Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
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* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
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* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
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* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
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* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
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* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
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* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
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tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
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* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
The Metadata dataclass dropped its `metadata: list[Triple]` field
and EntityEmbeddings/ChunkEmbeddings settled on a singular
`vector: list[float]` field, but several call sites kept passing
`Metadata(metadata=...)` and `EntityEmbeddings(vectors=...)`. The
bugs were latent until a websocket client first hit
`/api/v1/flow/default/import/entity-contexts`, at which point the
dispatcher TypeError'd on construction.
Production fixes (5 call sites on the same migration tail):
* trustgraph-flow gateway dispatchers entity_contexts_import.py
and graph_embeddings_import.py — drop the stale
Metadata(metadata=...) kwarg; switch graph_embeddings_import
to the singular `vector` wire key.
* trustgraph-base messaging translators knowledge.py and
document_loading.py — fix decode side to read the singular
`"vector"` key, matching what their own encode sides have
always written.
* trustgraph-flow tables/knowledge.py — fix Cassandra row
deserialiser to construct EntityEmbeddings(vector=...)
instead of vectors=.
* trustgraph-flow gateway core_import/core_export — switch the
kg-core msgpack wire format to the singular `"v"`/`"vector"`
key and drop the dead `m["m"]` envelope field that referenced
the removed Metadata.metadata triples list (it was a
guaranteed KeyError on the export side).
Defense-in-depth regression coverage (32 new tests across 7 files):
* tests/contract/test_schema_field_contracts.py — pin the field
set of Metadata, EntityEmbeddings, ChunkEmbeddings,
EntityContext so any future schema rename fails CI loudly
with a clear diff.
* tests/unit/test_translators/test_knowledge_translator_roundtrip.py
and test_document_embeddings_translator_roundtrip.py -
encode→decode round-trip the affected translators end to end,
locking in the singular `"vector"` wire key.
* tests/unit/test_gateway/test_entity_contexts_import_dispatcher.py
and test_graph_embeddings_import_dispatcher.py — exercise the
websocket dispatchers' receive() path with realistic
payloads, the direct regression test for the original
production crash.
* tests/unit/test_gateway/test_core_import_export_roundtrip.py
— pack/unpack the kg-core msgpack format through the real
dispatcher classes (with KnowledgeRequestor mocked),
including a full export→import round-trip.
* tests/unit/test_tables/test_knowledge_table_store.py —
exercise the Cassandra row → schema conversion via __new__ to
bypass the live cluster connection.
Also fixes an unrelated leaked-coroutine RuntimeWarning in
test_gateway/test_service.py::test_run_method_calls_web_run_app: the
mocked aiohttp.web.run_app now closes the coroutine that Api.run() hands
it, mirroring what the real run_app would do, instead of leaving it for
the GC to complain about.