Document the per-graph MCP surface (POST /graphs/{id}/mcp, shipped in the
preceding commits and landing under v0.8.0) and the `.gq` authoring controls
that shape stored-query tools.
- New docs/user/operations/mcp.md: the client-facing guide — transport, tool
catalog (built-ins + stored queries), projection modes, structured output,
authorization (call-authoritative + list-relaxation), Host/Origin policy, the
protocol-version contract.
- docs/user/operations/server.md: the /mcp endpoint + an "MCP surface" section;
docs/user/index.md: a "Connect an MCP agent" pointer.
- docs/user/queries/index.md: an Annotations section — query @description /
@instruction / @mcp(expose, tool_name) and per-parameter @description.
- AGENTS.md: topic-table row + MCP note on the HTTP-server capability row.
- docs/dev/testing.md: the omnigraph-mcp crate + server tests/mcp.rs.
- docs/dev/rfc-005 §D5: retire the "cluster = everything exposed" bridge —
cluster mode honors source `@mcp(expose: …)`; presentation vs authorization
split made explicit.
- skills/omnigraph: server-policy.md MCP section; stored-queries.md corrected
(per-query controls now ship via @mcp, not "planned"); SKILL.md MCP triggers,
Deep Dives row, version → 0.8.0.
- docs/releases/v0.8.0.md: the MCP surface + authoring-controls release notes.
Crate version manifests are deliberately NOT bumped — that is the v0.8.0
release-cut step; this lands on the feature branch.
15 KiB
HTTP Server (omnigraph-server)
Axum 0.8 + tokio + utoipa-generated OpenAPI. Cluster-only boot (RFC-011): the server always boots from a cluster (--cluster <dir | s3://…>) and serves N graphs (N ≥ 1) under cluster routes. There is no longer a single-graph flat-route mode, no positional <URI> boot, no --target, and no omnigraph.yaml-graphs:-map boot. All HTTP is nested under /graphs/{graph_id}/...; /healthz and the management /graphs enumeration stay flat.
Boot
Cluster boot (the only boot)
omnigraph-server --cluster <dir | s3://…> --bind 0.0.0.0:8080
omnigraph-server --cluster <dir-or-uri> boots from the cluster catalog's
applied revision. The server resolves that revision into per-graph
startup configs (id, URI, optional per-graph policy, stored-query
registry) plus an optional server-level policy, then opens every
configured graph in parallel at startup (bounded concurrency = 4,
fail-fast on the first open error). Routing is always multi-graph —
requests to bare flat protected paths (/read, /snapshot, …) return
404; the served surface is /graphs/{graph_id}/.... See
cluster-config.md
for what is read and the fail-fast readiness rules.
A scheme-qualified argument (s3://…) reads the ledger straight from the
storage root, with no local config directory. --bind,
--unauthenticated, and the bearer-token env vars all apply.
Stored-query validation at startup
If a graph declares a queries: registry (see cli-reference), the server loads and type-checks every stored query against that graph's live schema at startup and refuses to boot if any query references a type or property the schema lacks — the same fail-loud posture as a malformed policy file, so schema drift surfaces at the deploy boundary rather than at invocation. Two MCP-exposed queries claiming the same tool name is likewise a boot error. Non-blocking advisories (e.g. an MCP-exposed query with a vector parameter an agent cannot supply) are logged. Validate offline before deploying with omnigraph queries validate. Discover the exposed queries as a typed tool catalog with GET /queries, and invoke one over HTTP with POST /queries/{name} (both below).
Endpoint inventory
Per-graph endpoints — all nested under /graphs/{id}/.... {id} is the
graph id from the cluster's applied revision:
| Method | Path | Auth | Action |
|---|---|---|---|
| GET | /healthz |
none | — |
| GET | /openapi.json |
none | — (strips security if auth disabled; emits the nested cluster paths with cluster_ operation-id prefix) |
| GET | /graphs/{id}/snapshot?branch= |
bearer + read |
snapshot of branch |
| POST | /graphs/{id}/query |
bearer + read |
inline read query (canonical; clean field names query/name; mutations → 400) |
| POST | /graphs/{id}/read |
bearer + read |
deprecated alias of /query (legacy field names query_source/query_name, byte-stable response; carries Deprecation: true + Link: <query>; rel="successor-version") |
| POST | /graphs/{id}/export |
bearer + export |
NDJSON stream |
| POST | /graphs/{id}/mutate |
bearer + change |
mutation (canonical; query/name; accepts legacy query_source/query_name as serde aliases) |
| POST | /graphs/{id}/change |
bearer + change |
deprecated alias of /mutate (carries Deprecation: true + Link: <mutate>; rel="successor-version") |
| GET | /graphs/{id}/queries |
bearer + read |
list the mcp.expose stored queries as a typed tool catalog |
| POST | /graphs/{id}/queries/{name} |
bearer + invoke_query (+ change for a stored mutation) |
invoke a named query from the queries: registry; deny == 404 |
| POST | /graphs/{id}/mcp |
bearer + same per-tool Cedar gate | MCP (Model Context Protocol) surface — built-ins + stored queries as tools, schema/branches as resources (see mcp.md) |
| GET | /graphs/{id}/schema |
bearer + read |
get current .pg source |
| POST | /graphs/{id}/schema/apply |
bearer + schema_apply (target=main) |
disabled for cluster-backed serving; returns 409 and points operators at omnigraph cluster apply + restart |
| POST | /graphs/{id}/load |
bearer + branch_create (only when from is set and the branch is created) + change |
bulk load (canonical); branch creation is opt-in via from — without it a missing branch is a 404, never an implicit fork (32 MB body limit) |
| POST | /graphs/{id}/ingest |
bearer + branch_create (only when from is set and the branch is created) + change |
deprecated alias of /load (carries Deprecation: true + Link: <load>; rel="successor-version") (32 MB body limit) |
| GET | /graphs/{id}/branches |
bearer + read |
list branches |
| POST | /graphs/{id}/branches |
bearer + branch_create |
create |
| DELETE | /graphs/{id}/branches/{branch} |
bearer + branch_delete |
delete |
| POST | /graphs/{id}/branches/merge |
bearer + branch_merge |
merge source → target |
| GET | /graphs/{id}/commits?branch= |
bearer + read |
list |
| GET | /graphs/{id}/commits/{commit_id} |
bearer + read |
show |
Server-level management endpoints:
| Method | Path | Auth | Action |
|---|---|---|---|
| GET | /graphs |
bearer + graph_list on Server::"root" |
list registered graphs |
Stored-query catalog (GET /queries)
List the graph's mcp.expose stored queries as a typed tool catalog — enough for a client to register each as a tool without fetching .gq source. (The server also projects these queries as live MCP tools at POST /graphs/{id}/mcp — see mcp.md; this catalog endpoint is the REST view of the same registry.) Each entry: { name, tool_name, description, instruction, mutation, params }, where each param is { name, kind, item_kind?, vector_dim?, nullable }. kind is one of string | bool | int | bigint | float | date | datetime | blob | vector | list (decomposed so a consumer maps it with a closed switch, never re-parsing GQ type spelling). bigint (I64/U64), date, datetime, and blob are carried as JSON strings — a 64-bit integer loses precision as a JSON number, dates are ISO strings, and a blob is a URI string.
- Read-gated (works in default-deny mode). The catalog is graph-wide (branch-independent;
readis authorized againstmain). mcp.exposedefaults totrue— declaring a query inqueries:lists it; setmcp: { expose: false }to keep it HTTP/service-callable but hidden from the catalog.- Not Cedar-filtered per query (yet). A caller with
readbut notinvoke_querycan list a query they can't invoke (which would 404). Closing that gap is future per-query authorization; for now the catalog is a discovery surface andinvoke_queryremains the invocation gate.
Stored-query invocation (POST /queries/{name})
Invoke a curated, server-side stored query by name — the source comes from the graph's queries: registry, so the client never sends .gq. The request body itself is optional; omit it for no-param queries, or send { "params": { … }, "branch": "main", "snapshot": null }, where every field is optional and params keys match the query's declared parameters. The response is the read envelope (ReadOutput) for a stored read or the mutation envelope (ChangeOutput) for a stored mutation — serialized untagged, so the wire shape is identical to /query / /mutate.
- Gate:
invoke_query(per-graph, graph-scoped) at the boundary. A stored mutation is double-gated — it also passes the engine'schangegate, so an actor withinvoke_querybut notchangegets403. - Deny == unknown, for callers without
invoke_query: for a caller lacking the grant, aninvoke_querydenial and an unknown query name return the same404(identical body), so the catalog can't be probed. A caller that holdsinvoke_querymay still get the inner gate's403for an existing query it can'tread/change(the double-gate, above) — so existence is visible to grant-holders by design. - Requires an explicit policy grant when auth is on. In default-deny mode (bearer tokens but no
policy.file), onlyreadis permitted, so every/queries/{name}call returns404until aninvoke_queryrule is configured. - A stored mutation cannot target a
snapshot(400); a parameter type error is a structured400naming the parameter.
MCP surface (POST /graphs/{id}/mcp)
Each served graph is also an MCP (Model Context Protocol) server at
POST /graphs/{id}/mcp — a stateless Streamable-HTTP transport that projects the
built-in operations and the graph's stored-query registry as MCP tools, and
the schema / branch list as MCP resources. It adds no new capability: every
tool delegates to the same engine/handler path the REST routes use and is gated
by the same Cedar policy (resolved from the same bearer token). tools/list is a
relaxation of the per-call gate — a tool callable on some branch is never
hidden, while the per-call gate stays authoritative. Served automatically by the
cluster server; no separate flag.
Full client guide — connecting, the tool catalog, projection modes, structured output, Host/Origin policy, and the protocol-version contract — is in mcp.md.
Adding and removing graphs
Runtime add/remove via API is not exposed — neither POST /graphs
nor DELETE /graphs/{id} is implemented. Operators add or remove graphs
by running cluster apply against the cluster (which publishes a new
applied revision) and restarting the server so it boots from the new
revision. The server treats the cluster source as operator-owned and
never writes it.
A future release may introduce a managed registry and re-expose runtime mutation on top of it.
Inline read queries (POST /query)
POST /query is the read-only, agent-friendly twin of POST /read. The
request body uses clean field names that match the CLI -e flag and the GQ
query keyword:
{
"query": "query find($n: String) { match { $p: Person { name: $n } } return { $p.name } }",
"name": "find",
"params": { "n": "Alice" },
"branch": "main",
"snapshot": null
}
Response shape is identical to /read (ReadOutput). If the inline source
contains mutations (insert / update / delete), the request is rejected
with HTTP 400 and an error pointing the caller at POST /mutate — the
read-only contract is enforced at the URL.
POST /mutate is the canonical mutation endpoint. It accepts the same clean
field names (query, name); the legacy field names query_source and
query_name continue to deserialize as serde aliases so existing clients keep
working without changes.
Deprecated names (/read, /change)
POST /read and POST /change are kept for back-compat indefinitely — they
are byte-stable on the request side and otherwise behave identically to
/query / /mutate. They are flagged as deprecated through three independent
channels:
- OpenAPI: the operations carry
deprecated: trueinopenapi.json, so every OpenAPI codegen (typescript-fetch, openapi-generator, oapi-codegen, …) emits a@deprecatedmarker on the generated SDK method. - Response headers (RFC 9745): every response carries
Deprecation: true. - Response headers (RFC 8288): every response carries a
Linkheader pointing at the canonical successor:Link: <query>; rel="successor-version"for/read, andLink: <mutate>; rel="successor-version"for/change. SDKs and HTTP proxies can pick the successor up automatically.
Migration is purely cosmetic on the client side — swap the URL path, leave the request body and response handling alone.
Streaming
Only /export streams (application/x-ndjson, MPSC channel + Body::from_stream). Everything else is buffered JSON.
Error model
Uniform ErrorOutput { error, code?, merge_conflicts[], manifest_conflict? } with code ∈ unauthorized | forbidden | bad_request | not_found | conflict | too_many_requests | internal. Merge conflicts attach structured MergeConflictOutput { table_key, row_id?, kind, message }.
manifest_conflict is set on concurrent-write rejections (HTTP 409): the
caller's pre-write view of one table's manifest version was stale.
ManifestConflictOutput { table_key, expected, actual } tells the client
which table to refresh and retry. This is the conflict shape produced by
concurrent /mutate (or its /change alias) or /ingest calls landing
the same (table, branch) race.
HTTP status codes used: 200, 400, 401, 403, 404, 409, 429, 500.
Per-actor admission control
Disjoint
(table, branch) writes from different actors now run concurrently,
guarded only by the engine's per-(table, branch) write queue. To keep
one heavy actor from exhausting shared capacity (Lance I/O, manifest
churn, network), the server gates mutating handlers through per-process
admission limits configured from environment variables:
| Env var | Default | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
OMNIGRAPH_PER_ACTOR_INFLIGHT_MAX |
16 | Concurrent in-flight mutations per actor |
OMNIGRAPH_PER_ACTOR_BYTES_MAX |
4 GiB | In-flight estimated bytes per actor |
When an actor exceeds its in-flight count or byte budget, the server
returns HTTP 429 Too Many Requests with code: too_many_requests
and a Retry-After header (seconds). The actor should back off; other
actors are unaffected.
Cedar policy authorization runs before admission accounting so denied requests don't consume admission slots.
Today admission gates every mutating handler: /mutate (and its
deprecated alias /change), /ingest, /branches/{create,delete,merge},
and /schema/apply. Read-only endpoints (/snapshot, /query, /read,
/export, /branches GET, /commits, /schema GET) are not
admission-gated.
Body limits
- Default: 1 MB
/ingest: 32 MB
Auth model (bearer + SHA-256)
- Tokens are SHA-256 hashed on startup; plaintext is never persisted in memory.
- Constant-time comparison.
- Three sources, in precedence:
OMNIGRAPH_SERVER_BEARER_TOKENS_AWS_SECRET— AWS Secrets Manager (build with--features aws)OMNIGRAPH_SERVER_BEARER_TOKENS_FILEorOMNIGRAPH_SERVER_BEARER_TOKENS_JSON— JSON{actor_id: token, …}OMNIGRAPH_SERVER_BEARER_TOKEN— single legacy token, actordefault
- If no tokens are configured, startup refuses unless
--unauthenticatedorOMNIGRAPH_UNAUTHENTICATED=1explicitly opts into open local-dev mode. A policy file without tokens is also rejected at startup. In open mode/openapi.jsonstrips the security scheme.
See deployment.md for token-source operational details.
Tracing & observability
tower_http::TraceLayer::new_for_http()- Policy decisions logged at INFO level with actor, action, branch, decision, matched rule
- Startup logs: token source name, graph URI, bind address
- Graceful SIGINT shutdown
Not implemented (by design or "TBD")
- CORS — not configured; add
tower_http::corsif needed. - Rate limiting — per-actor admission control gates
/mutate(alias/change),/ingest,/branches/{create,delete,merge},/schema/apply(see "Per-actor admission control" above). No global rate limiter is configured; addtower_http::limitif a graph-wide cap is needed. - Pagination — none (commits/branches return everything; export streams).
- Runtime graph add/remove — run
cluster applyand restart.