omnigraph/docs/user/operations/mcp.md
Ragnor Comerford c06343362a
docs(mcp): document the MCP surface, authoring controls, and skill (v0.8.0)
Document the per-graph MCP surface (POST /graphs/{id}/mcp, shipped in the
preceding commits and landing under v0.8.0) and the `.gq` authoring controls
that shape stored-query tools.

- New docs/user/operations/mcp.md: the client-facing guide — transport, tool
  catalog (built-ins + stored queries), projection modes, structured output,
  authorization (call-authoritative + list-relaxation), Host/Origin policy, the
  protocol-version contract.
- docs/user/operations/server.md: the /mcp endpoint + an "MCP surface" section;
  docs/user/index.md: a "Connect an MCP agent" pointer.
- docs/user/queries/index.md: an Annotations section — query @description /
  @instruction / @mcp(expose, tool_name) and per-parameter @description.
- AGENTS.md: topic-table row + MCP note on the HTTP-server capability row.
- docs/dev/testing.md: the omnigraph-mcp crate + server tests/mcp.rs.
- docs/dev/rfc-005 §D5: retire the "cluster = everything exposed" bridge —
  cluster mode honors source `@mcp(expose: …)`; presentation vs authorization
  split made explicit.
- skills/omnigraph: server-policy.md MCP section; stored-queries.md corrected
  (per-query controls now ship via @mcp, not "planned"); SKILL.md MCP triggers,
  Deep Dives row, version → 0.8.0.
- docs/releases/v0.8.0.md: the MCP surface + authoring-controls release notes.

Crate version manifests are deliberately NOT bumped — that is the v0.8.0
release-cut step; this lands on the feature branch.
2026-06-17 16:04:29 +02:00

6.8 KiB

MCP Surface (POST /graphs/{id}/mcp)

Every graph a cluster server serves is also exposed as a Model Context Protocol server, so an MCP-capable agent (Claude Code/Desktop, Cursor, the OpenAI Responses mcp tool, …) can operate the graph directly — no bespoke client, no .gq source on the wire. The MCP surface adds no new capability or business logic: every tool delegates to the same engine/handler path the REST routes use and is gated by the same Cedar policy.

Available since v0.8.0. It is served automatically by omnigraph-server --cluster … — there is no separate flag to enable it.

Transport

One endpoint per served graph:

POST /graphs/{id}/mcp

It is a stateless Streamable-HTTP MCP transport: each call returns a single application/json JSON-RPC response — no SSE, no session id. GET/DELETE return 405 (Allow: POST).

curl -sS https://graph.example.com/graphs/sales/mcp \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Accept: application/json, text/event-stream" \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize",
       "params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-11-25","capabilities":{},
                 "clientInfo":{"name":"my-agent","version":"0"}}}'

A typical MCP client is configured with just the URL and the bearer token; it then drives initializetools/list / resources/listtools/call / resources/read itself.

Every tool operates on the single graph in the URL path, so the graph id never appears in tool arguments or output.

Tools

Built-in tools

Tool Action Notes
graph_health liveness/identity probe; always visible
graph_query read run an ad-hoc read-only GQ query (mutations rejected)
graph_snapshot read manifest version + per-table metadata of a branch
schema_get read the graph's .pg source
branch_list read branch names
commit_list / commit_get read commit history
graph_mutate change ad-hoc GQ insert/update/delete against a branch
graph_load change (+ branch_create with from) bulk NDJSON load
branch_create / branch_delete / branch_merge branch_create / branch_delete / branch_merge branch ops
schema_apply schema_apply disabled (409) under cluster-backed serving — evolve via cluster apply + restart

Tool names are domain-qualified snake_case. Read tools are annotated readOnly; writers are annotated destructive so clients can prompt for confirmation (annotations are advisory hints — Cedar is the enforcement boundary).

Stored-query tools

The graph's stored-query registry (declared in cluster.yaml, see stored queries) is projected as tools too, in one of two modes chosen automatically from the count of exposed queries:

  • per_query (fewer than 24 exposed queries) — each exposed query is its own tool, named by its @mcp(tool_name: …) (default: the query name), with a typed input schema. Query parameters are nested under a params object; branch (and, for reads, snapshot) sit alongside it.
  • meta (24 or more) — the per-query tools collapse to a discovery + execute pair, stored_query_list (filter/inspect the catalog) and stored_query_run(name, params, branch?, snapshot?), so a client's tool count stays bounded.

A stored-query tool's metadata comes from the .gq source (see query annotations):

  • description = @description, with @instruction folded in after a blank line (so the agent sees both in tools/list).
  • tool name = @mcp(tool_name: …), else the query name.
  • parameter docs = each parameter's @description, surfaced into the input schema's per-property description.

Only exposed queries are reachable on the MCP surface in either mode. Set @mcp(expose: false) to hide a query from tools/list, from stored_query_list, and from stored_query_run (by name). This is presentation only — the query stays HTTP/service-callable via POST /queries/{name} for any caller with the invoke_query grant.

Resources

URI Gate Contents
omnigraph://schema read the graph's .pg schema source
omnigraph://branches read branch names as JSON

Structured output

Tool results carry structured output: structuredContent (the typed result DTO — the same shape as the REST ReadOutput / ChangeOutput envelopes) plus a text mirror for clients that don't parse it.

Authorization

Authorization is identical to the REST routes — the bearer token resolves to a server-side actor, and every tool/resource hits the same Cedar gate:

  • Calls are authoritative. A built-in tool runs only if the actor's Cedar grant permits the action on the actual branch argument; a denial comes back as a tool error (isError), not a silent success.
  • Listing is a relaxation. tools/list shows a tool if the actor could invoke it on some branch, so a tool you can call is never hidden. Under the canonical "protect main, write feature branches" policy, graph_mutate is listed for an actor who can change unprotected branches even though a write to main would be denied. An actor with no write grant at all does not see the write tools.
  • Stored queries sit behind one coarse invoke_query gate (a stored mutation is additionally change-gated). For a caller lacking invoke_query, a stored tool masks as an unknown tool, so the catalog can't be probed.

Host & Origin policy

The transport derives a fail-closed DNS-rebinding / browser posture from the bind address at startup:

  • Loopback bind (127.0.0.1 or ::1) — the Host allow-list is the full loopback set 127.0.0.1, ::1, localhost (so either IP stack works regardless of which one the server bound), and Origin is unchecked (local-dev convenience).
  • Non-loopback bind — the Host allow-list is the configured public host(s) (or unrestricted if none are configured — rely on the bearer token there), and any present browser Origin is rejected (403) unless it is in the configured browser-origins list. A non-browser MCP client sends no Origin and passes.

A disallowed Host is 403.

Protocol version

The MCP-Protocol-Version header is validated on follow-up requests (an unsupported version → 400). The initialize request is exempt by design — it negotiates the version in its JSON-RPC body (protocolVersion), so the header is not checked there.

Not supported

MCP prompts, elicitation, sampling, tasks, and tools/list_changed / resources/list_changed subscriptions are not implemented — the surface is initialize + tools + resources over the stateless POST transport.