"text":"well over 90% of the population lives along the Mediterranean coast in and between Tripoli to the west and Al Bayda to the east; the interior remains vastly underpopulated due to the Sahara and lack of surface water as shown in this population distribution map"
"text":"<strong>note 1:</strong> more than 90% of the country is desert or semidesert<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the volcano Waw an Namus lies in south central Libya in the middle of the Sahara; the caldera is an oasis - the name means \"oasis of mosquitoes\" - containing several small lakes surrounded by vegetation and hosting various insects and a large diversity of birds"
"text":"7,017,224 (July 2021 est.)<br><br><strong>note:</strong> immigrants make up just over 12% of the total population, according to UN data (2019)",
"note":"<strong>note:</strong> immigrants make up just over 12% of the total population, according to UN data (2019)"
"text":"<br>كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
"text":"Muslim (official; virtually all Sunni) 96.6%, Christian 2.7%, Buddhist 0.3%, Hindu <0.1, Jewish <0.1, folk religion <0.1, unafilliated 0.2%, other <0.1 (2010 est.)<br><br><strong>note:</strong> non-Sunni Muslims include native Ibadhi Muslims (<1% of the population) and foreign Muslims",
"note":"<strong>note:</strong> non-Sunni Muslims include native Ibadhi Muslims (<1% of the population) and foreign Muslims"
"text":"<p>Despite continuing unrest, Libya remains a destination country for economic migrants. It is also a hub for transit migration to Europe because of its proximity to southern Europe and its lax border controls. Labor migrants have been drawn to Libya since the development of its oil sector in the 1960s. Until the latter part of the 1990s, most migrants to Libya were Arab (primarily Egyptians and Sudanese). However, international isolation stemming from Libya’s involvement in international terrorism and a perceived lack of support from Arab countries led QADHAFI in 1998 to adopt a decade-long pan-African policy that enabled large numbers of Sub-Saharan migrants to enter Libya without visas to work in the construction and agricultural industries. Although Sub-Saharan Africans provided a cheap labor source, they were poorly treated and were subjected to periodic mass expulsions.</p><p>By the mid-2000s, domestic animosity toward African migrants and a desire to reintegrate into the international community motivated QADHAFI to impose entry visas on Arab and African immigrants and to agree to joint maritime patrols and migrant repatriations with Italy, the main recipient of illegal migrants departing Libya. As his regime neared collapse in 2011, QADHAFI reversed his policy of cooperating with Italy to curb illegal migration and sent boats loaded with migrants and asylum seekers to strain European resources. Libya’s 2011 revolution decreased immigration drastically and prompted nearly 800,000 migrants to flee to third countries, mainly Tunisia and Egypt, or to their countries of origin. The inflow of migrants declined in 2012 but returned to normal levels by 2013, despite continued hostility toward Sub-Saharan Africans and a less-inviting job market.</p><p>While Libya is not an appealing destination for migrants, since 2014, transiting migrants – primarily from East and West Africa – continue to exploit its political instability and weak border controls and use it as a primary departure area to migrate across the central Mediterranean to Europe in growing numbers. In addition, more than 200,000 people were displaced internally as of August 2017 by fighting between armed groups in eastern and western Libya and, to a lesser extent, by inter-tribal clashes in the country’s south.</p>"
"text":"well over 90% of the population lives along the Mediterranean coast in and between Tripoli to the west and Al Bayda to the east; the interior remains vastly underpopulated due to the Sahara and lack of surface water as shown in this population distribution map"
"text":"desertification; limited natural freshwater resources; the Great Manmade River Project, the largest water development scheme in the world, brings water from large aquifers under the Sahara to coastal cities; water pollution is a significant problem; the combined impact of sewage, oil byproducts, and industrial waste threatens Libya's coast and the Mediterranean Sea"
"text":"Climate Change-Paris Agreement, Law of the Sea"
}
},
"Air pollutants":{
"particulate matter emissions":{
"text":"44.17 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions":{
"text":"50.56 megatons (2016 est.)"
},
"methane emissions":{
"text":"45.76 megatons (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Total water withdrawal":{
"municipal":{
"text":"700 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
},
"industrial":{
"text":"280 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
},
"agricultural":{
"text":"4.85 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Total renewable water resources":{
"text":"700 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
},
"Climate":{
"text":"Mediterranean along coast; dry, extreme desert interior"
},
"Land use":{
"agricultural land":{
"text":"8.8% (2018 est.)"
},
"agricultural land: arable land":{
"text":"arable land: 1% (2018 est.)"
},
"agricultural land: permanent crops":{
"text":"permanent crops: 0.2% (2018 est.)"
},
"agricultural land: permanent pasture":{
"text":"permanent pasture: 7.6% (2018 est.)"
},
"forest":{
"text":"0.1% (2018 est.)"
},
"other":{
"text":"91.1% (2018 est.)"
}
},
"Revenue from forest resources":{
"forest revenues":{
"text":"0.06% of GDP (2018 est.)"
}
},
"Revenue from coal":{
"coal revenues":{
"text":"0% of GDP (2018 est.)"
}
},
"Urbanization":{
"urban population":{
"text":"81% of total population (2021)"
},
"rate of urbanization":{
"text":"1.45% annual rate of change (2020-25 est.)"
}
},
"Food insecurity":{
"severe localized food insecurity":{
"text":"due to civil insecurity, economic and political instability, and high food prices - an estimated 1.3 million people (23% of the population) are in need of humanitarian assistance of which 700,000 require food assistance; half of the people in need of humanitarian assistance are internally displaced or migrants that are residing in, or transiting through, the country (2021)"
"note":"<strong>etymology:</strong> originally founded by the Phoenicians as Oea in the 7th century B.C., the city changed rulers many times over the successive centuries; by the beginning of the 3rd century A.D. the region around the city was referred to as Regio Tripolitana by the Romans, meaning \"region of the three cities\" - namely Oea (i.e., modern Tripoli), Sabratha (to the west), and Leptis Magna (to the east); over time, the shortened name of \"Tripoli\" came to refer to just Oea, which derives from the Greek words \"tria\" and \"polis\" meaning \"three cities\""
"text":"22 governorates (muhafazah, singular - muhafazat); Al Butnan, Al Jabal al Akhdar, Al Jabal al Gharbi, Al Jafarah, Al Jufrah, Al Kufrah, Al Marj, Al Marqab, Al Wahat, An Nuqat al Khams, Az Zawiyah, Banghazi (Benghazi), Darnah, Ghat, Misratah, Murzuq, Nalut, Sabha, Surt, Tarabulus (Tripoli), Wadi al Hayat, Wadi ash Shati"
"text":"previous 1951, 1977; in July 2017, the Constitutional Assembly completed and approved a draft of a new permanent constitution; in September 2018, the House of Representatives passed a constitutional referendum law in a session with contested reports of the quorum needed to pass the vote, and submitted it to the High National Elections Commission in December to begin preparations for a constitutional referendum"
"text":"on 5 February 2021, a UN-led forum elected - in a runoff - Mohammed Al MENFI chairman, Presidential Council and Abdul Hamid DBEIBEH, prime minister"
"text":"unicameral House of Representatives (Majlis Al Nuwab) or HoR (200 seats including 32 reserved for women; members directly elected by majority vote; member term NA); note - the High Council of State serves as an advisory group for the HoR"
"text":"last held on 25 June 2014 ( next election to be held on 24 December 2021); note - the Libyan Supreme Court in November 2014 declared the HoR election unconstitutional, but the HoR and the international community rejected the ruling"
"text":"percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 158, women 30, percent of women 16%; note - only 188 of the 200 seats were filled in the June 2014 election because of boycotts and lack of security at some polling stations; some elected members of the HoR also boycotted the election"
"text":"Ambassador Richard B. NORLAND (since 22 August 2019)"
},
"telephone":{
"text":"[218] (0) 91-220-3239"
},
"embassy":{
"text":"Sidi Slim Area/Walie Al-Ahed Road, Tripoli (temporarily closed); please direct inquiries regarding US citizens in Libya to LibyaEmergencyUSC@state.gov"
},
"mailing address":{
"text":"US Embassy, 8850 Tripoli Place, Washington, DC 20521-8850"
"note":"<strong>note:</strong> the US Embassy in Tripoli closed in July 2014 due to fighting near the embassy related to Libyan civil unrest; embassy staff and operations temporarily first relocated to Valetta, Malta and currently are temporarily relocated to Tunis, Tunisia"
"text":"three horizontal bands of red (top), black (double width), and green with a white crescent and star centered on the black stripe; the National Transitional Council reintroduced this flag design of the former Kingdom of Libya (1951-1969) on 27 February 2011; it replaced the former all-green banner promulgated by the QADHAFI regime in 1977; the colors represent the three major regions of the country: red stands for Fezzan, black symbolizes Cyrenaica, and green denotes Tripolitania; the crescent and star represent Islam, the main religion of the country"
},
"National symbol(s)":{
"text":"star and crescent, hawk; national colors: red, black, green"
"note":"<strong>note:</strong> also known as \"Ya Beladi\" or \"Oh, My Country!\"; adopted 1951; readopted 2011 with some modification to the lyrics; during the QADHAFI years between 1969 and 2011, the anthem was \"Allahu Akbar,\" (God is Great) a marching song of the Egyptian Army in the 1956 Suez War"
"text":"<p>Libya's economy, almost entirely dependent on oil and gas exports, has struggled since 2014 given security and political instability, disruptions in oil production, and decline in global oil prices. The Libyan dinar has lost much of its value since 2014 and the resulting gap between official and black market exchange rates has spurred the growth of a shadow economy and contributed to inflation. The country suffers from widespread power outages, caused by shortages of fuel for power generation. Living conditions, including access to clean drinking water, medical services, and safe housing have all declined since 2011. Oil production in 2017 reached a five-year high, driving GDP growth, with daily average production rising to 879,000 barrels per day. However, oil production levels remain below the average pre-Revolution highs of 1.6 million barrels per day.</p><p></p><p>The Central Bank of Libya continued to pay government salaries to a majority of the Libyan workforce and to fund subsidies for fuel and food, resulting in an estimated budget deficit of about 17% of GDP in 2017. Low consumer confidence in the banking sector and the economy as a whole has driven a severe liquidity shortage.</p>"
"text":"34.24 billion kWh (2016 est.)<br><br><strong>note:</strong> persistent electricity shortages have contributed to the ongoing instability throughout the country",
"note":"<strong>note:</strong> persistent electricity shortages have contributed to the ongoing instability throughout the country"
"text":"337,800 bbl/day (2015 est.)<br><br><strong>note:</strong> Libyan crude oil export values are highly volatile because of continuing protests and other disruptions across the country",
"note":"<strong>note:</strong> Libyan crude oil export values are highly volatile because of continuing protests and other disruptions across the country"
"text":"<p>political and security instability in Libya has disrupted its telecom sector, as warring factions make mobile towers a target and construction workers regularly cut cables by mistake; much of its infrastructure remains superior to that in most other African countries; rival operators fight for control; investment in fiber backbone and upgrades to international cables; limited LTE and 5G service; some satellite broadband; importer of broadcasting equipment from UAE and video displays from China (2021)</p> (2020)"
"text":"country code - 218; landing points for LFON, EIG, Italy-Libya, Silphium and Tobrok-Emasaed submarine cable system connecting Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia; satellite earth stations - 4 Intelsat, Arabsat, and Intersputnik; microwave radio relay to Tunisia and Egypt; tropospheric scatter to Greece; participant in Medarabtel (2019)"
"note":"<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
"text":"state-funded and private TV stations; some provinces operate local TV stations; pan-Arab satellite TV stations are available; state-funded radio (2019)"
"text":"note - in transition; the Government of National Accord (GNA) has various ground, air, and naval/coast guard forces under its command; the forces are comprised of a mix of semi-regular military units, militias, civilian volunteers, and foreign troops and mercenaries<br><br>forces under Khalifa HAFTER, known as the Libyan National Army (LNA), also include various ground, air, and naval units comprised of semi-regular military personnel, militias, and foreign troops and mercenaries (2020)"
"text":"both the forces of the Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army are largely equipped with weapons of Russian or Soviet origin; as of 2020, Russia, Turkey, and the UAE were reportedly providing weapons and military equipment to the forces in Libya (2020)"
"text":"as of the Fall of 2020, there were at least 10,000 foreign mercenaries and proxy forces estimated to be deployed in Libya to bolster both GNA- and LNA-aligned forces (2020)"
"text":"Ansar al-Sharia groups; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – Libya; al-Mulathamun Battalion (al-Mourabitoun); al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T",
"note":"<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T"
"text":"<p>dormant disputes include Libyan claims of about 32,000 sq km still reflected on its maps of southeastern Algeria and the FLN's assertions of a claim to Chirac Pastures in southeastern Morocco; various Chadian rebels from the Aozou region reside in southern Libya</p>"
