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4 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
cybermaggedon
67b2fc448f
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model.  The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.

IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
  passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra.  Reached over the
  standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
  caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
  rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
  change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
  workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA).  Key rotation writes a new kid and
  retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed.  Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
  required startup argument with no permissive default.  Masked
  "auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
  due to mode, state, or authorisation.

Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator.  Distinguishes JWTs
  (three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
  locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
  IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache.  Every failure path
  surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
  enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
  traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.

Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
  OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
  assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*").  No "cross-workspace"
  pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
  authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
  active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
  caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value.  Cross-
  workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
  permissive default.  Construction fails fast if omitted.  Enterprise
  editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
  protocol.

WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
  runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
  with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
  The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
  — browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
  reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
  enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
  the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
  handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).

Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
  op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
  the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).

Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
  Authenticator.permitted contract.  The gateway cannot run without
  IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
  downgrade path.

CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces.  Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.

Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
  resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
  operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
  role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
  policy, enterprise extensibility.

Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
  Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
  role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
  unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
  explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon).  New tests pin
  the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
  auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
cybermaggedon
c23e28aa66
Fix Metadata/EntityEmbeddings schema migration tail and add regression tests (#777)
The Metadata dataclass dropped its `metadata: list[Triple]` field
and EntityEmbeddings/ChunkEmbeddings settled on a singular
`vector: list[float]` field, but several call sites kept passing
`Metadata(metadata=...)` and `EntityEmbeddings(vectors=...)`. The
bugs were latent until a websocket client first hit
`/api/v1/flow/default/import/entity-contexts`, at which point the
dispatcher TypeError'd on construction.

Production fixes (5 call sites on the same migration tail):

  * trustgraph-flow gateway dispatchers entity_contexts_import.py
    and graph_embeddings_import.py — drop the stale
    Metadata(metadata=...)  kwarg; switch graph_embeddings_import
    to the singular `vector` wire key.
  * trustgraph-base messaging translators knowledge.py and
    document_loading.py — fix decode side to read the singular
    `"vector"` key, matching what their own encode sides have
    always written.
  * trustgraph-flow tables/knowledge.py — fix Cassandra row
    deserialiser to construct EntityEmbeddings(vector=...)
    instead of vectors=.
  * trustgraph-flow gateway core_import/core_export — switch the
    kg-core msgpack wire format to the singular `"v"`/`"vector"`
    key and drop the dead `m["m"]` envelope field that referenced
    the removed Metadata.metadata triples list (it was a
    guaranteed KeyError on the export side).

Defense-in-depth regression coverage (32 new tests across 7 files):

  * tests/contract/test_schema_field_contracts.py — pin the field
    set of Metadata, EntityEmbeddings, ChunkEmbeddings,
    EntityContext so any future schema rename fails CI loudly
    with a clear diff.
  * tests/unit/test_translators/test_knowledge_translator_roundtrip.py
    and test_document_embeddings_translator_roundtrip.py -
    encode→decode round-trip the affected translators end to end,
    locking in the singular `"vector"` wire key.
  * tests/unit/test_gateway/test_entity_contexts_import_dispatcher.py
    and test_graph_embeddings_import_dispatcher.py — exercise the
    websocket dispatchers' receive() path with realistic
    payloads, the direct regression test for the original
    production crash.
  * tests/unit/test_gateway/test_core_import_export_roundtrip.py
    — pack/unpack the kg-core msgpack format through the real
    dispatcher classes (with KnowledgeRequestor mocked),
    including a full export→import round-trip.
  * tests/unit/test_tables/test_knowledge_table_store.py —
    exercise the Cassandra row → schema conversion via __new__ to
    bypass the live cluster connection.

Also fixes an unrelated leaked-coroutine RuntimeWarning in
test_gateway/test_service.py::test_run_method_calls_web_run_app: the
mocked aiohttp.web.run_app now closes the coroutine that Api.run() hands
it, mirroring what the real run_app would do, instead of leaving it for
the GC to complain about.
2026-04-10 20:43:45 +01:00
cybermaggedon
5304f96fe6
Fix tests (#593)
* Fix unit/integration/contract tests which were broken by messaging fabric work
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
cybermaggedon
2f7fddd206
Test suite executed from CI pipeline (#433)
* Test strategy & test cases

* Unit tests

* Integration tests
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00