in proven oil reserves. Hydrocarbon exports enabled Algeria to maintain macroeconomic stability, amass large foreign currency reserves, and maintain low external debt while global oil prices were high. With lower oil prices since 2014, Algeria’s foreign exchange reserves have declined by more than half and its oil stabilization fund has decreased from about $20 billion at the end of 2013 to about $7 billion in 2017, which is the statutory minimum.</p><p></p><p>Declining oil prices have also reduced the government’s ability to use state-driven growth to distribute rents and fund generous public subsidies, and the government has been under pressure to reduce spending. Over the past three years, the government has enacted incremental increases in some taxes, resulting in modest increases in prices for gasoline, cigarettes, alcohol, and certain imported goods, but it has refrained from reducing subsidies, particularly for education, healthcare, and housing programs.</p><p></p><p>Algiers has increased protectionist measures since 2015 to limit its import bill and encourage domestic production of non-oil and gas industries. Since 2015, the government has imposed additional restrictions on access to foreign exchange for imports, and import quotas for specific products, such as cars. In January 2018 the government imposed an indefinite suspension on the importation of roughly 850 products, subject to periodic review.</p><p></p><p>President BOUTEFLIKA announced in fall 2017 that Algeria intends to develop its non-conventional energy resources. Algeria has struggled to develop non-hydrocarbon industries because of heavy regulation and an emphasis on state-driven growth. Algeria has not increased non-hydrocarbon exports, and hydrocarbon exports have declined because of field depletion and increased domestic demand.</p>"
"text": "<p>Algeria's economy remains dominated by the state, a legacy of the country's socialist post-independence development model. In recent years the Algerian Government has halted the privatization of state-owned industries and imposed restrictions on imports and foreign involvement in its economy, pursuing an explicit import substitution policy.</p> <p> </p> <p>Hydrocarbons have long been the backbone of the economy, accounting for roughly 30% of GDP, 60% of budget revenues, and nearly 95% of export earnings. Algeria has the 10th-largest reserves of natural gas in the world - including the 3rd-largest reserves of shale gas - and is the 6th-largest gas exporter. It ranks 16th in proven oil reserves. Hydrocarbon exports enabled Algeria to maintain macroeconomic stability, amass large foreign currency reserves, and maintain low external debt while global oil prices were high. With lower oil prices since 2014, Algeria’s foreign exchange reserves have declined by more than half and its oil stabilization fund has decreased from about $20 billion at the end of 2013 to about $7 billion in 2017, which is the statutory minimum.</p> <p> </p> <p>Declining oil prices have also reduced the government’s ability to use state-driven growth to distribute rents and fund generous public subsidies, and the government has been under pressure to reduce spending. Over the past three years, the government has enacted incremental increases in some taxes, resulting in modest increases in prices for gasoline, cigarettes, alcohol, and certain imported goods, but it has refrained from reducing subsidies, particularly for education, healthcare, and housing programs.</p> <p> </p> <p>Algiers has increased protectionist measures since 2015 to limit its import bill and encourage domestic production of non-oil and gas industries. Since 2015, the government has imposed additional restrictions on access to foreign exchange for imports, and import quotas for specific products, such as cars. In January 2018 the government imposed an indefinite suspension on the importation of roughly 850 products, subject to periodic review.</p> <p> </p> <p>President BOUTEFLIKA announced in fall 2017 that Algeria intends to develop its non-conventional energy resources. Algeria has struggled to develop non-hydrocarbon industries because of heavy regulation and an emphasis on state-driven growth. Algeria has not increased non-hydrocarbon exports, and hydrocarbon exports have declined because of field depletion and increased domestic demand.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -980,18 +980,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "4,784,306 (2020)"
"text": "4,784,306 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "10.91 (2020 est.)"
"text": "11 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "45,555,673 (2020)"
"text": "45,555,673 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "103.9 (2020 est.)"
"text": "104 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1022,10 +1022,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "3,790,459 (2022)"
"text": "3,790,459 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "8.64 (2022)"
"text": "9 (2020 est.)"
}
}
},
@ -1139,6 +1139,9 @@
"text": "Algerian People's National Army (ANP): Land Forces, Naval Forces (includes coast guard), Air Forces, Territorial Air Defense Forces, Republican Guard (under ANP, but responsible to the President), National Gendarmerie; Ministry of Interior: General Directorate of National Security (national police) (2021)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "5.6% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "6.7% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1150,9 +1153,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "5.9% of GDP (2017) (approximately $18.8 billion)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "6.4% of GDP (2016) (approximately $19.7 billion)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

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africa/ao.json
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@ -691,7 +691,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Angola's economy is overwhelmingly driven by its oil sector. Oil production and its supporting activities contribute about 50% of GDP, more than 70% of government revenue, and more than 90% of the country's exports; Angola is an OPEC member and subject to its direction regarding oil production levels. Diamonds contribute an additional 5% to exports. Subsistence agriculture provides the main livelihood for most of the people, but half of the country's food is still imported.</p><p></p><p>Increased oil production supported growth averaging more than 17% per year from 2004 to 2008. A postwar reconstruction boom and resettlement of displaced persons led to high rates of growth in construction and agriculture as well. Some of the country's infrastructure is still damaged or undeveloped from the 27-year-long civil war (1975-2002). However, the government since 2005 has used billions of dollars in credit from China, Brazil, Portugal, Germany, Spain, and the EU to help rebuild Angola's public infrastructure. Land mines left from the war still mar the countryside, and as a result, the national military, international partners, and private Angolan firms all continue to remove them.</p><p></p><p>The global recession that started in 2008 stalled Angola’s economic growth and many construction projects stopped because Luanda accrued billions in arrears to foreign construction companies when government revenue fell. Lower prices for oil and diamonds also resulted in GDP falling 0.7% in 2016. Angola formally abandoned its currency peg in 2009 but reinstituted it in April 2016 and maintains an overvalued exchange rate. In late 2016, Angola lost the last of its correspondent relationships with foreign banks, further exacerbating hard currency problems. Since 2013 the central bank has consistently spent down reserves to defend the kwanza, gradually allowing a 40% depreciation since late 2014. Consumer inflation declined from 325% in 2000 to less than 9% in 2014, before rising again to above 30% from 2015-2017.</p><p></p><p>Continued low oil prices, the depreciation of the kwanza, and slower than expected growth in non-oil GDP have reduced growth prospects, although several major international oil companies remain in Angola. Corruption, especially in the extractive sectors, is a major long-term challenge that poses an additional threat to the economy.</p>"
"text": "<p>Angola's economy is overwhelmingly driven by its oil sector. Oil production and its supporting activities contribute about 50% of GDP, more than 70% of government revenue, and more than 90% of the country's exports; Angola is an OPEC member and subject to its direction regarding oil production levels. Diamonds contribute an additional 5% to exports. Subsistence agriculture provides the main livelihood for most of the people, but half of the country's food is still imported.</p> <p> </p> <p>Increased oil production supported growth averaging more than 17% per year from 2004 to 2008. A postwar reconstruction boom and resettlement of displaced persons led to high rates of growth in construction and agriculture as well. Some of the country's infrastructure is still damaged or undeveloped from the 27-year-long civil war (1975-2002). However, the government since 2005 has used billions of dollars in credit from China, Brazil, Portugal, Germany, Spain, and the EU to help rebuild Angola's public infrastructure. Land mines left from the war still mar the countryside, and as a result, the national military, international partners, and private Angolan firms all continue to remove them.</p> <p> </p> <p>The global recession that started in 2008 stalled Angola’s economic growth and many construction projects stopped because Luanda accrued billions in arrears to foreign construction companies when government revenue fell. Lower prices for oil and diamonds also resulted in GDP falling 0.7% in 2016. Angola formally abandoned its currency peg in 2009 but reinstituted it in April 2016 and maintains an overvalued exchange rate. In late 2016, Angola lost the last of its correspondent relationships with foreign banks, further exacerbating hard currency problems. Since 2013 the central bank has consistently spent down reserves to defend the kwanza, gradually allowing a 40% depreciation since late 2014. Consumer inflation declined from 325% in 2000 to less than 9% in 2014, before rising again to above 30% from 2015-2017.</p> <p> </p> <p>Continued low oil prices, the depreciation of the kwanza, and slower than expected growth in non-oil GDP have reduced growth prospects, although several major international oil companies remain in Angola. Corruption, especially in the extractive sectors, is a major long-term challenge that poses an additional threat to the economy.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1025,18 +1025,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "119,164 (2020)"
"text": "119,164 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020) less than 1"
"text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "14,645,050 (2020)"
"text": "14,645,050 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "44.56 (2020 est.)"
"text": "45 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1067,10 +1067,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "230,610 (2021) This year we included fixed wireless technologies."
"text": "230,610 (2020 est.) This year we included fixed wireless technologies."
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.7 (2021 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0.7 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1185,6 +1185,9 @@
"text": "Angolan Armed Forces (Forcas Armadas Angolanas, FAA): Army, Navy (Marinha de Guerra Angola, MGA), Angolan National Air Force (Forca Aerea Nacional Angolana, FANA; under operational control of the Army); Rapid Reaction Police (paramilitary) (2021)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.4% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "1.7% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1196,9 +1199,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "2.6% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $3.65 billion)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "2.9% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $3.9 billion)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

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africa/bc.json
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@ -999,18 +999,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "142,587 (2020)"
"text": "140,003 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "5.95 (2020 est.)"
"text": "6 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "3,819,019 (2020)"
"text": "3,829,408 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "162.4 (2020 est.)"
"text": "163 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1041,10 +1041,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "259,525 (2021)"
"text": "259,525 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "11.04 (2021)"
"text": "11 (2020 est.)"
}
}
},
@ -1128,6 +1128,9 @@
"note": "note - both the armed forces and the Botswana Police Service report to the Ministry of Defense, Justice, and Security"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "3% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "3% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1139,9 +1142,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "2.9% of GDP (2017) (approximately $740 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "3.1% of GDP (2016) (approximately $760 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

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africa/bn.json
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@ -692,7 +692,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>The free market economy of Benin has grown consecutively for four years, though growth slowed in 2017, as its close trade links to Nigeria expose Benin to risks from volatile commodity prices. Cotton is a key export commodity, with export earnings significantly impacted by the price of cotton in the broader market. The economy began deflating in 2017, with the consumer price index falling 0.8%.</p><p></p><p>During the first two years of President TALON’s administration, which began in April 2016, the government has followed an ambitious action plan to kickstart development through investments in infrastructure, education, agriculture, and governance. Electricity generation, which has constrained Benin’s economic growth, has increased and blackouts have been considerably reduced. Private foreign direct investment is small, and foreign aid accounts for a large proportion of investment in infrastructure projects.</p><p></p><p>Benin has appealed for international assistance to mitigate piracy against commercial shipping in its territory, and has used equipment from donors effectively against such piracy. Pilferage has significantly dropped at the Port of Cotonou, though the port is still struggling with effective implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Projects included in Benin's $307 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) first compact (2006-11) were designed to increase investment and private sector activity by improving key institutional and physical infrastructure. The four projects focused on access to land, access to financial services, access to justice, and access to markets (including modernization of the port). The Port of Cotonou is a major contributor to Benin’s economy, with revenues projected to account for more than 40% of Benin’s national budget.</p><p></p><p>Benin will need further efforts to upgrade infrastructure, stem corruption, and expand access to foreign markets to achieve its potential. In September 2015, Benin signed a second MCC Compact for $375 million that entered into force in June 2017 and is designed to strengthen the national utility service provider, attract private sector investment, fund infrastructure investments in electricity generation and distribution, and develop off-grid electrification for poor and unserved households. As part of the Government of Benin’s action plan to spur growth, Benin passed public private partnership legislation in 2017 to attract more foreign investment, place more emphasis on tourism, facilitate the development of new food processing systems and agricultural products, encourage new information and communication technology, and establish Independent Power Producers. In April 2017, the IMF approved a three year $150.4 million Extended Credit Facility agreement to maintain debt sustainability and boost donor confidence.</p>"
"text": "<p>The free market economy of Benin has grown consecutively for four years, though growth slowed in 2017, as its close trade links to Nigeria expose Benin to risks from volatile commodity prices. Cotton is a key export commodity, with export earnings significantly impacted by the price of cotton in the broader market. The economy began deflating in 2017, with the consumer price index falling 0.8%.</p> <p> </p> <p>During the first two years of President TALON’s administration, which began in April 2016, the government has followed an ambitious action plan to kickstart development through investments in infrastructure, education, agriculture, and governance. Electricity generation, which has constrained Benin’s economic growth, has increased and blackouts have been considerably reduced. Private foreign direct investment is small, and foreign aid accounts for a large proportion of investment in infrastructure projects.</p> <p> </p> <p>Benin has appealed for international assistance to mitigate piracy against commercial shipping in its territory, and has used equipment from donors effectively against such piracy. Pilferage has significantly dropped at the Port of Cotonou, though the port is still struggling with effective implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Projects included in Benin's $307 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) first compact (2006-11) were designed to increase investment and private sector activity by improving key institutional and physical infrastructure. The four projects focused on access to land, access to financial services, access to justice, and access to markets (including modernization of the port). The Port of Cotonou is a major contributor to Benin’s economy, with revenues projected to account for more than 40% of Benin’s national budget.</p> <p> </p> <p>Benin will need further efforts to upgrade infrastructure, stem corruption, and expand access to foreign markets to achieve its potential. In September 2015, Benin signed a second MCC Compact for $375 million that entered into force in June 2017 and is designed to strengthen the national utility service provider, attract private sector investment, fund infrastructure investments in electricity generation and distribution, and develop off-grid electrification for poor and unserved households. As part of the Government of Benin’s action plan to spur growth, Benin passed public private partnership legislation in 2017 to attract more foreign investment, place more emphasis on tourism, facilitate the development of new food processing systems and agricultural products, encourage new information and communication technology, and establish Independent Power Producers. In April 2017, the IMF approved a three year $150.4 million Extended Credit Facility agreement to maintain debt sustainability and boost donor confidence.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1012,18 +1012,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "32,386 (2020)"
"text": "32,386 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "11,140,891 (2020)"
"text": "11,140,891 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "91.9 (2020 est.)"
"text": "92 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1054,10 +1054,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "29,981 (2021)"
"text": "29,981 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.25 (2021) less than 1"
"text": "0.3 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1153,6 +1153,9 @@
"text": "Benin Armed Forces (Forces Armees Beninoises, FAB): Army, Navy, Air Force; Ministry of Interior and Public Security: Republican Police (Police Republicaine, DGPR) (2021)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "0.7% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "0.5% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1164,9 +1167,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "0.9% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $160 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "0.7% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $130 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

16
africa/by.json
View file

@ -687,7 +687,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Burundi is a landlocked, resource-poor country with an underdeveloped manufacturing sector. Agriculture accounts for over 40% of GDP and employs more than 90% of the population. Burundi's primary exports are coffee and tea, which account for more than half of foreign exchange earnings, but these earnings are subject to fluctuations in weather and international coffee and tea prices, Burundi is heavily dependent on aid from bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as foreign exchange earnings from participation in the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Foreign aid represented 48% of Burundi's national income in 2015, one of the highest percentages in Sub-Saharan Africa, but this figure decreased to 33.5% in 2016 due to political turmoil surrounding President NKURUNZIZA’s bid for a third term. Burundi joined the East African Community (EAC) in 2009.</p><p></p><p>Burundi faces several underlying weaknesses – low governmental capacity, corruption, a high poverty rate, poor educational levels, a weak legal system, a poor transportation network, and overburdened utilities – that have prevented the implementation of planned economic reforms. The purchasing power of most Burundians has decreased as wage increases have not kept pace with inflation, which reached approximately 18% in 2017.</p><p></p><p>Real GDP growth dropped precipitously following political events in 2015 and has yet to recover to pre-conflict levels. Continued resistance by donors and the international community will restrict Burundi’s economic growth as the country deals with a large current account deficit.</p>"
"text": "<p>Burundi is a landlocked, resource-poor country with an underdeveloped manufacturing sector. Agriculture accounts for over 40% of GDP and employs more than 90% of the population. Burundi's primary exports are coffee and tea, which account for more than half of foreign exchange earnings, but these earnings are subject to fluctuations in weather and international coffee and tea prices, Burundi is heavily dependent on aid from bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as foreign exchange earnings from participation in the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Foreign aid represented 48% of Burundi's national income in 2015, one of the highest percentages in Sub-Saharan Africa, but this figure decreased to 33.5% in 2016 due to political turmoil surrounding President NKURUNZIZA’s bid for a third term. Burundi joined the East African Community (EAC) in 2009.</p> <p> </p> <p>Burundi faces several underlying weaknesses – low governmental capacity, corruption, a high poverty rate, poor educational levels, a weak legal system, a poor transportation network, and overburdened utilities – that have prevented the implementation of planned economic reforms. The purchasing power of most Burundians has decreased as wage increases have not kept pace with inflation, which reached approximately 18% in 2017.</p> <p> </p> <p>Real GDP growth dropped precipitously following political events in 2015 and has yet to recover to pre-conflict levels. Continued resistance by donors and the international community will restrict Burundi’s economic growth as the country deals with a large current account deficit.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1002,10 +1002,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "18,300 (2020)"
"text": "18,300 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1044,10 +1044,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "4,230 (2021)"
"text": "4,230 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.04 (2021) less than 1"
"text": "0.04 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1107,6 +1107,9 @@
"text": "National Defense Forces (Forces de Defense Nationale, FDN): Army (includes maritime wing, air wing); Ministry of Public Security: National Police (Police Nationale du Burundi) (2021)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "2% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "2.1% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1118,9 +1121,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "2.1% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $95 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "2.4% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $100 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

20
africa/cd.json
View file

@ -704,7 +704,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Chad’s landlocked location results in high transportation costs for imported goods and dependence on neighboring countries. Oil and agriculture are mainstays of Chad’s economy. Oil provides about 60% of export revenues, while cotton, cattle, livestock, and gum arabic provide the bulk of Chad's non-oil export earnings. The services sector contributes less than one-third of GDP and has attracted foreign investment mostly through telecommunications and banking.</p><p></p><p>Nearly all of Chad’s fuel is provided by one domestic refinery, and unanticipated shutdowns occasionally result in shortages. The country regulates the price of domestic fuel, providing an incentive for black market sales.</p><p></p><p>Although high oil prices and strong local harvests supported the economy in the past, low oil prices now stress Chad’s fiscal position and have resulted in significant government cutbacks. Chad relies on foreign assistance and foreign capital for most of its public and private sector investment. Investment in Chad is difficult due to its limited infrastructure, lack of trained workers, extensive government bureaucracy, and corruption. Chad obtained a three-year extended credit facility from the IMF in 2014 and was granted debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in April 2015.</p><p></p><p>In 2018, economic policy will be driven by efforts that started in 2016 to reverse the recession and to repair damage to public finances and exports. The government is implementing an emergency action plan to counterbalance the drop in oil revenue and to diversify the economy. Chad’s national development plan (NDP) cost just over $9 billion with a financing gap of $6.7 billion. The NDP emphasized the importance of private sector participation in Chad’s development, as well as the need to improve the business environment, particularly in priority sectors such as mining and agriculture.</p><p></p><p>The Government of Chad reached a deal with Glencore and four other banks on the restructuring of a $1.45 billion oil-backed loan in February 2018, after a long negotiation. The new terms include an extension of the maturity to 2030 from 2022, a two-year grace period on principal repayments, and a lower interest rate of the London Inter-bank Offer Rate (Libor) plus 2% - down from Libor plus 7.5%. The original Glencore loan was to be repaid with crude oil assets, however, Chad's oil sales were hit by the downturn in the price of oil. Chad had secured a $312 million credit from the IMF in June 2017, but release of those funds hinged on restructuring the Glencore debt. Chad had already cut public spending to try to meet the terms of the IMF program, but that prompted strikes and protests in a country where nearly 40% of the population lives below the poverty line. Multinational partners, such as the African Development Bank, the EU, and the World Bank are likely to continue budget support in 2018, but Chad will remain at high debt risk, given its dependence on oil revenue and pressure to spend on subsidies and security.</p>"
"text": "<p>Chad’s landlocked location results in high transportation costs for imported goods and dependence on neighboring countries. Oil and agriculture are mainstays of Chad’s economy. Oil provides about 60% of export revenues, while cotton, cattle, livestock, and gum arabic provide the bulk of Chad's non-oil export earnings. The services sector contributes less than one-third of GDP and has attracted foreign investment mostly through telecommunications and banking.</p> <p> </p> <p>Nearly all of Chad’s fuel is provided by one domestic refinery, and unanticipated shutdowns occasionally result in shortages. The country regulates the price of domestic fuel, providing an incentive for black market sales.</p> <p> </p> <p>Although high oil prices and strong local harvests supported the economy in the past, low oil prices now stress Chad’s fiscal position and have resulted in significant government cutbacks. Chad relies on foreign assistance and foreign capital for most of its public and private sector investment. Investment in Chad is difficult due to its limited infrastructure, lack of trained workers, extensive government bureaucracy, and corruption. Chad obtained a three-year extended credit facility from the IMF in 2014 and was granted debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in April 2015.</p> <p> </p> <p>In 2018, economic policy will be driven by efforts that started in 2016 to reverse the recession and to repair damage to public finances and exports. The government is implementing an emergency action plan to counterbalance the drop in oil revenue and to diversify the economy. Chad’s national development plan (NDP) cost just over $9 billion with a financing gap of $6.7 billion. The NDP emphasized the importance of private sector participation in Chad’s development, as well as the need to improve the business environment, particularly in priority sectors such as mining and agriculture.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Government of Chad reached a deal with Glencore and four other banks on the restructuring of a $1.45 billion oil-backed loan in February 2018, after a long negotiation. The new terms include an extension of the maturity to 2030 from 2022, a two-year grace period on principal repayments, and a lower interest rate of the London Inter-bank Offer Rate (Libor) plus 2% - down from Libor plus 7.5%. The original Glencore loan was to be repaid with crude oil assets, however, Chad's oil sales were hit by the downturn in the price of oil. Chad had secured a $312 million credit from the IMF in June 2017, but release of those funds hinged on restructuring the Glencore debt. Chad had already cut public spending to try to meet the terms of the IMF program, but that prompted strikes and protests in a country where nearly 40% of the population lives below the poverty line. Multinational partners, such as the African Development Bank, the EU, and the World Bank are likely to continue budget support in 2018, but Chad will remain at high debt risk, given its dependence on oil revenue and pressure to spend on subsidies and security.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1016,10 +1016,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "5,340 (2020)"
"text": "5,340 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1058,10 +1058,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "0 (2021)"
"text": "0 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0 (2021 est.)"
"text": "0 (2020 est.)"
}
}
},
@ -1138,8 +1138,11 @@
"note": "note(s) - the GDSSIE, formerly known as the Republican Guard, is the presidential guard force and is considered to be Chad's elite military unit; it is reportedly a division-size unit with infantry, armor, and special forces/anti-terrorism regiments (known as the Special Anti-Terrorist Group or SATG, aka Division of Special Anti-Terrorist Groups or DGSAT)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "2.5% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "2.5% of GDP (2020 est.)"
"text": "2.9% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2019": {
"text": "2% of GDP (2019 est.) (approximately $320 million)"
@ -1149,9 +1152,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "2% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $310 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "2.5% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $380 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
@ -1183,7 +1183,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "384,979 (Sudan), 122,421 (Central African Republic), 42,746 (Cameroon), 19,724 (Nigeria) (2022)"
"text": "388,550 (Sudan), 122,421 (Central African Republic), 42,549 (Cameroon), 19,724 (Nigeria) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "406,573 (majority are in the east) (2022)"

16
africa/cf.json
View file

@ -699,7 +699,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>The Republic of the Congo’s economy is a mixture of subsistence farming, an industrial sector based largely on oil and support services, and government spending. Oil has supplanted forestry as the mainstay of the economy, providing a major share of government revenues and exports. Natural gas is increasingly being converted to electricity rather than being flared, greatly improving energy prospects. New mining projects, particularly iron ore, which entered production in late 2013, may add as much as $1 billion to annual government revenue. The Republic of the Congo is a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and shares a common currency – the Central African Franc – with five other member states in the region.</p><p></p><p>The current administration faces difficult economic challenges of stimulating recovery and reducing poverty. The drop in oil prices that began in 2014 has constrained government spending; lower oil prices forced the government to cut more than $1 billion in planned spending. The fiscal deficit amounted to 11% of GDP in 2017. The government’s inability to pay civil servant salaries has resulted in multiple rounds of strikes by many groups, including doctors, nurses, and teachers. In the wake of a multi-year recession, the country reached out to the IMF in 2017 for a new program; the IMF noted that the country’s continued dependence on oil, unsustainable debt, and significant governance weakness are key impediments to the country’s economy. In 2018, the country’s external debt level will approach 120% of GDP. The IMF urged the government to renegotiate debts levels to sustainable levels before it agreed to a new macroeconomic adjustment package.</p>"
"text": "<p>The Republic of the Congo’s economy is a mixture of subsistence farming, an industrial sector based largely on oil and support services, and government spending. Oil has supplanted forestry as the mainstay of the economy, providing a major share of government revenues and exports. Natural gas is increasingly being converted to electricity rather than being flared, greatly improving energy prospects. New mining projects, particularly iron ore, which entered production in late 2013, may add as much as $1 billion to annual government revenue. The Republic of the Congo is a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and shares a common currency – the Central African Franc – with five other member states in the region.</p> <p> </p> <p>The current administration faces difficult economic challenges of stimulating recovery and reducing poverty. The drop in oil prices that began in 2014 has constrained government spending; lower oil prices forced the government to cut more than $1 billion in planned spending. The fiscal deficit amounted to 11% of GDP in 2017. The government’s inability to pay civil servant salaries has resulted in multiple rounds of strikes by many groups, including doctors, nurses, and teachers. In the wake of a multi-year recession, the country reached out to the IMF in 2017 for a new program; the IMF noted that the country’s continued dependence on oil, unsustainable debt, and significant governance weakness are key impediments to the country’s economy. In 2018, the country’s external debt level will approach 120% of GDP. The IMF urged the government to renegotiate debts levels to sustainable levels before it agreed to a new macroeconomic adjustment package.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1016,10 +1016,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "17,000 (2018 est.)"
"text": "17,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2018 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1058,10 +1058,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "1,000 (2021)"
"text": "1,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.02 (2021 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0.02 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1168,6 +1168,9 @@
"text": "Congolese Armed Forces (Forces Armees Congolaises, FAC): Army (Armee de Terre), Navy, Congolese Air Force (Armee de l'Air Congolaise), Gendarmerie (2021)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "2.5% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "3.2% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1179,9 +1182,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "3.6% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $580 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "4.2% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $690 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

12
africa/cg.json
View file

@ -725,7 +725,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>The economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo - a nation endowed with vast natural resource wealth - continues to perform poorly. Systemic corruption since independence in 1960, combined with countrywide instability and intermittent conflict that began in the early-90s, has reduced national output and government revenue, and increased external debt. With the installation of a transitional government in 2003 after peace accords, economic conditions slowly began to improve as the government reopened relations with international financial institutions and international donors, and President KABILA began implementing reforms. Progress on implementing substantive economic reforms remains slow because of political instability, bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, and patronage, which also dampen international investment prospects.</p><p></p><p>Renewed activity in the mining sector, the source of most export income, boosted Kinshasa's fiscal position and GDP growth until 2015, but low commodity prices have led to slower growth, volatile inflation, currency depreciation, and a growing fiscal deficit. An uncertain legal framework, corruption, and a lack of transparency in government policy are long-term problems for the large mining sector and for the economy as a whole. Much economic activity still occurs in the informal sector and is not reflected in GDP data.</p><p></p><p>Poverty remains widespread in DRC, and the country failed to meet any Millennium Development Goals by 2015. DRC also concluded its program with the IMF in 2015. The price of copper – the DRC’s primary export - plummeted in 2015 and remained at record lows during 2016-17, reducing government revenues, expenditures, and foreign exchange reserves, while inflation reached nearly 50% in mid-2017 – its highest level since the early 2000s.</p>"
"text": "<p>The economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo - a nation endowed with vast natural resource wealth - continues to perform poorly. Systemic corruption since independence in 1960, combined with countrywide instability and intermittent conflict that began in the early-90s, has reduced national output and government revenue, and increased external debt. With the installation of a transitional government in 2003 after peace accords, economic conditions slowly began to improve as the government reopened relations with international financial institutions and international donors, and President KABILA began implementing reforms. Progress on implementing substantive economic reforms remains slow because of political instability, bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, and patronage, which also dampen international investment prospects.</p> <p> </p> <p>Renewed activity in the mining sector, the source of most export income, boosted Kinshasa's fiscal position and GDP growth until 2015, but low commodity prices have led to slower growth, volatile inflation, currency depreciation, and a growing fiscal deficit. An uncertain legal framework, corruption, and a lack of transparency in government policy are long-term problems for the large mining sector and for the economy as a whole. Much economic activity still occurs in the informal sector and is not reflected in GDP data.</p> <p> </p> <p>Poverty remains widespread in DRC, and the country failed to meet any Millennium Development Goals by 2015. DRC also concluded its program with the IMF in 2015. The price of copper – the DRC’s primary export - plummeted in 2015 and remained at record lows during 2016-17, reducing government revenues, expenditures, and foreign exchange reserves, while inflation reached nearly 50% in mid-2017 – its highest level since the early 2000s.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1051,10 +1051,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "0 (2019)"
"text": "0 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0 (2019 est.)"
"text": "0 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1093,10 +1093,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "31,000 (2021 est.)"
"text": "31,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.03 (2021 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0.03 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "210,621 (Rwanda), 210,084 (Central African Republic), 56,351 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 40,511 (Burundi) (2022)"
"text": "210,621 (Rwanda), 210,357 (Central African Republic), 56,356 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 40,522 (Burundi) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "5.61 million (fighting between government forces and rebels since mid-1990s; conflict in Kasai region since 2016) (2021)"

18
africa/cm.json
View file

@ -723,7 +723,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Cameroon’s market-based, diversified economy features oil and gas, timber, aluminum, agriculture, mining and the service sector. Oil remains Cameroon’s main export commodity, and despite falling global oil prices, still accounts for nearly 40% of exports. Cameroon’s economy suffers from factors that often impact underdeveloped countries, such as stagnant per capita income, a relatively inequitable distribution of income, a top-heavy civil service, endemic corruption, continuing inefficiencies of a large parastatal system in key sectors, and a generally unfavorable climate for business enterprise.</p><p></p><p>Since 1990, the government has embarked on various IMF and World Bank programs designed to spur business investment, increase efficiency in agriculture, improve trade, and recapitalize the nation's banks. The IMF continues to press for economic reforms, including increased budget transparency, privatization, and poverty reduction programs. The Government of Cameroon provides subsidies for electricity, food, and fuel that have strained the federal budget and diverted funds from education, healthcare, and infrastructure projects, as low oil prices have led to lower revenues.</p><p></p><p>Cameroon devotes significant resources to several large infrastructure projects currently under construction, including a deep seaport in Kribi and the Lom Pangar Hydropower Project. Cameroon’s energy sector continues to diversify, recently opening a natural gas-powered electricity generating plant. Cameroon continues to seek foreign investment to improve its inadequate infrastructure, create jobs, and improve its economic footprint, but its unfavorable business environment remains a significant deterrent to foreign investment.</p>"
"text": "<p>Cameroon’s market-based, diversified economy features oil and gas, timber, aluminum, agriculture, mining and the service sector. Oil remains Cameroon’s main export commodity, and despite falling global oil prices, still accounts for nearly 40% of exports. Cameroon’s economy suffers from factors that often impact underdeveloped countries, such as stagnant per capita income, a relatively inequitable distribution of income, a top-heavy civil service, endemic corruption, continuing inefficiencies of a large parastatal system in key sectors, and a generally unfavorable climate for business enterprise.</p> <p> </p> <p>Since 1990, the government has embarked on various IMF and World Bank programs designed to spur business investment, increase efficiency in agriculture, improve trade, and recapitalize the nation's banks. The IMF continues to press for economic reforms, including increased budget transparency, privatization, and poverty reduction programs. The Government of Cameroon provides subsidies for electricity, food, and fuel that have strained the federal budget and diverted funds from education, healthcare, and infrastructure projects, as low oil prices have led to lower revenues.</p> <p> </p> <p>Cameroon devotes significant resources to several large infrastructure projects currently under construction, including a deep seaport in Kribi and the Lom Pangar Hydropower Project. Cameroon’s energy sector continues to diversify, recently opening a natural gas-powered electricity generating plant. Cameroon continues to seek foreign investment to improve its inadequate infrastructure, create jobs, and improve its economic footprint, but its unfavorable business environment remains a significant deterrent to foreign investment.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1054,10 +1054,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "883,015 (2020)"
"text": "964,378 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "3.33 (2020 est.)"
"text": "4 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1096,10 +1096,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "722,579 (2021)"
"text": "722,579 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "2.72 (2021)"
"text": "3 (2020 est.)"
}
}
},
@ -1207,6 +1207,9 @@
"note": "note(s) - the National Police (under the General Delegation of National Security) and the Gendarmerie are responsible for internal security; the Rapid Intervention Battalion (RIB) is a large brigade-sized force comprised of approximately 9 battalions, detachments, or groups (5 infantry, 1 airborne, 1 amphibious, 1 armored reconnaissance, and 1 counter-terrorism); the RIB maintains its own command and control structure and reports directly to the president, rather than the defense minister"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "1% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1218,9 +1221,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "1.5% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $710 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "1.5% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $700 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "345,587 (Central African Republic), 129,266 (Nigeria) (2022)"
"text": "345,622 (Central African Republic), 128,893 (Nigeria) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "936,767 (2022) (includes far north, northwest, and southwest)"

10
africa/cn.json
View file

@ -599,7 +599,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>One of the world's poorest and smallest economies, the Comoros is made up of three islands that are hampered by inadequate transportation links, a young and rapidly increasing population, and few natural resources. The low educational level of the labor force contributes to a subsistence level of economic activity and a heavy dependence on foreign grants and technical assistance. Agriculture, including fishing, hunting, and forestry, accounts for about 50% of GDP, employs a majority of the labor force, and provides most of the exports. Export income is heavily reliant on the three main crops of vanilla, cloves, and ylang ylang (perfume essence); and the Comoros' export earnings are easily disrupted by disasters such as fires and extreme weather. Despite agriculture’s importance to the economy, the country imports roughly 70% of its food; rice, the main staple, and other dried vegetables account for more than 25% of imports. Remittances from about 300,000 Comorans contribute about 25% of the country’s GDP. France, Comoros’s colonial power, remains a key trading partner and bilateral donor.</p><p></p><p>Comoros faces an education system in need of upgrades, limited opportunities for private commercial and industrial enterprises, poor health services, limited exports, and a high population growth rate. Recurring political instability, sometimes initiated from outside the country, and an ongoing electricity crisis have inhibited growth. The government, elected in mid-2016, has moved to improve revenue mobilization, reduce expenditures, and improve electricity access, although the public sector wage bill remains one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. In mid-2017, Comoros joined the Southern African Development Community with 15 other regional member states.</p>"
"text": "<p>One of the world's poorest and smallest economies, the Comoros is made up of three islands that are hampered by inadequate transportation links, a young and rapidly increasing population, and few natural resources. The low educational level of the labor force contributes to a subsistence level of economic activity and a heavy dependence on foreign grants and technical assistance. Agriculture, including fishing, hunting, and forestry, accounts for about 50% of GDP, employs a majority of the labor force, and provides most of the exports. Export income is heavily reliant on the three main crops of vanilla, cloves, and ylang ylang (perfume essence); and the Comoros' export earnings are easily disrupted by disasters such as fires and extreme weather. Despite agriculture’s importance to the economy, the country imports roughly 70% of its food; rice, the main staple, and other dried vegetables account for more than 25% of imports. Remittances from about 300,000 Comorans contribute about 25% of the country’s GDP. France, Comoros’s colonial power, remains a key trading partner and bilateral donor.</p> <p> </p> <p>Comoros faces an education system in need of upgrades, limited opportunities for private commercial and industrial enterprises, poor health services, limited exports, and a high population growth rate. Recurring political instability, sometimes initiated from outside the country, and an ongoing electricity crisis have inhibited growth. The government, elected in mid-2016, has moved to improve revenue mobilization, reduce expenditures, and improve electricity access, although the public sector wage bill remains one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. In mid-2017, Comoros joined the Southern African Development Community with 15 other regional member states.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -913,10 +913,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "7,573 (2020)"
"text": "7,573 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
"text": "1 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -955,10 +955,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "1,066 (2021)"
"text": "1,066 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.12 (2021) less than 1"
"text": "0.12 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},

14
africa/ct.json
View file

@ -689,7 +689,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Subsistence agriculture, together with forestry and mining, remains the backbone of the economy of the Central African Republic (CAR), with about 60% of the population living in outlying areas. The agricultural sector generates more than half of estimated GDP, although statistics are unreliable in the conflict-prone country. Timber and diamonds account for most export earnings, followed by cotton. Important constraints to economic development include the CAR's landlocked geography, poor transportation system, largely unskilled work force, and legacy of misdirected macroeconomic policies. Factional fighting between the government and its opponents remains a drag on economic revitalization. Distribution of income is highly unequal and grants from the international community can only partially meet humanitarian needs. CAR shares a common currency with the Central African Monetary Union. The currency is pegged to the Euro.</p><p></p><p>Since 2009, the IMF has worked closely with the government to institute reforms that have resulted in some improvement in budget transparency, but other problems remain. The government's additional spending in the run-up to the 2011 election worsened CAR's fiscal situation. In 2012, the World Bank approved $125 million in funding for transport infrastructure and regional trade, focused on the route between CAR's capital and the port of Douala in Cameroon. In July 2016, the IMF approved a three-year extended credit facility valued at $116 million; in mid-2017, the IMF completed a review of CAR’s fiscal performance and broadly approved of the government’s management, although issues with revenue collection, weak government capacity, and transparency remain. The World Bank in late 2016 approved a $20 million grant to restore basic fiscal management, improve transparency, and assist with economic recovery.</p><p></p><p>Participation in the Kimberley Process, a commitment to remove conflict diamonds from the global supply chain, led to a partially lifted the ban on diamond exports from CAR in 2015, but persistent insecurity is likely to constrain real GDP growth.</p>"
"text": "<p>Subsistence agriculture, together with forestry and mining, remains the backbone of the economy of the Central African Republic (CAR), with about 60% of the population living in outlying areas. The agricultural sector generates more than half of estimated GDP, although statistics are unreliable in the conflict-prone country. Timber and diamonds account for most export earnings, followed by cotton. Important constraints to economic development include the CAR's landlocked geography, poor transportation system, largely unskilled work force, and legacy of misdirected macroeconomic policies. Factional fighting between the government and its opponents remains a drag on economic revitalization. Distribution of income is highly unequal and grants from the international community can only partially meet humanitarian needs. CAR shares a common currency with the Central African Monetary Union. The currency is pegged to the Euro.</p> <p> </p> <p>Since 2009, the IMF has worked closely with the government to institute reforms that have resulted in some improvement in budget transparency, but other problems remain. The government's additional spending in the run-up to the 2011 election worsened CAR's fiscal situation. In 2012, the World Bank approved $125 million in funding for transport infrastructure and regional trade, focused on the route between CAR's capital and the port of Douala in Cameroon. In July 2016, the IMF approved a three-year extended credit facility valued at $116 million; in mid-2017, the IMF completed a review of CAR’s fiscal performance and broadly approved of the government’s management, although issues with revenue collection, weak government capacity, and transparency remain. The World Bank in late 2016 approved a $20 million grant to restore basic fiscal management, improve transparency, and assist with economic recovery.</p> <p> </p> <p>Participation in the Kimberley Process, a commitment to remove conflict diamonds from the global supply chain, led to a partially lifted the ban on diamond exports from CAR in 2015, but persistent insecurity is likely to constrain real GDP growth.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": {
@ -987,10 +987,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "2,193 (2018)"
"text": "2,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2018 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1029,7 +1029,7 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "499 (2019) Data available for 2019 only."
"text": "499 (2019 est.) Data available for 2019 only."
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.01 (2019 est.) less than 1"
@ -1111,6 +1111,9 @@
"note": "note - in 2019-2021, CAR created three Mixed Special Security units (<em>Unités Spéciales Mixtes de Sécurité</em> or USMS), regionally based battalion-sized units comprised of about 40% government and 60% rebel soldiers that are intended to provide security along transportation corridors and at mining sites; the units are intended to be transitional in nature with a scheduled deployment time of two years"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.8% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "1.8% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1122,9 +1125,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "1.4% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $40 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "1.6% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $40 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

16
africa/cv.json
View file

@ -622,7 +622,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Cabo Verde’s economy depends on development aid, foreign investment, remittances, and tourism. The economy is service-oriented with commerce, transport, tourism, and public services accounting for about three-fourths of GDP. Tourism is the mainstay of the economy and depends on conditions in the euro-zone countries. Cabo Verde annually runs a high trade deficit financed by foreign aid and remittances from its large pool of emigrants; remittances as a share of GDP are one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa.</p><p></p><p>Although about 40% of the population lives in rural areas, the share of food production in GDP is low. The island economy suffers from a poor natural resource base, including serious water shortages, exacerbated by cycles of long-term drought, and poor soil for growing food on several of the islands, requiring it to import most of what it consumes. The fishing potential, mostly lobster and tuna, is not fully exploited.</p><p></p><p>Economic reforms are aimed at developing the private sector and attracting foreign investment to diversify the economy and mitigate high unemployment. The government’s elevated debt levels have limited its capacity to finance any shortfalls.</p>"
"text": "<p>Cabo Verde’s economy depends on development aid, foreign investment, remittances, and tourism. The economy is service-oriented with commerce, transport, tourism, and public services accounting for about three-fourths of GDP. Tourism is the mainstay of the economy and depends on conditions in the euro-zone countries. Cabo Verde annually runs a high trade deficit financed by foreign aid and remittances from its large pool of emigrants; remittances as a share of GDP are one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa.</p> <p> </p> <p>Although about 40% of the population lives in rural areas, the share of food production in GDP is low. The island economy suffers from a poor natural resource base, including serious water shortages, exacerbated by cycles of long-term drought, and poor soil for growing food on several of the islands, requiring it to import most of what it consumes. The fishing potential, mostly lobster and tuna, is not fully exploited.</p> <p> </p> <p>Economic reforms are aimed at developing the private sector and attracting foreign investment to diversify the economy and mitigate high unemployment. The government’s elevated debt levels have limited its capacity to finance any shortfalls.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -945,10 +945,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "57,668 (2020)"
"text": "57,668 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "10.37 (2020 est.)"
"text": "10 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -987,10 +987,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "24,839 (2021)"
"text": "24,839 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "4.47 (2021 est.)"
"text": "5 (2020 est.)"
}
}
},
@ -1064,6 +1064,9 @@
"text": "Cabo Verdean Armed Forces (FACV): Army (also called the National Guard, GN; includes a small air component), Cabo Verde Coast Guard (Guardia Costeira de Cabo Verde, GCCV) (2021)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "0.5% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "0.5% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1075,9 +1078,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "0.5% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $20 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "0.6% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $20 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

10
africa/dj.json
View file

@ -643,7 +643,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Djibouti's economy is based on service activities connected with the country's strategic location as a deepwater port on the Red Sea. Three-fourths of Djibouti's inhabitants live in the capital city; the remainder are mostly nomadic herders. Scant rainfall and less than 4% arable land limits crop production to small quantities of fruits and vegetables, and most food must be imported.</p><p></p><p>Djibouti provides services as both a transit port for the region and an international transshipment and refueling center. Imports, exports, and reexports represent 70% of port activity at Djibouti's container terminal. Reexports consist primarily of coffee from landlocked neighbor Ethiopia. Djibouti has few natural resources and little industry. The nation is, therefore, heavily dependent on foreign assistance to support its balance of payments and to finance development projects. An official unemployment rate of nearly 40% - with youth unemployment near 80% - continues to be a major problem. Inflation was a modest 3% in 2014-2017, due to low international food prices and a decline in electricity tariffs.</p><p></p><p>Djibouti’s reliance on diesel-generated electricity and imported food and water leave average consumers vulnerable to global price shocks, though in mid-2015 Djibouti passed new legislation to liberalize the energy sector. The government has emphasized infrastructure development for transportation and energy and Djibouti – with the help of foreign partners, particularly China – has begun to increase and modernize its port capacity. In 2017, Djibouti opened two of the largest projects in its history, the Doraleh Port and Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railway, funded by China as part of the \"Belt and Road Initiative,\" which will increase the country’s ability to capitalize on its strategic location.</p>"
"text": "<p>Djibouti's economy is based on service activities connected with the country's strategic location as a deepwater port on the Red Sea. Three-fourths of Djibouti's inhabitants live in the capital city; the remainder are mostly nomadic herders. Scant rainfall and less than 4% arable land limits crop production to small quantities of fruits and vegetables, and most food must be imported.</p> <p> </p> <p>Djibouti provides services as both a transit port for the region and an international transshipment and refueling center. Imports, exports, and reexports represent 70% of port activity at Djibouti's container terminal. Reexports consist primarily of coffee from landlocked neighbor Ethiopia. Djibouti has few natural resources and little industry. The nation is, therefore, heavily dependent on foreign assistance to support its balance of payments and to finance development projects. An official unemployment rate of nearly 40% - with youth unemployment near 80% - continues to be a major problem. Inflation was a modest 3% in 2014-2017, due to low international food prices and a decline in electricity tariffs.</p> <p> </p> <p>Djibouti’s reliance on diesel-generated electricity and imported food and water leave average consumers vulnerable to global price shocks, though in mid-2015 Djibouti passed new legislation to liberalize the energy sector. The government has emphasized infrastructure development for transportation and energy and Djibouti – with the help of foreign partners, particularly China – has begun to increase and modernize its port capacity. In 2017, Djibouti opened two of the largest projects in its history, the Doraleh Port and Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railway, funded by China as part of the \"Belt and Road Initiative,\" which will increase the country’s ability to capitalize on its strategic location.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -960,10 +960,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "38,866 (2020)"
"text": "38,866 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "3.93 (2020 est.)"
"text": "4 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1002,10 +1002,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "25,053 (2021)"
"text": "25,053 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "2.54 (2021 est.)"
"text": "3 (2020 est.)"
}
}
},

18
africa/eg.json
View file

@ -697,7 +697,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Occupying the northeast corner of the African continent, Egypt is bisected by the highly fertile Nile valley where most economic activity takes place. Egypt's economy was highly centralized during the rule of former President Gamal Abdel NASSER but opened up considerably under former Presidents Anwar EL-SADAT and Mohamed Hosni MUBARAK. Agriculture, hydrocarbons, manufacturing, tourism, and other service sectors drove the country’s relatively diverse economic activity.</p><p></p><p>Despite Egypt’s mixed record for attracting foreign investment over the past two decades, poor living conditions and limited job opportunities have contributed to public discontent. These socioeconomic pressures were a major factor leading to the January 2011 revolution that ousted MUBARAK. The uncertain political, security, and policy environment since 2011 has restricted economic growth and failed to alleviate persistent unemployment, especially among the young.</p><p></p><p>In late 2016, persistent dollar shortages and waning aid from its Gulf allies led Cairo to turn to the IMF for a 3-year, $12 billion loan program. To secure the deal, Cairo floated its currency, introduced new taxes, and cut energy subsidies - all of which pushed inflation above 30% for most of 2017, a high that had not been seen in a generation. Since the currency float, foreign investment in Egypt’s high interest treasury bills has risen exponentially, boosting both dollar availability and central bank reserves. Cairo will be challenged to obtain foreign and local investment in manufacturing and other sectors without a sustained effort to implement a range of business reforms.</p>"
"text": "<p>Occupying the northeast corner of the African continent, Egypt is bisected by the highly fertile Nile valley where most economic activity takes place. Egypt's economy was highly centralized during the rule of former President Gamal Abdel NASSER but opened up considerably under former Presidents Anwar EL-SADAT and Mohamed Hosni MUBARAK. Agriculture, hydrocarbons, manufacturing, tourism, and other service sectors drove the country’s relatively diverse economic activity.</p> <p> </p> <p>Despite Egypt’s mixed record for attracting foreign investment over the past two decades, poor living conditions and limited job opportunities have contributed to public discontent. These socioeconomic pressures were a major factor leading to the January 2011 revolution that ousted MUBARAK. The uncertain political, security, and policy environment since 2011 has restricted economic growth and failed to alleviate persistent unemployment, especially among the young.</p> <p> </p> <p>In late 2016, persistent dollar shortages and waning aid from its Gulf allies led Cairo to turn to the IMF for a 3-year, $12 billion loan program. To secure the deal, Cairo floated its currency, introduced new taxes, and cut energy subsidies - all of which pushed inflation above 30% for most of 2017, a high that had not been seen in a generation. Since the currency float, foreign investment in Egypt’s high interest treasury bills has risen exponentially, boosting both dollar availability and central bank reserves. Cairo will be challenged to obtain foreign and local investment in manufacturing and other sectors without a sustained effort to implement a range of business reforms.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1032,10 +1032,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "9,858,331 (2020)"
"text": "9,858,331 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "9.63 (2020 est.)"
"text": "10 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1074,10 +1074,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "9,349,469 (2021)"
"text": "9,349,469 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "9.14 (2021 est.)"
"text": "9 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Communications - note": {
@ -1199,6 +1199,9 @@
"note": "note(s) - the Public Security Sector Police are responsible for law enforcement nationwide; the Central Security Force protects infrastructure and is responsible for crowd control; the National Security Sector is responsible for internal security threats and counterterrorism along with other security services; in addition to its external defense duties, the EAF also has a mandate to assist police in protecting vital infrastructure during a state of emergency; military personnel were granted full arrest authority in 2011 but normally only use this authority during states of emergency and &ldquo;periods of significant turmoil&rdquo;"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.3% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "1.3% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1210,9 +1213,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "1.6% of GDP (2017) (approximately $16.7 billion)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "1.8% of GDP (2016) (approximately $17.5 billion)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
@ -1244,7 +1244,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "70,022 (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (mid-year 2021); 140,789 (Syria), 52,003 (Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 20,713 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 20,927 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 15,484 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 9,891 (Yemen) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,807 (Iraq) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,765 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
"text": "70,022 (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (mid-year 2021); 141,303 (Syria), 52,446 (Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 20,970 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 21,105 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 15,585 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 10,025 (Yemen) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,815 (Iraq) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,802 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
},
"stateless persons": {
"text": "7 (mid-year 2021)"

14
africa/ek.json
View file

@ -471,7 +471,7 @@
},
"Capital": {
"name": {
"text": "Malabo; note - a new capital of Cuidad de la Paz (formerly referred to as Oyala) is being built on the mainland near Djibloho; Malabo is on the island of Bioko"
"text": "Malabo; note - a new capital of Ciudad de la Paz (formerly referred to as Oyala) is being built on the mainland near Djibloho; Malabo is on the island of Bioko"
},
"geographic coordinates": {
"text": "3 45 N, 8 47 E"
@ -480,7 +480,7 @@
"text": "UTC+1 (6 hours ahead of Washington, DC, during Standard Time)"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "named after Malabo Lopelo Melaka (1837&ndash;1937), the last king of the Bubi, the ethnic group indigenous to the island of Bioko; the name of the new capital, Cuidad de la Paz, translates to \"City of Peace\" in Spanish"
"text": "named after Malabo Lopelo Melaka (1837&ndash;1937), the last king of the Bubi, the ethnic group indigenous to the island of Bioko; the name of the new capital, Ciudad de la Paz, translates to \"City of Peace\" in Spanish"
}
},
"Administrative divisions": {
@ -623,7 +623,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Exploitation of oil and gas deposits, beginning in the 1990s, has driven economic growth in Equatorial Guinea; a recent rebasing of GDP resulted in an upward revision of the size of the economy by approximately 30%. Forestry and farming are minor components of GDP. Although preindependence Equatorial Guinea counted on cocoa production for hard currency earnings, the neglect of the rural economy since independence has diminished the potential for agriculture-led growth. Subsistence farming is the dominant form of livelihood. Declining revenue from hydrocarbon production, high levels of infrastructure expenditures, lack of economic diversification, and corruption have pushed the economy into decline in recent years and limited improvements in the general population’s living conditions. Equatorial Guinea’s real GDP growth has been weak in recent years, averaging -0.5% per year from 2010 to 2014, because of a declining hydrocarbon sector. Inflation remained very low in 2016, down from an average of 4% in 2014.</p><p></p><p>As a middle income country, Equatorial Guinea is now ineligible for most low-income World Bank and the IMF funding. The government has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency and misuse of oil revenues and has attempted to address this issue by working toward compliance with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. US foreign assistance to Equatorial Guinea is limited in part because of US restrictions pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.</p><p></p><p>Equatorial Guinea hosted two economic diversification symposia in 2014 that focused on attracting investment in five sectors: agriculture and animal ranching, fishing, mining and petrochemicals, tourism, and financial services. Undeveloped mineral resources include gold, zinc, diamonds, columbite-tantalite, and other base metals. In 2017 Equatorial Guinea signed a preliminary agreement with Ghana to sell liquefied natural gas (LNG); as oil production wanes, the government believes LNG could provide a boost to revenues, but it will require large investments and long lead times to develop.</p>"
"text": "<p>Exploitation of oil and gas deposits, beginning in the 1990s, has driven economic growth in Equatorial Guinea; a recent rebasing of GDP resulted in an upward revision of the size of the economy by approximately 30%. Forestry and farming are minor components of GDP. Although preindependence Equatorial Guinea counted on cocoa production for hard currency earnings, the neglect of the rural economy since independence has diminished the potential for agriculture-led growth. Subsistence farming is the dominant form of livelihood. Declining revenue from hydrocarbon production, high levels of infrastructure expenditures, lack of economic diversification, and corruption have pushed the economy into decline in recent years and limited improvements in the general population’s living conditions. Equatorial Guinea’s real GDP growth has been weak in recent years, averaging -0.5% per year from 2010 to 2014, because of a declining hydrocarbon sector. Inflation remained very low in 2016, down from an average of 4% in 2014.</p> <p> </p> <p>As a middle income country, Equatorial Guinea is now ineligible for most low-income World Bank and the IMF funding. The government has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency and misuse of oil revenues and has attempted to address this issue by working toward compliance with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. US foreign assistance to Equatorial Guinea is limited in part because of US restrictions pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.</p> <p> </p> <p>Equatorial Guinea hosted two economic diversification symposia in 2014 that focused on attracting investment in five sectors: agriculture and animal ranching, fishing, mining and petrochemicals, tourism, and financial services. Undeveloped mineral resources include gold, zinc, diamonds, columbite-tantalite, and other base metals. In 2017 Equatorial Guinea signed a preliminary agreement with Ghana to sell liquefied natural gas (LNG); as oil production wanes, the government believes LNG could provide a boost to revenues, but it will require large investments and long lead times to develop.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -922,10 +922,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "10,848 (2018)"
"text": "11,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2018 est.) less than 1"
"text": "1 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -964,10 +964,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "1,000 (2021 est.)"
"text": "1,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.07 (2021) less than 1"
"text": "0.07 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},

10
africa/er.json
View file

@ -627,7 +627,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Since formal independence from Ethiopia in 1993, Eritrea has faced many economic problems, including lack of financial resources and chronic drought. Eritrea has a command economy under the control of the sole political party, the People's Front for Democracy and Justice. Like the economies of many African nations, a large share of the population - nearly 80% in Eritrea - is engaged in subsistence agriculture, but the sector only produces a small share of the country's total output. Mining accounts for the lion's share of output.</p><p></p><p>The government has strictly controlled the use of foreign currency by limiting access and availability; new regulations in 2013 aimed at relaxing currency controls have had little economic effect. Few large private enterprises exist in Eritrea and most operate in conjunction with government partners, including a number of large international mining ventures, which began production in 2013. In late 2015, the Government of Eritrea introduced a new currency, retaining the name nakfa, and restricted the amount of hard currency individuals could withdraw from banks per month. The changeover has resulted in exchange fluctuations and the scarcity of hard currency available in the market.</p><p></p><p>While reliable statistics on Eritrea are difficult to obtain, erratic rainfall and the large percentage of the labor force tied up in military service continue to interfere with agricultural production and economic development. Eritrea's harvests generally cannot meet the food needs of the country without supplemental grain purchases. Copper, potash, and gold production are likely to continue to drive limited economic growth and government revenue over the next few years, but military spending will continue to compete with development and investment plans.</p>"
"text": "<p>Since formal independence from Ethiopia in 1993, Eritrea has faced many economic problems, including lack of financial resources and chronic drought. Eritrea has a command economy under the control of the sole political party, the People's Front for Democracy and Justice. Like the economies of many African nations, a large share of the population - nearly 80% in Eritrea - is engaged in subsistence agriculture, but the sector only produces a small share of the country's total output. Mining accounts for the lion's share of output.</p> <p> </p> <p>The government has strictly controlled the use of foreign currency by limiting access and availability; new regulations in 2013 aimed at relaxing currency controls have had little economic effect. Few large private enterprises exist in Eritrea and most operate in conjunction with government partners, including a number of large international mining ventures, which began production in 2013. In late 2015, the Government of Eritrea introduced a new currency, retaining the name nakfa, and restricted the amount of hard currency individuals could withdraw from banks per month. The changeover has resulted in exchange fluctuations and the scarcity of hard currency available in the market.</p> <p> </p> <p>While reliable statistics on Eritrea are difficult to obtain, erratic rainfall and the large percentage of the labor force tied up in military service continue to interfere with agricultural production and economic development. Eritrea's harvests generally cannot meet the food needs of the country without supplemental grain purchases. Copper, potash, and gold production are likely to continue to drive limited economic growth and government revenue over the next few years, but military spending will continue to compete with development and investment plans.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2017": {
@ -925,10 +925,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "66,170 (2017)"
"text": "66,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1.94 (2018 est.)"
"text": "2 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -967,10 +967,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "5,000 (2021 est.)"
"text": "5,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.14 (2021 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0.14 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},

18
africa/et.json
View file

@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
}
},
"Ethnic groups": {
"text": "Oromo 35.8%, Amhara 24.1%, Somali 7.2%, Tigray 5.7%, Sidama 4.1%, Gamo-Goffa-Dawuro 2.8%, Guragie 2.6%, Welaita 2.3%, Afar 2.2%, Silte 1.3%, Kefficho 1.2%, other 10.8% (2022 est.)"
"text": "Oromo 35.8%, Amhara 24.1%, Somali 7.2%, Tigray 5.7%, Sidama 4.1%, Guragie 2.6%, Welaita 2.3%, Afar 2.2%, Silte 1.3%, Kefficho 1.2%, other 13.5% (2022 est.)"
},
"Languages": {
"Languages": {
@ -734,7 +734,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Ethiopia - the second most populous country in Africa - is a one-party state with a planned economy. For more than a decade before 2016, GDP grew at a rate between 8% and 11% annually – one of the fastest growing states among the 188 IMF member countries. This growth was driven by government investment in infrastructure, as well as sustained progress in the agricultural and service sectors. More than 70% of Ethiopia’s population is still employed in the agricultural sector, but services have surpassed agriculture as the principal source of GDP.</p><p></p><p>Ethiopia has the lowest level of income-inequality in Africa and one of the lowest in the world, with a Gini coefficient comparable to that of the Scandinavian countries. Yet despite progress toward eliminating extreme poverty, Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the world, due both to rapid population growth and a low starting base. Changes in rainfall associated with world-wide weather patterns resulted in the worst drought in 30 years in 2015-16, creating food insecurity for millions of Ethiopians.</p><p></p><p>The state is heavily engaged in the economy. Ongoing infrastructure projects include power production and distribution, roads, rails, airports and industrial parks. Key sectors are state-owned, including telecommunications, banking and insurance, and power distribution. Under Ethiopia's constitution, the state owns all land and provides long-term leases to tenants. Title rights in urban areas, particularly Addis Ababa, are poorly regulated, and subject to corruption.</p><p></p><p>Ethiopia’s foreign exchange earnings are led by the services sector - primarily the state-run Ethiopian Airlines - followed by exports of several commodities. While coffee remains the largest foreign exchange earner, Ethiopia is diversifying exports, and commodities such as gold, sesame, khat, livestock and horticulture products are becoming increasingly important. Manufacturing represented less than 8% of total exports in 2016, but manufacturing exports should increase in future years due to a growing international presence.</p><p></p><p>The banking, insurance, telecommunications, and micro-credit industries are restricted to domestic investors, but Ethiopia has attracted roughly $8.5 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI), mostly from China, Turkey, India and the EU; US FDI is $567 million. Investment has been primarily in infrastructure, construction, agriculture/horticulture, agricultural processing, textiles, leather and leather products.</p><p></p><p>To support industrialization in sectors where Ethiopia has a comparative advantage, such as textiles and garments, leather goods, and processed agricultural products, Ethiopia plans to increase installed power generation capacity by 8,320 MW, up from a capacity of 2,000 MW, by building three more major dams and expanding to other sources of renewable energy. In 2017, the government devalued the birr by 15% to increase exports and alleviate a chronic foreign currency shortage in the country.</p>"
"text": "<p>Ethiopia - the second most populous country in Africa - is a one-party state with a planned economy. For more than a decade before 2016, GDP grew at a rate between 8% and 11% annually – one of the fastest growing states among the 188 IMF member countries. This growth was driven by government investment in infrastructure, as well as sustained progress in the agricultural and service sectors. More than 70% of Ethiopia’s population is still employed in the agricultural sector, but services have surpassed agriculture as the principal source of GDP.</p> <p> </p> <p>Ethiopia has the lowest level of income-inequality in Africa and one of the lowest in the world, with a Gini coefficient comparable to that of the Scandinavian countries. Yet despite progress toward eliminating extreme poverty, Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the world, due both to rapid population growth and a low starting base. Changes in rainfall associated with world-wide weather patterns resulted in the worst drought in 30 years in 2015-16, creating food insecurity for millions of Ethiopians.</p> <p> </p> <p>The state is heavily engaged in the economy. Ongoing infrastructure projects include power production and distribution, roads, rails, airports and industrial parks. Key sectors are state-owned, including telecommunications, banking and insurance, and power distribution. Under Ethiopia's constitution, the state owns all land and provides long-term leases to tenants. Title rights in urban areas, particularly Addis Ababa, are poorly regulated, and subject to corruption.</p> <p> </p> <p>Ethiopia’s foreign exchange earnings are led by the services sector - primarily the state-run Ethiopian Airlines - followed by exports of several commodities. While coffee remains the largest foreign exchange earner, Ethiopia is diversifying exports, and commodities such as gold, sesame, khat, livestock and horticulture products are becoming increasingly important. Manufacturing represented less than 8% of total exports in 2016, but manufacturing exports should increase in future years due to a growing international presence.</p> <p> </p> <p>The banking, insurance, telecommunications, and micro-credit industries are restricted to domestic investors, but Ethiopia has attracted roughly $8.5 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI), mostly from China, Turkey, India and the EU; US FDI is $567 million. Investment has been primarily in infrastructure, construction, agriculture/horticulture, agricultural processing, textiles, leather and leather products.</p> <p> </p> <p>To support industrialization in sectors where Ethiopia has a comparative advantage, such as textiles and garments, leather goods, and processed agricultural products, Ethiopia plans to increase installed power generation capacity by 8,320 MW, up from a capacity of 2,000 MW, by building three more major dams and expanding to other sources of renewable energy. In 2017, the government devalued the birr by 15% to increase exports and alleviate a chronic foreign currency shortage in the country.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1068,10 +1068,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "1.14 million (2018)"
"text": "1.252 million (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1.04 (2018 est.)"
"text": "1 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1110,10 +1110,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "212,000 (2021 est.)"
"text": "212,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.18 (2021) less than 1"
"text": "0.18 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1206,6 +1206,9 @@
"note": "note(s) - in January 2020 the Ethiopian Government announced it had re-established a navy, which was disbanded in 1996; in March 2019 Ethiopia signed a defense cooperation agreement with France which stipulated that France would support the establishment of an Ethiopian navy, which will reportedly be based out of Djibouti<br><br>in 2018, Ethiopia established a Republican Guard military unit responsible to the Prime Minister for protecting senior officials<br><br>"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "0.5% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "0.5% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1217,9 +1220,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "0.7% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $930 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "0.7% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $870 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

16
africa/ga.json
View file

@ -680,7 +680,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>The government has invested in the agriculture sector because three-quarters of the population depends on the sector for its livelihood and agriculture provides for about one-third of GDP, making The Gambia largely reliant on sufficient rainfall. The agricultural sector has untapped potential - less than half of arable land is cultivated and agricultural productivity is low. Small-scale manufacturing activity features the processing of cashews, groundnuts, fish, and hides. The Gambia's reexport trade accounts for almost 80% of goods exports and China has been its largest trade partner for both exports and imports for several years.</p><p></p><p>The Gambia has sparse natural resource deposits. It relies heavily on remittances from workers overseas and tourist receipts. Remittance inflows to The Gambia amount to about one-fifth of the country’s GDP. The Gambia's location on the ocean and proximity to Europe has made it one of the most frequented tourist destinations in West Africa, boosted by private sector investments in eco-tourism and facilities. Tourism normally brings in about 20% of GDP, but it suffered in 2014 from tourists’ fears of Ebola virus in neighboring West African countries. Unemployment and underemployment remain high.</p><p></p><p>Economic progress depends on sustained bilateral and multilateral aid, on responsible government economic management, and on continued technical assistance from multilateral and bilateral donors. International donors and lenders were concerned about the quality of fiscal management under the administration of former President Yahya JAMMEH, who reportedly stole hundreds of millions of dollars of the country’s funds during his 22 years in power, but anticipate significant improvements under the new administration of President Adama BARROW, who assumed power in early 2017. As of April 2017, the IMF, the World Bank, the European Union, and the African Development Bank were all negotiating with the new government of The Gambia to provide financial support in the coming months to ease the country’s financial crisis.</p><p></p><p>The country faces a limited availability of foreign exchange, weak agricultural output, a border closure with Senegal, a slowdown in tourism, high inflation, a large fiscal deficit, and a high domestic debt burden that has crowded out private sector investment and driven interest rates to new highs. The government has committed to taking steps to reduce the deficit, including through expenditure caps, debt consolidation, and reform of state-owned enterprises.</p>"
"text": "<p>The government has invested in the agriculture sector because three-quarters of the population depends on the sector for its livelihood and agriculture provides for about one-third of GDP, making The Gambia largely reliant on sufficient rainfall. The agricultural sector has untapped potential - less than half of arable land is cultivated and agricultural productivity is low. Small-scale manufacturing activity features the processing of cashews, groundnuts, fish, and hides. The Gambia's reexport trade accounts for almost 80% of goods exports and China has been its largest trade partner for both exports and imports for several years.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Gambia has sparse natural resource deposits. It relies heavily on remittances from workers overseas and tourist receipts. Remittance inflows to The Gambia amount to about one-fifth of the country’s GDP. The Gambia's location on the ocean and proximity to Europe has made it one of the most frequented tourist destinations in West Africa, boosted by private sector investments in eco-tourism and facilities. Tourism normally brings in about 20% of GDP, but it suffered in 2014 from tourists’ fears of Ebola virus in neighboring West African countries. Unemployment and underemployment remain high.</p> <p> </p> <p>Economic progress depends on sustained bilateral and multilateral aid, on responsible government economic management, and on continued technical assistance from multilateral and bilateral donors. International donors and lenders were concerned about the quality of fiscal management under the administration of former President Yahya JAMMEH, who reportedly stole hundreds of millions of dollars of the country’s funds during his 22 years in power, but anticipate significant improvements under the new administration of President Adama BARROW, who assumed power in early 2017. As of April 2017, the IMF, the World Bank, the European Union, and the African Development Bank were all negotiating with the new government of The Gambia to provide financial support in the coming months to ease the country’s financial crisis.</p> <p> </p> <p>The country faces a limited availability of foreign exchange, weak agricultural output, a border closure with Senegal, a slowdown in tourism, high inflation, a large fiscal deficit, and a high domestic debt burden that has crowded out private sector investment and driven interest rates to new highs. The government has committed to taking steps to reduce the deficit, including through expenditure caps, debt consolidation, and reform of state-owned enterprises.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -995,10 +995,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "44,000 (2018)"
"text": "60,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1.93 (2018 est.)"
"text": "2 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1037,10 +1037,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "5,000 (2021 est.)"
"text": "5,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.21 (2021 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0.21 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1105,6 +1105,9 @@
"text": "Gambia Armed Forces: the Gambian National Army (GNA; includes a small air wing), Navy, Republican National Guard (responsible for VIP protection, riot control, and presidential security) (2021)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "0.8% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "0.8% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1116,9 +1119,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "0.7% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $20 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "0.8% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $20 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

16
africa/gb.json
View file

@ -652,7 +652,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Gabon enjoys a per capita income four times that of most Sub-Saharan African nations, but because of high income inequality, a large proportion of the population remains poor. Gabon relied on timber and manganese exports until oil was discovered offshore in the early 1970s. From 2010 to 2016, oil accounted for approximately 80% of Gabon’s exports, 45% of its GDP, and 60% of its state budget revenues.</p><p></p><p>Gabon faces fluctuating international prices for its oil, timber, and manganese exports. A rebound of oil prices from 2001 to 2013 helped growth, but declining production, as some fields passed their peak production, has hampered Gabon from fully realizing potential gains. GDP grew nearly 6% per year over the 2010-14 period, but slowed significantly from 2014 to just 1% in 2017 as oil prices declined. Low oil prices also weakened government revenue and negatively affected the trade and current account balances. In the wake of lower revenue, Gabon signed a 3-year agreement with the IMF in June 2017.</p><p></p><p>Despite an abundance of natural wealth, poor fiscal management and over-reliance on oil has stifled the economy. Power cuts and water shortages are frequent. Gabon is reliant on imports and the government heavily subsidizes commodities, including food, but will be hard pressed to tamp down public frustration with unemployment and corruption.</p>"
"text": "<p>Gabon enjoys a per capita income four times that of most Sub-Saharan African nations, but because of high income inequality, a large proportion of the population remains poor. Gabon relied on timber and manganese exports until oil was discovered offshore in the early 1970s. From 2010 to 2016, oil accounted for approximately 80% of Gabon’s exports, 45% of its GDP, and 60% of its state budget revenues.</p> <p> </p> <p>Gabon faces fluctuating international prices for its oil, timber, and manganese exports. A rebound of oil prices from 2001 to 2013 helped growth, but declining production, as some fields passed their peak production, has hampered Gabon from fully realizing potential gains. GDP grew nearly 6% per year over the 2010-14 period, but slowed significantly from 2014 to just 1% in 2017 as oil prices declined. Low oil prices also weakened government revenue and negatively affected the trade and current account balances. In the wake of lower revenue, Gabon signed a 3-year agreement with the IMF in June 2017.</p> <p> </p> <p>Despite an abundance of natural wealth, poor fiscal management and over-reliance on oil has stifled the economy. Power cuts and water shortages are frequent. Gabon is reliant on imports and the government heavily subsidizes commodities, including food, but will be hard pressed to tamp down public frustration with unemployment and corruption.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -978,10 +978,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "25,428 (2020)"
"text": "25,428 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1.14 (2020 est.)"
"text": "1 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1020,10 +1020,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "44,607 (2021)"
"text": "44,607 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "2 (2021)"
"text": "2 (2020 est.)"
}
}
},
@ -1125,6 +1125,9 @@
"text": "Gabonese Defense Forces (Forces de Defense Gabonaise): Land Forces (Army), Navy, Air Forces, National Gendarmerie; Republican Guard (land forces under direct presidential control) (2021)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.7% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "1.8% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1136,9 +1139,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "1.8% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $480 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "1.5% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $400 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

22
africa/gh.json
View file

@ -696,7 +696,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Ghana has a market-based economy with relatively few policy barriers to trade and investment in comparison with other countries in the region, and Ghana is endowed with natural resources. Ghana's economy was strengthened by a quarter century of relatively sound management, a competitive business environment, and sustained reductions in poverty levels, but in recent years has suffered the consequences of loose fiscal policy, high budget and current account deficits, and a depreciating currency.</p><p></p><p>Agriculture accounts for about 20% of GDP and employs more than half of the workforce, mainly small landholders. Gold, oil, and cocoa exports, and individual remittances, are major sources of foreign exchange. Expansion of Ghana’s nascent oil industry has boosted economic growth, but the fall in oil prices since 2015 reduced by half Ghana’s oil revenue. Production at Jubilee, Ghana's first commercial offshore oilfield, began in mid-December 2010. Production from two more fields, TEN and Sankofa, started in 2016 and 2017 respectively. The country’s first gas processing plant at Atuabo is also producing natural gas from the Jubilee field, providing power to several of Ghana’s thermal power plants.</p><p></p><p>As of 2018, key economic concerns facing the government include the lack of affordable electricity, lack of a solid domestic revenue base, and the high debt burden. The AKUFO-ADDO administration has made some progress by committing to fiscal consolidation, but much work is still to be done. Ghana signed a $920 million extended credit facility with the IMF in April 2015 to help it address its growing economic crisis. The IMF fiscal targets require Ghana to reduce the deficit by cutting subsidies, decreasing the bloated public sector wage bill, strengthening revenue administration, boosting tax revenues, and improving the health of Ghana’s banking sector. Priorities for the new administration include rescheduling some of Ghana’s $31 billion debt, stimulating economic growth, reducing inflation, and stabilizing the currency. Prospects for new oil and gas production and follow through on tighter fiscal management are likely to help Ghana’s economy in 2018.</p>"
"text": "<p>Ghana has a market-based economy with relatively few policy barriers to trade and investment in comparison with other countries in the region, and Ghana is endowed with natural resources. Ghana's economy was strengthened by a quarter century of relatively sound management, a competitive business environment, and sustained reductions in poverty levels, but in recent years has suffered the consequences of loose fiscal policy, high budget and current account deficits, and a depreciating currency.</p> <p> </p> <p>Agriculture accounts for about 20% of GDP and employs more than half of the workforce, mainly small landholders. Gold, oil, and cocoa exports, and individual remittances, are major sources of foreign exchange. Expansion of Ghana’s nascent oil industry has boosted economic growth, but the fall in oil prices since 2015 reduced by half Ghana’s oil revenue. Production at Jubilee, Ghana's first commercial offshore oilfield, began in mid-December 2010. Production from two more fields, TEN and Sankofa, started in 2016 and 2017 respectively. The country’s first gas processing plant at Atuabo is also producing natural gas from the Jubilee field, providing power to several of Ghana’s thermal power plants.</p> <p> </p> <p>As of 2018, key economic concerns facing the government include the lack of affordable electricity, lack of a solid domestic revenue base, and the high debt burden. The AKUFO-ADDO administration has made some progress by committing to fiscal consolidation, but much work is still to be done. Ghana signed a $920 million extended credit facility with the IMF in April 2015 to help it address its growing economic crisis. The IMF fiscal targets require Ghana to reduce the deficit by cutting subsidies, decreasing the bloated public sector wage bill, strengthening revenue administration, boosting tax revenues, and improving the health of Ghana’s banking sector. Priorities for the new administration include rescheduling some of Ghana’s $31 billion debt, stimulating economic growth, reducing inflation, and stabilizing the currency. Prospects for new oil and gas production and follow through on tighter fiscal management are likely to help Ghana’s economy in 2018.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1028,10 +1028,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "307,668 (2020)"
"text": "307,668 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
"text": "1 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1070,10 +1070,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "78,371 (2021) Total fixed broadband subscriptions from Vodafone 62,284; AirtelTigo 700; MTN 14,038; Mainone 111; Simba Fibre 41; K-Net 310; Tizeti 810; Sactis Ghana 45; Orange business 22; Vodafone"
"text": "78,371 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.25 (2021 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0.25 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1169,20 +1169,20 @@
"text": "Ghana Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force (2021)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "0.5% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "0.4% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2019": {
"text": "0.4% of GDP (2019) (approximately $360 million)"
"text": "0.4% of GDP (2019 est.) (approximately $360 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2018": {
"text": "0.3% of GDP (2018) (approximately $330 million)"
"text": "0.3% of GDP (2018 est.) (approximately $330 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "0.3% of GDP (2017) (approximately $300 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "0.3% of GDP (2016) (approximately $300 million)"
"text": "0.3% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $300 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

14
africa/gv.json
View file

@ -706,7 +706,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Guinea is a poor country of approximately 12.9 million people in 2016 that possesses the world's largest reserves of bauxite and largest untapped high-grade iron ore reserves, as well as gold and diamonds. In addition, Guinea has fertile soil, ample rainfall, and is the source of several West African rivers, including the Senegal, Niger, and Gambia. Guinea's hydro potential is enormous and the country could be a major exporter of electricity. The country also has tremendous agriculture potential. Gold, bauxite, and diamonds are Guinea’s main exports. International investors have shown interest in Guinea's unexplored mineral reserves, which have the potential to propel Guinea's future growth.</p><p></p><p>Following the death of long-term President Lansana CONTE in 2008 and the coup that followed, international donors, including the G-8, the IMF, and the World Bank, significantly curtailed their development programs in Guinea. However, the IMF approved a 3-year Extended Credit Facility arrangement in 2012, following the December 2010 presidential elections. In September 2012, Guinea achieved Heavily Indebted Poor Countries completion point status. Future access to international assistance and investment will depend on the government’s ability to be transparent, combat corruption, reform its banking system, improve its business environment, and build infrastructure. In April 2013, the government amended its mining code to reduce taxes and royalties. In 2014, Guinea complied with requirements of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative by publishing its mining contracts. Guinea completed its program with the IMF in October 2016 even though some targeted reforms have been delayed. Currently Guinea is negotiating a new IMF program which will be based on Guinea’s new five-year economic plan, focusing on the development of higher value-added products, including from the agro-business sector and development of the rural economy.</p><p></p><p>Political instability, a reintroduction of the Ebola virus epidemic, low international commodity prices, and an enduring legacy of corruption, inefficiency, and lack of government transparency are factors that could impact Guinea’s future growth. Economic recovery will be a long process while the government adjusts to lower inflows of international donor aid following the surge of Ebola-related emergency support. Ebola stalled promising economic growth in the 2014-15 period and impeded several projects, such as offshore oil exploration and the Simandou iron ore project. The economy, however, grew by 6.6% in 2016 and 6.7% in 2017, mainly due to growth from bauxite mining and thermal energy generation as well as the resiliency of the agricultural sector. The 240-megawatt Kaleta Dam, inaugurated in September 2015, has expanded access to electricity for residents of Conakry. An combined with fears of Ebola virus, continue to undermine Guinea's economic viability.</p><p></p><p>Guinea’s iron ore industry took a hit in 2016 when investors in the Simandou iron ore project announced plans to divest from the project. In 2017, agriculture output and public investment boosted economic growth, while the mining sector continued to play a prominent role in economic performance.</p><p></p><p>Successive governments have failed to address the country's crumbling infrastructure. Guinea suffers from chronic electricity shortages; poor roads, rail lines and bridges; and a lack of access to clean water - all of which continue to plague economic development. The present government, led by President Alpha CONDE, is working to create an environment to attract foreign investment and hopes to have greater participation from western countries and firms in Guinea's economic development.</p>"
"text": "<p>Guinea is a poor country of approximately 12.9 million people in 2016 that possesses the world's largest reserves of bauxite and largest untapped high-grade iron ore reserves, as well as gold and diamonds. In addition, Guinea has fertile soil, ample rainfall, and is the source of several West African rivers, including the Senegal, Niger, and Gambia. Guinea's hydro potential is enormous and the country could be a major exporter of electricity. The country also has tremendous agriculture potential. Gold, bauxite, and diamonds are Guinea’s main exports. International investors have shown interest in Guinea's unexplored mineral reserves, which have the potential to propel Guinea's future growth.</p> <p> </p> <p>Following the death of long-term President Lansana CONTE in 2008 and the coup that followed, international donors, including the G-8, the IMF, and the World Bank, significantly curtailed their development programs in Guinea. However, the IMF approved a 3-year Extended Credit Facility arrangement in 2012, following the December 2010 presidential elections. In September 2012, Guinea achieved Heavily Indebted Poor Countries completion point status. Future access to international assistance and investment will depend on the government’s ability to be transparent, combat corruption, reform its banking system, improve its business environment, and build infrastructure. In April 2013, the government amended its mining code to reduce taxes and royalties. In 2014, Guinea complied with requirements of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative by publishing its mining contracts. Guinea completed its program with the IMF in October 2016 even though some targeted reforms have been delayed. Currently Guinea is negotiating a new IMF program which will be based on Guinea’s new five-year economic plan, focusing on the development of higher value-added products, including from the agro-business sector and development of the rural economy.</p> <p> </p> <p>Political instability, a reintroduction of the Ebola virus epidemic, low international commodity prices, and an enduring legacy of corruption, inefficiency, and lack of government transparency are factors that could impact Guinea’s future growth. Economic recovery will be a long process while the government adjusts to lower inflows of international donor aid following the surge of Ebola-related emergency support. Ebola stalled promising economic growth in the 2014-15 period and impeded several projects, such as offshore oil exploration and the Simandou iron ore project. The economy, however, grew by 6.6% in 2016 and 6.7% in 2017, mainly due to growth from bauxite mining and thermal energy generation as well as the resiliency of the agricultural sector. The 240-megawatt Kaleta Dam, inaugurated in September 2015, has expanded access to electricity for residents of Conakry. An combined with fears of Ebola virus, continue to undermine Guinea's economic viability.</p> <p> </p> <p>Guinea’s iron ore industry took a hit in 2016 when investors in the Simandou iron ore project announced plans to divest from the project. In 2017, agriculture output and public investment boosted economic growth, while the mining sector continued to play a prominent role in economic performance.</p> <p> </p> <p>Successive governments have failed to address the country's crumbling infrastructure. Guinea suffers from chronic electricity shortages; poor roads, rail lines and bridges; and a lack of access to clean water - all of which continue to plague economic development. The present government, led by President Alpha CONDE, is working to create an environment to attract foreign investment and hopes to have greater participation from western countries and firms in Guinea's economic development.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1032,7 +1032,7 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "0 (2018)"
"text": "0 (2018 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0 (2018 est.)"
@ -1074,10 +1074,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "1,000 (2021 est.)"
"text": "1,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.01 (2021) less than 1"
"text": "0.01 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1160,6 +1160,9 @@
"note": "note - the National Gendarmerie is overseen by the Ministry of Defense, while the National Police is under the Ministry of Security; the Gendarmerie and National Police share responsibility for internal security, but only the Gendarmerie can arrest police or military officials"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.5% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "1.4% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1171,9 +1174,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "1.8% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $260 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "1.9% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $240 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

14
africa/iv.json
View file

@ -710,7 +710,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>For the last 5 years Cote d'Ivoire's growth rate has been among the highest in the world. Cote d'Ivoire is heavily dependent on agriculture and related activities, which engage roughly two-thirds of the population. Cote d'Ivoire is the world's largest producer and exporter of cocoa beans and a significant producer and exporter of coffee and palm oil. Consequently, the economy is highly sensitive to fluctuations in international prices for these products and to climatic conditions. Cocoa, oil, and coffee are the country's top export revenue earners, but the country has targeted agricultural processing of cocoa, cashews, mangoes, and other commodities as a high priority. Mining gold and exporting electricity are growing industries outside agriculture.</p><p></p><p>Following the end of more than a decade of civil conflict in 2011, Cote d’Ivoire has experienced a boom in foreign investment and economic growth. In June 2012, the IMF and the World Bank announced $4.4 billion in debt relief for Cote d'Ivoire under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.</p>"
"text": "<p>For the last 5 years Cote d'Ivoire's growth rate has been among the highest in the world. Cote d'Ivoire is heavily dependent on agriculture and related activities, which engage roughly two-thirds of the population. Cote d'Ivoire is the world's largest producer and exporter of cocoa beans and a significant producer and exporter of coffee and palm oil. Consequently, the economy is highly sensitive to fluctuations in international prices for these products and to climatic conditions. Cocoa, oil, and coffee are the country's top export revenue earners, but the country has targeted agricultural processing of cocoa, cashews, mangoes, and other commodities as a high priority. Mining gold and exporting electricity are growing industries outside agriculture.</p> <p> </p> <p>Following the end of more than a decade of civil conflict in 2011, Cote d’Ivoire has experienced a boom in foreign investment and economic growth. In June 2012, the IMF and the World Bank announced $4.4 billion in debt relief for Cote d'Ivoire under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1032,7 +1032,7 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "264,073 (2020)"
"text": "264,073 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1 (2020 est.)"
@ -1074,10 +1074,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "260,097 (2021)"
"text": "260,097 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.99 (2021) less than 1"
"text": "0.99 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1184,6 +1184,9 @@
"text": "Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (Forces Armees de Cote d'Ivoire, FACI; aka Republican Forces of Ivory Coast, FRCI): Army (Armee de Terre), Navy (Marine Nationale), Cote Air Force (Force Aerienne Cote), Special Forces (Forces Speciale); National Gendarmerie (under the Ministry of Defense); National Police (under the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection); Coordination Center for Operational Decisions (a mix of police, gendarmerie, and FACI personnel for assisting police in providing security in some large cities) (2021)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.1% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "1.1% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1195,9 +1198,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "1.1% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $720 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "1.2% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $720 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

18
africa/ke.json
View file

@ -701,7 +701,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Kenya is the economic, financial, and transport hub of East Africa. Kenya’s real GDP growth has averaged over 5% for the last decade. Since 2014, Kenya has been ranked as a lower middle income country because its per capita GDP crossed a World Bank threshold. While Kenya has a growing entrepreneurial middle class and steady growth, its economic development has been impaired by weak governance and corruption. Although reliable numbers are hard to find, unemployment and under-employment are extremely high, and could be near 40% of the population. In 2013, the country adopted a devolved system of government with the creation of 47 counties, and is in the process of devolving state revenues and responsibilities to the counties.</p><p></p><p>Agriculture remains the backbone of the Kenyan economy, contributing one-third of GDP. About 75% of Kenya’s population of roughly 48.5 million work at least part-time in the agricultural sector, including livestock and pastoral activities. Over 75% of agricultural output is from small-scale, rain-fed farming or livestock production. Tourism also holds a significant place in Kenya’s economy. In spite of political turmoil throughout the second half of 2017, tourism was up 20%, showcasing the strength of this sector. Kenya has long been a target of terrorist activity and has struggled with instability along its northeastern borders. Some high visibility terrorist attacks during 2013-2015 (e.g., at Nairobi’s Westgate Mall and Garissa University) affected the tourism industry severely, but the sector rebounded strongly in 2016-2017 and appears poised to continue growing.</p><p></p><p>Inadequate infrastructure continues to hamper Kenya’s efforts to improve its annual growth so that it can meaningfully address poverty and unemployment. The KENYATTA administration has been successful in courting external investment for infrastructure development. International financial institutions and donors remain important to Kenya's growth and development, but Kenya has also successfully raised capital in the global bond market issuing its first sovereign bond offering in mid-2014, with a second occurring in February 2018. The first phase of a Chinese-financed and constructed standard gauge railway connecting Mombasa and Nairobi opened in May 2017.</p><p></p><p>In 2016 the government was forced to take over three small and undercapitalized banks when underlying weaknesses were exposed. The government also enacted legislation that limits interest rates banks can charge on loans and set a rate that banks must pay their depositors. This measure led to a sharp shrinkage of credit in the economy. A prolonged election cycle in 2017 hurt the economy, drained government resources, and slowed GDP growth. Drought-like conditions in parts of the country pushed 2017 inflation above 8%, but the rate had fallen to 4.5% in February 2018.</p><p></p><p>The economy, however, is well placed to resume its decade-long 5%-6% growth rate. While fiscal deficits continue to pose risks in the medium term, other economic indicators, including foreign exchange reserves, interest rates, current account deficits, remittances and FDI are positive. The credit and drought-related impediments were temporary. Now In his second term, President KENYATTA has pledged to make economic growth and development a centerpiece of his second administration, focusing on his \"Big Four\" initiatives of universal healthcare, food security, affordable housing, and expansion of manufacturing.</p>"
"text": "<p>Kenya is the economic, financial, and transport hub of East Africa. Kenya’s real GDP growth has averaged over 5% for the last decade. Since 2014, Kenya has been ranked as a lower middle income country because its per capita GDP crossed a World Bank threshold. While Kenya has a growing entrepreneurial middle class and steady growth, its economic development has been impaired by weak governance and corruption. Although reliable numbers are hard to find, unemployment and under-employment are extremely high, and could be near 40% of the population. In 2013, the country adopted a devolved system of government with the creation of 47 counties, and is in the process of devolving state revenues and responsibilities to the counties.</p> <p> </p> <p>Agriculture remains the backbone of the Kenyan economy, contributing one-third of GDP. About 75% of Kenya’s population of roughly 48.5 million work at least part-time in the agricultural sector, including livestock and pastoral activities. Over 75% of agricultural output is from small-scale, rain-fed farming or livestock production. Tourism also holds a significant place in Kenya’s economy. In spite of political turmoil throughout the second half of 2017, tourism was up 20%, showcasing the strength of this sector. Kenya has long been a target of terrorist activity and has struggled with instability along its northeastern borders. Some high visibility terrorist attacks during 2013-2015 (e.g., at Nairobi’s Westgate Mall and Garissa University) affected the tourism industry severely, but the sector rebounded strongly in 2016-2017 and appears poised to continue growing.</p> <p> </p> <p>Inadequate infrastructure continues to hamper Kenya’s efforts to improve its annual growth so that it can meaningfully address poverty and unemployment. The KENYATTA administration has been successful in courting external investment for infrastructure development. International financial institutions and donors remain important to Kenya's growth and development, but Kenya has also successfully raised capital in the global bond market issuing its first sovereign bond offering in mid-2014, with a second occurring in February 2018. The first phase of a Chinese-financed and constructed standard gauge railway connecting Mombasa and Nairobi opened in May 2017.</p> <p> </p> <p>In 2016 the government was forced to take over three small and undercapitalized banks when underlying weaknesses were exposed. The government also enacted legislation that limits interest rates banks can charge on loans and set a rate that banks must pay their depositors. This measure led to a sharp shrinkage of credit in the economy. A prolonged election cycle in 2017 hurt the economy, drained government resources, and slowed GDP growth. Drought-like conditions in parts of the country pushed 2017 inflation above 8%, but the rate had fallen to 4.5% in February 2018.</p> <p> </p> <p>The economy, however, is well placed to resume its decade-long 5%-6% growth rate. While fiscal deficits continue to pose risks in the medium term, other economic indicators, including foreign exchange reserves, interest rates, current account deficits, remittances and FDI are positive. The credit and drought-related impediments were temporary. Now In his second term, President KENYATTA has pledged to make economic growth and development a centerpiece of his second administration, focusing on his \"Big Four\" initiatives of universal healthcare, food security, affordable housing, and expansion of manufacturing.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1041,10 +1041,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "66,646 (2020)"
"text": "66,646 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1080,10 +1080,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "674,191 (2021)"
"text": "674,191 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1.25 (2021)"
"text": "1.3 (2020 est.)"
}
}
},
@ -1195,8 +1195,11 @@
"note": "note - the National Police Service maintains internal security and reports to the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government; it includes a paramilitary General Service Unit; the Kenya Coast Guard Service (established 2018) is under the Ministry of Interior, but led by a military officer and comprised of personnel from the military, as well as the National Police Service, intelligence services, and other government agencies"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.2% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "1.2% of GDP (2020)"
"text": "1.2% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2019": {
"text": "1.2% of GDP (2019) (approximately $1.21 billion)"
@ -1206,9 +1209,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "1.4% of GDP (2017) (approximately $1.19 billion)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "1.4% of GDP (2016) (approximately $1.16 billion)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

16
africa/li.json
View file

@ -653,7 +653,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Liberia is a low-income country that relies heavily on foreign assistance and remittances from the diaspora. It is richly endowed with water, mineral resources, forests, and a climate favorable to agriculture. Its principal exports are iron ore, rubber, diamonds, and gold. Palm oil and cocoa are emerging as new export products. The government has attempted to revive raw timber extraction and is encouraging oil exploration.</p><p></p><p>In the 1990s and early 2000s, civil war and government mismanagement destroyed much of Liberia's economy, especially infrastructure in and around the capital. Much of the conflict was fueled by control over Liberia’s natural resources. With the conclusion of fighting and the installation of a democratically elected government in 2006, businesses that had fled the country began to return. The country achieved high growth during the period 2010-13 due to favorable world prices for its commodities. However, during the 2014-2015 Ebola crisis, the economy declined and many foreign-owned businesses departed with their capital and expertise. The epidemic forced the government to divert scarce resources to combat the spread of the virus, reducing funds available for needed public investment. The cost of addressing the Ebola epidemic coincided with decreased economic activity reducing government revenue, although higher donor support significantly offset this loss. During the same period, global commodities prices for key exports fell and have yet to recover to pre-Ebola levels.</p><p></p><p>In 2017, gold was a key driver of growth, as a new mining project began its first full year of production; iron ore exports are also increased as Arcelor Mittal opened new mines at Mount Gangra. The completion of the rehabilitation of the Mount Coffee Hydroelectric Dam increased electricity production to support ongoing and future economic activity, although electricity tariffs remain high relative to other countries in the region and transmission infrastructure is limited. Presidential and legislative elections in October 2017 generated election-related spending pressures.</p><p></p><p>Revitalizing the economy in the future will depend on economic diversification, increasing investment and trade, higher global commodity prices, sustained foreign aid and remittances, development of infrastructure and institutions, combating corruption, and maintaining political stability and security.</p>"
"text": "<p>Liberia is a low-income country that relies heavily on foreign assistance and remittances from the diaspora. It is richly endowed with water, mineral resources, forests, and a climate favorable to agriculture. Its principal exports are iron ore, rubber, diamonds, and gold. Palm oil and cocoa are emerging as new export products. The government has attempted to revive raw timber extraction and is encouraging oil exploration.</p> <p> </p> <p>In the 1990s and early 2000s, civil war and government mismanagement destroyed much of Liberia's economy, especially infrastructure in and around the capital. Much of the conflict was fueled by control over Liberia’s natural resources. With the conclusion of fighting and the installation of a democratically elected government in 2006, businesses that had fled the country began to return. The country achieved high growth during the period 2010-13 due to favorable world prices for its commodities. However, during the 2014-2015 Ebola crisis, the economy declined and many foreign-owned businesses departed with their capital and expertise. The epidemic forced the government to divert scarce resources to combat the spread of the virus, reducing funds available for needed public investment. The cost of addressing the Ebola epidemic coincided with decreased economic activity reducing government revenue, although higher donor support significantly offset this loss. During the same period, global commodities prices for key exports fell and have yet to recover to pre-Ebola levels.</p> <p> </p> <p>In 2017, gold was a key driver of growth, as a new mining project began its first full year of production; iron ore exports are also increased as Arcelor Mittal opened new mines at Mount Gangra. The completion of the rehabilitation of the Mount Coffee Hydroelectric Dam increased electricity production to support ongoing and future economic activity, although electricity tariffs remain high relative to other countries in the region and transmission infrastructure is limited. Presidential and legislative elections in October 2017 generated election-related spending pressures.</p> <p> </p> <p>Revitalizing the economy in the future will depend on economic diversification, increasing investment and trade, higher global commodity prices, sustained foreign aid and remittances, development of infrastructure and institutions, combating corruption, and maintaining political stability and security.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -977,10 +977,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "8,000 (2018)"
"text": "6,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2018 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1019,10 +1019,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "13,000 (2021 est.)"
"text": "13,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.26 (2021 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0.26 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1106,6 +1106,9 @@
"note": "note(s) - the AFL Air Wing was previously disbanded in 2005 and has been under development since 2019; the Liberian National Police and the Liberian Drug Enforcement Agency are under the Ministry of Justice"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "0.7% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "0.5% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1117,9 +1120,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "0.4% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $19 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "0.4% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $18 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

16
africa/lt.json
View file

@ -661,7 +661,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Small, mountainous, and completely landlocked by South Africa, Lesotho depends on a narrow economic base of textile manufacturing, agriculture, remittances, and regional customs revenue. About three-fourths of the people live in rural areas and engage in animal herding and subsistence agriculture, although Lesotho produces less than 20% of the nation's demand for food. Agriculture is vulnerable to weather and climate variability.</p><p></p><p>Lesotho relies on South Africa for much of its economic activity; Lesotho imports 85% of the goods it consumes from South Africa, including most agricultural inputs. Households depend heavily on remittances from family members working in South Africa in mines, on farms, and as domestic workers, though mining employment has declined substantially since the 1990s. Lesotho is a member of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), and revenues from SACU accounted for roughly 26% of total GDP in 2016; however, SACU revenues are volatile and expected to decline over the next 5 years. Lesotho also gains royalties from the South African Government for water transferred to South Africa from a dam and reservoir system in Lesotho. However, the government continues to strengthen its tax system to reduce dependency on customs duties and other transfers.</p><p></p><p>The government maintains a large presence in the economy - government consumption accounted for about 26% of GDP in 2017. The government remains Lesotho's largest employer; in 2016, the government wage bill rose to 23% of GDP – the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Lesotho's largest private employer is the textile and garment industry - approximately 36,000 Basotho, mainly women, work in factories producing garments for export to South Africa and the US. Diamond mining in Lesotho has grown in recent years and accounted for nearly 35% of total exports in 2015. Lesotho managed steady GDP growth at an average of 4.5% from 2010 to 2014, dropping to about 2.5% in 2015-16, but poverty remains widespread around 57% of the total population.</p>"
"text": "<p>Small, mountainous, and completely landlocked by South Africa, Lesotho depends on a narrow economic base of textile manufacturing, agriculture, remittances, and regional customs revenue. About three-fourths of the people live in rural areas and engage in animal herding and subsistence agriculture, although Lesotho produces less than 20% of the nation's demand for food. Agriculture is vulnerable to weather and climate variability.</p> <p> </p> <p>Lesotho relies on South Africa for much of its economic activity; Lesotho imports 85% of the goods it consumes from South Africa, including most agricultural inputs. Households depend heavily on remittances from family members working in South Africa in mines, on farms, and as domestic workers, though mining employment has declined substantially since the 1990s. Lesotho is a member of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), and revenues from SACU accounted for roughly 26% of total GDP in 2016; however, SACU revenues are volatile and expected to decline over the next 5 years. Lesotho also gains royalties from the South African Government for water transferred to South Africa from a dam and reservoir system in Lesotho. However, the government continues to strengthen its tax system to reduce dependency on customs duties and other transfers.</p> <p> </p> <p>The government maintains a large presence in the economy - government consumption accounted for about 26% of GDP in 2017. The government remains Lesotho's largest employer; in 2016, the government wage bill rose to 23% of GDP – the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Lesotho's largest private employer is the textile and garment industry - approximately 36,000 Basotho, mainly women, work in factories producing garments for export to South Africa and the US. Diamond mining in Lesotho has grown in recent years and accounted for nearly 35% of total exports in 2015. Lesotho managed steady GDP growth at an average of 4.5% from 2010 to 2014, dropping to about 2.5% in 2015-16, but poverty remains widespread around 57% of the total population.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -991,10 +991,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "11,574 (2020)"
"text": "11,574 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
"text": "1 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1033,10 +1033,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "5,060 (2021)"
"text": "5,060 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.24 (2021) less than 1"
"text": "0.24 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1092,6 +1092,9 @@
"note": "note - the Lesotho Mounted Police Service is responsible for internal security and reports to the Minister of Police and Public Safety"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.5% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "1.6% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1103,9 +1106,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "2.2% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $70 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "1.9% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $65 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

10
africa/ly.json
View file

@ -617,7 +617,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Libya's economy, almost entirely dependent on oil and gas exports, has struggled since 2014 given security and political instability, disruptions in oil production, and decline in global oil prices. The Libyan dinar has lost much of its value since 2014 and the resulting gap between official and black market exchange rates has spurred the growth of a shadow economy and contributed to inflation. The country suffers from widespread power outages, caused by shortages of fuel for power generation. Living conditions, including access to clean drinking water, medical services, and safe housing have all declined since 2011. Oil production in 2017 reached a five-year high, driving GDP growth, with daily average production rising to 879,000 barrels per day. However, oil production levels remain below the average pre-Revolution highs of 1.6 million barrels per day.</p><p></p><p>The Central Bank of Libya continued to pay government salaries to a majority of the Libyan workforce and to fund subsidies for fuel and food, resulting in an estimated budget deficit of about 17% of GDP in 2017. Low consumer confidence in the banking sector and the economy as a whole has driven a severe liquidity shortage.</p>"
"text": "<p>Libya's economy, almost entirely dependent on oil and gas exports, has struggled since 2014 given security and political instability, disruptions in oil production, and decline in global oil prices. The Libyan dinar has lost much of its value since 2014 and the resulting gap between official and black market exchange rates has spurred the growth of a shadow economy and contributed to inflation. The country suffers from widespread power outages, caused by shortages of fuel for power generation. Living conditions, including access to clean drinking water, medical services, and safe housing have all declined since 2011. Oil production in 2017 reached a five-year high, driving GDP growth, with daily average production rising to 879,000 barrels per day. However, oil production levels remain below the average pre-Revolution highs of 1.6 million barrels per day.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Central Bank of Libya continued to pay government salaries to a majority of the Libyan workforce and to fund subsidies for fuel and food, resulting in an estimated budget deficit of about 17% of GDP in 2017. Low consumer confidence in the banking sector and the economy as a whole has driven a severe liquidity shortage.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -922,10 +922,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "1.576 million (2018)"
"text": "1.576 million (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "23.95 (2018 est.)"
"text": "23 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -964,10 +964,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "33,200 (2021 est.)"
"text": "332,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "4.83 (2021 est.)"
"text": "5 (2020 est.)"
}
}
},

16
africa/ma.json
View file

@ -686,7 +686,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Madagascar is a mostly unregulated economy with many untapped natural resources, but no capital markets, a weak judicial system, poorly enforced contracts, and rampant government corruption. The country faces challenges to improve education, healthcare, and the environment to boost long-term economic growth. Agriculture, including fishing and forestry, is a mainstay of the economy, accounting for more than one-fourth of GDP and employing roughly 80% of the population. Deforestation and erosion, aggravated by bushfires, slash-and-burn clearing techniques, and the use of firewood as the primary source of fuel, are serious concerns to the agriculture dependent economy.</p><p></p><p>After discarding socialist economic policies in the mid-1990s, Madagascar followed a World Bank- and IMF-led policy of privatization and liberalization until a 2009 coup d’état led many nations, including the United States, to suspend non-humanitarian aid until a democratically-elected president was inaugurated in 2014. The pre-coup strategy had placed the country on a slow and steady growth path from an extremely low starting point. Exports of apparel boomed after gaining duty-free access to the US market in 2000 under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); however, Madagascar's failure to comply with the requirements of the AGOA led to the termination of the country's duty-free access in January 2010, a sharp fall in textile production, a loss of more than 100,000 jobs, and a GDP drop of nearly 11%.</p><p></p><p>Madagascar regained AGOA access in January 2015 and ensuing growth has been slow and fragile. Madagascar produces around 80% of the world’s vanilla and its reliance on this commodity for most of its foreign exchange is a significant source of vulnerability. Economic reforms have been modest and the country’s financial sector remains weak, limiting the use of monetary policy to control inflation. An ongoing IMF program aims to strengthen financial and investment management capacity.</p>"
"text": "<p>Madagascar is a mostly unregulated economy with many untapped natural resources, but no capital markets, a weak judicial system, poorly enforced contracts, and rampant government corruption. The country faces challenges to improve education, healthcare, and the environment to boost long-term economic growth. Agriculture, including fishing and forestry, is a mainstay of the economy, accounting for more than one-fourth of GDP and employing roughly 80% of the population. Deforestation and erosion, aggravated by bushfires, slash-and-burn clearing techniques, and the use of firewood as the primary source of fuel, are serious concerns to the agriculture dependent economy.</p> <p> </p> <p>After discarding socialist economic policies in the mid-1990s, Madagascar followed a World Bank- and IMF-led policy of privatization and liberalization until a 2009 coup d’état led many nations, including the United States, to suspend non-humanitarian aid until a democratically-elected president was inaugurated in 2014. The pre-coup strategy had placed the country on a slow and steady growth path from an extremely low starting point. Exports of apparel boomed after gaining duty-free access to the US market in 2000 under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); however, Madagascar's failure to comply with the requirements of the AGOA led to the termination of the country's duty-free access in January 2010, a sharp fall in textile production, a loss of more than 100,000 jobs, and a GDP drop of nearly 11%.</p> <p> </p> <p>Madagascar regained AGOA access in January 2015 and ensuing growth has been slow and fragile. Madagascar produces around 80% of the world’s vanilla and its reliance on this commodity for most of its foreign exchange is a significant source of vulnerability. Economic reforms have been modest and the country’s financial sector remains weak, limiting the use of monetary policy to control inflation. An ongoing IMF program aims to strengthen financial and investment management capacity.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1004,10 +1004,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "69,046 (2018)"
"text": "69,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2018 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1046,10 +1046,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "32,000 (2021 est.)"
"text": "32,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.12 (2021 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0.12 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1146,6 +1146,9 @@
"note": "note - the National Gendarmerie is responsible for maintaining law and order in rural areas at the village level, protecting government facilities, and operating a maritime police contingent; the National Police is responsible for maintaining law and order in urban areas"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "0.7% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "0.7% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1157,9 +1160,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "0.5% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $120 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "0.5% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $120 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

16
africa/mi.json
View file

@ -693,7 +693,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Landlocked Malawi ranks among the world's least developed countries. The country’s economic performance has historically been constrained by policy inconsistency, macroeconomic instability, poor infrastructure, rampant corruption, high population growth, and poor health and education outcomes that limit labor productivity. The economy is predominately agricultural with about 80% of the population living in rural areas. Agriculture accounts for about one-third of GDP and 80% of export revenues. The performance of the tobacco sector is key to short-term growth as tobacco accounts for more than half of exports, although Malawi is looking to diversify away from tobacco to other cash crops.</p><p></p><p>The economy depends on substantial inflows of economic assistance from the IMF, the World Bank, and individual donor nations. Donors halted direct budget support from 2013 to 2016 because of concerns about corruption and fiscal carelessness, but the World Bank resumed budget support in May 2017. In 2006, Malawi was approved for relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program but recent increases in domestic borrowing mean that debt servicing in 2016 exceeded the levels prior to HIPC debt relief.</p><p></p><p>Heavily dependent on rain-fed agriculture, with corn being the staple crop, Malawi’s economy was hit hard by the El Nino-driven drought in 2015 and 2016, and now faces threat from the fall armyworm. The drought also slowed economic activity, led to two consecutive years of declining economic growth, and contributed to high inflation rates. Depressed food prices over 2017 led to a significant drop in inflation (from an average of 21.7% in 2016 to 12.3% in 2017), with a similar drop in interest rates.</p>"
"text": "<p>Landlocked Malawi ranks among the world's least developed countries. The country’s economic performance has historically been constrained by policy inconsistency, macroeconomic instability, poor infrastructure, rampant corruption, high population growth, and poor health and education outcomes that limit labor productivity. The economy is predominately agricultural with about 80% of the population living in rural areas. Agriculture accounts for about one-third of GDP and 80% of export revenues. The performance of the tobacco sector is key to short-term growth as tobacco accounts for more than half of exports, although Malawi is looking to diversify away from tobacco to other cash crops.</p> <p> </p> <p>The economy depends on substantial inflows of economic assistance from the IMF, the World Bank, and individual donor nations. Donors halted direct budget support from 2013 to 2016 because of concerns about corruption and fiscal carelessness, but the World Bank resumed budget support in May 2017. In 2006, Malawi was approved for relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program but recent increases in domestic borrowing mean that debt servicing in 2016 exceeded the levels prior to HIPC debt relief.</p> <p> </p> <p>Heavily dependent on rain-fed agriculture, with corn being the staple crop, Malawi’s economy was hit hard by the El Nino-driven drought in 2015 and 2016, and now faces threat from the fall armyworm. The drought also slowed economic activity, led to two consecutive years of declining economic growth, and contributed to high inflation rates. Depressed food prices over 2017 led to a significant drop in inflation (from an average of 21.7% in 2016 to 12.3% in 2017), with a similar drop in interest rates.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1019,10 +1019,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "12,465 (2020)"
"text": "12,465 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1061,10 +1061,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "12,255 (2021)"
"text": "12,255 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.06 (2021) less than 1"
"text": "0.06 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1153,6 +1153,9 @@
"note": "note - the Malawi Police Service is under the Ministry of Homeland Security"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "0.9% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "0.9% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1164,9 +1167,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "0.7% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $60 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "0.6% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $50 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

16
africa/ml.json
View file

@ -708,7 +708,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Among the 25 poorest countries in the world, landlocked Mali depends on gold mining and agricultural exports for revenue. The country's fiscal status fluctuates with gold and agricultural commodity prices and the harvest; cotton and gold exports make up around 80% of export earnings. Mali remains dependent on foreign aid.</p><p></p><p>Economic activity is largely confined to the riverine area irrigated by the Niger River; about 65% of Mali’s land area is desert or semidesert. About 10% of the population is nomadic and about 80% of the labor force is engaged in farming and fishing. Industrial activity is concentrated on processing farm commodities. The government subsidizes the production of cereals to decrease the country’s dependence on imported foodstuffs and to reduce its vulnerability to food price shocks.</p><p></p><p>Mali is developing its iron ore extraction industry to diversify foreign exchange earnings away from gold, but the pace will depend on global price trends. Although the political coup in 2012 slowed Mali’s growth, the economy has since bounced back, with GDP growth above 5% in 2014-17, although physical insecurity, high population growth, corruption, weak infrastructure, and low levels of human capital continue to constrain economic development. Higher rainfall helped to boost cotton output in 2017, and the country’s 2017 budget increased spending more than 10%, much of which was devoted to infrastructure and agriculture. Corruption and political turmoil are strong downside risks in 2018 and beyond.</p>"
"text": "<p>Among the 25 poorest countries in the world, landlocked Mali depends on gold mining and agricultural exports for revenue. The country's fiscal status fluctuates with gold and agricultural commodity prices and the harvest; cotton and gold exports make up around 80% of export earnings. Mali remains dependent on foreign aid.</p> <p> </p> <p>Economic activity is largely confined to the riverine area irrigated by the Niger River; about 65% of Mali’s land area is desert or semidesert. About 10% of the population is nomadic and about 80% of the labor force is engaged in farming and fishing. Industrial activity is concentrated on processing farm commodities. The government subsidizes the production of cereals to decrease the country’s dependence on imported foodstuffs and to reduce its vulnerability to food price shocks.</p> <p> </p> <p>Mali is developing its iron ore extraction industry to diversify foreign exchange earnings away from gold, but the pace will depend on global price trends. Although the political coup in 2012 slowed Mali’s growth, the economy has since bounced back, with GDP growth above 5% in 2014-17, although physical insecurity, high population growth, corruption, weak infrastructure, and low levels of human capital continue to constrain economic development. Higher rainfall helped to boost cotton output in 2017, and the country’s 2017 budget increased spending more than 10%, much of which was devoted to infrastructure and agriculture. Corruption and political turmoil are strong downside risks in 2018 and beyond.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1030,10 +1030,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "281,638 (2020)"
"text": "281,638 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1.39 (2020 est.)"
"text": "1 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1072,10 +1072,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "243,806 (2021)"
"text": "243,806 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1.2 (2021)"
"text": "1.2 (2020 est.)"
}
}
},
@ -1155,6 +1155,9 @@
"note": "note(s) - the Gendarmerie and the National Guard are under the authority of the Ministry of Defense and Veterans Affairs (Ministere De La Defense Et Des Anciens Combattants, MDAC), but operational control is shared between the MDAC and the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection<br><br>the Gendarmerie's primary mission is internal security and public order; its duties also include territorial defense, humanitarian operations, intelligence gathering, and protecting private property, mainly in rural areas; as of 2021, the Gendarmerie was comprised of approximately 8 paramilitary companies and a mobile intervention unit<br><br>the National Guard is a military force responsible for providing security to government facilities and institutions, prison service, public order, humanitarian operations, some border security, and intelligence gathering; as of 2021, it had approximately 8 companies of troops, including a camel corps for patrolling the deserts and borders of northern Mali"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "3.5% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "3.4% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1166,9 +1169,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "3.2% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $600 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "2.8% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $500 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

16
africa/mo.json
View file

@ -709,7 +709,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Morocco has capitalized on its proximity to Europe and relatively low labor costs to work towards building a diverse, open, market-oriented economy. Key sectors of the economy include agriculture, tourism, aerospace, automotive, phosphates, textiles, apparel, and subcomponents. Morocco has increased investment in its port, transportation, and industrial infrastructure to position itself as a center and broker for business throughout Africa. Industrial development strategies and infrastructure improvements - most visibly illustrated by a new port and free trade zone near Tangier - are improving Morocco's competitiveness.</p><p></p><p>In the 1980s, Morocco was a heavily indebted country before pursuing austerity measures and pro-market reforms, overseen by the IMF. Since taking the throne in 1999, King MOHAMMED VI has presided over a stable economy marked by steady growth, low inflation, and gradually falling unemployment, although poor harvests and economic difficulties in Europe contributed to an economic slowdown. To boost exports, Morocco entered into a bilateral Free Trade Agreement with the US in 2006 and an Advanced Status agreement with the EU in 2008. In late 2014, Morocco eliminated subsidies for gasoline, diesel, and fuel oil, dramatically reducing outlays that weighed on the country’s budget and current account. Subsidies on butane gas and certain food products remain in place. Morocco also seeks to expand its renewable energy capacity with a goal of making renewable more than 50% of installed electricity generation capacity by 2030.</p><p></p><p>Despite Morocco's economic progress, the country suffers from high unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy, particularly in rural areas. Key economic challenges for Morocco include reforming the education system and the judiciary.</p>"
"text": "<p>Morocco has capitalized on its proximity to Europe and relatively low labor costs to work towards building a diverse, open, market-oriented economy. Key sectors of the economy include agriculture, tourism, aerospace, automotive, phosphates, textiles, apparel, and subcomponents. Morocco has increased investment in its port, transportation, and industrial infrastructure to position itself as a center and broker for business throughout Africa. Industrial development strategies and infrastructure improvements - most visibly illustrated by a new port and free trade zone near Tangier - are improving Morocco's competitiveness.</p> <p> </p> <p>In the 1980s, Morocco was a heavily indebted country before pursuing austerity measures and pro-market reforms, overseen by the IMF. Since taking the throne in 1999, King MOHAMMED VI has presided over a stable economy marked by steady growth, low inflation, and gradually falling unemployment, although poor harvests and economic difficulties in Europe contributed to an economic slowdown. To boost exports, Morocco entered into a bilateral Free Trade Agreement with the US in 2006 and an Advanced Status agreement with the EU in 2008. In late 2014, Morocco eliminated subsidies for gasoline, diesel, and fuel oil, dramatically reducing outlays that weighed on the country’s budget and current account. Subsidies on butane gas and certain food products remain in place. Morocco also seeks to expand its renewable energy capacity with a goal of making renewable more than 50% of installed electricity generation capacity by 2030.</p> <p> </p> <p>Despite Morocco's economic progress, the country suffers from high unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy, particularly in rural areas. Key economic challenges for Morocco include reforming the education system and the judiciary.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1044,10 +1044,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "2,357,286 (2020)"
"text": "2,357,286 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "6.39 (2020 est.)"
"text": "6 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1086,10 +1086,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "2,102,434 (2021)"
"text": "2,102,434 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "5.7 (2021)"
"text": "6 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Communications - note": {
@ -1201,6 +1201,9 @@
"note": "note(s) - the National Police manages internal law enforcement in cities; the Royal Gendarmerie is responsible for law enforcement in rural regions and on national highways <br><br> "
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "4.5% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "4.5% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1212,9 +1215,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "3.4% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $7.08 billion)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "3.4% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $6.9 billion)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

14
africa/mp.json
View file

@ -944,10 +944,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "478,700 (2020)"
"text": "478,700 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "37.64 (2020 est.)"
"text": "38 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -986,10 +986,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "323,200 (2021)"
"text": "323,200 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "25.41 (2021)"
"text": "25 (2020 est.)"
}
}
},
@ -1068,6 +1068,9 @@
"text": "no regular military forces; the Mauritius Police Force (MPF) includes a paramilitary unit known as the Special Mobile Force, which includes a motorized infantry battalion and 2 light armored squadrons; the MPF also has a Police Helicopter Squadron, a Special Support Unit (riot police), and the National Coast Guard (also includes an air squadron) (2021)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "0.2% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "0.2% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1079,9 +1082,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "0.3% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $80 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "0.3% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $80 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

16
africa/mr.json
View file

@ -698,7 +698,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Mauritania's economy is dominated by extractive industries (oil and mines), fisheries, livestock, agriculture, and services. Half the population still depends on farming and raising livestock, even though many nomads and subsistence farmers were forced into the cities by recurrent droughts in the 1970s, 1980s, 2000s, and 2017. Recently, GDP growth has been driven largely by foreign investment in the mining and oil sectors.</p><p></p><p>Mauritania's extensive mineral resources include iron ore, gold, copper, gypsum, and phosphate rock, and exploration is ongoing for tantalum, uranium, crude oil, and natural gas. Extractive commodities make up about three-quarters of Mauritania's total exports, subjecting the economy to price swings in world commodity markets. Mining is also a growing source of government revenue, rising from 13% to 30% of total revenue from 2006 to 2014. The nation's coastal waters are among the richest fishing areas in the world, and fishing accounts for about 15% of budget revenues, 45% of foreign currency earnings. Mauritania processes a total of 1,800,000 tons of fish per year, but overexploitation by foreign and national fleets threaten the sustainability of this key source of revenue.</p><p></p><p>The economy is highly sensitive to international food and extractive commodity prices. Other risks to Mauritania's economy include its recurring droughts, dependence on foreign aid and investment, and insecurity in neighboring Mali, as well as significant shortages of infrastructure, institutional capacity, and human capital. In December 2017, Mauritania and the IMF agreed to a three year agreement under the Extended Credit Facility to foster economic growth, maintain macroeconomic stability, and reduce poverty. Investment in agriculture and infrastructure are the largest components of the country’s public expenditures.</p>"
"text": "<p>Mauritania's economy is dominated by extractive industries (oil and mines), fisheries, livestock, agriculture, and services. Half the population still depends on farming and raising livestock, even though many nomads and subsistence farmers were forced into the cities by recurrent droughts in the 1970s, 1980s, 2000s, and 2017. Recently, GDP growth has been driven largely by foreign investment in the mining and oil sectors.</p> <p> </p> <p>Mauritania's extensive mineral resources include iron ore, gold, copper, gypsum, and phosphate rock, and exploration is ongoing for tantalum, uranium, crude oil, and natural gas. Extractive commodities make up about three-quarters of Mauritania's total exports, subjecting the economy to price swings in world commodity markets. Mining is also a growing source of government revenue, rising from 13% to 30% of total revenue from 2006 to 2014. The nation's coastal waters are among the richest fishing areas in the world, and fishing accounts for about 15% of budget revenues, 45% of foreign currency earnings. Mauritania processes a total of 1,800,000 tons of fish per year, but overexploitation by foreign and national fleets threaten the sustainability of this key source of revenue.</p> <p> </p> <p>The economy is highly sensitive to international food and extractive commodity prices. Other risks to Mauritania's economy include its recurring droughts, dependence on foreign aid and investment, and insecurity in neighboring Mali, as well as significant shortages of infrastructure, institutional capacity, and human capital. In December 2017, Mauritania and the IMF agreed to a three year agreement under the Extended Credit Facility to foster economic growth, maintain macroeconomic stability, and reduce poverty. Investment in agriculture and infrastructure are the largest components of the country’s public expenditures.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1028,10 +1028,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "62,099 (2020)"
"text": "62,099 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1.34 (2020 est.)"
"text": "1 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1070,10 +1070,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "18,457 (2021)"
"text": "18,457 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.4 (2021) less than 1"
"text": "0.4 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1167,6 +1167,9 @@
"note": "note(s) - the Gendarmerie is responsible for maintaining civil order around metropolitan areas and providing law enforcement services in rural areas; the National Guard performs a limited police function in keeping with its peacetime role of providing security at government facilities, to include prisons; the General Group for Road Safety maintains security on roads and operates checkpoints throughout the country"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "2.4% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "2.5% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1178,9 +1181,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "2.3% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $440 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "2.5% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $420 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

16
africa/mz.json
View file

@ -698,7 +698,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>At independence in 1975, Mozambique was one of the world's poorest countries. Socialist policies, economic mismanagement, and a brutal civil war from 1977 to 1992 further impoverished the country. In 1987, the government embarked on a series of macroeconomic reforms designed to stabilize the economy. These steps, combined with donor assistance and with political stability since the multi-party elections in 1994, propelled the country’s GDP, in purchasing power parity terms, from $4 billion in 1993 to about $37 billion in 2017. Fiscal reforms, including the introduction of a value-added tax and reform of the customs service, have improved the government's revenue collection abilities. In spite of these gains, about half the population remains below the poverty line and subsistence agriculture continues to employ the vast majority of the country's work force.</p><p></p><p>Mozambique's once substantial foreign debt was reduced through forgiveness and rescheduling under the IMF's Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Enhanced HIPC initiatives. However, in 2016, information surfaced revealing that the Mozambican Government was responsible for over $2 billion in government-backed loans secured between 2012-14 by state-owned defense and security companies without parliamentary approval or national budget inclusion; this prompted the IMF and international donors to halt direct budget support to the Government of Mozambique. An international audit was performed on Mozambique’s debt in 2016-17, but debt restructuring and resumption of donor support have yet to occur.</p><p></p><p>Mozambique grew at an average annual rate of 6%-8% in the decade leading up to 2015, one of Africa's strongest performances, but the sizable external debt burden, donor withdrawal, elevated inflation, and currency depreciation contributed to slower growth in 2016-17.</p><p></p><p>Two major International consortiums, led by American companies ExxonMobil and Anadarko, are seeking approval to develop massive natural gas deposits off the coast of Cabo Delgado province, in what has the potential to become the largest infrastructure project in Africa. . The government predicts sales of liquefied natural gas from these projects could generate several billion dollars in revenues annually sometime after 2022.</p>"
"text": "<p>At independence in 1975, Mozambique was one of the world's poorest countries. Socialist policies, economic mismanagement, and a brutal civil war from 1977 to 1992 further impoverished the country. In 1987, the government embarked on a series of macroeconomic reforms designed to stabilize the economy. These steps, combined with donor assistance and with political stability since the multi-party elections in 1994, propelled the country’s GDP, in purchasing power parity terms, from $4 billion in 1993 to about $37 billion in 2017. Fiscal reforms, including the introduction of a value-added tax and reform of the customs service, have improved the government's revenue collection abilities. In spite of these gains, about half the population remains below the poverty line and subsistence agriculture continues to employ the vast majority of the country's work force.</p> <p> </p> <p>Mozambique's once substantial foreign debt was reduced through forgiveness and rescheduling under the IMF's Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Enhanced HIPC initiatives. However, in 2016, information surfaced revealing that the Mozambican Government was responsible for over $2 billion in government-backed loans secured between 2012-14 by state-owned defense and security companies without parliamentary approval or national budget inclusion; this prompted the IMF and international donors to halt direct budget support to the Government of Mozambique. An international audit was performed on Mozambique’s debt in 2016-17, but debt restructuring and resumption of donor support have yet to occur.</p> <p> </p> <p>Mozambique grew at an average annual rate of 6%-8% in the decade leading up to 2015, one of Africa's strongest performances, but the sizable external debt burden, donor withdrawal, elevated inflation, and currency depreciation contributed to slower growth in 2016-17.</p> <p> </p> <p>Two major International consortiums, led by American companies ExxonMobil and Anadarko, are seeking approval to develop massive natural gas deposits off the coast of Cabo Delgado province, in what has the potential to become the largest infrastructure project in Africa. . The government predicts sales of liquefied natural gas from these projects could generate several billion dollars in revenues annually sometime after 2022.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1035,10 +1035,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "80,791 (2019)"
"text": "89,016 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2019 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1077,10 +1077,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "70,000 (2021)"
"text": "70,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.22 (2021) less than 1"
"text": "0.22 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1189,6 +1189,9 @@
"note": "note - the FADM and other security forces are referred to collectively as the Defense and Security Forces (DFS)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.2% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "1.1% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1200,9 +1203,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "0.9% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $170 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "0.9% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $170 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

20
africa/ng.json
View file

@ -703,7 +703,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Niger is a landlocked, Sub-Saharan nation, whose economy centers on subsistence crops, livestock, and some of the world's largest uranium deposits. Agriculture contributes approximately 40% of GDP and provides livelihood for over 80% of the population. The UN ranked Niger as the second least developed country in the world in 2016 due to multiple factors such as food insecurity, lack of industry, high population growth, a weak educational sector, and few prospects for work outside of subsistence farming and herding.</p><p></p><p>Since 2011 public debt has increased due to efforts to scale-up public investment, particularly that related to infrastructure, as well as due to increased security spending. The government relies on foreign donor resources for a large portion of its fiscal budget. The economy in recent years has been hurt by terrorist activity near its uranium mines and by instability in Mali and in the Diffa region of the country; concerns about security have resulted in increased support from regional and international partners on defense. Low uranium prices, demographics, and security expenditures may continue to put pressure on the government’s finances.</p><p></p><p>The Government of Niger plans to exploit oil, gold, coal, and other mineral resources to sustain future growth. Although Niger has sizable reserves of oil, the prolonged drop in oil prices has reduced profitability. Food insecurity and drought remain perennial problems for Niger, and the government plans to invest more in irrigation. Niger’s three-year $131 million IMF Extended Credit Facility (ECF) agreement for the years 2012-15 was extended until the end of 2016. In February 2017, the IMF approved a new 3-year $134 million ECF. In June 2017, The World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) granted Niger $1 billion over three years for IDA18, a program to boost the country’s development and alleviate poverty. A $437 million Millennium Challenge Account compact for Niger, commencing in FY18, will focus on large-scale irrigation infrastructure development and community-based, climate-resilient agriculture, while promoting sustainable increases in agricultural productivity and sales.</p><p></p><p>Formal private sector investment needed for economic diversification and growth remains a challenge, given the country’s limited domestic markets, access to credit, and competitiveness. Although President ISSOUFOU is courting foreign investors, including those from the US, as of April 2017, there were no US firms operating in Niger. In November 2017, the National Assembly passed the 2018 Finance Law that was geared towards raising government revenues and moving away from international support.</p>"
"text": "<p>Niger is a landlocked, Sub-Saharan nation, whose economy centers on subsistence crops, livestock, and some of the world's largest uranium deposits. Agriculture contributes approximately 40% of GDP and provides livelihood for over 80% of the population. The UN ranked Niger as the second least developed country in the world in 2016 due to multiple factors such as food insecurity, lack of industry, high population growth, a weak educational sector, and few prospects for work outside of subsistence farming and herding.</p> <p> </p> <p>Since 2011 public debt has increased due to efforts to scale-up public investment, particularly that related to infrastructure, as well as due to increased security spending. The government relies on foreign donor resources for a large portion of its fiscal budget. The economy in recent years has been hurt by terrorist activity near its uranium mines and by instability in Mali and in the Diffa region of the country; concerns about security have resulted in increased support from regional and international partners on defense. Low uranium prices, demographics, and security expenditures may continue to put pressure on the government’s finances.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Government of Niger plans to exploit oil, gold, coal, and other mineral resources to sustain future growth. Although Niger has sizable reserves of oil, the prolonged drop in oil prices has reduced profitability. Food insecurity and drought remain perennial problems for Niger, and the government plans to invest more in irrigation. Niger’s three-year $131 million IMF Extended Credit Facility (ECF) agreement for the years 2012-15 was extended until the end of 2016. In February 2017, the IMF approved a new 3-year $134 million ECF. In June 2017, The World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) granted Niger $1 billion over three years for IDA18, a program to boost the country’s development and alleviate poverty. A $437 million Millennium Challenge Account compact for Niger, commencing in FY18, will focus on large-scale irrigation infrastructure development and community-based, climate-resilient agriculture, while promoting sustainable increases in agricultural productivity and sales.</p> <p> </p> <p>Formal private sector investment needed for economic diversification and growth remains a challenge, given the country’s limited domestic markets, access to credit, and competitiveness. Although President ISSOUFOU is courting foreign investors, including those from the US, as of April 2017, there were no US firms operating in Niger. In November 2017, the National Assembly passed the 2018 Finance Law that was geared towards raising government revenues and moving away from international support.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1031,10 +1031,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "114,352 (2018)"
"text": "58,000 (2020)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2018 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1073,10 +1073,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "12,000 (2021 est.)"
"text": "12,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.05 (2021 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0.05 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1160,8 +1160,11 @@
"note": "note - the Gendarmerie is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and has primary responsibility for rural security; the National Guard is responsible for domestic security and the protection of high-level officials and government buildings"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.8% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "2.1% of GDP (2020 est.)"
"text": "2% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2019": {
"text": "1.7% of GDP (2019 est.) (approximately $260 million)"
@ -1171,9 +1174,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "2% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $270 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "1.6% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $210 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
@ -1205,7 +1205,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "187,146 (Nigeria), 61,534 (Mali) (2022)"
"text": "187,148 (Nigeria), 61,534 (Mali) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "264,257 (includes the regions of Diffa, Tillaberi, and Tahoua; unknown how many of the 11,000 people displaced by clashes between government forces and the Tuareg militant group, Niger Movement for Justice, in 2007 are still displaced; inter-communal violence; Boko Haram attacks in southern Niger, 2015) (2022)"

18
africa/ni.json
View file

@ -718,7 +718,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Nigeria is Sub Saharan Africa’s largest economy and relies heavily on oil as its main source of foreign exchange earnings and government revenues. Following the 2008-09 global financial crises, the banking sector was effectively recapitalized and regulation enhanced. Since then, Nigeria’s economic growth has been driven by growth in agriculture, telecommunications, and services. Economic diversification and strong growth have not translated into a significant decline in poverty levels; over 62% of Nigeria's over 180 million people still live in extreme poverty.</p><p></p><p>Despite its strong fundamentals, oil-rich Nigeria has been hobbled by inadequate power supply, lack of infrastructure, delays in the passage of legislative reforms, an inefficient property registration system, restrictive trade policies, an inconsistent regulatory environment, a slow and ineffective judicial system, unreliable dispute resolution mechanisms, insecurity, and pervasive corruption. Regulatory constraints and security risks have limited new investment in oil and natural gas, and Nigeria's oil production had been contracting every year since 2012 until a slight rebound in 2017.</p><p></p><p>President BUHARI, elected in March 2015, has established a cabinet of economic ministers that includes several technocrats, and he has announced plans to increase transparency, diversify the economy away from oil, and improve fiscal management, but has taken a primarily protectionist approach that favors domestic producers at the expense of consumers. President BUHARI ran on an anti-corruption platform, and has made some headway in alleviating corruption, such as implementation of a Treasury Single Account that allows the government to better manage its resources and a more transparent government payroll and personnel system that eliminated duplicate and \"ghost workers.\" The government also is working to develop stronger public-private partnerships for roads, agriculture, and power.</p><p></p><p>Nigeria entered recession in 2016 as a result of lower oil prices and production, exacerbated by militant attacks on oil and gas infrastructure in the Niger Delta region, coupled with detrimental economic policies, including foreign exchange restrictions. GDP growth turned positive in 2017 as oil prices recovered and output stabilized.</p>"
"text": "<p>Nigeria is Sub Saharan Africa’s largest economy and relies heavily on oil as its main source of foreign exchange earnings and government revenues. Following the 2008-09 global financial crises, the banking sector was effectively recapitalized and regulation enhanced. Since then, Nigeria’s economic growth has been driven by growth in agriculture, telecommunications, and services. Economic diversification and strong growth have not translated into a significant decline in poverty levels; over 62% of Nigeria's over 180 million people still live in extreme poverty.</p> <p> </p> <p>Despite its strong fundamentals, oil-rich Nigeria has been hobbled by inadequate power supply, lack of infrastructure, delays in the passage of legislative reforms, an inefficient property registration system, restrictive trade policies, an inconsistent regulatory environment, a slow and ineffective judicial system, unreliable dispute resolution mechanisms, insecurity, and pervasive corruption. Regulatory constraints and security risks have limited new investment in oil and natural gas, and Nigeria's oil production had been contracting every year since 2012 until a slight rebound in 2017.</p> <p> </p> <p>President BUHARI, elected in March 2015, has established a cabinet of economic ministers that includes several technocrats, and he has announced plans to increase transparency, diversify the economy away from oil, and improve fiscal management, but has taken a primarily protectionist approach that favors domestic producers at the expense of consumers. President BUHARI ran on an anti-corruption platform, and has made some headway in alleviating corruption, such as implementation of a Treasury Single Account that allows the government to better manage its resources and a more transparent government payroll and personnel system that eliminated duplicate and \"ghost workers.\" The government also is working to develop stronger public-private partnerships for roads, agriculture, and power.</p> <p> </p> <p>Nigeria entered recession in 2016 as a result of lower oil prices and production, exacerbated by militant attacks on oil and gas infrastructure in the Niger Delta region, coupled with detrimental economic policies, including foreign exchange restrictions. GDP growth turned positive in 2017 as oil prices recovered and output stabilized.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1058,10 +1058,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "107,031 (2020)"
"text": "107,031 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1100,10 +1100,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "65,313 (2021)"
"text": "65,313 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.03 (2021) less than 1"
"text": "0.03 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1221,8 +1221,11 @@
"text": "Nigerian Armed Forces: Army, Navy (includes Coast Guard), Air Force; Ministry of Interior: Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC, a paramilitary agency commissioned to assist the military in the management of threats to internal security, including attacks and natural disasters) (2021)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "0.7% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "0.6% of GDP (2020)"
"text": "0.6% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2019": {
"text": "0.5% of GDP (2019) (approximately $3.53 billion)"
@ -1232,9 +1235,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "0.5% of GDP (2017) (approximately $3.42 billion)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "0.4% of GDP (2016) (approximately $3.05 billion)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

16
africa/od.json
View file

@ -625,7 +625,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Industry and infrastructure in landlocked South Sudan are severely underdeveloped and poverty is widespread, following several decades of civil war with Sudan. Continued fighting within the new nation is disrupting what remains of the economy. The vast majority of the population is dependent on subsistence agriculture and humanitarian assistance. Property rights are insecure and price signals are weak, because markets are not well-organized.</p><p></p><p>South Sudan has little infrastructure – about 10,000 kilometers of roads, but just 2% of them paved. Electricity is produced mostly by costly diesel generators, and indoor plumbing and potable water are scarce, so less than 2% of the population has access to electricity. About 90% of consumed goods, capital, and services are imported from neighboring countries – mainly Uganda, Kenya and Sudan. Chinese investment plays a growing role in the infrastructure and energy sectors.</p><p></p><p>Nevertheless, South Sudan does have abundant natural resources. South Sudan holds one of the richest agricultural areas in Africa, with fertile soils and abundant water supplies. Currently the region supports 10-20 million head of cattle. At independence in 2011, South Sudan produced nearly three-fourths of former Sudan's total oil output of nearly a half million barrels per day. The Government of South Sudan relies on oil for the vast majority of its budget revenues, although oil production has fallen sharply since independence. South Sudan is one of the most oil-dependent countries in the world, with 98% of the government’s annual operating budget and 80% of its gross domestic product (GDP) derived from oil. Oil is exported through a pipeline that runs to refineries and shipping facilities at Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The economy of South Sudan will remain linked to Sudan for some time, given the existing oil infrastructure. The outbreak of conflict in December 2013, combined with falling crude oil production and prices, meant that GDP fell significantly between 2014 and 2017. Since the second half of 2017 oil production has risen, and is currently about 130,000 barrels per day.</p><p></p><p>Poverty and food insecurity has risen due to displacement of people caused by the conflict. With famine spreading, 66% of the population in South Sudan is living on less than about $2 a day, up from 50.6% in 2009, according to the World Bank. About 80% of the population lives in rural areas, with agriculture, forestry and fishing providing the livelihood for a majority of the households. Much of rural sector activity is focused on low-input, low-output subsistence agriculture.</p><p></p><p>South Sudan is burdened by considerable debt because of increased military spending and high levels of government corruption. Economic mismanagement is prevalent. Civil servants, including police and the military, are not paid on time, creating incentives to engage in looting and banditry. South Sudan has received more than $11 billion in foreign aid since 2005, largely from the US, the UK, and the EU. Inflation peaked at over 800% per year in October 2016 but dropped to 118% in 2017. The government has funded its expenditures by borrowing from the central bank and foreign sources, using forward sales of oil as collateral. The central bank’s decision to adopt a managed floating exchange rate regime in December 2015 triggered a 97% depreciation of the currency and spawned a growing black market.</p><p></p><p>Long-term challenges include rooting out public sector corruption, improving agricultural productivity, alleviating poverty and unemployment, improving fiscal transparency - particularly in regard to oil revenues, taming inflation, improving government revenues, and creating a rules-based business environment.</p>"
"text": "<p>Industry and infrastructure in landlocked South Sudan are severely underdeveloped and poverty is widespread, following several decades of civil war with Sudan. Continued fighting within the new nation is disrupting what remains of the economy. The vast majority of the population is dependent on subsistence agriculture and humanitarian assistance. Property rights are insecure and price signals are weak, because markets are not well-organized.</p> <p> </p> <p>South Sudan has little infrastructure – about 10,000 kilometers of roads, but just 2% of them paved. Electricity is produced mostly by costly diesel generators, and indoor plumbing and potable water are scarce, so less than 2% of the population has access to electricity. About 90% of consumed goods, capital, and services are imported from neighboring countries – mainly Uganda, Kenya and Sudan. Chinese investment plays a growing role in the infrastructure and energy sectors.</p> <p> </p> <p>Nevertheless, South Sudan does have abundant natural resources. South Sudan holds one of the richest agricultural areas in Africa, with fertile soils and abundant water supplies. Currently the region supports 10-20 million head of cattle. At independence in 2011, South Sudan produced nearly three-fourths of former Sudan's total oil output of nearly a half million barrels per day. The Government of South Sudan relies on oil for the vast majority of its budget revenues, although oil production has fallen sharply since independence. South Sudan is one of the most oil-dependent countries in the world, with 98% of the government’s annual operating budget and 80% of its gross domestic product (GDP) derived from oil. Oil is exported through a pipeline that runs to refineries and shipping facilities at Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The economy of South Sudan will remain linked to Sudan for some time, given the existing oil infrastructure. The outbreak of conflict in December 2013, combined with falling crude oil production and prices, meant that GDP fell significantly between 2014 and 2017. Since the second half of 2017 oil production has risen, and is currently about 130,000 barrels per day.</p> <p> </p> <p>Poverty and food insecurity has risen due to displacement of people caused by the conflict. With famine spreading, 66% of the population in South Sudan is living on less than about $2 a day, up from 50.6% in 2009, according to the World Bank. About 80% of the population lives in rural areas, with agriculture, forestry and fishing providing the livelihood for a majority of the households. Much of rural sector activity is focused on low-input, low-output subsistence agriculture.</p> <p> </p> <p>South Sudan is burdened by considerable debt because of increased military spending and high levels of government corruption. Economic mismanagement is prevalent. Civil servants, including police and the military, are not paid on time, creating incentives to engage in looting and banditry. South Sudan has received more than $11 billion in foreign aid since 2005, largely from the US, the UK, and the EU. Inflation peaked at over 800% per year in October 2016 but dropped to 118% in 2017. The government has funded its expenditures by borrowing from the central bank and foreign sources, using forward sales of oil as collateral. The central bank’s decision to adopt a managed floating exchange rate regime in December 2015 triggered a 97% depreciation of the currency and spawned a growing black market.</p> <p> </p> <p>Long-term challenges include rooting out public sector corruption, improving agricultural productivity, alleviating poverty and unemployment, improving fiscal transparency - particularly in regard to oil revenues, taming inflation, improving government revenues, and creating a rules-based business environment.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2017": {
@ -878,7 +878,7 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "less than 1"
"text": "(2018 est.) less than 1"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2018 est.) less than 1"
@ -920,10 +920,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "200 (2020)"
"text": "200 (2019 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0 (2019 est.)"
}
}
},
@ -1009,8 +1009,11 @@
"note": "note - numerous irregular/militia forces operate in the country with official knowledge"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "2% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "2.3% of GDP (2020 est.)"
"text": "2% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2019": {
"text": "3.1% of GDP (2019 est.) (approximately $1.62 billion)"
@ -1020,9 +1023,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "2.1% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $660 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "4.4% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $1.0 billion)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

14
africa/pu.json
View file

@ -623,7 +623,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Guinea-Bissau is highly dependent on subsistence agriculture, cashew nut exports, and foreign assistance. Two out of three Bissau-Guineans remain below the absolute poverty line. The legal economy is based on cashews and fishing. Illegal logging and trafficking in narcotics also play significant roles. The combination of limited economic prospects, weak institutions, and favorable geography have made this West African country a way station for drugs bound for Europe.</p><p></p><p>Guinea-Bissau has substantial potential for development of mineral resources, including phosphates, bauxite, and mineral sands. Offshore oil and gas exploration has begun. The country’s climate and soil make it feasible to grow a wide range of cash crops, fruit, vegetables, and tubers; however, cashews generate more than 80% of export receipts and are the main source of income for many rural communities.</p><p></p><p>The government was deposed in August 2015, and since then, a political stalemate has resulted in weak governance and reduced donor support.</p><p></p><p>The country is participating in a three-year, IMF extended credit facility program that was suspended because of a planned bank bailout. The program was renewed in 2017, but the major donors of direct budget support (the EU, World Bank, and African Development Bank) have halted their programs indefinitely. Diversification of the economy remains a key policy goal, but Guinea-Bissau’s poor infrastructure and business climate will constrain this effort.</p>"
"text": "<p>Guinea-Bissau is highly dependent on subsistence agriculture, cashew nut exports, and foreign assistance. Two out of three Bissau-Guineans remain below the absolute poverty line. The legal economy is based on cashews and fishing. Illegal logging and trafficking in narcotics also play significant roles. The combination of limited economic prospects, weak institutions, and favorable geography have made this West African country a way station for drugs bound for Europe.</p> <p> </p> <p>Guinea-Bissau has substantial potential for development of mineral resources, including phosphates, bauxite, and mineral sands. Offshore oil and gas exploration has begun. The country’s climate and soil make it feasible to grow a wide range of cash crops, fruit, vegetables, and tubers; however, cashews generate more than 80% of export receipts and are the main source of income for many rural communities.</p> <p> </p> <p>The government was deposed in August 2015, and since then, a political stalemate has resulted in weak governance and reduced donor support.</p> <p> </p> <p>The country is participating in a three-year, IMF extended credit facility program that was suspended because of a planned bank bailout. The program was renewed in 2017, but the major donors of direct budget support (the EU, World Bank, and African Development Bank) have halted their programs indefinitely. Diversification of the economy remains a key policy goal, but Guinea-Bissau’s poor infrastructure and business climate will constrain this effort.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -924,7 +924,7 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "0 (2018)"
"text": "0 (2018 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0 (2018 est.)"
@ -966,10 +966,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "2,383 (2021)"
"text": "2,383 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.12 (2021) less than 1"
"text": "0.12 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1041,6 +1041,9 @@
"note": "note - the Public Order Police is responsible for maintaining law and order, while the Judicial Police, under the Ministry of Justice, has primary responsibility for investigating drug trafficking, terrorism, and other transnational crimes"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.8% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "1.7% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1052,9 +1055,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "1.7% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $45 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "1.6% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $40 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

18
africa/rw.json
View file

@ -668,7 +668,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Rwanda is a rural, agrarian country with agriculture accounting for about 63% of export earnings, and with some mineral and agro-processing. Population density is high but, with the exception of the capital Kigali, is not concentrated in large cities – its 12 million people are spread out on a small amount of land (smaller than the state of Maryland). Tourism, minerals, coffee, and tea are Rwanda's main sources of foreign exchange. Despite Rwanda's fertile ecosystem, food production often does not keep pace with demand, requiring food imports. Energy shortages, instability in neighboring states, and lack of adequate transportation linkages to other countries continue to handicap private sector growth.</p><p></p><p>The 1994 genocide decimated Rwanda's fragile economic base, severely impoverished the population, particularly women, and temporarily stalled the country's ability to attract private and external investment. However, Rwanda has made substantial progress in stabilizing and rehabilitating its economy well beyond pre-1994 levels. GDP has rebounded with an average annual growth of 6%-8% since 2003 and inflation has been reduced to single digits. In 2015, 39% of the population lived below the poverty line, according to government statistics, compared to 57% in 2006.</p><p></p><p>The government has embraced an expansionary fiscal policy to reduce poverty by improving education, infrastructure, and foreign and domestic investment. Rwanda consistently ranks well for ease of doing business and transparency.</p><p></p><p>The Rwandan Government is seeking to become a regional leader in information and communication technologies and aims to reach middle-income status by 2020 by leveraging the service industry. In 2012, Rwanda completed the first modern Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Kigali. The SEZ seeks to attract investment in all sectors, but specifically in agribusiness, information and communications, trade and logistics, mining, and construction. In 2016, the government launched an online system to give investors information about public land and its suitability for agricultural development.</p>"
"text": "<p>Rwanda is a rural, agrarian country with agriculture accounting for about 63% of export earnings, and with some mineral and agro-processing. Population density is high but, with the exception of the capital Kigali, is not concentrated in large cities – its 12 million people are spread out on a small amount of land (smaller than the state of Maryland). Tourism, minerals, coffee, and tea are Rwanda's main sources of foreign exchange. Despite Rwanda's fertile ecosystem, food production often does not keep pace with demand, requiring food imports. Energy shortages, instability in neighboring states, and lack of adequate transportation linkages to other countries continue to handicap private sector growth.</p> <p> </p> <p>The 1994 genocide decimated Rwanda's fragile economic base, severely impoverished the population, particularly women, and temporarily stalled the country's ability to attract private and external investment. However, Rwanda has made substantial progress in stabilizing and rehabilitating its economy well beyond pre-1994 levels. GDP has rebounded with an average annual growth of 6%-8% since 2003 and inflation has been reduced to single digits. In 2015, 39% of the population lived below the poverty line, according to government statistics, compared to 57% in 2006.</p> <p> </p> <p>The government has embraced an expansionary fiscal policy to reduce poverty by improving education, infrastructure, and foreign and domestic investment. Rwanda consistently ranks well for ease of doing business and transparency.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Rwandan Government is seeking to become a regional leader in information and communication technologies and aims to reach middle-income status by 2020 by leveraging the service industry. In 2012, Rwanda completed the first modern Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Kigali. The SEZ seeks to attract investment in all sectors, but specifically in agribusiness, information and communications, trade and logistics, mining, and construction. In 2016, the government launched an online system to give investors information about public land and its suitability for agricultural development.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -999,10 +999,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "11,671 (2020)"
"text": "11,671 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1041,10 +1041,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "17,685 (2021)"
"text": "17,685 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.14 (2021 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0.14 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1118,6 +1118,9 @@
"text": "Rwanda Defense Force (RDF): Rwanda Army (Rwanda Land Force), Rwanda Air Force (Force Aerienne Rwandaise, FAR), Rwanda Reserve Force, Special Units (2021)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.4% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "1.3% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1129,9 +1132,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "1.2% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $190 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "1.2% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $180 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
@ -1156,7 +1156,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "77,288 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) 48,125 (Burundi) (2022)"
"text": "77,288 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) 48,070 (Burundi) (2022)"
},
"stateless persons": {
"text": "9,500 (mid-year 2021)"

20
africa/se.json
View file

@ -930,10 +930,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "18,882 (2020)"
"text": "18,882 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "19.2 (2020 est.)"
"text": "19 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -972,10 +972,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "34,966 (2021)"
"text": "34,966 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "35.55 (2021)"
"text": "36 (2020 est.)"
}
}
},
@ -1061,20 +1061,20 @@
"note": "note - the military reports to the president, who acts as minister of defense &nbsp;"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.5% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "1.6% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2019": {
"text": "1.3% of GDP (2019)"
"text": "1.3% of GDP (2019 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2018": {
"text": "1.4% of GDP (2018)"
"text": "1.4% of GDP (2018 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "1.5% of GDP (2017)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "1.4% of GDP (2016)"
"text": "1.5% of GDP (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

10
africa/sf.json
View file

@ -692,7 +692,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>South Africa is a middle-income emerging market with an abundant supply of natural resources; well-developed financial, legal, communications, energy, and transport sectors; and a stock exchange that is Africa’s largest and among the top 20 in the world.</p><p></p><p>Economic growth has decelerated in recent years, slowing to an estimated 0.7% in 2017. Unemployment, poverty, and inequality - among the highest in the world - remain a challenge. Official unemployment is roughly 27% of the workforce, and runs significantly higher among black youth. Even though the country's modern infrastructure supports a relatively efficient distribution of goods to major urban centers throughout the region, unstable electricity supplies retard growth. Eskom, the state-run power company, is building three new power stations and is installing new power demand management programs to improve power grid reliability but has been plagued with accusations of mismanagement and corruption and faces an increasingly high debt burden.</p><p></p><p>South Africa's economic policy has focused on controlling inflation while empowering a broader economic base; however, the country faces structural constraints that also limit economic growth, such as skills shortages, declining global competitiveness, and frequent work stoppages due to strike action. The government faces growing pressure from urban constituencies to improve the delivery of basic services to low-income areas, to increase job growth, and to provide university level-education at affordable prices. Political infighting among South Africa’s ruling party and the volatility of the rand risks economic growth. International investors are concerned about the country’s long-term economic stability; in late 2016, most major international credit ratings agencies downgraded South Africa’s international debt to junk bond status.</p>"
"text": "<p>South Africa is a middle-income emerging market with an abundant supply of natural resources; well-developed financial, legal, communications, energy, and transport sectors; and a stock exchange that is Africa’s largest and among the top 20 in the world.</p> <p> </p> <p>Economic growth has decelerated in recent years, slowing to an estimated 0.7% in 2017. Unemployment, poverty, and inequality - among the highest in the world - remain a challenge. Official unemployment is roughly 27% of the workforce, and runs significantly higher among black youth. Even though the country's modern infrastructure supports a relatively efficient distribution of goods to major urban centers throughout the region, unstable electricity supplies retard growth. Eskom, the state-run power company, is building three new power stations and is installing new power demand management programs to improve power grid reliability but has been plagued with accusations of mismanagement and corruption and faces an increasingly high debt burden.</p> <p> </p> <p>South Africa's economic policy has focused on controlling inflation while empowering a broader economic base; however, the country faces structural constraints that also limit economic growth, such as skills shortages, declining global competitiveness, and frequent work stoppages due to strike action. The government faces growing pressure from urban constituencies to improve the delivery of basic services to low-income areas, to increase job growth, and to provide university level-education at affordable prices. Political infighting among South Africa’s ruling party and the volatility of the rand risks economic growth. International investors are concerned about the country’s long-term economic stability; in late 2016, most major international credit ratings agencies downgraded South Africa’s international debt to junk bond status.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1032,10 +1032,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "2,098,802 (2020)"
"text": "2,098,802 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "3.54 (2020 est.)"
"text": "4 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1074,10 +1074,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "1,303,057 (2021)"
"text": "1,303,057 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "2.2 (2021)"
"text": "2 (2020 est.)"
}
}
},

18
africa/sg.json
View file

@ -707,7 +707,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Senegal’s economy is driven by mining, construction, tourism, fisheries and agriculture, which are the primary sources of employment in rural areas. The country's key export industries include phosphate mining, fertilizer production, agricultural products and commercial fishing and Senegal is also working on oil exploration projects. It relies heavily on donor assistance, remittances and foreign direct investment. Senegal reached a growth rate of 7% in 2017, due in part to strong performance in agriculture despite erratic rainfall.</p><p></p><p>President Macky SALL, who was elected in March 2012 under a reformist policy agenda, inherited an economy with high energy costs, a challenging business environment, and a culture of overspending. President SALL unveiled an ambitious economic plan, the Emerging Senegal Plan (ESP), which aims to implement priority economic reforms and investment projects to increase economic growth while preserving macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability. Bureaucratic bottlenecks and a challenging business climate are among the perennial challenges that may slow the implementation of this plan.</p><p></p><p>Senegal receives technical support from the IMF under a Policy Support Instrument (PSI) to assist with implementation of the ESP. The PSI implementation continues to be satisfactory as concluded by the IMF’s fifth review in December 2017. Financial markets have signaled confidence in Senegal through successful Eurobond issuances in 2014, 2017, and 2018.</p><p></p><p>The government is focusing on 19 projects under the ESP to continue The government’s goal under the ESP is structural transformation of the economy. Key projects include the Thiès-Touba Highway, the new international airport opened in December 2017, and upgrades to energy infrastructure. The cost of electricity is a chief constraint for Senegal’s development. Electricity prices in Senegal are among the highest in the world. Power Africa, a US presidential initiative led by USAID, supports Senegal’s plans to improve reliability and increase generating capacity.</p>"
"text": "<p>Senegal’s economy is driven by mining, construction, tourism, fisheries and agriculture, which are the primary sources of employment in rural areas. The country's key export industries include phosphate mining, fertilizer production, agricultural products and commercial fishing and Senegal is also working on oil exploration projects. It relies heavily on donor assistance, remittances and foreign direct investment. Senegal reached a growth rate of 7% in 2017, due in part to strong performance in agriculture despite erratic rainfall.</p> <p> </p> <p>President Macky SALL, who was elected in March 2012 under a reformist policy agenda, inherited an economy with high energy costs, a challenging business environment, and a culture of overspending. President SALL unveiled an ambitious economic plan, the Emerging Senegal Plan (ESP), which aims to implement priority economic reforms and investment projects to increase economic growth while preserving macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability. Bureaucratic bottlenecks and a challenging business climate are among the perennial challenges that may slow the implementation of this plan.</p> <p> </p> <p>Senegal receives technical support from the IMF under a Policy Support Instrument (PSI) to assist with implementation of the ESP. The PSI implementation continues to be satisfactory as concluded by the IMF’s fifth review in December 2017. Financial markets have signaled confidence in Senegal through successful Eurobond issuances in 2014, 2017, and 2018.</p> <p> </p> <p>The government is focusing on 19 projects under the ESP to continue The government’s goal under the ESP is structural transformation of the economy. Key projects include the Thiès-Touba Highway, the new international airport opened in December 2017, and upgrades to energy infrastructure. The cost of electricity is a chief constraint for Senegal’s development. Electricity prices in Senegal are among the highest in the world. Power Africa, a US presidential initiative led by USAID, supports Senegal’s plans to improve reliability and increase generating capacity.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1032,10 +1032,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "207,592 (2019)"
"text": "228,774 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1.27 (2019 est.)"
"text": "1 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1074,10 +1074,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "153,813 (2021)"
"text": "153,813 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.92 (2021) less than 1"
"text": "0.92 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1177,8 +1177,11 @@
"note": "note - the National Police operates in major cities, while the Gendarmerie primarily operates outside urban areas"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.7% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "1.5% of GDP (2020)"
"text": "1.5% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2019": {
"text": "1.5% of GDP (2019 est.) (approximately $490 million)"
@ -1188,9 +1191,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "1.5% of GDP (2017) (approximately $430 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "1.4% of GDP (2016) (approximately $400 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

6
africa/sh.json
View file

@ -660,7 +660,7 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "3,000 (2018)"
"text": "3,000 (2018 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "49.93 (2018 est.)"
@ -702,10 +702,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "1,000 (2021 est.)"
"text": "1,000 (2018 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "16.64 (2021 est.)"
"text": "17 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Communications - note": {

10
africa/sl.json
View file

@ -669,7 +669,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Sierra Leone is extremely poor and nearly half of the working-age population engages in subsistence agriculture. The country possesses substantial mineral, agricultural, and fishery resources, but it is still recovering from a civil war that destroyed most institutions before ending in the early 2000s.</p><p></p><p>In recent years, economic growth has been driven by mining - particularly iron ore. The country’s principal exports are iron ore, diamonds, and rutile, and the economy is vulnerable to fluctuations in international prices. Until 2014, the government had relied on external assistance to support its budget, but it was gradually becoming more independent. The Ebola outbreak of 2014 and 2015, combined with falling global commodities prices, caused a significant contraction of economic activity in all areas. While the World Health Organization declared an end to the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone in November 2015, low commodity prices in 2015-2016 contributed to the country’s biggest fiscal shortfall since 2001. In 2017, increased iron ore exports, together with the end of the Ebola epidemic, supported a resumption of economic growth.</p><p></p><p>Continued economic growth will depend on rising commodities prices and increased efforts to diversify the sources of growth. Non-mining activities will remain constrained by inadequate infrastructure, such as power and roads, even though power sector projects may provide some additional electricity capacity in the near term. Pervasive corruption and undeveloped human capital will continue to deter foreign investors. Sustained international donor support in the near future will partially offset these fiscal constraints.</p>"
"text": "<p>Sierra Leone is extremely poor and nearly half of the working-age population engages in subsistence agriculture. The country possesses substantial mineral, agricultural, and fishery resources, but it is still recovering from a civil war that destroyed most institutions before ending in the early 2000s.</p> <p> </p> <p>In recent years, economic growth has been driven by mining - particularly iron ore. The country’s principal exports are iron ore, diamonds, and rutile, and the economy is vulnerable to fluctuations in international prices. Until 2014, the government had relied on external assistance to support its budget, but it was gradually becoming more independent. The Ebola outbreak of 2014 and 2015, combined with falling global commodities prices, caused a significant contraction of economic activity in all areas. While the World Health Organization declared an end to the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone in November 2015, low commodity prices in 2015-2016 contributed to the country’s biggest fiscal shortfall since 2001. In 2017, increased iron ore exports, together with the end of the Ebola epidemic, supported a resumption of economic growth.</p> <p> </p> <p>Continued economic growth will depend on rising commodities prices and increased efforts to diversify the sources of growth. Non-mining activities will remain constrained by inadequate infrastructure, such as power and roads, even though power sector projects may provide some additional electricity capacity in the near term. Pervasive corruption and undeveloped human capital will continue to deter foreign investors. Sustained international donor support in the near future will partially offset these fiscal constraints.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -992,7 +992,7 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "189 (2020)"
"text": "189 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0 (2020 est.)"
@ -1108,6 +1108,9 @@
"text": "Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF): operates under a Joint Force Command with Land Forces, Maritime Forces, and an Air Wing (2021)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "0.3% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "0.3% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1119,9 +1122,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "0.3% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $40 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "0.4% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $45 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

10
africa/so.json
View file

@ -631,7 +631,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Despite the lack of effective national governance, Somalia maintains an informal economy largely based on livestock, remittance/money transfer companies, and telecommunications. Somalia's government lacks the ability to collect domestic revenue and external debt – mostly in arrears – was estimated at about 77% of GDP in 2017.</p><p></p><p>Agriculture is the most important sector, with livestock normally accounting for about 40% of GDP and more than 50% of export earnings. Nomads and semi-pastoralists, who are dependent upon livestock for their livelihood, make up a large portion of the population. Economic activity is estimated to have increased by 2.4% in 2017 because of growth in the agriculture, construction and telecommunications sector. Somalia's small industrial sector, based on the processing of agricultural products, has largely been looted and the machinery sold as scrap metal.</p><p></p><p>In recent years, Somalia's capital city, Mogadishu, has witnessed the development of the city's first gas stations, supermarkets, and airline flights to Turkey since the collapse of central authority in 1991. Mogadishu's main market offers a variety of goods from food to electronic gadgets. Hotels continue to operate and are supported with private-security militias. Formalized economic growth has yet to expand outside of Mogadishu and a few regional capitals, and within the city, security concerns dominate business. Telecommunication firms provide wireless services in most major cities and offer the lowest international call rates on the continent. In the absence of a formal banking sector, money transfer/remittance services have sprouted throughout the country, handling up to $1.6 billion in remittances annually, although international concerns over the money transfers into Somalia continues to threaten these services’ ability to operate in Western nations. In 2017, Somalia elected a new president and collected a record amount of foreign aid and investment, a positive sign for economic recovery.</p>"
"text": "<p>Despite the lack of effective national governance, Somalia maintains an informal economy largely based on livestock, remittance/money transfer companies, and telecommunications. Somalia's government lacks the ability to collect domestic revenue and external debt – mostly in arrears – was estimated at about 77% of GDP in 2017.</p> <p> </p> <p>Agriculture is the most important sector, with livestock normally accounting for about 40% of GDP and more than 50% of export earnings. Nomads and semi-pastoralists, who are dependent upon livestock for their livelihood, make up a large portion of the population. Economic activity is estimated to have increased by 2.4% in 2017 because of growth in the agriculture, construction and telecommunications sector. Somalia's small industrial sector, based on the processing of agricultural products, has largely been looted and the machinery sold as scrap metal.</p> <p> </p> <p>In recent years, Somalia's capital city, Mogadishu, has witnessed the development of the city's first gas stations, supermarkets, and airline flights to Turkey since the collapse of central authority in 1991. Mogadishu's main market offers a variety of goods from food to electronic gadgets. Hotels continue to operate and are supported with private-security militias. Formalized economic growth has yet to expand outside of Mogadishu and a few regional capitals, and within the city, security concerns dominate business. Telecommunication firms provide wireless services in most major cities and offer the lowest international call rates on the continent. In the absence of a formal banking sector, money transfer/remittance services have sprouted throughout the country, handling up to $1.6 billion in remittances annually, although international concerns over the money transfers into Somalia continues to threaten these services’ ability to operate in Western nations. In 2017, Somalia elected a new president and collected a record amount of foreign aid and investment, a positive sign for economic recovery.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -909,10 +909,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "74,800 (2018)"
"text": "91,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0 (2018 est.)"
"text": "1 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -951,10 +951,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "119,000 (2021)"
"text": "119,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.75 (2021 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0.75 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},

8
africa/su.json
View file

@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "129,408 (2020)"
"text": "129,408 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
@ -1052,10 +1052,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "28,782 (2021)"
"text": "28,782 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.07 (2021) less than 1"
"text": "0.07 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1210,7 +1210,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "799,545 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 128,996 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 93,482 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers), 73,335 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 28,023 (Central African Republic) (2022)"
"text": "803,634 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 128,996 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 93,482 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers), 73,335 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 28,028 (Central African Republic) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "2,276,000 (civil war 1983-2005; ongoing conflict in Darfur region; government and rebel fighting along South Sudan border; inter-tribal clashes) (2020)"

16
africa/to.json
View file

@ -693,7 +693,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Togo has enjoyed a period of steady economic growth fueled by political stability and a concerted effort by the government to modernize the country’s commercial infrastructure, but discontent with President Faure GNASSINGBE has led to a rapid rise in protests, creating downside risks. The country completed an ambitious large-scale infrastructure improvement program, including new principal roads, a new airport terminal, and a new seaport. The economy depends heavily on both commercial and subsistence agriculture, providing employment for around 60% of the labor force. Some basic foodstuffs must still be imported. Cocoa, coffee, and cotton and other agricultural products generate about 20% of export earnings with cotton being the most important cash crop. Togo is among the world's largest producers of phosphate and seeks to develop its carbonate phosphate reserves, which provide more than 20% of export earnings.</p><p></p><p>Supported by the World Bank and the IMF, the government's decade-long effort to implement economic reform measures, encourage foreign investment, and bring revenues in line with expenditures has moved slowly. Togo completed its IMF Extended Credit Facility in 2011 and reached a Heavily Indebted Poor Country debt relief completion point in 2010 at which 95% of the country's debt was forgiven. Togo continues to work with the IMF on structural reforms, and in January 2017, the IMF signed an Extended Credit Facility arrangement consisting of a three-year $238 million loan package. Progress depends on follow through on privatization, increased transparency in government financial operations, progress toward legislative elections, and continued support from foreign donors.</p><p></p><p>Togo’s 2017 economic growth probably remained steady at 5.0%, largely driven by infusions of foreign aid, infrastructure investment in its port and mineral industry, and improvements in the business climate. Foreign direct investment inflows have slowed in recent years.</p>"
"text": "<p>Togo has enjoyed a period of steady economic growth fueled by political stability and a concerted effort by the government to modernize the country’s commercial infrastructure, but discontent with President Faure GNASSINGBE has led to a rapid rise in protests, creating downside risks. The country completed an ambitious large-scale infrastructure improvement program, including new principal roads, a new airport terminal, and a new seaport. The economy depends heavily on both commercial and subsistence agriculture, providing employment for around 60% of the labor force. Some basic foodstuffs must still be imported. Cocoa, coffee, and cotton and other agricultural products generate about 20% of export earnings with cotton being the most important cash crop. Togo is among the world's largest producers of phosphate and seeks to develop its carbonate phosphate reserves, which provide more than 20% of export earnings.</p> <p> </p> <p>Supported by the World Bank and the IMF, the government's decade-long effort to implement economic reform measures, encourage foreign investment, and bring revenues in line with expenditures has moved slowly. Togo completed its IMF Extended Credit Facility in 2011 and reached a Heavily Indebted Poor Country debt relief completion point in 2010 at which 95% of the country's debt was forgiven. Togo continues to work with the IMF on structural reforms, and in January 2017, the IMF signed an Extended Credit Facility arrangement consisting of a three-year $238 million loan package. Progress depends on follow through on privatization, increased transparency in government financial operations, progress toward legislative elections, and continued support from foreign donors.</p> <p> </p> <p>Togo’s 2017 economic growth probably remained steady at 5.0%, largely driven by infusions of foreign aid, infrastructure investment in its port and mineral industry, and improvements in the business climate. Foreign direct investment inflows have slowed in recent years.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1018,10 +1018,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "46,499 (2020)"
"text": "46,499 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
"text": "1 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1060,10 +1060,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "52,706 (2021) DSL, dedicated internet line, Wimax, WLL, FTTH"
"text": "52,706 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.64 (2021 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0.64 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1157,6 +1157,9 @@
"note": "note - the Gendarmerie falls under the Ministry of Defense but also reports to the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection on many matters involving law enforcement and internal security"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.8% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "2% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1168,9 +1171,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "1.9% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $130 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "1.8% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $120 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

10
africa/tp.json
View file

@ -639,7 +639,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>The economy of São Tomé and Príncipe is small, based mainly on agricultural production, and, since independence in 1975, increasingly dependent on the export of cocoa beans. Cocoa production has substantially declined in recent years because of drought and mismanagement. Sao Tome depends heavily on imports of food, fuels, most manufactured goods, and consumer goods, and changes in commodity prices affect the country’s inflation rate. Maintaining control of inflation, fiscal discipline, and increasing flows of foreign direct investment into the nascent oil sector are major economic problems facing the country. In recent years the government has attempted to reduce price controls and subsidies. In 2017, several business-related laws were enacted that aim to improve the business climate.</p><p></p><p>São Tomé and Príncipe has had difficulty servicing its external debt and has relied heavily on concessional aid and debt rescheduling. In April 2011, the country completed a Threshold Country Program with The Millennium Challenge Corporation to help increase tax revenues, reform customs, and improve the business environment. In 2016, Sao Tome and Portugal signed a five-year cooperation agreement worth approximately $64 million, some of which will be provided as loans. In 2017, China and São Tomé signed a mutual cooperation agreement in areas such as infrastructure, health, and agriculture worth approximately $146 million over five years.</p><p></p><p>Considerable potential exists for development of tourism, and the government has taken steps to expand tourist facilities in recent years. Potential also exists for the development of petroleum resources in São Tomé and Príncipe's territorial waters in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea, some of which are being jointly developed in a 60-40 split with Nigeria, but production is at least several years off.</p><p></p><p>Volatile aid and investment inflows have limited growth, and poverty remains high. Restricteded capacity at the main port increases the periodic risk of shortages of consumer goods. Contract enforcement in the country’s judicial system is difficult. The IMF in late 2016 expressed concern about vulnerabilities in the country’s banking sector, although the country plans some austerity measures in line with IMF recommendations under their three year extended credit facility. Deforestation, coastal erosion, poor waste management, and misuse of natural resources also are challenging issues.</p>"
"text": "<p>The economy of São Tomé and Príncipe is small, based mainly on agricultural production, and, since independence in 1975, increasingly dependent on the export of cocoa beans. Cocoa production has substantially declined in recent years because of drought and mismanagement. Sao Tome depends heavily on imports of food, fuels, most manufactured goods, and consumer goods, and changes in commodity prices affect the country’s inflation rate. Maintaining control of inflation, fiscal discipline, and increasing flows of foreign direct investment into the nascent oil sector are major economic problems facing the country. In recent years the government has attempted to reduce price controls and subsidies. In 2017, several business-related laws were enacted that aim to improve the business climate.</p> <p> </p> <p>São Tomé and Príncipe has had difficulty servicing its external debt and has relied heavily on concessional aid and debt rescheduling. In April 2011, the country completed a Threshold Country Program with The Millennium Challenge Corporation to help increase tax revenues, reform customs, and improve the business environment. In 2016, Sao Tome and Portugal signed a five-year cooperation agreement worth approximately $64 million, some of which will be provided as loans. In 2017, China and São Tomé signed a mutual cooperation agreement in areas such as infrastructure, health, and agriculture worth approximately $146 million over five years.</p> <p> </p> <p>Considerable potential exists for development of tourism, and the government has taken steps to expand tourist facilities in recent years. Potential also exists for the development of petroleum resources in São Tomé and Príncipe's territorial waters in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea, some of which are being jointly developed in a 60-40 split with Nigeria, but production is at least several years off.</p> <p> </p> <p>Volatile aid and investment inflows have limited growth, and poverty remains high. Restricteded capacity at the main port increases the periodic risk of shortages of consumer goods. Contract enforcement in the country’s judicial system is difficult. The IMF in late 2016 expressed concern about vulnerabilities in the country’s banking sector, although the country plans some austerity measures in line with IMF recommendations under their three year extended credit facility. Deforestation, coastal erosion, poor waste management, and misuse of natural resources also are challenging issues.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -965,10 +965,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "2,720 (2020)"
"text": "2,790 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1.24 (2020 est.)"
"text": "1 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1007,10 +1007,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "2,512 (2021)"
"text": "2,512 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1.15 (2021)"
"text": "1.15 (2020 est.)"
}
}
},

26
africa/ts.json
View file

@ -514,7 +514,7 @@
},
"Constitution": {
"history": {
"text": "several previous; latest approved by Constituent Assembly 26 January 2014, signed by the president, prime minister, and Constituent Assembly speaker 27 January 2014; note - in mid-December 2021 President Kais SAIED announced that a constitutional referendum would be held in late July 2022"
"text": "<p>history: several previous; latest approved by Constituent Assembly 26 January 2014, signed by the president, prime minister, and Constituent Assembly speaker on 27 January 2014; note - in September 2021, President Kais SAIED issued a decree granting him certain executive, legislative, and judiciary powers, and the authority to rule by decree, but allowed continued implementation of the preamble and chapters one and two of the Constitution, which guarantee rights and freedoms; in mid-December 202, SAIED announced that a constitutional referendum would be held on 25 July 2022</p>"
},
"amendments": {
"text": "proposed by the president of the republic or by one third of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People membership; following review by the Constitutional Court, approval to proceed requires an absolute majority vote by the Assembly and final passage requires a two-thirds majority vote by the Assembly; the president can opt to submit an amendment to a referendum, which requires an absolute majority of votes cast for passage"
@ -562,7 +562,7 @@
},
"Legislative branch": {
"description": {
"text": "<strong>note</strong>: on 25 July 2021, President SAIED suspended indefinitely  the Assembly<br>unicameral Assembly of the Representatives of the People or Majlis Nuwwab ash-Sha'b (Assemblee des representants du peuple) (217 seats; 199 members directly elected in Tunisian multi-seat constituencies and 18 members in multi-seat constituencies living abroad by party-list proportional representation vote; members serve 5-year terms)"
"text": "<strong>note</strong>: on 25 July 2021, President SAIED suspended indefinitely the Assembly, and on 30 March 2022 he dissolved the Assembly<br>unicameral Assembly of the Representatives of the People or Majlis Nuwwab ash-Sha'b (Assemblee des representants du peuple) (217 seats; 199 members directly elected in Tunisian multi-seat constituencies and 18 members in multi-seat constituencies living abroad by party-list proportional representation vote; members serve 5-year terms)"
},
"elections": {
"text": "initial election held on 6 October 2019 (next to be held in December 2022)"
@ -576,7 +576,7 @@
"text": "Court of Cassation (consists of the first president, chamber presidents, and magistrates and organized into 27 civil and 11 criminal chambers)"
},
"judge selection and term of office": {
"text": "Supreme Court judges nominated by the Supreme Judicial Council, an independent 4-part body consisting mainly of elected judges and the remainder legal specialists; judge tenure based on terms of appointment; Constitutional Court; note -court was established in the constitution but establishment has been delayed"
"text": "Supreme Court judges nominated by the Supreme Judicial Council, an independent 4-part body consisting mainly of elected judges and the remainder legal specialists; judge tenure based on terms of appointment; Constitutional Court (established in the constitution but inception has been delayed; note - in mid-February 2022, President SAIED dissolved the Supreme Judicial Council and replaced it with an interim council in early March"
},
"subordinate courts": {
"text": "Courts of Appeal; administrative courts; Court of Audit; Housing Court; courts of first instance; lower district courts; military courts"
@ -584,7 +584,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the new Tunisian constitution of January 2014 called for the creation of a constitutional court by the end of 2015, but as November 2021, the court had not been appointed; the court to consist of 12 members - 4 each to be appointed by the president, the Supreme Judicial Council (an independent 4-part body consisting mainly of elected judges and the remainder are legal specialists), and the Chamber of the People's Deputies (parliament); members are to serve 9-year terms with one-third of the membership renewed every 3 years"
},
"Political parties and leaders": {
"text": "Afek Tounes [Yassine BRAHIM]Al Badil Al-Tounisi (The Tunisian Alternative) [Mehdi JOMAA]<br>Call for Tunisia Party (Nidaa Tounes) [Ali HAFSI]<br>Current of Love [Hachemi HAMDI] (formerly the Popular Petition party)<br>Democratic Current [Mohamed ABBOU]<br>Democratic Patriots' Unified Party [Zied LAKHDHAR]<br>Dignity Coalition or Al Karama [Seifeddine MAKHIOUF]<br>Ennahda Movement (The Renaissance) [Rachid GHANNOUCHI]<br>Free Destourian Party or PDL [Abir MOUSSI]<br>Free Patriotic Union (Union patriotique libre) or UPL  [Slim RIAHI]<br>Green Tunisia Party [Abdelkader ZITOUNI]<br>Heart of Tunisia (Qalb Tounes) [Nabil KAROUI]<br>Irada Movement or Movement Party [Moncef MARZOUKI]<br>Long Live Tunisia (Tahya Tounes) [Youssef CHAHED]<br>Machrou Tounes (Tunisia Project) [Mohsen MARZOUK]<br>Movement of Socialist Democrats or MDS [Ahmed KHASKHOUSSI]<br>Party of the Democratic Arab Vanguard [Kheireddine SOUABNI]<br>People's Movement [Zouheir MAGHZAOUI]<br>Republican Party [Maya JRIBI]<br>Tunisian Ba'ath Movement [Othmen Bel Haj AMOR]<br>Tunisia First (Tunis Awlan) [Ridha BELHAJ]<br>Workers' Party [Hamma HAMMAMI]"
"text": "Afek Tounes [Yassine BRAHIM]Al Badil Al-Tounisi (The Tunisian Alternative) [Mehdi JOMAA]<br>Amal Party [Ridha BELHAJ]<br>Call for Tunisia Party (Nidaa Tounes) [Ali HAFSI]<br>Current of Love [Hachemi HAMDI] (formerly the Popular Petition party)<br>Democratic Current [Ghazi CHAOUACHI]<br>Democratic Patriots' Unified Party [Zied LAKHDHAR]<br>Dignity Coalition or Al Karama Coalition [Seifeddine MAKHIOUF]<br>Ennahda Movement (The Renaissance) [Rached GHANNOUCHI]<br>Free Destourian Party or PDL [Abir MOUSSI]<br>Green Tunisia Party [Abdelkader ZITOUNI]<br>Heart of Tunisia (Qalb Tounes) [Nabil KAROUI]<br>Long Live Tunisia (Tahya Tounes) [Youssef CHAHED]<br>Machrou Tounes (Tunisia Project) [Mohsen MARZOUK]<br>Movement of Socialist Democrats or MDS [Ahmed KHASKHOUSSI]<br>Party of the Democratic Arab Vanguard [Kheireddine SOUABNI]<br>People's Movement [Zouheir MAGHZAOUI]<br>Republican Party (Al Joumhouri) [Issam CHEBBI] <br>The Movement Party (Hizb Harak) [Moncef MARZOUKI]<br>Third Republic Party [Olfa Hamdi]<br>Tunisian Ba'ath Movement [Othmen Bel Haj AMOR]<br>Workers' Party [Hamma HAMMAMI]"
},
"International organization participation": {
"text": "ABEDA, AfDB, AFESD, AMF, AMU, AU, BSEC (observer), CAEU, CD, EBRD, FAO, G-11, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LAS, MIGA, MONUSCO, NAM, OAS (observer), OIC, OIF, OPCW, OSCE (partner), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@ -653,7 +653,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Tunisia's economy – structurally designed to favor vested interests – faced an array of challenges exposed by the 2008 global financial crisis that helped precipitate the 2011 Arab Spring revolution. After the revolution and a series of terrorist attacks, including on the country’s tourism sector, barriers to economic inclusion continued to add to slow economic growth and high unemployment.</p><p></p><p>Following an ill-fated experiment with socialist economic policies in the 1960s, Tunisia focused on bolstering exports, foreign investment, and tourism, all of which have become central to the country's economy. Key exports now include textiles and apparel, food products, petroleum products, chemicals, and phosphates, with about 80% of exports bound for Tunisia's main economic partner, the EU. Tunisia's strategy, coupled with investments in education and infrastructure, fueled decades of 4-5% annual GDP growth and improved living standards. Former President Zine el Abidine BEN ALI (1987-2011) continued these policies, but as his reign wore on cronyism and corruption stymied economic performance, unemployment rose, and the informal economy grew. Tunisia’s economy became less and less inclusive. These grievances contributed to the January 2011 overthrow of BEN ALI, further depressing Tunisia's economy as tourism and investment declined sharply.</p><p></p><p>Tunisia’s government remains under pressure to boost economic growth quickly to mitigate chronic socio-economic challenges, especially high levels of youth unemployment, which has persisted since the 2011 revolution. Successive terrorist attacks against the tourism sector and worker strikes in the phosphate sector, which combined account for nearly 15% of GDP, slowed growth from 2015 to 2017. Tunis is seeking increased foreign investment and working with the IMF through an Extended Fund Facility agreement to fix fiscal deficiencies.</p>"
"text": "<p>Tunisia's economy – structurally designed to favor vested interests – faced an array of challenges exposed by the 2008 global financial crisis that helped precipitate the 2011 Arab Spring revolution. After the revolution and a series of terrorist attacks, including on the country’s tourism sector, barriers to economic inclusion continued to add to slow economic growth and high unemployment.</p> <p> </p> <p>Following an ill-fated experiment with socialist economic policies in the 1960s, Tunisia focused on bolstering exports, foreign investment, and tourism, all of which have become central to the country's economy. Key exports now include textiles and apparel, food products, petroleum products, chemicals, and phosphates, with about 80% of exports bound for Tunisia's main economic partner, the EU. Tunisia's strategy, coupled with investments in education and infrastructure, fueled decades of 4-5% annual GDP growth and improved living standards. Former President Zine el Abidine BEN ALI (1987-2011) continued these policies, but as his reign wore on cronyism and corruption stymied economic performance, unemployment rose, and the informal economy grew. Tunisia’s economy became less and less inclusive. These grievances contributed to the January 2011 overthrow of BEN ALI, further depressing Tunisia's economy as tourism and investment declined sharply.</p> <p> </p> <p>Tunisia’s government remains under pressure to boost economic growth quickly to mitigate chronic socio-economic challenges, especially high levels of youth unemployment, which has persisted since the 2011 revolution. Successive terrorist attacks against the tourism sector and worker strikes in the phosphate sector, which combined account for nearly 15% of GDP, slowed growth from 2015 to 2017. Tunis is seeking increased foreign investment and working with the IMF through an Extended Fund Facility agreement to fix fiscal deficiencies.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -981,10 +981,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "1,533,273 (2020)"
"text": "1,533,273 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "12.97 (2020 est.)"
"text": "13 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1023,10 +1023,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "1,334,059 (2021)"
"text": "1,334,059 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "11.29 (2021)"
"text": "11 (2020 est.)"
}
}
},
@ -1126,8 +1126,11 @@
"note": "note - the National Police has primary responsibility for law enforcement in the major cities, while the National Guard (gendarmerie) oversees border security and patrols smaller towns and rural areas"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "3% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "2.9% of GDP (2020 est.)"
"text": "3% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2019": {
"text": "3.8% of GDP (2019 est.) (approximately $2.81 billion)"
@ -1137,9 +1140,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "4% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $2.81 billion)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "4.4% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $2.95 billion)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

18
africa/tz.json
View file

@ -714,7 +714,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Tanzania has achieved high growth rates based on its vast natural resource wealth and tourism with GDP growth in 2009-17 averaging 6%-7% per year. Dar es Salaam used fiscal stimulus measures and easier monetary policies to lessen the impact of the global recession and in general, benefited from low oil prices. Tanzania has largely completed its transition to a market economy, though the government retains a presence in sectors such as telecommunications, banking, energy, and mining.</p><p></p><p>The economy depends on agriculture, which accounts for slightly less than one-quarter of GDP and employs about 65% of the work force, although gold production in recent years has increased to about 35% of exports. All land in Tanzania is owned by the government, which can lease land for up to 99 years. Proposed reforms to allow for land ownership, particularly foreign land ownership, remain unpopular.</p><p></p><p>The financial sector in Tanzania has expanded in recent years and foreign-owned banks account for about 48% of the banking industry's total assets. Competition among foreign commercial banks has resulted in significant improvements in the efficiency and quality of financial services, though interest rates are still relatively high, reflecting high fraud risk. Banking reforms have helped increase private-sector growth and investment.</p><p></p><p>The World Bank, the IMF, and bilateral donors have provided funds to rehabilitate Tanzania's aging infrastructure, including rail and port, which provide important trade links for inland countries. In 2013, Tanzania completed the world's largest Millennium Challenge Compact (MCC) grant, worth $698 million, but in late 2015, the MCC Board of Directors deferred a decision to renew Tanzania’s eligibility because of irregularities in voting in Zanzibar and concerns over the government's use of a controversial cybercrime bill.</p><p></p><p>The new government elected in 2015 has developed an ambitious development agenda focused on creating a better business environment through improved infrastructure, access to financing, and education progress, but implementing budgets remains challenging for the government. Recent policy moves by President MAGUFULI are aimed at protecting domestic industry and have caused concern among foreign investors.</p>"
"text": "<p>Tanzania has achieved high growth rates based on its vast natural resource wealth and tourism with GDP growth in 2009-17 averaging 6%-7% per year. Dar es Salaam used fiscal stimulus measures and easier monetary policies to lessen the impact of the global recession and in general, benefited from low oil prices. Tanzania has largely completed its transition to a market economy, though the government retains a presence in sectors such as telecommunications, banking, energy, and mining.</p> <p> </p> <p>The economy depends on agriculture, which accounts for slightly less than one-quarter of GDP and employs about 65% of the work force, although gold production in recent years has increased to about 35% of exports. All land in Tanzania is owned by the government, which can lease land for up to 99 years. Proposed reforms to allow for land ownership, particularly foreign land ownership, remain unpopular.</p> <p> </p> <p>The financial sector in Tanzania has expanded in recent years and foreign-owned banks account for about 48% of the banking industry's total assets. Competition among foreign commercial banks has resulted in significant improvements in the efficiency and quality of financial services, though interest rates are still relatively high, reflecting high fraud risk. Banking reforms have helped increase private-sector growth and investment.</p> <p> </p> <p>The World Bank, the IMF, and bilateral donors have provided funds to rehabilitate Tanzania's aging infrastructure, including rail and port, which provide important trade links for inland countries. In 2013, Tanzania completed the world's largest Millennium Challenge Compact (MCC) grant, worth $698 million, but in late 2015, the MCC Board of Directors deferred a decision to renew Tanzania’s eligibility because of irregularities in voting in Zanzibar and concerns over the government's use of a controversial cybercrime bill.</p> <p> </p> <p>The new government elected in 2015 has developed an ambitious development agenda focused on creating a better business environment through improved infrastructure, access to financing, and education progress, but implementing budgets remains challenging for the government. Recent policy moves by President MAGUFULI are aimed at protecting domestic industry and have caused concern among foreign investors.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1040,10 +1040,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "72,469 (2020)"
"text": "72,469 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1082,10 +1082,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "1,135,608 (2021)"
"text": "1,135,608 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1.9 (2021 est.)"
"text": "2 (2020 est.)"
}
}
},
@ -1198,6 +1198,9 @@
"note": "note - the National Building Army is a paramilitary organization under the Defense Forces that provides 6 months of military and vocational training to individuals as part of their 2 years of public service; after completion of training, some graduates join the regular Defense Forces while the remainder become part of the People's (or Citizen's) Militia"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.1% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "1.2% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1209,9 +1212,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "1% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $690 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "1.1% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $690 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
@ -1245,7 +1245,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "127,009 (Burundi), 80,599 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2022)"
"text": "127,104 (Burundi), 80,599 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2022)"
}
},
"Trafficking in persons": {

14
africa/ug.json
View file

@ -691,7 +691,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Uganda has substantial natural resources, including fertile soils, regular rainfall, substantial reserves of recoverable oil, and small deposits of copper, gold, and other minerals. Agriculture is one of the most important sectors of the economy, employing 72% of the work force. The country’s export market suffered a major slump following the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan, but has recovered lately, largely due to record coffee harvests, which account for 16% of exports, and increasing gold exports, which account for 10% of exports. Uganda has a small industrial sector that is dependent on imported inputs such as refined oil and heavy equipment. Overall, productivity is hampered by a number of supply-side constraints, including insufficient infrastructure, lack of modern technology in agriculture, and corruption.</p><p></p><p>Uganda’s economic growth has slowed since 2016 as government spending and public debt has grown. Uganda’s budget is dominated by energy and road infrastructure spending, while Uganda relies on donor support for long-term drivers of growth, including agriculture, health, and education. The largest infrastructure projects are externally financed through concessional loans, but at inflated costs. As a result, debt servicing for these loans is expected to rise.</p><p></p><p>Oil revenues and taxes are expected to become a larger source of government funding as oil production starts in the next three to 10 years. Over the next three to five years, foreign investors are planning to invest $9 billion in production facilities projects, $4 billion in an export pipeline, as well as in a $2-3 billion refinery to produce petroleum products for the domestic and East African Community markets. Furthermore, the government is looking to build several hundred million dollars’ worth of highway projects to the oil region.</p><p></p><p>Uganda faces many economic challenges. Instability in South Sudan has led to a sharp increase in Sudanese refugees and is disrupting Uganda's main export market. Additional economic risks include: poor economic management, endemic corruption, and the government’s failure to invest adequately in the health, education, and economic opportunities for a burgeoning young population. Uganda has one of the lowest electrification rates in Africa - only 22% of Ugandans have access to electricity, dropping to 10% in rural areas.</p>"
"text": "<p>Uganda has substantial natural resources, including fertile soils, regular rainfall, substantial reserves of recoverable oil, and small deposits of copper, gold, and other minerals. Agriculture is one of the most important sectors of the economy, employing 72% of the work force. The country’s export market suffered a major slump following the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan, but has recovered lately, largely due to record coffee harvests, which account for 16% of exports, and increasing gold exports, which account for 10% of exports. Uganda has a small industrial sector that is dependent on imported inputs such as refined oil and heavy equipment. Overall, productivity is hampered by a number of supply-side constraints, including insufficient infrastructure, lack of modern technology in agriculture, and corruption.</p> <p> </p> <p>Uganda’s economic growth has slowed since 2016 as government spending and public debt has grown. Uganda’s budget is dominated by energy and road infrastructure spending, while Uganda relies on donor support for long-term drivers of growth, including agriculture, health, and education. The largest infrastructure projects are externally financed through concessional loans, but at inflated costs. As a result, debt servicing for these loans is expected to rise.</p> <p> </p> <p>Oil revenues and taxes are expected to become a larger source of government funding as oil production starts in the next three to 10 years. Over the next three to five years, foreign investors are planning to invest $9 billion in production facilities projects, $4 billion in an export pipeline, as well as in a $2-3 billion refinery to produce petroleum products for the domestic and East African Community markets. Furthermore, the government is looking to build several hundred million dollars’ worth of highway projects to the oil region.</p> <p> </p> <p>Uganda faces many economic challenges. Instability in South Sudan has led to a sharp increase in Sudanese refugees and is disrupting Uganda's main export market. Additional economic risks include: poor economic management, endemic corruption, and the government’s failure to invest adequately in the health, education, and economic opportunities for a burgeoning young population. Uganda has one of the lowest electrification rates in Africa - only 22% of Ugandans have access to electricity, dropping to 10% in rural areas.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1032,7 +1032,7 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "90,774 (2020)"
"text": "90,774 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
@ -1074,10 +1074,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "58,594 (2021)"
"text": "58,594 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.13 (2021) less than 1"
"text": "0.13 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1166,6 +1166,9 @@
"note": "note - in 2018, President MUSEVENI created a volunteer force of Local Defense Units under the military to beef up local security in designated parts of the country"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "2.5% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "2.5% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1177,9 +1180,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "1.2% of GDP (2017) (approximately $610 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "1.3% of GDP (2016) (approximately $620 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

20
africa/uv.json
View file

@ -689,7 +689,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Burkina Faso is a poor, landlocked country that depends on adequate rainfall. Irregular patterns of rainfall, poor soil, and the lack of adequate communications and other infrastructure contribute to the economy’s vulnerability to external shocks. About 80% of the population is engaged in subsistence farming and cotton is the main cash crop. The country has few natural resources and a weak industrial base.</p><p></p><p>Cotton and gold are Burkina Faso’s key exports - gold has accounted for about three-quarters of the country’s total export revenues. Burkina Faso’s economic growth and revenue depends largely on production levels and global prices for the two commodities. The country has seen an upswing in gold exploration, production, and exports.</p><p></p><p>In 2016, the government adopted a new development strategy, set forth in the 2016-2020 National Plan for Economic and Social Development, that aims to reduce poverty, build human capital, and to satisfy basic needs. A new three-year IMF program (2018-2020), approved in 2018, will allow the government to reduce the budget deficit and preserve critical spending on social services and priority public investments.</p><p></p><p>While the end of the political crisis has allowed Burkina Faso’s economy to resume positive growth, the country’s fragile security situation could put these gains at risk. Political insecurity in neighboring Mali, unreliable energy supplies, and poor transportation links pose long-term challenges.</p>"
"text": "<p>Burkina Faso is a poor, landlocked country that depends on adequate rainfall. Irregular patterns of rainfall, poor soil, and the lack of adequate communications and other infrastructure contribute to the economy’s vulnerability to external shocks. About 80% of the population is engaged in subsistence farming and cotton is the main cash crop. The country has few natural resources and a weak industrial base.</p> <p> </p> <p>Cotton and gold are Burkina Faso’s key exports - gold has accounted for about three-quarters of the country’s total export revenues. Burkina Faso’s economic growth and revenue depends largely on production levels and global prices for the two commodities. The country has seen an upswing in gold exploration, production, and exports.</p> <p> </p> <p>In 2016, the government adopted a new development strategy, set forth in the 2016-2020 National Plan for Economic and Social Development, that aims to reduce poverty, build human capital, and to satisfy basic needs. A new three-year IMF program (2018-2020), approved in 2018, will allow the government to reduce the budget deficit and preserve critical spending on social services and priority public investments.</p> <p> </p> <p>While the end of the political crisis has allowed Burkina Faso’s economy to resume positive growth, the country’s fragile security situation could put these gains at risk. Political insecurity in neighboring Mali, unreliable energy supplies, and poor transportation links pose long-term challenges.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1015,10 +1015,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "75,039 (2020)"
"text": "75,039 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1057,10 +1057,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "13,979 (2021)"
"text": "13,979 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.07 (2021) less than 1"
"text": "0.1 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1139,8 +1139,11 @@
"note": "note - the National Gendarmerie officially reports to the Ministry of Defense, but usually operates in support of the Ministry of Security and the Ministry of Justice; Gendarmerie troops are typically integrated with Army forces in anti-terrorism operations; for example, Gendarmerie, Army, and police forces were combined to form a 1,500-member task force known as the <em>Groupement des Forces Anti-Terroristes</em> (GFAT) to address terrorist activities along the country's northern border in 2013"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "2.4% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "2.5% of GDP (2020 est.)"
"text": "2.4% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2019": {
"text": "2.2% of GDP (2019 est.) (approximately $450 million)"
@ -1150,9 +1153,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "1.4% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $260 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "1.2% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $200 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
@ -1187,7 +1187,7 @@
"text": "24,756 (Mali) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "<p>1,814,283 (2022)</p>"
"text": "<p>1,850,293 (2022)</p>"
}
}
}

16
africa/wa.json
View file

@ -681,7 +681,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Namibia’s economy is heavily dependent on the extraction and processing of minerals for export. Mining accounts for about 12.5% of GDP, but provides more than 50% of foreign exchange earnings. Rich alluvial diamond deposits make Namibia a primary source for gem-quality diamonds. Marine diamond mining is increasingly important as the terrestrial diamond supply has dwindled. The rising cost of mining diamonds, especially from the sea, combined with increased diamond production in Russia and China, has reduced profit margins. Namibian authorities have emphasized the need to add value to raw materials, do more in-country manufacturing, and exploit the services market, especially in the logistics and transportation sectors.</p><p></p><p>Namibia is one of the world’s largest producers of uranium. The Chinese-owned Husab uranium mine began producing uranium ore in 2017, and is expected to reach full production in August 2018 and produce 15 million pounds of uranium a year. Namibia also produces large quantities of zinc and is a smaller producer of gold and copper. Namibia's economy remains vulnerable to world commodity price fluctuations and drought.</p><p></p><p>Namibia normally imports about 50% of its cereal requirements; in drought years, food shortages are problematic in rural areas. A high per capita GDP, relative to the region, obscures one of the world's most unequal income distributions; the current government has prioritized exploring wealth redistribution schemes while trying to maintain a pro-business environment. GDP growth in 2017 slowed to about 1%, however, due to contractions in both the construction and mining sectors, as well as an ongoing drought. Growth is expected to recover modestly in 2018.</p><p></p><p>A five-year Millennium Challenge Corporation compact ended in September 2014. As an upper middle income country, Namibia is ineligible for a second compact. The Namibian economy is closely linked to South Africa with the Namibian dollar pegged one-to-one to the South African rand. Namibia receives 30%-40% of its revenues from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); volatility in the size of Namibia's annual SACU allotment and global mineral prices complicates budget planning.</p>"
"text": "<p>Namibia’s economy is heavily dependent on the extraction and processing of minerals for export. Mining accounts for about 12.5% of GDP, but provides more than 50% of foreign exchange earnings. Rich alluvial diamond deposits make Namibia a primary source for gem-quality diamonds. Marine diamond mining is increasingly important as the terrestrial diamond supply has dwindled. The rising cost of mining diamonds, especially from the sea, combined with increased diamond production in Russia and China, has reduced profit margins. Namibian authorities have emphasized the need to add value to raw materials, do more in-country manufacturing, and exploit the services market, especially in the logistics and transportation sectors.</p> <p> </p> <p>Namibia is one of the world’s largest producers of uranium. The Chinese-owned Husab uranium mine began producing uranium ore in 2017, and is expected to reach full production in August 2018 and produce 15 million pounds of uranium a year. Namibia also produces large quantities of zinc and is a smaller producer of gold and copper. Namibia's economy remains vulnerable to world commodity price fluctuations and drought.</p> <p> </p> <p>Namibia normally imports about 50% of its cereal requirements; in drought years, food shortages are problematic in rural areas. A high per capita GDP, relative to the region, obscures one of the world's most unequal income distributions; the current government has prioritized exploring wealth redistribution schemes while trying to maintain a pro-business environment. GDP growth in 2017 slowed to about 1%, however, due to contractions in both the construction and mining sectors, as well as an ongoing drought. Growth is expected to recover modestly in 2018.</p> <p> </p> <p>A five-year Millennium Challenge Corporation compact ended in September 2014. As an upper middle income country, Namibia is ineligible for a second compact. The Namibian economy is closely linked to South Africa with the Namibian dollar pegged one-to-one to the South African rand. Namibia receives 30%-40% of its revenues from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); volatility in the size of Namibia's annual SACU allotment and global mineral prices complicates budget planning.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1019,10 +1019,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "141,334 (2020)"
"text": "140,370 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "5.56 (2020 est.)"
"text": "6 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1061,10 +1061,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "71,063 (2021)"
"text": "71,063 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "2.8 (2021)"
"text": "3 (2020 est.)"
}
}
},
@ -1160,6 +1160,9 @@
"text": "Namibian Defense Force (NDF): Army, Navy, Air Force<br><br>Ministry of Safety and Security: Namibian Police Force (includes a paramilitary Special Field Force responsible for protecting borders and government installations) (2021)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "3% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "3.4% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1171,9 +1174,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "3.6% of GDP (2017) (approximately $670 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "4.1% of GDP (2016) (approximately $750 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

16
africa/wz.json
View file

@ -642,7 +642,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>A small, landlocked kingdom, Eswatini is bordered in the north, west and south by the Republic of South Africa and by Mozambique in the east. Eswatini depends on South Africa for a majority of its exports and imports. Eswatini's currency is pegged to the South African rand, effectively relinquishing Eswatini's monetary policy to South Africa. The government is dependent on customs duties from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) for almost half of its revenue. Eswatini is a lower middle income country. As of 2017, more than one-quarter of the adult population was infected by HIV/AIDS; Eswatini has the world’s highest HIV prevalence rate, a financial strain and source of economic instability.</p><p></p><p>The manufacturing sector diversified in the 1980s and 1990s, but manufacturing has grown little in the last decade. Sugar and soft drink concentrate are the largest foreign exchange earners, although a drought in 2015-16 decreased sugar production and exports. Overgrazing, soil depletion, drought, and floods are persistent problems. Mining has declined in importance in recent years. Coal, gold, diamond, and quarry stone mines are small scale, and the only iron ore mine closed in 2014. With an estimated 28% unemployment rate, Eswatini's need to increase the number and size of small and medium enterprises and to attract foreign direct investment is acute.</p><p></p><p>Eswatini's national development strategy, which expires in 2022, prioritizes increases in infrastructure, agriculture production, and economic diversification, while aiming to reduce poverty and government spending. Eswatini's revenue from SACU receipts are likely to continue to decline as South Africa pushes for a new distribution scheme, making it harder for the government to maintain fiscal balance without introducing new sources of revenue.</p>"
"text": "<p>A small, landlocked kingdom, Eswatini is bordered in the north, west and south by the Republic of South Africa and by Mozambique in the east. Eswatini depends on South Africa for a majority of its exports and imports. Eswatini's currency is pegged to the South African rand, effectively relinquishing Eswatini's monetary policy to South Africa. The government is dependent on customs duties from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) for almost half of its revenue. Eswatini is a lower middle income country. As of 2017, more than one-quarter of the adult population was infected by HIV/AIDS; Eswatini has the world’s highest HIV prevalence rate, a financial strain and source of economic instability.</p> <p> </p> <p>The manufacturing sector diversified in the 1980s and 1990s, but manufacturing has grown little in the last decade. Sugar and soft drink concentrate are the largest foreign exchange earners, although a drought in 2015-16 decreased sugar production and exports. Overgrazing, soil depletion, drought, and floods are persistent problems. Mining has declined in importance in recent years. Coal, gold, diamond, and quarry stone mines are small scale, and the only iron ore mine closed in 2014. With an estimated 28% unemployment rate, Eswatini's need to increase the number and size of small and medium enterprises and to attract foreign direct investment is acute.</p> <p> </p> <p>Eswatini's national development strategy, which expires in 2022, prioritizes increases in infrastructure, agriculture production, and economic diversification, while aiming to reduce poverty and government spending. Eswatini's revenue from SACU receipts are likely to continue to decline as South Africa pushes for a new distribution scheme, making it harder for the government to maintain fiscal balance without introducing new sources of revenue.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -970,10 +970,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "41,000 (2018)"
"text": "39,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "3.65 (2018 est.)"
"text": "3 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1012,10 +1012,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "12,000 (2021 est.)"
"text": "12,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1.03 (2021)"
"text": "1 (2020 est.)"
}
}
},
@ -1069,6 +1069,9 @@
"text": "Umbutfo Eswatini Defense Force (UEDF): Army (includes a small air wing) (2021)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.7% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "1.8% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1080,9 +1083,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "2.1% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $140 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "2.2% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $150 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

16
africa/za.json
View file

@ -685,7 +685,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Zambia had one of the world’s fastest growing economies for the ten years up to 2014, with real GDP growth averaging roughly 6.7% per annum, though growth slowed during the period 2015 to 2017, due to falling copper prices, reduced power generation, and depreciation of the kwacha. Zambia’s lack of economic diversification and dependency on copper as its sole major export makes it vulnerable to fluctuations in the world commodities market and prices turned downward in 2015 due to declining demand from China; Zambia was overtaken by the Democratic Republic of Congo as Africa’s largest copper producer. GDP growth picked up in 2017 as mineral prices rose.</p><p></p><p>Despite recent strong economic growth and its status as a lower middle-income country, widespread and extreme rural poverty and high unemployment levels remain significant problems, made worse by a high birth rate, a relatively high HIV/AIDS burden, by market-distorting agricultural and energy policies, and growing government debt. Zambia raised $7 billion from international investors by issuing separate sovereign bonds in 2012, 2014, and 2015. Concurrently, it issued over $4 billion in domestic debt and agreed to Chinese-financed infrastructure projects, significantly increasing the country’s public debt burden to more than 60% of GDP. The government has considered refinancing $3 billion worth of Eurobonds and significant Chinese loans to cut debt servicing costs.</p>"
"text": "<p>Zambia had one of the world’s fastest growing economies for the ten years up to 2014, with real GDP growth averaging roughly 6.7% per annum, though growth slowed during the period 2015 to 2017, due to falling copper prices, reduced power generation, and depreciation of the kwacha. Zambia’s lack of economic diversification and dependency on copper as its sole major export makes it vulnerable to fluctuations in the world commodities market and prices turned downward in 2015 due to declining demand from China; Zambia was overtaken by the Democratic Republic of Congo as Africa’s largest copper producer. GDP growth picked up in 2017 as mineral prices rose.</p> <p> </p> <p>Despite recent strong economic growth and its status as a lower middle-income country, widespread and extreme rural poverty and high unemployment levels remain significant problems, made worse by a high birth rate, a relatively high HIV/AIDS burden, by market-distorting agricultural and energy policies, and growing government debt. Zambia raised $7 billion from international investors by issuing separate sovereign bonds in 2012, 2014, and 2015. Concurrently, it issued over $4 billion in domestic debt and agreed to Chinese-financed infrastructure projects, significantly increasing the country’s public debt burden to more than 60% of GDP. The government has considered refinancing $3 billion worth of Eurobonds and significant Chinese loans to cut debt servicing costs.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1025,10 +1025,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "71,844 (2020)"
"text": "71,844 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
"text": "0 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1067,10 +1067,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "82,317 (2021)"
"text": "82,317 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0.45 (2021) less than 1"
"text": "0.5 (2020 est.) less than 1"
}
}
},
@ -1176,6 +1176,9 @@
"text": "Zambia Defense Force (ZDF): Zambia Army, Zambia Air Force, Zambia National Service (support organization that also does public work projects); Defense Force Medical Service; Ministry of Home Affairs: Zambia Police (includes a paramilitary battalion) (2021)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.3% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "1.3% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
@ -1187,9 +1190,6 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "1.3% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $420 million)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2016": {
"text": "1.5% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $450 million)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {

10
africa/zi.json
View file

@ -691,7 +691,7 @@
},
"Economy": {
"Economic overview": {
"text": "<p>Zimbabwe's economy depends heavily on its mining and agriculture sectors. Following a contraction from 1998 to 2008, the economy recorded real growth of more than 10% per year in the period 2010-13, before falling below 3% in the period 2014-17, due to poor harvests, low diamond revenues, and decreased investment. Lower mineral prices, infrastructure and regulatory deficiencies, a poor investment climate, a large public and external debt burden, and extremely high government wage expenses impede the country’s economic performance.</p><p></p><p>Until early 2009, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) routinely printed money to fund the budget deficit, causing hyperinflation. Adoption of a multi-currency basket in early 2009 - which allowed currencies such as the Botswana pula, the South Africa rand, and the US dollar to be used locally - reduced inflation below 10% per year. In January 2015, as part of the government’s effort to boost trade and attract foreign investment, the RBZ announced that the Chinese renmimbi, Indian rupee, Australian dollar, and Japanese yen would be accepted as legal tender in Zimbabwe, though transactions were predominantly carried out in US dollars and South African rand until 2016, when the rand’s devaluation and instability led to near-exclusive use of the US dollar. The government in November 2016 began releasing bond notes, a parallel currency legal only in Zimbabwe which the government claims will have a one-to-one exchange ratio with the US dollar, to ease cash shortages. Bond notes began trading at a discount of up to 10% in the black market by the end of 2016.</p><p></p><p>Zimbabwe’s government entered a second Staff Monitored Program with the IMF in 2014 and undertook other measures to reengage with international financial institutions. Zimbabwe repaid roughly $108 million in arrears to the IMF in October 2016, but financial observers note that Zimbabwe is unlikely to gain new financing because the government has not disclosed how it plans to repay more than $1.7 billion in arrears to the World Bank and African Development Bank. International financial institutions want Zimbabwe to implement significant fiscal and structural reforms before granting new loans. Foreign and domestic investment continues to be hindered by the lack of land tenure and titling, the inability to repatriate dividends to investors overseas, and the lack of clarity regarding the government’s Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act.</p>"
"text": "<p>Zimbabwe's economy depends heavily on its mining and agriculture sectors. Following a contraction from 1998 to 2008, the economy recorded real growth of more than 10% per year in the period 2010-13, before falling below 3% in the period 2014-17, due to poor harvests, low diamond revenues, and decreased investment. Lower mineral prices, infrastructure and regulatory deficiencies, a poor investment climate, a large public and external debt burden, and extremely high government wage expenses impede the country’s economic performance.</p> <p> </p> <p>Until early 2009, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) routinely printed money to fund the budget deficit, causing hyperinflation. Adoption of a multi-currency basket in early 2009 - which allowed currencies such as the Botswana pula, the South Africa rand, and the US dollar to be used locally - reduced inflation below 10% per year. In January 2015, as part of the government’s effort to boost trade and attract foreign investment, the RBZ announced that the Chinese renmimbi, Indian rupee, Australian dollar, and Japanese yen would be accepted as legal tender in Zimbabwe, though transactions were predominantly carried out in US dollars and South African rand until 2016, when the rand’s devaluation and instability led to near-exclusive use of the US dollar. The government in November 2016 began releasing bond notes, a parallel currency legal only in Zimbabwe which the government claims will have a one-to-one exchange ratio with the US dollar, to ease cash shortages. Bond notes began trading at a discount of up to 10% in the black market by the end of 2016.</p> <p> </p> <p>Zimbabwe’s government entered a second Staff Monitored Program with the IMF in 2014 and undertook other measures to reengage with international financial institutions. Zimbabwe repaid roughly $108 million in arrears to the IMF in October 2016, but financial observers note that Zimbabwe is unlikely to gain new financing because the government has not disclosed how it plans to repay more than $1.7 billion in arrears to the World Bank and African Development Bank. International financial institutions want Zimbabwe to implement significant fiscal and structural reforms before granting new loans. Foreign and domestic investment continues to be hindered by the lack of land tenure and titling, the inability to repatriate dividends to investors overseas, and the lack of clarity regarding the government’s Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act.</p>"
},
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": {
@ -1013,10 +1013,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "252,067 (2020)"
"text": "252,067 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1.7 (2020 est.)"
"text": "2 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -1055,10 +1055,10 @@
},
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
"total": {
"text": "203,461 (2021)"
"text": "203,461 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1.37 (2021)"
"text": "1.4 (2020 est.)"
}
}
},