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README: add the '## Vestige Pro' section so the #vestige-pro anchor that six shipped surfaces link to actually resolves. States the price and the zero-knowledge guarantee honestly, with no checkout link, because checkout is not open yet. SECURITY: 'Vulnerabilities: 0' was false at 5. Updated rustls-webpki, quinn-proto and crossbeam-epoch; cargo audit now genuinely exits 0. Supported versions now list 2.3.x. Migration V20: clears connector sync cursors so the V19 idempotency repair happens automatically on the next source_sync, instead of a changelog note telling users to run something that could not have worked. cloud-sync hardening: redact the sync key and passphrase from Debug, require https (loopback carve-out), enforce a 12 character passphrase minimum. Trace retention days are clamped so a hostile value cannot abort the process. release.yml: add 'connectors' to the Windows and Intel Mac rows so source_sync is a real tool on those platforms rather than a compiled-out stub. CHANGELOG: correct three claims the audit fact-checked as false, document the breaking plaintext-sync change, and add the two new env levers. Gates: cargo test 1588/0, cloud-sync suite 18/0, clippy clean, svelte-check 937/0/0, dashboard build green, cargo audit 0 vulnerabilities. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
115 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
115 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
# Security Policy
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## Supported Versions
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| Version | Supported |
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| ------- | ------------------ |
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| 2.3.x | :white_check_mark: |
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| 2.2.x | Critical fixes only |
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| 2.1.x | Critical fixes only |
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| 2.0.x | :x: |
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| 1.x | :x: |
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## Reporting a Vulnerability
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If you discover a security vulnerability in Vestige, please report it responsibly:
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1. **DO NOT** open a public GitHub issue
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2. Email the maintainer directly (see GitHub profile)
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3. Include:
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- Description of the vulnerability
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- Steps to reproduce
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- Potential impact
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- Suggested fix (if any)
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You can expect a response within 48 hours.
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## Security Model
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### Trust Boundaries
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Vestige is a **local MCP server** designed to run on your machine with your user permissions:
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- **Trusted**: The MCP client or local agent that connects via stdio
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- **Untrusted**: Content passed through MCP tool arguments (validated before use)
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### What Vestige Does NOT Do
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- ❌ Make network requests during normal memory use, except first-run model download from Hugging Face
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- ❌ Require telemetry, hosted memory storage, or a cloud account
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- ❌ Access files outside its data directory
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- ❌ Send telemetry or analytics
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- ❌ Phone home to any server
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### Data Storage
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All data is stored locally in SQLite:
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| Platform | Location |
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|----------|----------|
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| macOS | `~/Library/Application Support/com.vestige.core/vestige.db` |
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| Linux | `~/.local/share/vestige/core/vestige.db` |
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| Windows | `%APPDATA%\vestige\core\vestige.db` |
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**Default**: Data is stored in plaintext with owner-only file permissions (0600).
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### Encryption at Rest
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For database-level encryption, build with SQLCipher:
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```bash
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cargo build --no-default-features --features encryption,embeddings,vector-search
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```
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Set `VESTIGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY` environment variable. SQLCipher encrypts all database files including the WAL journal. Alternatively, use OS-level encryption (FileVault, BitLocker, LUKS).
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### Input Validation
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All MCP tool inputs are validated:
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- Content size limit: 1MB max
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- Query length limit: 1000 characters
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- FTS5 queries are sanitized to prevent injection
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- All SQL uses parameterized queries (`params![]` macro)
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### Dependencies
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We use well-maintained dependencies and run `cargo audit` as part of the release gate. Status as of the v2.3.0 audit (2026-07-25, 564 crate dependencies scanned):
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- **Vulnerabilities**: 0
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- **Warnings**: 9 (3 unmaintained, 5 unsound, 1 yanked), all transitive, none with a known exploit path in Vestige
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That zero is not the default state. The 2.3.0 lockfile carried 5 vulnerabilities
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until three transitive dependencies were updated. Resolved for this release:
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| Advisory | Crate | Issue | Resolved by |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| RUSTSEC-2026-0185 (7.5 high) | `quinn-proto` | Remote memory exhaustion from unbounded out-of-order stream reassembly | 0.11.14 -> 0.11.16 |
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| RUSTSEC-2026-0104 | `rustls-webpki` | Reachable panic parsing a certificate revocation list | 0.103.11 -> 0.103.13 |
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| RUSTSEC-2026-0098 | `rustls-webpki` | Name constraints for URI names incorrectly accepted | 0.103.11 -> 0.103.13 |
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| RUSTSEC-2026-0099 | `rustls-webpki` | Name constraints accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard name | 0.103.11 -> 0.103.13 |
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| RUSTSEC-2026-0204 | `crossbeam-epoch` | Invalid pointer dereference in the `fmt::Pointer` impl | 0.9.18 -> 0.9.20 |
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`rustls-webpki` is the certificate validation path that Vestige Pro cloud sync
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depends on, so these versions are pinned forward in `Cargo.lock` and a downgrade
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is a release blocker, not a lockfile detail.
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The 9 remaining warnings are not vulnerabilities and have no available fix we can
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apply, because each is pulled in transitively by `fastembed`, `candle`,
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`usearch`, or `git2`:
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- **Unmaintained**: `core2` (RUSTSEC-2026-0105, also yanked), `number_prefix`
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(RUSTSEC-2025-0119), `paste` (RUSTSEC-2024-0436)
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- **Unsound**: `anyhow` (RUSTSEC-2026-0190), `cxx` (RUSTSEC-2026-0202), `git2`
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(RUSTSEC-2026-0183, RUSTSEC-2026-0184), `memmap2` (RUSTSEC-2026-0186)
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We track these and will pull the fixes through as soon as our direct
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dependencies publish releases that carry them. We would rather print the real
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number here than a zero.
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## Security Checklist
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- [x] No hardcoded secrets
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- [x] Parameterized SQL queries
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- [x] Input validation on all tools
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- [x] No command injection vectors
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- [x] No unsafe Rust code
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- [x] Dependencies audited
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