auto-update week 6

africa/ag.json

@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "6.2% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "6.3% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "1.72 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "11.67 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "11.67 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {

africa/ao.json

@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 41.1%, Protestant 38.1%, other 8.6%, none 12.3% (2014 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>More than two decades after the end of Angola's 27-year civil war, the country still faces a variety of socioeconomic problems, including poverty, high maternal and child mortality, and illiteracy. Despite the country's rapid post-war economic growth based on oil production, about 30 percent of Angolans live below the poverty line and unemployment is widespread, especially among the large young-adult population. Only about 70% of the population is literate, and the rate drops to around 60% for women. The youthful population - about 45% are under the age of 15 - is expected to continue growing rapidly with a fertility rate of more than 5 children per woman and a low rate of contraceptive use. Fewer than half of women deliver their babies with the assistance of trained health care personnel, which contributes to Angola's high maternal mortality rate.</p> <p>Of the estimated 550,000 Angolans who fled their homeland during its civil war, most have returned home since 2002. In 2012, the UN assessed that conditions in Angola had been stable for several years and invoked a cessation of refugee status for Angolans. Following the cessation clause, some of those still in exile returned home voluntarily through UN repatriation programs, and others integrated into host countries.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>More than two decades after the end of Angola's 27-year civil war, the country still faces a variety of socioeconomic problems, including poverty, high maternal and child mortality, and illiteracy. Despite the country's rapid post-war economic growth based on oil production, about 30 percent of Angolans live below the poverty line and unemployment is widespread, especially among the large young-adult population. Only about 70% of the population is literate, and the rate drops to around 60% for women. The youthful population - about 48% are under the age of 15 as of 2022 - is expected to continue growing rapidly with a fertility rate of more than 5 children per woman and a low rate of contraceptive use. Fewer than half of women deliver their babies with the assistance of trained health care personnel, which contributes to Angola's high maternal mortality rate.</p> <p>Of the estimated 550,000 Angolans who fled their homeland during its civil war, most have returned home since 2002. In 2012, the UN assessed that conditions in Angola had been stable for several years and invoked a cessation of refugee status for Angolans. Following the cessation clause, some of those still in exile returned home voluntarily through UN repatriation programs, and others integrated into host countries.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "2.5% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "2.9% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.21 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "148.4 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "148.4 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {

africa/bc.json

@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@
       "text": "Christian 79.1%, Badimo 4.1%, other 1.4% (includes Baha'i, Hindu, Muslim, Rastafarian), none 15.2%, unspecified 0.3% (2011 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Botswana has experienced one of the most rapid declines in fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa. The total fertility rate fell from more than 5 children per woman in the mid 1980s to approximately 2.4 in 2013, and remains at that level in 2022. The fertility reduction has been attributed to a host of factors, including higher educational attainment among women, greater participation of women in the workforce, increased contraceptive use, later first births, and a strong national family planning program. Botswana was making significant progress in several health indicators, including life expectancy and infant and child mortality rates, until being devastated by the HIV/AIDs epidemic in the 1990s.</p> <p>In 2021,  Botswana had one of the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the world at close to 20%, however comprehensive and effective treatment programs have reduced HIV/AIDS-related deaths. The combination of declining fertility and increasing mortality rates because of HIV/AIDS is slowing the population aging process, with a narrowing of the youngest age groups and little expansion of the oldest age groups. Nevertheless, having the bulk of its population (about 60%) of working age will only yield economic benefits if the labor force is healthy, educated, and productively employed.</p> <p>Batswana have been working as contract miners in South Africa since the 19th century. Although Botswana’s economy improved shortly after independence in 1966 with the discovery of diamonds and other minerals, its lingering high poverty rate and lack of job opportunities continued to push workers to seek mining work in southern African countries. In the early 1970s, about a third of Botswana’s male labor force worked in South Africa (lesser numbers went to Namibia and Zimbabwe). Not until the 1980s and 1990s, when South African mining companies had reduced their recruitment of foreign workers and Botswana’s economic prospects had improved, were Batswana increasingly able to find job opportunities at home.</p> <p>Most Batswana prefer life in their home country and choose cross-border migration on a temporary basis only for work, shopping, visiting family, or tourism. Since the 1970s, Botswana has pursued an open migration policy enabling it to recruit thousands of foreign workers to fill skilled labor shortages. In the late 1990s, Botswana’s prosperity and political stability attracted not only skilled workers but small numbers of refugees from neighboring Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Botswana has experienced one of the most rapid declines in fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa. The total fertility rate fell from more than 5 children per woman in the mid 1980s to approximately 2.4 in 2013, and remains at that level in 2022. The fertility reduction has been attributed to a host of factors, including higher educational attainment among women, greater participation of women in the workforce, increased contraceptive use, later first births, and a strong national family planning program. Botswana was making significant progress in several health indicators, including life expectancy and infant and child mortality rates, until being devastated by the HIV/AIDs epidemic in the 1990s.</p> <p>In 2021,  Botswana had one of the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the world at close to 20%, however comprehensive and effective treatment programs have reduced HIV/AIDS-related deaths. The combination of declining fertility and increasing mortality rates because of HIV/AIDS is slowing the population aging process, with a narrowing of the youngest age groups and little expansion of the oldest age groups. Nevertheless, having the bulk of its population (about 60% as of 2022) of working age will only yield economic benefits if the labor force is healthy, educated, and productively employed.</p> <p>Batswana have been working as contract miners in South Africa since the 19th century. Although Botswana’s economy improved shortly after independence in 1966 with the discovery of diamonds and other minerals, its lingering high poverty rate and lack of job opportunities continued to push workers to seek mining work in southern African countries. In the early 1970s, about a third of Botswana’s male labor force worked in South Africa (lesser numbers went to Namibia and Zimbabwe). Not until the 1980s and 1990s, when South African mining companies had reduced their recruitment of foreign workers and Botswana’s economic prospects had improved, were Batswana increasingly able to find job opportunities at home.</p> <p>Most Batswana prefer life in their home country and choose cross-border migration on a temporary basis only for work, shopping, visiting family, or tourism. Since the 1970s, Botswana has pursued an open migration policy enabling it to recruit thousands of foreign workers to fill skilled labor shortages. In the late 1990s, Botswana’s prosperity and political stability attracted not only skilled workers but small numbers of refugees from neighboring Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "6.1% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "6.2% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.38 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -1254,7 +1254,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 300 Mozambique (Southern African Development Community force) (2023)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "Bechuanaland/Botswana did not have a permanent military during colonial times, with the British colonial administrators relying instead on small, lightly armed constabularies such as the Bechuanaland Mounted Police, the Bechuanaland Border Police, and by the early 1960s, the Police Mobile Unit (PMU); after independence in 1966, Botswana militarized the PMU and gave it responsibility for the country’s defense rather than create a conventional military force; however, turmoil in neighboring countries and numerous cross-border incursions by Rhodesian and South African security forces in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated that the PMU was inadequate for defending the country and led to the establishment of the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) in 1977; as of 2022, the BDF’s primary missions included securing territorial integrity/border security and internal duties such as disaster relief and anti-poaching <br><br>Botswana participates in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force, and in 2021-2022 contributed nearly 300 troops to the SADC’s effort to help the Mozambique Government suppress an insurgency (2022)"
+      "text": "Bechuanaland/Botswana did not have a permanent military during colonial times, with the British colonial administrators relying instead on small, lightly armed constabularies such as the Bechuanaland Mounted Police, the Bechuanaland Border Police, and by the early 1960s, the Police Mobile Unit (PMU); after independence in 1966, Botswana militarized the PMU and gave it responsibility for the country’s defense rather than create a conventional military force; however, turmoil in neighboring countries and numerous cross-border incursions by Rhodesian and South African security forces in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated that the PMU was inadequate for defending the country and led to the establishment of the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) in 1977; as of 2022, the BDF’s primary missions included securing territorial integrity/border security and internal duties such as disaster relief and anti-poaching <br><br>Botswana participates in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force, and beginning in 2021 contributed nearly 300 troops to the SADC’s effort to help the Mozambique Government suppress an insurgency (2023)"
     }
   },
   "Transnational Issues": {

africa/bn.json

@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim 27.7%, Roman Catholic 25.5%, Protestant 13.5% (Celestial 6.7%, Methodist 3.4%, other Protestant 3.4%), Vodoun 11.6%, other Christian 9.5%, other traditional religions 2.6%, other 2.6%, none 5.8% (2013 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Benin has a youthful age structure – almost 65% of the population is under the age of 25 – which is bolstered by high fertility and population growth rates. Benin’s total fertility has been falling over time but remains high, declining from almost 7 children per women in 1990 to 4.8 in 2016. Benin’s low contraceptive use and high unmet need for contraception contribute to the sustained high fertility rate. Although the majority of Beninese women use skilled health care personnel for antenatal care and delivery, the high rate of maternal mortality indicates the need for more access to high quality obstetric care.</p><p>Poverty, unemployment, increased living costs, and dwindling resources increasingly drive the Beninese to migrate. An estimated 4.4 million, more than 40%, of Beninese live abroad. Virtually all Beninese emigrants move to West African countries, particularly Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire. Of the less than 1% of Beninese emigrants who settle in Europe, the vast majority live in France, Benin’s former colonial ruler.</p><p>With about 40% of the population living below the poverty line, many desperate parents resort to sending their children to work in wealthy households as domestic servants (a common practice known as vidomegon), mines, quarries, or agriculture domestically or in Nigeria and other neighboring countries, often under brutal conditions. Unlike in other West African countries, where rural people move to the coast, farmers from Benin’s densely populated southern and northwestern regions move to the historically sparsely populated central region to pursue agriculture. Immigrants from West African countries came to Benin in increasing numbers between 1992 and 2002 because of its political stability and porous borders.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Benin has a youthful age structure – almost 65% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2022 – which is bolstered by high fertility and population growth rates. Benin’s total fertility has been falling over time but remains high, declining from almost 7 children per women in 1990 to 5.4 in 2022. Benin’s low contraceptive use and high unmet need for contraception contribute to the sustained high fertility rate. Although the majority of Beninese women use skilled health care personnel for antenatal care and delivery, the high rate of maternal mortality indicates the need for more access to high quality obstetric care.</p> <p>Poverty, unemployment, increased living costs, and dwindling resources increasingly drive the Beninese to migrate. An estimated 4.4 million, more than 30%, of Beninese live abroad. Virtually all Beninese emigrants move to West African countries, particularly Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire. Of the less than 1% of Beninese emigrants who settle in Europe, the vast majority live in France, Benin’s former colonial ruler.</p> <p>With about 40% of the population living below the poverty line as of 2019, many desperate parents resort to sending their children to work in wealthy households as domestic servants (a common practice known as vidomegon), mines, quarries, or agriculture domestically or in Nigeria and other neighboring countries, often under brutal conditions. Unlike in other West African countries, where rural people move to the coast, farmers from Benin’s densely populated southern and northwestern regions move to the historically sparsely populated central region to pursue agriculture. Immigrants from West African countries came to Benin in increasing numbers between 1992 and 2002 because of its political stability and porous borders.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "2.4% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "2.6% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.07 physicians/1,000 population (2019)"
@@ -1276,7 +1276,7 @@
       "text": "260 (plus about 160 police) Mali (MINUSMA) (May 2022)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "as of 2022, a key focus for the security forces of Benin was countering infiltrations into the country by terrorist groups tied to al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) operating just over the border from north Benin in Burkina Faso and Niger; in May 2022, the Benin Government said it was \"at war\" with terrorism after suffering a series of attacks from these groups; in addition, the FAB participated in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) along with Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups operating in the general area of the Lake Chad Basin and along Nigeria's northeast border <br><br>the FAB has a close working relationship with the Belgian armed forces; the Belgians offer military advice, training, and second-hand equipment donations, and deploy to Benin for limited military exercises (2022)"
+      "text": "a key focus for the security forces of Benin is countering infiltrations into the country by terrorist groups tied to al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) operating just over the border from north Benin in Burkina Faso and Niger; in May 2022, the Benin Government said it was \"at war\" with terrorism after suffering a series of attacks from these groups; in addition, the FAB participated in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) along with Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups operating in the general area of the Lake Chad Basin and along Nigeria's northeast border <br><br>the FAB has a close working relationship with the Belgian armed forces; the Belgians offer military advice, training, and second-hand equipment donations, and deploy to Benin for limited military exercises (2023)"
     },
     "Maritime threats": {
       "text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"</p>"

africa/by.json

@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 58.6%, Protestant 35.3% (includes Adventist 2.7% and other Protestant 32.6%), Muslim 3.4%, other 1.3%, none 1.3% (2016-17 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Burundi is a densely populated country with a high population growth rate, factors that combined with land scarcity and poverty place a large share of its population at risk of food insecurity. About 90% of the population relies on subsistence agriculture. Subdivision of land to sons, and redistribution to returning refugees, results in smaller, overworked, and less productive plots. Food shortages, poverty, and a lack of clean water contribute to a 60% chronic malnutrition rate among children. A lack of reproductive health services has prevented a significant reduction in Burundi’s maternal mortality and fertility rates, which are both among the world’s highest. With two-thirds of its population under the age of 25 and a birth rate of about 6 children per woman, Burundi’s population will continue to expand rapidly for decades to come, putting additional strain on a poor country.</p><p>Historically, migration flows into and out of Burundi have consisted overwhelmingly of refugees from violent conflicts. In the last decade, more than a half million Burundian refugees returned home from neighboring countries, mainly Tanzania. Reintegrating the returnees has been problematic due to their prolonged time in exile, land scarcity, poor infrastructure, poverty, and unemployment. Repatriates and existing residents (including internally displaced persons) compete for limited land and other resources. To further complicate matters, international aid organizations reduced their assistance because they no longer classified Burundi as a post-conflict country. Conditions have deteriorated since renewed violence erupted in April 2015, causing another outpouring of refugees. In addition to refugee out-migration, Burundi has hosted thousands of refugees from neighboring countries, mostly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and lesser numbers from Rwanda.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Burundi is a densely populated country with a high population growth rate, factors that combined with land scarcity and poverty place a large share of its population at risk of food insecurity. About 90% of the population relies on subsistence agriculture. Subdivision of land to sons, and redistribution to returning refugees, results in smaller, overworked, and less-productive plots. Food shortages, poverty, and a lack of clean water contribute to a 60% chronic malnutrition rate among children. A lack of reproductive health services has prevented a significant reduction in Burundi’s maternal mortality and fertility rates, which are both among the world’s highest. With almost two-thirds of its population under the age of 25 and a birth rate of about 5 children per woman as of 2022, Burundi’s population will continue to expand rapidly for decades to come, putting additional strain on a poor country.</p> <p>Historically, migration flows into and out of Burundi have consisted overwhelmingly of refugees from violent conflicts. In the last decade, more than a half million Burundian refugees returned home from neighboring countries, mainly Tanzania. Reintegrating the returnees has been problematic due to their prolonged time in exile, land scarcity, poor infrastructure, poverty, and unemployment. Repatriates and existing residents (including internally displaced persons) compete for limited land and other resources. To further complicate matters, international aid organizations reduced their assistance because they no longer classified Burundi as a post-conflict country. Conditions deteriorated when renewed violence erupted in April 2015, causing another outpouring of refugees. In addition to refugee out-migration, Burundi has hosted thousands of refugees from neighboring countries, mostly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and lesser numbers from Rwanda.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "8% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "6.5% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.07 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -1232,7 +1232,7 @@
       "text": "760 Central African Republic (MINUSCA); 5,400 Somalia (ATMIS) (2022)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "in addition to its foreign deployments, the FDN was focused on internal security missions, particularly against rebel groups opposed to the regime such as National Forces of Liberation (FNL), the Resistance for the Rule of Law-Tabara (aka RED Tabara), and Popular Forces of Burundi (FPB or FOREBU); these groups were based in the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo and have carried out sporadic attacks in Burundi (2022)"
+      "text": "in addition to its foreign deployments the FDN was focused on internal security missions, particularly against rebel groups opposed to the regime such as National Forces of Liberation (FNL), the Resistance for the Rule of Law-Tabara (aka RED Tabara), and Popular Forces of Burundi (FPB or FOREBU); these groups were based in the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo and have carried out sporadic attacks in Burundi (2022)"
     }
   },
   "Transnational Issues": {

africa/cd.json

@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim 52.1%, Protestant 23.9%, Roman Catholic 20%, animist 0.3%, other Christian 0.2%, none 2.8%, unspecified 0.7% (2014-15 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Despite the start of oil production in 2003, 40% of Chad’s population lives below the poverty line. The population will continue to grow rapidly because of the country’s very high fertility rate and large youth cohort – more than 65% of the populace is under the age of 25 – although the mortality rate is high and life expectancy is low. Chad has the world’s third highest maternal mortality rate. Among the primary risk factors are poverty, anemia, rural habitation, high fertility, poor education, and a lack of access to family planning and obstetric care. Impoverished, uneducated adolescents living in rural areas are most affected. To improve women’s reproductive health and reduce fertility, Chad will need to increase women’s educational attainment, job participation, and knowledge of and access to family planning. Only about a quarter of women are literate, less than 5% use contraceptives, and more than 40% undergo genital cutting.</p><p>As of October 2017, more than 320,000 refugees from Sudan and more than 75,000 from the Central African Republic strain Chad’s limited resources and create tensions in host communities. Thousands of new refugees fled to Chad in 2013 to escape worsening violence in the Darfur region of Sudan. The large refugee populations are hesitant to return to their home countries because of continued instability. Chad was relatively stable in 2012 in comparison to other states in the region, but past fighting between government forces and opposition groups and inter-communal violence have left nearly 60,000 of its citizens displaced in the eastern part of the country.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Despite the start of oil production in 2003, around 40% of Chad’s population lived below the poverty line as of 2018. The population will continue to grow rapidly because of the country’s very high fertility rate and large youth cohort – more than 65% of the populace is under the age of 25 as of 2022 – although the mortality rate is high and life expectancy is low. Chad has the world’s second highest maternal mortality rate as of 2017. Among the primary risk factors are poverty, anemia, rural habitation, high fertility, poor education, and a lack of access to family planning and obstetric care. Impoverished, uneducated adolescents living in rural areas are most affected. To improve women’s reproductive health and reduce fertility, Chad will need to increase women’s educational attainment, job participation, and knowledge of and access to family planning. Less than a quarter of women are literate, less than 10% use contraceptives, and more than 40% undergo genital cutting.</p> <p>As of December 2022, more than 403,000 refugees from Sudan and more than 120,000 from the Central African Republic strain Chad’s limited resources and create tensions in host communities. Thousands of new refugees fled to Chad in 2013 to escape worsening violence in the Darfur region of Sudan. The large refugee populations are hesitant to return to their home countries because of continued instability. Chad was relatively stable in 2012 in comparison to other states in the region, but past fighting between government forces and opposition groups and inter-communal violence have left more than 380,000 of its citizens displaced in the eastern part of the country as of 2022.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "4.4% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "5.4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.06 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"

africa/cf.json

@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 33.1%, Awakening Churches/Christian Revival 22.3%, Protestant 19.9%, Salutiste 2.2%, Muslim 1.6%, Kimbanguiste 1.5%, other 8.1%, none 11.3% (2007 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>The Republic of the Congo is one of the most urbanized countries in Africa, with nearly 70% of Congolese living in urban areas.  The population is concentrated in the southwest of the country, mainly in the capital Brazzaville, Pointe-Noire, and along the railway line that connects the two.  The tropical jungles in the north of the country are sparsely populated.  Most Congolese are Bantu, and most belong to one of four main ethnic groups, the Kongo, Teke, Mbochi, and Sangha, which consist of over 70 subgroups.</p> <p>The Republic of Congo is in the early stages of a demographic transition, whereby a population shifts from high fertility and mortality rates to low fertility and mortality rates associated with industrialized societies.  Its total fertility rate (TFR), the average number of children born per woman, remains high at 4.4.  While its TFR has steadily decreased, the progress slowed beginning in about 1995.  The slowdown in fertility reduction has delayed the demographic transition and Congo’s potential to reap a demographic dividend, the economic boost that can occur when the share of the working-age population is larger than the dependent age groups. </p> <p>The TFR differs significantly between urban and rural areas – 3.7 in urban areas versus 6.5 in rural areas.  The TFR also varies among regions.  The urban regions of Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire have much lower TFRs than other regions, which are predominantly or completely rural.  The gap between desired fertility and actual fertility is also greatest in rural areas.  Rural families may have more children to contribute to agricultural production and/or due to a lack of information about and access to contraception.  Urban families may prefer to have fewer children because raising them is more expensive and balancing work and childcare may be more difficult.  The number of births among teenage girls, the frequency of giving birth before the age of fifteen, and a lack of education are the most likely reasons for higher TFRs in rural areas.  Although 90% of school-age children are enrolled in primary school, repetition and dropout rates are high and the quality of education is poor.  Congolese women with no or little education start having children earlier and have more children in total than those with at least some secondary education.</p> <p> </p>"
+      "text": "<p>The Republic of the Congo is one of the most urbanized countries in Africa, with nearly 70% of Congolese living in urban areas.  The population is concentrated in the southwest of the country, mainly in the capital Brazzaville, Pointe-Noire, and along the railway line that connects the two.  The tropical jungles in the north of the country are sparsely populated.  Most Congolese are Bantu, and most belong to one of four main ethnic groups, the Kongo, Teke, Mbochi, and Sangha, which consist of over 70 subgroups.</p> <p>The Republic of Congo is in the early stages of a demographic transition, whereby a population shifts from high fertility and mortality rates to low fertility and mortality rates associated with industrialized societies.  Its total fertility rate (TFR), the average number of children born per woman, remains high at 4.4 as of 2022.  While its TFR has steadily decreased, the progress slowed beginning in about 1995.  The slowdown in fertility reduction has delayed the demographic transition and Congo’s potential to reap a demographic dividend, the economic boost that can occur when the share of the working-age population is larger than the dependent age groups. </p> <p>The TFR differs significantly between urban and rural areas – 3.7 in urban areas versus 6.5 in rural areas.  The TFR also varies among regions.  The urban regions of Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire have much lower TFRs than other regions, which are predominantly or completely rural.  The gap between desired fertility and actual fertility is also greatest in rural areas.  Rural families may have more children to contribute to agricultural production and/or due to a lack of information about and access to contraception.  Urban families may prefer to have fewer children because raising them is more expensive and balancing work and childcare may be more difficult.  The number of births among teenage girls, the frequency of giving birth before the age of fifteen, and a lack of education are the most likely reasons for higher TFRs in rural areas.  Although 90% of school-age children are enrolled in primary school, repetition and dropout rates are high and the quality of education is poor.  Congolese women with no or little education start having children earlier and have more children in total than those with at least some secondary education.</p> <p> </p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "2.1% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "4.5% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.1 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -1310,7 +1310,7 @@
       "text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; conscription ended in 1969 (2021)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "<p>as of 2022, the FAC had limited capabilities due to obsolescent and poorly maintained equipment and low levels of training; its primary focus was internal security; since its creation in 1961, the FAC has had a turbulent history; it has been sidelined by some national leaders in favor of personal militias, endured an internal rebellion (1996), and clashed with various rebel groups and political or ethnic militias (1993-1996, 2002-2005, 2017); during the 1997-1999 civil war, the military generally split along ethnic lines, with most northern officers supporting eventual winner SASSOU-Nguesso, and most southerners backing the rebels; others joined ethnic-based factions loyal to regional warlords; forces backing SASSOU-Nguesso were supported by Angolan troops and received some French assistance; the FAC also has undergone at least three reorganizations that included the incorporation of former rebel combatants and various ethnic and political militias; in recent years, France has provided some advice and training, and a military cooperation agreement was signed with Russia in 2019</p>"
+      "text": "the FAC is viewed as having limited capabilities due to obsolescent and poorly maintained equipment and low levels of training; its primary focus is internal security; since its creation in 1961, the FAC has had a turbulent history; it has been sidelined by some national leaders in favor of personal militias, endured an internal rebellion (1996), and clashed with various rebel groups and political or ethnic militias (1993-1996, 2002-2005, 2017); during the 1997-1999 civil war, the military generally split along ethnic lines, with most northern officers supporting eventual winner SASSOU-Nguesso, and most southerners backing the rebels; others joined ethnic-based factions loyal to regional warlords; forces backing SASSOU-Nguesso were supported by Angolan troops and received some French assistance; the FAC also has undergone at least three reorganizations that included the incorporation of former rebel combatants and various ethnic and political militias; in recent years, France has provided some advice and training, and a military cooperation agreement was signed with Russia in 2019 (2022)"
     }
   },
   "Transnational Issues": {

africa/cg.json

@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 29.9%, Protestant 26.7%, other Christian 36.5%, Kimbanguist 2.8%, Muslim 1.3%, other (includes syncretic sects and indigenous beliefs) 1.2%, none 1.3%, unspecified 0.2% (2014 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Despite a wealth of fertile soil, hydroelectric power potential, and mineral resources, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) struggles with many socioeconomic problems, including high infant and maternal mortality rates, malnutrition, poor vaccination coverage, lack of access to improved water sources and sanitation, and frequent and early fertility. Ongoing conflict, mismanagement of resources, and a lack of investment have resulted in food insecurity; almost 30% of children under the age of 5 are malnourished. The overall coverage of basic public services – education, health, sanitation, and potable water – is very limited and piecemeal, with substantial regional and rural/urban disparities. Fertility remains high at more than 5 children per woman and is likely to remain high because of the low use of contraception and the cultural preference for larger families.</p> <p>The DRC is a source and host country for refugees. Between 2012 and 2014, more than 119,000 Congolese refugees returned from the Republic of Congo to the relative stability of northwest DRC, but more than 850,000 Congolese refugees and asylum seekers were hosted by neighboring countries as of December 2021. In addition, an estimated 5.5 million Congolese were internally displaced as of July 2022, the vast majority fleeing violence between rebel group and Congolese armed forces. Thousands of refugees have come to the DRC from neighboring countries, including Rwanda, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Burundi.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Despite a wealth of fertile soil, hydroelectric power potential, and mineral resources, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) struggles with many socioeconomic problems, including high infant and maternal mortality rates, malnutrition, poor vaccination coverage, lack of access to improved water sources and sanitation, and frequent and early fertility. Ongoing conflict, mismanagement of resources, and a lack of investment have resulted in food insecurity; almost 25% of children under the age of 5 were malnourished as of 2018. The overall coverage of basic public services – education, health, sanitation, and potable water – is very limited and piecemeal, with substantial regional and rural/urban disparities. Fertility remains high at more than 5 children per woman and is likely to remain high because of the low use of contraception and the cultural preference for larger families.</p> <p>The DRC is a source and host country for refugees. Between 2012 and 2014, more than 119,000 Congolese refugees returned from the Republic of Congo to the relative stability of northwest DRC, but more than 1 million Congolese refugees and asylum seekers were hosted by neighboring countries as of December 2022. In addition, an estimated 5.5 million Congolese were internally displaced as of October 2022, the vast majority fleeing violence between rebel group and Congolese armed forces. Thousands of refugees have come to the DRC from neighboring countries, including Rwanda, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Burundi.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "3.5% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "4.1% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.38 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -1324,14 +1324,14 @@
       "text": "limited and widely varied information; approximately 100,000 active troops (mostly Army, but includes several thousand Navy and Air Force personnel, as well as about 10,000 Republican Guard; note -&nbsp; Navy personnel includes naval infantry) (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the FARDC is equipped mostly with Soviet-era weapons systems and equipment; in recent years, Ukraine has been the largest supplier of arms to the FARDC (2022)"
+      "text": "the FARDC is equipped mostly with Soviet-era weapons systems and equipment (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-45 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; 18-45 years of age for compulsory military service for men; it is unclear how much conscription is used (2021)",
       "note": "note: in eastern Congo, fighters from armed groups, and in some cases government security forces, have been accused of forced recruitment of child soldiers"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "the modern FARDC was created out of the armed factions of the two Congo wars of 1996-1997 and 1998-2003; as part of the peace accords that ended the last war, the largest rebel groups were incorporated into the FARDC; many armed groups, however, continue to fight and as of 2022, there were over 100 illegal armed groups operating in the country by some estimates; as of 2022, the FARDC was actively engaged in combat operations against numerous armed groups, particularly in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, although there was also violence in Maniema, Kasai, Kasai Central, and Tanganyika provinces; the military is widely assessed as being unable to provide adequate security throughout the country due to insufficient training, poor morale and leadership, ill-discipline and corruption, low equipment readiness, a fractious ethnic makeup, and the sheer size of the country and diversity of armed rebel groups<br><br>as of 2022, one of the primary armed groups the FARDC was conducting operations against was the March 23 Movement (M23, aka Congolese Revolutionary Army), which resumed attacks, largely against civilians, in the DRC province of North Kivu in 2022 after having been defeated in 2013 by FARDC and UN forces; the M23's resurgence has raised tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, as the DRC Government claims Rwanda backs the M23, which it has labeled a terrorist group, charges that the Rwandan Government has denied; M23 attacks and fighting between the FARDC and M23 in 2022 has led to the displacement of more than 200,000 people; UN troops were supporting the FARDC's operations against M23<br><br>the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has operated in the central and eastern parts of the country since 1999; as of mid-2022, MONUSCO had around 15,000 personnel; MONUSCO includes a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB; 3 infantry battalions, plus artillery and special forces), the first ever UN peacekeeping force specifically tasked to carry out targeted offensive operations to neutralize and disarm groups considered a threat to state authority and civilian security (2022)"
+      "text": "the modern FARDC was created out of the armed factions of the two Congo wars of 1996-1997 and 1998-2003; as part of the peace accords that ended the last war, the largest rebel groups were incorporated into the FARDC; many armed groups, however, continue to fight and as of 2022, there were over 100 illegal armed groups operating in the country by some estimates; as of 2022, the FARDC was actively engaged in combat operations against numerous armed groups, particularly in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, although there was also violence in Maniema, Kasai, Kasai Central, and Tanganyika provinces; the military is widely assessed as being unable to provide adequate security throughout the country due to insufficient training, poor morale and leadership, ill-discipline and corruption, low equipment readiness, a fractious ethnic makeup, and the sheer size of the country and diversity of armed rebel groups<br><br>as of 2022, one of the primary armed groups the FARDC was conducting operations against was the March 23 Movement (M23, aka Congolese Revolutionary Army), which resumed attacks, largely against civilians, in the DRC province of North Kivu in 2022 after having been defeated in 2013 by FARDC and UN forces; the M23's resurgence has raised tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, as the DRC Government claims Rwanda backs the M23, which it has labeled a terrorist group, charges that the Rwandan Government has denied; M23 attacks and fighting between the FARDC and M23 in 2022 has led to the displacement of more than 200,000 people; UN troops were supporting the FARDC's operations against M23<br><br>the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has operated in the central and eastern parts of the country since 1999; as of 2022, MONUSCO had around 15,000 military and police personnel; MONUSCO includes a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB; 3 infantry battalions, plus artillery and special forces), the first ever UN peacekeeping force specifically tasked to carry out targeted offensive operations to neutralize and disarm groups considered a threat to state authority and civilian security (2022)"
     }
   },
   "Terrorism": {
@@ -1342,7 +1342,7 @@
   },
   "Transnational Issues": {
     "Disputes - international": {
-      "text": "<p>heads of the Great Lakes states and UN pledged in 2004 to abate tribal, rebel, and militia fighting in the region, including northeast Congo, where the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), organized in 1999, maintains over 16,500 uniformed peacekeepers<br><br><em>Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC)-Republic of the Congo: </em>the location of the boundary in the broad Congo River is indefinite except in the Pool Malebo/Stanley Pool area<br><br><em>Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC)-Uganda:</em> Uganda rejects the DRC claim to Margherita Peak in the Rwenzori mountains and considers it a boundary divide; there is tension and violence on Lake Albert over prospective oil reserves at the mouth of the Semliki River<br><br><em>Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC)-Zambia: </em>boundary commission continues discussions over Congolese-administered triangle of land on the right bank of the Lunkinda River claimed by Zambia near the DRC village of Pweto<br><br><em>Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC)-Angola: </em>DRC accuses Angola of shifting monuments</p>"
+      "text": "<p>heads of the Great Lakes states and UN pledged in 2004 to abate tribal, rebel, and militia fighting in the region, including northeast Congo<br><br><em>Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC)-Republic of the Congo: </em>the location of the boundary in the broad Congo River is indefinite except in the Pool Malebo/Stanley Pool area<br><br><em>Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC)-Uganda:</em> Uganda rejects the DRC claim to Margherita Peak in the Rwenzori mountains and considers it a boundary divide; there is tension and violence on Lake Albert over prospective oil reserves at the mouth of the Semliki River<br><br><em>Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC)-Zambia: </em>boundary commission continues discussions over Congolese-administered triangle of land on the right bank of the Lunkinda River claimed by Zambia near the DRC village of Pweto<br><br><em>Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC)-Angola: </em>DRC accuses Angola of shifting monuments</p>"
     },
     "Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
       "refugees (country of origin)": {

africa/cm.json

@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 38.3%, Protestant 25.5%, other Christian 6.9%, Muslim 24.4%, animist 2.2%, other 0.5%, none 2.2% (2018 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Cameroon has a large youth population, with more than 60% of the populace under the age of 25. Fertility is falling but remains at a high level, especially among poor, rural, and uneducated women, in part because of inadequate access to contraception. Life expectancy remains low at about 55 years due to the prevalence of HIV and AIDs and an elevated maternal mortality rate, which has remained high since 1990. Cameroon, particularly the northern region, is vulnerable to food insecurity largely because of government mismanagement, corruption, high production costs, inadequate infrastructure, and natural disasters. Despite economic growth in some regions, poverty is on the rise, and is most prevalent in rural areas, which are especially affected by a shortage of jobs, declining incomes, poor school and health care infrastructure, and a lack of clean water and sanitation. Underinvestment in social safety nets and ineffective public financial management also contribute to Cameroon’s high rate of poverty.  The activities of Boko Haram, other armed groups, and counterinsurgency operations have worsened food insecurity in the Far North region.  </p> <p>International migration has been driven by unemployment (including fewer government jobs), poverty, the search for educational opportunities, and corruption. The US and Europe are preferred destinations, but, with tighter immigration restrictions in these countries, young Cameroonians are increasingly turning to neighboring states, such as Gabon and Nigeria, South Africa, other parts of Africa, and the Near and Far East. Cameroon’s limited resources make it dependent on UN support to host more than 490,000 refugees and asylum seekers as of September 2022. These refugees and asylum seekers are primarily from the Central African Republic and Nigeria.  Internal and external displacement have grown dramatically in recent years.  Boko Haram's attacks and counterattacks by government forces in the Far North since 2014 have increased the number of internally displaced people.  Armed conflict between separatists and Cameroon's military in the Northwest and Southwest since 2016 have displaced hundreds of thousands of the country's Anglophone minority.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Cameroon has a large youth population, with more than 60% of the populace under the age of 25 as of 2020. Fertility is falling but remains at a high level, especially among poor, rural, and uneducated women, in part because of inadequate access to contraception. Life expectancy remains low at about 55 years due to the prevalence of HIV and AIDs and an elevated maternal mortality rate, which has remained high since 1990. Cameroon, particularly the northern region, is vulnerable to food insecurity largely because of government mismanagement, corruption, high production costs, inadequate infrastructure, and natural disasters. Despite economic growth in some regions, poverty is on the rise, and is most prevalent in rural areas, which are especially affected by a shortage of jobs, declining incomes, poor school and health care infrastructure, and a lack of clean water and sanitation. Underinvestment in social safety nets and ineffective public financial management also contribute to Cameroon’s high rate of poverty.  The activities of Boko Haram, other armed groups, and counterinsurgency operations have worsened food insecurity in the Far North region.  </p> <p>International migration has been driven by unemployment (including fewer government jobs), poverty, the search for educational opportunities, and corruption. The US and Europe are preferred destinations, but, with tighter immigration restrictions in these countries, young Cameroonians are increasingly turning to neighboring states, such as Gabon and Nigeria, South Africa, other parts of Africa, and the Near and Far East. Cameroon’s limited resources make it dependent on UN support to host more than 480,000 refugees and asylum seekers as of December 2022. These refugees and asylum seekers are primarily from the Central African Republic and Nigeria.  Internal and external displacement have grown dramatically in recent years.  Boko Haram's attacks and counterattacks by government forces in the Far North since 2014 have increased the number of internally displaced people.  Armed conflict between separatists and Cameroon's military in the Northwest and Southwest since 2016 have displaced hundreds of thousands of the country's Anglophone minority.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "3.6% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "3.8% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.13 physicians/1,000 population (2019)"
@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@
   "Military and Security": {
     "Military and security forces": {
       "text": "Cameroon Armed Forces (Forces Armees Camerounaises, FAC): Army (L'Armee de Terre), Navy (Marine Nationale Republique, MNR, includes naval infantry), Air Force (Armee de l'Air du Cameroun, AAC), Rapid Intervention Battalion (Bataillons d’Intervention Rapide or BIR), National Gendarmerie, Presidential Guard (2022)",
-      "note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the National Police and the National Gendarmerie are responsible for internal security; the Police report to the General Delegation of National Security, while the Gendarmerie reports to the Secretariat of State for Defense in charge of the Gendarmerie<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) maintains its own command and control structure and reports directly to the president; the BIR is structured as a large brigade with up to 9 battalions, detachments, or groups consisting of infantry, airborne/airmobile, amphibious, armored reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and support elements, such as artillery and intelligence"
+      "note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the National Police and the National Gendarmerie are responsible for internal security; the Police report to the General Delegation of National Security, while the Gendarmerie reports to the Secretariat of State for Defense in charge of the Gendarmerie<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) maintains its own command and control structure and reports directly to the president; the BIR is structured as a large brigade with up to 9 battalions, detachments, or groups consisting of infantry, airborne/airmobile, amphibious, armored reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and support elements, such as artillery and intelligence; the BIR receives better training, equipment, and pay than regular Army units"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
       "Military Expenditures 2021": {
@@ -1325,7 +1325,7 @@
       "note": "<strong>note: </strong>the BIR has approximately 5,000 personnel"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the FAC inventory includes a wide mix of mostly older or secondhand Chinese, Russian, and Western equipment, with a limited quantity of more modern weapons; in recent years, China has been the leading supplier of armaments to the FAC (2022)"
+      "text": "the FAC inventory includes a wide mix of mostly older or second-hand Chinese, Russian, and Western equipment, with a limited quantity of more modern weapons received in recent years from such countries as China, South Africa, and the US (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-23 years of age for male and female voluntary military service; no conscription; high school graduation required; service obligation 4 years (2021)"
@@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@
       "note": "<strong>note: </strong>Cameroon has committed approximately 2,000-2,500 troops to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups operating in the general area of the Lake Chad Basin and along Nigeria's northeast border; national MNJTF troop contingents are deployed within their own country territories, although cross‐border operations occur occasionally"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "as of 2023, the FAC was largely focused on the threat from the terrorist group Boko Haram along its frontiers with Nigeria and Chad (Far North region) and an insurgency from armed Anglophone separatist groups in the North-West and South-West regions (as of 2023, this internal conflict has left more than 3,500 civilians dead and over 500,000 people displaced since fighting started in 2016); in addition, the FAC often deployed units to the border region with the Central African Republic to counter intrusions from armed militias and bandits"
+      "text": "the FAC's air, ground, and gendarmerie forces are largely focused on the threat from the terrorist group Boko Haram along its frontiers with Nigeria and Chad (Far North region) and an insurgency from armed Anglophone separatist groups in the North-West and South-West regions (as of 2023, this internal conflict has left more than 3,500 civilians dead and over 500,000 people displaced since fighting started in 2016); in addition, ground units are often deployed units to the border region with the Central African Republic to counter intrusions from armed militias and bandits; the Navy is focused on protecting Cameroon's oil installations, combating crime and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, and patrolling the country's rivers and lakes (2023)"
     },
     "Maritime threats": {
       "text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of maritime kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""

africa/cn.json

@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "5.2% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "5.4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.26 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"

africa/ct.json

@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
       "note": "<strong>note:</strong> animistic beliefs and practices strongly influence the Christian majority"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>The Central African Republic’s (CAR) humanitarian crisis has worsened since the coup of March 2013. CAR’s high mortality rate and low life expectancy are attributed to elevated rates of preventable and treatable diseases (including malaria and malnutrition), an inadequate health care system, precarious food security, and armed conflict. Some of the worst mortality rates are in western CAR’s diamond mining region, which has been impoverished because of government attempts to control the diamond trade and the fall in industrial diamond prices. To make matters worse, the government and international donors have reduced health funding in recent years. The CAR’s weak educational system and low literacy rate have also suffered as a result of the country’s ongoing conflict. Schools are closed, qualified teachers are scarce, infrastructure, funding, and supplies are lacking and subject to looting, and many students and teachers have been displaced by violence.</p> <p>Rampant poverty, human rights violations, unemployment, poor infrastructure, and a lack of security and stability have led to forced displacement internally and externally. Since the political crisis that resulted in CAR’s March 2013 coup began in December 2012, approximately 600,000 people have fled to Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and other neighboring countries, while another estimated 600,000 were displaced internally as of October 2019. The UN has urged countries to refrain from repatriating CAR refugees amid the heightened lawlessness.</p> (2019)"
+      "text": "<p>The Central African Republic’s (CAR) humanitarian crisis has worsened since the coup of March 2013. CAR’s high mortality rate and low life expectancy are attributed to elevated rates of preventable and treatable diseases (including malaria and malnutrition), an inadequate health care system, precarious food security, and armed conflict. Some of the worst mortality rates are in western CAR’s diamond mining region, which has been impoverished because of government attempts to control the diamond trade and the fall in industrial diamond prices. To make matters worse, the government and international donors have reduced health funding in recent years. The CAR’s weak educational system and low literacy rate have also suffered as a result of the country’s ongoing conflict. Schools are closed, qualified teachers are scarce, infrastructure, funding, and supplies are lacking and subject to looting, and many students and teachers have been displaced by violence.</p> <p>Rampant poverty, human rights violations, unemployment, poor infrastructure, and a lack of security and stability have led to forced displacement internally and externally. Since the political crisis that resulted in CAR’s March 2013 coup began in December 2012, approximately 600,000 people have fled to Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and other neighboring countries, while another estimated 515,000 were displaced internally as of December 2022. The UN has urged countries to refrain from repatriating CAR refugees amid the heightened lawlessness.</p> (2019)"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "7.8% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "9.4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.07 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@
       "text": "18 years of age for military service; no conscription (2021)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "the 2013 coup resulted in the institutional collapse of the FACA; its forces were overwhelmed and forced to flee to neighboring countries; it has been estimated that only 10% of the FACA returned after the coup, and it has struggled to rebuild in the years of instability since; the European Union, France, Russia, the UN, and the US have provided various levels of security assistance <br><br>in 2018, the UN Security Council approved Russian security assistance for the CAR to help train and advise FACA personnel, as well as transport them to operational areas, provide logistical support, and assist with medical evacuation; Russia sent private military contractors, and as of early 2022, as many as 2,000 were providing assistance to the FACA, as well as performing other security roles such as guarding mines and government officials; some Russian contractors and the CAR forces they supported have been accused of carrying out indiscriminate killings, using excessive force against civilians, and looting<br><br>the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) has operated in the country since 2014; its peacekeeping mission includes providing security, protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, disarming and demobilizing armed groups, and supporting the country’s fragile transitional government; in November 2019, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the MINUSCA peacekeeping mission another year; as of mid-2022, MINUSCA had nearly 15,000 total personnel<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA) has operated in the country since 2016, providing advice, training, and educational programs to the country's security forces (2022)"
+      "text": "the 2013 coup resulted in the institutional collapse of the FACA; its forces were overwhelmed and forced to flee to neighboring countries; it has been estimated that only 10% of the FACA returned after the coup, and it has struggled to rebuild in the years of instability since; the European Union, France, Russia, the UN, and the US have provided various levels of security assistance <br><br>in 2018, the UN Security Council approved Russian security assistance for the CAR to help train and advise FACA personnel, as well as transport them to operational areas, provide logistical support, and assist with medical evacuation; Russia sent private military contractors, and as of 2022, as many as 2,000 were providing assistance to the FACA, as well as performing other security roles such as guarding mines and government officials; some Russian contractors and the CAR forces they supported have been accused of carrying out indiscriminate killings, using excessive force against civilians, and looting<br><br>the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) has operated in the country since 2014; its peacekeeping mission includes providing security, protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, disarming and demobilizing armed groups, and supporting the country’s fragile transitional government; in November 2019, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the MINUSCA peacekeeping mission another year; as of 2022, MINUSCA had approximately 15,000 military and police personnel<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA) has operated in the country since 2016, providing advice, training, and educational programs to the country's security forces; since 2016, the EU mission has trained 5 territorial infantry battalions and 1 amphibious infantry battalion (2022)"
     }
   },
   "Transnational Issues": {

africa/cv.json

@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "4.9% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "6% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.83 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@
     },
     "Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
       "stateless persons": {
-        "text": "115 (mid-year 2021)"
+        "text": "115 (2022)"
       }
     },
     "Illicit drugs": {

africa/dj.json

@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
       "text": "Sunni Muslim 94% (nearly all Djiboutians), other 6% (mainly foreign-born residents - Shia Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Baha'i, and atheist)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Djibouti is a poor, predominantly urban country, characterized by high rates of illiteracy, unemployment, and childhood malnutrition. More than 75% of the population lives in cities and towns (predominantly in the capital, Djibouti). The rural population subsists primarily on nomadic herding. Prone to droughts and floods, the country has few natural resources and must import more than 80% of its food from neighboring countries or Europe. Health care, particularly outside the capital, is limited by poor infrastructure, shortages of equipment and supplies, and a lack of qualified personnel. More than a third of health care recipients are migrants because the services are still better than those available in their neighboring home countries. The nearly universal practice of female genital cutting reflects Djibouti’s lack of gender equality and is a major contributor to obstetrical complications and its high rates of maternal and infant mortality. A 1995 law prohibiting the practice has never been enforced.</p> <p>Because of its political stability and its strategic location at the confluence of East Africa and the Gulf States along the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, Djibouti is a key transit point for migrants and asylum seekers heading for the Gulf States and beyond. Each year some 100,000 people, mainly Ethiopians and some Somalis, journey through Djibouti, usually to the port of Obock, to attempt a dangerous sea crossing to Yemen. However, with the escalation of the ongoing Yemen conflict, Yemenis began fleeing to Djibouti in March 2015, with almost 20,000 arriving by August 2017. Most Yemenis remain unregistered and head for Djibouti City rather than seeking asylum at one of Djibouti’s three spartan refugee camps. Djibouti has been hosting refugees and asylum seekers, predominantly Somalis and lesser numbers of Ethiopians and Eritreans, at camps for 20 years, despite lacking potable water, food shortages, and unemployment.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Djibouti is a poor, predominantly urban country, characterized by high rates of illiteracy, unemployment, and childhood malnutrition. Approximately 70% of the population lives in cities and towns (predominantly in the capital, Djibouti). The rural population subsists primarily on nomadic herding. Prone to droughts and floods, the country has few natural resources and must import more than 80% of its food from neighboring countries or Europe. Health care, particularly outside the capital, is limited by poor infrastructure, shortages of equipment and supplies, and a lack of qualified personnel. More than a third of health care recipients are migrants because the services are still better than those available in their neighboring home countries. The nearly universal practice of female genital cutting reflects Djibouti’s lack of gender equality and is a major contributor to obstetrical complications and its high rates of maternal and infant mortality. A 1995 law prohibiting the practice has never been enforced.</p> <p>Because of its political stability and its strategic location at the confluence of East Africa and the Gulf States along the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, Djibouti is a key transit point for migrants and asylum seekers heading for the Gulf States and beyond. Each year some 100,000 people, mainly Ethiopians and some Somalis, journey through Djibouti, usually to the port of Obock, to attempt a dangerous sea crossing to Yemen. However, with the escalation of the ongoing Yemen conflict, Yemenis began fleeing to Djibouti in March 2015, with almost 20,000 arriving by August 2017. Most Yemenis remain unregistered and head for Djibouti City rather than seeking asylum at one of Djibouti’s three spartan refugee camps. Djibouti has been hosting refugees and asylum seekers, predominantly Somalis and lesser numbers of Ethiopians and Eritreans, at camps for 20 years, despite lacking potable water, food shortages, and unemployment.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "1.8% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "2% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.22 physicians/1,000 population (2014)"

africa/eg.json

@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim (predominantly Sunni) 90%, Christian (majority Coptic Orthodox, other Christians include Armenian Apostolic, Catholic, Maronite, Orthodox, and Anglican) 10%"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world and the third most populous country in Africa, behind Nigeria and Ethiopia. Most of the country is desert, so about 95% of the population is concentrated in a narrow strip of fertile land along the Nile River, which represents only about 5% of Egypt’s land area. Egypt’s rapid population growth – 46% between 1994 and 2014 – stresses limited natural resources, jobs, housing, sanitation, education, and health care.</p><p>Although the country’s total fertility rate (TFR) fell from roughly 5.5 children per woman in 1980 to just over 3 in the late 1990s, largely as a result of state-sponsored family planning programs, the population growth rate dropped more modestly because of decreased mortality rates and longer life expectancies. During the last decade, Egypt’s TFR decline stalled for several years and then reversed, reaching 3.6 in 2011, and has plateaued the last few years. Contraceptive use has held steady at about 60%, while preferences for larger families and early marriage may have strengthened in the wake of the recent 2011 revolution. The large cohort of women of or nearing childbearing age will sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future (an effect called population momentum).</p><p>Nevertheless, post-MUBARAK governments have not made curbing population growth a priority. To increase contraceptive use and to prevent further overpopulation will require greater government commitment and substantial social change, including encouraging smaller families and better educating and empowering women. Currently, literacy, educational attainment, and labor force participation rates are much lower for women than men. In addition, the prevalence of violence against women, the lack of female political representation, and the perpetuation of the nearly universal practice of female genital cutting continue to keep women from playing a more significant role in Egypt’s public sphere.</p><p>Population pressure, poverty, high unemployment, and the fragmentation of inherited land holdings have historically motivated Egyptians, primarily young men, to migrate internally from rural and smaller urban areas in the Nile Delta region and the poorer rural south to Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban centers in the north, while a much smaller number migrated to the Red Sea and Sinai areas. Waves of forced internal migration also resulted from the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the floods caused by the completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1970. Limited numbers of students and professionals emigrated temporarily prior to the early 1970s, when economic problems and high unemployment pushed the Egyptian Government to lift restrictions on labor migration. At the same time, high oil revenues enabled Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and other Gulf states, as well as Libya and Jordan, to fund development projects, creating a demand for unskilled labor (mainly in construction), which attracted tens of thousands of young Egyptian men.</p><p>Between 1970 and 1974 alone, Egyptian migrants in the Gulf countries increased from approximately 70,000 to 370,000. Egyptian officials encouraged legal labor migration both to alleviate unemployment and to generate remittance income (remittances continue to be one of Egypt’s largest sources of foreign currency and GDP). During the mid-1980s, however, depressed oil prices resulting from the Iran-Iraq War, decreased demand for low-skilled labor, competition from less costly South Asian workers, and efforts to replace foreign workers with locals significantly reduced Egyptian migration to the Gulf States. The number of Egyptian migrants dropped from a peak of almost 3.3 million in 1983 to about 2.2 million at the start of the 1990s, but numbers gradually recovered.</p><p>In the 2000s, Egypt began facilitating more labor migration through bilateral agreements, notably with Arab countries and Italy, but illegal migration to Europe through overstayed visas or maritime human smuggling via Libya also rose. The Egyptian Government estimated there were 6.5 million Egyptian migrants in 2009, with roughly 75% being temporary migrants in other Arab countries (Libya, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates) and 25% being predominantly permanent migrants in the West (US, UK, Italy, France, and Canada).</p><p>During the 2000s, Egypt became an increasingly important transit and destination country for economic migrants and asylum seekers, including Palestinians, East Africans, and South Asians and, more recently, Iraqis and Syrians. Egypt draws many refugees because of its resettlement programs with the West; Cairo has one of the largest urban refugee populations in the world. Many East African migrants are interned or live in temporary encampments along the Egypt-Israel border, and some have been shot and killed by Egyptian border guards.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world and the third-most-populous country in Africa, behind Nigeria and Ethiopia. Most of the country is desert, so about 95% of the population is concentrated in a narrow strip of fertile land along the Nile River, which represents only about 5% of Egypt’s land area. Egypt’s rapid population growth – 46% between 1994 and 2014 – stresses limited natural resources, jobs, housing, sanitation, education, and health care.</p> <p>Although the country’s total fertility rate (TFR) fell from roughly 5.5 children per woman in 1980 to just over 3 in the late 1990s, largely as a result of state-sponsored family planning programs, the population growth rate dropped more modestly because of decreased mortality rates and longer life expectancies. During the last decade, Egypt’s TFR decline stalled for several years and then reversed, reaching 3.6 in 2011, and is under 3 as of 2022. Contraceptive use has held steady at about 60%, while preferences for larger families and early marriage may have strengthened in the wake of the recent 2011 revolution. The large cohort of women of or nearing childbearing age will sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future (an effect called population momentum).</p> <p>Nevertheless, post-MUBARAK governments have not made curbing population growth a priority. To increase contraceptive use and to prevent further overpopulation will require greater government commitment and substantial social change, including encouraging smaller families and better educating and empowering women. Currently, literacy, educational attainment, and labor force participation rates are much lower for women than men. In addition, the prevalence of violence against women, the lack of female political representation, and the perpetuation of the nearly universal practice of female genital cutting continue to keep women from playing a more significant role in Egypt’s public sphere.</p> <p>Population pressure, poverty, high unemployment, and the fragmentation of inherited land holdings have historically motivated Egyptians, primarily young men, to migrate internally from rural and smaller urban areas in the Nile Delta region and the poorer rural south to Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban centers in the north, while a much smaller number migrated to the Red Sea and Sinai areas. Waves of forced internal migration also resulted from the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the floods caused by the completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1970. Limited numbers of students and professionals emigrated temporarily prior to the early 1970s, when economic problems and high unemployment pushed the Egyptian Government to lift restrictions on labor migration. At the same time, high oil revenues enabled Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and other Gulf states, as well as Libya and Jordan, to fund development projects, creating a demand for unskilled labor (mainly in construction), which attracted tens of thousands of young Egyptian men.</p> <p>Between 1970 and 1974 alone, Egyptian migrants in the Gulf countries increased from approximately 70,000 to 370,000. Egyptian officials encouraged legal labor migration both to alleviate unemployment and to generate remittance income (remittances continue to be one of Egypt’s largest sources of foreign currency and GDP). During the mid-1980s, however, depressed oil prices resulting from the Iran-Iraq War, decreased demand for low-skilled labor, competition from less costly South Asian workers, and efforts to replace foreign workers with locals significantly reduced Egyptian migration to the Gulf States. The number of Egyptian migrants dropped from a peak of almost 3.3 million in 1983 to about 2.2 million at the start of the 1990s, but numbers gradually recovered.</p> <p>In the 2000s, Egypt began facilitating more labor migration through bilateral agreements, notably with Arab countries and Italy, but illegal migration to Europe through overstayed visas or maritime human smuggling via Libya also rose. The Egyptian Government estimated there were 6.5 million Egyptian migrants in 2009, with roughly 75% being temporary migrants in other Arab countries (Libya, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates) and 25% being predominantly permanent migrants in the West (US, UK, Italy, France, and Canada).</p> <p>During the 2000s, Egypt became an increasingly important transit and destination country for economic migrants and asylum seekers, including Palestinians, East Africans, and South Asians and, more recently, Iraqis and Syrians. Egypt draws many refugees because of its resettlement programs with the West; Cairo has one of the largest urban refugee populations in the world. Many East African migrants are interned or live in temporary encampments along the Egypt-Israel border, and some have been shot and killed by Egyptian border guards.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "4.7% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "4.4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.75 physicians/1,000 population (2019)"
@@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@
         "text": "70,021 (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (mid-year 2022); 145,157 (Syria), 52,446 (Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 20,970 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 21,105 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 15,585 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 10,025 (Yemen) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,815 (Iraq) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,802 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
       },
       "stateless persons": {
-        "text": "7 (mid-year 2021)"
+        "text": "10 (2022)"
       }
     },
     "Illicit drugs": {

africa/ek.json

@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 88%, Protestant 5%, Muslim 2%, other 5% (animist, Baha'i, Jewish) (2015 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Equatorial Guinea is one of the smallest and least populated countries in continental Africa and is the only independent African country where Spanish is an official language. Despite a boom in oil production in the 1990s, authoritarianism, corruption, and resource mismanagement have concentrated the benefits among a small elite. These practices have perpetuated income inequality and unbalanced development, such as low public spending on education and health care. Unemployment remains problematic because the oil-dominated economy employs a small labor force dependent on skilled foreign workers. The agricultural sector, Equatorial Guinea’s main employer, continues to deteriorate because of a lack of investment and the migration of rural workers to urban areas. About three-quarters of the population lives below the poverty line.</p> <p>Equatorial Guinea’s large and growing youth population – about 60% are under the age of 25 – is particularly affected because job creation in the non-oil sectors is limited, and young people often do not have the skills needed in the labor market. Equatorial Guinean children frequently enter school late, have poor attendance, and have high dropout rates. Thousands of Equatorial Guineans fled across the border to Gabon in the 1970s to escape the dictatorship of Francisco MACIAS NGUEMA; smaller numbers have followed in the decades since. Continued inequitable economic growth and high youth unemployment increases the likelihood of ethnic and regional violence.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Equatorial Guinea is one of the smallest and least populated countries in continental Africa and is the only independent African country where Spanish is an official language. Despite a boom in oil production in the 1990s, authoritarianism, corruption, and resource mismanagement have concentrated the benefits among a small elite. These practices have perpetuated income inequality and unbalanced development, such as low public spending on education and health care. Unemployment remains problematic because the oil-dominated economy employs a small labor force dependent on skilled foreign workers. The agricultural sector, Equatorial Guinea’s main employer, continues to deteriorate because of a lack of investment and the migration of rural workers to urban areas. About two-thirds of the population lives below the poverty line as of 2020.</p> <p>Equatorial Guinea’s large and growing youth population – about 60% are under the age of 25 as of 2022 – is particularly affected because job creation in the non-oil sectors is limited, and young people often do not have the skills needed in the labor market. Equatorial Guinean children frequently enter school late, have poor attendance, and have high dropout rates. Thousands of Equatorial Guineans fled across the border to Gabon in the 1970s to escape the dictatorship of Francisco MACIAS NGUEMA; smaller numbers have followed in the decades since. Continued inequitable economic growth and high youth unemployment increases the likelihood of ethnic and regional violence.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "3.1% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "3.8% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.4 physicians/1,000 population (2017)"
@@ -553,7 +553,7 @@
         "text": "President Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Teodoro OBIANG Nguema Mbasogo (since 3 August 1979 when he seized power in a military coup); Vice President Teodoro Nguema OBIANG Mangue (since 2012)"
       },
       "head of government": {
-        "text": "Prime Minister Manuela ROKA Botey (since 31 January 2023); First Deputy Prime Minister Clemente Engonga NGUEMA Onguene (since 23 June 2016); Second Deputy Prime Minister Angel MESIE Mibuy (since 5 February 2018); Third Deputy Prime Minister Alfonso Nsue MOKUY (since 23 June 2016)<br>"
+        "text": "Prime Minister Manuela ROKA Botey (since 1 February 2023); First Deputy Prime Minister Clemente Engonga NGUEMA Onguene (since 23 June 2016); Second Deputy Prime Minister Angel MESIE Mibuy (since 5 February 2018); Third Deputy Prime Minister Alfonso Nsue MOKUY (since 23 June 2016)"
       },
       "cabinet": {
         "text": "Council of Ministers appointed by the president and overseen by the prime minister"
@@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@
       "text": "18 years of age for selective compulsory military service, although conscription is rare in practice; 2-year service obligation; women hold only administrative positions in the Navy (2021)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "the FAGE&rsquo;s National Guard (Army) has only three small infantry battalions with limited combat capabilities; the country has invested heavily in naval capabilities in the 2010s to protect its oil installations and combat piracy and crime in the Gulf of Guinea; while the Navy was small, it was well-equipped with an inventory that included a light frigate and a corvette, as well as several off-shore patrol boats; the Air Force possessed only a few operational combat aircraft and ground attack-capable helicopters (2023)"
+      "text": "the FAGE&rsquo;s National Guard (Army) has only three small infantry battalions with limited combat capabilities; the country has invested heavily in naval capabilities in recent years to protect its oil installations and combat piracy and crime in the Gulf of Guinea; while the Navy was small, it is well-equipped with an inventory that includes a light frigate and a corvette, as well as several off-shore patrol boats; the Air Force has only a few operational combat aircraft and ground attack-capable helicopters (2023)"
     },
     "Maritime threats": {
       "text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""

africa/er.json

@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@
       "text": "Eritrean Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Evangelical Lutheran, Sunni Muslim"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Eritrea is a persistently poor country that has made progress in some socioeconomic categories but not in others. Education and human capital formation are national priorities for facilitating economic development and eradicating poverty. To this end, Eritrea has made great strides in improving adult literacy – doubling the literacy rate over the last 20 years – in large part because of its successful adult education programs. The overall literacy rate was estimated to be almost 74% in 2015; more work needs to be done to raise female literacy and school attendance among nomadic and rural communities. Subsistence farming fails to meet the needs of Eritrea’s growing population because of repeated droughts, dwindling arable land, overgrazing, soil erosion, and a shortage of farmers due to conscription and displacement. The government’s emphasis on spending on defense over agriculture and its lack of foreign exchange to import food also contribute to food insecurity.</p><p>Eritrea has been a leading refugee source country since at least the 1960s, when its 30-year war for independence from Ethiopia began. Since gaining independence in 1993, Eritreans have continued migrating to Sudan, Ethiopia, Yemen, Egypt, or Israel because of a lack of basic human rights or political freedom, educational and job opportunities, or to seek asylum because of militarization. Eritrea’s large diaspora has been a source of vital remittances, funding its war for independence and providing 30% of the country’s GDP annually since it became independent.</p><p>In the last few years, Eritreans have increasingly been trafficked and held hostage by Bedouins in the Sinai Desert, where they are victims of organ harvesting, rape, extortion, and torture. Some Eritrean trafficking victims are kidnapped after being smuggled to Sudan or Ethiopia, while others are kidnapped from within or around refugee camps or crossing Eritrea’s borders. Eritreans composed approximately 90% of the conservatively estimated 25,000-30,000 victims of Sinai trafficking from 2009-2013, according to a 2013 consultancy firm report.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Eritrea is a persistently poor country that has made progress in some socioeconomic categories but not in others. Education and human capital formation are national priorities for facilitating economic development and eradicating poverty. To this end, Eritrea has made great strides in improving adult literacy – doubling the literacy rate over the last 20 years – in large part because of its successful adult education programs. The overall literacy rate was estimated to be more than 75% in 2018; more work needs to be done to raise female literacy and school attendance among nomadic and rural communities. Subsistence farming fails to meet the needs of Eritrea’s growing population because of repeated droughts, dwindling arable land, overgrazing, soil erosion, and a shortage of farmers due to conscription and displacement. The government’s emphasis on spending on defense over agriculture and its lack of foreign exchange to import food also contribute to food insecurity.</p> <p>Eritrea has been a leading refugee source country since at least the 1960s, when its 30-year war for independence from Ethiopia began. Since gaining independence in 1993, Eritreans have continued migrating to Sudan, Ethiopia, Yemen, Egypt, or Israel because of a lack of basic human rights or political freedom, educational and job opportunities, or to seek asylum because of militarization. Eritrea’s large diaspora has been a source of vital remittances, funding its war for independence and providing 30% of the country’s GDP annually since it became independent.</p> <p>In the last few years, Eritreans have increasingly been trafficked and held hostage by Bedouins in the Sinai Desert, where they are victims of organ harvesting, rape, extortion, and torture. Some Eritrean trafficking victims are kidnapped after being smuggled to Sudan or Ethiopia, while others are kidnapped from within or around refugee camps or crossing Eritrea’s borders. Eritreans composed approximately 90% of the conservatively estimated 25,000-30,000 victims of Sinai trafficking from 2009-2013, according to a 2013 consultancy firm report.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "4.5% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "4.1% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.08 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -1192,7 +1192,7 @@
       "text": "limited available information; estimated 150,000-200,000 personnel, including about 2,000 in the naval and air forces (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the EDF inventory is comprised primarily of older Russian and Soviet-era systems; Eritrea was under a UN arms embargo from 2009 to 2018; from the 1990s to 2008, Russia was the leading supplier of arms to Eritrea, and in years, Eritrea has expressed interest in purchasing additional Russian equipment (2022)"
+      "text": "the EDF inventory is comprised primarily of older Russian and Soviet-era systems; Eritrea was under a UN arms embargo from 2009 to 2018; from the 1990s to 2008, Russia was the leading supplier of arms to Eritrea, and in recent years, Eritrea has expressed interest in purchasing additional Russian equipment (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "Eritrea mandates military service for all citizens between the ages of 18 and 40 (18-27 for women if conscripted); 18-month conscript service obligation, which includes 4-6 months of military training and 12 months of military or other national service (military service is most common); in practice, military service is often extended indefinitely; citizens up to the age of 55 eligible for recall during mobilization (2022)",

africa/et.json

@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "3.2% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "3.5% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.11 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"

africa/ga.json

@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim 96.4%, Christian 3.5%, other or none 0.1% (2019-20 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>The Gambia’s youthful age structure – almost 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – is likely to persist because the country’s total fertility rate remains strong at nearly 4 children per woman. The overall literacy rate is around 55%, and is significantly lower for women than for men. At least 70% of the populace are farmers who are reliant on rain-fed agriculture and cannot afford improved seeds and fertilizers. Crop failures caused by droughts between 2011 and 2013 have increased poverty, food shortages, and malnutrition.</p><p>The Gambia is a source country for migrants and a transit and destination country for migrants and refugees. Since the 1980s, economic deterioration, drought, and high unemployment, especially among youths, have driven both domestic migration (largely urban) and migration abroad (legal and illegal). Emigrants are largely skilled workers, including doctors and nurses, and provide a significant amount of remittances. The top receiving countries for Gambian emigrants are Spain, the US, Nigeria, Senegal, and the UK. While the Gambia and Spain do not share historic, cultural, or trade ties, rural Gambians have migrated to Spain in large numbers because of its proximity and the availability of jobs in its underground economy (this flow slowed following the onset of Spain’s late 2007 economic crisis).</p><p>The Gambia’s role as a host country to refugees is a result of wars in several of its neighboring West African countries. Since 2006, refugees from the Casamance conflict in Senegal have replaced their pattern of flight and return with permanent settlement in The Gambia, often moving in with relatives along the Senegal-Gambia border. The strain of providing for about 7,400 Casamance refugees has increased poverty among Gambian villagers.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>The Gambia’s youthful age structure – approximately 55% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2021 – is likely to persist because the country’s total fertility rate remains strong at nearly 4 children per woman. The overall literacy rate is around 50%, and is significantly lower for women than for men. At least 70% of the populace are farmers who are reliant on rain-fed agriculture and cannot afford improved seeds and fertilizers. Crop failures caused by droughts between 2011 and 2013 increased poverty, food shortages, and malnutrition.</p> <p>The Gambia is a source country for migrants and a transit and destination country for migrants and refugees. Since the 1980s, economic deterioration, drought, and high unemployment, especially among youths, have driven both domestic migration (largely urban) and migration abroad (legal and illegal). Emigrants are largely skilled workers, including doctors and nurses, and provide a significant amount of remittances. The top receiving countries for Gambian emigrants are Spain, the US, Nigeria, Senegal, and the UK. While the Gambia and Spain do not share historic, cultural, or trade ties, rural Gambians have migrated to Spain in large numbers because of its proximity and the availability of jobs in its underground economy (this flow slowed following the onset of Spain’s late 2007 economic crisis).</p> <p>The Gambia’s role as a host country to refugees is a result of wars in several of its neighboring West African countries. Since 2006, refugees from the Casamance conflict in Senegal have replaced their pattern of flight and return with permanent settlement in The Gambia, often moving in with relatives along the Senegal-Gambia border. The strain of providing for about 7,400 Casamance refugees increased poverty among Gambian villagers. The number of refugees decreased to around 3,500 by 2022.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "3.8% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "2.6% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.08 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -1203,8 +1203,8 @@
   },
   "Military and Security": {
     "Military and security forces": {
-      "text": "Gambian Armed Forces (GAF): the Gambian National Army (GNA), Gambia Navy, Gambia Air Force, Republican National Guard (2022)",
-      "note": "<strong>note: </strong>the National Guard is responsible for VIP protection, riot control, and presidential security"
+      "text": "Gambian Armed Forces (GAF): the Gambian National Army (GNA), Gambia Navy, Gambia Air Force, Republican National Guard; Ministry of Interior: Gambia Police Force (2023)",
+      "note": "<strong>note: </strong>the National Guard is responsible for VIP protection, riot control, and presidential security; the Gambia Police Force maintains internal security"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
       "Military Expenditures 2021": {
@@ -1227,13 +1227,13 @@
       "text": "information varies; approximately 3,000 active troops (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the GAF has a limited equipment inventory; since 2000, it has received only a few second-hand items from Georgia and Taiwan (2022)"
+      "text": "the GAF has a limited equipment inventory (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-25 years of age for male and female voluntary military service (18-22 for officers); no conscription; service obligation 6 months (2021)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "in 2017, several members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent security forces to The Gambia to conduct stability operations and provide assistance and training following the 2016 election; as of 2022, the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG) was comprised of about 1,000 military and gendarmerie personnel from Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal<br><br>as of 2022, the Gambian Armed Forces' (GAF) principal responsibilities included aiding civil authorities in emergencies and providing natural disaster relief the GAF traces its origins to the Gambia Regiment of the British Army; established in 1901, the Gambia Regiment was part of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF, later Royal West African Frontier Force or RWAFF) and served in both World Wars, including the British 1944-45 military campaign in Burma; the Gambia Regiment was disbanded in 1958 and replaced by the Field Force, a police paramilitary unit; the Field Force was responsible for The Gambia’s security until the establishment of the Gambian Armed Forces in 1985; in addition, a defense agreement signed in 1965 between The Gambia and Senegal provided mutual assistance in the face of an external threat; from 1981-1989, The Gambia and Senegal formed a Confederal Army that was made up of troops from both countries <br><br>the military in Gambia, including the Field Force, has a history of heavy involvement in the country’s politics, including multiple coups or coup attempts and mutinies; as of 2022, the Gambia Armed Forces’ principal responsibilities included aiding civil authorities in emergencies and providing natural disaster relief (2022)"
+      "text": "in addition to external defense, the responsibilities of the GAF include providing maritime security, countering human trafficking, aiding civil authorities in emergencies and assistance with natural disaster relief; the GAF traces its origins to the Gambia Regiment of the British Army; established in 1901, the Gambia Regiment was part of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF, later Royal West African Frontier Force or RWAFF) and served in both World Wars, including the British 1944-45 military campaign in Burma; the Gambia Regiment was disbanded in 1958 and replaced by the Field Force, a police paramilitary unit; the Field Force was responsible for The Gambia’s security until the establishment of the Gambian Armed Forces in 1985; in addition, a defense agreement signed in 1965 between The Gambia and Senegal provided mutual assistance in the face of an external threat; from 1981-1989, The Gambia and Senegal formed a Confederal Army that was made up of troops from both countries <br><br>the military in Gambia, including the Field Force, has a history of heavy involvement in the country’s politics, including multiple coups or coup attempts and mutinies<br><br>in 2017, several members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent security forces to The Gambia to conduct stability operations and provide assistance and training following the 2016 election; as of 2022, the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG) was comprised of about 1,000 military and gendarmerie personnel from Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal (2022)"
     }
   },
   "Transnational Issues": {

africa/gb.json

@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 42.3%, Protestant 12.3%, other Christian 27.4%, Muslim 9.8%, animist 0.6%, other 0.5%, none/no answer 7.1% (2012 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Gabon’s oil revenues have given it one of the highest per capita income levels in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the wealth is not evenly distributed and poverty is widespread. Unemployment is especially prevalent among the large youth population; more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25. With a fertility rate still averaging more than 4 children per woman, the youth population will continue to grow and further strain the mismatch between Gabon’s supply of jobs and the skills of its labor force.</p><p>Gabon has been a magnet to migrants from neighboring countries since the 1960s because of the discovery of oil, as well as the country’s political stability and timber, mineral, and natural gas resources. Nonetheless, income inequality and high unemployment have created slums in Libreville full of migrant workers from Senegal, Nigeria, Cameroon, Benin, Togo, and elsewhere in West Africa. In 2011, Gabon declared an end to refugee status for 9,500 remaining Congolese nationals to whom it had granted asylum during the Republic of the Congo’s civil war between 1997 and 2003. About 5,400 of these refugees received permits to reside in Gabon.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Gabon’s oil revenues have given it one of the highest per capita income levels in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the wealth is not evenly distributed and poverty is widespread. Unemployment is especially prevalent among the large youth population; more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020. With a fertility rate still averaging more than 3 children per woman, the youth population will continue to grow and further strain the mismatch between Gabon’s supply of jobs and the skills of its labor force.</p> <p>Gabon has been a magnet to migrants from neighboring countries since the 1960s because of the discovery of oil, as well as the country’s political stability and timber, mineral, and natural gas resources. Nonetheless, income inequality and high unemployment have created slums in Libreville full of migrant workers from Senegal, Nigeria, Cameroon, Benin, Togo, and elsewhere in West Africa. In 2011, Gabon declared an end to refugee status for 9,500 remaining Congolese nationals to whom it had granted asylum during the Republic of the Congo’s civil war between 1997 and 2003. About 5,400 of these refugees received permits to reside in Gabon.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "2.8% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "3.4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.65 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -1221,8 +1221,8 @@
   },
   "Military and Security": {
     "Military and security forces": {
-      "text": "Gabonese Armed Forces (Force Armées Gabonaise or FAG; aka Gabonese Defense and Security Forces): Land Forces (Army), National Navy, Air Force, National Gendarmerie (includes Coast Guard), Corps of Firemen; Republican Guard (2022)",
-      "note": "<strong>note: </strong>the National Police Forces, under the Ministry of Interior, and the National Gendarmerie, under the Ministry of Defense, are responsible for law enforcement and public security; elements of the armed forces and the Republican Guard, an elite unit that protects the president under his direct authority, sometimes performed internal security functions"
+      "text": "Gabonese Armed Forces (Force Armées Gabonaise or FAG; aka Gabonese Defense and Security Forces): Land Forces (Army), National Navy, Air Force, National Gendarmerie (includes Coast Guard), Corps of Firemen; Republican Guard (2023)",
+      "note": "<strong>note: </strong>the National Police Forces, under the Ministry of Interior, and the National Gendarmerie, under the Ministry of Defense, are responsible for law enforcement and public security; elements of the armed forces and the Republican Guard, an elite unit that protects the president under his direct authority, sometimes perform internal security functions"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
       "Military Expenditures 2021": {

africa/gh.json

@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@
       "text": "Christian 71.3% (Pentecostal/Charismatic 31.6%, Protestant 17.4%, Catholic 10%, other 12.3%), Muslim 19.9%, traditionalist 3.2%, other 4.5%, none 1.1% (2021 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Ghana has a young age structure, with approximately 57% of the population under the age of 25. Its total fertility rate fell significantly during the 1980s and 1990s but has stalled at around four children per woman for the last few years. Fertility remains higher in the northern region than the Greater Accra region. On average, desired fertility has remained stable for several years; urban dwellers want fewer children than rural residents. Increased life expectancy, due to better health care, nutrition, and hygiene, and reduced fertility have increased Ghana’s share of elderly persons; Ghana’s proportion of persons aged 60+ is among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Poverty has declined in Ghana, but it remains pervasive in the northern region, which is susceptible to droughts and floods and has less access to transportation infrastructure, markets, fertile farming land, and industrial centers. The northern region also has lower school enrollment, higher illiteracy, and fewer opportunities for women.</p><p>Ghana was a country of immigration in the early years after its 1957 independence, attracting labor migrants largely from Nigeria and other neighboring countries to mine minerals and harvest cocoa – immigrants composed about 12% of Ghana’s population in 1960. In the late 1960s, worsening economic and social conditions discouraged immigration, and hundreds of thousands of immigrants, mostly Nigerians, were expelled.</p><p>During the 1970s, severe drought and an economic downturn transformed Ghana into a country of emigration; neighboring Cote d’Ivoire was the initial destination. Later, hundreds of thousands of Ghanaians migrated to Nigeria to work in its booming oil industry, but most were deported in 1983 and 1985 as oil prices plummeted. Many Ghanaians then turned to more distant destinations, including other parts of Africa, Europe, and North America, but the majority continued to migrate within West Africa. Since the 1990s, increased emigration of skilled Ghanaians, especially to the US and the UK, drained the country of its health care and education professionals. Internally, poverty and other developmental disparities continue to drive Ghanaians from the north to the south, particularly to its urban centers.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Ghana has a young age structure, with approximately 56% of the population under the age of 25 as of 2020. Its total fertility rate fell significantly during the 1980s and 1990s but has stalled at around four children per woman for the last few years. Fertility remains higher in the northern region than the Greater Accra region. On average, desired fertility has remained stable for several years; urban dwellers want fewer children than rural residents. Increased life expectancy, due to better health care, nutrition, and hygiene, and reduced fertility have increased Ghana’s share of elderly persons; Ghana’s proportion of persons aged 60+ is among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Poverty has declined in Ghana, but it remains pervasive in the northern region, which is susceptible to droughts and floods and has less access to transportation infrastructure, markets, fertile farming land, and industrial centers. The northern region also has lower school enrollment, higher illiteracy, and fewer opportunities for women.</p> <p>Ghana was a country of immigration in the early years after its 1957 independence, attracting labor migrants largely from Nigeria and other neighboring countries to mine minerals and harvest cocoa – immigrants composed about 12% of Ghana’s population in 1960. In the late 1960s, worsening economic and social conditions discouraged immigration, and hundreds of thousands of immigrants, mostly Nigerians, were expelled.</p> <p>During the 1970s, severe drought and an economic downturn transformed Ghana into a country of emigration; neighboring Cote d’Ivoire was the initial destination. Later, hundreds of thousands of Ghanaians migrated to Nigeria to work in its booming oil industry, but most were deported in 1983 and 1985 as oil prices plummeted. Many Ghanaians then turned to more distant destinations, including other parts of Africa, Europe, and North America, but the majority continued to migrate within West Africa. Since the 1990s, increased emigration of skilled Ghanaians, especially to the US and the UK, drained the country of its health care and education professionals. Internally, poverty and other developmental disparities continue to drive Ghanaians from the north to the south, particularly to its urban centers.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "3.4% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.17 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@
   },
   "Military and Security": {
     "Military and security forces": {
-      "text": "Ghana Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force (2022)"
+      "text": "Ghana Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force; Ministry of the Interior: Ghana Police Service (2022)"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
       "Military Expenditures 2021": {
@@ -1284,7 +1284,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 14,000 active personnel (10,000 Army; 2,000 Navy; 2,000 Air Force) (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the inventory of the Ghana Armed Forces is a mix of Russian, Chinese, and Western equipment; since 2010, China has been the leading supplier of arms (2022)"
+      "text": "the military's inventory is a mix of Russian, Chinese, and Western equipment; in recent years, China and Czechia have been among the leading arms suppliers&nbsp; (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-26 years of age for voluntary military service, with basic education certificate; no conscription (2022)"
@@ -1294,7 +1294,7 @@
       "note": "<strong>note:</strong> since sending a contingent of troops to the Congo in 1960, the military has been a regular contributor to African- and UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "<p>the military of Ghana traces its origins to the Gold Coast Constabulary that was established in 1879 and renamed the Gold Coast Regiment in 1901; the Gold Coast Regiment was part of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the WAFF served with distinction in both East and West Africa during World War I; in 1928, it received royal recognition and was re-named the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF); the RWAFF went on to serve in World War II as part of the British 81st and 82nd (West African) divisions in the East Africa and Burma campaigns; following independence in 1957, the Gold Coast Regiment formed the basis for the new Ghanaian Army</p> <p>as of 2022, the primary missions for the Ghanaian military included assisting other security services with internal security and patrolling the country’s economic exclusion zone, which has led to efforts to expand the Navy’s capabilities in recent years; in 2022, Ghana beefed up its military presence in the north of the country against threats from the terrorist organization Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida linked militant groups, which has conducted attacks in the neighboring countries of Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togo</p>"
+      "text": "the primary missions for the Ghanaian military include assisting other security services with internal security and patrolling the country’s economic exclusion zone, which has led to efforts to expand the Navy’s capabilities in recent years; in 2022, Ghana beefed up its military presence in the north of the country against threats from the terrorist organization Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida linked militant groups, which has conducted attacks in the neighboring countries of Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togo<br><br>the military of Ghana traces its origins to the Gold Coast Constabulary that was established in 1879 and renamed the Gold Coast Regiment in 1901; the Gold Coast Regiment was part of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the WAFF served with distinction in both East and West Africa during World War I; in 1928, it received royal recognition and was re-named the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF); the RWAFF went on to serve in World War II as part of the British 81st and 82nd (West African) divisions in the East Africa and Burma campaigns; following independence in 1957, the Gold Coast Regiment formed the basis for the new Ghanaian Army (2022)"
     },
     "Maritime threats": {
       "text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"</p>"

africa/gv.json

@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim 89.1%, Christian 6.8%, animist 1.6%, other 0.1%, none 2.4% (2014 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Guinea’s strong population growth is a result of declining mortality rates and sustained elevated fertility. The population growth rate was somewhat tempered in the 2000s because of a period of net outmigration. Although life expectancy and mortality rates have improved over the last two decades, the nearly universal practice of female genital cutting continues to contribute to high infant and maternal mortality rates. Guinea’s total fertility remains high at about 5 children per woman because of the ongoing preference for larger families, low contraceptive usage and availability, a lack of educational attainment and empowerment among women, and poverty. A lack of literacy and vocational training programs limit job prospects for youths, but even those with university degrees often have no option but to work in the informal sector. About 60% of the country’s large youth population is unemployed.</p><p>Tensions and refugees have spilled over Guinea’s borders with Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire. During the 1990s Guinea harbored as many as half a million refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia, more refugees than any other African country for much of that decade. About half sought refuge in the volatile \"Parrot’s Beak\" region of southwest Guinea, a wedge of land jutting into Sierra Leone near the Liberian border. Many were relocated within Guinea in the early 2000s because the area suffered repeated cross-border attacks from various government and rebel forces, as well as anti-refugee violence.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Guinea’s strong population growth is a result of declining mortality rates and sustained elevated fertility. The population growth rate was somewhat tempered in the 2000s because of a period of net outmigration. Although life expectancy and mortality rates have improved over the last two decades, the nearly universal practice of female genital cutting continues to contribute to high infant and maternal mortality rates. Guinea’s total fertility remains high at about 5 children per woman as of 2022 because of the ongoing preference for larger families, low contraceptive usage and availability, a lack of educational attainment and empowerment among women, and poverty. A lack of literacy and vocational training programs limit job prospects for youths, but even those with university degrees often have no option but to work in the informal sector. About 60% of the country’s large youth population is unemployed.</p> <p>Tensions and refugees have spilled over Guinea’s borders with Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire. During the 1990s Guinea harbored as many as half a million refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia, more refugees than any other African country for much of that decade. About half sought refuge in the volatile \"Parrot’s Beak\" region of southwest Guinea, a wedge of land jutting into Sierra Leone near the Liberian border. Many were relocated within Guinea in the early 2000s because the area suffered repeated cross-border attacks from various government and rebel forces, as well as anti-refugee violence.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "4% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.23 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 12,000 active personnel (9,000 Army; 400 Navy; 800 Air Force; 300 BASP; 1,500 Gendarmerie) (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the inventory of the Guinean military consists largely of aging and outdated (mostly Soviet-era) equipment; since 2010, it has received small amounts of equipment from China, France, Russia, and South Africa (2022)"
+      "text": "the inventory of the Guinean military consists largely of aging and outdated (mostly Soviet-era) equipment; in recent years, it has received small amounts of equipment from China, France, Russia, and South Africa (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "Voluntary and selective conscripted service, 9-24 mos (2022)"

africa/iv.json

@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@
       "note": "<strong>note:</strong> the majority of foreign migrant workers are Muslim (72.7%) and Christian (17.7%)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Cote d’Ivoire’s population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future because almost 60% of the populace is younger than 25, the total fertility rate is holding steady at about 3.5 children per woman, and contraceptive use is under 20%. The country will need to improve education, health care, and gender equality in order to turn its large and growing youth cohort into human capital. Even prior to 2010 unrest that shuttered schools for months, access to education was poor, especially for women. The lack of educational attainment contributes to Cote d’Ivoire’s high rates of unskilled labor, adolescent pregnancy, and HIV/AIDS prevalence.</p> <p>Following its independence in 1960, Cote d’Ivoire’s stability and the blossoming of its labor-intensive cocoa and coffee industries in the southwest made it an attractive destination for migrants from other parts of the country and its neighbors, particularly Burkina Faso. The HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY administration continued the French colonial policy of encouraging labor immigration by offering liberal land ownership laws. Foreigners from West Africa, Europe (mainly France), and Lebanon composed about 25% of the population by 1998.</p> <p>Ongoing economic decline since the 1980s and the power struggle after HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY’s death in 1993 ushered in the politics of \"Ivoirite,\" institutionalizing an Ivoirian identity that further marginalized northern Ivoirians and scapegoated immigrants. The hostile Muslim north-Christian south divide snowballed into a 2002 civil war, pushing tens of thousands of foreign migrants, Liberian refugees, and Ivoirians to flee to war-torn Liberia or other regional countries and more than a million people to be internally displaced. Subsequently, violence following the contested 2010 presidential election prompted some 250,000 people to seek refuge in Liberia and other neighboring countries and again internally displaced as many as a million people. By July 2012, the majority had returned home, but ongoing inter-communal tension and armed conflict continue to force people from their homes.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Cote d’Ivoire’s population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future because almost 60% of the populace is younger than 25 as of 2020, the total fertility rate is holding steady at about 3.5 children per woman, and contraceptive use is under 30%. The country will need to improve education, health care, and gender equality in order to turn its large and growing youth cohort into human capital. Even prior to 2010 unrest that shuttered schools for months, access to education was poor, especially for women. The lack of educational attainment contributes to Cote d’Ivoire’s high rates of unskilled labor, adolescent pregnancy, and HIV/AIDS prevalence.</p> <p>Following its independence in 1960, Cote d’Ivoire’s stability and the blossoming of its labor-intensive cocoa and coffee industries in the southwest made it an attractive destination for migrants from other parts of the country and its neighbors, particularly Burkina Faso. The HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY administration continued the French colonial policy of encouraging labor immigration by offering liberal land ownership laws. Foreigners from West Africa, Europe (mainly France), and Lebanon composed about 25% of the population by 1998.</p> <p>Ongoing economic decline since the 1980s and the power struggle after HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY’s death in 1993 ushered in the politics of \"Ivoirite,\" institutionalizing an Ivoirian identity that further marginalized northern Ivoirians and scapegoated immigrants. The hostile Muslim north-Christian south divide snowballed into a 2002 civil war, pushing tens of thousands of foreign migrants, Liberian refugees, and Ivoirians to flee to war-torn Liberia or other regional countries and more than a million people to be internally displaced. Subsequently, violence following the contested 2010 presidential election prompted some 250,000 people to seek refuge in Liberia and other neighboring countries and again internally displaced as many as a million people. By July 2012, the majority had returned home, but ongoing inter-communal tension and armed conflict continue to force people from their homes.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "3.3% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "3.3% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.16 physicians/1,000 population (2019)"
@@ -1298,7 +1298,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 25,000 active troops (23,000 Army, including about 2,000 Special Forces; 1,000 Navy; 1,000 Air Force); 5-10,000 Gendarmerie (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the inventory of the FACI consists mostly of older or second-hand equipment, typically of French or Soviet-era origin; Cote d'Ivoire was under a partial UN arms embargo from 2004 to 2016; since 2016, it has received limited amounts of mostly second-hand equipment from several countries, including France (2022)"
+      "text": "the inventory of the FACI consists mostly of older or second-hand equipment, typically of French or Soviet-era origin; Cote d'Ivoire was under a partial UN arms embargo from 2004 to 2016; in recent years it has received limited amounts of mostly second-hand equipment from several countries, including France (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-25 years of age for compulsory and voluntary male and female military service; conscription is not enforced; voluntary recruitment of former rebels into the new national army is restricted to ages 22-29 (2022)"
@@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@
       "text": "850 Mali (MINUSMA) (2022)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "the military has mutinied several times since the late 1990s, most recently in 2017, and has had a large role in the country’s political turmoil; as of 2022, the FACI was focused on internal security and the growing threat posed by Islamic militants associated with the al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorist group operating across the border in Burkina Faso; AQIM militants conducted significant attacks in the country in 2016 and 2020; Côte d’Ivoire since 2016 has stepped up border security and completed building a joint counter-terrorism training center with France near Abidjan in 2020<br><br>the UN maintained a 9,000-strong peacekeeping force in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) from 2004 until 2017 (2022)"
+      "text": "the military has mutinied several times since the late 1990s, most recently in 2017, and has had a large role in the country’s political turmoil; the FACI's operational focus is internal security and the growing threat posed by Islamic militants associated with the al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorist group operating across the border in Burkina Faso; AQIM militants conducted significant attacks in the country in 2016 and 2020; Côte d’Ivoire since 2016 has stepped up border security and completed building a joint counter-terrorism training center with France near Abidjan in 2020<br><br>the UN maintained a 9,000-strong peacekeeping force in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) from 2004 until 2017 (2022)"
     },
     "Maritime threats": {
       "text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
@@ -1328,7 +1328,7 @@
         "text": "302,000 (post-election conflict in 2010-11, as well as civil war from 2002-04; land disputes; most pronounced in western and southwestern regions) (2021)"
       },
       "stateless persons": {
-        "text": "952,969 (mid-year 2021); note - many Ivoirians lack documentation proving their nationality, which prevent them from accessing education and healthcare; birth on Ivorian soil does not automatically result in citizenship; disputes over citizenship and the associated rights of the large population descended from migrants from neighboring countries is an ongoing source of tension and contributed to the country's 2002 civil war; some observers believe the government's mass naturalizations of thousands of people over the last couple of years is intended to boost its electoral support base; the government in October 2013 acceded to international conventions on statelessness and in August 2013 reformed its nationality law, key steps to clarify the nationality of thousands of residents; since the adoption of the Abidjan Declaration to eradicate statelessness in West Africa in February 2015, 6,400 people have received nationality papers in Cote d'Ivoire; in September 2020, Cote d'Ivoire adopted Africa's first statelessness determination procedure to regularize the status of stateless people"
+        "text": "930,578 (2022); note - many Ivoirians lack documentation proving their nationality, which prevent them from accessing education and healthcare; birth on Ivorian soil does not automatically result in citizenship; disputes over citizenship and the associated rights of the large population descended from migrants from neighboring countries is an ongoing source of tension and contributed to the country's 2002 civil war; some observers believe the government's mass naturalizations of thousands of people over the last couple of years is intended to boost its electoral support base; the government in October 2013 acceded to international conventions on statelessness and in August 2013 reformed its nationality law, key steps to clarify the nationality of thousands of residents; since the adoption of the Abidjan Declaration to eradicate statelessness in West Africa in February 2015, 6,400 people have received nationality papers in Cote d'Ivoire; in September 2020, Cote d'Ivoire adopted Africa's first statelessness determination procedure to regularize the status of stateless people"
       }
     },
     "Illicit drugs": {

africa/ke.json

@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@
       "text": "Christian 85.5% (Protestant 33.4%, Catholic 20.6%, Evangelical 20.4%, African Instituted Churches 7%, other Christian 4.1%), Muslim 10.9%, other 1.8%, none 1.6%, don't know/no answer 0.2% (2019 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Kenya has experienced dramatic population growth since the mid-20th century as a result of its high birth rate and its declining mortality rate. Almost 40% of Kenyans are under the age of 15 as of 2022 because of sustained high fertility, early marriage and childbearing, and an unmet need for family planning. Kenya’s persistent rapid population growth strains the labor market, social services, arable land, and natural resources. Although Kenya in 1967 was the first Sub-Saharan country to launch a nationwide family planning program, progress in reducing the birth rate has largely stalled since the late 1990s, when the government decreased its support for family planning to focus on the HIV epidemic. Government commitment and international technical support spurred Kenyan contraceptive use, decreasing the fertility rate (children per woman) from about 8 in the late 1970s to less than 5 children twenty years later, but it has plateaued at 3 children as of 2022.</p> <p>Kenya is a source of emigrants and a host country for refugees. In the 1960s and 1970s, Kenyans pursued higher education in the UK because of colonial ties, but as British immigration rules tightened, the US, the then Soviet Union, and Canada became attractive study destinations. Kenya’s stagnant economy and political problems during the 1980s and 1990s led to an outpouring of Kenyan students and professionals seeking permanent opportunities in the West and southern Africa. Nevertheless, Kenya’s relative stability since its independence in 1963 has attracted hundreds of thousands of refugees escaping violent conflicts in neighboring countries; Kenya was sheltering nearly 280,000 Somali refugees as of 2022.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Kenya has experienced dramatic population growth since the mid-20th century as a result of its high birth rate and its declining mortality rate. Almost 40% of Kenyans are under the age of 15 as of 2020 because of sustained high fertility, early marriage and childbearing, and an unmet need for family planning. Kenya’s persistent rapid population growth strains the labor market, social services, arable land, and natural resources. Although Kenya in 1967 was the first Sub-Saharan country to launch a nationwide family planning program, progress in reducing the birth rate has largely stalled since the late 1990s, when the government decreased its support for family planning to focus on the HIV epidemic. Government commitment and international technical support spurred Kenyan contraceptive use, decreasing the fertility rate (children per woman) from about 8 in the late 1970s to less than 5 children twenty years later, but it has plateaued at about 3 children as of 2022.</p> <p>Kenya is a source of emigrants and a host country for refugees. In the 1960s and 1970s, Kenyans pursued higher education in the UK because of colonial ties, but as British immigration rules tightened, the US, the then Soviet Union, and Canada became attractive study destinations. Kenya’s stagnant economy and political problems during the 1980s and 1990s led to an outpouring of Kenyan students and professionals seeking permanent opportunities in the West and southern Africa. Nevertheless, Kenya’s relative stability since its independence in 1963 has attracted hundreds of thousands of refugees escaping violent conflicts in neighboring countries; Kenya was sheltering nearly 280,000 Somali refugees as of 2022.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "4.6% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "4.3% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.16 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 24,000 personnel (20,000 Army; 1,500 Navy; 2,500 Air Force) (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the KDF's inventory traditionally carried mostly older or second-hand Western weapons systems, particularly from France, the UK, and the US; however, since the 2000s it has sought to modernize and diversify its imports, and suppliers have included more than a dozen countries including China, Italy, Jordan, and the US (2022)"
+      "text": "the KDF's inventory traditionally carried mostly older or second-hand Western weapons systems, particularly from France, the UK, and the US; however, since the 2000s it has sought to modernize and diversify its imports, and suppliers have included more than a dozen countries including China, Italy, and the US (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "no conscription; 18-26 years of age for male and female voluntary service (under 18 with parental consent; upper limit 30 years of age for specialists, tradesmen, or women with a diploma; 39 years of age for chaplains/imams); 9-year service obligation (7 years for Kenyan Navy) and subsequent 3-year re-enlistments; applicants must be Kenyan citizens (2022)"
@@ -1336,7 +1336,7 @@
         "text": "190,000 (election-related violence, intercommunal violence, resource conflicts, al-Shabaab attacks in 2017 and 2018) (2021)"
       },
       "stateless persons": {
-        "text": "16,820 (mid-year 2021); note - the stateless population consists of Nubians, Kenyan Somalis, and coastal Arabs; the Nubians are descendants of Sudanese soldiers recruited by the British to fight for them in East Africa more than a century ago; Nubians did not receive Kenyan citizenship when the country became independent in 1963; only recently have Nubians become a formally recognized tribe and had less trouble obtaining national IDs; Galjeel and other Somalis who have lived in Kenya for decades are included with more recent Somali refugees and denied ID cards"
+        "text": "16,779 (2022); note - the stateless population consists of Nubians, Kenyan Somalis, and coastal Arabs; the Nubians are descendants of Sudanese soldiers recruited by the British to fight for them in East Africa more than a century ago; Nubians did not receive Kenyan citizenship when the country became independent in 1963; only recently have Nubians become a formally recognized tribe and had less trouble obtaining national IDs; Galjeel and other Somalis who have lived in Kenya for decades are included with more recent Somali refugees and denied ID cards"
       }
     },
     "Illicit drugs": {

africa/li.json

@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@
       "text": "Christian 85.6%, Muslim 12.2%, Traditional 0.6%, other 0.2%, none 1.5% (2008 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Liberia’s high fertility rate of nearly 5 children per woman and large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – will sustain a high dependency ratio for many years to come. Significant progress has been made in preventing child deaths, despite a lack of health care workers and infrastructure. Infant and child mortality have dropped nearly 70% since 1990; the annual reduction rate of about 5.4% is the highest in Africa.</p> <p>Nevertheless, Liberia’s high maternal mortality rate remains among the world’s worst; it reflects a high unmet need for family planning services, frequency of early childbearing, lack of quality obstetric care, high adolescent fertility, and a low proportion of births attended by a medical professional. Female mortality is also increased by the prevalence of female genital cutting (FGC), which is practiced by 10 of Liberia’s 16 tribes and affects more than two-thirds of women and girls. FGC is an initiation ritual performed in rural bush schools, which teach traditional beliefs on marriage and motherhood and are an obstacle to formal classroom education for Liberian girls.</p> <p>Liberia has been both a source and a destination for refugees. During Liberia’s 14-year civil war (1989-2003), more than 250,000 people became refugees and another half million were internally displaced. Between 2004 and the cessation of refugee status for Liberians in June 2012, the UNHCR helped more than 155,000 Liberians to voluntarily repatriate, while others returned home on their own. Some Liberian refugees spent more than two decades living in other West African countries. Between 2011 and 2022, more than 300,000 Ivoirian refugees in Liberia have been repatriated; as of year-end 2022, less than 2,300 Ivoirian refugees were still living in Liberia.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Liberia’s high fertility rate of nearly 5 children per woman and large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020 – will sustain a high dependency ratio for many years to come. Significant progress has been made in preventing child deaths, despite a lack of health care workers and infrastructure. Infant and child mortality have dropped nearly 70% since 1990; the annual reduction rate of about 5.4% is the highest in Africa.</p> <p>Nevertheless, Liberia’s high maternal mortality rate remains among the world’s worst; it reflects a high unmet need for family planning services, frequency of early childbearing, lack of quality obstetric care, high adolescent fertility, and a low proportion of births attended by a medical professional. Female mortality is also increased by the prevalence of female genital cutting (FGC), which is practiced by 10 of Liberia’s 16 tribes and affects more than two-thirds of women and girls. FGC is an initiation ritual performed in rural bush schools, which teach traditional beliefs on marriage and motherhood and are an obstacle to formal classroom education for Liberian girls.</p> <p>Liberia has been both a source and a destination for refugees. During Liberia’s 14-year civil war (1989-2003), more than 250,000 people became refugees and another half million were internally displaced. Between 2004 and the cessation of refugee status for Liberians in June 2012, the UNHCR helped more than 155,000 Liberians to voluntarily repatriate, while others returned home on their own. Some Liberian refugees spent more than two decades living in other West African countries. Between 2011 and 2022, more than 300,000 Ivoirian refugees in Liberia have been repatriated; as of year-end 2022, less than 2,300 Ivoirian refugees were still living in Liberia.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "8.5% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "9.5% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.05 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -1202,8 +1202,8 @@
   },
   "Military and Security": {
     "Military and security forces": {
-      "text": "Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL): Army, Liberian Coast Guard, Air Wing (2022)",
-      "note": "<strong>note:</strong> the AFL Air Wing was previously disbanded in 2005 and has been under redevelopment since 2019; the Liberian National Police and the Liberian Drug Enforcement Agency are under the Ministry of Justice"
+      "text": "Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL): Army, Liberian Coast Guard, Air Wing (2023)",
+      "note": "<strong>note:</strong> the AFL Air Wing was previously disbanded in 2005 and has been under redevelopment since 2019; the Liberian National Police and the Liberian Drug Enforcement Agency are under the Ministry of Justice"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
       "Military Expenditures 2021": {
@@ -1236,7 +1236,7 @@
       "text": "160 Mali (MINUSMA) (May 2022)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "<p>the first militia unit established for defense of the colony was raised in 1832; the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) traces its origins to the 1908 establishment of the Liberia Frontier Force, which became the Liberian National Guard in 1965; the AFL was established in 1970; at the end of the second civil war in 2003, military and police forces were disbanded and approximately 100,000 military, police, and rebel combatants were disarmed; the AFL began to rebuild in 2003 with US assistance and the first infantry battalion of the restructured AFL was re-activated in late 2007; a second battalion was added in 2008</p> <p>the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established in 2003 as a peacekeeping force; at its height, UNMIL was comprised of about 15,000 personnel, including more than 3,000 troops absorbed from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping mission; Liberian forces reassumed full control of the country’s security in June of 2016, and the UNMIL mission was ended in 2018</p> <p> </p>"
+      "text": "the AFL is responsible for external defense but also has some domestic security responsibilities if called upon, such as humanitarian assistance during natural disasters and support to law enforcement; it is a small, lightly equipped force comprised of 2 combat infantry battalions and supporting units; the infantry battalions were rebuilt with US assistance in 2007-2008 from the restructured AFL following the end of the second civil war in 2003 when military and police forces were disbanded and approximately 100,000 military, police, and rebel combatants were disarmed<br><br>the first militia unit established for defense of the colony was raised in 1832; the AFL traces its origins to the 1908 establishment of the Liberia Frontier Force, which became the Liberian National Guard in 1965; the AFL was established in 1970<br><br>the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established in 2003 as a peacekeeping force; at its height, UNMIL was comprised of about 15,000 personnel, including more than 3,000 troops absorbed from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping mission; Liberian forces reassumed full control of the country’s security in June of 2016, and the UNMIL mission was ended in 2018 (2023)"
     },
     "Maritime threats": {
       "text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""

africa/lt.json

@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@
       "text": "Protestant 47.8% (Pentecostal 23.1%, Lesotho Evangelical 17.3%, Anglican 7.4%), Roman Catholic 39.3%, other Christian 9.1%, non-Christian 1.4%, none 2.3% (2014 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Lesotho faces great socioeconomic challenges. More than half of its population lives below the poverty line, and the country’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is the second highest in the world. In addition, Lesotho is a small, mountainous, landlocked country with little arable land, leaving its population vulnerable to food shortages and reliant on remittances. Lesotho’s persistently high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates have been increasing during the last decade, according to the last two Demographic and Health Surveys. Despite these significant shortcomings, Lesotho has made good progress in education; it is on-track to achieve universal primary education and has one of the highest adult literacy rates in Africa.</p> <p>Lesotho’s migration history is linked to its unique geography; it is surrounded by South Africa with which it shares linguistic and cultural traits. Lesotho at one time had more of its workforce employed outside its borders than any other country. Today remittances equal about 17% of its GDP. With few job options at home, a high rate of poverty, and higher wages available across the border, labor migration to South Africa replaced agriculture as the prevailing Basotho source of income decades ago. The majority of Basotho migrants were single men contracted to work as gold miners in South Africa. However, migration trends changed in the 1990s, and fewer men found mining jobs in South Africa because of declining gold prices, stricter immigration policies, and a preference for South African workers.</p> <p>Although men still dominate cross-border labor migration, more women are working in South Africa, mostly as domestics, because they are widows or their husbands are unemployed. Internal rural-urban flows have also become more frequent, with more women migrating within the country to take up jobs in the garment industry or moving to care for loved ones with HIV/AIDS. Lesotho’s small population of immigrants is increasingly composed of Taiwanese and Chinese migrants who are involved in the textile industry and small retail businesses.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Lesotho faces great socioeconomic challenges. Almost half of its population lives below the poverty line as of 2017, and the country’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is the second highest in the world as of 2021. In addition, Lesotho is a small, mountainous, landlocked country with little arable land, leaving its population vulnerable to food shortages and reliant on remittances. Lesotho’s persistently high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates have been increasing during the last decade, according to the last two Demographic and Health Surveys. Despite these significant shortcomings, Lesotho has made good progress in education; it is on-track to achieve universal primary education and has one of the highest adult literacy rates in Africa.</p> <p>Lesotho’s migration history is linked to its unique geography; it is surrounded by South Africa with which it shares linguistic and cultural traits. Lesotho at one time had more of its workforce employed outside its borders than any other country. Today remittances equal about 20% of its GDP. With few job options at home, a high rate of poverty, and higher wages available across the border, labor migration to South Africa replaced agriculture as the prevailing Basotho source of income decades ago. The majority of Basotho migrants were single men contracted to work as gold miners in South Africa. However, migration trends changed in the 1990s, and fewer men found mining jobs in South Africa because of declining gold prices, stricter immigration policies, and a preference for South African workers.</p> <p>Although men still dominate cross-border labor migration, more women are working in South Africa, mostly as domestics, because they are widows or their husbands are unemployed. Internal rural-urban flows have also become more frequent, with more women migrating within the country to take up jobs in the garment industry or moving to care for loved ones with HIV/AIDS. Lesotho’s small population of immigrants is increasingly composed of Taiwanese and Chinese migrants who are involved in the textile industry and small retail businesses.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "11.3% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "11.8% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.47 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "3.022 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "3 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {
@@ -1208,7 +1208,7 @@
       "text": "20-30 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription (2022)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "Lesotho's declared policy for its military is the maintenance of the country's sovereignty and the preservation of internal security; in practice, external security is guaranteed by South Africa<br><br>the LDF began in 1964 as the Police Mobile Unit (PMU); the PMU was designated as the Lesotho Paramilitary Force in 1980 and became the Royal Lesotho Defense Force in 1986; it was subsequently renamed the Lesotho Defense Force in 1993 (2022)"
+      "text": "Lesotho's declared policy for its military is the maintenance of the country's sovereignty and the preservation of internal security; in practice, external security is guaranteed by South Africa<br><br>the LDF is a small force comprised of about a half dozen infantry companies; it began in 1964 as the Police Mobile Unit (PMU); the PMU was designated as the Lesotho Paramilitary Force in 1980 and became the Royal Lesotho Defense Force in 1986; it was subsequently renamed the Lesotho Defense Force in 1993 (2023)"
     }
   },
   "Transnational Issues": {

africa/ma.json

@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@
       "text": "Church of Jesus Christ in Madagascar/Malagasy Lutheran Church/Anglican Church 34%, Roman Catholic 32.3%, other Christian 8.1%, traditional/Animist 1.7%, Muslim 1.4%, other 0.6%, none 21.9% (2021 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Madagascar’s youthful population – nearly 60% are under the age of 25 as of 2022 – and moderately high total fertility rate of more than 3.6 children per woman ensures that the Malagasy population will continue its rapid growth trajectory for the foreseeable future. The population is predominantly rural and poor; chronic malnutrition is prevalent, and large families are the norm. Many young Malagasy girls are withdrawn from school, marry early (often pressured to do so by their parents), and soon begin having children. Early childbearing, coupled with Madagascar’s widespread poverty and lack of access to skilled health care providers during delivery, increases the risk of death and serious health problems for young mothers and their babies.</p> <p>Child marriage perpetuates gender inequality and is prevalent among the poor, the uneducated, and rural households – as of 2018, 40% of Malagasy women aged 20 to 24 were married. Although the legal age for marriage is 18, parental consent is often given for earlier marriages or the law is flouted, especially in rural areas that make up approximately 60% of the country. Forms of arranged marriage whereby young girls are married to older men in exchange for oxen or money are traditional. If a union does not work out, a girl can be placed in another marriage, but the dowry paid to her family diminishes with each unsuccessful marriage.</p> <p>Madagascar’s population consists of 18 main ethnic groups, all of whom speak the same Malagasy language. Most Malagasy are multi-ethnic, however, reflecting the island’s diversity of settlers and historical contacts (see Background). Madagascar’s legacy of hierarchical societies practicing domestic slavery (most notably the Merina Kingdom of the 16th to the 19th century) is evident today in persistent class tension, with some ethnic groups maintaining a caste system. Slave descendants are vulnerable to unequal access to education and jobs, despite Madagascar’s constitutional guarantee of free compulsory primary education and its being party to several international conventions on human rights. Historical distinctions also remain between central highlanders and coastal people.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Madagascar’s youthful population – nearly 60% are under the age of 25 as of 2020 – and moderately high total fertility rate of more than 3.6 children per woman ensures that the Malagasy population will continue its rapid growth trajectory for the foreseeable future. The population is predominantly rural and poor; chronic malnutrition is prevalent, and large families are the norm. Many young Malagasy girls are withdrawn from school, marry early (often pressured to do so by their parents), and soon begin having children. Early childbearing, coupled with Madagascar’s widespread poverty and lack of access to skilled health care providers during delivery, increases the risk of death and serious health problems for young mothers and their babies.</p> <p>Child marriage perpetuates gender inequality and is prevalent among the poor, the uneducated, and rural households – as of 2018, 40% of Malagasy women aged 20 to 24 were married. Although the legal age for marriage is 18, parental consent is often given for earlier marriages or the law is flouted, especially in rural areas that make up approximately 60% of the country. Forms of arranged marriage whereby young girls are married to older men in exchange for oxen or money are traditional. If a union does not work out, a girl can be placed in another marriage, but the dowry paid to her family diminishes with each unsuccessful marriage.</p> <p>Madagascar’s population consists of 18 main ethnic groups, all of whom speak the same Malagasy language. Most Malagasy are multi-ethnic, however, reflecting the island’s diversity of settlers and historical contacts (see Background). Madagascar’s legacy of hierarchical societies practicing domestic slavery (most notably the Merina Kingdom of the 16th to the 19th century) is evident today in persistent class tension, with some ethnic groups maintaining a caste system. Slave descendants are vulnerable to unequal access to education and jobs, despite Madagascar’s constitutional guarantee of free compulsory primary education and its being party to several international conventions on human rights. Historical distinctions also remain between central highlanders and coastal people.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "3.7% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "3.9% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.2 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 13,000 personnel (12,000 Army; 500 Navy; 500 Air Force); estimated 10,000 Gendarmerie (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the PAF's inventory consists mostly of aging Soviet-era equipment; since 2010, it has received limited amounts of second-hand equipment from France, South Africa, and the UAE (2022)"
+      "text": "the PAF's inventory consists mostly of aging Soviet-era equipment; in recent years, it has received limited amounts of secondhand equipment from France, South Africa, and the UAE (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-25 years of age for men and women; service obligation 18 months; no conscription; women are permitted to serve in all branches (2022)"

africa/mi.json

@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "7.4% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "5.4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.05 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "17.28 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "17.3 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {
@@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@
   },
   "Military and Security": {
     "Military and security forces": {
-      "text": "Malawi Defense Force (MDF): Army (includes marine unit), Air Force (established as a separate service August 2019; previously was an air wing under the Army); Ministry of Homeland Security: Malawi Police Service (2022)",
+      "text": "Malawi Defense Force (MDF): Army (includes maritime force), Air Force (established as a separate service August 2019; previously was an air wing under the Army); Ministry of Homeland Security: Malawi Police Service (2023)",
       "note": "<strong>note:</strong> the MDF reports directly to the president as commander in chief; the Malawi Ministry of Defense was abolished in 2011"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {

africa/ml.json

@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "3.9% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "4.3% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.13 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -1278,7 +1278,7 @@
       "text": "<strong>note: </strong>until announcing its withdrawal in May of 2022, Mali was part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger; Mali had committed 1,100 troops and 200 gendarmes to the force"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "prior to the coup in August 2020 and military takeover in May 2021, the Malian military had intervened in the political arena at least five times since the country gained independence in 1960; two attempts failed (1976 and 1978), while three succeeded in overturning civilian rule (1968, 1991, and 2012); the military collapsed in 2012 during the fighting against Tuareg rebels and Islamic militants; it has been since rebuilt, but continues to have limited capabilities and is heavily reliant on external assistance <br><br>as of 2023, Malian security forces were actively engaged in operations against several insurgent terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), as well as other rebel groups, communal militias, and criminal bands spread across the central, northern, and southern regions of the country; the government was reportedly in control of only an estimated 10-20% of the country's central and northern territories, and terror attacks were increasing in the more heavily populated south, including around the capital Bamako; the Macina Liberation Front (FLM), part of the Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) coalition of al-Qa'ida-linked terror groups, has played a large role in a surge in violence in Mali’s central and southern regions; in the north, the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) has been able to reassert itself in 2022 <br><br>the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has operated in the country since 2013; the Mission's responsibilities include providing security, rebuilding Malian security forces, protecting civilians, supporting national political dialogue, and assisting in the reestablishment of Malian government authority; as of late 2022, MINUSMA had around 14,000 personnel deployed; in June 2022, the UN extended its mission another 12 months<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM-M) and the French military (under a separate, bi-lateral mission) have also operated in the country since 2013; the EUTM-M provides advice and training to the Malian Armed Forces and military assistance to the G5 Sahel Joint Force; in 2022, the mission included about 700 personnel from more than 20 European countries; in April of 2022, the EU said it would suspend its training program in Mali, citing issues with the ruling military government, including human rights abuses and the presence of Russian private military contractors; in August 2022, France completed withdrawing the last of its forces from Mali, also citing obstructions from the military government; prior to the withdrawal, more than 2,000 French troops had provided military assistance and conducted counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency operations<br><br>in December 2021, the Malian military government contracted with a Russian private military company to provide training for local armed forces and security to senior Malian officials; as of mid-2022, there were an estimated 1,000 Russian military contractors in Mali (2022)"
+      "text": "prior to the coup in August 2020 and military takeover in May 2021, the Malian military had intervened in the political arena at least five times since the country gained independence in 1960; two attempts failed (1976 and 1978), while three succeeded in overturning civilian rule (1968, 1991, and 2012); the military collapsed in 2012 during the fighting against Tuareg rebels and Islamic militants; it has been since rebuilt, but continues to have limited capabilities and is heavily reliant on external assistance <br><br>Malian security forces are actively engaged in operations against several insurgent terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), as well as other rebel groups, communal militias, and criminal bands spread across the central, northern, and southern regions of the country; the government is reportedly in control of only an estimated 10-20% of the country's central and northern territories, and terror attacks were increasing in the more heavily populated south, including around the capital Bamako; the Macina Liberation Front (FLM), part of the Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) coalition of al-Qa'ida-linked terror groups, has played a large role in a surge in violence in Mali’s central and southern regions; in the north, the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) has been able to reassert itself in 2022 <br><br>the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has operated in the country since 2013; the Mission's responsibilities include providing security, rebuilding Malian security forces, protecting civilians, supporting national political dialogue, and assisting in the reestablishment of Malian government authority; as of late 2022, MINUSMA had around 14,000 personnel deployed; in June 2022, the UN extended its mission another 12 months<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM-M) and the French military (under a separate, bi-lateral mission) have also operated in the country since 2013; the EUTM-M provides advice and training to the Malian Armed Forces and military assistance to the G5 Sahel Joint Force; in 2022, the mission included about 700 personnel from more than 20 European countries; in April of 2022, the EU said it would suspend its training program in Mali, citing issues with the ruling military government, including human rights abuses and the presence of Russian private military contractors; in August 2022, France completed withdrawing the last of its forces from Mali, also citing obstructions from the military government; prior to the withdrawal, more than 2,000 French troops had provided military assistance and conducted counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency operations<br><br>in December 2021, the Malian military government contracted with a Russian private military company to provide training for local armed forces and security to senior Malian officials; as of mid-2022, there were an estimated 1,000 Russian military contractors in Mali (2022)"
     }
   },
   "Terrorism": {

africa/mo.json

@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@
       "note": "<strong>note:</strong> does not include data from the former Western Sahara"
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "5.3% of GDP (2019)",
+      "text": "6% of GDP (2020)",
       "note": "<strong>note:</strong> does not include data from the former Western Sahara"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
@@ -1298,7 +1298,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 200,000 active personnel (175,000 Army; 10,000 Navy; 15,000 Air Force); estimated 20,000 Gendarmerie; estimated 5,000 Mobile Intervention Corps (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the Moroccan military's inventory is comprised of mostly older French and US equipment; in recent years, it has received some more modern equipment from a variety of countries with France and the US as the leading suppliers (2022)"
+      "text": "the Moroccan military's inventory is comprised of mostly older French and US equipment, although in recent years, it has received quantities of more modern equipment from a variety of countries with France and the US continuing to be the leading suppliers (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "19-25 years of age for 12-month compulsory and voluntary military service for men and women (conscription abolished 2006 and reintroduced in 2019) (2022)"

africa/mp.json

@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "6.2% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "6.7% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "2.71 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "2.751 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "2.8 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {

africa/mr.json

@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim (official) 100%"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>With a sustained total fertility rate of about 3.5 children per woman and almost 60% of the population under the age of 25, as of 2022, Mauritania's population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future. Mauritania's large youth cohort is vital to its development prospects, but available schooling does not adequately prepare students for the workplace. Girls continue to be underrepresented in the classroom, educational quality remains poor, and the dropout rate is high. The literacy rate is only about 50%, even though access to primary education has improved since the mid-2000s. Women's restricted access to education and discriminatory laws maintain gender inequality - worsened by early and forced marriages and female genital cutting.</p> <p>The denial of education to black Moors also helps to perpetuate slavery. Although Mauritania abolished slavery in 1981 (the last country in the world to do so) and made it a criminal offense in 2007, the millenniums-old practice persists largely because anti-slavery laws are rarely enforced and the custom is so ingrained.  According to a 2018 nongovernmental organization's report, a little more than 2% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which includes individuals subjected to forced labor and forced marriage, while many thousands of individuals who are legally free contend with discrimination, poor education, and a lack of identity papers and, therefore, live in de facto slavery.  The UN and international press outlets have claimed that up to 20% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which would be the highest rate worldwide.</p> <p>Drought, poverty, and unemployment have driven outmigration from Mauritania since the 1970s. Early flows were directed toward other West African countries, including Senegal, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gambia. The 1989 Mauritania-Senegal conflict forced thousands of black Mauritanians to take refuge in Senegal and pushed labor migrants toward the Gulf, Libya, and Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mauritania has accepted migrants from neighboring countries to fill labor shortages since its independence in 1960 and more recently has received refugees escaping civil wars, including tens of thousands of Tuaregs who fled Mali in 2012.</p> <p>Mauritania was an important transit point for Sub-Saharan migrants moving illegally to North Africa and Europe. In the mid-2000s, as border patrols increased in the Strait of Gibraltar, security increased around Spain's North African enclaves (Ceuta and Melilla), and Moroccan border controls intensified, illegal migration flows shifted from the Western Mediterranean to Spain's Canary Islands. In 2006, departure points moved southward along the West African coast from Morocco and then Western Sahara to Mauritania's two key ports (Nouadhibou and the capital Nouakchott), and illegal migration to the Canaries peaked at almost 32,000. The numbers fell dramatically in the following years because of joint patrolling off the West African coast by Frontex (the EU's border protection agency), Spain, Mauritania, and Senegal; the expansion of Spain's border surveillance system; and the 2008 European economic downturn.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>With a sustained total fertility rate of about 3.5 children per woman and almost 60% of the population under the age of 25 as of 2020, Mauritania's population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future. Mauritania's large youth cohort is vital to its development prospects, but available schooling does not adequately prepare students for the workplace. Girls continue to be underrepresented in the classroom, educational quality remains poor, and the dropout rate is high. The literacy rate is only about 50%, even though access to primary education has improved since the mid-2000s. Women's restricted access to education and discriminatory laws maintain gender inequality - worsened by early and forced marriages and female genital cutting.</p> <p>The denial of education to black Moors also helps to perpetuate slavery. Although Mauritania abolished slavery in 1981 (the last country in the world to do so) and made it a criminal offense in 2007, the millenniums-old practice persists largely because anti-slavery laws are rarely enforced and the custom is so ingrained.  According to a 2018 nongovernmental organization's report, a little more than 2% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which includes individuals subjected to forced labor and forced marriage, while many thousands of individuals who are legally free contend with discrimination, poor education, and a lack of identity papers and, therefore, live in de facto slavery.  The UN and international press outlets have claimed that up to 20% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which would be the highest rate worldwide.</p> <p>Drought, poverty, and unemployment have driven outmigration from Mauritania since the 1970s. Early flows were directed toward other West African countries, including Senegal, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gambia. The 1989 Mauritania-Senegal conflict forced thousands of black Mauritanians to take refuge in Senegal and pushed labor migrants toward the Gulf, Libya, and Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mauritania has accepted migrants from neighboring countries to fill labor shortages since its independence in 1960 and more recently has received refugees escaping civil wars, including tens of thousands of Tuaregs who fled Mali in 2012.</p> <p>Mauritania was an important transit point for Sub-Saharan migrants moving illegally to North Africa and Europe. In the mid-2000s, as border patrols increased in the Strait of Gibraltar, security increased around Spain's North African enclaves (Ceuta and Melilla), and Moroccan border controls intensified, illegal migration flows shifted from the Western Mediterranean to Spain's Canary Islands. In 2006, departure points moved southward along the West African coast from Morocco and then Western Sahara to Mauritania's two key ports (Nouadhibou and the capital Nouakchott), and illegal migration to the Canaries peaked at almost 32,000. The numbers fell dramatically in the following years because of joint patrolling off the West African coast by Frontex (the EU's border protection agency), Spain, Mauritania, and Senegal; the expansion of Spain's border surveillance system; and the 2008 European economic downturn.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "3.3% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "3.4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.19 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 16,000 active armed forces personnel (15,000 Army; 700 Navy; 300 Air Force); estimated 3,000 Gendarmerie; estimated 2,000 National Guard (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the Mauritanian Armed Forces' inventory is limited and made up largely of older French and Soviet-era equipment; since 2010, Mauritania has received a limited amount of mostly second-hand military equipment from a variety of suppliers, with China as the leading provider (2022)"
+      "text": "the military's inventory is limited and made up largely of older French and Soviet-era equipment; in recent years, Mauritania has received a limited amount of mostly secondhand military equipment from a variety of suppliers, with China as the leading provider (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary military service; no conscription (2022)"

africa/mz.json

@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 27.2%, Muslim 18.9%, Zionist Christian 15.6%, Evangelical/Pentecostal 15.3%, Anglican 1.7%, other 4.8%, none 13.9%, unspecified 2.5% (2017 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Mozambique is a poor, sparsely populated country with high fertility and mortality rates and a rapidly growing youthful population – 45% of the population is younger than 15, as of 2022. Mozambique’s high poverty rate is sustained by natural disasters, disease, high population growth, low agricultural productivity, and the unequal distribution of wealth. The country’s birth rate is among the world’s highest, averaging around more than 5 children per woman (and higher in rural areas) for at least the last three decades. The sustained high level of fertility reflects gender inequality, low contraceptive use, early marriages and childbearing, and a lack of education, particularly among women. The high population growth rate is somewhat restrained by the country’s high HIV/AIDS and overall mortality rates. Mozambique ranks among the worst in the world for HIV/AIDS prevalence, HIV/AIDS deaths, and life expectancy at birth, as of 2022.</p> <p>Mozambique is predominantly a country of emigration, but internal, rural-urban migration has begun to grow. Mozambicans, primarily from the country’s southern region, have been migrating to South Africa for work for more than a century. Additionally, approximately 1.7 million Mozambicans fled to Malawi, South Africa, and other neighboring countries between 1979 and 1992 to escape from civil war. Labor migrants have usually been men from rural areas whose crops have failed or who are unemployed and have headed to South Africa to work as miners; multiple generations of the same family often become miners. Since the abolition of apartheid in South Africa in 1991, other job opportunities have opened to Mozambicans, including in the informal and manufacturing sectors, but mining remains their main source of employment.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Mozambique is a poor, sparsely populated country with high fertility and mortality rates and a rapidly growing youthful population – 45% of the population is younger than 15, as of 2020. Mozambique’s high poverty rate is sustained by natural disasters, disease, high population growth, low agricultural productivity, and the unequal distribution of wealth. The country’s birth rate is among the world’s highest, averaging around  5 children per woman (and higher in rural areas) for at least the last three decades. The sustained high level of fertility reflects gender inequality, low contraceptive use, early marriages and childbearing, and a lack of education, particularly among women. The high population growth rate is somewhat restrained by the country’s high HIV/AIDS and overall mortality rates. Mozambique ranks among the worst in the world for HIV/AIDS prevalence, HIV/AIDS deaths, and life expectancy at birth, as of 2022.</p> <p>Mozambique is predominantly a country of emigration, but internal, rural-urban migration has begun to grow. Mozambicans, primarily from the country’s southern region, have been migrating to South Africa for work for more than a century. Additionally, approximately 1.7 million Mozambicans fled to Malawi, South Africa, and other neighboring countries between 1979 and 1992 to escape from civil war. Labor migrants have usually been men from rural areas whose crops have failed or who are unemployed and have headed to South Africa to work as miners; multiple generations of the same family often become miners. Since the abolition of apartheid in South Africa in 1991, other job opportunities have opened to Mozambicans, including in the informal and manufacturing sectors, but mining remains their main source of employment.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "7.8% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "7.6% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.09 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"

africa/ng.json

@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim 99.3%, Christian 0.3%, animist 0.2%, none 0.1% (2012 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Niger has the highest total fertility rate (TFR) of any country in the world, averaging close to 7 children per woman in 2022. A slight decline in fertility over the last few decades has stalled. This leveling off of the high fertility rate is in large part a product of the continued desire for large families. In Niger, the TFR is lower than the desired fertility rate, which makes it unlikely that contraceptive use will increase. The high TFR sustains rapid population growth and a large youth population – almost 70% of the populace is under the age of 25, as of 2022. Gender inequality, including a lack of educational opportunities for women and early marriage and childbirth, also contributes to high population growth.</p> <p>Because of large family sizes, children are inheriting smaller and smaller parcels of land. The dependence of most Nigeriens on subsistence farming on increasingly small landholdings, coupled with declining rainfall and the resultant shrinkage of arable land, are all preventing food production from keeping up with population growth.</p> <p>For more than half a century, Niger's lack of economic development has led to steady net outmigration. In the 1960s, Nigeriens mainly migrated to coastal West African countries to work on a seasonal basis. Some headed to Libya and Algeria in the 1970s to work in the booming oil industry until its decline in the 1980s. Since the 1990s, the principal destinations for Nigerien labor migrants have been West African countries, especially Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire, while emigration to Europe and North America has remained modest. During the same period, Niger’s desert trade route town Agadez became a hub for West African and other Sub-Saharan migrants crossing the Sahara to North Africa and sometimes onward to Europe.</p> <p>More than 60,000 Malian refugees have fled to Niger since violence between Malian government troops and armed rebels began in early 2012. Ongoing attacks by the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency, dating to 2013 in northern Nigeria and February 2015 in southeastern Niger, pushed tens of thousands of Nigerian refugees and Nigerien returnees across the border to Niger and displaced thousands of locals in Niger’s already impoverished Diffa region.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Niger has the highest total fertility rate (TFR) of any country in the world, averaging close to 7 children per woman in 2022. A slight decline in fertility over the last few decades has stalled. This leveling off of the high fertility rate is in large part a product of the continued desire for large families. In Niger, the TFR is lower than the desired fertility rate, which makes it unlikely that contraceptive use will increase. The high TFR sustains rapid population growth and a large youth population – almost 70% of the populace is under the age of 25, as of 2020. Gender inequality, including a lack of educational opportunities for women and early marriage and childbirth, also contributes to high population growth.</p> <p>Because of large family sizes, children are inheriting smaller and smaller parcels of land. The dependence of most Nigeriens on subsistence farming on increasingly small landholdings, coupled with declining rainfall and the resultant shrinkage of arable land, are all preventing food production from keeping up with population growth.</p> <p>For more than half a century, Niger's lack of economic development has led to steady net outmigration. In the 1960s, Nigeriens mainly migrated to coastal West African countries to work on a seasonal basis. Some headed to Libya and Algeria in the 1970s to work in the booming oil industry until its decline in the 1980s. Since the 1990s, the principal destinations for Nigerien labor migrants have been West African countries, especially Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire, while emigration to Europe and North America has remained modest. During the same period, Niger’s desert trade route town Agadez became a hub for West African and other Sub-Saharan migrants crossing the Sahara to North Africa and sometimes onward to Europe.</p> <p>More than 60,000 Malian refugees have fled to Niger since violence between Malian government troops and armed rebels began in early 2012. Ongoing attacks by the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency, dating to 2013 in northern Nigeria and February 2015 in southeastern Niger, pushed tens of thousands of Nigerian refugees and Nigerien returnees across the border to Niger and displaced thousands of locals in Niger’s already impoverished Diffa region.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "5.7% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "6.2% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.04 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "34.05 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "34.1 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {
@@ -865,8 +865,8 @@
       "text": "40.8% (2018 est.)"
     },
     "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income": {
-      "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2014": {
-        "text": "34.3 (2014 est.)"
+      "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2018": {
+        "text": "37.3 (2018 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Household income or consumption by percentage share": {
@@ -1268,7 +1268,7 @@
       "text": "information varies; approximately 12,000 active FAN troops (8,000 Army; 200 Air Force; 4,000 Gendarmerie); approximately 3,000 National Guard (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the FAN's inventory consists of a wide variety of older weapons; since 2010, the FAN has received small amounts of mostly second-hand equipment and donations from several countries with the US as the top provider (2022)"
+      "text": "the FAN's inventory consists of a wide variety of older weapons; in recent years, it has received small amounts of mostly secondhand equipment and donations from several countries with the US as the top provider (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "has conscription, although it is reportedly not always enforced; 18 is the legal minimum age for compulsory or voluntary military service; enlistees must be Nigerien citizens and unmarried; 2-year service term; women may serve in health care (2022)"

africa/ni.json

@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "3% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "3.4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.38 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@
       "text": "information varies; approximately 135,000 active duty armed forces personnel (100,000 Army; 20,000 Navy/Coast Guard; 15,000 Air Force); approximately 80,000 Security and Civil Defense Corps (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the military's inventory consists of a wide variety of imported weapons systems of Chinese, European, Middle Eastern, Russian (including Soviet-era), and US origin; since 2010, Nigeria has undertaken a considerable military modernization program, and has received equipment from some 20 countries with China, Russia, and the US as the leading suppliers; Nigeria is also developing a defense-industry capacity, including small arms, armored personnel vehicles, and small-scale naval production (2022)"
+      "text": "the military's inventory consists of a wide variety of imported weapons systems of Chinese, European, Middle Eastern, Russian (including Soviet-era), and US origin; the military is undergoing a considerable modernization program, and in recent years has received equipment from some 20 countries with China, Russia, and the US as the leading suppliers; Nigeria is also developing a defense-industry capacity, including small arms, armored personnel vehicles, and small-scale naval production (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-26 years of age for men and women for voluntary military service; no conscription (2022)"

africa/od.json

@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@
       "text": "Christian 60.5%, folk religion 32.9%, Muslim 6.2%, other <1%, unaffiliated <1% (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>South Sudan, independent from Sudan since July 2011 after decades of civil war, is one of the world’s poorest countries and ranks among the lowest in many socioeconomic categories. Problems are exacerbated by ongoing tensions with Sudan over oil revenues and land borders, fighting between government forces and rebel groups, and inter-communal violence. Most of the population lives off of farming, while smaller numbers rely on animal husbandry; more than 80% of the populace lives in rural areas. The maternal mortality rate is among the world’s highest for a variety of reasons, including a shortage of health care workers, facilities, and supplies; poor roads and a lack of transport; and cultural beliefs that prevent women from seeking obstetric care. Most women marry and start having children early, giving birth at home with the assistance of traditional birth attendants, who are unable to handle complications.</p> <p>Educational attainment is extremely poor due to the lack of schools, qualified teachers, and materials. Only one-third of the population is literate (the rate is even lower among women), and half live below the poverty line. Teachers and students are also struggling with the switch from Arabic to English as the language of instruction. Many adults missed out on schooling because of warfare and displacement.</p> <p>More than 2 million South Sudanese have sought refuge in neighboring countries since the current conflict began in December 2013. Another 2.2 million South Sudanese are internally displaced as of December 2022. Despite South Sudan’s instability and lack of infrastructure and social services, more than 275,000 people had fled to South Sudan to escape fighting in Sudan as of December 2022.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>South Sudan, independent from Sudan since July 2011 after decades of civil war, is one of the world’s poorest countries and ranks among the lowest in many socioeconomic categories. Problems are exacerbated by ongoing tensions with Sudan over oil revenues and land borders, fighting between government forces and rebel groups, and inter-communal violence. Most of the population lives off of farming, while smaller numbers rely on animal husbandry; abput 80% of the populace lives in rural areas. The maternal mortality rate is among the world’s highest for a variety of reasons, including a shortage of health care workers, facilities, and supplies; poor roads and a lack of transport; and cultural beliefs that prevent women from seeking obstetric care. Most women marry and start having children early, giving birth at home with the assistance of traditional birth attendants, who are unable to handle complications.</p> <p>Educational attainment is extremely poor due to the lack of schools, qualified teachers, and materials. Only one-third of the population is literate (the rate is even lower among women), and half live below the poverty line. Teachers and students are also struggling with the switch from Arabic to English as the language of instruction. Many adults missed out on schooling because of warfare and displacement.</p> <p>More than 2 million South Sudanese have sought refuge in neighboring countries since the current conflict began in December 2013. Another 2.2 million South Sudanese are internally displaced as of October 2022. Despite South Sudan’s instability and lack of infrastructure and social services, more than 275,000 people had fled to South Sudan to escape fighting in Sudan as of December 2022.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "6% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "5.3% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
       "improved: urban": {
@@ -1101,14 +1101,14 @@
       "note": "<strong>note: </strong>some active SSPDF personnel may be militia; the National/Necessary Unified Forces (NUF) will have about 50-80,000 troops from the SSPDF and armed opposition groups when it is formed; as of August 2022, approximately 20,000 NUF had been trained"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the SSPDF inventory is primarily of Soviet origin; South Sudan has been under a UN arms embargo since 2018 (2022)"
+      "text": "the SSPDF inventory is primarily of Soviet origin; South Sudan has been under a UN arms embargo since 2018 (2023)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18 is the legal minimum age for compulsory and voluntary military service; conscription only for men; women may volunteer; 12-24 months service (2022)",
       "note": "<strong>note:</strong> in 2019, women made up less than 10% of the active military"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "the South Sudan People’s Defense Force (SSPDF), formerly the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), was founded as a guerrilla movement against the Sudanese Government in 1983 and participated in the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005); the Juba Declaration that followed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 unified the SPLA and the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF), the second-largest rebel militia remaining from the civil war, under the SPLA name; in 2017, the SPLA was renamed the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) and in September 2018 was renamed again as the SSPDF<br><br>the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has operated in the country since 2011 with the objectives of consolidating peace and security and helping establish conditions for the successful economic and political development of South Sudan; UNMISS had about 15,000 personnel deployed in the country as of mid-2022<br><br>United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has operated in the disputed Abyei region along the border between Sudan and South Sudan since 2011; UNISFA's mission includes ensuring security, protecting civilians, strengthening the capacity of the Abyei Police Service, de-mining, monitoring/verifying the redeployment of armed forces from the area, and facilitating the flow of humanitarian aid; as of mid-2022, UNISFA had approximately 2,000 personnel deployed"
+      "text": "the South Sudan People’s Defense Force (SSPDF), formerly the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), was founded as a guerrilla movement against the Sudanese Government in 1983 and participated in the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005); the Juba Declaration that followed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 unified the SPLA and the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF), the second-largest rebel militia remaining from the civil war, under the SPLA name; in 2017, the SPLA was renamed the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) and in September 2018 was renamed again as the SSPDF<br><br>the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has operated in the country since 2011 with the objectives of consolidating peace and security and helping establish conditions for the successful economic and political development of South Sudan; UNMISS had about 15,000 personnel deployed in the country as of 2022<br><br>United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has operated in the disputed Abyei region along the border between Sudan and South Sudan since 2011; UNISFA's mission includes ensuring security, protecting civilians, strengthening the capacity of the Abyei Police Service, de-mining, monitoring/verifying the redeployment of armed forces from the area, and facilitating the flow of humanitarian aid; as of 2022, UNISFA had approximately 2,500 military and police personnel"
     }
   },
   "Transnational Issues": {
@@ -1123,7 +1123,7 @@
         "text": "2.23 million (alleged coup attempt and ethnic conflict beginning in December 2013; information is lacking on those displaced in earlier years by: fighting in Abyei between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in May 2011; clashes between the SPLA and dissident militia groups in South Sudan; inter-ethnic conflicts over resources and cattle; attacks from the Lord's Resistance Army; floods and drought) (2022)"
       },
       "stateless persons": {
-        "text": "10,000 (mid-year 2021)"
+        "text": "10,000 (2022)"
       }
     },
     "Trafficking in persons": {

africa/pu.json

@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim 46.1%, folk religions 30.6%, Christian 18.9%, other or unaffiliated 4.4% (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Guinea-Bissau’s young and growing population is sustained by high fertility; approximately 60% of the population is under the age of 25. Its large reproductive-age population and total fertility rate of more than 4 children per woman offsets the country’s high infant and maternal mortality rates. The latter is among the world’s highest because of the prevalence of early childbearing, a lack of birth spacing, the high percentage of births outside of health care facilities, and a shortage of medicines and supplies.</p><p>Guinea-Bissau’s history of political instability, a civil war, and several coups (the latest in 2012) have resulted in a fragile state with a weak economy, high unemployment, rampant corruption, widespread poverty, and thriving drug and child trafficking. With the country lacking educational infrastructure, school funding and materials, and qualified teachers, and with the cultural emphasis placed on religious education, parents frequently send boys to study in residential Koranic schools (daaras) in Senegal and The Gambia. They often are extremely deprived and are forced into street begging or agricultural work by marabouts (Muslim religious teachers), who enrich themselves at the expense of the children. Boys who leave their marabouts often end up on the streets of Dakar or other large Senegalese towns and are vulnerable to even worse abuse.</p><p>Some young men lacking in education and job prospects become involved in the flourishing international drug trade. Local drug use and associated violent crime are growing.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Guinea-Bissau’s young and growing population is sustained by high fertility; approximately 60% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020. Its large reproductive-age population and total fertility rate of more than 4 children per woman offsets the country’s high infant and maternal mortality rates. The latter is among the world’s highest because of the prevalence of early childbearing, a lack of birth spacing, the high percentage of births outside of health care facilities, and a shortage of medicines and supplies.</p> <p>Guinea-Bissau’s history of political instability, a civil war, and several coups (the latest in 2012) have resulted in a fragile state with a weak economy, high unemployment, rampant corruption, widespread poverty, and thriving drug and child trafficking. With the country lacking educational infrastructure, school funding and materials, and qualified teachers, and with the cultural emphasis placed on religious education, parents frequently send boys to study in residential Koranic schools (daaras) in Senegal and The Gambia. They often are extremely deprived and are forced into street begging or agricultural work by marabouts (Muslim religious teachers), who enrich themselves at the expense of the children. Boys who leave their marabouts often end up on the streets of Dakar or other large Senegalese towns and are vulnerable to even worse abuse.</p> <p>Some young men lacking in education and job prospects become involved in the flourishing international drug trade. Local drug use and associated violent crime are growing.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "8.4% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "8.4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.2 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 4,000 total active troops, including a few hundred air and naval personnel (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the FARP is poorly armed with an inventory consisting of Soviet-era equipment, much of which is reportedly unserviceable; the only reported deliveries of military equipment since 2015 were patrol boats from Spain in 2017 and non-lethal equipment from China in 2015; Guinea-Bissau has also discussed acquiring military equipment with Indonesia (2022)"
+      "text": "the FARP is poorly armed with an inventory consisting of Soviet-era equipment, much of which is reportedly unserviceable; over the past several years, it has received only a small amount of equipment from China and Spain (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-25 years of age for selective compulsory military service (Air Force service is voluntary); 16 years of age or younger, with parental consent, for voluntary service (2022)"

africa/rw.json

@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
       "text": "Protestant 57.7% (includes Adventist 12.6%), Roman Catholic 38.2%, Muslim 2.1%, other 1% (includes traditional, Jehovah's Witness), none 1.1% (2019-20 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Rwanda’s fertility rate declined sharply during the last decade, as a result of the government’s commitment to family planning, the increased use of contraceptives, and a downward trend in ideal family size. Increases in educational attainment, particularly among girls, and exposure to social media also contributed to the reduction in the birth rate. The average number of births per woman decreased from a 5.6 in 2005 to 4.5 in 2016. Despite these significant strides in reducing fertility, Rwanda’s birth rate remains very high and will continue to for an extended period of time because of its large population entering reproductive age. Because Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, its persistent high population growth and increasingly small agricultural landholdings will put additional strain on families’ ability to raise foodstuffs and access potable water. These conditions will also hinder the government’s efforts to reduce poverty and prevent environmental degradation.</p> <p>The UNHCR recommended that effective 30 June 2013 countries invoke a cessation of refugee status for those Rwandans who fled their homeland between 1959 and 1998, including the 1994 genocide, on the grounds that the conditions that drove them to seek protection abroad no longer exist. The UNHCR’s decision is controversial because many Rwandan refugees still fear persecution if they return home, concerns that are supported by the number of Rwandans granted asylum since 1998 and by the number exempted from the cessation. Rwandan refugees can still seek an exemption or local integration, but host countries are anxious to send the refugees back to Rwanda and are likely to avoid options that enable them to stay. Conversely, Rwanda itself hosts approximately 125,000 refugees as of 2022; virtually all of them fleeing conflict in neighboring Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Rwanda’s fertility rate declined sharply during the last decade, as a result of the government’s commitment to family planning, the increased use of contraceptives, and a downward trend in ideal family size. Increases in educational attainment, particularly among girls, and exposure to social media also contributed to the reduction in the birth rate. The average number of births per woman decreased from a 5.6 in 2005 to 4.5 in 2016 and 3.3 in 2022. Despite these significant strides in reducing fertility, Rwanda’s birth rate remains very high and will continue to for an extended period of time because of its large population entering reproductive age. Because Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, its persistent high population growth and increasingly small agricultural landholdings will put additional strain on families’ ability to raise foodstuffs and access potable water. These conditions will also hinder the government’s efforts to reduce poverty and prevent environmental degradation.</p> <p>The UNHCR recommended that effective 30 June 2013 countries invoke a cessation of refugee status for those Rwandans who fled their homeland between 1959 and 1998, including the 1994 genocide, on the grounds that the conditions that drove them to seek protection abroad no longer exist. The UNHCR’s decision is controversial because many Rwandan refugees still fear persecution if they return home, concerns that are supported by the number of Rwandans granted asylum since 1998 and by the number exempted from the cessation. Rwandan refugees can still seek an exemption or local integration, but host countries are anxious to send the refugees back to Rwanda and are likely to avoid options that enable them to stay. Conversely, Rwanda itself hosts approximately 125,000 refugees as of 2022; virtually all of them fleeing conflict in neighboring Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "6.4% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "7.3% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.12 physicians/1,000 population (2019)"
@@ -1252,7 +1252,7 @@
         "text": "72,192 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 48,367 (Burundi) (2022)"
       },
       "stateless persons": {
-        "text": "9,500 (mid-year 2021)"
+        "text": "9,500 (2022)"
       }
     }
   }

africa/se.json

@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "5.2% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "6.4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "2.25 physicians/1,000 population (2019)"
@@ -1169,7 +1169,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 500 personnel (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the SDF's inventory primarily consists of Soviet-era equipment delivered in the 1970s and 1980s; since 2010, the SDF has received limited amounts of more modern equipment, mostly donations of patrol boats and aircraft, from several suppliers led by China and India (2022)"
+      "text": "the SDF's inventory primarily consists of Soviet-era equipment delivered in the 1970s and 1980s; in recent years, the SDF has received limited amounts of more modern equipment, mostly donations of patrol boats and aircraft, from several suppliers led by China and India (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-28 (18-25 for officers) years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; 6-year initial commitment; no conscription (2022)"

africa/sf.json

@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "9.1% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "8.6% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.79 physicians/1,000 population (2019)"
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "51.35 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "51.4 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {
@@ -1305,7 +1305,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 75,000 active duty personnel (40,000 Army; 7,000 Navy; 10,000 Air Force; 8,000 Military Health Service; 10,000 other, including administrative, logistics, military police); 180,000 South African Police Service (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the SANDF's inventory consists of a mix of domestically produced and foreign-supplied equipment; South Africa's domestic defense industry produced most of the Army's major weapons systems (some were jointly-produced with foreign companies), while the Air Force and Navy inventories include a mix of European-, Israeli-, and US-origin weapons systems (2022)"
+      "text": "the SANDF's inventory consists of a mix of domestically produced and foreign-supplied equipment; South Africa's domestic defense industry produced most of the Army's major weapons systems (some were jointly produced with foreign companies), while the Air Force and Navy inventories include a mix of European-, Israeli-, and US-origin weapons systems (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-22 (18-26 for college graduates) years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; 2-year service obligation (2022)",

africa/sg.json

@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "4.1% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "5.2% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.09 physicians/1,000 population (2019)"
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "38.97 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "39 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {
@@ -872,8 +872,8 @@
       "text": "46.7% (2011 est.)"
     },
     "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income": {
-      "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2011": {
-        "text": "40.3 (2011 est.)"
+      "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2018": {
+        "text": "38.1 (2018 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Household income or consumption by percentage share": {
@@ -1288,7 +1288,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 19,000 active personnel (12,000 Army; 1,000 Navy/Coast Guard; 1,000 Air Force; 5,000 National Gendarmerie) (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the FAS inventory includes mostly older or second-hand equipment from a variety of countries, including France, South Africa, and Russia/former Soviet Union; in recent years, the FAS has undertaken a modernization program; since 2010, it has received small amounts of newer equipment from more than 10 countries, with France as the leading supplier (2022)"
+      "text": "the FAS inventory includes mostly older or second-hand equipment from a variety of countries, including France, South Africa, and Russia/former Soviet Union; in recent years, the FAS has undertaken a modernization program; in recent years, it has received small amounts of newer equipment from more than 10 countries, with France as the leading supplier (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; 20 years of age for selective conscript service; 2-year service obligation; women have been accepted into military service since 2008 (2022)"

africa/sl.json

@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim 77.1%, Christian 22.9% (2019 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Sierra Leone’s youthful and growing population is driven by its high total fertility rate (TFR) of almost 5 children per woman, which has declined little over the last two decades. Its elevated TFR is sustained by the continued desire for large families, the low level of contraceptive use, and the early start of childbearing. Despite its high TFR, Sierra Leone’s population growth is somewhat tempered by high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates that are among the world’s highest and are a result of poverty, a lack of potable water and sanitation, poor nutrition, limited access to quality health care services, and the prevalence of female genital cutting.</p> <p>Sierra Leone’s large youth cohort – about 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – continues to struggle with high levels of unemployment, which was one of the major causes of the country’s 1991-2002 civil war and remains a threat to stability today. Its estimated 60% youth unemployment rate is attributed to high levels of illiteracy and unskilled labor, a lack of private sector jobs, and low pay.</p> <p>Sierra Leone has been a source of and destination for refugees. Sierra Leone’s civil war internally displaced as many as 2 million people, or almost half the population, and forced almost another half million to seek refuge in neighboring countries (370,000 Sierra Leoneans fled to Guinea and 120,000 to Liberia). The UNHCR has helped almost 180,000 Sierra Leoneans to return home, while more than 90,000 others have repatriated on their own. Of the more than 65,000 Liberians who took refuge in Sierra Leone during their country’s civil war (1989-2003), about 50,000 have been voluntarily repatriated by the UNHCR and others have returned home independently.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Sierra Leone’s youthful and growing population is driven by its high total fertility rate (TFR) of almost 4 children per woman as of 2022, which has declined little over the last two decades. Its elevated TFR is sustained by the continued desire for large families, the low level of contraceptive use, and the early start of childbearing. Despite its high TFR, Sierra Leone’s population growth is somewhat tempered by high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates that are among the world’s highest and are a result of poverty, a lack of potable water and sanitation, poor nutrition, limited access to quality health care services, and the prevalence of female genital cutting.</p> <p>Sierra Leone’s large youth cohort – about 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – continues to struggle with high levels of unemployment, which was one of the major causes of the country’s 1991-2002 civil war and remains a threat to stability today. Its estimated 60% youth unemployment rate is attributed to high levels of illiteracy and unskilled labor, a lack of private sector jobs, and low pay.</p> <p>Sierra Leone has been a source of and destination for refugees. Sierra Leone’s civil war internally displaced as many as 2 million people, or almost half the population, and forced almost another half million to seek refuge in neighboring countries (370,000 Sierra Leoneans fled to Guinea and 120,000 to Liberia). The UNHCR has helped almost 180,000 Sierra Leoneans to return home, while more than 90,000 others have repatriated on their own. Of the more than 65,000 Liberians who took refuge in Sierra Leone during their country’s civil war (1989-2003), about 50,000 have been voluntarily repatriated by the UNHCR and others have returned home independently.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "8.8% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "8.8% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.07 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"

africa/so.json

@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
       "text": "Sunni Muslim (Islam) (official, according to the 2012 Transitional Federal Charter)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Somalia scores very low for most humanitarian indicators, suffering from poor governance, protracted internal conflict, underdevelopment, economic decline, poverty, social and gender inequality, and environmental degradation. Despite civil war and famine raising its mortality rate, Somalia’s high fertility rate and large proportion of people of reproductive age maintain rapid population growth, with each generation being larger than the prior one. More than 60% of Somalia’s population is younger than 25, and the fertility rate is among the world’s highest at almost 6 children per woman – a rate that has decreased little since the 1970s.</p> <p>A lack of educational and job opportunities is a major source of tension for Somalia’s large youth cohort, making them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist and pirate groups. Somalia has one of the world’s lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school – and one of the world’s highest youth unemployment rates. Life expectancy is low as a result of high infant and maternal mortality rates, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition, and inadequate health services.</p> <p>During the two decades of conflict that followed the fall of the SIAD regime in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes. Today Somalia is the world’s fourth highest source country for refugees, after Ukraine, Syria and Afghanistan. Insecurity, drought, floods, food shortages, and a lack of economic opportunities are the driving factors.</p> <p>As of 2022, more than 660,000 Somali refugees were hosted in the region, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, while nearly 3 million Somalis were internally displaced. Since the implementation of a tripartite voluntary repatriation agreement among Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR in 2013, many Somali refugees have returned home, some 80,000 between 2014 and 2022.  The Kenyan Government in March 2021 ordered the closure of its two largest refugee camps, Dadaab and Kakuma, which then hosted more than 410,000 mainly Somali refugees.  However, the UN refugee agency presented a road map, including voluntary repatriation, relocation to third countries, and alternative stay options that persuaded the Kenyan Government to delay the closures.  The plan was supposed to lead to both camps being closed by 30 June 2022. Yet, as of May 2022, few Somali refugees had decided to return home because of security concerns and the lack of job prospects, instead waiting in the camps unsure of what the future held for them. Other Somali asylum seekers brave the dangers of crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen – despite its internal conflict – with aspirations to move onward to Saudi Arabia and other locations.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Somalia scores very low for most humanitarian indicators, suffering from poor governance, protracted internal conflict, underdevelopment, economic decline, poverty, social and gender inequality, and environmental degradation. Despite civil war and famine raising its mortality rate, Somalia’s high fertility rate and large proportion of people of reproductive age maintain rapid population growth, with each generation being larger than the prior one. More than 60% of Somalia’s population is younger than 25 as of 2020, and the fertility rate is among the world’s highest at almost 5.5 children per woman – a rate that has decreased little since the 1970s.</p> <p>A lack of educational and job opportunities is a major source of tension for Somalia’s large youth cohort, making them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist and pirate groups. Somalia has one of the world’s lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school – and one of the world’s highest youth unemployment rates. Life expectancy is low as a result of high infant and maternal mortality rates, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition, and inadequate health services.</p> <p>During the two decades of conflict that followed the fall of the SIAD regime in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes. Today Somalia is the world’s fourth highest source country for refugees, after Ukraine, Syria and Afghanistan. Insecurity, drought, floods, food shortages, and a lack of economic opportunities are the driving factors.</p> <p>As of 2022, more than 660,000 Somali refugees were hosted in the region, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, while nearly 3 million Somalis were internally displaced. Since the implementation of a tripartite voluntary repatriation agreement among Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR in 2013, many Somali refugees have returned home, some 80,000 between 2014 and 2022.  The Kenyan Government in March 2021 ordered the closure of its two largest refugee camps, Dadaab and Kakuma, which then hosted more than 410,000 mainly Somali refugees.  However, the UN refugee agency presented a road map, including voluntary repatriation, relocation to third countries, and alternative stay options that persuaded the Kenyan Government to delay the closures.  The plan was supposed to lead to both camps being closed by 30 June 2022. Yet, as of May 2022, few Somali refugees had decided to return home because of security concerns and the lack of job prospects, instead waiting in the camps unsure of what the future held for them. Other Somali asylum seekers brave the dangers of crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen – despite its internal conflict – with aspirations to move onward to Saudi Arabia and other locations.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -1147,28 +1147,28 @@
       "note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> Somalia has numerous militia and regional forces operating throughout the country; these forces include ones that are clan- and warlord-based, semi-official paramilitary and special police forces (aka darwish), and externally-sponsored militias; the SNA is attempting to incorporate some of these militia units<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>Somaliland has army and naval forces under the Somaliland Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
+      "Military Expenditures 2021": {
+        "text": "6% of GDP (2021 est.)"
+      },
+      "Military Expenditures 2020": {
+        "text": "6% of GDP (2020 est.)"
+      },
       "Military Expenditures 2019": {
-        "text": "5.6% of GDP (2019 est.) (approximately $120 million)"
+        "text": "5.6% of GDP (2019 est.)"
       },
       "Military Expenditures 2018": {
-        "text": "6% of GDP (2018 est.) (approximately $120 million)"
+        "text": "6% of GDP (2018 est.)"
       },
       "Military Expenditures 2017": {
-        "text": "5.9% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $110 million)"
-      },
-      "Military Expenditures 2016": {
-        "text": "6% of GDP (2016 est.) (approximately $110 million)"
-      },
-      "Military Expenditures 2015": {
-        "text": "5.9% of GDP (2015 est.) (approximately $110 million)"
+        "text": "5.9% of GDP (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Military and security service personnel strengths": {
       "text": "approximately 18-20,000 SNA personnel (2022)",
-      "note": "<strong>note: </strong>as of 2022, there were estimates of up to 50,000 militia forces operating in the country"
+      "note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> in January 2023, the Somali Government said the SNA would have 24,000 trained and equipped troops by 2024<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> as of 2022, there were estimates of up to 50,000 militia forces operating in the country"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the SNA is lightly armed with an inventory that includes a variety of older, second-hand equipment largely from Italy, Russia, South Africa, and the UK; since 2015, it has received small quantities of second-hand equipment as aid/donations from a variety of countries, including the US (2022)",
+      "text": "the SNA is lightly armed with an inventory that includes a variety of older, secondhand equipment largely from Italy, Russia, South Africa, and the UK; in recent years, it has received small quantities of equipment as aid/donations from a variety of countries, including the US (2022)",
       "note": "<strong>note:</strong> in 2022, the UN voted to maintain an arms embargo on Somali in place since 1992; however, the embargo was modified to reflect the Somali Government’s progress in improving its management of weapons and ammunition; it includes allowing Somalia to import portable surface-to-air missiles, higher-caliber mortars, anti-tank guided weapons, some aircraft and vessels designed or modified for military use, and combat drones for use by its security forces and police — unless the Security Council committee monitoring sanctions objects within five working days of receiving notification from the Somali Government"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@
       "note": "<strong>note:</strong> in 2019, the Federal Government of Somalia renewed its commitment to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers by signing a roadmap detailing measures and practical actions to prevent violations against children, release children associated with armed forces, and reintegrate them into communities; the signing followed a similar accord committed to ending the use of child soldiers signed by both the Somali Transitional Government and the UN in 2012"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "as of 2023, the Somali National Army (SNA) and supporting security and militia forces were actively conducting operations against the al-Shabaab terrorist group (see Appendix T); al-Shabaab controlled large parts of southern and central Somalia <br><br>of the SNA’s approximately 13 brigades, the most effective were assessed to be the US-trained Danab (\"Lightning\") Advanced Infantry Brigade and those of the Turkish-trained Gorgor (\"Eagle\") Special Division; as of 2022, the Danab Brigade numbered about 1,500 troops with an eventual projected strength of 3,000, while the Gorgor Division was estimated to up to 5,000 trained troops; the Somali Government also sent some 5,000 recruits to Eritrea for military training; the troops returned in 2022<br><br>the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operated in the country with the approval of the UN from 2007-2022; its peacekeeping mission included assisting Somali forces in providing security for a stable political process, enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; in April 2022, AMISOM was reconfigured and replaced with the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS); the ATMIS mission is to support the Somalia Federal Government (FGS) in implementing the security objectives of the FGS's security transition plan, a comprehensive strategy developed by the FGS and its international partners in 2018 and updated in 2021 to gradually transfer security responsibilities from ATMIS to Somali security forces; ATMIS is projected to gradually reduce staffing from its 2022 level of about 20,000 personnel (civilians, military, and police) to zero by the end of 2024 <br><br>UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM; established 2013) is mandated by the Security Council to work with the FGS to support national reconciliation, provide advice on peace-building and state-building, monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international community; the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS; established 2015) is responsible for providing logistical field support to ATMIS, UNSOM, and the Somali security forces on joint operations with ATMIS<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM-S) has operated in the country since 2010; the EUTM provides advice and training to the Somali military; the US, UK, and Turkey maintain separate military training missions in Somalia (the US has also supported the SNA with air strikes); the UAE maintains a military presence in Somaliland (2023)"
+      "text": "the Somali National Army (SNA) and supporting security and militia forces are actively conducting operations against the al-Shabaab terrorist group (see Appendix T); al-Shabaab controls large parts of southern and central Somalia <br><br>of the SNA’s approximately 13 brigades, the most effective are assessed to be the US-trained Danab (\"Lightning\") Advanced Infantry Brigade and those of the Turkish-trained Gorgor (\"Eagle\") Special Division; as of 2022, the Danab Brigade numbered about 1,500 troops with an eventual projected strength of 3,000, while the Gorgor Division was estimated to have up to 5,000 trained troops; the Somali Government has sent thousands of troops to Eritrea and Uganda for training and in 2023 announced plans to send additional personnel to Egypt and Ethiopia for training<br><br>the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operates in the country with the approval of the UN from 2007-2022; its peacekeeping mission includes assisting Somali forces in providing security for a stable political process, enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; in April 2022, AMISOM was reconfigured and replaced with the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS); the ATMIS mission is to support the Somalia Federal Government (FGS) in implementing the security objectives of the FGS's security transition plan, a comprehensive strategy developed by the FGS and its international partners in 2018 and updated in 2021 to gradually transfer security responsibilities from ATMIS to Somali security forces; ATMIS is projected to gradually reduce staffing from its 2022 level of about 20,000 personnel (civilians, military, and police) to zero by the end of 2024 <br><br>UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM; established 2013) is mandated by the Security Council to work with the FGS to support national reconciliation, provide advice on peace-building and state-building, monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international community; the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS; established 2015) is responsible for providing logistical field support to ATMIS, UNSOM, and the Somali security forces on joint operations with ATMIS<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM-S) has operated in the country since 2010; the EUTM provides advice and training to the Somali military; the US, UK, and Turkey maintain separate military training missions in Somalia (the US has also supported the SNA with air strikes); the UAE maintains a military presence in Somaliland (2023)"
     },
     "Maritime threats": {
       "text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) received one incident of piracy and armed robbery in 2021 for the Horn of Africa; while there were no recorded incidents, the IMB PRC warns that Somalia pirates continue to possess the capacity to carry out attacks in the Somali basin and wider Indian Ocean; in particular, the report warns that, \"Masters and crew must remain vigilant and cautious when transiting these waters.\"; the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, contributed to the drop in incidents; the EU naval mission, Operation ATALANTA, continues its operations in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean through 2022; naval units from China, India, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, the US, and other countries also operate in conjunction with EU forces</p>"

africa/su.json

@@ -139,6 +139,9 @@
     "Religions": {
       "text": "Sunni Muslim, small Christian minority"
     },
+    "Demographic profile": {
+      "text": "<p>Sudan’s population grew almost fourfold between 1956 and 2008, the date of its last census.  Even after the southern part of the country became independent South Sudan in 2011, the population of Sudan has continued to grow.  The gender balance overall is fairly even.  Females, however, are more prevalent in rural areas because of males migrating to urban areas in search of work.  The total fertility rate (TFR) remains high despite falling from 7 children per woman in Sudan’s first census in 1955 to about 4.5 in 2022, which can be attributed to early marriage and a low contraceptive prevalence rate.  Among the factors that led to the reduction in fertility are family planning, improvement in women’s education and participation in the labor force outside the home, and migration and urbanization. </p> <p>The continued slow decline in fertility accompanied by a drop in mortality and increased life expectancy has produced an age structure where approximately 55% of the population was of working age (15-64) as of 2020.  This share will grow as the sizable youth population becomes working age.  As Sudan’s working age population increasingly outnumbers the youth and elderly populations (the dependent populations), the country will approach the possibility of a demographic dividend.  The window of opportunity for potential economic growth depends not only on a favorable age structure but also on having a trained and educated workforce, job creation (particularly in the formal market), and investment in health, as well as generating savings to invest in schooling and care for the elderly.  As of 2018, Sudan’s literacy rate was just over 60%, and even lower among women.  Improvements in school enrollment, student-teacher ratio, infrastructure, funding, and educational quality could help the country to realize a demographic dividend.</p>"
+    },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
         "text": "42.01% (male 9,726,937/female 9,414,988)"
@@ -285,7 +288,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "4.6% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "3% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.26 physicians/1,000 population (2017)"
@@ -1268,7 +1271,7 @@
       "text": "information varies widely; estimated 100-125,000 active duty armed forces personnel; approximately 30-40,000 Rapid Support Forces (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the SAF's inventory includes a mix of Chinese, Russian, Soviet-era, Ukrainian, and domestically-produced weapons systems; since 2010, the leading arms providers to the SAF have been Belarus, China, Russia, and Ukraine; North Korea has also provided arms; Sudan has a domestic arms industry that manufactures ammunition, small arms, and armored vehicles, largely based on older Chinese and Russian systems (2022)"
+      "text": "the SAF's inventory includes a mix of Chinese, Russian, Soviet-era, and domestically produced weapons systems; in recent years, leading arms providers have included Belarus, China, Russia, and Ukraine; North Korea has also provided arms; Sudan has a domestic arms industry that manufactures ammunition, small arms, and armored vehicles, largely based on older Chinese and Russian systems (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-33 years of age for compulsory or voluntary military service for men and women; 1-2 year service obligation (2022)",

africa/to.json

@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "5.7% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "6% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.08 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"

africa/tp.json

@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@
       "text": "Catholic 55.7%, Adventist 4.1%, Assembly of God 3.4%, New Apostolic 2.9%, Mana 2.3%, Universal Kingdom of God 2%, Jehovah's Witness 1.2%, other 6.2%, none 21.2%, unspecified 1% (2012 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Sao Tome and Principe’s youthful age structure – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – and high fertility rate ensure future population growth. Although Sao Tome has a net negative international migration rate, emigration is not a sufficient safety valve to reduce already high levels of unemployment and poverty. While literacy and primary school attendance have improved in recent years, Sao Tome still struggles to improve its educational quality and to increase its secondary school completion rate. Despite some improvements in education and access to healthcare, Sao Tome and Principe has much to do to decrease its high poverty rate, create jobs, and increase its economic growth.</p><p>The population of Sao Tome and Principe descends primarily from the islands’ colonial Portuguese settlers, who first arrived in the late 15th century, and the much larger number of African slaves brought in for sugar production and the slave trade. For about 100 years after the abolition of slavery in 1876, the population was further shaped by the widespread use of imported unskilled contract laborers from Portugal’s other African colonies, who worked on coffee and cocoa plantations. In the first decades after abolition, most workers were brought from Angola under a system similar to slavery. While Angolan laborers were technically free, they were forced or coerced into long contracts that were automatically renewed and extended to their children. Other contract workers from Mozambique and famine-stricken Cape Verde first arrived in the early 20th century under short-term contracts and had the option of repatriation, although some chose to remain in Sao Tome and Principe.</p><p>Today’s Sao Tomean population consists of mesticos (creole descendants of the European immigrants and African slaves that first inhabited the islands), forros (descendants of freed African slaves), angolares (descendants of runaway African slaves that formed a community in the south of Sao Tome Island and today are fishermen), servicais (contract laborers from Angola, Mozambique, and Cape Verde), tongas (locally born children of contract laborers), and lesser numbers of Europeans and Asians.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Sao Tome and Principe’s youthful age structure – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020 – and high fertility rate ensure future population growth. Although Sao Tome has a net negative international migration rate, emigration is not a sufficient safety valve to reduce already high levels of unemployment and poverty. While literacy and primary school attendance have improved in recent years, Sao Tome still struggles to improve its educational quality and to increase its secondary school completion rate. Despite some improvements in education and access to healthcare, Sao Tome and Principe has much to do to decrease its high poverty rate, create jobs, and increase its economic growth.</p> <p>The population of Sao Tome and Principe descends primarily from the islands’ colonial Portuguese settlers, who first arrived in the late 15th century, and the much larger number of African slaves brought in for sugar production and the slave trade. For about 100 years after the abolition of slavery in 1876, the population was further shaped by the widespread use of imported unskilled contract laborers from Portugal’s other African colonies, who worked on coffee and cocoa plantations. In the first decades after abolition, most workers were brought from Angola under a system similar to slavery. While Angolan laborers were technically free, they were forced or coerced into long contracts that were automatically renewed and extended to their children. Other contract workers from Mozambique and famine-stricken Cape Verde first arrived in the early 20th century under short-term contracts and had the option of repatriation, although some chose to remain in Sao Tome and Principe.</p> <p>Today’s Sao Tomean population consists of mesticos (creole descendants of the European immigrants and African slaves that first inhabited the islands), forros (descendants of freed African slaves), angolares (descendants of runaway African slaves that formed a community in the south of Sao Tome Island and today are fishermen), servicais (contract laborers from Angola, Mozambique, and Cape Verde), tongas (locally born children of contract laborers), and lesser numbers of Europeans and Asians.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "5.5% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "4.9% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.49 physicians/1,000 population (2019)"
@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "2.18 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "2.2 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {
@@ -793,7 +793,7 @@
     },
     "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income": {
       "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2017": {
-        "text": "56.3 (2017 est.)"
+        "text": "40.7 (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Household income or consumption by percentage share": {

africa/ts.json

@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "7% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "6.3% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "1.3 physicians/1,000 population (2017)"
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "4.615 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "4.6 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {
@@ -1229,7 +1229,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 35,000 active duty personnel (25,000 Army; 5,000 Navy; 5,000 Air Force); estimated 10,000 National Guard (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the Tunisian military's inventory includes mostly older or second-hand US and European equipment; since 2010, the Netherlands and US have been the leading suppliers of arms to Tunisia (2022)"
+      "text": "the Tunisian military's inventory includes mostly older or second-hand US and European equipment; in recent years, the Netherlands and US have been the leading suppliers of arms to Tunisia (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "20-23 years of age for male compulsory service, 1-year service obligation; individuals engaged in higher education or vocational training programs prior to their military drafting are allowed to delay service until they have completed their programs; 18-23 years of age for voluntary service; women may volunteer (2022)",

africa/tz.json

@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@
       "note": "<strong>note:</strong> Zanzibar is almost entirely Muslim"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Tanzania has the largest population in East Africa and the lowest population density; more than a third of the population is urban. Tanzania’s youthful population – about two-thirds of the population is under 25 – is growing rapidly because of the high total fertility rate of 4.4 children per woman, as of 2022. Progress in reducing the birth rate has stalled, sustaining the country’s nearly 3% annual growth. The maternal mortality rate has improved since 2000, yet it remains very high because of early and frequent pregnancies, inadequate maternal health services, and a lack of skilled birth attendants – problems that are worse among poor and rural women. Tanzania has made strides in reducing under-5 and infant mortality rates, but a recent drop in immunization threatens to undermine gains in child health. Malaria is a leading killer of children under 5, while HIV is the main source of adult mortality.</p> <p>For Tanzania, most migration is internal, rural to urban movement, while some temporary labor migration from towns to plantations takes place seasonally for harvests. Tanzania was Africa’s largest refugee-hosting country for decades, hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Great Lakes region, primarily Burundi, over the last fifty years. However, the assisted repatriation and naturalization of tens of thousands of Burundian refugees between 2002 and 2014 dramatically reduced the refugee population. Tanzania is increasingly a transit country for illegal migrants from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region who are heading to southern Africa for security reasons and/or economic opportunities. Some of these migrants choose to settle in Tanzania.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Tanzania has the largest population in East Africa and the lowest population density; more than a third of the population is urban. Tanzania’s youthful population – over 60% of the population is under 25 as of 2020 – is growing rapidly because of the high total fertility rate of 4.4 children per woman, as of 2022. Progress in reducing the birth rate has stalled, sustaining the country’s nearly 3% annual growth rate. The maternal mortality rate has improved since 2000, yet it remains very high because of early and frequent pregnancies, inadequate maternal health services, and a lack of skilled birth attendants – problems that are worse among poor and rural women. Tanzania has made strides in reducing under-5 and infant mortality rates, but a recent drop in immunization threatens to undermine gains in child health. Malaria is a leading killer of children under 5, while HIV is the main source of adult mortality.</p> <p>For Tanzania, most migration is internal, rural to urban movement, while some temporary labor migration from towns to plantations takes place seasonally for harvests. Tanzania was Africa’s largest refugee-hosting country for decades, hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Great Lakes region, primarily Burundi, over the last fifty years. However, the assisted repatriation and naturalization of tens of thousands of Burundian refugees between 2002 and 2014 dramatically reduced the refugee population. Tanzania is increasingly a transit country for illegal migrants from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region who are heading to southern Africa for security reasons and/or economic opportunities. Some of these migrants choose to settle in Tanzania.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "3.8% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "3.8% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.05 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "96.27 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "96.3 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {
@@ -1310,7 +1310,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 25,000 active duty personnel (21,000 Land Forces; 1,000 Naval Forces; 3,000 Air Force) (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the TPDF's inventory includes mostly Soviet-era and Chinese equipment; since 2010, China has been the leading supplier of arms to the TPDF (2022)"
+      "text": "the TPDF's inventory includes mostly Soviet-era and Chinese equipment; in recent years, China has been the leading supplier of arms to the TPDF (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-25 years of age for voluntary military service; 6-year commitment (2-year contracts afterwards); selective conscription for 2 years of public service (2022)"

africa/ug.json

@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "3.8% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.15 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -1291,6 +1291,9 @@
     "Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
       "refugees (country of origin)": {
         "text": "854,268 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 473,529 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 61,563 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 40,630 (Burundi), 26,683 (Eritrea), 23,251 (Rwanda), 5,330 (Ethiopia) (2022)"
+      },
+      "stateless persons": {
+        "text": "67,000 (2022)"
       }
     }
   }

africa/uv.json

@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim 63.2%, Roman Catholic 24.6%, Protestant 6.9%, traditional/animist 4.2%, none 0.7%, unspecified 0.4% (2017-18 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Burkina Faso has a young age structure – the result of declining mortality combined with steady high fertility – and continues to experience rapid population growth, which is putting increasing pressure on the country’s limited arable land. More than 65% of the population is under the age of 25, and the population is growing at 3% annually. Mortality rates, especially those of infants and children, have decreased because of improved health care, hygiene, and sanitation, but women continue to have an average of almost 6 children. Even if fertility were substantially reduced, today’s large cohort entering their reproductive years would sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future. Only about a third of the population is literate and unemployment is widespread, dampening the economic prospects of Burkina Faso’s large working-age population.</p> <p>Migration has traditionally been a way of life for Burkinabe, with seasonal migration being replaced by stints of up to two years abroad. Cote d’Ivoire remains the top destination, although it has experienced periods of internal conflict. Under French colonization, Burkina Faso became a main labor source for agricultural and factory work in Cote d’Ivoire. Burkinabe also migrated to Ghana, Mali, and Senegal for work between the world wars. Burkina Faso attracts migrants from Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Mali, who often share common ethnic backgrounds with the Burkinabe. Despite its food shortages and high poverty rate, Burkina Faso has become a destination for refugees in recent years and hosts about 33,600 Malian refugees as of October 2022.</p> (2018)"
+      "text": "<p>Burkina Faso has a young age structure – the result of declining mortality combined with steady high fertility – and continues to experience rapid population growth, which is putting increasing pressure on the country’s limited arable land. Almost 65% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020, and the population is growing at 2.5% annually. Mortality rates, especially those of infants and children, have decreased because of improved health care, hygiene, and sanitation, but women continue to have an average of more than 4 children. Even if fertility were substantially reduced, today’s large cohort entering their reproductive years would sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future. Only about a third of the population is literate and unemployment is widespread, dampening the economic prospects of Burkina Faso’s large working-age population.</p> <p>Migration has traditionally been a way of life for Burkinabe, with seasonal migration being replaced by stints of up to two years abroad. Cote d’Ivoire remains the top destination, although it has experienced periods of internal conflict. Under French colonization, Burkina Faso became a main labor source for agricultural and factory work in Cote d’Ivoire. Burkinabe also migrated to Ghana, Mali, and Senegal for work between the world wars. Burkina Faso attracts migrants from Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Mali, who often share common ethnic backgrounds with the Burkinabe. Despite its food shortages and high poverty rate, Burkina Faso has become a destination for refugees in recent years and hosts about 33,600 Malian refugees as of October 2022.</p> (2018)"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "5.5% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "6.7% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.09 physicians/1,000 population (2019)"
@@ -1251,7 +1251,7 @@
     },
     "Military and security service personnel strengths": {
       "text": "approximately 13,000 personnel (8,000 Army; 500 Air Force; 4,500 National Gendarmerie) (2022)",
-      "note": "<strong>note 1: </strong>in 2019, the Burkina Faso Government announced an initial strength goal for the VDF of 15,000 members, but in October 2022 announced plans to recruit up to 50,000 VDF volunteers<br><strong><br>note 2:</strong>  in 2022, Burkina Faso announced a special recruitment for 3,000 additional soldiers to assist with its fight against terrorist groups operating in the country"
+      "note": "<strong>note 1: </strong>in 2019, the Burkina Faso Government announced an initial strength goal for the VDF of 15,000 members, but in October 2022 announced intentions to recruit up to 50,000 VDF volunteers<br><strong><br>note 2:</strong>  in 2022, Burkina Faso announced a special recruitment for 3,000 additional soldiers to assist with its fight against terrorist groups operating in the country"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
       "text": "the FABF has a mix of mostly older or secondhand equipment from a mix of suppliers, including France, South Africa, the UK, and the US (2022)"
@@ -1264,7 +1264,7 @@
       "note": "<strong>note:</strong> Burkina Faso is part of a four (formerly five)-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G4 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Chad, Mali (withdrew in 2022), Mauritania, and Niger; it has committed 550 troops and 100 gendarmes to the force; as of 2020, defense forces from each of the participating states were allowed to pursue terrorist fighters up to 100 km into neighboring countries; the force is backed by France, the UN, and the US"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "including the most recent in October 2022, the military has conducted eight coups since 1960; as of 2022, the military was also actively engaged in combat operations with terrorist groups linked to al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), particularly in the northern and eastern regions; in the north, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida linked militant groups, has exploited ethnic tensions and perceptions of state neglect, as well as grievances over corruption, patronage politics, social stratification, and land disputes; in 2022, JNIM conducted attacks in 10 of the country's 13 provinces; most of the attacks were assessed to be by the Macina Liberation Front (FLM) of the JNIM coalition; the ISIS-Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) terrorist group operated in the eastern part of the country; in 2022, an estimated 40% of the country was not under government control&nbsp; (2022)"
+      "text": "including the most recent in October 2022, the military has conducted eight coups since 1960; the FABF and the National Gendarmerie were struggling to contain terrorist groups linked to al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), particularly in the northern and eastern regions of the country; in the north, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida linked militant groups, has exploited ethnic tensions and perceptions of state neglect, as well as grievances over corruption, patronage politics, social stratification, and land disputes; in 2022, JNIM conducted attacks in 10 of the country's 13 provinces; most of the attacks were assessed to be by the Macina Liberation Front (FLM) of the JNIM coalition; the ISIS-Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) terrorist group operated in the eastern part of the country; an estimated 40% of the country was not under government control (2022)"
     }
   },
   "Terrorism": {

africa/wa.json

@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@
       "text": "Christian 97.5%, other 0.6% (includes Muslim, Baha'i, Jewish, Buddhist), unaffiliated 1.9% (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Planning officials view Namibia’s reduced population growth rate as sustainable based on the country’s economic growth over the past decade. Prior to independence in 1990, Namibia’s relatively small population grew at about 3% annually, but declining fertility and the impact of HIV/AIDS slowed this growth to 1.4% by 2011, rebounding to close to 2% by 2016. Namibia’s fertility rate has fallen over the last two decades – from about 4.5 children per woman in 1996 to 3.4 in 2016 – due to increased contraceptive use, higher educational attainment among women, and greater female participation in the labor force. The average age at first birth has stayed fairly constant, but the age at first marriage continues to increase, indicating a rising incidence of premarital childbearing.</p><p>The majority of Namibians are rural dwellers (about 55%) and live in the better-watered north and northeast parts of the country. Migration, historically male-dominated, generally flows from northern communal areas – non-agricultural lands where blacks were sequestered under the apartheid system – to agricultural, mining, and manufacturing centers in the center and south. After independence from South Africa, restrictions on internal movement eased, and rural-urban migration increased, bolstering urban growth.</p><p>Some Namibians – usually persons who are better-educated, more affluent, and from urban areas – continue to legally migrate to South Africa temporarily to visit family and friends and, much less frequently, to pursue tertiary education or better economic opportunities. Namibians concentrated along the country’s other borders make unauthorized visits to Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, or Botswana, to visit family and to trade agricultural goods. Few Namibians express interest in permanently settling in other countries; they prefer the safety of their homeland, have a strong national identity, and enjoy a well-supplied retail sector. Although Namibia is receptive to foreign investment and cross-border trade, intolerance toward non-citizens is widespread.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Planning officials view Namibia’s reduced population growth rate as sustainable based on the country’s economic growth over the past decade. Prior to independence in 1990, Namibia’s relatively small population grew at about 3% annually, but declining fertility and the impact of HIV/AIDS slowed this growth to 1.4% by 2011, rebounding to close to 2% by 2016. Namibia’s fertility rate has fallen over the last two decades – from about 4.5 children per woman in 1996 to 3.4 in 2016 and to 3 in 2022 – due to increased contraceptive use, higher educational attainment among women, and greater female participation in the labor force. The average age at first birth has stayed fairly constant, but the age at first marriage continues to increase, indicating a rising incidence of premarital childbearing.</p> <p>The majority of Namibians are rural dwellers (about 55%) and live in the better-watered north and northeast parts of the country. Migration, historically male-dominated, generally flows from northern communal areas – non-agricultural lands where blacks were sequestered under the apartheid system – to agricultural, mining, and manufacturing centers in the center and south. After independence from South Africa, restrictions on internal movement eased, and rural-urban migration increased, bolstering urban growth.</p> <p>Some Namibians – usually persons who are better-educated, more affluent, and from urban areas – continue to legally migrate to South Africa temporarily to visit family and friends and, much less frequently, to pursue tertiary education or better economic opportunities. Namibians concentrated along the country’s other borders make unauthorized visits to Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, or Botswana, to visit family and to trade agricultural goods. Few Namibians express interest in permanently settling in other countries; they prefer the safety of their homeland, have a strong national identity, and enjoy a well-supplied retail sector. Although Namibia is receptive to foreign investment and cross-border trade, intolerance toward non-citizens is widespread.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "8.5% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "8.9% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.59 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "39.91 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "39.9 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {

africa/wz.json

@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@
       "text": "Christian 90% (Zionist - a blend of Christianity and indigenous ancestral worship - 40%, Roman Catholic 20%, other 30% - includes Anglican, Methodist, Church of Jesus Christ, Jehovah's Witness), Muslim 2%, other 8% (includes Baha'i, Buddhist, Hindu, indigenous, Jewish) (2015 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Eswatini, a small, predominantly rural, landlocked country surrounded by South Africa and Mozambique, suffers from severe poverty and the world’s highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate. A weak and deteriorating economy, high unemployment, rapid population growth, and an uneven distribution of resources all combine to worsen already persistent poverty and food insecurity, especially in rural areas. Erratic weather (frequent droughts and intermittent heavy rains and flooding), overuse of small plots, the overgrazing of cattle, and outdated agricultural practices reduce crop yields and further degrade the environment, exacerbating Eswatini's poverty and subsistence problems. Eswatini's extremely high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate – more than 28% of adults have the disease – compounds these issues. Agricultural production has declined due to HIV/AIDS, as the illness causes households to lose manpower and to sell livestock and other assets to pay for medicine and funerals.</p><p>Swazis, mainly men from the country’s rural south, have been migrating to South Africa to work in coal, and later gold, mines since the late 19th century. Although the number of miners abroad has never been high in absolute terms because of Eswatini's small population, the outflow has had important social and economic repercussions. The peak of mining employment in South Africa occurred during the 1980s. Cross-border movement has accelerated since the 1990s, as increasing unemployment has pushed more Swazis to look for work in South Africa (creating a \"brain drain\" in the health and educational sectors); southern Swazi men have continued to pursue mining, although the industry has downsized. Women now make up an increasing share of migrants and dominate cross-border trading in handicrafts, using the proceeds to purchase goods back in Eswatini. Much of today’s migration, however, is not work-related but focuses on visits to family and friends, tourism, and shopping.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Eswatini, a small, predominantly rural, landlocked country surrounded by South Africa and Mozambique, suffers from severe poverty and the world’s highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate. A weak and deteriorating economy, high unemployment, rapid population growth, and an uneven distribution of resources all combine to worsen already persistent poverty and food insecurity, especially in rural areas. Erratic weather (frequent droughts and intermittent heavy rains and flooding), overuse of small plots, the overgrazing of cattle, and outdated agricultural practices reduce crop yields and further degrade the environment, exacerbating Eswatini's poverty and subsistence problems. Eswatini's extremely high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate – nearly 28% of adults have the disease – compounds these issues. Agricultural production has declined due to HIV/AIDS, as the illness causes households to lose manpower and to sell livestock and other assets to pay for medicine and funerals.</p> <p>Swazis, mainly men from the country’s rural south, have been migrating to South Africa to work in coal, and later gold, mines since the late 19th century. Although the number of miners abroad has never been high in absolute terms because of Eswatini's small population, the outflow has had important social and economic repercussions. The peak of mining employment in South Africa occurred during the 1980s. Cross-border movement has accelerated since the 1990s, as increasing unemployment has pushed more Swazis to look for work in South Africa (creating a \"brain drain\" in the health and educational sectors); southern Swazi men have continued to pursue mining, although the industry has downsized. Women now make up an increasing share of migrants and dominate cross-border trading in handicrafts, using the proceeds to purchase goods back in Eswatini. Much of today’s migration, however, is not work-related but focuses on visits to family and friends, tourism, and shopping.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "6.8% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "6.5% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.14 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@
       "text": "18-30 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; no conscription (2021)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "the UEDF was originally created in 1973 as the Royal Swaziland Defense Force; the UEDF&rsquo;s primary mission is external security but it also has domestic security responsibilities, including protecting members of the royal family; the king is the UEDF commander in chief and holds the position of minister of defense, although the UEDF reports to the Army commander and principal undersecretary of defense for day-to-day operations; the Royal Eswatini Police Service (REPS) is responsible for maintaining internal security as well as migration and border crossing enforcement; it is under the prime minister, although the king is the force&rsquo;s titular commissioner in chief (2022)"
+      "text": "the UEDF&rsquo;s primary mission is external security but it also has domestic security responsibilities, including protecting members of the royal family; the king is the UEDF commander in chief and holds the position of minister of defense, although the UEDF reports to the Army commander and principal undersecretary of defense for day-to-day operations; the Royal Eswatini Police Service (REPS) is responsible for maintaining internal security as well as migration and border crossing enforcement; it is under the prime minister, although the king is the force&rsquo;s titular commissioner in chief; the UEDF was originally created in 1973 as the Royal Swaziland Defense Force (2023)"
     }
   },
   "Transnational Issues": {

africa/za.json

@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@
       "text": "Protestant 75.3%, Roman Catholic 20.2%, other 2.7% (includes Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, and Baha'i), none 1.8% (2010 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Zambia’s poor, youthful population consists primarily of Bantu-speaking people representing nearly 70 different ethnicities. Zambia’s high fertility rate continues to drive rapid population growth, averaging almost 3 percent annually between 2000 and 2010. The country’s total fertility rate has fallen by less than 1.5 children per woman during the last 30 years and still averages among the world’s highest, almost 6 children per woman, largely because of the country’s lack of access to family planning services, education for girls, and employment for women. Zambia also exhibits wide fertility disparities based on rural or urban location, education, and income. Poor, uneducated women from rural areas are more likely to marry young, to give birth early, and to have more children, viewing children as a sign of prestige and recognizing that not all of their children will live to adulthood. HIV/AIDS is prevalent in Zambia and contributes to its low life expectancy.</p><p>Zambian emigration is low compared to many other African countries and is comprised predominantly of the well-educated. The small amount of brain drain, however, has a major impact in Zambia because of its limited human capital and lack of educational infrastructure for developing skilled professionals in key fields. For example, Zambia has few schools for training doctors, nurses, and other health care workers. Its spending on education is low compared to other Sub-Saharan countries.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Zambia’s poor, youthful population consists primarily of Bantu-speaking people representing nearly 70 different ethnicities. Zambia’s high fertility rate continues to drive rapid population growth, averaging almost 3% annually between 2000 and 2010, and reaching over 3.3% in 2022. The country’s total fertility rate has fallen by less than 1.5 children per woman during the last 30 years and still averages among the world’s highest, almost 6 children per woman, largely because of the country’s lack of access to family planning services, education for girls, and employment for women. Zambia also exhibits wide fertility disparities based on rural or urban location, education, and income. Poor, uneducated women from rural areas are more likely to marry young, to give birth early, and to have more children, viewing children as a sign of prestige and recognizing that not all of their children will live to adulthood. HIV/AIDS is prevalent in Zambia and contributes to its low life expectancy.</p> <p>Zambian emigration is low compared to many other African countries and is comprised predominantly of the well-educated. The small amount of brain drain, however, has a major impact in Zambia because of its limited human capital and lack of educational infrastructure for developing skilled professionals in key fields. For example, Zambia has few schools for training doctors, nurses, and other health care workers. Its spending on education is low compared to other Sub-Saharan countries.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "5.3% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "5.6% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "1.17 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"

africa/zi.json

@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@
       "text": "Protestant 74.8% (includes Apostolic 37.5%, Pentecostal 21.8%, other 15.5%), Roman Catholic 7.3%, other Christian 5.3%, traditional 1.5%, Muslim 0.5%, other 0.1%, none 10.5% (2015 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "<p>Zimbabwe’s progress in reproductive, maternal, and child health has stagnated in recent years. According to a 2010 Demographic and Health Survey, contraceptive use, the number of births attended by skilled practitioners, and child mortality have either stalled or somewhat deteriorated since the mid-2000s. Zimbabwe’s total fertility rate has remained fairly stable at about 4 children per woman for the last two decades, although an uptick in the urban birth rate in recent years has caused a slight rise in the country’s overall fertility rate. Zimbabwe’s HIV prevalence rate dropped from approximately 29% to 15% since 1997 but remains among the world’s highest and continues to suppress the country’s life expectancy rate. The proliferation of HIV/AIDS information and prevention programs and personal experience with those suffering or dying from the disease have helped to change sexual behavior and reduce the epidemic.</p><p>Historically, the vast majority of Zimbabwe’s migration has been internal – a rural-urban flow. In terms of international migration, over the last 40 years Zimbabwe has gradually shifted from being a destination country to one of emigration and, to a lesser degree, one of transit (for East African illegal migrants traveling to South Africa). As a British colony, Zimbabwe attracted significant numbers of permanent immigrants from the UK and other European countries, as well as temporary economic migrants from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. Although Zimbabweans have migrated to South Africa since the beginning of the 20th century to work as miners, the first major exodus from the country occurred in the years before and after independence in 1980. The outward migration was politically and racially influenced; a large share of the white population of European origin chose to leave rather than live under a new black-majority government.</p><p>In the 1990s and 2000s, economic mismanagement and hyperinflation sparked a second, more diverse wave of emigration. This massive out migration – primarily to other southern African countries, the UK, and the US – has created a variety of challenges, including brain drain, illegal migration, and human smuggling and trafficking. Several factors have pushed highly skilled workers to go abroad, including unemployment, lower wages, a lack of resources, and few opportunities for career growth.</p>"
+      "text": "<p>Zimbabwe’s progress in reproductive, maternal, and child health has stagnated in recent years. According to a 2010 Demographic and Health Survey, contraceptive use, the number of births attended by skilled practitioners, and child mortality have either stalled or somewhat deteriorated since the mid-2000s. Zimbabwe’s total fertility rate has remained fairly stable at about 4 children per woman for the last two decades, although an uptick in the urban birth rate in recent years has caused a slight rise in the country’s overall fertility rate. Zimbabwe’s HIV prevalence rate dropped from approximately 29% to 15% since 1997 but remains among the world’s highest and continues to suppress the country’s life expectancy rate. The proliferation of HIV/AIDS information and prevention programs and personal experience with those suffering or dying from the disease have helped to change sexual behavior and reduce the epidemic.</p> <p>Historically, the vast majority of Zimbabwe’s migration has been internal – a rural-urban flow. In terms of international migration, over the last 40 years Zimbabwe has gradually shifted from being a destination country to one of emigration and, to a lesser degree, one of transit (for East African illegal migrants traveling to South Africa). As a British colony, Zimbabwe attracted significant numbers of permanent immigrants from the UK and other European countries, as well as temporary economic migrants from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. Although Zimbabweans have migrated to South Africa since the beginning of the 20th century to work as miners, the first major exodus from the country occurred in the years before and after independence in 1980. The outward migration was politically and racially influenced; a large share of the white population of European origin chose to leave rather than live under a new black-majority government.</p> <p>In the 1990s and 2000s, economic mismanagement and hyperinflation sparked a second, more diverse wave of emigration. This massive outmigration – primarily to other southern African countries, the UK, and the US – has created a variety of challenges, including brain drain, illegal migration, and human smuggling and trafficking. Several factors have pushed highly skilled workers to go abroad, including unemployment, lower wages, a lack of resources, and few opportunities for career growth.</p>"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "7.7% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "3.4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.2 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -1264,7 +1264,7 @@
       "text": "information varies; approximately 30,000 active duty troops, including about 4,000 Air Force personnel (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the ZDF inventory is comprised mostly of Soviet-era and older Chinese equipment; since the early 2000s, Zimbabwe has been under an arms embargo from the European Union, as well as targeted sanctions from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the US (2022)"
+      "text": "the ZDF inventory is comprised mostly of Soviet-era and older Chinese equipment; since the early 2000s, Zimbabwe has been under an arms embargo from the EU, as well as targeted sanctions from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the US (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-22 years of age for voluntary military service (18-24 for officer cadets; 18-30 for technical/specialist personnel); no conscription; women are eligible to serve (2022)"

australia-oceania/as.json

@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "9.9% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "10.7% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "4.13 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "492 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "492 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {
@@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@
         "text": "12,180 (Iran), 8,741 (Afghanistan), 5,042 (Pakistan) (mid-year 2022)"
       },
       "stateless persons": {
-        "text": "5,770 (mid-year 2021)"
+        "text": "7,649 (2022)"
       }
     },
     "Illicit drugs": {

australia-oceania/bp.json

@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "4.8% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "4.4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.19 physicians/1,000 population (2016)"

australia-oceania/cw.json

@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "3.1% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "3.2% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "1.41 physicians/1,000 population (2014)"

australia-oceania/fj.json

@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "3.8% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "3.8% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.86 physicians/1,000 population (2015)"

australia-oceania/fm.json

@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "11.4% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "11.6% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Hospital bed density": {
       "text": "3.2 beds/1,000 population"

australia-oceania/kr.json

@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "10.3% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "11.6% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.2 physicians/1,000 population (2013)"

australia-oceania/ne.json

@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "5.3% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "7.8% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "NA"

australia-oceania/nh.json

@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "3.4% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.17 physicians/1,000 population (2016)"

australia-oceania/nr.json

@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "9.8% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "12% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "1.35 physicians/1,000 population (2015)"
@@ -695,6 +695,11 @@
     "Population below poverty line": {
       "text": "NA"
     },
+    "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income": {
+      "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2012": {
+        "text": "34.8 (2012 est.)"
+      }
+    },
     "Household income or consumption by percentage share": {
       "lowest 10%": {
         "text": "NA"
@@ -1050,7 +1055,7 @@
     },
     "Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
       "stateless persons": {
-        "text": "133 (mid-year 2021)"
+        "text": "140 (2022)"
       }
     }
   }

australia-oceania/nz.json

@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "9.7% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "10% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "3.62 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -1237,7 +1237,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 9,500 active-duty troops (4,700 Army; 2,300 Navy; 2,500 Air Force) (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the NZDF is equipped mostly with imported weapons and equipment from Western suppliers; the US has been the leading provider since 2010 (2022)"
+      "text": "the NZDF is equipped mostly with Western-supplied weapons and equipment with the US as the leading provider (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "17 years of age for men and women for voluntary military service; soldiers cannot be deployed until the age of 18; no conscription (2022)",
@@ -1260,6 +1260,11 @@
     "Disputes - international": {
       "text": "<p><em>New Zealand-Antarctica</em>: asserts a territorial claim in Antarctica (Ross Dependency)</p>"
     },
+    "Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
+      "stateless persons": {
+        "text": "5 (2022)"
+      }
+    },
     "Illicit drugs": {
       "text": "significant consumer of amphetamines"
     }

australia-oceania/ps.json

@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "15.2% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "18.4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "1.77 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"

australia-oceania/rm.json

@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "16.3% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "13% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.42 physicians/1,000 population (2012)"

australia-oceania/tn.json

@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "5% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "5.3% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.95 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -1178,7 +1178,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 650 personnel (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the Tonga military's inventory includes mostly light weapons and equipment from Australia, European (primarily the UK) countries, and the US (2022)"
+      "text": "the Tonga military's inventory includes mostly light weapons and equipment from Australia, European countries (primarily the UK), and the US (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "voluntary military service for men and women 18-25 (16 with parental approval for non-combat positions); no conscription (2022)"

australia-oceania/tv.json

@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "24% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "21.5% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "1.19 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"

australia-oceania/ws.json

@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "6.4% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "5.3% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.6 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"

central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json

@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "4.4% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "5.6% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "2.76 physicians/1,000 population (2017)"
@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "52 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "50 million cubic meters (2019 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {

central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json

@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "6.3% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "7.2% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "2.49 physicians/1,000 population (2017)"
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "80 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "80 million cubic meters (2019 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {

central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json

@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "5.8% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "7.6% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "1.94 physicians/1,000 population (2017)"
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "700 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "700 million cubic meters (2019 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {

central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json

@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "6% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "6.9% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "1.08 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"

central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json

@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "7.3% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "7.9% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "3.3 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@
         "text": "29,906 (Venezuela) (economic and political crisis; includes Venezuelans who have claimed asylum, are recognized as refugees, or received alternative legal stay) (2021)"
       },
       "stateless persons": {
-        "text": "205 (mid-year 2021)"
+        "text": "192 (2022)"
       }
     },
     "Illicit drugs": {

central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json

@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "11.3% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "12.5% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "8.42 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -1247,7 +1247,7 @@
       "text": "limited available information; estimated 50,000 active personnel (approximately 40,000 Army; 3,000 Navy; 8,000 Air Force) (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the Cuban military inventory is comprised of aging Russian and Soviet-era equipment; the last recorded arms delivery to Cuba was by Russia in 2004; in 2019, Russia approved a loan for approximately $43-50 million for Cuba's purchase of spare parts and armored vehicles (2022)"
+      "text": "the military's inventory is comprised of aging Russian and Soviet-era equipment (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "17-28 years of age for compulsory (men) and voluntary (men and women) military service; conscripts serve for two years (2022)"

central-america-n-caribbean/do.json

@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "5.5% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "5.7% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "1.1 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"

central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json

@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "5.9% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "4.9% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "1.45 physicians/1,000 population (2019)"

central-america-n-caribbean/es.json

@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "7.2% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "9.9% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "2.87 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@
       "note": "<strong>note:</strong> in 2021, El Salvador announced intentions to double the size of the military, although no time frame was given"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the FAES is dependent on a mix of mostly older imported platforms, largely from the US; since 2010, the FAES has received small amounts of equipment from several countries, including Chile, Israel, Spain, and the US (2022)"
+      "text": "the FAES is dependent on a mix of mostly older imported platforms, largely from the US; in recent years, the FAES has received small amounts of equipment from several countries, including Chile, Israel, Spain, and the US (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18 years of age for selective compulsory military service; 16-22 years of age for voluntary male or female service; service obligation is 12 months, with 11 months for officers and non-commissioned officers (2022)",

central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json

@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "5% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "5.8% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "1.44 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"

central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json

@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "6.2% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "6.5% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "1.24 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -1276,7 +1276,7 @@
       "text": "information varies; approximately 20,000 active military personnel (18,000 Land Forces; 1,000 Naval Forces; 1,000 Air Forces); approximately 30,000 National Civil Police (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the Guatemalan military inventory is small and mostly comprised of older US equipment; since 2010, Guatemala has received small amounts of equipment from several countries, including the US (2022)"
+      "text": "the military's inventory is small and mostly comprised of older US equipment; in recent years, Guatemala has received small amounts of equipment from several countries, including the US (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 50 are eligible for military service; in practice, most of the force is volunteer, however, a selective draft system is employed, resulting in a small portion of 17-21 year-olds being conscripted; conscript service obligation varies from 1 to 2 years; women may volunteer (2022)",

central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json

@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "4.7% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "3.3% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.23 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"

central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json

@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "7.3% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "9% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.5 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -1257,7 +1257,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 16,000 active personnel (7,500 Army; 1,500 Navy, including about 1,000 marines; 2,000 Air Force; 5,000 Military Police of Public Order); approximately 18,000 National Police (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the FFAA's inventory is comprised of mostly older imported equipment from Israel, the UK, and the US; since 2010, Honduras has received limited amounts of military equipment from several countries, including Colombia, Israel, and the Netherlands (2022)"
+      "text": "the FFAA's inventory is comprised of mostly older imported equipment from Israel, the UK, and the US; in recent years, it has received limited amounts of military equipment from several countries, including Colombia, Israel, and the Netherlands (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18 years of age for voluntary 2- to 3-year military service (men and women); no conscription (2022)",

central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json

@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "6.1% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "6.6% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.53 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"

central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json

@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "8.4% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "8.6% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "1.67 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "164.52 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "164.5 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {
@@ -1227,7 +1227,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 12,000 active personnel (10,000 Army; 800 Navy; 1,200 Air Force) (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the Nicaraguan military's inventory includes mostly second-hand Russian/Soviet-era equipment; since 2010, Russia has been the leading arms supplier to Nicaragua (2022)"
+      "text": "the Nicaraguan military's inventory includes mostly secondhand Russian/Soviet-era equipment; in recent years, Russia has been the leading arms supplier to Nicaragua (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-30 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription; tour of duty 18-36 months; requires Nicaraguan nationality and 6th-grade education (2022)"

central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json

@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "7.6% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "9.7% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "1.63 physicians/1,000 population (2019)"
@@ -832,8 +832,8 @@
       "text": "22.1% (2016 est.)"
     },
     "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income": {
-      "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2018": {
-        "text": "49.2 (2018 est.)"
+      "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2019": {
+        "text": "49.8 (2019 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Household income or consumption by percentage share": {
@@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 20,000 National Police; 4,000 National Border Service; 3,000 National Air-Naval Service (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "Panama's security forces are lightly armed; Canada, Italy and the US have provided equipment to the security forces since 2010 (2022)"
+      "text": "Panama's security forces are lightly armed; Canada, Italy and the US have provided equipment to the security forces in recent years (2022)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
       "text": "<p>the MPS's chief focuses are countering narcotics trafficking and border security; Panama's security forces have long been criticized for being ineffective and corrupt</p> Panama created a paramilitary National Guard (Guardia Nacional de Panamá) in the 1950s from the former National Police (established 1904); the National Guard subsequently evolved into more of a military force with some police responsibilities; it seized power in a coup in 1968 and military officers ran the country until 1989; in 1983, the National Guard was renamed the Panama Defense Force (PDF); the PDF was disbanded after the 1989 US invasion and the current national police forces were formed in 1990; the armed forces were officially abolished under the 1994 Constitution (2022)"

central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json

@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "5.4% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "5.4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "2.77 physicians/1,000 population (2018)"
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@
     },
     "Executive branch": {
       "chief of state": {
-        "text": "King CHARLES III (since 8 September 2022); represented by Governor General Samuel W.T. SEATON (since 2 September 2015); note - SEATON was Acting Governor General from 20 May to 2 September 2015"
+        "text": "King CHARLES III (since 8 September 2022); represented by Governor General Marcella LIBURD (since 4 February 2023)"
       },
       "head of government": {
         "text": "Prime Minister Dr. Terrance DREW (since 6 August 2022); Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Geoffrey HANLEY (since 13 August 2022)"

central-america-n-caribbean/st.json

@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "4.3% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "6.7% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.64 physicians/1,000 population (2017)"

central-america-n-caribbean/td.json

@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "7% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "7.3% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "4.48 physicians/1,000 population (2019)"
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "3.84 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "3.8 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {
@@ -1142,7 +1142,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 4,500 TTDF personnel (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the TTDF's ground force inventory includes only light weapons, while the Coast Guard and Air Guard field mostly second-hand equipment from a mix of countries, including Australia, China, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US (2022)"
+      "text": "the TTDF's ground force inventory includes only light weapons, while the Coast Guard and Air Guard field mostly secondhand equipment from a mix of countries, including Australia, China, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-25 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women (some age variations between services, reserves); no conscription (2022)",

central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json

@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "4.8% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "4.8% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.66 physicians/1,000 population (2012)"

central-asia/kg.json

@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "4.5% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "5.3% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "2.21 physicians/1,000 population (2014)"
@@ -1245,7 +1245,7 @@
     },
     "Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
       "stateless persons": {
-        "text": "16 (mid-year 2021)"
+        "text": "482 (2022)"
       }
     },
     "Illicit drugs": {

central-asia/kz.json

@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "2.8% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "3.8% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "3.98 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -1279,7 +1279,7 @@
       "text": "information varies; approximately 40,000 active duty personnel (25,000 Land Forces; 3,000 Naval Forces; 12,000 Air and Air Defense Forces) (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the Kazakh military's inventory is comprised of mostly older Russian and Soviet-era equipment; since 2010, Russia has been the leading supplier of weapons systems (2022)"
+      "text": "the Kazakh military's inventory is comprised of mostly older Russian and Soviet-era equipment; Russia continues to be the leading supplier of arms (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "all men 18-27 are required to serve in the military for 12-24 months (2022)"
@@ -1294,7 +1294,7 @@
     },
     "Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
       "stateless persons": {
-        "text": "7,915 (mid-year 2021)"
+        "text": "7,558 (2022)"
       }
     },
     "Illicit drugs": {

central-asia/rs.json

@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "5.7% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "7.6% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "3.82 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "4.525 trillion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "4.5 trillion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {
@@ -886,8 +886,8 @@
       "text": "12.6% (2018 est.)"
     },
     "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income": {
-      "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2018": {
-        "text": "37.5 (2018 est.)"
+      "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2020": {
+        "text": "36 (2020 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Household income or consumption by percentage share": {
@@ -1348,7 +1348,7 @@
     },
     "Military deployments": {
       "text": "information varies; approximately 3,000 Armenia; approximately 2,000 Armenia/Azerbaijan (peacekeepers for Nagorno-Karabakh); estimated 3,000-5,000 Belarus; approximately 7,000-10,000 Georgia; approximately 500 Kyrgyzstan; approximately 1,500 Moldova (Transnistria); estimated 2,000-5,000 Syria; approximately 5,000 Tajikistan (2022)",
-      "note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> in February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine with an estimated 150,000 troops; prior to the invasion, it maintained an estimated 30,000 troops in areas of Ukraine occupied since 2014<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Russia was assessed to have about 3,000-5,000 private military contractors conducting military and security operations in Africa, including in the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, and Sudan"
+      "note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> in February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine with an estimated 150,000 troops; prior to the invasion, it maintained an estimated 30,000 troops in areas of Ukraine occupied since 2014<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Russia was assessed to have about 3,000-5,000 private military contractors conducting military and security operations in Africa and the Middle East, including in the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, Sudan, and Syria"
     },
     "Military - note": {
       "text": "as of 2023, Russian military forces continued to conduct active combat operations in Syria; Russia intervened in the Syrian civil war at the request of the ASAD government in September 2015; Russian assistance included air support, special operations forces, military advisors, private military contractors, training, arms, and equipment<br><br>Russia is the leading member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and contributes approximately 8,000 troops to CSTO's rapid reaction force (2023)"

central-asia/ti.json

@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "7.1% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "8.2% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "1.72 physicians/1,000 population (2014)"
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "21.91 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "21.9 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {
@@ -1232,7 +1232,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 9,500 active duty troops (8,000 Land and Mobile Forces; 1,500 Air and Air Defense Forces) (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the military's inventory is comprised of older Russian and Soviet-era equipment; it has received limited quantities of weapons systems since 2010, most of which was second-hand material from Russia (2021)"
+      "text": "the military's inventory is comprised of older Russian and Soviet-era equipment; it has received limited quantities of weapons systems in recent years, most of which was secondhand material from Russia (2021)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-27 years of age for compulsory or voluntary military service for men; women may volunteer; 24-month conscript service obligation; in August 2021, the Tajik Government began allowing men to pay a fee in order to avoid conscription (2022)"
@@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@
         "text": "6,775 (Afghanistan) (mid-year 2021)"
       },
       "stateless persons": {
-        "text": "6,141 (mid-year 2021)"
+        "text": "4,898 (2022)"
       }
     },
     "Illicit drugs": {

central-asia/tx.json

@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "6.6% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "5.7% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "2.23 physicians/1,000 population (2014)"
@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "24.765 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "24.8 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {
@@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@
       "text": "information varies; estimated 30,000 active duty troops (25,000 National Army; 1,000 Navy; 4,000 Air and Air Defense Forces) (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the inventory for Turkmenistan's military is comprised largely of older Russian and Soviet-era weapons systems; since 2010, however, it has attempted to diversify and purchased equipment from more than a dozen countries, with Turkey as the top supplier (2022)"
+      "text": "the inventory for Turkmenistan's military is comprised largely of older Russian and Soviet-era weapons systems; in recent years however, it has attempted to diversify and purchased equipment from more than a dozen countries, with Turkey as the top supplier (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-30 years of age for compulsory male military service; 24-month conscript service obligation (30 months for the Navy); 20 years of age for voluntary service (including females); males may enroll in military schools from age 15 (2022)"
@@ -1236,7 +1236,7 @@
     },
     "Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
       "stateless persons": {
-        "text": "4,107 (mid-year 2021)"
+        "text": "4,463 (2022)"
       }
     },
     "Trafficking in persons": {

central-asia/uz.json

@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "5.6% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "6.8% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "2.37 physicians/1,000 population (2014)"
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Total renewable water resources": {
-      "text": "48.87 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
+      "text": "48.9 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
     }
   },
   "Government": {
@@ -1232,7 +1232,7 @@
       "text": "information varies; approximately 60,000 active duty troops, including 10-15,000 Air Force (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the Uzbek Armed Forces use mainly Soviet-era equipment; since 2010, Russia has been the leading supplier of arms, followed by China (2022)"
+      "text": "the Uzbek Armed Forces use mainly Soviet-era equipment; in recent years, Russia has been the leading supplier of arms, followed by China (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-27 years of age for compulsory military service; 12-month conscript service obligation for men (those conscripted have the option of paying for a shorter service of 1 month while remaining in the reserves until the age of 27); Uzbek citizens who have completed their service terms in the armed forces have privileges in employment and admission to higher educational institutions (2022)"
@@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@
         "text": "13,031 (Afghanistan) (mid-year 2022)"
       },
       "stateless persons": {
-        "text": "59,136 (mid-year 2021)"
+        "text": "31,829 (2022)"
       }
     },
     "Illicit drugs": {

east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json

@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "4.7% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "3.7% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.74 physicians/1,000 population (2019)"
@@ -635,14 +635,14 @@
       "state counsellor": {
         "text": "State Counselor AUNG SAN SUU KYI (since 6 April 2016); note - under arrest since 1 February 2021 (has been sentenced to more than 30 years in prison as of late 2022); formerly served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister for the Office of the President"
       },
-      "note": "<strong>note:</strong> a parliamentary bill creating the position of \"state counsellor\" was signed into law by former President HTIN KYAW on 6 April 2016; a state counsellor serves the equivalent term of the president and is similar to a prime minister in that the holder acts as a link between the parliament and the executive branch"
+      "note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> a parliamentary bill creating the position of \"state counsellor\" was signed into law by former President HTIN KYAW on 6 April 2016; a state counsellor serves the equivalent term of the president and is similar to a prime minister in that the holder acts as a link between the parliament and the executive branch<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> in January 2023, the junta announced a 6-month extension on the state of emergency in place since 2021, a move that would likely delay elections that it had pledged to hold by August 2023"
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
         "text": "bicameral Assembly of the Union or Pyidaungsu consists of:<br>House of Nationalities or Amyotha Hluttaw, (224 seats; 168 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by absolute majority vote with a second round if needed and 56 appointed by the military; members serve 5-year terms)<br>House of Representatives or Pyithu Hluttaw, (440 seats, currently 433; 330 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 110 appointed by the military; members serve 5-year terms); note - on 1 February 2021, the military dissolved the Assembly of the Union; the State Administration Council (SAC) governs in place of the Assembly of the Union"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "House of Nationalities - last held on 8 November 2020 (next to be held in 2025)<br>House of Representatives - last held on 8 November 2020 (next to be held in 2025); note - the military junta overturned the results of the 8 November legislative elections"
+        "text": "House of Nationalities - last held on 8 November 2020 <br>House of Representatives - last held on 8 November 2020; note - the military junta overturned the results of the 8 November legislative elections"
       },
       "election results": {
         "text": "House of Nationalities - percent of vote by party - NLD 61.6%, USDP 3.1%, ANP 1.8%, MUP 1.3%, KySDP 1.3%, other 5.9%, military appointees 25%; seats by party - NLD 138, USDP 7, ANP 4, MUP 3, KySPD 3, SNLD 2, TNP 2, other 2, canceled due to insurgency 7, military appointees 56 <br><br>House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - NLD 58.6%, USDP 5.9%, SNLD 3.0%, other 7.5%, military 25%; seats by party - NLD 258, USDP 26, SNLD 13, ANP 4, PNO 3, TNP 3, MUP 2, KySPD 2, other 4, canceled due to insurgency 15, military appointees 110"
@@ -660,7 +660,8 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Arakan National Party or ANP [THAR TUN HLA]<br>Democratic Party or DP [U THU WAI]<br>Kayah State Democratic Party or KySDP <br>Kayin People's Party or KPP [TUN AUNG MYINT]<br>Kokang Democracy and Unity Party or KDUP [LUO XINGGUANG]<br>La Hu National Development Party or LHNDP [KYA HAR SHAL]<br>Lisu National Development Party or LNDP [U ARKI DAW]<br>Mon Unity Party (formed in 2019 from the All Mon Region Democracy Party and Mon National Party)<br>National Democratic Force or NDF [KHIN MAUNG SWE]<br>National League for Democracy or NLD [AUNG SAN SUU KYI]<br>National Unity Party or NUP [U HAN SHWE]<br>Pa-O National Organization or PNO [AUNG KHAM HTI]<br>People's Party [KO KO GYI]<br>Shan Nationalities Democratic Party or SNDP [SAI AI PAO]<br>Shan Nationalities League for Democracy or SNLD <br>Ta'ang National Party or TNP [AIK MONE]<br>Tai-Leng Nationalities Development Party or TNDP [ U SAI HTAY AUNG]<br>Union Solidarity and Development Party or USDP [THAN HTAY]<br>Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State or UDPKS [U KHAT HTEIN NAN]<br>Wa Democratic Party or WDP [KHUN HTUN LU]<br>Wa National Unity Party or WNUP [NYI PALOTE]<br>Zomi Congress for Democracy or ZCD [PU CIN SIAN THANG]<br>numerous smaller parties"
+      "text": "Arakan National Party or ANP [THAR TUN HLA]<br>Democratic Party or DP [U THU WAI]<br>Kayah State Democratic Party or KySDP <br>Kayin People's Party or KPP [TUN AUNG MYINT]<br>Kokang Democracy and Unity Party or KDUP [LUO XINGGUANG]<br>La Hu National Development Party or LHNDP [KYA HAR SHAL]<br>Lisu National Development Party or LNDP [U ARKI DAW]<br>Mon Unity Party (formed in 2019 from the All Mon Region Democracy Party and Mon National Party)<br>National Democratic Force or NDF [KHIN MAUNG SWE]<br>National League for Democracy or NLD [AUNG SAN SUU KYI]<br>National Unity Party or NUP [U HAN SHWE]<br>Pa-O National Organization or PNO [AUNG KHAM HTI]<br>People's Party [KO KO GYI]<br>Shan Nationalities Democratic Party or SNDP [SAI AI PAO]<br>Shan Nationalities League for Democracy or SNLD <br>Ta'ang National Party or TNP [AIK MONE]<br>Tai-Leng Nationalities Development Party or TNDP [ U SAI HTAY AUNG]<br>Union Solidarity and Development Party or USDP [THAN HTAY]<br>Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State or UDPKS [U KHAT HTEIN NAN]<br>Wa Democratic Party or WDP [KHUN HTUN LU]<br>Wa National Unity Party or WNUP [NYI PALOTE]<br>Zomi Congress for Democracy or ZCD [PU CIN SIAN THANG]<br>numerous smaller parties",
+      "note": "<strong>note: </strong>the military junta in January 2023 announced a new law that restricts the ability of political parties to participate in elections, including: 1) barring parties and candidates deemed to have links to individuals or organizations alleged to have committed terrorism or other unlawful acts; 2) stipulating that political parties that want to contest the national election would also need to secure at least 100,000 members within 90 days of registration and have funds of 100 million Myanmar kyat ($45,500), 100 times more than previously required, which would need to be deposited with a state-owned bank; 3) requiring that any existing party must apply for registration within 60 days of the legislation being announced or be invalidated; parties can also be suspended for 3 years, and ultimately dissolved, for failing to comply with the provisions of the new law; 4) not allowing parties to lodge an appeal against election commission decisions on registration"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ADB, ARF, ASEAN, BIMSTEC, CP, EAS, EITI (candidate country), FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITU, ITUC (NGOs), NAM, OPCW (signatory), SAARC (observer), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -1301,13 +1302,13 @@
       "text": "estimates vary widely, from approximately 300,000 to as many as 400,000 active duty personnel (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the Burmese military inventory is comprised mostly of older Chinese and Russian/Soviet-era equipment with a smaller mix of more modern acquisitions; since 2010, China and Russia have been the leading suppliers of military hardware; Burma has a limited defense industry, including a growing shipbuilding capability and some production of ground force equipment that is largely based on Chinese and Russian designs (2022)"
+      "text": "the Burmese military inventory is comprised mostly of older Chinese and Russian/Soviet-era equipment with a smaller mix of more modern acquisitions; in recent years, China and Russia have been the leading suppliers of military hardware; Burma has a limited defense industry, including a growing shipbuilding capability and some production of ground force equipment that is largely based on Chinese and Russian designs (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-35 years of age (men) and 18-27 years of age (women) for voluntary military service; no conscription (a 2010 law reintroducing conscription has not yet entered into force); 2-year service obligation; male (ages 18-45) and female (ages 18-35) professionals (including doctors, engineers, mechanics) serve up to 3 years; service terms may be stretched to 5 years in an officially declared emergency (2021)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "since the country's founding, the armed forces have been heavily involved in domestic politics, running the country for five decades following a military coup in 1962; prior to the 2021 coup, the military already controlled three key security ministries (Defense, Border, and Home Affairs), one of two vice presidential appointments, 25% of the parliamentary seats, and had a proxy political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)<br><br>as of 2022, the military owned and operated two business conglomerates that had over 100 subsidiaries and close ties to other companies; the business activities of these conglomerates included banking and insurance, hotels, tourism, jade and ruby mining, timber, construction, real estate, and the production of palm oil, sugar, soap, cement, beverages, drinking water, coal, and gas; some of the companies supplied goods and services to the military, such as food, clothing, insurance, and cellphone service; the military also managed a film industry, publishing houses, and television stations<br><br>as of 2022, the military's primary operational focus was internal security, particularly attempts to quell a growing armed insurgency against the 2021 coup and operations against ethnic-based separatist groups; these operations have resulted in numerous civilian casualties, human rights abuses, and internal displacement--ethnic-based armed groups have been fighting for self-rule against the Burmese Government since the country’s 1948 independence; as of 2022, there were approximately 20 such groups operating in Burma with strengths of a few hundred up to more than 20,000 estimated fighters; some were organized along military lines with \"brigades\" and \"divisions\" and armed with heavy weaponry, including artillery; they reportedly controlled an estimated one-third of the country’s territory, primarily in the border regions; key groups included the United Wa State Army, Karen National Union, Kachin Independence Army, Arakan Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army<br><br>as of 2022, Burma also had a large number of other armed militias which took many different forms and varied in allegiances and size; most were pro-military junta and associated with the Burmese military (Tatmadaw); some were integrated within the Tatmadaw’s command structure as Border Guard Forces (BGF); the BGF were organized as 325-man battalions, which included a mix of militia forces, ethnic armed groups, and government soldiers; they were armed, supplied, and paid by the Tatmadaw; other pro-military government militias were not integrated within the Tatmadaw command structure but received direction from the military and were recognized as government militias; the amount of support they received from the Tatmadaw varied depending on local security conditions; the third type of pro-government militias were small community-based units that were armed, coordinated, and trained by local Tatmadaw forces and activated as needed; as of 2022, the military junta government was raising new militia units to help combat the popular uprising<br><br>in mid-2022, the rebel National Unity Government claimed its armed wing, the People's Defense Force (PDF), had more than 60,000 fighters organized into battalions; in addition, several armed ethnic groups have added their support to anti-junta resistance groups or joined forces with local units of the PDF (2022)"
+      "text": "since the country's founding, the armed forces have been heavily involved in domestic politics, running the country for five decades following a military coup in 1962; prior to the 2021 coup, the military already controlled three key security ministries (Defense, Border, and Home Affairs), one of two vice presidential appointments, 25% of the parliamentary seats, and had a proxy political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)<br><br>the military owns and operates two business conglomerates that have over 100 subsidiaries and close ties to other companies; the business activities of these conglomerates include banking and insurance, hotels, tourism, jade and ruby mining, timber, construction, real estate, and the production of palm oil, sugar, soap, cement, beverages, drinking water, coal, and gas; some of the companies supply goods and services to the military, such as food, clothing, insurance, and cellphone service; the military also managed a film industry, publishing houses, and television stations<br><br>the military's primary operational focus is internal security, particularly attempts to quell a growing armed insurgency against the 2021 coup and operations against ethnic-based separatist groups; these operations have resulted in numerous civilian casualties, human rights abuses, and internal displacement--ethnic-based armed groups have been fighting for self-rule against the Burmese Government since the country’s 1948 independence; as of 2022, there were approximately 20 such groups operating in Burma with strengths of a few hundred up to more than 20,000 estimated fighters; some were organized along military lines with \"brigades\" and \"divisions\" and armed with heavy weaponry, including artillery; they reportedly controlled an estimated one-third of the country’s territory, primarily in the border regions; key groups included the United Wa State Army, Karen National Union, Kachin Independence Army, Arakan Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army<br><br>Burma also has a large number of other armed militias which take many different forms and varied in allegiances and size; most are pro-military junta and associated with the Burmese military (Tatmadaw); some are integrated within the Tatmadaw’s command structure as Border Guard Forces (BGF); the BGF are organized as 325-man battalions, which include a mix of militia forces, ethnic armed groups, and government soldiers; they are armed, supplied, and paid by the Tatmadaw; other pro-military government militias are not integrated within the Tatmadaw command structure but receive direction from the military and are recognized as government militias; the amount of Tatmadaw support they receive varies depending on local security conditions; the third type of pro-government militias are small community-based units that are armed, coordinated, and trained by local Tatmadaw forces and activated as needed; as of 2022, the military junta government was raising new militia units to help combat the popular uprising<br><br>in mid-2022, the rebel National Unity Government claimed its armed wing, the People's Defense Force (PDF), had more than 60,000 fighters organized into battalions; in addition, several armed ethnic groups have added their support to anti-junta resistance groups or joined forces with local units of the PDF (2022)"
     }
   },
   "Transnational Issues": {
@@ -1319,7 +1320,7 @@
         "text": "671,011 (government offensives against armed ethnic minority groups near its borders with China and Thailand, natural disasters, forced land evictions) (2021)"
       },
       "stateless persons": {
-        "text": "600,000 (mid-year 2021); note - Rohingya Muslims, living predominantly in Rakhine State, are Burma's main group of stateless people; the Burmese Government does not recognize the Rohingya as a \"national race\" and stripped them of their citizenship under the 1982 Citizenship Law, categorizing them as \"non-nationals\" or \"foreign residents;\" under the Rakhine State Action Plan drafted in October 2014, the Rohingya must demonstrate their family has lived in Burma for at least 60 years to qualify for a lesser naturalized citizenship and the classification of Bengali or be put in detention camps and face deportation; native-born but non-indigenous people, such as Indians, are also stateless; the Burmese Government does not grant citizenship to children born outside of the country to Burmese parents who left the country illegally or fled persecution, such as those born in Thailand; the number of stateless persons has decreased dramatically because hundreds of thousands of Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh since 25 August 2017 to escape violence"
+        "text": "600,000 (2022); note - Rohingya Muslims, living predominantly in Rakhine State, are Burma's main group of stateless people; the Burmese Government does not recognize the Rohingya as a \"national race\" and stripped them of their citizenship under the 1982 Citizenship Law, categorizing them as \"non-nationals\" or \"foreign residents;\" under the Rakhine State Action Plan drafted in October 2014, the Rohingya must demonstrate their family has lived in Burma for at least 60 years to qualify for a lesser naturalized citizenship and the classification of Bengali or be put in detention camps and face deportation; native-born but non-indigenous people, such as Indians, are also stateless; the Burmese Government does not grant citizenship to children born outside of the country to Burmese parents who left the country illegally or fled persecution, such as those born in Thailand; the number of stateless persons has decreased dramatically because hundreds of thousands of Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh since 25 August 2017 to escape violence"
       }
     },
     "Trafficking in persons": {

east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json

@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "2.2% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "2.4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "1.61 physicians/1,000 population (2017)"
@@ -1180,7 +1180,7 @@
     },
     "Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
       "stateless persons": {
-        "text": "20,863 (mid-year 2021); note - thousands of stateless persons, often ethnic Chinese, are permanent residents and their families have lived in Brunei for generations; obtaining citizenship is difficult and requires individuals to pass rigorous tests on Malay culture, customs, and language; stateless residents receive an International Certificate of Identity, which enables them to travel overseas; the government is considering changing the law prohibiting non-Bruneians, including stateless permanent residents, from owning land"
+        "text": "20,863 (2022); note - thousands of stateless persons, often ethnic Chinese, are permanent residents and their families have lived in Brunei for generations; obtaining citizenship is difficult and requires individuals to pass rigorous tests on Malay culture, customs, and language; stateless residents receive an International Certificate of Identity, which enables them to travel overseas; the government is considering changing the law prohibiting non-Bruneians, including stateless permanent residents, from owning land"
       }
     },
     "Trafficking in persons": {

east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "<p>Most Cambodians consider themselves to be Khmers, descendants of the Angkor Empire that extended over much of Southeast Asia and reached its zenith between the 10th and 13th centuries. Attacks by the Thai and Cham (from present-day Vietnam) weakened the empire, ushering in a long period of decline. The king placed the country under French protection in 1863, and it became part of French Indochina in 1887. Following Japanese occupation in World War II, Cambodia gained full independence from France in 1953. In April 1975, after a seven-year struggle, communist Khmer Rouge forces captured Phnom Penh and evacuated all cities and towns. At least 1.5 million Cambodians died from execution, forced hardships, or starvation during the Khmer Rouge regime under POL POT. A December 1978 Vietnamese invasion drove the Khmer Rouge into the countryside, began a 10-year Vietnamese occupation, and touched off 20 years of civil war.</p> The 1991 Paris Peace Accords mandated democratic elections and a cease-fire, which was not fully respected by the Khmer Rouge. UN-sponsored elections in 1993 helped restore some semblance of normalcy under a coalition government. Factional fighting in 1997 ended the first coalition government, but a second round of national elections in 1998 led to the formation of another coalition government and renewed political stability. The remaining elements of the Khmer Rouge surrendered in early 1999. Some of the surviving Khmer Rouge leaders were tried for crimes against humanity by a hybrid UN-Cambodian tribunal supported by international assistance. In 2018, the tribunal heard its final cases, but it remains in operation to hear appeals. Elections in July 2003 were relatively peaceful, but it took one year of negotiations between contending political parties before a coalition government was formed. In October 2004, King Norodom SIHANOUK abdicated the throne and his son, Prince Norodom SIHAMONI, was selected to succeed him. Local (Commune Council) elections were held in Cambodia in 2012, with little of the violence that preceded prior elections. National elections in July 2013 were disputed, with the opposition - the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) - boycotting the National Assembly. The political impasse was ended nearly a year later, with the CNRP agreeing to enter parliament in exchange for commitments by the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) to undertake electoral and legislative reforms. The CNRP made further gains in local commune elections in June 2017, accelerating sitting Prime Minister HUN SEN’s efforts to marginalize the CNRP before national elections in 2018. HUN SEN arrested CNRP President KEM SOKHA in September 2017. The Supreme Court dissolved the CNRP in November 2017 and banned its leaders from participating in politics for at least five years. The CNRP’s seats in the National Assembly were redistributed to smaller, less influential opposition parties, while all of the CNRP’s 5,007 seats in the commune councils throughout the country were reallocated to the CPP. With the CNRP banned, the CPP swept the 2018 national elections, winning all 125 National Assembly seats and effectively turning the country into a one-party state.<br><br>Cambodia has strong and growing economic and political ties with its large neighbor to the north, China. More than 53% of foreign investment in the country in 2021 came from China, and Beijing has provided over $15 billion in financial assistance since the 1990s. China accounted for 443 percent of Cambodia’s foreign debt in 2021. The CPP also partly sees Chinese support as a counterbalance to Thailand and Vietnam and to international criticism of the CPP’s human rights and antidemocratic record."
+      "text": "<p>Most Cambodians consider themselves to be Khmers, descendants of the Angkor Empire that extended over much of Southeast Asia and reached its zenith between the 10th and 13th centuries. Attacks by the Thai and Cham (from present-day Vietnam) weakened the empire, ushering in a long period of decline. The king placed the country under French protection in 1863, and it became part of French Indochina in 1887. Following the Japanese occupation in World War II, Cambodia gained full independence from France in 1953. In April 1975, after a seven-year struggle, communist Khmer Rouge forces captured Phnom Penh and evacuated all cities and towns. At least 1.5 million Cambodians died from execution, forced hardships, or starvation during the Khmer Rouge regime under POL POT. A December 1978 Vietnamese invasion drove the Khmer Rouge into the countryside, began a 10-year Vietnamese occupation, and touched off 20 years of civil war.</p> The 1991 Paris Peace Accords mandated democratic elections and a cease-fire, which was not fully respected by the Khmer Rouge. UN-sponsored elections in 1993 helped restore some semblance of normalcy under a coalition government. Factional fighting in 1997 ended the first coalition government, but a second round of national elections in 1998 led to the formation of another coalition government and renewed political stability. The remaining elements of the Khmer Rouge surrendered in early 1999. Some of the surviving Khmer Rouge leaders were tried for crimes against humanity by a hybrid UN-Cambodian tribunal supported by international assistance. In 2018, the tribunal heard its final cases, but it remains in operation to hear appeals. Elections in July 2003 were relatively peaceful, but it took one year of negotiations between contending political parties before a coalition government was formed. In October 2004, King Norodom SIHANOUK abdicated the throne and his son, Prince Norodom SIHAMONI, was selected to succeed him. Local (Commune Council) elections were held in Cambodia in 2012, with little of the violence that preceded prior elections. National elections in July 2013 were disputed, with the opposition - the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) - boycotting the National Assembly. The political impasse was ended nearly a year later, with the CNRP agreeing to enter parliament in exchange for commitments by the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) to undertake electoral and legislative reforms. The CNRP made further gains in local commune elections in June 2017, accelerating sitting Prime Minister HUN SEN’s efforts to marginalize the CNRP before national elections in 2018. HUN SEN arrested CNRP President KEM SOKHA in September 2017. The Supreme Court dissolved the CNRP in November 2017 and banned its leaders from participating in politics for at least five years. The CNRP’s seats in the National Assembly were redistributed to smaller, less influential opposition parties, while all of the CNRP’s 5,007 seats in the commune councils throughout the country were reallocated to the CPP. With the CNRP banned, the CPP swept the 2018 national elections, winning all 125 National Assembly seats and effectively turning the country into a one-party state.<br><br>Cambodia has strong and growing economic and political ties with its large neighbor to the north, China. More than 53% of foreign investment in the country in 2021 came from China, and Beijing has provided over $15 billion in financial assistance since the 1990s. China accounted for 443 percent of Cambodia’s foreign debt in 2021. The CPP also partly sees Chinese support as a counterbalance to Thailand and Vietnam and to international criticism of the CPP’s human rights and antidemocratic record."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "7% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "7.5% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.19 physicians/1,000 population (2014)"
@@ -625,8 +625,8 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Candlelight Party or CP (the latest incarnation of the Sam <u>Rainsy</u> Party or SRP and the former Human Rights Party or HRP, which joined to form the Cambodia National Rescue Party or CNRP in 2012; the CNRP was dissolved in 2017)<br>Cambodian People's Party or CPP [HUN SEN]<br>Khmer Will Party [KONG MONIKA]<br>Khmer National Unity Party or KNUP (an offshoot of FUNCINPEC) [NHEK BUN CHHAY]<br>League for Democracy Party or LDP [KHEM Veasna]<br>National United Front for Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia or FUNCINPEC [Prince NORODOM CHAKRAVUTH]<br><br>note - other minor parties that registered for the 2022 commune-level elections included: Cambodia National Love Party, Cambodia Nationality Party, Cambodian Youth Party, Cambodia Reform Party, Kampucheaniyum Party, Grassroots Democratic Party, Khmer United Party, Beehive Social Democratic Party, Cambodia Indigenous People's Democracy Party, Ekpheap Cheat Khmer Party, Reaksmey Khemara Party, Khmer Economic Development Party (2022)",
-      "note": "<strong>note:</strong> following the 2017 commune election, the CPP-led government arrested the CNRP president Kem SOKHA for treason, dissolved the party on similar grounds, and forced most of its senior leadership into exile, where the party’s former president, Sam RAINSY, had been living since late 2015; as of March 2022, a total of 17 political parties had registered to run in the June 2022 commune-level elections, and opposition parties, particularly the Candlelight Party, continued to report, intimidation, harassment, and arrests by the Cambodian Government"
+      "text": "Candlelight Party or CP (the latest incarnation of the Sam <u>Rainsy</u> Party or SRP and the former Human Rights Party or HRP, which joined to form the Cambodia National Rescue Party or CNRP in 2012; the CNRP was dissolved in 2017)<br>Cambodian People's Party or CPP [HUN SEN]<br>Khmer Will Party [KONG MONIKA]<br>Khmer National Unity Party or KNUP (an offshoot of FUNCINPEC) [NHEK BUN CHHAY]<br>League for Democracy Party or LDP [KHEM Veasna]<br>National United Front for Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia or FUNCINPEC [Prince NORODOM CHAKRAVUTH]<br><br>note - other minor parties that registered for the 2022 commune-level elections included: Cambodia National Love Party, Cambodia Nationality Party, Cambodian Youth Party, Cambodia Reform Party, Kampucheaniyum Party, Grassroots Democratic Party, Khmer United Party, Beehive Social Democratic Party, Cambodia Indigenous People's Democracy Party, Ekpheap Cheat Khmer Party, Reaksmey Khemara Party, Khmer Economic Development Party",
+      "note": "<strong>note:</strong> following the 2017 commune election, the CPP-led government arrested the CNRP president Kem SOKHA for treason, dissolved the party on similar grounds, and forced most of its senior leadership into exile, where the party’s former president, Sam RAINSY, had been living since late 2015; as of 2022, opposition parties, particularly the Candlelight Party, continue to report, intimidation, harassment, and arrests by the Cambodian Government"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ADB, ARF, ASEAN, CICA, EAS, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITU, MINUSMA, MIGA, NAM, OIF, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNISFA, UNMISS, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -1265,7 +1265,7 @@
       "text": "information varies; approximately 100,000 total active troops including less than 5,000 Navy and Air Force personnel; approximately 10,000 Gendarmerie (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the RCAF is armed largely with older Chinese and Russian-origin equipment; since 2010, it has received limited amounts of more modern equipment from a variety of suppliers, particularly China (2022)",
+      "text": "the RCAF is armed largely with older Chinese and Russian-origin equipment; in recent years it has received limited amounts of more modern equipment from a variety of suppliers, particularly China (2022)",
       "note": "<strong>note: </strong>in December 2021, the US Government halted arms-related trade with Cambodia, citing deepening Chinese military influence, corruption, and human rights abuses by the government and armed forces; the policy of denial applied to licenses or other approvals for exports and imports of defense articles and defense services destined for or originating in Cambodia, with exceptions (on a case-by-case basis) related to conventional weapons destruction and humanitarian demining activities"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@
     },
     "Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
       "stateless persons": {
-        "text": "57,444 (mid-year 2021)"
+        "text": "75,000 (2022)"
       }
     },
     "Trafficking in persons": {

east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json

@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "5.4% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "5.6% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "2.23 physicians/1,000 population (2019)"
@@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 2 million active-duty troops (approximately 1 million Ground; 250,000 Navy/Marines; 350-400,000 Air Force; 120,000 Rocket Forces; 150-175,000 Strategic Support Forces); estimated 600-650,000 People’s Armed Police (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the PLA is outfitted primarily with a wide mix of older and modern domestically-produced systems heavily influenced by technology derived from other countries; Russia has been the top supplier of foreign military equipment since 2010; China has a large defense-industrial sector capable of producing advanced weapons systems across all military domains (2022)",
+      "text": "the PLA is outfitted primarily with a wide mix of older and modern domestically produced systems heavily influenced by technology derived from other countries; Russia has been the top supplier of foreign military equipment in recent years; China has a large defense-industrial sector capable of producing advanced weapons systems across all military domains (2022)",
       "note": "<strong>note:</strong> the PLA is in the midst of a decades-long modernization effort; in 2017, President XI set three developmental goals for the force - becoming a mechanized force with increased information and strategic capabilities by 2020, a fully modernized force by 2035, and a world-class military by mid-century"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {

east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json

@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@
     },
     "Diplomatic representation from the US": {
       "chief of mission": {
-        "text": "Consul General Hanscom SMITH (since July 2019); note - also accredited to Macau"
+        "text": "Consul General Gregory MAY (since September 2022); note - also accredited to Macau"
       },
       "embassy": {
         "text": "26 Garden Road, Central, Hong Kong"

east-n-southeast-asia/id.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "The archipelago was once largely under the control of Buddhist and Hindu rulers. By around the 7th century, a Buddhist kingdom arose on Sumatra and expanded into Java and the Malay Peninsula until it was conquered in the late 13th century by the Hindu Majapahit Empire from Java. Majapahit (1290-1527) united most of modern-day Indonesia and Malaysia. Traders introduced Islam in the trade ports around the 11th century, and Indonesians gradually adopted Islam over the next 500 years. The Portuguese conquered parts of Indonesia in the 16th century, but they were ousted by the Dutch (except in East Timor), who began colonizing the islands in the early 17th century. It would be the early 20th century before Dutch colonial rule was established across the entirety of what would become the boundaries of the modern Indonesian state.<br><br>Japan occupied the islands from 1942 to 1945. Indonesia declared its independence shortly before Japan's surrender, but it required four years of sometimes brutal fighting, intermittent negotiations, and UN mediation before the Netherlands agreed to transfer sovereignty in 1949. A period of sometimes unruly parliamentary democracy ended in 1957 when President SOEKARNO declared martial law and instituted \"Guided Democracy.\" After an abortive coup in 1965 by alleged communist sympathizers, SOEKARNO was gradually eased from power. From 1967 until 1998, President SUHARTO ruled Indonesia with his \"New Order\" government. After street protests toppled SUHARTO in 1998, free and fair legislative elections took place in 1999. Indonesia is now the world's third most populous democracy, the world's largest archipelagic state, and the world's largest Muslim-majority nation. Current issues include: alleviating poverty, improving education, preventing terrorism, consolidating democracy after four decades of authoritarianism, implementing economic and financial reforms, stemming corruption, reforming the criminal justice system, addressing climate change, and controlling infectious diseases, particularly those of global and regional importance. In 2005, Indonesia reached a historic peace agreement with armed separatists in Aceh. Indonesia continues to face low intensity armed resistance in Papua by the separatist Free Papua Movement."
+      "text": "The archipelago was once largely under the control of Buddhist and Hindu rulers. By around the 7th century, a Buddhist kingdom arose on Sumatra and expanded into Java and the Malay Peninsula until it was conquered in the late 13th century by the Hindu Majapahit Empire from Java. Majapahit (1290-1527) united most of modern-day Indonesia and Malaysia. Traders introduced Islam in the trade ports around the 11th century, and Indonesians gradually adopted Islam over the next 500 years. The Portuguese conquered parts of Indonesia in the 16th century, but they were ousted by the Dutch (except in East Timor), who began colonizing the islands in the early 17th century. It would be the early 20th century before Dutch colonial rule was established across the entirety of what would become the boundaries of the modern Indonesian state.<br><br>Japan occupied the islands from 1942 to 1945. Indonesia declared its independence shortly before Japan's surrender, but it required four years of sometimes brutal fighting, intermittent negotiations, and UN mediation before the Netherlands agreed to transfer sovereignty in 1949. A period of sometimes unruly parliamentary democracy ended in 1957 when President SOEKARNO declared martial law and instituted \"Guided Democracy.\" After an abortive coup in 1965 by alleged communist sympathizers, SOEKARNO was gradually eased from power. From 1967 until 1998, President SUHARTO ruled Indonesia with his \"New Order\" government. After street protests toppled SUHARTO in 1998, free and fair legislative elections took place in 1999. Indonesia is now the world's third most populous democracy, the world's largest archipelagic state, and the world's largest Muslim-majority nation. <br><br>Indonesia faces a number of issues, including alleviating poverty, improving education, preventing terrorism, consolidating democracy after four decades of authoritarianism, implementing economic and financial reforms, stemming corruption, reforming the criminal justice system, addressing climate change, and controlling infectious diseases, particularly those of global and regional importance. In 2005, Indonesia reached a historic peace agreement with armed separatists in Aceh. Indonesia continues to face low intensity armed resistance in Papua by the separatist Free Papua Movement."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Current health expenditure": {
-      "text": "2.9% of GDP (2019)"
+      "text": "3.4% of GDP (2020)"
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "0.62 physicians/1,000 population (2020)"
@@ -630,13 +630,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral People's Consultative Assembly or Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) consists of:<br>Regional Representative Council or Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (136 seats; non-partisan members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies - 4 each from the country's 34 electoral districts - by proportional representation vote to serve 5-year terms); note - the Regional Representative Council has no legislative authority<br>House of Representatives or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) (575 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by single non-transferable vote to serve 5-year terms) (2019)"
+        "text": "bicameral People's Consultative Assembly or Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) consists of:<br>Regional Representative Council or Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (136 seats; non-partisan members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies - 4 each from the country's 34 electoral districts - by proportional representation vote to serve 5-year terms); note - the Regional Representative Council has no legislative authority<br>House of Representatives or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) (575 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by single non-transferable vote to serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Regional Representative Council - last held on 17 April 2019 (next to be held 2024)<br>House of Representatives - last held on 17 April 2019 (next to be held 2024) (2019)"
+        "text": "Regional Representative Council - last held on 17 April 2019 (next to be held 2024)<br>House of Representatives - last held on 17 April 2019 (next to be held 2024)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Regional Representative Council - all seats elected on a non-partisan basis; composition - men 102, women 34, percent of women 25%<br>House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - PDI-P 19.3%, Gerindra 12.6%, Golkar 12.3%,  PKB 9.7%, Nasdem 9.1%, PKS 8.2%, PD 7.8%, PAN 6.8%, PPP 4.5%, other 9.6%; seats by party - PDI-P 128, Golkar 85, Gerindra 78, Nasdem 59, PKB 58, PD 54, PKS 50, PAN 44, PPP 19; composition - men 449, women 126, percent of women 21.9%; total People's Consultative Assembly percent of women 22.5% (2019)"
+        "text": "Regional Representative Council - all seats elected on a non-partisan basis; composition - men 102, women 34, percent of women 25%<br>House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - PDI-P 19.3%, Gerindra 12.6%, Golkar 12.3%,  PKB 9.7%, Nasdem 9.1%, PKS 8.2%, PD 7.8%, PAN 6.8%, PPP 4.5%, other 9.6%; seats by party - PDI-P 128, Golkar 85, Gerindra 78, Nasdem 59, PKB 58, PD 54, PKS 50, PAN 44, PPP 19; composition - men 449, women 126, percent of women 21.9%; total People's Consultative Assembly percent of women 22.5%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@
       "text": "approximately 400,000 active duty troops (300,000 Army; 60,000 Navy, including about 20,000 marines; 30,000 Air Force) (2022)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
-      "text": "the Indonesian military inventory comes from a wide variety of sources; since 2010, the top suppliers have included China, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, South Korea, the UK, and the US; the TNI has been engaged in a long-term modernization program since 2010 with uneven success; Indonesia has a growing defense industry fueled by technology transfers and cooperation agreements with several countries; in 2019, the Indonesian Government said that growing its domestic defense industry was a national priority over the following 10 years (2022)"
+      "text": "the Indonesian military inventory comes from a wide variety of sources; in recent years, the top suppliers have included China, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, South Korea, the UK, and the US; the TNI has been engaged in a modernization program for more than a decade with uneven success; Indonesia has a growing defense industry fueled by technology transfers and cooperation agreements with several countries; in 2019, the Indonesian Government said that growing its domestic defense industry was a national priority over the following 10 years (2022)"
     },
     "Military service age and obligation": {
       "text": "18-45 years of age for voluntary military service, with selective conscription authorized (males, age 18), but not utilized; 2-year service obligation, with reserve obligation to age 45 (officers) (2021)"
@@ -1352,7 +1352,7 @@
         "text": "73,000 (inter-communal, inter-faith, and separatist violence between 1998 and 2004 in Aceh and Papua; religious attacks and land conflicts in 2007 and 2013; most IDPs in Aceh, Maluku, East Nusa Tengarra) (2021)"
       },
       "stateless persons": {
-        "text": "668 (mid-year 2021)"
+        "text": "866 (2022)"
       }
     },
     "Illicit drugs": {