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@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ Human-readable, color-coded output to stdout. Status messages go to stderr.
| Tag | Color | Meaning |
|-----|-------|---------|
| `[HIGH]` | Red, bold | Critical -- likely exploitable |
| `[MEDIUM]` | Orange, bold | Important -- may be exploitable |
| `[LOW]` | Muted blue-gray | Informational -- code quality or weak signal |
| `[HIGH]` | Red, bold | Critical, likely exploitable |
| `[MEDIUM]` | Orange, bold | Important, may be exploitable |
| `[LOW]` | Muted blue-gray | Informational: code quality or weak signal |
### Evidence fields
@ -69,48 +69,71 @@ Use --include-quality, --max-low, or --all to adjust.
## JSON
Machine-readable JSON array. Each finding is an object:
Machine-readable JSON object. The main keys are:
| Key | Type | Description |
|-----|------|-------------|
| `findings` | array | Finding objects |
| `chains` | array | Composed exploit chains, when emitted |
| `dynamic_verification` | object | Count of attached dynamic verdicts |
| `verdict_diff` | object | Baseline comparison, only when `--baseline` is used |
```json
[
{
"path": "src/handler.rs",
"line": 12,
"col": 5,
"severity": "High",
"id": "taint-unsanitised-flow (source 5:11)",
"path_validated": false,
"labels": [
["Source", "env::var(\"CMD\") at 5:11"],
["Sink", "Command::new(\"sh\").arg(\"-c\")"]
],
"confidence": "High",
"evidence": {
"source": {
"path": "src/handler.rs",
"line": 5,
"col": 11,
"kind": "source",
"snippet": "env::var(\"CMD\")"
{
"findings": [
{
"path": "src/handler.rs",
"line": 12,
"col": 5,
"severity": "High",
"id": "taint-unsanitised-flow (source 5:11)",
"path_validated": false,
"labels": [
["Source", "env::var(\"CMD\") at 5:11"],
["Sink", "Command::new(\"sh\").arg(\"-c\")"]
],
"confidence": "High",
"evidence": {
"source": {
"path": "src/handler.rs",
"line": 5,
"col": 11,
"kind": "source",
"snippet": "env::var(\"CMD\")"
},
"sink": {
"path": "src/handler.rs",
"line": 12,
"col": 5,
"kind": "sink",
"snippet": "Command::new(\"sh\")"
},
"notes": ["source_kind:EnvironmentConfig"],
"dynamic_verdict": {
"finding_id": "a3b12f0c91e04420",
"status": "Confirmed",
"triggered_payload": "cmdi-echo-marker"
}
},
"sink": {
"path": "src/handler.rs",
"line": 12,
"col": 5,
"kind": "sink",
"snippet": "Command::new(\"sh\")"
},
"notes": ["source_kind:EnvironmentConfig"]
},
"rank_score": 76.0,
"rank_reason": [
["severity_base", "60"],
["analysis_kind", "10"],
["source_kind", "5"],
["evidence_count", "1"]
]
"rank_score": 76.0,
"rank_reason": [
["severity_base", "60"],
["analysis_kind", "10"],
["source_kind", "5"],
["evidence_count", "1"]
]
}
],
"chains": [],
"dynamic_verification": {
"total": 1,
"confirmed": 1,
"partially_confirmed": 0,
"not_confirmed": 0,
"inconclusive": 0,
"unsupported": 0
}
]
}
```
### Field descriptions
@ -132,6 +155,7 @@ Machine-readable JSON array. Each finding is an object:
| `rank_score` | float | no | Attack-surface score (omitted when ranking disabled) |
| `rank_reason` | array | no | Score breakdown (omitted when ranking disabled) |
| `rollup` | object | no | Rollup data when findings are grouped (see below) |
| `chain_member_of` | int | no | Stable hash of the emitted chain this finding belongs to |
Fields marked "no" are omitted when empty/null/false to keep output compact.
@ -139,9 +163,9 @@ Fields marked "no" are omitted when empty/null/false to keep output compact.
| Level | Meaning |
|-------|---------|
| `High` | Strong signal -- taint-confirmed flow, definite state violation |
| `Medium` | Moderate signal -- resource leak, path-validated taint, CFG structural |
| `Low` | Weak signal -- AST pattern match, possible resource leak, degraded analysis |
| `High` | Strong signal: taint-confirmed flow, definite state violation |
| `Medium` | Moderate signal: resource leak, path-validated taint, CFG structural |
| `Low` | Weak signal: AST pattern match, possible resource leak, degraded analysis |
### Evidence object
@ -155,9 +179,40 @@ The `evidence` field provides structured provenance data:
| `sanitizers` | array | Sanitizer spans |
| `state` | object | State-machine evidence (machine, subject, from_state, to_state) |
| `notes` | array | Free-form notes (e.g. `"source_kind:UserInput"`, `"path_validated"`) |
| `dynamic_verdict` | object | Dynamic verification result, when verification ran or was skipped for a typed reason |
All fields are omitted when empty/null.
### Dynamic verdict object
`evidence.dynamic_verdict` uses this shape:
| Field | Type | Description |
|-------|------|-------------|
| `finding_id` | string | Stable 16-character hex finding id |
| `status` | string | `Confirmed`, `PartiallyConfirmed`, `NotConfirmed`, `Inconclusive`, or `Unsupported` |
| `triggered_payload` | string | Payload label for `Confirmed` verdicts |
| `reason` | object/string | Typed reason for `Unsupported` |
| `inconclusive_reason` | object/string | Typed reason for `Inconclusive` |
| `detail` | string | Extra build, sandbox, or policy detail |
| `attempts` | array | Per-payload attempt summaries |
| `toolchain_match` | string | `exact` or `drift` |
| `differential` | object | Vulnerable versus benign control result, when both ran |
| `hardening_outcome` | object | Process-backend hardening result, when recorded |
The top-level `dynamic_verification` object counts verdict statuses across the emitted findings:
```json
{
"total": 4,
"confirmed": 2,
"partially_confirmed": 0,
"not_confirmed": 1,
"inconclusive": 0,
"unsupported": 1
}
```
### Rollup object
When a finding is a rollup (grouped from multiple occurrences), the `rollup` field is present:
@ -192,12 +247,13 @@ nyx scan . --format sarif > results.sarif
The SARIF output includes:
- **Tool metadata** -- Nyx name and version
- **Rules** -- Rule ID, description, severity mapping
- **Results** -- One result per finding with location, message, and properties
- **Properties** -- Each result includes `category` and optionally `confidence` and `rollup.count`
- **Related locations** -- Rollup findings include example locations in `relatedLocations`
- **Artifacts** -- File paths referenced by findings
- **Tool metadata**: Nyx name and version
- **Rules**: Rule ID, description, severity mapping
- **Results**: One result per finding with location, message, and properties
- **Properties**: Each result includes `category` and optionally `confidence`, `rollup.count`, and `nyx_dynamic_verdict`
- **Fingerprints**: Dynamic verdict status is added as `partialFingerprints.dynamic_verdict_status` when present
- **Related locations**: Rollup findings include example locations in `relatedLocations`
- **Artifacts**: File paths referenced by findings
### GitHub Code Scanning integration
@ -219,9 +275,10 @@ The SARIF output includes:
|------|---------|
| `0` | Scan completed successfully; no findings matched `--fail-on` threshold |
| `1` | `--fail-on` threshold breached (at least one finding meets or exceeds the specified severity) |
| Non-zero | Error (I/O, config, database, parse error) |
| `2` | `--gate` policy tripped (e.g. `no-new-confirmed` saw a new Confirmed finding, or `resolve-all-confirmed` saw a previously Confirmed finding still open) |
| Other non-zero | Error (I/O, config, database, parse error) |
Without `--fail-on`, Nyx always exits `0` on a successful scan regardless of findings count.
Without `--fail-on` or `--gate`, Nyx always exits `0` on a successful scan regardless of findings count.
---
@ -229,9 +286,9 @@ Without `--fail-on`, Nyx always exits `0` on a successful scan regardless of fin
| Level | Description | Typical rules |
|-------|-------------|---------------|
| **High** | Critical vulnerabilities -- likely exploitable | Command injection, unsafe deserialization, banned C functions, taint-confirmed flows with user input sources |
| **Medium** | Important issues -- may be exploitable with additional context | SQL concatenation, XSS sinks, reflection, unguarded sinks, resource leaks |
| **Low** | Informational -- code quality or weak signals | Weak crypto algorithms, insecure randomness, `unwrap()`/`panic!()`, type-safety escapes |
| **High** | Critical vulnerabilities, likely exploitable | Command injection, unsafe deserialization, banned C functions, taint-confirmed flows with user input sources |
| **Medium** | Important issues, may be exploitable with additional context | SQL concatenation, XSS sinks, reflection, unguarded sinks, resource leaks |
| **Low** | Informational: code quality or weak signals | Weak crypto algorithms, insecure randomness, `unwrap()`/`panic!()`, type-safety escapes |
### Non-production severity downgrade
@ -260,13 +317,13 @@ Suppress specific findings directly in source code using `nyx:ignore` comments.
### Directive forms
```python
x = dangerous() # nyx:ignore taint-unsanitised-flow ← suppresses this line
x = dangerous() # nyx:ignore taint-unsanitised-flow (suppresses this line)
# nyx:ignore-next-line taint-unsanitised-flow
x = dangerous() ← suppresses this line
x = dangerous() (suppressed by the comment above)
```
- `nyx:ignore <RULE_ID>` -- suppresses findings on the **same line** as the comment.
- `nyx:ignore-next-line <RULE_ID>` -- suppresses findings on the **next line**.
- `nyx:ignore <RULE_ID>`: suppresses findings on the **same line** as the comment.
- `nyx:ignore-next-line <RULE_ID>`: suppresses findings on the **next line**.
- For taint findings, the primary line is the **sink line** (the `line` field in output).
### Rule ID matching