The CODEOWNERS required checks blocked every PR — the real root cause was a name mismatch, compounded by a path filter: - branch-protection.json required the contexts `CODEOWNERS / drift` and `CODEOWNERS / noedit` (the GitHub UI "workflow / job-id" display form), but the jobs report check-run names from their `name:` fields — "CODEOWNERS matches source" / "CODEOWNERS not hand-edited". The required contexts therefore never matched any reported check and sat permanently pending. - The workflow was also path-filtered to CODEOWNERS files, so it didn't even run for most PRs. Net effect: with both required checks unsatisfiable, every PR could only land via admin override (e.g. #140). Fixes: - A: drop the `paths:` filter so the workflow runs on every PR and both required contexts always report. - name fix: point branch-protection.json at the actual job names verbatim, and add a doc note that the contexts must equal the job `name:` values. - B: the `drift` job now re-renders and, on same-repo PRs, auto-commits the regenerated artifacts back to the branch (mirrors the openapi.json job in ci.yml); forks / manual runs strict-check instead. Contributors no longer run the script by hand. - D: render-codeowners.py also generates a "who owns what" path->owners + roles table spliced into docs/dev/codeowners.md between markers, so the human-readable view never drifts. Idempotent; CODEOWNERS output unchanged. - docs: correct the stale `enforce_admins: true` line (JSON and live are false). NOTE: the branch-protection.json change only takes effect after an admin runs `./scripts/apply-branch-protection.sh` (deliberate manual step, per docs/dev/branch-protection.md). Until then `main` still requires the old mismatched contexts, so this PR itself needs an admin-override merge — the last one that should be necessary. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Branch protection on main
main is gated by a declarative branch-protection policy. The source of truth is .github/branch-protection.json; the apply mechanism is scripts/apply-branch-protection.sh. Re-running the script with a changed JSON is idempotent.
This page explains what the policy says and how to change it.
Current policy
| Setting | Value | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Required status checks (strict) | Classify Changes, Check AGENTS.md Links, Test Workspace, Test omnigraph-server --features aws, CODEOWNERS matches source, CODEOWNERS not hand-edited |
Every PR must pass workspace tests, AGENTS.md link integrity, and the CODEOWNERS hygiene checks. The two CODEOWNERS contexts must equal the job name: values in .github/workflows/codeowners.yml verbatim — a context naming a job that never reports (the old CODEOWNERS / drift used the job id, and the job was path-filtered) leaves every PR permanently pending and forces admin overrides. strict: true requires the branch to be up-to-date with main before merge. |
| Required approving reviews | 1 |
At least one reviewer. With a 2-person team, going higher would block all merges when one person is unavailable. |
| Require code-owner reviews | true |
The reviewer must be a code owner per .github/CODEOWNERS. This is what makes the codeowners chassis enforced. |
| Dismiss stale reviews on new commits | true |
A push after approval invalidates the prior review. Prevents the "approve, then sneak in unreviewed changes" pattern. |
| Require linear history | true |
No merge commits — squash or rebase only. Matches recent practice. |
| Disallow force pushes | true |
No history rewrites on main. |
| Disallow branch deletions | true |
main cannot be deleted. |
| Required conversation resolution | true |
All review comment threads must be resolved before merge. |
| Enforce on admins | false |
Admins can override the gates (enforce_admins: false in the JSON). This is the intended escape hatch for the 2-person team; tightening to true is tracked under hardening below. |
| Required signed commits | not yet | Not enabled. Would lock out maintainers until everyone enrolls GPG/SSH commit signing. Tracked as a follow-up. |
How to apply
Run from the repository root:
./scripts/apply-branch-protection.sh
The script reads .github/branch-protection.json, strips the human-readable _comment field (the GitHub API rejects unknown keys), and PUTs to repos/ModernRelay/omnigraph/branches/main/protection.
Requires gh authenticated with a token that has admin permissions on the repository.
To preview without applying:
DRY_RUN=1 ./scripts/apply-branch-protection.sh
How to change the policy
- Edit
.github/branch-protection.json. - Open a PR. The JSON change goes through normal review.
- After the PR merges, an admin runs
./scripts/apply-branch-protection.shto push the new policy to GitHub.
The script is not run automatically by CI. Branch-protection changes are admin actions that should be applied deliberately — a CI-driven automatic apply would mean any merged PR could rewrite protection rules, which defeats the purpose. The script's existence makes the apply reproducible; the admin's manual invocation is the audit point.
How to read the current GitHub state
gh api repos/ModernRelay/omnigraph/branches/main/protection
Outputs the live policy. Compare against .github/branch-protection.json to detect drift.
Why declared as code
- Audit trail:
git log .github/branch-protection.jsonshows every change with a reviewable diff and a merge commit. - Disaster recovery: if branch protection is accidentally removed or weakened via the UI, the JSON is the canonical recovery point.
- Consistency: pairs with
.github/codeowners-roles.yml(the CODEOWNERS source of truth). Repository policy lives in the repository.
What this gates
After branch protection is applied, every PR targeting main must:
- Pass all listed status checks.
- Be up-to-date with
main(rebase or merge-from-main). - Have at least one approving review from a code owner for the touched paths.
- Have all review conversations resolved.
- Be squash- or rebase-merged (no merge commits).
Even repository admins are subject to these rules.
Subsequent hardening (not in this PR)
The branch-protection policy is the foundation. Future hardening adds:
- Required signed commits (
required_signatures: true) — once maintainers enroll GPG/SSH signing. - Tag protection for
v*tags viarepos/.../tags/protection. - Required reviewers from specific teams for high-leverage paths (e.g.,
docs/dev/invariants.md) via CODEOWNERS tier expansion + the N-unique-approvers CI workaround. - More required CI checks:
cargo deny,cargo audit,cargo fmt --check,cargo clippy -D warnings, CodeQL, secret scanning, schema-lint (MR-946).
See the hardening playbook for the full plan.