trustgraph/tests/unit/test_gateway/test_service.py
cybermaggedon 67b2fc448f
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model.  The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.

IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
  passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra.  Reached over the
  standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
  caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
  rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
  change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
  workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA).  Key rotation writes a new kid and
  retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed.  Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
  required startup argument with no permissive default.  Masked
  "auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
  due to mode, state, or authorisation.

Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator.  Distinguishes JWTs
  (three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
  locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
  IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache.  Every failure path
  surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
  enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
  traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.

Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
  OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
  assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*").  No "cross-workspace"
  pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
  authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
  active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
  caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value.  Cross-
  workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
  permissive default.  Construction fails fast if omitted.  Enterprise
  editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
  protocol.

WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
  runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
  with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
  The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
  — browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
  reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
  enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
  the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
  handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).

Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
  op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
  the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).

Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
  Authenticator.permitted contract.  The gateway cannot run without
  IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
  downgrade path.

CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces.  Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.

Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
  resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
  operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
  role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
  policy, enterprise extensibility.

Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
  Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
  role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
  unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
  explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon).  New tests pin
  the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
  auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00

179 lines
6.1 KiB
Python

"""
Tests for gateway/service.py — the Api class that wires together
the pub/sub backend, IAM auth, config receiver, dispatcher manager,
and endpoint manager.
The legacy ``GATEWAY_SECRET`` / ``default_api_token`` / allow-all
surface is gone, so the tests here focus on the Api's construction
and composition rather than the removed auth behaviour. IamAuth's
own behaviour is covered in test_auth.py.
"""
import pytest
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, Mock, patch
from aiohttp import web
from trustgraph.gateway.service import (
Api,
default_pulsar_host, default_prometheus_url,
default_timeout, default_port,
)
from trustgraph.gateway.auth import IamAuth
# -- constants -------------------------------------------------------------
class TestDefaults:
def test_exports_default_constants(self):
# These are consumed by CLIs / tests / docs. Sanity-check
# that they're the expected shape.
assert default_port == 8088
assert default_timeout == 600
assert default_pulsar_host.startswith("pulsar://")
assert default_prometheus_url.startswith("http")
# -- Api construction ------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.fixture
def mock_backend():
return Mock()
@pytest.fixture
def api(mock_backend):
with patch(
"trustgraph.gateway.service.get_pubsub",
return_value=mock_backend,
):
yield Api()
class TestApiConstruction:
def test_defaults(self, api):
assert api.port == default_port
assert api.timeout == default_timeout
assert api.pulsar_host == default_pulsar_host
assert api.pulsar_api_key is None
# prometheus_url gets normalised with a trailing slash
assert api.prometheus_url == default_prometheus_url + "/"
def test_auth_is_iam_backed(self, api):
# Any Api always gets an IamAuth. There is no "no auth" mode
# (GATEWAY_SECRET / allow_all has been removed — see IAM spec).
assert isinstance(api.auth, IamAuth)
def test_components_wired(self, api):
assert api.config_receiver is not None
assert api.dispatcher_manager is not None
assert api.endpoint_manager is not None
def test_dispatcher_manager_has_auth(self, api):
# The Mux uses this handle for first-frame socket auth.
assert api.dispatcher_manager.auth is api.auth
def test_custom_config(self, mock_backend):
config = {
"port": 9000,
"timeout": 300,
"pulsar_host": "pulsar://custom-host:6650",
"pulsar_api_key": "custom-key",
"prometheus_url": "http://custom-prometheus:9090",
}
with patch(
"trustgraph.gateway.service.get_pubsub",
return_value=mock_backend,
):
a = Api(**config)
assert a.port == 9000
assert a.timeout == 300
assert a.pulsar_host == "pulsar://custom-host:6650"
assert a.pulsar_api_key == "custom-key"
# Trailing slash added.
assert a.prometheus_url == "http://custom-prometheus:9090/"
def test_prometheus_url_already_has_trailing_slash(self, mock_backend):
with patch(
"trustgraph.gateway.service.get_pubsub",
return_value=mock_backend,
):
a = Api(prometheus_url="http://p:9090/")
assert a.prometheus_url == "http://p:9090/"
def test_queue_overrides_parsed_for_config(self, mock_backend):
with patch(
"trustgraph.gateway.service.get_pubsub",
return_value=mock_backend,
):
a = Api(
config_request_queue="alt-config-req",
config_response_queue="alt-config-resp",
)
overrides = a.dispatcher_manager.queue_overrides
assert overrides.get("config", {}).get("request") == "alt-config-req"
assert overrides.get("config", {}).get("response") == "alt-config-resp"
# -- app_factory -----------------------------------------------------------
class TestAppFactory:
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_creates_aiohttp_app(self, api):
# Stub out the long-tail dependencies that reach out to IAM /
# pub/sub so we can exercise the factory in isolation.
api.auth.start = AsyncMock()
api.config_receiver = Mock()
api.config_receiver.start = AsyncMock()
api.endpoint_manager = Mock()
api.endpoint_manager.add_routes = Mock()
api.endpoint_manager.start = AsyncMock()
api.endpoints = []
app = await api.app_factory()
assert isinstance(app, web.Application)
assert app._client_max_size == 256 * 1024 * 1024
api.auth.start.assert_called_once()
api.config_receiver.start.assert_called_once()
api.endpoint_manager.add_routes.assert_called_once_with(app)
api.endpoint_manager.start.assert_called_once()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_auth_start_runs_before_accepting_traffic(self, api):
"""``auth.start()`` fetches the IAM signing key, and must
complete (or time out) before the gateway begins accepting
requests. It's the first await in app_factory."""
order = []
# AsyncMock.side_effect expects a sync callable (its return
# value becomes the coroutine's return); a plain list.append
# avoids the "coroutine was never awaited" trap of an async
# side_effect.
api.auth.start = AsyncMock(
side_effect=lambda: order.append("auth"),
)
api.config_receiver = Mock()
api.config_receiver.start = AsyncMock(
side_effect=lambda: order.append("config"),
)
api.endpoint_manager = Mock()
api.endpoint_manager.add_routes = Mock()
api.endpoint_manager.start = AsyncMock(
side_effect=lambda: order.append("endpoints"),
)
api.endpoints = []
await api.app_factory()
# auth.start must be first (before config receiver, before
# any endpoint starts).
assert order[0] == "auth"
# All three must have run.
assert set(order) == {"auth", "config", "endpoints"}