omnigraph/docs/dev/rfc-013-tenancy-cells.md

RFC-013: Tenancy model — cluster-as-tenant cells, pooled compute

Status: Proposed — general architecture (server topology, identity, deployment). Date: 2026-06-16 Audience: server / cluster / platform maintainers. Builds on: rfc-005-server-cluster-boot.md (cluster-only boot, applied-revision serving), rfc-011-cli-refactoring.md (the store/cluster/server ontology), rfc-004-cluster-graph-schema-apply.md (ledger/recovery/approvals — what makes a cell self-contained), rfc-007-operator-config.md (keyed credentials / secret resolution). Consumed by: rfc-003-mcp-server-surface.md (the MCP surface is one tenant-scoped consumer of this model, not its driver — see §6). Target release: v0.9.x (cell refactor) → cloud GA (pooled tier + WorkOS/OIDC).

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1. Summary

This RFC fixes the tenancy model for OmniGraph as a server/platform concern — independent of any one surface (HTTP data plane, MCP, CLI). It resolves an ambiguity that currently sits half-built in the code: the server is cluster-only (one cluster per process — rfc-005), yet the identity layer carries pooled multi-tenant scaffolding (GraphKey.tenant_id, ResolvedActor.tenant_id, "Cloud will set Some(...) from the OAuth org_id claim"). Those two point at different tenancy architectures. We pick one:

The cluster is the tenant is the cell. A cell is the unit of data isolation — its own storage root, catalog, Cedar policy bundle, and token source. Isolation is structural (by deployment), never a row-level tenant_id filter on shared data. Density comes from one server process hosting many cells, not from pooling tenants into one graph.

The one structural change: lift today's per-cluster server runtime into a CellRuntime value and let the server hold a map of them, resolved per request by host (or path) before authentication. The entire per-graph stack beneath — handlers, Cedar enforcement, stored queries, the RFC-003 MCP backend — is unchanged; it gains one outer dimension, not a rewrite. Identity maps WorkOS Organization → cell, 1:1, with a per-cell OAuth audience, so a token for one tenant cannot be verified against another's endpoint. The result is best-practice tiered isolation (silo the data, pool the compute) on one binary: dedicated/on-prem (1 process : 1 cell) and pooled cloud (1 process : N cells) are the same code, different topology.

2. Goals

• Decide the tenancy model and make the code stop implying two.
• Isolation by construction: a tenant cannot reach or enumerate another tenant's data even if a Cedar policy is missing or a handler has a bug.
• Density without row-level pooling: amortize compute across tenants while keeping each tenant's storage, catalog, policy, and tokens fully separate.
• One binary, tiered topology: dedicated, pooled, and on-prem are deployment choices, not forks. No cloud-only correctness.
• Additive to the substrate: no change to the manifest/commit/Cedar invariants; the data plane and MCP surface ride on top unchanged.

3. Non-Goals

• Row-level (pooled-into-one-graph) multi-tenancy. OmniGraph has no engine-level row security; pooling tenants into a shared graph would make isolation depend on a per-query filter — the highest-risk pattern, explicitly rejected (§4).
• A new in-process tenant_id authorization dimension. Cedar stays per-graph / per-cell; the cell boundary does the tenant isolation (§5.5).
• Hosting an OAuth Authorization Server. Each cell is a Resource Server; the AS is WorkOS or the customer's IdP (§5.4), same posture as rfc-003 §3.
• Cross-cell queries / cross-tenant joins. A cell is a hard boundary by design.

4. The tenancy decision (and why)

The industry framing is silo / pool / bridge, refined to tiered + cell-based:

Model	Isolation	Density	Fit
Silo — infra per tenant	strongest (structural)	worst	few, large, regulated
Pool — shared infra, logical tenant_id	weakest (code-dependent)	best	many small — only with engine RLS
Bridge — silo some layers, pool others	tunable	tunable	most real products

Why not pool the data tier. A pooled data store puts isolation in one place: every read/write must carry the tenant filter; one miss is a cross-tenant breach, and leaked customer data cannot be rotated. Postgres has Row-Level Security precisely to move that check into the engine. OmniGraph has no RLS equivalent and no row-level tenant filtering — so pooling tenants into a shared graph would adopt the most dangerous isolation pattern without the substrate support that makes it safe. Disqualifying for a data substrate.

Therefore: silo the data, pool the compute (the bridge model, biased to storage-silo because it is a database). The isolation unit is the cluster, which already gives separate storage root + catalog + policy bundle + token source. A cluster is also a natural cell (a bounded blast-radius unit, the cell-based architecture pattern): a fault or breach is contained to one tenant, never the fleet. Density is then a compute concern — one process serving many cells — not a data concern. This is the model the code is already ~80% built for; the gap is compute-density routing, not isolation.

5. Design

5.1 The Cell abstraction

A cell is exactly today's whole single-cluster server runtime, lifted into a value. The fields that are per-cluster today (registry, token table, server policy, boot source) move off AppState onto a CellRuntime:

// new — a cell == one cluster's runtime == one tenant
pub struct CellRuntime {
    pub cell_id:       CellId,                       // == cluster id == tenant id (audit/log key, NOT an isolation check)
    pub registry:      Arc<GraphRegistry>,           // this cell's graphs (GraphHandle{ engine, policy, queries })
    pub auth:          CellAuth,                      // per-cell token source — §5.4
    pub server_policy: Option<Arc<PolicyEngine>>,    // this cell's server-scoped Cedar (GraphList, …)
    pub config_path:   PathBuf,                       // this cell's cluster boot source (applied revision)
}

Everything inside a cell — GraphHandle, per-graph Cedar bundles, stored-query registries, GraphKey { tenant_id, graph_id } — is unchanged. Graph ids are unique within a cell, which is all that is needed; there is no global graph namespace and no route↔key reconciliation problem because the cell is resolved first.

5.2 Server: one process, many cells

pub struct AppState {
    pub cells:    Arc<CellRegistry>,     // host/prefix -> Arc<CellRuntime>   (the ONLY new top-level field)
    pub workload: Arc<WorkloadController>, // admission control (see Deferred — per-cell fairness)
}

// today's single `Multi { graphs, config_path, server_policy }` (rfc-005) becomes ONE cell;
// the server boots N of them.
pub enum ServerConfigMode {
    MultiCluster { cells: Vec<CellBootConfig> },
}

Boot opens each cell's applied revision (the existing rfc-005 path, run N times, bounded-concurrency) and inserts Arc<CellRuntime> into the CellRegistry keyed by its host (or path prefix). A dedicated/on-prem deployment boots a one-entry map; a pooled deployment boots many.

5.3 Routing & middleware — one new outer hop

The existing build_app nests per-graph routes under /graphs/{graph_id} with two route_layers (resolve_graph_handle inner, require_bearer_auth outer). We add one outermost layer, resolve_cell, and rebind two existing layers to read the cell instead of AppState:

let per_graph_protected = Router::new()
    .route("/snapshot", get(server_snapshot))
    // … /query /mutate /queries /schema /load /branches /commits …
    .merge(mcp::mcp_router(state.clone()))                       // RFC-003 — unchanged
    .route_layer(from_fn_with_state(state.clone(), resolve_graph_handle))  // inner: reads CELL.registry  (was AppState.routing)
    .route_layer(from_fn_with_state(state.clone(), require_bearer_auth))   // mid:   reads CELL.auth      (was AppState.bearer_tokens)
    .route_layer(from_fn_with_state(state.clone(), resolve_cell));         // OUTER: injects Arc<CellRuntime>   ← NEW

Request lifecycle:

resolve_cell        host/prefix → Arc<CellRuntime>            (404 unknown cell)   ← NEW, outermost
  └─ require_bearer_auth   validate token vs CELL.auth → ResolvedActor   (401)     ← now cell-scoped
       └─ resolve_graph_handle   {graph_id} in CELL.registry → Arc<GraphHandle> (404) ← now cell-scoped
            └─ handler / MCP   run_query · run_mutate · /mcp · Cedar enforce(...)   ← UNCHANGED

The only handler-adjacent edits: require_bearer_auth reads cell.auth, resolve_graph_handle / server_graphs_list read cell.registry. The isolation is in the ordering: cell-A's token table and registry are unreachable from a cell-B request because the cell is resolved first and everything downstream reads that cell.

Cell selector — host-based (recommended) vs path-based:

	Host-based	Path-based
Selector	Host: tenant-a.omnigraph.example.com	/clusters/{cell_id}/…
OAuth audience	the per-tenant origin (natural RFC 8707 resource)	…/clusters/{cell_id}
Origin/CORS	isolated per subdomain (free)	shared origin
DNS/cert	wildcard *.example.com → pooled fleet	one host
resolve_cell	cells.by_host(host)	cells.by_prefix(first_segment)

Host-based wins for cloud (per-tenant audience, Origin, and cookie boundaries fall out for free). Path-based is the simple on-prem/dev shape. resolve_cell abstracts which.

5.4 Identity & auth — per cell, two modes

pub enum CellAuth {
    Static(Arc<[(BearerTokenHash, Arc<str>)]>),   // on-prem / self-host / dev — today's path, per cell
    Oidc(Arc<dyn TokenVerifier>),                  // WorkOS (or customer IdP) for this org — cloud
}

• WorkOS Organization → cell, 1:1. The cell's Oidc verifier is configured with that org's issuer + audience. A token minted for tenant-a's audience fails verification at tenant-b (wrong aud) — structural isolation that runs before Cedar and is independent of policy completeness.
• Same Resource-Server endpoint, mode by cell. require_bearer_auth dispatches on cell.auth. Static and OIDC cells coexist in one process. This is the TokenVerifier seam already drafted in identity.rs ("RFC 0001 step 1 adds AuthSource::Oidc when the OidcJwtVerifier ships"); WorkOS is one implementation.
• ResolvedActor mapping: actor_id ← sub; tenant_id ← the cell id (for audit/log clarity — not an isolation mechanism, since the endpoint already isolated); scopes ← the OAuth scope/roles claim; source ← Oidc/Static. This repurposes tenant_id from vestigial pooled scaffolding into "which cell logged this," which is honest. Identity stays server-resolved, never client-set (the MR-731 invariant, now applied per cell).
• Per-cell OAuth discovery: each cell serves its own /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource → that org's WorkOS AS, with the cell's audience. Per-tenant PRM → per-tenant OAuth → per-tenant audience. (The RFC-003 §8 PRM config-gate for issue #59467 becomes a per-cell flag.)

5.5 Authorization — Cedar stays per-graph / per-cell

The cell boundary already guarantees a cell-A actor never reaches cell-B's policy engine, so no tenant dimension is added to authorization:

• PolicyRequest { action, branch, target_branch } and ResourceScope (Graph / Branch / TargetBranch) — unchanged. The principal stays actor_id.
• authorize's default-deny-except-Read becomes safe: "readable on missing policy" now means the tenant's own graphs, not cross-tenant. The exact hazard that would make this dangerous under pooled tenancy is structurally absent.
• GET /graphs reads cell.registry, so it enumerates only the tenant's own graphs and storage URIs — no cross-tenant topology leak.

This is the payoff of cluster-as-tenant: the in-process tenant machinery a pooled model would require (tenant-keyed routing, a tenant Cedar principal, a tenant-aware deny default, a tenant-filtered enumeration) is not built because it is not needed.

5.6 Control plane — the one legitimately pooled component

A small Cell Registry holds metadata only (no tenant data):

org_id (WorkOS)  ──▶  cell_id  ──▶  { storage_root, issuer, audience, host, tier }

Onboarding a tenant is provisioning-as-code — the thing that makes silo operable (automated, not N hand-built stacks):

1. WorkOS Organization created / detected.
2. `cluster apply` a NEW cell on a fresh storage root (own bucket/prefix), with the
   org's schema.pg / queries / policy        → ledger + recovery + approvals (rfc-004).
3. Register org_id → cell_id (+ issuer/audience/host) in the Cell Registry.
4. Cell goes live:
     • dedicated tier → its own process boots that one cell (today's exact path).
     • pooled tier   → the fleet HOT-LOADS the cell into the CellRegistry map.
5. DNS: tenant-a.example.com → the pooled fleet (wildcard); the host selects the cell.

Step 4's pooled hot-load is the one new runtime-mutation primitive, and it is deliberately cell-granular, not graph-granular: rfc-011 closes runtime graph-add inside a cluster (correct — it mutates a live registry), but loading a whole, independently-validated cell is just "open a cluster" — its own ledger/recovery/catalog, nothing in any other cell moves. Far safer than the thing rfc-011 forbids. Eviction = drop the Arc<CellRuntime> from the map; in-flight requests keep their Arc.

5.7 Deployment tiers — same binary, different topology

Tier	Topology	Mode	Use
Dedicated	1 process : 1 cell	MultiCluster { cells: [one] }	enterprise / regulated / data-residency
Pooled	1 process : N cells	MultiCluster { cells: [many] }	SMB / free / long tail
On-prem	1 process : 1 cell, Static auth	MultiCluster { cells: [one], Static }	air-gapped / self-host

A tenant graduates pooled → dedicated by moving its cell to its own process — no data migration (the storage root does not move; the cell is already self-contained).

6. How the surfaces ride on top

This is a server/topology change; the surfaces are consumers and need little or no change:

• HTTP data plane. Every protected route already resolves Arc<GraphHandle> from a request extension; it now comes from the cell's registry. Handlers are unchanged.
• MCP (rfc-003). The MCP backend "consumes a resolved actor and branches on nothing about how the token was verified" and mounts under per_graph_protected. So /graphs/{id}/mcp simply lives under a cell now: https://tenant-a.example.com/graphs/{id}/mcp. Per-graph isolation (rfc-003 §15.1) is sufficient under cluster-as-tenant — each tenant's MCP clients point at their own cell's endpoints; the discovery/enumeration concerns that would bite a pooled model do not apply. MCP is one tenant-scoped consumer, not the reason for this RFC.
• CLI (rfc-011). A --server <name|url> scope already addresses one served endpoint; a per-tenant subdomain is just a server URL. No new addressing concept — the cell is reached as a server.

7. Migration & backward compatibility

Today's omnigraph-server --cluster <one> is a MultiCluster with one cell and a host-agnostic resolve_cell (any host → the sole cell). Therefore:

• Existing single-cluster deployments keep working unchanged (one cell; resolve_cell is identity).
• --cluster <dir|s3> stays the dedicated/on-prem entry point.
• A pooled fleet boots from a cell list (e.g. repeated --cluster, or a --cells <registry> source).
• RFC-003 MCP, OpenAPI generation, and CLI addressing are unchanged; /graphs/{id}/… just lives under a cell.
• ResolvedActor.tenant_id / GraphKey.tenant_id are repurposed to the cell id (or removed) — they stop implying pooled-row tenancy. This is the cleanup that ends the two-models ambiguity.

8. Invariants & deny-list check

• §11 transport/auth at the boundary: cell auth + resolve_cell live only in omnigraph-server; engine/compiler/cluster crates never learn cells exist. ✓
• §12 no client-set identity: both the cell (host/prefix → registry) and the actor (token → ResolvedActor) are server-resolved; neither is client-settable. ✓
• No cloud-only correctness / no fork: cells are a server-layer wrapper; the OSS Static-auth cell is first-class, OIDC is additive. ✓
• Strong consistency / manifest atomicity (§1–§6): untouched — this adds an outer routing dimension, not a write path. Each cell's engine keeps its own snapshot isolation and manifest publish. ✓
• No state that drifts: the Cell Registry is control-plane metadata; per-cell state remains the cluster's applied revision (rfc-005), derived from the ledger. ✓
• Least privilege: a leaked cell token reaches one tenant; rotation is per-cell; storage credentials stay with the server process, never operators. ✓

9. Decisions, open questions, deferred

Decided:

• Cluster = tenant = cell; silo data, pool compute. No row-level pooling.
• Cells resolved before auth; per-cell token source; per-cell Cedar.
• WorkOS Organization → cell 1:1; per-cell OAuth audience.
• tenant_id repurposed to cell id (audit), not an isolation mechanism.

Open / deferred:

• Per-cell vs process-wide admission control. WorkloadController is process-wide today; pooled cells want per-cell fairness (noisy-neighbor). Make workload a per-cell value or add per-cell quotas. This is the one shared resource pooling reintroduces — design before the pooled tier ships.
• Cell hot-load / evict protocol. Control-plane push vs poll of the Cell Registry; pin the consistency story (a cell appears atomically or not at all; eviction drains).
• Cell Registry storage. Its own OmniGraph graph, a control DB, or a config object — metadata-only either way. Decide ownership and durability.
• TokenVerifier trait shape. Still draft in identity.rs; this RFC fixes where it plugs in (per-cell CellAuth::Oidc), not its exact signature.
• Scope semantics. ResolvedActor.scopes is currently [Full] and read nowhere; when OIDC populates real scopes, decide whether/how they feed Cedar context (a behavior change to sequence deliberately, not silently).

10. Relationship to prior RFCs

rfc-005 made the server boot one cluster from its applied revision; this RFC makes the server boot many such clusters as cells and resolves one per request. rfc-011 fixed the store/cluster/server ontology and closed runtime graph mutation; this RFC adds the cell as the tenant unit and the one safe runtime mutation (cell hot-load) that does not violate rfc-011's reasoning. rfc-004's ledger/recovery/approvals are what make a cell a self-contained, independently provisionable unit. rfc-003 is a consumer: its per-graph MCP surface becomes per-tenant for free once each cluster is a tenant. The net: tenancy is decided once, at the server topology layer, and every surface inherits it.