More than two decades after the end of Angola's 27-year civil war, the country still faces a variety of socioeconomic problems, including poverty, high maternal and child mortality, and illiteracy. Despite the country's rapid post-war economic growth based on oil production, about 30 percent of Angolans live below the poverty line and unemployment is widespread, especially among the large young-adult population. Only about 70% of the population is literate, and the rate drops to around 60% for women. The youthful population - about 45% are under the age of 15 - is expected to continue growing rapidly with a fertility rate of more than 5 children per woman and a low rate of contraceptive use. Fewer than half of women deliver their babies with the assistance of trained health care personnel, which contributes to Angola's high maternal mortality rate.
Of the estimated 550,000 Angolans who fled their homeland during its civil war, most have returned home since 2002. In 2012, the UN assessed that conditions in Angola had been stable for several years and invoked a cessation of refugee status for Angolans. Following the cessation clause, some of those still in exile returned home voluntarily through UN repatriation programs, and others integrated into host countries.
" + "text": "More than two decades after the end of Angola's 27-year civil war, the country still faces a variety of socioeconomic problems, including poverty, high maternal and child mortality, and illiteracy. Despite the country's rapid post-war economic growth based on oil production, about 30 percent of Angolans live below the poverty line and unemployment is widespread, especially among the large young-adult population. Only about 70% of the population is literate, and the rate drops to around 60% for women. The youthful population - about 48% are under the age of 15 as of 2022 - is expected to continue growing rapidly with a fertility rate of more than 5 children per woman and a low rate of contraceptive use. Fewer than half of women deliver their babies with the assistance of trained health care personnel, which contributes to Angola's high maternal mortality rate.
Of the estimated 550,000 Angolans who fled their homeland during its civil war, most have returned home since 2002. In 2012, the UN assessed that conditions in Angola had been stable for several years and invoked a cessation of refugee status for Angolans. Following the cessation clause, some of those still in exile returned home voluntarily through UN repatriation programs, and others integrated into host countries.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "2.5% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "2.9% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.21 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "148.4 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "148.4 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" } }, "Government": { diff --git a/africa/bc.json b/africa/bc.json index 4176df75..1b8de29b 100644 --- a/africa/bc.json +++ b/africa/bc.json @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ "text": "Christian 79.1%, Badimo 4.1%, other 1.4% (includes Baha'i, Hindu, Muslim, Rastafarian), none 15.2%, unspecified 0.3% (2011 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Botswana has experienced one of the most rapid declines in fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa. The total fertility rate fell from more than 5 children per woman in the mid 1980s to approximately 2.4 in 2013, and remains at that level in 2022. The fertility reduction has been attributed to a host of factors, including higher educational attainment among women, greater participation of women in the workforce, increased contraceptive use, later first births, and a strong national family planning program. Botswana was making significant progress in several health indicators, including life expectancy and infant and child mortality rates, until being devastated by the HIV/AIDs epidemic in the 1990s.
In 2021, Botswana had one of the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the world at close to 20%, however comprehensive and effective treatment programs have reduced HIV/AIDS-related deaths. The combination of declining fertility and increasing mortality rates because of HIV/AIDS is slowing the population aging process, with a narrowing of the youngest age groups and little expansion of the oldest age groups. Nevertheless, having the bulk of its population (about 60%) of working age will only yield economic benefits if the labor force is healthy, educated, and productively employed.
Batswana have been working as contract miners in South Africa since the 19th century. Although Botswana’s economy improved shortly after independence in 1966 with the discovery of diamonds and other minerals, its lingering high poverty rate and lack of job opportunities continued to push workers to seek mining work in southern African countries. In the early 1970s, about a third of Botswana’s male labor force worked in South Africa (lesser numbers went to Namibia and Zimbabwe). Not until the 1980s and 1990s, when South African mining companies had reduced their recruitment of foreign workers and Botswana’s economic prospects had improved, were Batswana increasingly able to find job opportunities at home.
Most Batswana prefer life in their home country and choose cross-border migration on a temporary basis only for work, shopping, visiting family, or tourism. Since the 1970s, Botswana has pursued an open migration policy enabling it to recruit thousands of foreign workers to fill skilled labor shortages. In the late 1990s, Botswana’s prosperity and political stability attracted not only skilled workers but small numbers of refugees from neighboring Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.
" + "text": "Botswana has experienced one of the most rapid declines in fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa. The total fertility rate fell from more than 5 children per woman in the mid 1980s to approximately 2.4 in 2013, and remains at that level in 2022. The fertility reduction has been attributed to a host of factors, including higher educational attainment among women, greater participation of women in the workforce, increased contraceptive use, later first births, and a strong national family planning program. Botswana was making significant progress in several health indicators, including life expectancy and infant and child mortality rates, until being devastated by the HIV/AIDs epidemic in the 1990s.
In 2021, Botswana had one of the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the world at close to 20%, however comprehensive and effective treatment programs have reduced HIV/AIDS-related deaths. The combination of declining fertility and increasing mortality rates because of HIV/AIDS is slowing the population aging process, with a narrowing of the youngest age groups and little expansion of the oldest age groups. Nevertheless, having the bulk of its population (about 60% as of 2022) of working age will only yield economic benefits if the labor force is healthy, educated, and productively employed.
Batswana have been working as contract miners in South Africa since the 19th century. Although Botswana’s economy improved shortly after independence in 1966 with the discovery of diamonds and other minerals, its lingering high poverty rate and lack of job opportunities continued to push workers to seek mining work in southern African countries. In the early 1970s, about a third of Botswana’s male labor force worked in South Africa (lesser numbers went to Namibia and Zimbabwe). Not until the 1980s and 1990s, when South African mining companies had reduced their recruitment of foreign workers and Botswana’s economic prospects had improved, were Batswana increasingly able to find job opportunities at home.
Most Batswana prefer life in their home country and choose cross-border migration on a temporary basis only for work, shopping, visiting family, or tourism. Since the 1970s, Botswana has pursued an open migration policy enabling it to recruit thousands of foreign workers to fill skilled labor shortages. In the late 1990s, Botswana’s prosperity and political stability attracted not only skilled workers but small numbers of refugees from neighboring Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "6.1% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "6.2% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.38 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -1254,7 +1254,7 @@ "text": "approximately 300 Mozambique (Southern African Development Community force) (2023)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "Bechuanaland/Botswana did not have a permanent military during colonial times, with the British colonial administrators relying instead on small, lightly armed constabularies such as the Bechuanaland Mounted Police, the Bechuanaland Border Police, and by the early 1960s, the Police Mobile Unit (PMU); after independence in 1966, Botswana militarized the PMU and gave it responsibility for the country’s defense rather than create a conventional military force; however, turmoil in neighboring countries and numerous cross-border incursions by Rhodesian and South African security forces in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated that the PMU was inadequate for defending the country and led to the establishment of the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) in 1977; as of 2022, the BDF’s primary missions included securing territorial integrity/border security and internal duties such as disaster relief and anti-poachingBenin has a youthful age structure – almost 65% of the population is under the age of 25 – which is bolstered by high fertility and population growth rates. Benin’s total fertility has been falling over time but remains high, declining from almost 7 children per women in 1990 to 4.8 in 2016. Benin’s low contraceptive use and high unmet need for contraception contribute to the sustained high fertility rate. Although the majority of Beninese women use skilled health care personnel for antenatal care and delivery, the high rate of maternal mortality indicates the need for more access to high quality obstetric care.
Poverty, unemployment, increased living costs, and dwindling resources increasingly drive the Beninese to migrate. An estimated 4.4 million, more than 40%, of Beninese live abroad. Virtually all Beninese emigrants move to West African countries, particularly Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire. Of the less than 1% of Beninese emigrants who settle in Europe, the vast majority live in France, Benin’s former colonial ruler.
With about 40% of the population living below the poverty line, many desperate parents resort to sending their children to work in wealthy households as domestic servants (a common practice known as vidomegon), mines, quarries, or agriculture domestically or in Nigeria and other neighboring countries, often under brutal conditions. Unlike in other West African countries, where rural people move to the coast, farmers from Benin’s densely populated southern and northwestern regions move to the historically sparsely populated central region to pursue agriculture. Immigrants from West African countries came to Benin in increasing numbers between 1992 and 2002 because of its political stability and porous borders.
" + "text": "Benin has a youthful age structure – almost 65% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2022 – which is bolstered by high fertility and population growth rates. Benin’s total fertility has been falling over time but remains high, declining from almost 7 children per women in 1990 to 5.4 in 2022. Benin’s low contraceptive use and high unmet need for contraception contribute to the sustained high fertility rate. Although the majority of Beninese women use skilled health care personnel for antenatal care and delivery, the high rate of maternal mortality indicates the need for more access to high quality obstetric care.
Poverty, unemployment, increased living costs, and dwindling resources increasingly drive the Beninese to migrate. An estimated 4.4 million, more than 30%, of Beninese live abroad. Virtually all Beninese emigrants move to West African countries, particularly Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire. Of the less than 1% of Beninese emigrants who settle in Europe, the vast majority live in France, Benin’s former colonial ruler.
With about 40% of the population living below the poverty line as of 2019, many desperate parents resort to sending their children to work in wealthy households as domestic servants (a common practice known as vidomegon), mines, quarries, or agriculture domestically or in Nigeria and other neighboring countries, often under brutal conditions. Unlike in other West African countries, where rural people move to the coast, farmers from Benin’s densely populated southern and northwestern regions move to the historically sparsely populated central region to pursue agriculture. Immigrants from West African countries came to Benin in increasing numbers between 1992 and 2002 because of its political stability and porous borders.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "2.4% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "2.6% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.07 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -1276,7 +1276,7 @@ "text": "260 (plus about 160 police) Mali (MINUSMA) (May 2022)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "as of 2022, a key focus for the security forces of Benin was countering infiltrations into the country by terrorist groups tied to al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) operating just over the border from north Benin in Burkina Faso and Niger; in May 2022, the Benin Government said it was \"at war\" with terrorism after suffering a series of attacks from these groups; in addition, the FAB participated in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) along with Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups operating in the general area of the Lake Chad Basin and along Nigeria's northeast borderthe International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"
" diff --git a/africa/by.json b/africa/by.json index a22ee31f..40beb380 100644 --- a/africa/by.json +++ b/africa/by.json @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ "text": "Roman Catholic 58.6%, Protestant 35.3% (includes Adventist 2.7% and other Protestant 32.6%), Muslim 3.4%, other 1.3%, none 1.3% (2016-17 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Burundi is a densely populated country with a high population growth rate, factors that combined with land scarcity and poverty place a large share of its population at risk of food insecurity. About 90% of the population relies on subsistence agriculture. Subdivision of land to sons, and redistribution to returning refugees, results in smaller, overworked, and less productive plots. Food shortages, poverty, and a lack of clean water contribute to a 60% chronic malnutrition rate among children. A lack of reproductive health services has prevented a significant reduction in Burundi’s maternal mortality and fertility rates, which are both among the world’s highest. With two-thirds of its population under the age of 25 and a birth rate of about 6 children per woman, Burundi’s population will continue to expand rapidly for decades to come, putting additional strain on a poor country.
Historically, migration flows into and out of Burundi have consisted overwhelmingly of refugees from violent conflicts. In the last decade, more than a half million Burundian refugees returned home from neighboring countries, mainly Tanzania. Reintegrating the returnees has been problematic due to their prolonged time in exile, land scarcity, poor infrastructure, poverty, and unemployment. Repatriates and existing residents (including internally displaced persons) compete for limited land and other resources. To further complicate matters, international aid organizations reduced their assistance because they no longer classified Burundi as a post-conflict country. Conditions have deteriorated since renewed violence erupted in April 2015, causing another outpouring of refugees. In addition to refugee out-migration, Burundi has hosted thousands of refugees from neighboring countries, mostly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and lesser numbers from Rwanda.
" + "text": "Burundi is a densely populated country with a high population growth rate, factors that combined with land scarcity and poverty place a large share of its population at risk of food insecurity. About 90% of the population relies on subsistence agriculture. Subdivision of land to sons, and redistribution to returning refugees, results in smaller, overworked, and less-productive plots. Food shortages, poverty, and a lack of clean water contribute to a 60% chronic malnutrition rate among children. A lack of reproductive health services has prevented a significant reduction in Burundi’s maternal mortality and fertility rates, which are both among the world’s highest. With almost two-thirds of its population under the age of 25 and a birth rate of about 5 children per woman as of 2022, Burundi’s population will continue to expand rapidly for decades to come, putting additional strain on a poor country.
Historically, migration flows into and out of Burundi have consisted overwhelmingly of refugees from violent conflicts. In the last decade, more than a half million Burundian refugees returned home from neighboring countries, mainly Tanzania. Reintegrating the returnees has been problematic due to their prolonged time in exile, land scarcity, poor infrastructure, poverty, and unemployment. Repatriates and existing residents (including internally displaced persons) compete for limited land and other resources. To further complicate matters, international aid organizations reduced their assistance because they no longer classified Burundi as a post-conflict country. Conditions deteriorated when renewed violence erupted in April 2015, causing another outpouring of refugees. In addition to refugee out-migration, Burundi has hosted thousands of refugees from neighboring countries, mostly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and lesser numbers from Rwanda.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "8% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "6.5% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.07 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -1232,7 +1232,7 @@ "text": "760 Central African Republic (MINUSCA); 5,400 Somalia (ATMIS) (2022)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "in addition to its foreign deployments, the FDN was focused on internal security missions, particularly against rebel groups opposed to the regime such as National Forces of Liberation (FNL), the Resistance for the Rule of Law-Tabara (aka RED Tabara), and Popular Forces of Burundi (FPB or FOREBU); these groups were based in the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo and have carried out sporadic attacks in Burundi (2022)" + "text": "in addition to its foreign deployments the FDN was focused on internal security missions, particularly against rebel groups opposed to the regime such as National Forces of Liberation (FNL), the Resistance for the Rule of Law-Tabara (aka RED Tabara), and Popular Forces of Burundi (FPB or FOREBU); these groups were based in the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo and have carried out sporadic attacks in Burundi (2022)" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/africa/cd.json b/africa/cd.json index 7bfdf432..da497098 100644 --- a/africa/cd.json +++ b/africa/cd.json @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ "text": "Muslim 52.1%, Protestant 23.9%, Roman Catholic 20%, animist 0.3%, other Christian 0.2%, none 2.8%, unspecified 0.7% (2014-15 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Despite the start of oil production in 2003, 40% of Chad’s population lives below the poverty line. The population will continue to grow rapidly because of the country’s very high fertility rate and large youth cohort – more than 65% of the populace is under the age of 25 – although the mortality rate is high and life expectancy is low. Chad has the world’s third highest maternal mortality rate. Among the primary risk factors are poverty, anemia, rural habitation, high fertility, poor education, and a lack of access to family planning and obstetric care. Impoverished, uneducated adolescents living in rural areas are most affected. To improve women’s reproductive health and reduce fertility, Chad will need to increase women’s educational attainment, job participation, and knowledge of and access to family planning. Only about a quarter of women are literate, less than 5% use contraceptives, and more than 40% undergo genital cutting.
As of October 2017, more than 320,000 refugees from Sudan and more than 75,000 from the Central African Republic strain Chad’s limited resources and create tensions in host communities. Thousands of new refugees fled to Chad in 2013 to escape worsening violence in the Darfur region of Sudan. The large refugee populations are hesitant to return to their home countries because of continued instability. Chad was relatively stable in 2012 in comparison to other states in the region, but past fighting between government forces and opposition groups and inter-communal violence have left nearly 60,000 of its citizens displaced in the eastern part of the country.
" + "text": "Despite the start of oil production in 2003, around 40% of Chad’s population lived below the poverty line as of 2018. The population will continue to grow rapidly because of the country’s very high fertility rate and large youth cohort – more than 65% of the populace is under the age of 25 as of 2022 – although the mortality rate is high and life expectancy is low. Chad has the world’s second highest maternal mortality rate as of 2017. Among the primary risk factors are poverty, anemia, rural habitation, high fertility, poor education, and a lack of access to family planning and obstetric care. Impoverished, uneducated adolescents living in rural areas are most affected. To improve women’s reproductive health and reduce fertility, Chad will need to increase women’s educational attainment, job participation, and knowledge of and access to family planning. Less than a quarter of women are literate, less than 10% use contraceptives, and more than 40% undergo genital cutting.
As of December 2022, more than 403,000 refugees from Sudan and more than 120,000 from the Central African Republic strain Chad’s limited resources and create tensions in host communities. Thousands of new refugees fled to Chad in 2013 to escape worsening violence in the Darfur region of Sudan. The large refugee populations are hesitant to return to their home countries because of continued instability. Chad was relatively stable in 2012 in comparison to other states in the region, but past fighting between government forces and opposition groups and inter-communal violence have left more than 380,000 of its citizens displaced in the eastern part of the country as of 2022.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "4.4% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "5.4% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.06 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" diff --git a/africa/cf.json b/africa/cf.json index 031ba7f7..e7441e6d 100644 --- a/africa/cf.json +++ b/africa/cf.json @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ "text": "Roman Catholic 33.1%, Awakening Churches/Christian Revival 22.3%, Protestant 19.9%, Salutiste 2.2%, Muslim 1.6%, Kimbanguiste 1.5%, other 8.1%, none 11.3% (2007 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "The Republic of the Congo is one of the most urbanized countries in Africa, with nearly 70% of Congolese living in urban areas. The population is concentrated in the southwest of the country, mainly in the capital Brazzaville, Pointe-Noire, and along the railway line that connects the two. The tropical jungles in the north of the country are sparsely populated. Most Congolese are Bantu, and most belong to one of four main ethnic groups, the Kongo, Teke, Mbochi, and Sangha, which consist of over 70 subgroups.
The Republic of Congo is in the early stages of a demographic transition, whereby a population shifts from high fertility and mortality rates to low fertility and mortality rates associated with industrialized societies. Its total fertility rate (TFR), the average number of children born per woman, remains high at 4.4. While its TFR has steadily decreased, the progress slowed beginning in about 1995. The slowdown in fertility reduction has delayed the demographic transition and Congo’s potential to reap a demographic dividend, the economic boost that can occur when the share of the working-age population is larger than the dependent age groups.
The TFR differs significantly between urban and rural areas – 3.7 in urban areas versus 6.5 in rural areas. The TFR also varies among regions. The urban regions of Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire have much lower TFRs than other regions, which are predominantly or completely rural. The gap between desired fertility and actual fertility is also greatest in rural areas. Rural families may have more children to contribute to agricultural production and/or due to a lack of information about and access to contraception. Urban families may prefer to have fewer children because raising them is more expensive and balancing work and childcare may be more difficult. The number of births among teenage girls, the frequency of giving birth before the age of fifteen, and a lack of education are the most likely reasons for higher TFRs in rural areas. Although 90% of school-age children are enrolled in primary school, repetition and dropout rates are high and the quality of education is poor. Congolese women with no or little education start having children earlier and have more children in total than those with at least some secondary education.
" + "text": "
The Republic of the Congo is one of the most urbanized countries in Africa, with nearly 70% of Congolese living in urban areas. The population is concentrated in the southwest of the country, mainly in the capital Brazzaville, Pointe-Noire, and along the railway line that connects the two. The tropical jungles in the north of the country are sparsely populated. Most Congolese are Bantu, and most belong to one of four main ethnic groups, the Kongo, Teke, Mbochi, and Sangha, which consist of over 70 subgroups.
The Republic of Congo is in the early stages of a demographic transition, whereby a population shifts from high fertility and mortality rates to low fertility and mortality rates associated with industrialized societies. Its total fertility rate (TFR), the average number of children born per woman, remains high at 4.4 as of 2022. While its TFR has steadily decreased, the progress slowed beginning in about 1995. The slowdown in fertility reduction has delayed the demographic transition and Congo’s potential to reap a demographic dividend, the economic boost that can occur when the share of the working-age population is larger than the dependent age groups.
The TFR differs significantly between urban and rural areas – 3.7 in urban areas versus 6.5 in rural areas. The TFR also varies among regions. The urban regions of Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire have much lower TFRs than other regions, which are predominantly or completely rural. The gap between desired fertility and actual fertility is also greatest in rural areas. Rural families may have more children to contribute to agricultural production and/or due to a lack of information about and access to contraception. Urban families may prefer to have fewer children because raising them is more expensive and balancing work and childcare may be more difficult. The number of births among teenage girls, the frequency of giving birth before the age of fifteen, and a lack of education are the most likely reasons for higher TFRs in rural areas. Although 90% of school-age children are enrolled in primary school, repetition and dropout rates are high and the quality of education is poor. Congolese women with no or little education start having children earlier and have more children in total than those with at least some secondary education.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "2.1% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "4.5% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.1 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -1310,7 +1310,7 @@ "text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; conscription ended in 1969 (2021)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "
as of 2022, the FAC had limited capabilities due to obsolescent and poorly maintained equipment and low levels of training; its primary focus was internal security; since its creation in 1961, the FAC has had a turbulent history; it has been sidelined by some national leaders in favor of personal militias, endured an internal rebellion (1996), and clashed with various rebel groups and political or ethnic militias (1993-1996, 2002-2005, 2017); during the 1997-1999 civil war, the military generally split along ethnic lines, with most northern officers supporting eventual winner SASSOU-Nguesso, and most southerners backing the rebels; others joined ethnic-based factions loyal to regional warlords; forces backing SASSOU-Nguesso were supported by Angolan troops and received some French assistance; the FAC also has undergone at least three reorganizations that included the incorporation of former rebel combatants and various ethnic and political militias; in recent years, France has provided some advice and training, and a military cooperation agreement was signed with Russia in 2019
" + "text": "the FAC is viewed as having limited capabilities due to obsolescent and poorly maintained equipment and low levels of training; its primary focus is internal security; since its creation in 1961, the FAC has had a turbulent history; it has been sidelined by some national leaders in favor of personal militias, endured an internal rebellion (1996), and clashed with various rebel groups and political or ethnic militias (1993-1996, 2002-2005, 2017); during the 1997-1999 civil war, the military generally split along ethnic lines, with most northern officers supporting eventual winner SASSOU-Nguesso, and most southerners backing the rebels; others joined ethnic-based factions loyal to regional warlords; forces backing SASSOU-Nguesso were supported by Angolan troops and received some French assistance; the FAC also has undergone at least three reorganizations that included the incorporation of former rebel combatants and various ethnic and political militias; in recent years, France has provided some advice and training, and a military cooperation agreement was signed with Russia in 2019 (2022)" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/africa/cg.json b/africa/cg.json index 9e04254b..23e31728 100644 --- a/africa/cg.json +++ b/africa/cg.json @@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ "text": "Roman Catholic 29.9%, Protestant 26.7%, other Christian 36.5%, Kimbanguist 2.8%, Muslim 1.3%, other (includes syncretic sects and indigenous beliefs) 1.2%, none 1.3%, unspecified 0.2% (2014 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Despite a wealth of fertile soil, hydroelectric power potential, and mineral resources, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) struggles with many socioeconomic problems, including high infant and maternal mortality rates, malnutrition, poor vaccination coverage, lack of access to improved water sources and sanitation, and frequent and early fertility. Ongoing conflict, mismanagement of resources, and a lack of investment have resulted in food insecurity; almost 30% of children under the age of 5 are malnourished. The overall coverage of basic public services – education, health, sanitation, and potable water – is very limited and piecemeal, with substantial regional and rural/urban disparities. Fertility remains high at more than 5 children per woman and is likely to remain high because of the low use of contraception and the cultural preference for larger families.
The DRC is a source and host country for refugees. Between 2012 and 2014, more than 119,000 Congolese refugees returned from the Republic of Congo to the relative stability of northwest DRC, but more than 850,000 Congolese refugees and asylum seekers were hosted by neighboring countries as of December 2021. In addition, an estimated 5.5 million Congolese were internally displaced as of July 2022, the vast majority fleeing violence between rebel group and Congolese armed forces. Thousands of refugees have come to the DRC from neighboring countries, including Rwanda, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Burundi.
" + "text": "Despite a wealth of fertile soil, hydroelectric power potential, and mineral resources, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) struggles with many socioeconomic problems, including high infant and maternal mortality rates, malnutrition, poor vaccination coverage, lack of access to improved water sources and sanitation, and frequent and early fertility. Ongoing conflict, mismanagement of resources, and a lack of investment have resulted in food insecurity; almost 25% of children under the age of 5 were malnourished as of 2018. The overall coverage of basic public services – education, health, sanitation, and potable water – is very limited and piecemeal, with substantial regional and rural/urban disparities. Fertility remains high at more than 5 children per woman and is likely to remain high because of the low use of contraception and the cultural preference for larger families.
The DRC is a source and host country for refugees. Between 2012 and 2014, more than 119,000 Congolese refugees returned from the Republic of Congo to the relative stability of northwest DRC, but more than 1 million Congolese refugees and asylum seekers were hosted by neighboring countries as of December 2022. In addition, an estimated 5.5 million Congolese were internally displaced as of October 2022, the vast majority fleeing violence between rebel group and Congolese armed forces. Thousands of refugees have come to the DRC from neighboring countries, including Rwanda, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Burundi.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "3.5% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "4.1% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.38 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -1324,14 +1324,14 @@ "text": "limited and widely varied information; approximately 100,000 active troops (mostly Army, but includes several thousand Navy and Air Force personnel, as well as about 10,000 Republican Guard; note - Navy personnel includes naval infantry) (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the FARDC is equipped mostly with Soviet-era weapons systems and equipment; in recent years, Ukraine has been the largest supplier of arms to the FARDC (2022)" + "text": "the FARDC is equipped mostly with Soviet-era weapons systems and equipment (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-45 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; 18-45 years of age for compulsory military service for men; it is unclear how much conscription is used (2021)", "note": "note: in eastern Congo, fighters from armed groups, and in some cases government security forces, have been accused of forced recruitment of child soldiers" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the modern FARDC was created out of the armed factions of the two Congo wars of 1996-1997 and 1998-2003; as part of the peace accords that ended the last war, the largest rebel groups were incorporated into the FARDC; many armed groups, however, continue to fight and as of 2022, there were over 100 illegal armed groups operating in the country by some estimates; as of 2022, the FARDC was actively engaged in combat operations against numerous armed groups, particularly in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, although there was also violence in Maniema, Kasai, Kasai Central, and Tanganyika provinces; the military is widely assessed as being unable to provide adequate security throughout the country due to insufficient training, poor morale and leadership, ill-discipline and corruption, low equipment readiness, a fractious ethnic makeup, and the sheer size of the country and diversity of armed rebel groupsheads of the Great Lakes states and UN pledged in 2004 to abate tribal, rebel, and militia fighting in the region, including northeast Congo, where the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), organized in 1999, maintains over 16,500 uniformed peacekeepers
Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC)-Republic of the Congo: the location of the boundary in the broad Congo River is indefinite except in the Pool Malebo/Stanley Pool area
Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC)-Uganda: Uganda rejects the DRC claim to Margherita Peak in the Rwenzori mountains and considers it a boundary divide; there is tension and violence on Lake Albert over prospective oil reserves at the mouth of the Semliki River
Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC)-Zambia: boundary commission continues discussions over Congolese-administered triangle of land on the right bank of the Lunkinda River claimed by Zambia near the DRC village of Pweto
Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC)-Angola: DRC accuses Angola of shifting monuments
heads of the Great Lakes states and UN pledged in 2004 to abate tribal, rebel, and militia fighting in the region, including northeast Congo
Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC)-Republic of the Congo: the location of the boundary in the broad Congo River is indefinite except in the Pool Malebo/Stanley Pool area
Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC)-Uganda: Uganda rejects the DRC claim to Margherita Peak in the Rwenzori mountains and considers it a boundary divide; there is tension and violence on Lake Albert over prospective oil reserves at the mouth of the Semliki River
Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC)-Zambia: boundary commission continues discussions over Congolese-administered triangle of land on the right bank of the Lunkinda River claimed by Zambia near the DRC village of Pweto
Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC)-Angola: DRC accuses Angola of shifting monuments
Cameroon has a large youth population, with more than 60% of the populace under the age of 25. Fertility is falling but remains at a high level, especially among poor, rural, and uneducated women, in part because of inadequate access to contraception. Life expectancy remains low at about 55 years due to the prevalence of HIV and AIDs and an elevated maternal mortality rate, which has remained high since 1990. Cameroon, particularly the northern region, is vulnerable to food insecurity largely because of government mismanagement, corruption, high production costs, inadequate infrastructure, and natural disasters. Despite economic growth in some regions, poverty is on the rise, and is most prevalent in rural areas, which are especially affected by a shortage of jobs, declining incomes, poor school and health care infrastructure, and a lack of clean water and sanitation. Underinvestment in social safety nets and ineffective public financial management also contribute to Cameroon’s high rate of poverty. The activities of Boko Haram, other armed groups, and counterinsurgency operations have worsened food insecurity in the Far North region.
International migration has been driven by unemployment (including fewer government jobs), poverty, the search for educational opportunities, and corruption. The US and Europe are preferred destinations, but, with tighter immigration restrictions in these countries, young Cameroonians are increasingly turning to neighboring states, such as Gabon and Nigeria, South Africa, other parts of Africa, and the Near and Far East. Cameroon’s limited resources make it dependent on UN support to host more than 490,000 refugees and asylum seekers as of September 2022. These refugees and asylum seekers are primarily from the Central African Republic and Nigeria. Internal and external displacement have grown dramatically in recent years. Boko Haram's attacks and counterattacks by government forces in the Far North since 2014 have increased the number of internally displaced people. Armed conflict between separatists and Cameroon's military in the Northwest and Southwest since 2016 have displaced hundreds of thousands of the country's Anglophone minority.
" + "text": "Cameroon has a large youth population, with more than 60% of the populace under the age of 25 as of 2020. Fertility is falling but remains at a high level, especially among poor, rural, and uneducated women, in part because of inadequate access to contraception. Life expectancy remains low at about 55 years due to the prevalence of HIV and AIDs and an elevated maternal mortality rate, which has remained high since 1990. Cameroon, particularly the northern region, is vulnerable to food insecurity largely because of government mismanagement, corruption, high production costs, inadequate infrastructure, and natural disasters. Despite economic growth in some regions, poverty is on the rise, and is most prevalent in rural areas, which are especially affected by a shortage of jobs, declining incomes, poor school and health care infrastructure, and a lack of clean water and sanitation. Underinvestment in social safety nets and ineffective public financial management also contribute to Cameroon’s high rate of poverty. The activities of Boko Haram, other armed groups, and counterinsurgency operations have worsened food insecurity in the Far North region.
International migration has been driven by unemployment (including fewer government jobs), poverty, the search for educational opportunities, and corruption. The US and Europe are preferred destinations, but, with tighter immigration restrictions in these countries, young Cameroonians are increasingly turning to neighboring states, such as Gabon and Nigeria, South Africa, other parts of Africa, and the Near and Far East. Cameroon’s limited resources make it dependent on UN support to host more than 480,000 refugees and asylum seekers as of December 2022. These refugees and asylum seekers are primarily from the Central African Republic and Nigeria. Internal and external displacement have grown dramatically in recent years. Boko Haram's attacks and counterattacks by government forces in the Far North since 2014 have increased the number of internally displaced people. Armed conflict between separatists and Cameroon's military in the Northwest and Southwest since 2016 have displaced hundreds of thousands of the country's Anglophone minority.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "3.6% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "3.8% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.13 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { "text": "Cameroon Armed Forces (Forces Armees Camerounaises, FAC): Army (L'Armee de Terre), Navy (Marine Nationale Republique, MNR, includes naval infantry), Air Force (Armee de l'Air du Cameroun, AAC), Rapid Intervention Battalion (Bataillons d’Intervention Rapide or BIR), National Gendarmerie, Presidential Guard (2022)", - "note": "note 1: the National Police and the National Gendarmerie are responsible for internal security; the Police report to the General Delegation of National Security, while the Gendarmerie reports to the Secretariat of State for Defense in charge of the GendarmerieThe Central African Republic’s (CAR) humanitarian crisis has worsened since the coup of March 2013. CAR’s high mortality rate and low life expectancy are attributed to elevated rates of preventable and treatable diseases (including malaria and malnutrition), an inadequate health care system, precarious food security, and armed conflict. Some of the worst mortality rates are in western CAR’s diamond mining region, which has been impoverished because of government attempts to control the diamond trade and the fall in industrial diamond prices. To make matters worse, the government and international donors have reduced health funding in recent years. The CAR’s weak educational system and low literacy rate have also suffered as a result of the country’s ongoing conflict. Schools are closed, qualified teachers are scarce, infrastructure, funding, and supplies are lacking and subject to looting, and many students and teachers have been displaced by violence.
Rampant poverty, human rights violations, unemployment, poor infrastructure, and a lack of security and stability have led to forced displacement internally and externally. Since the political crisis that resulted in CAR’s March 2013 coup began in December 2012, approximately 600,000 people have fled to Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and other neighboring countries, while another estimated 600,000 were displaced internally as of October 2019. The UN has urged countries to refrain from repatriating CAR refugees amid the heightened lawlessness.
(2019)" + "text": "The Central African Republic’s (CAR) humanitarian crisis has worsened since the coup of March 2013. CAR’s high mortality rate and low life expectancy are attributed to elevated rates of preventable and treatable diseases (including malaria and malnutrition), an inadequate health care system, precarious food security, and armed conflict. Some of the worst mortality rates are in western CAR’s diamond mining region, which has been impoverished because of government attempts to control the diamond trade and the fall in industrial diamond prices. To make matters worse, the government and international donors have reduced health funding in recent years. The CAR’s weak educational system and low literacy rate have also suffered as a result of the country’s ongoing conflict. Schools are closed, qualified teachers are scarce, infrastructure, funding, and supplies are lacking and subject to looting, and many students and teachers have been displaced by violence.
Rampant poverty, human rights violations, unemployment, poor infrastructure, and a lack of security and stability have led to forced displacement internally and externally. Since the political crisis that resulted in CAR’s March 2013 coup began in December 2012, approximately 600,000 people have fled to Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and other neighboring countries, while another estimated 515,000 were displaced internally as of December 2022. The UN has urged countries to refrain from repatriating CAR refugees amid the heightened lawlessness.
(2019)" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "7.8% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "9.4% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.07 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@ "text": "18 years of age for military service; no conscription (2021)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the 2013 coup resulted in the institutional collapse of the FACA; its forces were overwhelmed and forced to flee to neighboring countries; it has been estimated that only 10% of the FACA returned after the coup, and it has struggled to rebuild in the years of instability since; the European Union, France, Russia, the UN, and the US have provided various levels of security assistanceDjibouti is a poor, predominantly urban country, characterized by high rates of illiteracy, unemployment, and childhood malnutrition. More than 75% of the population lives in cities and towns (predominantly in the capital, Djibouti). The rural population subsists primarily on nomadic herding. Prone to droughts and floods, the country has few natural resources and must import more than 80% of its food from neighboring countries or Europe. Health care, particularly outside the capital, is limited by poor infrastructure, shortages of equipment and supplies, and a lack of qualified personnel. More than a third of health care recipients are migrants because the services are still better than those available in their neighboring home countries. The nearly universal practice of female genital cutting reflects Djibouti’s lack of gender equality and is a major contributor to obstetrical complications and its high rates of maternal and infant mortality. A 1995 law prohibiting the practice has never been enforced.
Because of its political stability and its strategic location at the confluence of East Africa and the Gulf States along the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, Djibouti is a key transit point for migrants and asylum seekers heading for the Gulf States and beyond. Each year some 100,000 people, mainly Ethiopians and some Somalis, journey through Djibouti, usually to the port of Obock, to attempt a dangerous sea crossing to Yemen. However, with the escalation of the ongoing Yemen conflict, Yemenis began fleeing to Djibouti in March 2015, with almost 20,000 arriving by August 2017. Most Yemenis remain unregistered and head for Djibouti City rather than seeking asylum at one of Djibouti’s three spartan refugee camps. Djibouti has been hosting refugees and asylum seekers, predominantly Somalis and lesser numbers of Ethiopians and Eritreans, at camps for 20 years, despite lacking potable water, food shortages, and unemployment.
" + "text": "Djibouti is a poor, predominantly urban country, characterized by high rates of illiteracy, unemployment, and childhood malnutrition. Approximately 70% of the population lives in cities and towns (predominantly in the capital, Djibouti). The rural population subsists primarily on nomadic herding. Prone to droughts and floods, the country has few natural resources and must import more than 80% of its food from neighboring countries or Europe. Health care, particularly outside the capital, is limited by poor infrastructure, shortages of equipment and supplies, and a lack of qualified personnel. More than a third of health care recipients are migrants because the services are still better than those available in their neighboring home countries. The nearly universal practice of female genital cutting reflects Djibouti’s lack of gender equality and is a major contributor to obstetrical complications and its high rates of maternal and infant mortality. A 1995 law prohibiting the practice has never been enforced.
Because of its political stability and its strategic location at the confluence of East Africa and the Gulf States along the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, Djibouti is a key transit point for migrants and asylum seekers heading for the Gulf States and beyond. Each year some 100,000 people, mainly Ethiopians and some Somalis, journey through Djibouti, usually to the port of Obock, to attempt a dangerous sea crossing to Yemen. However, with the escalation of the ongoing Yemen conflict, Yemenis began fleeing to Djibouti in March 2015, with almost 20,000 arriving by August 2017. Most Yemenis remain unregistered and head for Djibouti City rather than seeking asylum at one of Djibouti’s three spartan refugee camps. Djibouti has been hosting refugees and asylum seekers, predominantly Somalis and lesser numbers of Ethiopians and Eritreans, at camps for 20 years, despite lacking potable water, food shortages, and unemployment.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "1.8% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "2% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.22 physicians/1,000 population (2014)" diff --git a/africa/eg.json b/africa/eg.json index 460fe2e2..480966f8 100644 --- a/africa/eg.json +++ b/africa/eg.json @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ "text": "Muslim (predominantly Sunni) 90%, Christian (majority Coptic Orthodox, other Christians include Armenian Apostolic, Catholic, Maronite, Orthodox, and Anglican) 10%" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world and the third most populous country in Africa, behind Nigeria and Ethiopia. Most of the country is desert, so about 95% of the population is concentrated in a narrow strip of fertile land along the Nile River, which represents only about 5% of Egypt’s land area. Egypt’s rapid population growth – 46% between 1994 and 2014 – stresses limited natural resources, jobs, housing, sanitation, education, and health care.
Although the country’s total fertility rate (TFR) fell from roughly 5.5 children per woman in 1980 to just over 3 in the late 1990s, largely as a result of state-sponsored family planning programs, the population growth rate dropped more modestly because of decreased mortality rates and longer life expectancies. During the last decade, Egypt’s TFR decline stalled for several years and then reversed, reaching 3.6 in 2011, and has plateaued the last few years. Contraceptive use has held steady at about 60%, while preferences for larger families and early marriage may have strengthened in the wake of the recent 2011 revolution. The large cohort of women of or nearing childbearing age will sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future (an effect called population momentum).
Nevertheless, post-MUBARAK governments have not made curbing population growth a priority. To increase contraceptive use and to prevent further overpopulation will require greater government commitment and substantial social change, including encouraging smaller families and better educating and empowering women. Currently, literacy, educational attainment, and labor force participation rates are much lower for women than men. In addition, the prevalence of violence against women, the lack of female political representation, and the perpetuation of the nearly universal practice of female genital cutting continue to keep women from playing a more significant role in Egypt’s public sphere.
Population pressure, poverty, high unemployment, and the fragmentation of inherited land holdings have historically motivated Egyptians, primarily young men, to migrate internally from rural and smaller urban areas in the Nile Delta region and the poorer rural south to Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban centers in the north, while a much smaller number migrated to the Red Sea and Sinai areas. Waves of forced internal migration also resulted from the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the floods caused by the completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1970. Limited numbers of students and professionals emigrated temporarily prior to the early 1970s, when economic problems and high unemployment pushed the Egyptian Government to lift restrictions on labor migration. At the same time, high oil revenues enabled Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and other Gulf states, as well as Libya and Jordan, to fund development projects, creating a demand for unskilled labor (mainly in construction), which attracted tens of thousands of young Egyptian men.
Between 1970 and 1974 alone, Egyptian migrants in the Gulf countries increased from approximately 70,000 to 370,000. Egyptian officials encouraged legal labor migration both to alleviate unemployment and to generate remittance income (remittances continue to be one of Egypt’s largest sources of foreign currency and GDP). During the mid-1980s, however, depressed oil prices resulting from the Iran-Iraq War, decreased demand for low-skilled labor, competition from less costly South Asian workers, and efforts to replace foreign workers with locals significantly reduced Egyptian migration to the Gulf States. The number of Egyptian migrants dropped from a peak of almost 3.3 million in 1983 to about 2.2 million at the start of the 1990s, but numbers gradually recovered.
In the 2000s, Egypt began facilitating more labor migration through bilateral agreements, notably with Arab countries and Italy, but illegal migration to Europe through overstayed visas or maritime human smuggling via Libya also rose. The Egyptian Government estimated there were 6.5 million Egyptian migrants in 2009, with roughly 75% being temporary migrants in other Arab countries (Libya, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates) and 25% being predominantly permanent migrants in the West (US, UK, Italy, France, and Canada).
During the 2000s, Egypt became an increasingly important transit and destination country for economic migrants and asylum seekers, including Palestinians, East Africans, and South Asians and, more recently, Iraqis and Syrians. Egypt draws many refugees because of its resettlement programs with the West; Cairo has one of the largest urban refugee populations in the world. Many East African migrants are interned or live in temporary encampments along the Egypt-Israel border, and some have been shot and killed by Egyptian border guards.
" + "text": "Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world and the third-most-populous country in Africa, behind Nigeria and Ethiopia. Most of the country is desert, so about 95% of the population is concentrated in a narrow strip of fertile land along the Nile River, which represents only about 5% of Egypt’s land area. Egypt’s rapid population growth – 46% between 1994 and 2014 – stresses limited natural resources, jobs, housing, sanitation, education, and health care.
Although the country’s total fertility rate (TFR) fell from roughly 5.5 children per woman in 1980 to just over 3 in the late 1990s, largely as a result of state-sponsored family planning programs, the population growth rate dropped more modestly because of decreased mortality rates and longer life expectancies. During the last decade, Egypt’s TFR decline stalled for several years and then reversed, reaching 3.6 in 2011, and is under 3 as of 2022. Contraceptive use has held steady at about 60%, while preferences for larger families and early marriage may have strengthened in the wake of the recent 2011 revolution. The large cohort of women of or nearing childbearing age will sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future (an effect called population momentum).
Nevertheless, post-MUBARAK governments have not made curbing population growth a priority. To increase contraceptive use and to prevent further overpopulation will require greater government commitment and substantial social change, including encouraging smaller families and better educating and empowering women. Currently, literacy, educational attainment, and labor force participation rates are much lower for women than men. In addition, the prevalence of violence against women, the lack of female political representation, and the perpetuation of the nearly universal practice of female genital cutting continue to keep women from playing a more significant role in Egypt’s public sphere.
Population pressure, poverty, high unemployment, and the fragmentation of inherited land holdings have historically motivated Egyptians, primarily young men, to migrate internally from rural and smaller urban areas in the Nile Delta region and the poorer rural south to Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban centers in the north, while a much smaller number migrated to the Red Sea and Sinai areas. Waves of forced internal migration also resulted from the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the floods caused by the completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1970. Limited numbers of students and professionals emigrated temporarily prior to the early 1970s, when economic problems and high unemployment pushed the Egyptian Government to lift restrictions on labor migration. At the same time, high oil revenues enabled Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and other Gulf states, as well as Libya and Jordan, to fund development projects, creating a demand for unskilled labor (mainly in construction), which attracted tens of thousands of young Egyptian men.
Between 1970 and 1974 alone, Egyptian migrants in the Gulf countries increased from approximately 70,000 to 370,000. Egyptian officials encouraged legal labor migration both to alleviate unemployment and to generate remittance income (remittances continue to be one of Egypt’s largest sources of foreign currency and GDP). During the mid-1980s, however, depressed oil prices resulting from the Iran-Iraq War, decreased demand for low-skilled labor, competition from less costly South Asian workers, and efforts to replace foreign workers with locals significantly reduced Egyptian migration to the Gulf States. The number of Egyptian migrants dropped from a peak of almost 3.3 million in 1983 to about 2.2 million at the start of the 1990s, but numbers gradually recovered.
In the 2000s, Egypt began facilitating more labor migration through bilateral agreements, notably with Arab countries and Italy, but illegal migration to Europe through overstayed visas or maritime human smuggling via Libya also rose. The Egyptian Government estimated there were 6.5 million Egyptian migrants in 2009, with roughly 75% being temporary migrants in other Arab countries (Libya, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates) and 25% being predominantly permanent migrants in the West (US, UK, Italy, France, and Canada).
During the 2000s, Egypt became an increasingly important transit and destination country for economic migrants and asylum seekers, including Palestinians, East Africans, and South Asians and, more recently, Iraqis and Syrians. Egypt draws many refugees because of its resettlement programs with the West; Cairo has one of the largest urban refugee populations in the world. Many East African migrants are interned or live in temporary encampments along the Egypt-Israel border, and some have been shot and killed by Egyptian border guards.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "4.7% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "4.4% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.75 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@ "text": "70,021 (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (mid-year 2022); 145,157 (Syria), 52,446 (Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 20,970 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 21,105 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 15,585 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 10,025 (Yemen) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,815 (Iraq) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,802 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)" }, "stateless persons": { - "text": "7 (mid-year 2021)" + "text": "10 (2022)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/africa/ek.json b/africa/ek.json index 15d836c1..9e2edfdf 100644 --- a/africa/ek.json +++ b/africa/ek.json @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ "text": "Roman Catholic 88%, Protestant 5%, Muslim 2%, other 5% (animist, Baha'i, Jewish) (2015 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Equatorial Guinea is one of the smallest and least populated countries in continental Africa and is the only independent African country where Spanish is an official language. Despite a boom in oil production in the 1990s, authoritarianism, corruption, and resource mismanagement have concentrated the benefits among a small elite. These practices have perpetuated income inequality and unbalanced development, such as low public spending on education and health care. Unemployment remains problematic because the oil-dominated economy employs a small labor force dependent on skilled foreign workers. The agricultural sector, Equatorial Guinea’s main employer, continues to deteriorate because of a lack of investment and the migration of rural workers to urban areas. About three-quarters of the population lives below the poverty line.
Equatorial Guinea’s large and growing youth population – about 60% are under the age of 25 – is particularly affected because job creation in the non-oil sectors is limited, and young people often do not have the skills needed in the labor market. Equatorial Guinean children frequently enter school late, have poor attendance, and have high dropout rates. Thousands of Equatorial Guineans fled across the border to Gabon in the 1970s to escape the dictatorship of Francisco MACIAS NGUEMA; smaller numbers have followed in the decades since. Continued inequitable economic growth and high youth unemployment increases the likelihood of ethnic and regional violence.
" + "text": "Equatorial Guinea is one of the smallest and least populated countries in continental Africa and is the only independent African country where Spanish is an official language. Despite a boom in oil production in the 1990s, authoritarianism, corruption, and resource mismanagement have concentrated the benefits among a small elite. These practices have perpetuated income inequality and unbalanced development, such as low public spending on education and health care. Unemployment remains problematic because the oil-dominated economy employs a small labor force dependent on skilled foreign workers. The agricultural sector, Equatorial Guinea’s main employer, continues to deteriorate because of a lack of investment and the migration of rural workers to urban areas. About two-thirds of the population lives below the poverty line as of 2020.
Equatorial Guinea’s large and growing youth population – about 60% are under the age of 25 as of 2022 – is particularly affected because job creation in the non-oil sectors is limited, and young people often do not have the skills needed in the labor market. Equatorial Guinean children frequently enter school late, have poor attendance, and have high dropout rates. Thousands of Equatorial Guineans fled across the border to Gabon in the 1970s to escape the dictatorship of Francisco MACIAS NGUEMA; smaller numbers have followed in the decades since. Continued inequitable economic growth and high youth unemployment increases the likelihood of ethnic and regional violence.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "3.1% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "3.8% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.4 physicians/1,000 population (2017)" @@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ "text": "President Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Teodoro OBIANG Nguema Mbasogo (since 3 August 1979 when he seized power in a military coup); Vice President Teodoro Nguema OBIANG Mangue (since 2012)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Prime Minister Manuela ROKA Botey (since 31 January 2023); First Deputy Prime Minister Clemente Engonga NGUEMA Onguene (since 23 June 2016); Second Deputy Prime Minister Angel MESIE Mibuy (since 5 February 2018); Third Deputy Prime Minister Alfonso Nsue MOKUY (since 23 June 2016)Eritrea is a persistently poor country that has made progress in some socioeconomic categories but not in others. Education and human capital formation are national priorities for facilitating economic development and eradicating poverty. To this end, Eritrea has made great strides in improving adult literacy – doubling the literacy rate over the last 20 years – in large part because of its successful adult education programs. The overall literacy rate was estimated to be almost 74% in 2015; more work needs to be done to raise female literacy and school attendance among nomadic and rural communities. Subsistence farming fails to meet the needs of Eritrea’s growing population because of repeated droughts, dwindling arable land, overgrazing, soil erosion, and a shortage of farmers due to conscription and displacement. The government’s emphasis on spending on defense over agriculture and its lack of foreign exchange to import food also contribute to food insecurity.
Eritrea has been a leading refugee source country since at least the 1960s, when its 30-year war for independence from Ethiopia began. Since gaining independence in 1993, Eritreans have continued migrating to Sudan, Ethiopia, Yemen, Egypt, or Israel because of a lack of basic human rights or political freedom, educational and job opportunities, or to seek asylum because of militarization. Eritrea’s large diaspora has been a source of vital remittances, funding its war for independence and providing 30% of the country’s GDP annually since it became independent.
In the last few years, Eritreans have increasingly been trafficked and held hostage by Bedouins in the Sinai Desert, where they are victims of organ harvesting, rape, extortion, and torture. Some Eritrean trafficking victims are kidnapped after being smuggled to Sudan or Ethiopia, while others are kidnapped from within or around refugee camps or crossing Eritrea’s borders. Eritreans composed approximately 90% of the conservatively estimated 25,000-30,000 victims of Sinai trafficking from 2009-2013, according to a 2013 consultancy firm report.
" + "text": "Eritrea is a persistently poor country that has made progress in some socioeconomic categories but not in others. Education and human capital formation are national priorities for facilitating economic development and eradicating poverty. To this end, Eritrea has made great strides in improving adult literacy – doubling the literacy rate over the last 20 years – in large part because of its successful adult education programs. The overall literacy rate was estimated to be more than 75% in 2018; more work needs to be done to raise female literacy and school attendance among nomadic and rural communities. Subsistence farming fails to meet the needs of Eritrea’s growing population because of repeated droughts, dwindling arable land, overgrazing, soil erosion, and a shortage of farmers due to conscription and displacement. The government’s emphasis on spending on defense over agriculture and its lack of foreign exchange to import food also contribute to food insecurity.
Eritrea has been a leading refugee source country since at least the 1960s, when its 30-year war for independence from Ethiopia began. Since gaining independence in 1993, Eritreans have continued migrating to Sudan, Ethiopia, Yemen, Egypt, or Israel because of a lack of basic human rights or political freedom, educational and job opportunities, or to seek asylum because of militarization. Eritrea’s large diaspora has been a source of vital remittances, funding its war for independence and providing 30% of the country’s GDP annually since it became independent.
In the last few years, Eritreans have increasingly been trafficked and held hostage by Bedouins in the Sinai Desert, where they are victims of organ harvesting, rape, extortion, and torture. Some Eritrean trafficking victims are kidnapped after being smuggled to Sudan or Ethiopia, while others are kidnapped from within or around refugee camps or crossing Eritrea’s borders. Eritreans composed approximately 90% of the conservatively estimated 25,000-30,000 victims of Sinai trafficking from 2009-2013, according to a 2013 consultancy firm report.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "4.5% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "4.1% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.08 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -1192,7 +1192,7 @@ "text": "limited available information; estimated 150,000-200,000 personnel, including about 2,000 in the naval and air forces (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the EDF inventory is comprised primarily of older Russian and Soviet-era systems; Eritrea was under a UN arms embargo from 2009 to 2018; from the 1990s to 2008, Russia was the leading supplier of arms to Eritrea, and in years, Eritrea has expressed interest in purchasing additional Russian equipment (2022)" + "text": "the EDF inventory is comprised primarily of older Russian and Soviet-era systems; Eritrea was under a UN arms embargo from 2009 to 2018; from the 1990s to 2008, Russia was the leading supplier of arms to Eritrea, and in recent years, Eritrea has expressed interest in purchasing additional Russian equipment (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "Eritrea mandates military service for all citizens between the ages of 18 and 40 (18-27 for women if conscripted); 18-month conscript service obligation, which includes 4-6 months of military training and 12 months of military or other national service (military service is most common); in practice, military service is often extended indefinitely; citizens up to the age of 55 eligible for recall during mobilization (2022)", diff --git a/africa/et.json b/africa/et.json index 59b2c59a..8ccc61a7 100644 --- a/africa/et.json +++ b/africa/et.json @@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "3.2% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "3.5% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.11 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" diff --git a/africa/ga.json b/africa/ga.json index 30a64273..c96a0a31 100644 --- a/africa/ga.json +++ b/africa/ga.json @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ "text": "Muslim 96.4%, Christian 3.5%, other or none 0.1% (2019-20 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "The Gambia’s youthful age structure – almost 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – is likely to persist because the country’s total fertility rate remains strong at nearly 4 children per woman. The overall literacy rate is around 55%, and is significantly lower for women than for men. At least 70% of the populace are farmers who are reliant on rain-fed agriculture and cannot afford improved seeds and fertilizers. Crop failures caused by droughts between 2011 and 2013 have increased poverty, food shortages, and malnutrition.
The Gambia is a source country for migrants and a transit and destination country for migrants and refugees. Since the 1980s, economic deterioration, drought, and high unemployment, especially among youths, have driven both domestic migration (largely urban) and migration abroad (legal and illegal). Emigrants are largely skilled workers, including doctors and nurses, and provide a significant amount of remittances. The top receiving countries for Gambian emigrants are Spain, the US, Nigeria, Senegal, and the UK. While the Gambia and Spain do not share historic, cultural, or trade ties, rural Gambians have migrated to Spain in large numbers because of its proximity and the availability of jobs in its underground economy (this flow slowed following the onset of Spain’s late 2007 economic crisis).
The Gambia’s role as a host country to refugees is a result of wars in several of its neighboring West African countries. Since 2006, refugees from the Casamance conflict in Senegal have replaced their pattern of flight and return with permanent settlement in The Gambia, often moving in with relatives along the Senegal-Gambia border. The strain of providing for about 7,400 Casamance refugees has increased poverty among Gambian villagers.
" + "text": "The Gambia’s youthful age structure – approximately 55% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2021 – is likely to persist because the country’s total fertility rate remains strong at nearly 4 children per woman. The overall literacy rate is around 50%, and is significantly lower for women than for men. At least 70% of the populace are farmers who are reliant on rain-fed agriculture and cannot afford improved seeds and fertilizers. Crop failures caused by droughts between 2011 and 2013 increased poverty, food shortages, and malnutrition.
The Gambia is a source country for migrants and a transit and destination country for migrants and refugees. Since the 1980s, economic deterioration, drought, and high unemployment, especially among youths, have driven both domestic migration (largely urban) and migration abroad (legal and illegal). Emigrants are largely skilled workers, including doctors and nurses, and provide a significant amount of remittances. The top receiving countries for Gambian emigrants are Spain, the US, Nigeria, Senegal, and the UK. While the Gambia and Spain do not share historic, cultural, or trade ties, rural Gambians have migrated to Spain in large numbers because of its proximity and the availability of jobs in its underground economy (this flow slowed following the onset of Spain’s late 2007 economic crisis).
The Gambia’s role as a host country to refugees is a result of wars in several of its neighboring West African countries. Since 2006, refugees from the Casamance conflict in Senegal have replaced their pattern of flight and return with permanent settlement in The Gambia, often moving in with relatives along the Senegal-Gambia border. The strain of providing for about 7,400 Casamance refugees increased poverty among Gambian villagers. The number of refugees decreased to around 3,500 by 2022.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "3.8% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "2.6% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.08 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -1203,8 +1203,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Gambian Armed Forces (GAF): the Gambian National Army (GNA), Gambia Navy, Gambia Air Force, Republican National Guard (2022)", - "note": "note: the National Guard is responsible for VIP protection, riot control, and presidential security" + "text": "Gambian Armed Forces (GAF): the Gambian National Army (GNA), Gambia Navy, Gambia Air Force, Republican National Guard; Ministry of Interior: Gambia Police Force (2023)", + "note": "note: the National Guard is responsible for VIP protection, riot control, and presidential security; the Gambia Police Force maintains internal security" }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2021": { @@ -1227,13 +1227,13 @@ "text": "information varies; approximately 3,000 active troops (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the GAF has a limited equipment inventory; since 2000, it has received only a few second-hand items from Georgia and Taiwan (2022)" + "text": "the GAF has a limited equipment inventory (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-25 years of age for male and female voluntary military service (18-22 for officers); no conscription; service obligation 6 months (2021)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "in 2017, several members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent security forces to The Gambia to conduct stability operations and provide assistance and training following the 2016 election; as of 2022, the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG) was comprised of about 1,000 military and gendarmerie personnel from Ghana, Nigeria, and SenegalGabon’s oil revenues have given it one of the highest per capita income levels in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the wealth is not evenly distributed and poverty is widespread. Unemployment is especially prevalent among the large youth population; more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25. With a fertility rate still averaging more than 4 children per woman, the youth population will continue to grow and further strain the mismatch between Gabon’s supply of jobs and the skills of its labor force.
Gabon has been a magnet to migrants from neighboring countries since the 1960s because of the discovery of oil, as well as the country’s political stability and timber, mineral, and natural gas resources. Nonetheless, income inequality and high unemployment have created slums in Libreville full of migrant workers from Senegal, Nigeria, Cameroon, Benin, Togo, and elsewhere in West Africa. In 2011, Gabon declared an end to refugee status for 9,500 remaining Congolese nationals to whom it had granted asylum during the Republic of the Congo’s civil war between 1997 and 2003. About 5,400 of these refugees received permits to reside in Gabon.
" + "text": "Gabon’s oil revenues have given it one of the highest per capita income levels in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the wealth is not evenly distributed and poverty is widespread. Unemployment is especially prevalent among the large youth population; more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020. With a fertility rate still averaging more than 3 children per woman, the youth population will continue to grow and further strain the mismatch between Gabon’s supply of jobs and the skills of its labor force.
Gabon has been a magnet to migrants from neighboring countries since the 1960s because of the discovery of oil, as well as the country’s political stability and timber, mineral, and natural gas resources. Nonetheless, income inequality and high unemployment have created slums in Libreville full of migrant workers from Senegal, Nigeria, Cameroon, Benin, Togo, and elsewhere in West Africa. In 2011, Gabon declared an end to refugee status for 9,500 remaining Congolese nationals to whom it had granted asylum during the Republic of the Congo’s civil war between 1997 and 2003. About 5,400 of these refugees received permits to reside in Gabon.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "2.8% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "3.4% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.65 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -1221,8 +1221,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Gabonese Armed Forces (Force Armées Gabonaise or FAG; aka Gabonese Defense and Security Forces): Land Forces (Army), National Navy, Air Force, National Gendarmerie (includes Coast Guard), Corps of Firemen; Republican Guard (2022)", - "note": "note: the National Police Forces, under the Ministry of Interior, and the National Gendarmerie, under the Ministry of Defense, are responsible for law enforcement and public security; elements of the armed forces and the Republican Guard, an elite unit that protects the president under his direct authority, sometimes performed internal security functions" + "text": "Gabonese Armed Forces (Force Armées Gabonaise or FAG; aka Gabonese Defense and Security Forces): Land Forces (Army), National Navy, Air Force, National Gendarmerie (includes Coast Guard), Corps of Firemen; Republican Guard (2023)", + "note": "note: the National Police Forces, under the Ministry of Interior, and the National Gendarmerie, under the Ministry of Defense, are responsible for law enforcement and public security; elements of the armed forces and the Republican Guard, an elite unit that protects the president under his direct authority, sometimes perform internal security functions" }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2021": { diff --git a/africa/gh.json b/africa/gh.json index 97cfd2bb..1ff83f64 100644 --- a/africa/gh.json +++ b/africa/gh.json @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ "text": "Christian 71.3% (Pentecostal/Charismatic 31.6%, Protestant 17.4%, Catholic 10%, other 12.3%), Muslim 19.9%, traditionalist 3.2%, other 4.5%, none 1.1% (2021 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Ghana has a young age structure, with approximately 57% of the population under the age of 25. Its total fertility rate fell significantly during the 1980s and 1990s but has stalled at around four children per woman for the last few years. Fertility remains higher in the northern region than the Greater Accra region. On average, desired fertility has remained stable for several years; urban dwellers want fewer children than rural residents. Increased life expectancy, due to better health care, nutrition, and hygiene, and reduced fertility have increased Ghana’s share of elderly persons; Ghana’s proportion of persons aged 60+ is among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Poverty has declined in Ghana, but it remains pervasive in the northern region, which is susceptible to droughts and floods and has less access to transportation infrastructure, markets, fertile farming land, and industrial centers. The northern region also has lower school enrollment, higher illiteracy, and fewer opportunities for women.
Ghana was a country of immigration in the early years after its 1957 independence, attracting labor migrants largely from Nigeria and other neighboring countries to mine minerals and harvest cocoa – immigrants composed about 12% of Ghana’s population in 1960. In the late 1960s, worsening economic and social conditions discouraged immigration, and hundreds of thousands of immigrants, mostly Nigerians, were expelled.
During the 1970s, severe drought and an economic downturn transformed Ghana into a country of emigration; neighboring Cote d’Ivoire was the initial destination. Later, hundreds of thousands of Ghanaians migrated to Nigeria to work in its booming oil industry, but most were deported in 1983 and 1985 as oil prices plummeted. Many Ghanaians then turned to more distant destinations, including other parts of Africa, Europe, and North America, but the majority continued to migrate within West Africa. Since the 1990s, increased emigration of skilled Ghanaians, especially to the US and the UK, drained the country of its health care and education professionals. Internally, poverty and other developmental disparities continue to drive Ghanaians from the north to the south, particularly to its urban centers.
" + "text": "Ghana has a young age structure, with approximately 56% of the population under the age of 25 as of 2020. Its total fertility rate fell significantly during the 1980s and 1990s but has stalled at around four children per woman for the last few years. Fertility remains higher in the northern region than the Greater Accra region. On average, desired fertility has remained stable for several years; urban dwellers want fewer children than rural residents. Increased life expectancy, due to better health care, nutrition, and hygiene, and reduced fertility have increased Ghana’s share of elderly persons; Ghana’s proportion of persons aged 60+ is among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Poverty has declined in Ghana, but it remains pervasive in the northern region, which is susceptible to droughts and floods and has less access to transportation infrastructure, markets, fertile farming land, and industrial centers. The northern region also has lower school enrollment, higher illiteracy, and fewer opportunities for women.
Ghana was a country of immigration in the early years after its 1957 independence, attracting labor migrants largely from Nigeria and other neighboring countries to mine minerals and harvest cocoa – immigrants composed about 12% of Ghana’s population in 1960. In the late 1960s, worsening economic and social conditions discouraged immigration, and hundreds of thousands of immigrants, mostly Nigerians, were expelled.
During the 1970s, severe drought and an economic downturn transformed Ghana into a country of emigration; neighboring Cote d’Ivoire was the initial destination. Later, hundreds of thousands of Ghanaians migrated to Nigeria to work in its booming oil industry, but most were deported in 1983 and 1985 as oil prices plummeted. Many Ghanaians then turned to more distant destinations, including other parts of Africa, Europe, and North America, but the majority continued to migrate within West Africa. Since the 1990s, increased emigration of skilled Ghanaians, especially to the US and the UK, drained the country of its health care and education professionals. Internally, poverty and other developmental disparities continue to drive Ghanaians from the north to the south, particularly to its urban centers.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "3.4% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "4% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.17 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Ghana Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force (2022)" + "text": "Ghana Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force; Ministry of the Interior: Ghana Police Service (2022)" }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2021": { @@ -1284,7 +1284,7 @@ "text": "approximately 14,000 active personnel (10,000 Army; 2,000 Navy; 2,000 Air Force) (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the inventory of the Ghana Armed Forces is a mix of Russian, Chinese, and Western equipment; since 2010, China has been the leading supplier of arms (2022)" + "text": "the military's inventory is a mix of Russian, Chinese, and Western equipment; in recent years, China and Czechia have been among the leading arms suppliers (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-26 years of age for voluntary military service, with basic education certificate; no conscription (2022)" @@ -1294,7 +1294,7 @@ "note": "note: since sending a contingent of troops to the Congo in 1960, the military has been a regular contributor to African- and UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the military of Ghana traces its origins to the Gold Coast Constabulary that was established in 1879 and renamed the Gold Coast Regiment in 1901; the Gold Coast Regiment was part of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the WAFF served with distinction in both East and West Africa during World War I; in 1928, it received royal recognition and was re-named the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF); the RWAFF went on to serve in World War II as part of the British 81st and 82nd (West African) divisions in the East Africa and Burma campaigns; following independence in 1957, the Gold Coast Regiment formed the basis for the new Ghanaian Army
as of 2022, the primary missions for the Ghanaian military included assisting other security services with internal security and patrolling the country’s economic exclusion zone, which has led to efforts to expand the Navy’s capabilities in recent years; in 2022, Ghana beefed up its military presence in the north of the country against threats from the terrorist organization Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida linked militant groups, which has conducted attacks in the neighboring countries of Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togo
" + "text": "the primary missions for the Ghanaian military include assisting other security services with internal security and patrolling the country’s economic exclusion zone, which has led to efforts to expand the Navy’s capabilities in recent years; in 2022, Ghana beefed up its military presence in the north of the country against threats from the terrorist organization Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida linked militant groups, which has conducted attacks in the neighboring countries of Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togothe International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"
" diff --git a/africa/gv.json b/africa/gv.json index dfe051d8..0283ef2c 100644 --- a/africa/gv.json +++ b/africa/gv.json @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ "text": "Muslim 89.1%, Christian 6.8%, animist 1.6%, other 0.1%, none 2.4% (2014 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Guinea’s strong population growth is a result of declining mortality rates and sustained elevated fertility. The population growth rate was somewhat tempered in the 2000s because of a period of net outmigration. Although life expectancy and mortality rates have improved over the last two decades, the nearly universal practice of female genital cutting continues to contribute to high infant and maternal mortality rates. Guinea’s total fertility remains high at about 5 children per woman because of the ongoing preference for larger families, low contraceptive usage and availability, a lack of educational attainment and empowerment among women, and poverty. A lack of literacy and vocational training programs limit job prospects for youths, but even those with university degrees often have no option but to work in the informal sector. About 60% of the country’s large youth population is unemployed.
Tensions and refugees have spilled over Guinea’s borders with Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire. During the 1990s Guinea harbored as many as half a million refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia, more refugees than any other African country for much of that decade. About half sought refuge in the volatile \"Parrot’s Beak\" region of southwest Guinea, a wedge of land jutting into Sierra Leone near the Liberian border. Many were relocated within Guinea in the early 2000s because the area suffered repeated cross-border attacks from various government and rebel forces, as well as anti-refugee violence.
" + "text": "Guinea’s strong population growth is a result of declining mortality rates and sustained elevated fertility. The population growth rate was somewhat tempered in the 2000s because of a period of net outmigration. Although life expectancy and mortality rates have improved over the last two decades, the nearly universal practice of female genital cutting continues to contribute to high infant and maternal mortality rates. Guinea’s total fertility remains high at about 5 children per woman as of 2022 because of the ongoing preference for larger families, low contraceptive usage and availability, a lack of educational attainment and empowerment among women, and poverty. A lack of literacy and vocational training programs limit job prospects for youths, but even those with university degrees often have no option but to work in the informal sector. About 60% of the country’s large youth population is unemployed.
Tensions and refugees have spilled over Guinea’s borders with Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire. During the 1990s Guinea harbored as many as half a million refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia, more refugees than any other African country for much of that decade. About half sought refuge in the volatile \"Parrot’s Beak\" region of southwest Guinea, a wedge of land jutting into Sierra Leone near the Liberian border. Many were relocated within Guinea in the early 2000s because the area suffered repeated cross-border attacks from various government and rebel forces, as well as anti-refugee violence.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "4% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "4% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.23 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@ "text": "approximately 12,000 active personnel (9,000 Army; 400 Navy; 800 Air Force; 300 BASP; 1,500 Gendarmerie) (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the inventory of the Guinean military consists largely of aging and outdated (mostly Soviet-era) equipment; since 2010, it has received small amounts of equipment from China, France, Russia, and South Africa (2022)" + "text": "the inventory of the Guinean military consists largely of aging and outdated (mostly Soviet-era) equipment; in recent years, it has received small amounts of equipment from China, France, Russia, and South Africa (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "Voluntary and selective conscripted service, 9-24 mos (2022)" diff --git a/africa/iv.json b/africa/iv.json index c8a5e0aa..b26c45e0 100644 --- a/africa/iv.json +++ b/africa/iv.json @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ "note": "note: the majority of foreign migrant workers are Muslim (72.7%) and Christian (17.7%)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Cote d’Ivoire’s population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future because almost 60% of the populace is younger than 25, the total fertility rate is holding steady at about 3.5 children per woman, and contraceptive use is under 20%. The country will need to improve education, health care, and gender equality in order to turn its large and growing youth cohort into human capital. Even prior to 2010 unrest that shuttered schools for months, access to education was poor, especially for women. The lack of educational attainment contributes to Cote d’Ivoire’s high rates of unskilled labor, adolescent pregnancy, and HIV/AIDS prevalence.
Following its independence in 1960, Cote d’Ivoire’s stability and the blossoming of its labor-intensive cocoa and coffee industries in the southwest made it an attractive destination for migrants from other parts of the country and its neighbors, particularly Burkina Faso. The HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY administration continued the French colonial policy of encouraging labor immigration by offering liberal land ownership laws. Foreigners from West Africa, Europe (mainly France), and Lebanon composed about 25% of the population by 1998.
Ongoing economic decline since the 1980s and the power struggle after HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY’s death in 1993 ushered in the politics of \"Ivoirite,\" institutionalizing an Ivoirian identity that further marginalized northern Ivoirians and scapegoated immigrants. The hostile Muslim north-Christian south divide snowballed into a 2002 civil war, pushing tens of thousands of foreign migrants, Liberian refugees, and Ivoirians to flee to war-torn Liberia or other regional countries and more than a million people to be internally displaced. Subsequently, violence following the contested 2010 presidential election prompted some 250,000 people to seek refuge in Liberia and other neighboring countries and again internally displaced as many as a million people. By July 2012, the majority had returned home, but ongoing inter-communal tension and armed conflict continue to force people from their homes.
" + "text": "Cote d’Ivoire’s population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future because almost 60% of the populace is younger than 25 as of 2020, the total fertility rate is holding steady at about 3.5 children per woman, and contraceptive use is under 30%. The country will need to improve education, health care, and gender equality in order to turn its large and growing youth cohort into human capital. Even prior to 2010 unrest that shuttered schools for months, access to education was poor, especially for women. The lack of educational attainment contributes to Cote d’Ivoire’s high rates of unskilled labor, adolescent pregnancy, and HIV/AIDS prevalence.
Following its independence in 1960, Cote d’Ivoire’s stability and the blossoming of its labor-intensive cocoa and coffee industries in the southwest made it an attractive destination for migrants from other parts of the country and its neighbors, particularly Burkina Faso. The HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY administration continued the French colonial policy of encouraging labor immigration by offering liberal land ownership laws. Foreigners from West Africa, Europe (mainly France), and Lebanon composed about 25% of the population by 1998.
Ongoing economic decline since the 1980s and the power struggle after HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY’s death in 1993 ushered in the politics of \"Ivoirite,\" institutionalizing an Ivoirian identity that further marginalized northern Ivoirians and scapegoated immigrants. The hostile Muslim north-Christian south divide snowballed into a 2002 civil war, pushing tens of thousands of foreign migrants, Liberian refugees, and Ivoirians to flee to war-torn Liberia or other regional countries and more than a million people to be internally displaced. Subsequently, violence following the contested 2010 presidential election prompted some 250,000 people to seek refuge in Liberia and other neighboring countries and again internally displaced as many as a million people. By July 2012, the majority had returned home, but ongoing inter-communal tension and armed conflict continue to force people from their homes.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "3.3% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "3.3% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.16 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -1298,7 +1298,7 @@ "text": "approximately 25,000 active troops (23,000 Army, including about 2,000 Special Forces; 1,000 Navy; 1,000 Air Force); 5-10,000 Gendarmerie (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the inventory of the FACI consists mostly of older or second-hand equipment, typically of French or Soviet-era origin; Cote d'Ivoire was under a partial UN arms embargo from 2004 to 2016; since 2016, it has received limited amounts of mostly second-hand equipment from several countries, including France (2022)" + "text": "the inventory of the FACI consists mostly of older or second-hand equipment, typically of French or Soviet-era origin; Cote d'Ivoire was under a partial UN arms embargo from 2004 to 2016; in recent years it has received limited amounts of mostly second-hand equipment from several countries, including France (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-25 years of age for compulsory and voluntary male and female military service; conscription is not enforced; voluntary recruitment of former rebels into the new national army is restricted to ages 22-29 (2022)" @@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ "text": "850 Mali (MINUSMA) (2022)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the military has mutinied several times since the late 1990s, most recently in 2017, and has had a large role in the country’s political turmoil; as of 2022, the FACI was focused on internal security and the growing threat posed by Islamic militants associated with the al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorist group operating across the border in Burkina Faso; AQIM militants conducted significant attacks in the country in 2016 and 2020; Côte d’Ivoire since 2016 has stepped up border security and completed building a joint counter-terrorism training center with France near Abidjan in 2020Kenya has experienced dramatic population growth since the mid-20th century as a result of its high birth rate and its declining mortality rate. Almost 40% of Kenyans are under the age of 15 as of 2022 because of sustained high fertility, early marriage and childbearing, and an unmet need for family planning. Kenya’s persistent rapid population growth strains the labor market, social services, arable land, and natural resources. Although Kenya in 1967 was the first Sub-Saharan country to launch a nationwide family planning program, progress in reducing the birth rate has largely stalled since the late 1990s, when the government decreased its support for family planning to focus on the HIV epidemic. Government commitment and international technical support spurred Kenyan contraceptive use, decreasing the fertility rate (children per woman) from about 8 in the late 1970s to less than 5 children twenty years later, but it has plateaued at 3 children as of 2022.
Kenya is a source of emigrants and a host country for refugees. In the 1960s and 1970s, Kenyans pursued higher education in the UK because of colonial ties, but as British immigration rules tightened, the US, the then Soviet Union, and Canada became attractive study destinations. Kenya’s stagnant economy and political problems during the 1980s and 1990s led to an outpouring of Kenyan students and professionals seeking permanent opportunities in the West and southern Africa. Nevertheless, Kenya’s relative stability since its independence in 1963 has attracted hundreds of thousands of refugees escaping violent conflicts in neighboring countries; Kenya was sheltering nearly 280,000 Somali refugees as of 2022.
" + "text": "Kenya has experienced dramatic population growth since the mid-20th century as a result of its high birth rate and its declining mortality rate. Almost 40% of Kenyans are under the age of 15 as of 2020 because of sustained high fertility, early marriage and childbearing, and an unmet need for family planning. Kenya’s persistent rapid population growth strains the labor market, social services, arable land, and natural resources. Although Kenya in 1967 was the first Sub-Saharan country to launch a nationwide family planning program, progress in reducing the birth rate has largely stalled since the late 1990s, when the government decreased its support for family planning to focus on the HIV epidemic. Government commitment and international technical support spurred Kenyan contraceptive use, decreasing the fertility rate (children per woman) from about 8 in the late 1970s to less than 5 children twenty years later, but it has plateaued at about 3 children as of 2022.
Kenya is a source of emigrants and a host country for refugees. In the 1960s and 1970s, Kenyans pursued higher education in the UK because of colonial ties, but as British immigration rules tightened, the US, the then Soviet Union, and Canada became attractive study destinations. Kenya’s stagnant economy and political problems during the 1980s and 1990s led to an outpouring of Kenyan students and professionals seeking permanent opportunities in the West and southern Africa. Nevertheless, Kenya’s relative stability since its independence in 1963 has attracted hundreds of thousands of refugees escaping violent conflicts in neighboring countries; Kenya was sheltering nearly 280,000 Somali refugees as of 2022.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "4.6% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "4.3% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.16 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ "text": "approximately 24,000 personnel (20,000 Army; 1,500 Navy; 2,500 Air Force) (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the KDF's inventory traditionally carried mostly older or second-hand Western weapons systems, particularly from France, the UK, and the US; however, since the 2000s it has sought to modernize and diversify its imports, and suppliers have included more than a dozen countries including China, Italy, Jordan, and the US (2022)" + "text": "the KDF's inventory traditionally carried mostly older or second-hand Western weapons systems, particularly from France, the UK, and the US; however, since the 2000s it has sought to modernize and diversify its imports, and suppliers have included more than a dozen countries including China, Italy, and the US (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "no conscription; 18-26 years of age for male and female voluntary service (under 18 with parental consent; upper limit 30 years of age for specialists, tradesmen, or women with a diploma; 39 years of age for chaplains/imams); 9-year service obligation (7 years for Kenyan Navy) and subsequent 3-year re-enlistments; applicants must be Kenyan citizens (2022)" @@ -1336,7 +1336,7 @@ "text": "190,000 (election-related violence, intercommunal violence, resource conflicts, al-Shabaab attacks in 2017 and 2018) (2021)" }, "stateless persons": { - "text": "16,820 (mid-year 2021); note - the stateless population consists of Nubians, Kenyan Somalis, and coastal Arabs; the Nubians are descendants of Sudanese soldiers recruited by the British to fight for them in East Africa more than a century ago; Nubians did not receive Kenyan citizenship when the country became independent in 1963; only recently have Nubians become a formally recognized tribe and had less trouble obtaining national IDs; Galjeel and other Somalis who have lived in Kenya for decades are included with more recent Somali refugees and denied ID cards" + "text": "16,779 (2022); note - the stateless population consists of Nubians, Kenyan Somalis, and coastal Arabs; the Nubians are descendants of Sudanese soldiers recruited by the British to fight for them in East Africa more than a century ago; Nubians did not receive Kenyan citizenship when the country became independent in 1963; only recently have Nubians become a formally recognized tribe and had less trouble obtaining national IDs; Galjeel and other Somalis who have lived in Kenya for decades are included with more recent Somali refugees and denied ID cards" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/africa/li.json b/africa/li.json index 77a0e317..2dfad1e0 100644 --- a/africa/li.json +++ b/africa/li.json @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ "text": "Christian 85.6%, Muslim 12.2%, Traditional 0.6%, other 0.2%, none 1.5% (2008 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Liberia’s high fertility rate of nearly 5 children per woman and large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – will sustain a high dependency ratio for many years to come. Significant progress has been made in preventing child deaths, despite a lack of health care workers and infrastructure. Infant and child mortality have dropped nearly 70% since 1990; the annual reduction rate of about 5.4% is the highest in Africa.
Nevertheless, Liberia’s high maternal mortality rate remains among the world’s worst; it reflects a high unmet need for family planning services, frequency of early childbearing, lack of quality obstetric care, high adolescent fertility, and a low proportion of births attended by a medical professional. Female mortality is also increased by the prevalence of female genital cutting (FGC), which is practiced by 10 of Liberia’s 16 tribes and affects more than two-thirds of women and girls. FGC is an initiation ritual performed in rural bush schools, which teach traditional beliefs on marriage and motherhood and are an obstacle to formal classroom education for Liberian girls.
Liberia has been both a source and a destination for refugees. During Liberia’s 14-year civil war (1989-2003), more than 250,000 people became refugees and another half million were internally displaced. Between 2004 and the cessation of refugee status for Liberians in June 2012, the UNHCR helped more than 155,000 Liberians to voluntarily repatriate, while others returned home on their own. Some Liberian refugees spent more than two decades living in other West African countries. Between 2011 and 2022, more than 300,000 Ivoirian refugees in Liberia have been repatriated; as of year-end 2022, less than 2,300 Ivoirian refugees were still living in Liberia.
" + "text": "Liberia’s high fertility rate of nearly 5 children per woman and large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020 – will sustain a high dependency ratio for many years to come. Significant progress has been made in preventing child deaths, despite a lack of health care workers and infrastructure. Infant and child mortality have dropped nearly 70% since 1990; the annual reduction rate of about 5.4% is the highest in Africa.
Nevertheless, Liberia’s high maternal mortality rate remains among the world’s worst; it reflects a high unmet need for family planning services, frequency of early childbearing, lack of quality obstetric care, high adolescent fertility, and a low proportion of births attended by a medical professional. Female mortality is also increased by the prevalence of female genital cutting (FGC), which is practiced by 10 of Liberia’s 16 tribes and affects more than two-thirds of women and girls. FGC is an initiation ritual performed in rural bush schools, which teach traditional beliefs on marriage and motherhood and are an obstacle to formal classroom education for Liberian girls.
Liberia has been both a source and a destination for refugees. During Liberia’s 14-year civil war (1989-2003), more than 250,000 people became refugees and another half million were internally displaced. Between 2004 and the cessation of refugee status for Liberians in June 2012, the UNHCR helped more than 155,000 Liberians to voluntarily repatriate, while others returned home on their own. Some Liberian refugees spent more than two decades living in other West African countries. Between 2011 and 2022, more than 300,000 Ivoirian refugees in Liberia have been repatriated; as of year-end 2022, less than 2,300 Ivoirian refugees were still living in Liberia.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "8.5% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "9.5% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.05 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -1202,8 +1202,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL): Army, Liberian Coast Guard, Air Wing (2022)", - "note": "note: the AFL Air Wing was previously disbanded in 2005 and has been under redevelopment since 2019; the Liberian National Police and the Liberian Drug Enforcement Agency are under the Ministry of Justice" + "text": "Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL): Army, Liberian Coast Guard, Air Wing (2023)", + "note": "note: the AFL Air Wing was previously disbanded in 2005 and has been under redevelopment since 2019; the Liberian National Police and the Liberian Drug Enforcement Agency are under the Ministry of Justice" }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2021": { @@ -1236,7 +1236,7 @@ "text": "160 Mali (MINUSMA) (May 2022)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the first militia unit established for defense of the colony was raised in 1832; the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) traces its origins to the 1908 establishment of the Liberia Frontier Force, which became the Liberian National Guard in 1965; the AFL was established in 1970; at the end of the second civil war in 2003, military and police forces were disbanded and approximately 100,000 military, police, and rebel combatants were disarmed; the AFL began to rebuild in 2003 with US assistance and the first infantry battalion of the restructured AFL was re-activated in late 2007; a second battalion was added in 2008
the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established in 2003 as a peacekeeping force; at its height, UNMIL was comprised of about 15,000 personnel, including more than 3,000 troops absorbed from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping mission; Liberian forces reassumed full control of the country’s security in June of 2016, and the UNMIL mission was ended in 2018
" + "text": "the AFL is responsible for external defense but also has some domestic security responsibilities if called upon, such as humanitarian assistance during natural disasters and support to law enforcement; it is a small, lightly equipped force comprised of 2 combat infantry battalions and supporting units; the infantry battalions were rebuilt with US assistance in 2007-2008 from the restructured AFL following the end of the second civil war in 2003 when military and police forces were disbanded and approximately 100,000 military, police, and rebel combatants were disarmed
Lesotho faces great socioeconomic challenges. More than half of its population lives below the poverty line, and the country’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is the second highest in the world. In addition, Lesotho is a small, mountainous, landlocked country with little arable land, leaving its population vulnerable to food shortages and reliant on remittances. Lesotho’s persistently high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates have been increasing during the last decade, according to the last two Demographic and Health Surveys. Despite these significant shortcomings, Lesotho has made good progress in education; it is on-track to achieve universal primary education and has one of the highest adult literacy rates in Africa.
Lesotho’s migration history is linked to its unique geography; it is surrounded by South Africa with which it shares linguistic and cultural traits. Lesotho at one time had more of its workforce employed outside its borders than any other country. Today remittances equal about 17% of its GDP. With few job options at home, a high rate of poverty, and higher wages available across the border, labor migration to South Africa replaced agriculture as the prevailing Basotho source of income decades ago. The majority of Basotho migrants were single men contracted to work as gold miners in South Africa. However, migration trends changed in the 1990s, and fewer men found mining jobs in South Africa because of declining gold prices, stricter immigration policies, and a preference for South African workers.
Although men still dominate cross-border labor migration, more women are working in South Africa, mostly as domestics, because they are widows or their husbands are unemployed. Internal rural-urban flows have also become more frequent, with more women migrating within the country to take up jobs in the garment industry or moving to care for loved ones with HIV/AIDS. Lesotho’s small population of immigrants is increasingly composed of Taiwanese and Chinese migrants who are involved in the textile industry and small retail businesses.
" + "text": "Lesotho faces great socioeconomic challenges. Almost half of its population lives below the poverty line as of 2017, and the country’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is the second highest in the world as of 2021. In addition, Lesotho is a small, mountainous, landlocked country with little arable land, leaving its population vulnerable to food shortages and reliant on remittances. Lesotho’s persistently high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates have been increasing during the last decade, according to the last two Demographic and Health Surveys. Despite these significant shortcomings, Lesotho has made good progress in education; it is on-track to achieve universal primary education and has one of the highest adult literacy rates in Africa.
Lesotho’s migration history is linked to its unique geography; it is surrounded by South Africa with which it shares linguistic and cultural traits. Lesotho at one time had more of its workforce employed outside its borders than any other country. Today remittances equal about 20% of its GDP. With few job options at home, a high rate of poverty, and higher wages available across the border, labor migration to South Africa replaced agriculture as the prevailing Basotho source of income decades ago. The majority of Basotho migrants were single men contracted to work as gold miners in South Africa. However, migration trends changed in the 1990s, and fewer men found mining jobs in South Africa because of declining gold prices, stricter immigration policies, and a preference for South African workers.
Although men still dominate cross-border labor migration, more women are working in South Africa, mostly as domestics, because they are widows or their husbands are unemployed. Internal rural-urban flows have also become more frequent, with more women migrating within the country to take up jobs in the garment industry or moving to care for loved ones with HIV/AIDS. Lesotho’s small population of immigrants is increasingly composed of Taiwanese and Chinese migrants who are involved in the textile industry and small retail businesses.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "11.3% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "11.8% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.47 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "3.022 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "3 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -1208,7 +1208,7 @@ "text": "20-30 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription (2022)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "Lesotho's declared policy for its military is the maintenance of the country's sovereignty and the preservation of internal security; in practice, external security is guaranteed by South AfricaMadagascar’s youthful population – nearly 60% are under the age of 25 as of 2022 – and moderately high total fertility rate of more than 3.6 children per woman ensures that the Malagasy population will continue its rapid growth trajectory for the foreseeable future. The population is predominantly rural and poor; chronic malnutrition is prevalent, and large families are the norm. Many young Malagasy girls are withdrawn from school, marry early (often pressured to do so by their parents), and soon begin having children. Early childbearing, coupled with Madagascar’s widespread poverty and lack of access to skilled health care providers during delivery, increases the risk of death and serious health problems for young mothers and their babies.
Child marriage perpetuates gender inequality and is prevalent among the poor, the uneducated, and rural households – as of 2018, 40% of Malagasy women aged 20 to 24 were married. Although the legal age for marriage is 18, parental consent is often given for earlier marriages or the law is flouted, especially in rural areas that make up approximately 60% of the country. Forms of arranged marriage whereby young girls are married to older men in exchange for oxen or money are traditional. If a union does not work out, a girl can be placed in another marriage, but the dowry paid to her family diminishes with each unsuccessful marriage.
Madagascar’s population consists of 18 main ethnic groups, all of whom speak the same Malagasy language. Most Malagasy are multi-ethnic, however, reflecting the island’s diversity of settlers and historical contacts (see Background). Madagascar’s legacy of hierarchical societies practicing domestic slavery (most notably the Merina Kingdom of the 16th to the 19th century) is evident today in persistent class tension, with some ethnic groups maintaining a caste system. Slave descendants are vulnerable to unequal access to education and jobs, despite Madagascar’s constitutional guarantee of free compulsory primary education and its being party to several international conventions on human rights. Historical distinctions also remain between central highlanders and coastal people.
" + "text": "Madagascar’s youthful population – nearly 60% are under the age of 25 as of 2020 – and moderately high total fertility rate of more than 3.6 children per woman ensures that the Malagasy population will continue its rapid growth trajectory for the foreseeable future. The population is predominantly rural and poor; chronic malnutrition is prevalent, and large families are the norm. Many young Malagasy girls are withdrawn from school, marry early (often pressured to do so by their parents), and soon begin having children. Early childbearing, coupled with Madagascar’s widespread poverty and lack of access to skilled health care providers during delivery, increases the risk of death and serious health problems for young mothers and their babies.
Child marriage perpetuates gender inequality and is prevalent among the poor, the uneducated, and rural households – as of 2018, 40% of Malagasy women aged 20 to 24 were married. Although the legal age for marriage is 18, parental consent is often given for earlier marriages or the law is flouted, especially in rural areas that make up approximately 60% of the country. Forms of arranged marriage whereby young girls are married to older men in exchange for oxen or money are traditional. If a union does not work out, a girl can be placed in another marriage, but the dowry paid to her family diminishes with each unsuccessful marriage.
Madagascar’s population consists of 18 main ethnic groups, all of whom speak the same Malagasy language. Most Malagasy are multi-ethnic, however, reflecting the island’s diversity of settlers and historical contacts (see Background). Madagascar’s legacy of hierarchical societies practicing domestic slavery (most notably the Merina Kingdom of the 16th to the 19th century) is evident today in persistent class tension, with some ethnic groups maintaining a caste system. Slave descendants are vulnerable to unequal access to education and jobs, despite Madagascar’s constitutional guarantee of free compulsory primary education and its being party to several international conventions on human rights. Historical distinctions also remain between central highlanders and coastal people.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "3.7% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "3.9% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.2 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@ "text": "approximately 13,000 personnel (12,000 Army; 500 Navy; 500 Air Force); estimated 10,000 Gendarmerie (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the PAF's inventory consists mostly of aging Soviet-era equipment; since 2010, it has received limited amounts of second-hand equipment from France, South Africa, and the UAE (2022)" + "text": "the PAF's inventory consists mostly of aging Soviet-era equipment; in recent years, it has received limited amounts of secondhand equipment from France, South Africa, and the UAE (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-25 years of age for men and women; service obligation 18 months; no conscription; women are permitted to serve in all branches (2022)" diff --git a/africa/mi.json b/africa/mi.json index efaebdce..d256a3cd 100644 --- a/africa/mi.json +++ b/africa/mi.json @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "7.4% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "5.4% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.05 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "17.28 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "17.3 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Malawi Defense Force (MDF): Army (includes marine unit), Air Force (established as a separate service August 2019; previously was an air wing under the Army); Ministry of Homeland Security: Malawi Police Service (2022)", + "text": "Malawi Defense Force (MDF): Army (includes maritime force), Air Force (established as a separate service August 2019; previously was an air wing under the Army); Ministry of Homeland Security: Malawi Police Service (2023)", "note": "note: the MDF reports directly to the president as commander in chief; the Malawi Ministry of Defense was abolished in 2011" }, "Military expenditures": { diff --git a/africa/ml.json b/africa/ml.json index 9f90ec92..665f4059 100644 --- a/africa/ml.json +++ b/africa/ml.json @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "3.9% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "4.3% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.13 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -1278,7 +1278,7 @@ "text": "note: until announcing its withdrawal in May of 2022, Mali was part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger; Mali had committed 1,100 troops and 200 gendarmes to the force" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "prior to the coup in August 2020 and military takeover in May 2021, the Malian military had intervened in the political arena at least five times since the country gained independence in 1960; two attempts failed (1976 and 1978), while three succeeded in overturning civilian rule (1968, 1991, and 2012); the military collapsed in 2012 during the fighting against Tuareg rebels and Islamic militants; it has been since rebuilt, but continues to have limited capabilities and is heavily reliant on external assistanceWith a sustained total fertility rate of about 3.5 children per woman and almost 60% of the population under the age of 25, as of 2022, Mauritania's population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future. Mauritania's large youth cohort is vital to its development prospects, but available schooling does not adequately prepare students for the workplace. Girls continue to be underrepresented in the classroom, educational quality remains poor, and the dropout rate is high. The literacy rate is only about 50%, even though access to primary education has improved since the mid-2000s. Women's restricted access to education and discriminatory laws maintain gender inequality - worsened by early and forced marriages and female genital cutting.
The denial of education to black Moors also helps to perpetuate slavery. Although Mauritania abolished slavery in 1981 (the last country in the world to do so) and made it a criminal offense in 2007, the millenniums-old practice persists largely because anti-slavery laws are rarely enforced and the custom is so ingrained. According to a 2018 nongovernmental organization's report, a little more than 2% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which includes individuals subjected to forced labor and forced marriage, while many thousands of individuals who are legally free contend with discrimination, poor education, and a lack of identity papers and, therefore, live in de facto slavery. The UN and international press outlets have claimed that up to 20% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which would be the highest rate worldwide.
Drought, poverty, and unemployment have driven outmigration from Mauritania since the 1970s. Early flows were directed toward other West African countries, including Senegal, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gambia. The 1989 Mauritania-Senegal conflict forced thousands of black Mauritanians to take refuge in Senegal and pushed labor migrants toward the Gulf, Libya, and Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mauritania has accepted migrants from neighboring countries to fill labor shortages since its independence in 1960 and more recently has received refugees escaping civil wars, including tens of thousands of Tuaregs who fled Mali in 2012.
Mauritania was an important transit point for Sub-Saharan migrants moving illegally to North Africa and Europe. In the mid-2000s, as border patrols increased in the Strait of Gibraltar, security increased around Spain's North African enclaves (Ceuta and Melilla), and Moroccan border controls intensified, illegal migration flows shifted from the Western Mediterranean to Spain's Canary Islands. In 2006, departure points moved southward along the West African coast from Morocco and then Western Sahara to Mauritania's two key ports (Nouadhibou and the capital Nouakchott), and illegal migration to the Canaries peaked at almost 32,000. The numbers fell dramatically in the following years because of joint patrolling off the West African coast by Frontex (the EU's border protection agency), Spain, Mauritania, and Senegal; the expansion of Spain's border surveillance system; and the 2008 European economic downturn.
" + "text": "With a sustained total fertility rate of about 3.5 children per woman and almost 60% of the population under the age of 25 as of 2020, Mauritania's population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future. Mauritania's large youth cohort is vital to its development prospects, but available schooling does not adequately prepare students for the workplace. Girls continue to be underrepresented in the classroom, educational quality remains poor, and the dropout rate is high. The literacy rate is only about 50%, even though access to primary education has improved since the mid-2000s. Women's restricted access to education and discriminatory laws maintain gender inequality - worsened by early and forced marriages and female genital cutting.
The denial of education to black Moors also helps to perpetuate slavery. Although Mauritania abolished slavery in 1981 (the last country in the world to do so) and made it a criminal offense in 2007, the millenniums-old practice persists largely because anti-slavery laws are rarely enforced and the custom is so ingrained. According to a 2018 nongovernmental organization's report, a little more than 2% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which includes individuals subjected to forced labor and forced marriage, while many thousands of individuals who are legally free contend with discrimination, poor education, and a lack of identity papers and, therefore, live in de facto slavery. The UN and international press outlets have claimed that up to 20% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which would be the highest rate worldwide.
Drought, poverty, and unemployment have driven outmigration from Mauritania since the 1970s. Early flows were directed toward other West African countries, including Senegal, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gambia. The 1989 Mauritania-Senegal conflict forced thousands of black Mauritanians to take refuge in Senegal and pushed labor migrants toward the Gulf, Libya, and Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mauritania has accepted migrants from neighboring countries to fill labor shortages since its independence in 1960 and more recently has received refugees escaping civil wars, including tens of thousands of Tuaregs who fled Mali in 2012.
Mauritania was an important transit point for Sub-Saharan migrants moving illegally to North Africa and Europe. In the mid-2000s, as border patrols increased in the Strait of Gibraltar, security increased around Spain's North African enclaves (Ceuta and Melilla), and Moroccan border controls intensified, illegal migration flows shifted from the Western Mediterranean to Spain's Canary Islands. In 2006, departure points moved southward along the West African coast from Morocco and then Western Sahara to Mauritania's two key ports (Nouadhibou and the capital Nouakchott), and illegal migration to the Canaries peaked at almost 32,000. The numbers fell dramatically in the following years because of joint patrolling off the West African coast by Frontex (the EU's border protection agency), Spain, Mauritania, and Senegal; the expansion of Spain's border surveillance system; and the 2008 European economic downturn.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "3.3% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "3.4% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.19 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ "text": "approximately 16,000 active armed forces personnel (15,000 Army; 700 Navy; 300 Air Force); estimated 3,000 Gendarmerie; estimated 2,000 National Guard (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the Mauritanian Armed Forces' inventory is limited and made up largely of older French and Soviet-era equipment; since 2010, Mauritania has received a limited amount of mostly second-hand military equipment from a variety of suppliers, with China as the leading provider (2022)" + "text": "the military's inventory is limited and made up largely of older French and Soviet-era equipment; in recent years, Mauritania has received a limited amount of mostly secondhand military equipment from a variety of suppliers, with China as the leading provider (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary military service; no conscription (2022)" diff --git a/africa/mz.json b/africa/mz.json index da626e2a..32b63a61 100644 --- a/africa/mz.json +++ b/africa/mz.json @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ "text": "Roman Catholic 27.2%, Muslim 18.9%, Zionist Christian 15.6%, Evangelical/Pentecostal 15.3%, Anglican 1.7%, other 4.8%, none 13.9%, unspecified 2.5% (2017 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Mozambique is a poor, sparsely populated country with high fertility and mortality rates and a rapidly growing youthful population – 45% of the population is younger than 15, as of 2022. Mozambique’s high poverty rate is sustained by natural disasters, disease, high population growth, low agricultural productivity, and the unequal distribution of wealth. The country’s birth rate is among the world’s highest, averaging around more than 5 children per woman (and higher in rural areas) for at least the last three decades. The sustained high level of fertility reflects gender inequality, low contraceptive use, early marriages and childbearing, and a lack of education, particularly among women. The high population growth rate is somewhat restrained by the country’s high HIV/AIDS and overall mortality rates. Mozambique ranks among the worst in the world for HIV/AIDS prevalence, HIV/AIDS deaths, and life expectancy at birth, as of 2022.
Mozambique is predominantly a country of emigration, but internal, rural-urban migration has begun to grow. Mozambicans, primarily from the country’s southern region, have been migrating to South Africa for work for more than a century. Additionally, approximately 1.7 million Mozambicans fled to Malawi, South Africa, and other neighboring countries between 1979 and 1992 to escape from civil war. Labor migrants have usually been men from rural areas whose crops have failed or who are unemployed and have headed to South Africa to work as miners; multiple generations of the same family often become miners. Since the abolition of apartheid in South Africa in 1991, other job opportunities have opened to Mozambicans, including in the informal and manufacturing sectors, but mining remains their main source of employment.
" + "text": "Mozambique is a poor, sparsely populated country with high fertility and mortality rates and a rapidly growing youthful population – 45% of the population is younger than 15, as of 2020. Mozambique’s high poverty rate is sustained by natural disasters, disease, high population growth, low agricultural productivity, and the unequal distribution of wealth. The country’s birth rate is among the world’s highest, averaging around 5 children per woman (and higher in rural areas) for at least the last three decades. The sustained high level of fertility reflects gender inequality, low contraceptive use, early marriages and childbearing, and a lack of education, particularly among women. The high population growth rate is somewhat restrained by the country’s high HIV/AIDS and overall mortality rates. Mozambique ranks among the worst in the world for HIV/AIDS prevalence, HIV/AIDS deaths, and life expectancy at birth, as of 2022.
Mozambique is predominantly a country of emigration, but internal, rural-urban migration has begun to grow. Mozambicans, primarily from the country’s southern region, have been migrating to South Africa for work for more than a century. Additionally, approximately 1.7 million Mozambicans fled to Malawi, South Africa, and other neighboring countries between 1979 and 1992 to escape from civil war. Labor migrants have usually been men from rural areas whose crops have failed or who are unemployed and have headed to South Africa to work as miners; multiple generations of the same family often become miners. Since the abolition of apartheid in South Africa in 1991, other job opportunities have opened to Mozambicans, including in the informal and manufacturing sectors, but mining remains their main source of employment.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "7.8% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "7.6% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.09 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" diff --git a/africa/ng.json b/africa/ng.json index 29db395f..deace1c0 100644 --- a/africa/ng.json +++ b/africa/ng.json @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ "text": "Muslim 99.3%, Christian 0.3%, animist 0.2%, none 0.1% (2012 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Niger has the highest total fertility rate (TFR) of any country in the world, averaging close to 7 children per woman in 2022. A slight decline in fertility over the last few decades has stalled. This leveling off of the high fertility rate is in large part a product of the continued desire for large families. In Niger, the TFR is lower than the desired fertility rate, which makes it unlikely that contraceptive use will increase. The high TFR sustains rapid population growth and a large youth population – almost 70% of the populace is under the age of 25, as of 2022. Gender inequality, including a lack of educational opportunities for women and early marriage and childbirth, also contributes to high population growth.
Because of large family sizes, children are inheriting smaller and smaller parcels of land. The dependence of most Nigeriens on subsistence farming on increasingly small landholdings, coupled with declining rainfall and the resultant shrinkage of arable land, are all preventing food production from keeping up with population growth.
For more than half a century, Niger's lack of economic development has led to steady net outmigration. In the 1960s, Nigeriens mainly migrated to coastal West African countries to work on a seasonal basis. Some headed to Libya and Algeria in the 1970s to work in the booming oil industry until its decline in the 1980s. Since the 1990s, the principal destinations for Nigerien labor migrants have been West African countries, especially Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire, while emigration to Europe and North America has remained modest. During the same period, Niger’s desert trade route town Agadez became a hub for West African and other Sub-Saharan migrants crossing the Sahara to North Africa and sometimes onward to Europe.
More than 60,000 Malian refugees have fled to Niger since violence between Malian government troops and armed rebels began in early 2012. Ongoing attacks by the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency, dating to 2013 in northern Nigeria and February 2015 in southeastern Niger, pushed tens of thousands of Nigerian refugees and Nigerien returnees across the border to Niger and displaced thousands of locals in Niger’s already impoverished Diffa region.
" + "text": "Niger has the highest total fertility rate (TFR) of any country in the world, averaging close to 7 children per woman in 2022. A slight decline in fertility over the last few decades has stalled. This leveling off of the high fertility rate is in large part a product of the continued desire for large families. In Niger, the TFR is lower than the desired fertility rate, which makes it unlikely that contraceptive use will increase. The high TFR sustains rapid population growth and a large youth population – almost 70% of the populace is under the age of 25, as of 2020. Gender inequality, including a lack of educational opportunities for women and early marriage and childbirth, also contributes to high population growth.
Because of large family sizes, children are inheriting smaller and smaller parcels of land. The dependence of most Nigeriens on subsistence farming on increasingly small landholdings, coupled with declining rainfall and the resultant shrinkage of arable land, are all preventing food production from keeping up with population growth.
For more than half a century, Niger's lack of economic development has led to steady net outmigration. In the 1960s, Nigeriens mainly migrated to coastal West African countries to work on a seasonal basis. Some headed to Libya and Algeria in the 1970s to work in the booming oil industry until its decline in the 1980s. Since the 1990s, the principal destinations for Nigerien labor migrants have been West African countries, especially Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire, while emigration to Europe and North America has remained modest. During the same period, Niger’s desert trade route town Agadez became a hub for West African and other Sub-Saharan migrants crossing the Sahara to North Africa and sometimes onward to Europe.
More than 60,000 Malian refugees have fled to Niger since violence between Malian government troops and armed rebels began in early 2012. Ongoing attacks by the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency, dating to 2013 in northern Nigeria and February 2015 in southeastern Niger, pushed tens of thousands of Nigerian refugees and Nigerien returnees across the border to Niger and displaced thousands of locals in Niger’s already impoverished Diffa region.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "5.7% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "6.2% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.04 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "34.05 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "34.1 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -865,8 +865,8 @@ "text": "40.8% (2018 est.)" }, "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income": { - "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2014": { - "text": "34.3 (2014 est.)" + "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2018": { + "text": "37.3 (2018 est.)" } }, "Household income or consumption by percentage share": { @@ -1268,7 +1268,7 @@ "text": "information varies; approximately 12,000 active FAN troops (8,000 Army; 200 Air Force; 4,000 Gendarmerie); approximately 3,000 National Guard (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the FAN's inventory consists of a wide variety of older weapons; since 2010, the FAN has received small amounts of mostly second-hand equipment and donations from several countries with the US as the top provider (2022)" + "text": "the FAN's inventory consists of a wide variety of older weapons; in recent years, it has received small amounts of mostly secondhand equipment and donations from several countries with the US as the top provider (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "has conscription, although it is reportedly not always enforced; 18 is the legal minimum age for compulsory or voluntary military service; enlistees must be Nigerien citizens and unmarried; 2-year service term; women may serve in health care (2022)" diff --git a/africa/ni.json b/africa/ni.json index ae092232..bac75d78 100644 --- a/africa/ni.json +++ b/africa/ni.json @@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "3% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "3.4% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.38 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@ "text": "information varies; approximately 135,000 active duty armed forces personnel (100,000 Army; 20,000 Navy/Coast Guard; 15,000 Air Force); approximately 80,000 Security and Civil Defense Corps (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the military's inventory consists of a wide variety of imported weapons systems of Chinese, European, Middle Eastern, Russian (including Soviet-era), and US origin; since 2010, Nigeria has undertaken a considerable military modernization program, and has received equipment from some 20 countries with China, Russia, and the US as the leading suppliers; Nigeria is also developing a defense-industry capacity, including small arms, armored personnel vehicles, and small-scale naval production (2022)" + "text": "the military's inventory consists of a wide variety of imported weapons systems of Chinese, European, Middle Eastern, Russian (including Soviet-era), and US origin; the military is undergoing a considerable modernization program, and in recent years has received equipment from some 20 countries with China, Russia, and the US as the leading suppliers; Nigeria is also developing a defense-industry capacity, including small arms, armored personnel vehicles, and small-scale naval production (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-26 years of age for men and women for voluntary military service; no conscription (2022)" diff --git a/africa/od.json b/africa/od.json index 5184fa7e..b057284a 100644 --- a/africa/od.json +++ b/africa/od.json @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ "text": "Christian 60.5%, folk religion 32.9%, Muslim 6.2%, other <1%, unaffiliated <1% (2020 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "South Sudan, independent from Sudan since July 2011 after decades of civil war, is one of the world’s poorest countries and ranks among the lowest in many socioeconomic categories. Problems are exacerbated by ongoing tensions with Sudan over oil revenues and land borders, fighting between government forces and rebel groups, and inter-communal violence. Most of the population lives off of farming, while smaller numbers rely on animal husbandry; more than 80% of the populace lives in rural areas. The maternal mortality rate is among the world’s highest for a variety of reasons, including a shortage of health care workers, facilities, and supplies; poor roads and a lack of transport; and cultural beliefs that prevent women from seeking obstetric care. Most women marry and start having children early, giving birth at home with the assistance of traditional birth attendants, who are unable to handle complications.
Educational attainment is extremely poor due to the lack of schools, qualified teachers, and materials. Only one-third of the population is literate (the rate is even lower among women), and half live below the poverty line. Teachers and students are also struggling with the switch from Arabic to English as the language of instruction. Many adults missed out on schooling because of warfare and displacement.
More than 2 million South Sudanese have sought refuge in neighboring countries since the current conflict began in December 2013. Another 2.2 million South Sudanese are internally displaced as of December 2022. Despite South Sudan’s instability and lack of infrastructure and social services, more than 275,000 people had fled to South Sudan to escape fighting in Sudan as of December 2022.
" + "text": "South Sudan, independent from Sudan since July 2011 after decades of civil war, is one of the world’s poorest countries and ranks among the lowest in many socioeconomic categories. Problems are exacerbated by ongoing tensions with Sudan over oil revenues and land borders, fighting between government forces and rebel groups, and inter-communal violence. Most of the population lives off of farming, while smaller numbers rely on animal husbandry; abput 80% of the populace lives in rural areas. The maternal mortality rate is among the world’s highest for a variety of reasons, including a shortage of health care workers, facilities, and supplies; poor roads and a lack of transport; and cultural beliefs that prevent women from seeking obstetric care. Most women marry and start having children early, giving birth at home with the assistance of traditional birth attendants, who are unable to handle complications.
Educational attainment is extremely poor due to the lack of schools, qualified teachers, and materials. Only one-third of the population is literate (the rate is even lower among women), and half live below the poverty line. Teachers and students are also struggling with the switch from Arabic to English as the language of instruction. Many adults missed out on schooling because of warfare and displacement.
More than 2 million South Sudanese have sought refuge in neighboring countries since the current conflict began in December 2013. Another 2.2 million South Sudanese are internally displaced as of October 2022. Despite South Sudan’s instability and lack of infrastructure and social services, more than 275,000 people had fled to South Sudan to escape fighting in Sudan as of December 2022.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "6% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "5.3% of GDP (2020)" }, "Sanitation facility access": { "improved: urban": { @@ -1101,14 +1101,14 @@ "note": "note: some active SSPDF personnel may be militia; the National/Necessary Unified Forces (NUF) will have about 50-80,000 troops from the SSPDF and armed opposition groups when it is formed; as of August 2022, approximately 20,000 NUF had been trained" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the SSPDF inventory is primarily of Soviet origin; South Sudan has been under a UN arms embargo since 2018 (2022)" + "text": "the SSPDF inventory is primarily of Soviet origin; South Sudan has been under a UN arms embargo since 2018 (2023)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18 is the legal minimum age for compulsory and voluntary military service; conscription only for men; women may volunteer; 12-24 months service (2022)", "note": "note: in 2019, women made up less than 10% of the active military" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the South Sudan People’s Defense Force (SSPDF), formerly the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), was founded as a guerrilla movement against the Sudanese Government in 1983 and participated in the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005); the Juba Declaration that followed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 unified the SPLA and the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF), the second-largest rebel militia remaining from the civil war, under the SPLA name; in 2017, the SPLA was renamed the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) and in September 2018 was renamed again as the SSPDFGuinea-Bissau’s young and growing population is sustained by high fertility; approximately 60% of the population is under the age of 25. Its large reproductive-age population and total fertility rate of more than 4 children per woman offsets the country’s high infant and maternal mortality rates. The latter is among the world’s highest because of the prevalence of early childbearing, a lack of birth spacing, the high percentage of births outside of health care facilities, and a shortage of medicines and supplies.
Guinea-Bissau’s history of political instability, a civil war, and several coups (the latest in 2012) have resulted in a fragile state with a weak economy, high unemployment, rampant corruption, widespread poverty, and thriving drug and child trafficking. With the country lacking educational infrastructure, school funding and materials, and qualified teachers, and with the cultural emphasis placed on religious education, parents frequently send boys to study in residential Koranic schools (daaras) in Senegal and The Gambia. They often are extremely deprived and are forced into street begging or agricultural work by marabouts (Muslim religious teachers), who enrich themselves at the expense of the children. Boys who leave their marabouts often end up on the streets of Dakar or other large Senegalese towns and are vulnerable to even worse abuse.
Some young men lacking in education and job prospects become involved in the flourishing international drug trade. Local drug use and associated violent crime are growing.
" + "text": "Guinea-Bissau’s young and growing population is sustained by high fertility; approximately 60% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020. Its large reproductive-age population and total fertility rate of more than 4 children per woman offsets the country’s high infant and maternal mortality rates. The latter is among the world’s highest because of the prevalence of early childbearing, a lack of birth spacing, the high percentage of births outside of health care facilities, and a shortage of medicines and supplies.
Guinea-Bissau’s history of political instability, a civil war, and several coups (the latest in 2012) have resulted in a fragile state with a weak economy, high unemployment, rampant corruption, widespread poverty, and thriving drug and child trafficking. With the country lacking educational infrastructure, school funding and materials, and qualified teachers, and with the cultural emphasis placed on religious education, parents frequently send boys to study in residential Koranic schools (daaras) in Senegal and The Gambia. They often are extremely deprived and are forced into street begging or agricultural work by marabouts (Muslim religious teachers), who enrich themselves at the expense of the children. Boys who leave their marabouts often end up on the streets of Dakar or other large Senegalese towns and are vulnerable to even worse abuse.
Some young men lacking in education and job prospects become involved in the flourishing international drug trade. Local drug use and associated violent crime are growing.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "8.4% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "8.4% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.2 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@ "text": "approximately 4,000 total active troops, including a few hundred air and naval personnel (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the FARP is poorly armed with an inventory consisting of Soviet-era equipment, much of which is reportedly unserviceable; the only reported deliveries of military equipment since 2015 were patrol boats from Spain in 2017 and non-lethal equipment from China in 2015; Guinea-Bissau has also discussed acquiring military equipment with Indonesia (2022)" + "text": "the FARP is poorly armed with an inventory consisting of Soviet-era equipment, much of which is reportedly unserviceable; over the past several years, it has received only a small amount of equipment from China and Spain (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-25 years of age for selective compulsory military service (Air Force service is voluntary); 16 years of age or younger, with parental consent, for voluntary service (2022)" diff --git a/africa/rw.json b/africa/rw.json index 6b0e685e..9839219c 100644 --- a/africa/rw.json +++ b/africa/rw.json @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ "text": "Protestant 57.7% (includes Adventist 12.6%), Roman Catholic 38.2%, Muslim 2.1%, other 1% (includes traditional, Jehovah's Witness), none 1.1% (2019-20 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Rwanda’s fertility rate declined sharply during the last decade, as a result of the government’s commitment to family planning, the increased use of contraceptives, and a downward trend in ideal family size. Increases in educational attainment, particularly among girls, and exposure to social media also contributed to the reduction in the birth rate. The average number of births per woman decreased from a 5.6 in 2005 to 4.5 in 2016. Despite these significant strides in reducing fertility, Rwanda’s birth rate remains very high and will continue to for an extended period of time because of its large population entering reproductive age. Because Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, its persistent high population growth and increasingly small agricultural landholdings will put additional strain on families’ ability to raise foodstuffs and access potable water. These conditions will also hinder the government’s efforts to reduce poverty and prevent environmental degradation.
The UNHCR recommended that effective 30 June 2013 countries invoke a cessation of refugee status for those Rwandans who fled their homeland between 1959 and 1998, including the 1994 genocide, on the grounds that the conditions that drove them to seek protection abroad no longer exist. The UNHCR’s decision is controversial because many Rwandan refugees still fear persecution if they return home, concerns that are supported by the number of Rwandans granted asylum since 1998 and by the number exempted from the cessation. Rwandan refugees can still seek an exemption or local integration, but host countries are anxious to send the refugees back to Rwanda and are likely to avoid options that enable them to stay. Conversely, Rwanda itself hosts approximately 125,000 refugees as of 2022; virtually all of them fleeing conflict in neighboring Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
" + "text": "Rwanda’s fertility rate declined sharply during the last decade, as a result of the government’s commitment to family planning, the increased use of contraceptives, and a downward trend in ideal family size. Increases in educational attainment, particularly among girls, and exposure to social media also contributed to the reduction in the birth rate. The average number of births per woman decreased from a 5.6 in 2005 to 4.5 in 2016 and 3.3 in 2022. Despite these significant strides in reducing fertility, Rwanda’s birth rate remains very high and will continue to for an extended period of time because of its large population entering reproductive age. Because Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, its persistent high population growth and increasingly small agricultural landholdings will put additional strain on families’ ability to raise foodstuffs and access potable water. These conditions will also hinder the government’s efforts to reduce poverty and prevent environmental degradation.
The UNHCR recommended that effective 30 June 2013 countries invoke a cessation of refugee status for those Rwandans who fled their homeland between 1959 and 1998, including the 1994 genocide, on the grounds that the conditions that drove them to seek protection abroad no longer exist. The UNHCR’s decision is controversial because many Rwandan refugees still fear persecution if they return home, concerns that are supported by the number of Rwandans granted asylum since 1998 and by the number exempted from the cessation. Rwandan refugees can still seek an exemption or local integration, but host countries are anxious to send the refugees back to Rwanda and are likely to avoid options that enable them to stay. Conversely, Rwanda itself hosts approximately 125,000 refugees as of 2022; virtually all of them fleeing conflict in neighboring Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "6.4% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "7.3% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.12 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -1252,7 +1252,7 @@ "text": "72,192 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 48,367 (Burundi) (2022)" }, "stateless persons": { - "text": "9,500 (mid-year 2021)" + "text": "9,500 (2022)" } } } diff --git a/africa/se.json b/africa/se.json index eb05bc08..6bca0c10 100644 --- a/africa/se.json +++ b/africa/se.json @@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "5.2% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "6.4% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "2.25 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -1169,7 +1169,7 @@ "text": "approximately 500 personnel (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the SDF's inventory primarily consists of Soviet-era equipment delivered in the 1970s and 1980s; since 2010, the SDF has received limited amounts of more modern equipment, mostly donations of patrol boats and aircraft, from several suppliers led by China and India (2022)" + "text": "the SDF's inventory primarily consists of Soviet-era equipment delivered in the 1970s and 1980s; in recent years, the SDF has received limited amounts of more modern equipment, mostly donations of patrol boats and aircraft, from several suppliers led by China and India (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-28 (18-25 for officers) years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; 6-year initial commitment; no conscription (2022)" diff --git a/africa/sf.json b/africa/sf.json index d9303382..0f038d13 100644 --- a/africa/sf.json +++ b/africa/sf.json @@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "9.1% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "8.6% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.79 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "51.35 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "51.4 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -1305,7 +1305,7 @@ "text": "approximately 75,000 active duty personnel (40,000 Army; 7,000 Navy; 10,000 Air Force; 8,000 Military Health Service; 10,000 other, including administrative, logistics, military police); 180,000 South African Police Service (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the SANDF's inventory consists of a mix of domestically produced and foreign-supplied equipment; South Africa's domestic defense industry produced most of the Army's major weapons systems (some were jointly-produced with foreign companies), while the Air Force and Navy inventories include a mix of European-, Israeli-, and US-origin weapons systems (2022)" + "text": "the SANDF's inventory consists of a mix of domestically produced and foreign-supplied equipment; South Africa's domestic defense industry produced most of the Army's major weapons systems (some were jointly produced with foreign companies), while the Air Force and Navy inventories include a mix of European-, Israeli-, and US-origin weapons systems (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-22 (18-26 for college graduates) years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; 2-year service obligation (2022)", diff --git a/africa/sg.json b/africa/sg.json index faf5091d..66138763 100644 --- a/africa/sg.json +++ b/africa/sg.json @@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "4.1% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "5.2% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.09 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "38.97 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "39 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -872,8 +872,8 @@ "text": "46.7% (2011 est.)" }, "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income": { - "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2011": { - "text": "40.3 (2011 est.)" + "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2018": { + "text": "38.1 (2018 est.)" } }, "Household income or consumption by percentage share": { @@ -1288,7 +1288,7 @@ "text": "approximately 19,000 active personnel (12,000 Army; 1,000 Navy/Coast Guard; 1,000 Air Force; 5,000 National Gendarmerie) (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the FAS inventory includes mostly older or second-hand equipment from a variety of countries, including France, South Africa, and Russia/former Soviet Union; in recent years, the FAS has undertaken a modernization program; since 2010, it has received small amounts of newer equipment from more than 10 countries, with France as the leading supplier (2022)" + "text": "the FAS inventory includes mostly older or second-hand equipment from a variety of countries, including France, South Africa, and Russia/former Soviet Union; in recent years, the FAS has undertaken a modernization program; in recent years, it has received small amounts of newer equipment from more than 10 countries, with France as the leading supplier (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; 20 years of age for selective conscript service; 2-year service obligation; women have been accepted into military service since 2008 (2022)" diff --git a/africa/sl.json b/africa/sl.json index 81fd1b10..1701695c 100644 --- a/africa/sl.json +++ b/africa/sl.json @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ "text": "Muslim 77.1%, Christian 22.9% (2019 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Sierra Leone’s youthful and growing population is driven by its high total fertility rate (TFR) of almost 5 children per woman, which has declined little over the last two decades. Its elevated TFR is sustained by the continued desire for large families, the low level of contraceptive use, and the early start of childbearing. Despite its high TFR, Sierra Leone’s population growth is somewhat tempered by high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates that are among the world’s highest and are a result of poverty, a lack of potable water and sanitation, poor nutrition, limited access to quality health care services, and the prevalence of female genital cutting.
Sierra Leone’s large youth cohort – about 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – continues to struggle with high levels of unemployment, which was one of the major causes of the country’s 1991-2002 civil war and remains a threat to stability today. Its estimated 60% youth unemployment rate is attributed to high levels of illiteracy and unskilled labor, a lack of private sector jobs, and low pay.
Sierra Leone has been a source of and destination for refugees. Sierra Leone’s civil war internally displaced as many as 2 million people, or almost half the population, and forced almost another half million to seek refuge in neighboring countries (370,000 Sierra Leoneans fled to Guinea and 120,000 to Liberia). The UNHCR has helped almost 180,000 Sierra Leoneans to return home, while more than 90,000 others have repatriated on their own. Of the more than 65,000 Liberians who took refuge in Sierra Leone during their country’s civil war (1989-2003), about 50,000 have been voluntarily repatriated by the UNHCR and others have returned home independently.
" + "text": "Sierra Leone’s youthful and growing population is driven by its high total fertility rate (TFR) of almost 4 children per woman as of 2022, which has declined little over the last two decades. Its elevated TFR is sustained by the continued desire for large families, the low level of contraceptive use, and the early start of childbearing. Despite its high TFR, Sierra Leone’s population growth is somewhat tempered by high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates that are among the world’s highest and are a result of poverty, a lack of potable water and sanitation, poor nutrition, limited access to quality health care services, and the prevalence of female genital cutting.
Sierra Leone’s large youth cohort – about 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – continues to struggle with high levels of unemployment, which was one of the major causes of the country’s 1991-2002 civil war and remains a threat to stability today. Its estimated 60% youth unemployment rate is attributed to high levels of illiteracy and unskilled labor, a lack of private sector jobs, and low pay.
Sierra Leone has been a source of and destination for refugees. Sierra Leone’s civil war internally displaced as many as 2 million people, or almost half the population, and forced almost another half million to seek refuge in neighboring countries (370,000 Sierra Leoneans fled to Guinea and 120,000 to Liberia). The UNHCR has helped almost 180,000 Sierra Leoneans to return home, while more than 90,000 others have repatriated on their own. Of the more than 65,000 Liberians who took refuge in Sierra Leone during their country’s civil war (1989-2003), about 50,000 have been voluntarily repatriated by the UNHCR and others have returned home independently.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "8.8% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "8.8% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.07 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" diff --git a/africa/so.json b/africa/so.json index b4f79217..515e27d1 100644 --- a/africa/so.json +++ b/africa/so.json @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ "text": "Sunni Muslim (Islam) (official, according to the 2012 Transitional Federal Charter)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Somalia scores very low for most humanitarian indicators, suffering from poor governance, protracted internal conflict, underdevelopment, economic decline, poverty, social and gender inequality, and environmental degradation. Despite civil war and famine raising its mortality rate, Somalia’s high fertility rate and large proportion of people of reproductive age maintain rapid population growth, with each generation being larger than the prior one. More than 60% of Somalia’s population is younger than 25, and the fertility rate is among the world’s highest at almost 6 children per woman – a rate that has decreased little since the 1970s.
A lack of educational and job opportunities is a major source of tension for Somalia’s large youth cohort, making them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist and pirate groups. Somalia has one of the world’s lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school – and one of the world’s highest youth unemployment rates. Life expectancy is low as a result of high infant and maternal mortality rates, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition, and inadequate health services.
During the two decades of conflict that followed the fall of the SIAD regime in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes. Today Somalia is the world’s fourth highest source country for refugees, after Ukraine, Syria and Afghanistan. Insecurity, drought, floods, food shortages, and a lack of economic opportunities are the driving factors.
As of 2022, more than 660,000 Somali refugees were hosted in the region, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, while nearly 3 million Somalis were internally displaced. Since the implementation of a tripartite voluntary repatriation agreement among Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR in 2013, many Somali refugees have returned home, some 80,000 between 2014 and 2022. The Kenyan Government in March 2021 ordered the closure of its two largest refugee camps, Dadaab and Kakuma, which then hosted more than 410,000 mainly Somali refugees. However, the UN refugee agency presented a road map, including voluntary repatriation, relocation to third countries, and alternative stay options that persuaded the Kenyan Government to delay the closures. The plan was supposed to lead to both camps being closed by 30 June 2022. Yet, as of May 2022, few Somali refugees had decided to return home because of security concerns and the lack of job prospects, instead waiting in the camps unsure of what the future held for them. Other Somali asylum seekers brave the dangers of crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen – despite its internal conflict – with aspirations to move onward to Saudi Arabia and other locations.
" + "text": "Somalia scores very low for most humanitarian indicators, suffering from poor governance, protracted internal conflict, underdevelopment, economic decline, poverty, social and gender inequality, and environmental degradation. Despite civil war and famine raising its mortality rate, Somalia’s high fertility rate and large proportion of people of reproductive age maintain rapid population growth, with each generation being larger than the prior one. More than 60% of Somalia’s population is younger than 25 as of 2020, and the fertility rate is among the world’s highest at almost 5.5 children per woman – a rate that has decreased little since the 1970s.
A lack of educational and job opportunities is a major source of tension for Somalia’s large youth cohort, making them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist and pirate groups. Somalia has one of the world’s lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school – and one of the world’s highest youth unemployment rates. Life expectancy is low as a result of high infant and maternal mortality rates, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition, and inadequate health services.
During the two decades of conflict that followed the fall of the SIAD regime in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes. Today Somalia is the world’s fourth highest source country for refugees, after Ukraine, Syria and Afghanistan. Insecurity, drought, floods, food shortages, and a lack of economic opportunities are the driving factors.
As of 2022, more than 660,000 Somali refugees were hosted in the region, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, while nearly 3 million Somalis were internally displaced. Since the implementation of a tripartite voluntary repatriation agreement among Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR in 2013, many Somali refugees have returned home, some 80,000 between 2014 and 2022. The Kenyan Government in March 2021 ordered the closure of its two largest refugee camps, Dadaab and Kakuma, which then hosted more than 410,000 mainly Somali refugees. However, the UN refugee agency presented a road map, including voluntary repatriation, relocation to third countries, and alternative stay options that persuaded the Kenyan Government to delay the closures. The plan was supposed to lead to both camps being closed by 30 June 2022. Yet, as of May 2022, few Somali refugees had decided to return home because of security concerns and the lack of job prospects, instead waiting in the camps unsure of what the future held for them. Other Somali asylum seekers brave the dangers of crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen – despite its internal conflict – with aspirations to move onward to Saudi Arabia and other locations.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -1147,28 +1147,28 @@ "note": "note 1: Somalia has numerous militia and regional forces operating throughout the country; these forces include ones that are clan- and warlord-based, semi-official paramilitary and special police forces (aka darwish), and externally-sponsored militias; the SNA is attempting to incorporate some of these militia unitsthe International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) received one incident of piracy and armed robbery in 2021 for the Horn of Africa; while there were no recorded incidents, the IMB PRC warns that Somalia pirates continue to possess the capacity to carry out attacks in the Somali basin and wider Indian Ocean; in particular, the report warns that, \"Masters and crew must remain vigilant and cautious when transiting these waters.\"; the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, contributed to the drop in incidents; the EU naval mission, Operation ATALANTA, continues its operations in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean through 2022; naval units from China, India, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, the US, and other countries also operate in conjunction with EU forces
" diff --git a/africa/su.json b/africa/su.json index ee8fa31b..358bb18f 100644 --- a/africa/su.json +++ b/africa/su.json @@ -139,6 +139,9 @@ "Religions": { "text": "Sunni Muslim, small Christian minority" }, + "Demographic profile": { + "text": "Sudan’s population grew almost fourfold between 1956 and 2008, the date of its last census. Even after the southern part of the country became independent South Sudan in 2011, the population of Sudan has continued to grow. The gender balance overall is fairly even. Females, however, are more prevalent in rural areas because of males migrating to urban areas in search of work. The total fertility rate (TFR) remains high despite falling from 7 children per woman in Sudan’s first census in 1955 to about 4.5 in 2022, which can be attributed to early marriage and a low contraceptive prevalence rate. Among the factors that led to the reduction in fertility are family planning, improvement in women’s education and participation in the labor force outside the home, and migration and urbanization.
The continued slow decline in fertility accompanied by a drop in mortality and increased life expectancy has produced an age structure where approximately 55% of the population was of working age (15-64) as of 2020. This share will grow as the sizable youth population becomes working age. As Sudan’s working age population increasingly outnumbers the youth and elderly populations (the dependent populations), the country will approach the possibility of a demographic dividend. The window of opportunity for potential economic growth depends not only on a favorable age structure but also on having a trained and educated workforce, job creation (particularly in the formal market), and investment in health, as well as generating savings to invest in schooling and care for the elderly. As of 2018, Sudan’s literacy rate was just over 60%, and even lower among women. Improvements in school enrollment, student-teacher ratio, infrastructure, funding, and educational quality could help the country to realize a demographic dividend.
" + }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { "text": "42.01% (male 9,726,937/female 9,414,988)" @@ -285,7 +288,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "4.6% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "3% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.26 physicians/1,000 population (2017)" @@ -1268,7 +1271,7 @@ "text": "information varies widely; estimated 100-125,000 active duty armed forces personnel; approximately 30-40,000 Rapid Support Forces (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the SAF's inventory includes a mix of Chinese, Russian, Soviet-era, Ukrainian, and domestically-produced weapons systems; since 2010, the leading arms providers to the SAF have been Belarus, China, Russia, and Ukraine; North Korea has also provided arms; Sudan has a domestic arms industry that manufactures ammunition, small arms, and armored vehicles, largely based on older Chinese and Russian systems (2022)" + "text": "the SAF's inventory includes a mix of Chinese, Russian, Soviet-era, and domestically produced weapons systems; in recent years, leading arms providers have included Belarus, China, Russia, and Ukraine; North Korea has also provided arms; Sudan has a domestic arms industry that manufactures ammunition, small arms, and armored vehicles, largely based on older Chinese and Russian systems (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-33 years of age for compulsory or voluntary military service for men and women; 1-2 year service obligation (2022)", diff --git a/africa/to.json b/africa/to.json index 63171f11..4e676cb6 100644 --- a/africa/to.json +++ b/africa/to.json @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "5.7% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "6% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.08 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" diff --git a/africa/tp.json b/africa/tp.json index 19c019ee..4ddeca2c 100644 --- a/africa/tp.json +++ b/africa/tp.json @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ "text": "Catholic 55.7%, Adventist 4.1%, Assembly of God 3.4%, New Apostolic 2.9%, Mana 2.3%, Universal Kingdom of God 2%, Jehovah's Witness 1.2%, other 6.2%, none 21.2%, unspecified 1% (2012 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Sao Tome and Principe’s youthful age structure – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – and high fertility rate ensure future population growth. Although Sao Tome has a net negative international migration rate, emigration is not a sufficient safety valve to reduce already high levels of unemployment and poverty. While literacy and primary school attendance have improved in recent years, Sao Tome still struggles to improve its educational quality and to increase its secondary school completion rate. Despite some improvements in education and access to healthcare, Sao Tome and Principe has much to do to decrease its high poverty rate, create jobs, and increase its economic growth.
The population of Sao Tome and Principe descends primarily from the islands’ colonial Portuguese settlers, who first arrived in the late 15th century, and the much larger number of African slaves brought in for sugar production and the slave trade. For about 100 years after the abolition of slavery in 1876, the population was further shaped by the widespread use of imported unskilled contract laborers from Portugal’s other African colonies, who worked on coffee and cocoa plantations. In the first decades after abolition, most workers were brought from Angola under a system similar to slavery. While Angolan laborers were technically free, they were forced or coerced into long contracts that were automatically renewed and extended to their children. Other contract workers from Mozambique and famine-stricken Cape Verde first arrived in the early 20th century under short-term contracts and had the option of repatriation, although some chose to remain in Sao Tome and Principe.
Today’s Sao Tomean population consists of mesticos (creole descendants of the European immigrants and African slaves that first inhabited the islands), forros (descendants of freed African slaves), angolares (descendants of runaway African slaves that formed a community in the south of Sao Tome Island and today are fishermen), servicais (contract laborers from Angola, Mozambique, and Cape Verde), tongas (locally born children of contract laborers), and lesser numbers of Europeans and Asians.
" + "text": "Sao Tome and Principe’s youthful age structure – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020 – and high fertility rate ensure future population growth. Although Sao Tome has a net negative international migration rate, emigration is not a sufficient safety valve to reduce already high levels of unemployment and poverty. While literacy and primary school attendance have improved in recent years, Sao Tome still struggles to improve its educational quality and to increase its secondary school completion rate. Despite some improvements in education and access to healthcare, Sao Tome and Principe has much to do to decrease its high poverty rate, create jobs, and increase its economic growth.
The population of Sao Tome and Principe descends primarily from the islands’ colonial Portuguese settlers, who first arrived in the late 15th century, and the much larger number of African slaves brought in for sugar production and the slave trade. For about 100 years after the abolition of slavery in 1876, the population was further shaped by the widespread use of imported unskilled contract laborers from Portugal’s other African colonies, who worked on coffee and cocoa plantations. In the first decades after abolition, most workers were brought from Angola under a system similar to slavery. While Angolan laborers were technically free, they were forced or coerced into long contracts that were automatically renewed and extended to their children. Other contract workers from Mozambique and famine-stricken Cape Verde first arrived in the early 20th century under short-term contracts and had the option of repatriation, although some chose to remain in Sao Tome and Principe.
Today’s Sao Tomean population consists of mesticos (creole descendants of the European immigrants and African slaves that first inhabited the islands), forros (descendants of freed African slaves), angolares (descendants of runaway African slaves that formed a community in the south of Sao Tome Island and today are fishermen), servicais (contract laborers from Angola, Mozambique, and Cape Verde), tongas (locally born children of contract laborers), and lesser numbers of Europeans and Asians.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "5.5% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "4.9% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.49 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "2.18 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "2.2 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -793,7 +793,7 @@ }, "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income": { "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2017": { - "text": "56.3 (2017 est.)" + "text": "40.7 (2017 est.)" } }, "Household income or consumption by percentage share": { diff --git a/africa/ts.json b/africa/ts.json index e341757e..dbfb10a6 100644 --- a/africa/ts.json +++ b/africa/ts.json @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "7% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "6.3% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "1.3 physicians/1,000 population (2017)" @@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "4.615 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "4.6 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -1229,7 +1229,7 @@ "text": "approximately 35,000 active duty personnel (25,000 Army; 5,000 Navy; 5,000 Air Force); estimated 10,000 National Guard (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the Tunisian military's inventory includes mostly older or second-hand US and European equipment; since 2010, the Netherlands and US have been the leading suppliers of arms to Tunisia (2022)" + "text": "the Tunisian military's inventory includes mostly older or second-hand US and European equipment; in recent years, the Netherlands and US have been the leading suppliers of arms to Tunisia (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "20-23 years of age for male compulsory service, 1-year service obligation; individuals engaged in higher education or vocational training programs prior to their military drafting are allowed to delay service until they have completed their programs; 18-23 years of age for voluntary service; women may volunteer (2022)", diff --git a/africa/tz.json b/africa/tz.json index f5c2a8ae..a7cdc564 100644 --- a/africa/tz.json +++ b/africa/tz.json @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ "note": "note: Zanzibar is almost entirely Muslim" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Tanzania has the largest population in East Africa and the lowest population density; more than a third of the population is urban. Tanzania’s youthful population – about two-thirds of the population is under 25 – is growing rapidly because of the high total fertility rate of 4.4 children per woman, as of 2022. Progress in reducing the birth rate has stalled, sustaining the country’s nearly 3% annual growth. The maternal mortality rate has improved since 2000, yet it remains very high because of early and frequent pregnancies, inadequate maternal health services, and a lack of skilled birth attendants – problems that are worse among poor and rural women. Tanzania has made strides in reducing under-5 and infant mortality rates, but a recent drop in immunization threatens to undermine gains in child health. Malaria is a leading killer of children under 5, while HIV is the main source of adult mortality.
For Tanzania, most migration is internal, rural to urban movement, while some temporary labor migration from towns to plantations takes place seasonally for harvests. Tanzania was Africa’s largest refugee-hosting country for decades, hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Great Lakes region, primarily Burundi, over the last fifty years. However, the assisted repatriation and naturalization of tens of thousands of Burundian refugees between 2002 and 2014 dramatically reduced the refugee population. Tanzania is increasingly a transit country for illegal migrants from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region who are heading to southern Africa for security reasons and/or economic opportunities. Some of these migrants choose to settle in Tanzania.
" + "text": "Tanzania has the largest population in East Africa and the lowest population density; more than a third of the population is urban. Tanzania’s youthful population – over 60% of the population is under 25 as of 2020 – is growing rapidly because of the high total fertility rate of 4.4 children per woman, as of 2022. Progress in reducing the birth rate has stalled, sustaining the country’s nearly 3% annual growth rate. The maternal mortality rate has improved since 2000, yet it remains very high because of early and frequent pregnancies, inadequate maternal health services, and a lack of skilled birth attendants – problems that are worse among poor and rural women. Tanzania has made strides in reducing under-5 and infant mortality rates, but a recent drop in immunization threatens to undermine gains in child health. Malaria is a leading killer of children under 5, while HIV is the main source of adult mortality.
For Tanzania, most migration is internal, rural to urban movement, while some temporary labor migration from towns to plantations takes place seasonally for harvests. Tanzania was Africa’s largest refugee-hosting country for decades, hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Great Lakes region, primarily Burundi, over the last fifty years. However, the assisted repatriation and naturalization of tens of thousands of Burundian refugees between 2002 and 2014 dramatically reduced the refugee population. Tanzania is increasingly a transit country for illegal migrants from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region who are heading to southern Africa for security reasons and/or economic opportunities. Some of these migrants choose to settle in Tanzania.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "3.8% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "3.8% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.05 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "96.27 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "96.3 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -1310,7 +1310,7 @@ "text": "approximately 25,000 active duty personnel (21,000 Land Forces; 1,000 Naval Forces; 3,000 Air Force) (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the TPDF's inventory includes mostly Soviet-era and Chinese equipment; since 2010, China has been the leading supplier of arms to the TPDF (2022)" + "text": "the TPDF's inventory includes mostly Soviet-era and Chinese equipment; in recent years, China has been the leading supplier of arms to the TPDF (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-25 years of age for voluntary military service; 6-year commitment (2-year contracts afterwards); selective conscription for 2 years of public service (2022)" diff --git a/africa/ug.json b/africa/ug.json index bf16695b..8a5e45f6 100644 --- a/africa/ug.json +++ b/africa/ug.json @@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "3.8% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "4% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.15 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -1291,6 +1291,9 @@ "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { "text": "854,268 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 473,529 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 61,563 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 40,630 (Burundi), 26,683 (Eritrea), 23,251 (Rwanda), 5,330 (Ethiopia) (2022)" + }, + "stateless persons": { + "text": "67,000 (2022)" } } } diff --git a/africa/uv.json b/africa/uv.json index 4df023fd..9c40da01 100644 --- a/africa/uv.json +++ b/africa/uv.json @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ "text": "Muslim 63.2%, Roman Catholic 24.6%, Protestant 6.9%, traditional/animist 4.2%, none 0.7%, unspecified 0.4% (2017-18 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Burkina Faso has a young age structure – the result of declining mortality combined with steady high fertility – and continues to experience rapid population growth, which is putting increasing pressure on the country’s limited arable land. More than 65% of the population is under the age of 25, and the population is growing at 3% annually. Mortality rates, especially those of infants and children, have decreased because of improved health care, hygiene, and sanitation, but women continue to have an average of almost 6 children. Even if fertility were substantially reduced, today’s large cohort entering their reproductive years would sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future. Only about a third of the population is literate and unemployment is widespread, dampening the economic prospects of Burkina Faso’s large working-age population.
Migration has traditionally been a way of life for Burkinabe, with seasonal migration being replaced by stints of up to two years abroad. Cote d’Ivoire remains the top destination, although it has experienced periods of internal conflict. Under French colonization, Burkina Faso became a main labor source for agricultural and factory work in Cote d’Ivoire. Burkinabe also migrated to Ghana, Mali, and Senegal for work between the world wars. Burkina Faso attracts migrants from Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Mali, who often share common ethnic backgrounds with the Burkinabe. Despite its food shortages and high poverty rate, Burkina Faso has become a destination for refugees in recent years and hosts about 33,600 Malian refugees as of October 2022.
(2018)" + "text": "Burkina Faso has a young age structure – the result of declining mortality combined with steady high fertility – and continues to experience rapid population growth, which is putting increasing pressure on the country’s limited arable land. Almost 65% of the population is under the age of 25 as of 2020, and the population is growing at 2.5% annually. Mortality rates, especially those of infants and children, have decreased because of improved health care, hygiene, and sanitation, but women continue to have an average of more than 4 children. Even if fertility were substantially reduced, today’s large cohort entering their reproductive years would sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future. Only about a third of the population is literate and unemployment is widespread, dampening the economic prospects of Burkina Faso’s large working-age population.
Migration has traditionally been a way of life for Burkinabe, with seasonal migration being replaced by stints of up to two years abroad. Cote d’Ivoire remains the top destination, although it has experienced periods of internal conflict. Under French colonization, Burkina Faso became a main labor source for agricultural and factory work in Cote d’Ivoire. Burkinabe also migrated to Ghana, Mali, and Senegal for work between the world wars. Burkina Faso attracts migrants from Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Mali, who often share common ethnic backgrounds with the Burkinabe. Despite its food shortages and high poverty rate, Burkina Faso has become a destination for refugees in recent years and hosts about 33,600 Malian refugees as of October 2022.
(2018)" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "5.5% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "6.7% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.09 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -1251,7 +1251,7 @@ }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { "text": "approximately 13,000 personnel (8,000 Army; 500 Air Force; 4,500 National Gendarmerie) (2022)", - "note": "note 1: in 2019, the Burkina Faso Government announced an initial strength goal for the VDF of 15,000 members, but in October 2022 announced plans to recruit up to 50,000 VDF volunteersPlanning officials view Namibia’s reduced population growth rate as sustainable based on the country’s economic growth over the past decade. Prior to independence in 1990, Namibia’s relatively small population grew at about 3% annually, but declining fertility and the impact of HIV/AIDS slowed this growth to 1.4% by 2011, rebounding to close to 2% by 2016. Namibia’s fertility rate has fallen over the last two decades – from about 4.5 children per woman in 1996 to 3.4 in 2016 – due to increased contraceptive use, higher educational attainment among women, and greater female participation in the labor force. The average age at first birth has stayed fairly constant, but the age at first marriage continues to increase, indicating a rising incidence of premarital childbearing.
The majority of Namibians are rural dwellers (about 55%) and live in the better-watered north and northeast parts of the country. Migration, historically male-dominated, generally flows from northern communal areas – non-agricultural lands where blacks were sequestered under the apartheid system – to agricultural, mining, and manufacturing centers in the center and south. After independence from South Africa, restrictions on internal movement eased, and rural-urban migration increased, bolstering urban growth.
Some Namibians – usually persons who are better-educated, more affluent, and from urban areas – continue to legally migrate to South Africa temporarily to visit family and friends and, much less frequently, to pursue tertiary education or better economic opportunities. Namibians concentrated along the country’s other borders make unauthorized visits to Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, or Botswana, to visit family and to trade agricultural goods. Few Namibians express interest in permanently settling in other countries; they prefer the safety of their homeland, have a strong national identity, and enjoy a well-supplied retail sector. Although Namibia is receptive to foreign investment and cross-border trade, intolerance toward non-citizens is widespread.
" + "text": "Planning officials view Namibia’s reduced population growth rate as sustainable based on the country’s economic growth over the past decade. Prior to independence in 1990, Namibia’s relatively small population grew at about 3% annually, but declining fertility and the impact of HIV/AIDS slowed this growth to 1.4% by 2011, rebounding to close to 2% by 2016. Namibia’s fertility rate has fallen over the last two decades – from about 4.5 children per woman in 1996 to 3.4 in 2016 and to 3 in 2022 – due to increased contraceptive use, higher educational attainment among women, and greater female participation in the labor force. The average age at first birth has stayed fairly constant, but the age at first marriage continues to increase, indicating a rising incidence of premarital childbearing.
The majority of Namibians are rural dwellers (about 55%) and live in the better-watered north and northeast parts of the country. Migration, historically male-dominated, generally flows from northern communal areas – non-agricultural lands where blacks were sequestered under the apartheid system – to agricultural, mining, and manufacturing centers in the center and south. After independence from South Africa, restrictions on internal movement eased, and rural-urban migration increased, bolstering urban growth.
Some Namibians – usually persons who are better-educated, more affluent, and from urban areas – continue to legally migrate to South Africa temporarily to visit family and friends and, much less frequently, to pursue tertiary education or better economic opportunities. Namibians concentrated along the country’s other borders make unauthorized visits to Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, or Botswana, to visit family and to trade agricultural goods. Few Namibians express interest in permanently settling in other countries; they prefer the safety of their homeland, have a strong national identity, and enjoy a well-supplied retail sector. Although Namibia is receptive to foreign investment and cross-border trade, intolerance toward non-citizens is widespread.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "8.5% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "8.9% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.59 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "39.91 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "39.9 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" } }, "Government": { diff --git a/africa/wz.json b/africa/wz.json index 189276a2..e11e181b 100644 --- a/africa/wz.json +++ b/africa/wz.json @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ "text": "Christian 90% (Zionist - a blend of Christianity and indigenous ancestral worship - 40%, Roman Catholic 20%, other 30% - includes Anglican, Methodist, Church of Jesus Christ, Jehovah's Witness), Muslim 2%, other 8% (includes Baha'i, Buddhist, Hindu, indigenous, Jewish) (2015 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Eswatini, a small, predominantly rural, landlocked country surrounded by South Africa and Mozambique, suffers from severe poverty and the world’s highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate. A weak and deteriorating economy, high unemployment, rapid population growth, and an uneven distribution of resources all combine to worsen already persistent poverty and food insecurity, especially in rural areas. Erratic weather (frequent droughts and intermittent heavy rains and flooding), overuse of small plots, the overgrazing of cattle, and outdated agricultural practices reduce crop yields and further degrade the environment, exacerbating Eswatini's poverty and subsistence problems. Eswatini's extremely high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate – more than 28% of adults have the disease – compounds these issues. Agricultural production has declined due to HIV/AIDS, as the illness causes households to lose manpower and to sell livestock and other assets to pay for medicine and funerals.
Swazis, mainly men from the country’s rural south, have been migrating to South Africa to work in coal, and later gold, mines since the late 19th century. Although the number of miners abroad has never been high in absolute terms because of Eswatini's small population, the outflow has had important social and economic repercussions. The peak of mining employment in South Africa occurred during the 1980s. Cross-border movement has accelerated since the 1990s, as increasing unemployment has pushed more Swazis to look for work in South Africa (creating a \"brain drain\" in the health and educational sectors); southern Swazi men have continued to pursue mining, although the industry has downsized. Women now make up an increasing share of migrants and dominate cross-border trading in handicrafts, using the proceeds to purchase goods back in Eswatini. Much of today’s migration, however, is not work-related but focuses on visits to family and friends, tourism, and shopping.
" + "text": "Eswatini, a small, predominantly rural, landlocked country surrounded by South Africa and Mozambique, suffers from severe poverty and the world’s highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate. A weak and deteriorating economy, high unemployment, rapid population growth, and an uneven distribution of resources all combine to worsen already persistent poverty and food insecurity, especially in rural areas. Erratic weather (frequent droughts and intermittent heavy rains and flooding), overuse of small plots, the overgrazing of cattle, and outdated agricultural practices reduce crop yields and further degrade the environment, exacerbating Eswatini's poverty and subsistence problems. Eswatini's extremely high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate – nearly 28% of adults have the disease – compounds these issues. Agricultural production has declined due to HIV/AIDS, as the illness causes households to lose manpower and to sell livestock and other assets to pay for medicine and funerals.
Swazis, mainly men from the country’s rural south, have been migrating to South Africa to work in coal, and later gold, mines since the late 19th century. Although the number of miners abroad has never been high in absolute terms because of Eswatini's small population, the outflow has had important social and economic repercussions. The peak of mining employment in South Africa occurred during the 1980s. Cross-border movement has accelerated since the 1990s, as increasing unemployment has pushed more Swazis to look for work in South Africa (creating a \"brain drain\" in the health and educational sectors); southern Swazi men have continued to pursue mining, although the industry has downsized. Women now make up an increasing share of migrants and dominate cross-border trading in handicrafts, using the proceeds to purchase goods back in Eswatini. Much of today’s migration, however, is not work-related but focuses on visits to family and friends, tourism, and shopping.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "6.8% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "6.5% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.14 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@ "text": "18-30 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; no conscription (2021)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the UEDF was originally created in 1973 as the Royal Swaziland Defense Force; the UEDF’s primary mission is external security but it also has domestic security responsibilities, including protecting members of the royal family; the king is the UEDF commander in chief and holds the position of minister of defense, although the UEDF reports to the Army commander and principal undersecretary of defense for day-to-day operations; the Royal Eswatini Police Service (REPS) is responsible for maintaining internal security as well as migration and border crossing enforcement; it is under the prime minister, although the king is the force’s titular commissioner in chief (2022)" + "text": "the UEDF’s primary mission is external security but it also has domestic security responsibilities, including protecting members of the royal family; the king is the UEDF commander in chief and holds the position of minister of defense, although the UEDF reports to the Army commander and principal undersecretary of defense for day-to-day operations; the Royal Eswatini Police Service (REPS) is responsible for maintaining internal security as well as migration and border crossing enforcement; it is under the prime minister, although the king is the force’s titular commissioner in chief; the UEDF was originally created in 1973 as the Royal Swaziland Defense Force (2023)" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/africa/za.json b/africa/za.json index fbe1d3d7..1944a90f 100644 --- a/africa/za.json +++ b/africa/za.json @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ "text": "Protestant 75.3%, Roman Catholic 20.2%, other 2.7% (includes Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, and Baha'i), none 1.8% (2010 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Zambia’s poor, youthful population consists primarily of Bantu-speaking people representing nearly 70 different ethnicities. Zambia’s high fertility rate continues to drive rapid population growth, averaging almost 3 percent annually between 2000 and 2010. The country’s total fertility rate has fallen by less than 1.5 children per woman during the last 30 years and still averages among the world’s highest, almost 6 children per woman, largely because of the country’s lack of access to family planning services, education for girls, and employment for women. Zambia also exhibits wide fertility disparities based on rural or urban location, education, and income. Poor, uneducated women from rural areas are more likely to marry young, to give birth early, and to have more children, viewing children as a sign of prestige and recognizing that not all of their children will live to adulthood. HIV/AIDS is prevalent in Zambia and contributes to its low life expectancy.
Zambian emigration is low compared to many other African countries and is comprised predominantly of the well-educated. The small amount of brain drain, however, has a major impact in Zambia because of its limited human capital and lack of educational infrastructure for developing skilled professionals in key fields. For example, Zambia has few schools for training doctors, nurses, and other health care workers. Its spending on education is low compared to other Sub-Saharan countries.
" + "text": "Zambia’s poor, youthful population consists primarily of Bantu-speaking people representing nearly 70 different ethnicities. Zambia’s high fertility rate continues to drive rapid population growth, averaging almost 3% annually between 2000 and 2010, and reaching over 3.3% in 2022. The country’s total fertility rate has fallen by less than 1.5 children per woman during the last 30 years and still averages among the world’s highest, almost 6 children per woman, largely because of the country’s lack of access to family planning services, education for girls, and employment for women. Zambia also exhibits wide fertility disparities based on rural or urban location, education, and income. Poor, uneducated women from rural areas are more likely to marry young, to give birth early, and to have more children, viewing children as a sign of prestige and recognizing that not all of their children will live to adulthood. HIV/AIDS is prevalent in Zambia and contributes to its low life expectancy.
Zambian emigration is low compared to many other African countries and is comprised predominantly of the well-educated. The small amount of brain drain, however, has a major impact in Zambia because of its limited human capital and lack of educational infrastructure for developing skilled professionals in key fields. For example, Zambia has few schools for training doctors, nurses, and other health care workers. Its spending on education is low compared to other Sub-Saharan countries.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "5.3% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "5.6% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "1.17 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" diff --git a/africa/zi.json b/africa/zi.json index 4053e268..59612ac0 100644 --- a/africa/zi.json +++ b/africa/zi.json @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ "text": "Protestant 74.8% (includes Apostolic 37.5%, Pentecostal 21.8%, other 15.5%), Roman Catholic 7.3%, other Christian 5.3%, traditional 1.5%, Muslim 0.5%, other 0.1%, none 10.5% (2015 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { - "text": "Zimbabwe’s progress in reproductive, maternal, and child health has stagnated in recent years. According to a 2010 Demographic and Health Survey, contraceptive use, the number of births attended by skilled practitioners, and child mortality have either stalled or somewhat deteriorated since the mid-2000s. Zimbabwe’s total fertility rate has remained fairly stable at about 4 children per woman for the last two decades, although an uptick in the urban birth rate in recent years has caused a slight rise in the country’s overall fertility rate. Zimbabwe’s HIV prevalence rate dropped from approximately 29% to 15% since 1997 but remains among the world’s highest and continues to suppress the country’s life expectancy rate. The proliferation of HIV/AIDS information and prevention programs and personal experience with those suffering or dying from the disease have helped to change sexual behavior and reduce the epidemic.
Historically, the vast majority of Zimbabwe’s migration has been internal – a rural-urban flow. In terms of international migration, over the last 40 years Zimbabwe has gradually shifted from being a destination country to one of emigration and, to a lesser degree, one of transit (for East African illegal migrants traveling to South Africa). As a British colony, Zimbabwe attracted significant numbers of permanent immigrants from the UK and other European countries, as well as temporary economic migrants from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. Although Zimbabweans have migrated to South Africa since the beginning of the 20th century to work as miners, the first major exodus from the country occurred in the years before and after independence in 1980. The outward migration was politically and racially influenced; a large share of the white population of European origin chose to leave rather than live under a new black-majority government.
In the 1990s and 2000s, economic mismanagement and hyperinflation sparked a second, more diverse wave of emigration. This massive out migration – primarily to other southern African countries, the UK, and the US – has created a variety of challenges, including brain drain, illegal migration, and human smuggling and trafficking. Several factors have pushed highly skilled workers to go abroad, including unemployment, lower wages, a lack of resources, and few opportunities for career growth.
" + "text": "Zimbabwe’s progress in reproductive, maternal, and child health has stagnated in recent years. According to a 2010 Demographic and Health Survey, contraceptive use, the number of births attended by skilled practitioners, and child mortality have either stalled or somewhat deteriorated since the mid-2000s. Zimbabwe’s total fertility rate has remained fairly stable at about 4 children per woman for the last two decades, although an uptick in the urban birth rate in recent years has caused a slight rise in the country’s overall fertility rate. Zimbabwe’s HIV prevalence rate dropped from approximately 29% to 15% since 1997 but remains among the world’s highest and continues to suppress the country’s life expectancy rate. The proliferation of HIV/AIDS information and prevention programs and personal experience with those suffering or dying from the disease have helped to change sexual behavior and reduce the epidemic.
Historically, the vast majority of Zimbabwe’s migration has been internal – a rural-urban flow. In terms of international migration, over the last 40 years Zimbabwe has gradually shifted from being a destination country to one of emigration and, to a lesser degree, one of transit (for East African illegal migrants traveling to South Africa). As a British colony, Zimbabwe attracted significant numbers of permanent immigrants from the UK and other European countries, as well as temporary economic migrants from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. Although Zimbabweans have migrated to South Africa since the beginning of the 20th century to work as miners, the first major exodus from the country occurred in the years before and after independence in 1980. The outward migration was politically and racially influenced; a large share of the white population of European origin chose to leave rather than live under a new black-majority government.
In the 1990s and 2000s, economic mismanagement and hyperinflation sparked a second, more diverse wave of emigration. This massive outmigration – primarily to other southern African countries, the UK, and the US – has created a variety of challenges, including brain drain, illegal migration, and human smuggling and trafficking. Several factors have pushed highly skilled workers to go abroad, including unemployment, lower wages, a lack of resources, and few opportunities for career growth.
" }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "7.7% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "3.4% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.2 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -1264,7 +1264,7 @@ "text": "information varies; approximately 30,000 active duty troops, including about 4,000 Air Force personnel (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the ZDF inventory is comprised mostly of Soviet-era and older Chinese equipment; since the early 2000s, Zimbabwe has been under an arms embargo from the European Union, as well as targeted sanctions from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the US (2022)" + "text": "the ZDF inventory is comprised mostly of Soviet-era and older Chinese equipment; since the early 2000s, Zimbabwe has been under an arms embargo from the EU, as well as targeted sanctions from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the US (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-22 years of age for voluntary military service (18-24 for officer cadets; 18-30 for technical/specialist personnel); no conscription; women are eligible to serve (2022)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/as.json b/australia-oceania/as.json index 4697f319..2da26bd8 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/as.json +++ b/australia-oceania/as.json @@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "9.9% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "10.7% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "4.13 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "492 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "492 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@ "text": "12,180 (Iran), 8,741 (Afghanistan), 5,042 (Pakistan) (mid-year 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { - "text": "5,770 (mid-year 2021)" + "text": "7,649 (2022)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/bp.json b/australia-oceania/bp.json index b8d571b1..f433c51d 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/bp.json +++ b/australia-oceania/bp.json @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "4.8% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "4.4% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.19 physicians/1,000 population (2016)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/cw.json b/australia-oceania/cw.json index 9c35cce8..15fbd78b 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/cw.json +++ b/australia-oceania/cw.json @@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "3.1% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "3.2% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "1.41 physicians/1,000 population (2014)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/fj.json b/australia-oceania/fj.json index cbae0232..7961c134 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/fj.json +++ b/australia-oceania/fj.json @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "3.8% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "3.8% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.86 physicians/1,000 population (2015)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/fm.json b/australia-oceania/fm.json index 76563dff..c263f9ab 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/fm.json +++ b/australia-oceania/fm.json @@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "11.4% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "11.6% of GDP (2020)" }, "Hospital bed density": { "text": "3.2 beds/1,000 population" diff --git a/australia-oceania/kr.json b/australia-oceania/kr.json index cf606ba4..3395b1c4 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/kr.json +++ b/australia-oceania/kr.json @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "10.3% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "11.6% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.2 physicians/1,000 population (2013)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/ne.json b/australia-oceania/ne.json index 688124ef..16eb6144 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ne.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ne.json @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "5.3% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "7.8% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "NA" diff --git a/australia-oceania/nh.json b/australia-oceania/nh.json index 12a9586a..8df8915b 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nh.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nh.json @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "3.4% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "4% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.17 physicians/1,000 population (2016)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/nr.json b/australia-oceania/nr.json index b9c409eb..9320f5ed 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nr.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nr.json @@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "9.8% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "12% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "1.35 physicians/1,000 population (2015)" @@ -695,6 +695,11 @@ "Population below poverty line": { "text": "NA" }, + "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income": { + "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2012": { + "text": "34.8 (2012 est.)" + } + }, "Household income or consumption by percentage share": { "lowest 10%": { "text": "NA" @@ -1050,7 +1055,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "stateless persons": { - "text": "133 (mid-year 2021)" + "text": "140 (2022)" } } } diff --git a/australia-oceania/nz.json b/australia-oceania/nz.json index 7b17f59d..c5de6e42 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nz.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nz.json @@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "9.7% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "10% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "3.62 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -1237,7 +1237,7 @@ "text": "approximately 9,500 active-duty troops (4,700 Army; 2,300 Navy; 2,500 Air Force) (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the NZDF is equipped mostly with imported weapons and equipment from Western suppliers; the US has been the leading provider since 2010 (2022)" + "text": "the NZDF is equipped mostly with Western-supplied weapons and equipment with the US as the leading provider (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "17 years of age for men and women for voluntary military service; soldiers cannot be deployed until the age of 18; no conscription (2022)", @@ -1260,6 +1260,11 @@ "Disputes - international": { "text": "New Zealand-Antarctica: asserts a territorial claim in Antarctica (Ross Dependency)
" }, + "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { + "stateless persons": { + "text": "5 (2022)" + } + }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "significant consumer of amphetamines" } diff --git a/australia-oceania/ps.json b/australia-oceania/ps.json index 9d6157f5..66be38d0 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ps.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ps.json @@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "15.2% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "18.4% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "1.77 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/rm.json b/australia-oceania/rm.json index dc3f1748..f8fdcb3e 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/rm.json +++ b/australia-oceania/rm.json @@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "16.3% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "13% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.42 physicians/1,000 population (2012)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/tn.json b/australia-oceania/tn.json index bc26b9e4..1099dc74 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/tn.json +++ b/australia-oceania/tn.json @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "5% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "5.3% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.95 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -1178,7 +1178,7 @@ "text": "approximately 650 personnel (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the Tonga military's inventory includes mostly light weapons and equipment from Australia, European (primarily the UK) countries, and the US (2022)" + "text": "the Tonga military's inventory includes mostly light weapons and equipment from Australia, European countries (primarily the UK), and the US (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "voluntary military service for men and women 18-25 (16 with parental approval for non-combat positions); no conscription (2022)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/tv.json b/australia-oceania/tv.json index c03498fe..3b267a2e 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/tv.json +++ b/australia-oceania/tv.json @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "24% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "21.5% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "1.19 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/ws.json b/australia-oceania/ws.json index d07dcf85..a69fe734 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ws.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ws.json @@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "6.4% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "5.3% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.6 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json index 6422d8ae..67d75d63 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json @@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "4.4% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "5.6% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "2.76 physicians/1,000 population (2017)" @@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "52 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "50 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" } }, "Government": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json index 0dbffc62..cb3c4b69 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json @@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "6.3% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "7.2% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "2.49 physicians/1,000 population (2017)" @@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "80 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "80 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" } }, "Government": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json index 351ebbde..6b1e77a8 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json @@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "5.8% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "7.6% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "1.94 physicians/1,000 population (2017)" @@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "700 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "700 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" } }, "Government": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json index fc842fa6..3e6a612b 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "6% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "6.9% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "1.08 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json index 9dd31413..0882c2e7 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json @@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "7.3% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "7.9% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "3.3 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@ "text": "29,906 (Venezuela) (economic and political crisis; includes Venezuelans who have claimed asylum, are recognized as refugees, or received alternative legal stay) (2021)" }, "stateless persons": { - "text": "205 (mid-year 2021)" + "text": "192 (2022)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json index 2b0281b0..8e40a4ce 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "11.3% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "12.5% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "8.42 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -1247,7 +1247,7 @@ "text": "limited available information; estimated 50,000 active personnel (approximately 40,000 Army; 3,000 Navy; 8,000 Air Force) (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the Cuban military inventory is comprised of aging Russian and Soviet-era equipment; the last recorded arms delivery to Cuba was by Russia in 2004; in 2019, Russia approved a loan for approximately $43-50 million for Cuba's purchase of spare parts and armored vehicles (2022)" + "text": "the military's inventory is comprised of aging Russian and Soviet-era equipment (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "17-28 years of age for compulsory (men) and voluntary (men and women) military service; conscripts serve for two years (2022)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json index af036095..2c408dd2 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json @@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "5.5% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "5.7% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "1.1 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json index b32f5ef4..7406278d 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json @@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "5.9% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "4.9% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "1.45 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json index d6bcdb21..8764b474 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "7.2% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "9.9% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "2.87 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@ "note": "note: in 2021, El Salvador announced intentions to double the size of the military, although no time frame was given" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the FAES is dependent on a mix of mostly older imported platforms, largely from the US; since 2010, the FAES has received small amounts of equipment from several countries, including Chile, Israel, Spain, and the US (2022)" + "text": "the FAES is dependent on a mix of mostly older imported platforms, largely from the US; in recent years, the FAES has received small amounts of equipment from several countries, including Chile, Israel, Spain, and the US (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18 years of age for selective compulsory military service; 16-22 years of age for voluntary male or female service; service obligation is 12 months, with 11 months for officers and non-commissioned officers (2022)", diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json index 5eee7048..a27d0ada 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json @@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "5% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "5.8% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "1.44 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json index bb3e4299..e8bc763c 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "6.2% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "6.5% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "1.24 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -1276,7 +1276,7 @@ "text": "information varies; approximately 20,000 active military personnel (18,000 Land Forces; 1,000 Naval Forces; 1,000 Air Forces); approximately 30,000 National Civil Police (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the Guatemalan military inventory is small and mostly comprised of older US equipment; since 2010, Guatemala has received small amounts of equipment from several countries, including the US (2022)" + "text": "the military's inventory is small and mostly comprised of older US equipment; in recent years, Guatemala has received small amounts of equipment from several countries, including the US (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 50 are eligible for military service; in practice, most of the force is volunteer, however, a selective draft system is employed, resulting in a small portion of 17-21 year-olds being conscripted; conscript service obligation varies from 1 to 2 years; women may volunteer (2022)", diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json index ba2d0fa3..d10881a9 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json @@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "4.7% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "3.3% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.23 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json index 979a4ae1..e798ef1f 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "7.3% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "9% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.5 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -1257,7 +1257,7 @@ "text": "approximately 16,000 active personnel (7,500 Army; 1,500 Navy, including about 1,000 marines; 2,000 Air Force; 5,000 Military Police of Public Order); approximately 18,000 National Police (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the FFAA's inventory is comprised of mostly older imported equipment from Israel, the UK, and the US; since 2010, Honduras has received limited amounts of military equipment from several countries, including Colombia, Israel, and the Netherlands (2022)" + "text": "the FFAA's inventory is comprised of mostly older imported equipment from Israel, the UK, and the US; in recent years, it has received limited amounts of military equipment from several countries, including Colombia, Israel, and the Netherlands (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18 years of age for voluntary 2- to 3-year military service (men and women); no conscription (2022)", diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json index d46e194d..b15b86e0 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json @@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "6.1% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "6.6% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.53 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json index 3765f60e..093a5824 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "8.4% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "8.6% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "1.67 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "164.52 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "164.5 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -1227,7 +1227,7 @@ "text": "approximately 12,000 active personnel (10,000 Army; 800 Navy; 1,200 Air Force) (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the Nicaraguan military's inventory includes mostly second-hand Russian/Soviet-era equipment; since 2010, Russia has been the leading arms supplier to Nicaragua (2022)" + "text": "the Nicaraguan military's inventory includes mostly secondhand Russian/Soviet-era equipment; in recent years, Russia has been the leading arms supplier to Nicaragua (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-30 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription; tour of duty 18-36 months; requires Nicaraguan nationality and 6th-grade education (2022)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json index 4850526b..02228390 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json @@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "7.6% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "9.7% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "1.63 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -832,8 +832,8 @@ "text": "22.1% (2016 est.)" }, "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income": { - "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2018": { - "text": "49.2 (2018 est.)" + "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2019": { + "text": "49.8 (2019 est.)" } }, "Household income or consumption by percentage share": { @@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@ "text": "approximately 20,000 National Police; 4,000 National Border Service; 3,000 National Air-Naval Service (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "Panama's security forces are lightly armed; Canada, Italy and the US have provided equipment to the security forces since 2010 (2022)" + "text": "Panama's security forces are lightly armed; Canada, Italy and the US have provided equipment to the security forces in recent years (2022)" }, "Military - note": { "text": "the MPS's chief focuses are countering narcotics trafficking and border security; Panama's security forces have long been criticized for being ineffective and corrupt
Panama created a paramilitary National Guard (Guardia Nacional de Panamá) in the 1950s from the former National Police (established 1904); the National Guard subsequently evolved into more of a military force with some police responsibilities; it seized power in a coup in 1968 and military officers ran the country until 1989; in 1983, the National Guard was renamed the Panama Defense Force (PDF); the PDF was disbanded after the 1989 US invasion and the current national police forces were formed in 1990; the armed forces were officially abolished under the 1994 Constitution (2022)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json index 32a1bd3f..4c368817 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "5.4% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "5.4% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "2.77 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ }, "Executive branch": { "chief of state": { - "text": "King CHARLES III (since 8 September 2022); represented by Governor General Samuel W.T. SEATON (since 2 September 2015); note - SEATON was Acting Governor General from 20 May to 2 September 2015" + "text": "King CHARLES III (since 8 September 2022); represented by Governor General Marcella LIBURD (since 4 February 2023)" }, "head of government": { "text": "Prime Minister Dr. Terrance DREW (since 6 August 2022); Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Geoffrey HANLEY (since 13 August 2022)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json index 63f62719..2ebffc87 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json @@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "4.3% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "6.7% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.64 physicians/1,000 population (2017)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json index 8ea09baa..6feb3fc8 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json @@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "7% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "7.3% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "4.48 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "3.84 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "3.8 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -1142,7 +1142,7 @@ "text": "approximately 4,500 TTDF personnel (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the TTDF's ground force inventory includes only light weapons, while the Coast Guard and Air Guard field mostly second-hand equipment from a mix of countries, including Australia, China, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US (2022)" + "text": "the TTDF's ground force inventory includes only light weapons, while the Coast Guard and Air Guard field mostly secondhand equipment from a mix of countries, including Australia, China, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-25 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women (some age variations between services, reserves); no conscription (2022)", diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json index 91724be8..a0a7211b 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "4.8% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "4.8% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.66 physicians/1,000 population (2012)" diff --git a/central-asia/kg.json b/central-asia/kg.json index 31d126ed..92394059 100644 --- a/central-asia/kg.json +++ b/central-asia/kg.json @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "4.5% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "5.3% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "2.21 physicians/1,000 population (2014)" @@ -1245,7 +1245,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "stateless persons": { - "text": "16 (mid-year 2021)" + "text": "482 (2022)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/central-asia/kz.json b/central-asia/kz.json index 274d805e..010155ac 100644 --- a/central-asia/kz.json +++ b/central-asia/kz.json @@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "2.8% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "3.8% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "3.98 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -1279,7 +1279,7 @@ "text": "information varies; approximately 40,000 active duty personnel (25,000 Land Forces; 3,000 Naval Forces; 12,000 Air and Air Defense Forces) (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the Kazakh military's inventory is comprised of mostly older Russian and Soviet-era equipment; since 2010, Russia has been the leading supplier of weapons systems (2022)" + "text": "the Kazakh military's inventory is comprised of mostly older Russian and Soviet-era equipment; Russia continues to be the leading supplier of arms (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "all men 18-27 are required to serve in the military for 12-24 months (2022)" @@ -1294,7 +1294,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "stateless persons": { - "text": "7,915 (mid-year 2021)" + "text": "7,558 (2022)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/central-asia/rs.json b/central-asia/rs.json index d6f05b57..d72c349b 100644 --- a/central-asia/rs.json +++ b/central-asia/rs.json @@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "5.7% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "7.6% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "3.82 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "4.525 trillion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "4.5 trillion cubic meters (2017 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -886,8 +886,8 @@ "text": "12.6% (2018 est.)" }, "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income": { - "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2018": { - "text": "37.5 (2018 est.)" + "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2020": { + "text": "36 (2020 est.)" } }, "Household income or consumption by percentage share": { @@ -1348,7 +1348,7 @@ }, "Military deployments": { "text": "information varies; approximately 3,000 Armenia; approximately 2,000 Armenia/Azerbaijan (peacekeepers for Nagorno-Karabakh); estimated 3,000-5,000 Belarus; approximately 7,000-10,000 Georgia; approximately 500 Kyrgyzstan; approximately 1,500 Moldova (Transnistria); estimated 2,000-5,000 Syria; approximately 5,000 Tajikistan (2022)", - "note": "note 1: in February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine with an estimated 150,000 troops; prior to the invasion, it maintained an estimated 30,000 troops in areas of Ukraine occupied since 2014Most Cambodians consider themselves to be Khmers, descendants of the Angkor Empire that extended over much of Southeast Asia and reached its zenith between the 10th and 13th centuries. Attacks by the Thai and Cham (from present-day Vietnam) weakened the empire, ushering in a long period of decline. The king placed the country under French protection in 1863, and it became part of French Indochina in 1887. Following Japanese occupation in World War II, Cambodia gained full independence from France in 1953. In April 1975, after a seven-year struggle, communist Khmer Rouge forces captured Phnom Penh and evacuated all cities and towns. At least 1.5 million Cambodians died from execution, forced hardships, or starvation during the Khmer Rouge regime under POL POT. A December 1978 Vietnamese invasion drove the Khmer Rouge into the countryside, began a 10-year Vietnamese occupation, and touched off 20 years of civil war.
The 1991 Paris Peace Accords mandated democratic elections and a cease-fire, which was not fully respected by the Khmer Rouge. UN-sponsored elections in 1993 helped restore some semblance of normalcy under a coalition government. Factional fighting in 1997 ended the first coalition government, but a second round of national elections in 1998 led to the formation of another coalition government and renewed political stability. The remaining elements of the Khmer Rouge surrendered in early 1999. Some of the surviving Khmer Rouge leaders were tried for crimes against humanity by a hybrid UN-Cambodian tribunal supported by international assistance. In 2018, the tribunal heard its final cases, but it remains in operation to hear appeals. Elections in July 2003 were relatively peaceful, but it took one year of negotiations between contending political parties before a coalition government was formed. In October 2004, King Norodom SIHANOUK abdicated the throne and his son, Prince Norodom SIHAMONI, was selected to succeed him. Local (Commune Council) elections were held in Cambodia in 2012, with little of the violence that preceded prior elections. National elections in July 2013 were disputed, with the opposition - the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) - boycotting the National Assembly. The political impasse was ended nearly a year later, with the CNRP agreeing to enter parliament in exchange for commitments by the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) to undertake electoral and legislative reforms. The CNRP made further gains in local commune elections in June 2017, accelerating sitting Prime Minister HUN SEN’s efforts to marginalize the CNRP before national elections in 2018. HUN SEN arrested CNRP President KEM SOKHA in September 2017. The Supreme Court dissolved the CNRP in November 2017 and banned its leaders from participating in politics for at least five years. The CNRP’s seats in the National Assembly were redistributed to smaller, less influential opposition parties, while all of the CNRP’s 5,007 seats in the commune councils throughout the country were reallocated to the CPP. With the CNRP banned, the CPP swept the 2018 national elections, winning all 125 National Assembly seats and effectively turning the country into a one-party state.Most Cambodians consider themselves to be Khmers, descendants of the Angkor Empire that extended over much of Southeast Asia and reached its zenith between the 10th and 13th centuries. Attacks by the Thai and Cham (from present-day Vietnam) weakened the empire, ushering in a long period of decline. The king placed the country under French protection in 1863, and it became part of French Indochina in 1887. Following the Japanese occupation in World War II, Cambodia gained full independence from France in 1953. In April 1975, after a seven-year struggle, communist Khmer Rouge forces captured Phnom Penh and evacuated all cities and towns. At least 1.5 million Cambodians died from execution, forced hardships, or starvation during the Khmer Rouge regime under POL POT. A December 1978 Vietnamese invasion drove the Khmer Rouge into the countryside, began a 10-year Vietnamese occupation, and touched off 20 years of civil war.
The 1991 Paris Peace Accords mandated democratic elections and a cease-fire, which was not fully respected by the Khmer Rouge. UN-sponsored elections in 1993 helped restore some semblance of normalcy under a coalition government. Factional fighting in 1997 ended the first coalition government, but a second round of national elections in 1998 led to the formation of another coalition government and renewed political stability. The remaining elements of the Khmer Rouge surrendered in early 1999. Some of the surviving Khmer Rouge leaders were tried for crimes against humanity by a hybrid UN-Cambodian tribunal supported by international assistance. In 2018, the tribunal heard its final cases, but it remains in operation to hear appeals. Elections in July 2003 were relatively peaceful, but it took one year of negotiations between contending political parties before a coalition government was formed. In October 2004, King Norodom SIHANOUK abdicated the throne and his son, Prince Norodom SIHAMONI, was selected to succeed him. Local (Commune Council) elections were held in Cambodia in 2012, with little of the violence that preceded prior elections. National elections in July 2013 were disputed, with the opposition - the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) - boycotting the National Assembly. The political impasse was ended nearly a year later, with the CNRP agreeing to enter parliament in exchange for commitments by the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) to undertake electoral and legislative reforms. The CNRP made further gains in local commune elections in June 2017, accelerating sitting Prime Minister HUN SEN’s efforts to marginalize the CNRP before national elections in 2018. HUN SEN arrested CNRP President KEM SOKHA in September 2017. The Supreme Court dissolved the CNRP in November 2017 and banned its leaders from participating in politics for at least five years. The CNRP’s seats in the National Assembly were redistributed to smaller, less influential opposition parties, while all of the CNRP’s 5,007 seats in the commune councils throughout the country were reallocated to the CPP. With the CNRP banned, the CPP swept the 2018 national elections, winning all 125 National Assembly seats and effectively turning the country into a one-party state.The first recorded kingdom (Choson) on the Korean Peninsula dates from approximately 2300 B.C. Over the subsequent centuries, three main kingdoms - Kogoryo, Paekche, and Silla - were established on the Peninsula. By the 5th century A.D., Kogoryo emerged as the most powerful, with control over much of the Peninsula, as well as part of Manchuria (modern-day northeast China). However, Silla allied with the Chinese to create the first unified Korean state in the late 7th century (688). Following the collapse of Silla in the 9th century, Korea was unified under the Koryo (Goryeo; 918-1392) and the Chosen (Joseon; 1392-1910) dynasties.
Korea became the object of intense imperialistic rivalry between the Chinese (its traditional benefactor), Japanese, and Russian empires in the latter half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Following the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), Korea was occupied by Imperial Japan. In 1910, Japan formally annexed the entire peninsula. After World War II, Korea was split with the northern half coming under Soviet-sponsored communist control. After the Korean War (1950-53), during which North Korea failed to conquer UN-backed South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK), North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK), under its founder President KIM Il Sung, adopted a policy of juche (\"self-reliance\") as a check against outside influence. North Korea demonized the US as the ultimate threat to its social system through state-funded propaganda, and molded political, economic, and military policies around the core ideological objective of eventual unification of Korea under Pyongyang's control. KIM Il Sung's son, KIM Jong Il, was officially designated as his father's successor in 1980, assuming a growing political and managerial role until the elder KIM's death in 1994. Under KIM Jong Il's reign, North Korea continued developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. KIM Jong Un was publicly unveiled as his father's successor in 2010. Following KIM Jong Il's death in 2011, KIM Jong Un quickly assumed power and has since occupied the regime's highest political and military posts.
After decades of economic mismanagement and resource misallocation, the North since the mid-1990s has faced chronic food shortages and economic stagnation. In recent years, the North's domestic agricultural production has increased, but still falls far short of producing sufficient food to provide for its entire population. Starting in 2002, North Korea began to ease restrictions to allow semi-private markets, but has made few other efforts to meet its goal of improving the overall standard of living. New economic development plans in the 2010s failed to meet government-mandated goals for key industrial sectors, food production, or overall economic performance. In response, the North Korean leader in early 2021 admitted these failures, but vowed to continue \"self-reliant\" policies.
North Korea has a history of provocative regional military actions and posturing that are of major concern to the international community and have limited North Korea’s international engagement, particularly economically. These include proliferation of military-related items; long-range missile development; WMD programs including tests of nuclear devices in 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016, and 2017; and large conventional armed forces. In 2013, North Korea declared a policy of simultaneous development of its nuclear weapons program and economy. In late 2017, KIM Jong Un declared the North's nuclear weapons development complete. In 2018, KIM announced a pivot towards diplomacy, including a re-prioritization of economic development, a pause in missile testing beginning in late 2017, and a refrain from anti-US rhetoric starting in June 2018. Since 2018, KIM has participated in four meetings with Chinese President XI Jinping, three with South Korean President MOON Jae-in, and three with US President TRUMP. Since 2019, North Korea has continued developing its ballistic missile program and issued statements condemning the US, and vowing to further strengthen its military capabilities, including long range missiles and nuclear weapons. North Korea remains one of the world’s most isolated and one of Asia’s poorest countries.
The first recorded kingdom (Choson) on the Korean Peninsula dates from approximately 2300 B.C. Over the subsequent centuries, three main kingdoms - Kogoryo, Paekche, and Silla - were established on the Peninsula. By the 5th century A.D., Kogoryo emerged as the most powerful, with control over much of the Peninsula, as well as part of Manchuria (modern-day northeast China). However, Silla allied with the Chinese to create the first unified Korean state in the late 7th century (688). Following the collapse of Silla in the 9th century, Korea was unified under the Koryo (Goryeo; 918-1392) and the Chosen (Joseon; 1392-1910) dynasties.
Korea became the object of intense imperialistic rivalry between the Chinese (its traditional benefactor), Japanese, and Russian empires in the latter half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Following the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), Korea was occupied by Imperial Japan. In 1910, Japan formally annexed the entire peninsula. After World War II, Korea was split with the northern half coming under Soviet-sponsored communist control. After the Korean War (1950-53), during which North Korea failed to conquer UN-backed South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK), North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK), under its founder President KIM Il Sung, adopted a policy of juche (\"self-reliance\") as a check against outside influence. North Korea demonized the US as the ultimate threat to its social system through state-funded propaganda, and molded political, economic, and military policies around the core ideological objective of eventual unification of Korea under Pyongyang's control. KIM Il Sung's son, KIM Jong Il, was officially designated as his father's successor in 1980, assuming a growing political and managerial role until the elder KIM's death in 1994. Under KIM Jong Il's reign, North Korea continued developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. KIM Jong Un was publicly unveiled as his father's successor in 2010. Following KIM Jong Il's death in 2011, KIM Jong Un quickly assumed power and has since occupied the regime's highest political and military posts.
After decades of economic mismanagement and resource misallocation, the North since the mid-1990s has faced chronic food shortages and economic stagnation. In recent years, the North's domestic agricultural production has increased, but still falls far short of producing sufficient food to provide for its entire population. Starting in 2002, North Korea began to ease restrictions to allow semi-private markets but has made few other efforts to meet its goal of improving the overall standard of living. New economic development plans in the 2010s failed to meet government-mandated goals for key industrial sectors, food production, or overall economic performance. In response, the North Korean leader in 2021 admitted these failures, but vowed to continue \"self-reliant\" policies.
North Korea has a history of provocative regional military actions and posturing that are of major concern to the international community and have limited North Korea’s international engagement, particularly economically. These include proliferation of military-related items; long-range missile development; WMD programs including tests of nuclear devices in 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016, and 2017; and large conventional armed forces. In 2013, North Korea declared a policy of simultaneous development of its nuclear weapons program and economy. In late 2017, KIM Jong Un declared the North's nuclear weapons development complete. In 2018, KIM announced a pivot towards diplomacy, including a re-prioritization of economic development, a pause in missile testing beginning in late 2017, and a refrain from anti-US rhetoric starting in June 2018. However, despite high-level efforts to ease tensions during the 2018-19 timeframe, including summits with the leaders of China, South Korea, and the US, North Korea in recent years has continued developing its ballistic missile program and issued statements condemning the US, and vowing to further strengthen its military capabilities, including long range missiles and nuclear weapons. North Korea remains one of the world’s most isolated and one of Asia’s poorest countries.
The first recorded kingdom (Choson) on the Korean Peninsula dates from approximately 2300 B.C. Over the subsequent centuries, three main kingdoms - Kogoryo, Paekche, and Silla - were established on the Peninsula. By the 5th century A.D., Kogoryo emerged as the most powerful, with control over much of the Peninsula, as well as part of Manchuria (modern-day northeast China). However, Silla allied with the Chinese to create the first unified Korean state in the late 7th century (688). Following the collapse of Silla in the 9th century, Korea was unified under the Koryo (Goryeo; 918-1392) and the Chosen (Joseon; 1392-1910) dynasties.
Korea became the object of intense imperialistic rivalry between the Chinese (its traditional benefactor), Japanese, and Russian empires in the latter half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Following the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), Korea was occupied by Imperial Japan. In 1910, Tokyo formally annexed the entire Peninsula. Korea regained its independence following Japan's surrender to the US and its allies in 1945. After World War II, a democratic government (Republic of Korea, ROK) was set up in the southern half of the Korean Peninsula while a communist-style government was installed in the north (North Korea; aka Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK). During the Korean War (1950-53), US troops and UN forces fought alongside ROK soldiers to defend South Korea from a North Korean invasion supported by communist China and the Soviet Union. A 1953 armistice split the Peninsula along a demilitarized zone at about the 38th parallel. PARK Chung-hee took over leadership of the country in a 1961 coup. During his regime from 1961 to 1979, South Korea achieved rapid economic growth, with per capita income rising to roughly 17 times the level of North Korea in 1979.
PARK was assassinated in 1979, and subsequent years were marked by political turmoil and continued authoritarian rule as the country's pro-democracy movement grew. South Korea held its first free presidential election under a revised democratic constitution in 1987, with former South Korean Army general ROH Tae-woo winning a close race. In 1993, KIM Young-sam (1993-98) became the first civilian president of South Korea's new democratic era. President KIM Dae-jung (1998-2003) won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for his contributions to South Korean democracy and his \"Sunshine Policy\" of engagement with North Korea. President PARK Geun-hye, daughter of former South Korean President PARK Chung-hee, took office in February 2013 as South Korea's first female leader. In December 2016, the National Assembly passed an impeachment motion against President PARK over her alleged involvement in a corruption and influence-peddling scandal, immediately suspending her presidential authorities. The impeachment was upheld in March 2017, triggering an early presidential election in May 2017 won by MOON Jae-in.
South Korea hosted the Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games in February 2018, in which North Korea also participated. Discord with North Korea has permeated inter-Korean relations for much of the past decade, highlighted by North Korea's attacks on a South Korean ship and island in 2010, the exchange of artillery fire across the DMZ in 2015, and multiple nuclear and missile tests in 2016 and 2017. North Korea’s participation in the Winter Olympics, dispatch of a senior delegation to Seoul, and three inter-Korean summits in 2018 appear to have ushered in a temporary period of respite, buoyed by the historic US-North Korea summits in 2018 and 2019. Nevertheless, relations were stagnant into early 2022.
The first recorded kingdom (Choson) on the Korean Peninsula dates from approximately 2300 B.C. Over the subsequent centuries, three main kingdoms - Kogoryo, Paekche, and Silla - were established on the Peninsula. By the 5th century A.D., Kogoryo emerged as the most powerful, with control over much of the Peninsula, as well as part of Manchuria (modern-day northeast China). However, Silla allied with the Chinese to create the first unified Korean state in the late 7th century (688). Following the collapse of Silla in the 9th century, Korea was unified under the Koryo (Goryeo; 918-1392) and the Chosen (Joseon; 1392-1910) dynasties.
Korea became the object of intense imperialistic rivalry between the Chinese (its traditional benefactor), Japanese, and Russian empires in the latter half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Following the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), Korea was occupied by Imperial Japan. In 1910, Tokyo formally annexed the entire Peninsula. Korea regained its independence following Japan's surrender to the US and its allies in 1945. After World War II, a democratic government (Republic of Korea, ROK) was set up in the southern half of the Korean Peninsula while a communist-style government was installed in the north (North Korea; aka Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK). During the Korean War (1950-53), US troops and UN forces fought alongside ROK soldiers to defend South Korea from a North Korean invasion supported by communist China and the Soviet Union. A 1953 armistice split the Peninsula along a demilitarized zone at about the 38th parallel.
Syngman RHEE led the country as its first president from 1948-1960. PARK Chung-hee took over leadership of the country in a 1961 coup. During his regime from 1961 to 1979, South Korea achieved rapid economic growth, with per capita income rising to roughly 17 times the level of North Korea in 1979. PARK was assassinated in 1979, and subsequent years were marked by political turmoil and continued authoritarian rule as the country's pro-democracy movement grew. South Korea held its first free presidential election under a revised democratic constitution in 1987, with former South Korean Army general ROH Tae-woo winning a close race. In 1993, KIM Young-sam (1993-98) became the first civilian president of South Korea's new democratic era. President KIM Dae-jung (1998-2003) won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for his contributions to South Korean democracy and his \"Sunshine Policy\" of engagement with North Korea. President PARK Geun-hye, daughter of former South Korean President PARK Chung-hee, took office in February 2013 as South Korea's first female leader. In December 2016, the National Assembly passed an impeachment motion against President PARK over her alleged involvement in a corruption and influence-peddling scandal, immediately suspending her presidential authorities. The impeachment was upheld in March 2017, triggering an early presidential election in May 2017 won by MOON Jae-in.
Discord and tensions with North Korea, punctuated by North Korean military provocations, missile launches, and nuclear tests, have permeated inter-Korean relations for much of the past decade. Despite a period of respite in 2018-2019 ushered in by North Korea's participation in the 2018 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games in South Korea and high-level diplomatic meetings, including historic US-North Korea summits, relations were stagnant through 2022.
The peoples of Mongolia have a long history under a number of nomadic empires dating back to the period of the Xiongnu in the 4th century B.C. The name Mongol goes back to at least the 11th century A.D. The most famous Mongol, TEMÜÜJIN (aka Genghis Khan) emerged as the ruler of all Mongols in the early 1200s. By the time of his death in 1227, he had created through conquest a Mongol Empire that extended across much of Eurasia. His descendants, including ÖGÖDEI and KHUBILAI (aka Kublai Khan), continued military campaigns of conquest, taking control of Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the rest of China where KHUBILAI established the Yuan Dynasty in the 1270s. The Mongols attempted to invade Japan and Java before their empire broke apart in the 14th century. In the 17th century, Mongolia fell under the rule of the Manchus of the Chinese Qing Dynasty. Following the collapse of the Manchus in 1911, Mongolia declared its independence, achieving it with help from the Soviet Union in 1921. Mongolia became a socialist state (the Mongolian People’s Republic) in 1924. Following independence and until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the country was a Soviet satellite state, and heavily reliant on economic, military, and political assistance from Moscow. The period also was marked by purges, political repression, economic stagnation, and tensions with China.
Mongolia peacefully transitioned to an independent democracy in 1990. In 1992, it adopted a new constitution and established a free market economy. Since the country's transition, it has conducted eight presidential and nine legislative elections as of 2021. Throughout the period, the ex-communist Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) - which took the name Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) in 2010 - has competed for political power with the Democratic Party (DP) and several other smaller parties, including a new party formed by former President ENKHBAYAR, which confusingly adopted for itself the MPRP name until it merged with MPP in 2021. In the 2016 parliamentary elections, the MPP won overwhelming control of the Parliament over the DP, which had overseen a sharp decline in Mongolia’s economy during its control of the Parliament in the preceding years. Mongolians elected a DP member, Khaltmaa BATTULGA, as president in 2017. The June 2020 parliamentary elections left the MPP with continued dominant control of the parliament. Mongolians elected former prime minister and MPP member Ukhnaa KHURELSUKH as president in 2021. Mongolia maintains close cultural, political, and military ties with Russia while China is its largest economic partner. Mongolia’s foreign relations are focused on preserving its autonomy by balancing relations with China and Russia, as well as its other major partners, Japan, South Korea, and the US.
The peoples of Mongolia have a long history under a number of nomadic empires dating back to the period of the Xiongnu in the 4th century B.C. The name Mongol goes back to at least the 11th century A.D. The most famous Mongol, TEMÜÜJIN (aka Genghis Khan) emerged as the ruler of all Mongols in the early 1200s. By the time of his death in 1227, he had created through conquest a Mongol Empire that extended across much of Eurasia. His descendants, including ÖGÖDEI and KHUBILAI (aka Kublai Khan), continued military campaigns of conquest, taking control of Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the rest of China where KHUBILAI established the Yuan Dynasty in the 1270s. The Mongols attempted to invade Japan and Java before their empire broke apart in the 14th century. In the 17th century, Mongolia fell under the rule of the Manchus of the Chinese Qing Dynasty. Following the collapse of the Manchus in 1911, Mongolia declared its independence, achieving it with help from the Soviet Union in 1921. Mongolia became a socialist state (the Mongolian People’s Republic) in 1924. Following independence and until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the country was a Soviet satellite state, and heavily reliant on economic, military, and political assistance from Moscow. The period also was marked by purges, political repression, economic stagnation, and tensions with China.
Mongolia peacefully transitioned to an independent democracy in 1990. In 1992, it adopted a new constitution and established a free market economy. Since the country's transition, it has conducted eight presidential and nine legislative elections as of 2021. Throughout the period, the ex-communist Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) - which took the name Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) in 2010 - has competed for political power with the Democratic Party (DP) and several other smaller parties. In the 2016 parliamentary elections, the MPP won overwhelming control of the Parliament over the DP, which had overseen a sharp decline in Mongolia’s economy during its control of the Parliament in the preceding years. Mongolians elected a DP member, Khaltmaa BATTULGA, as president in 2017. The June 2020 parliamentary elections left the MPP with continued dominant control of the parliament. Mongolians elected former prime minister and MPP member Ukhnaa KHURELSUKH as president in 2021. Mongolia maintains close cultural, political, and military ties with Russia while China is its largest economic partner. Mongolia’s foreign relations are focused on preserving its autonomy by balancing relations with China and Russia, as well as its other major partners, Japan, South Korea, and the US.
Mongolia has been engaged in dialogue and cooperation with NATO since 2005 and is considered by NATO to be a global partner; Mongolia supported the NATO-led Kosovo Force from 2005-2007 and contributed troops to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan from 2009-2014, as well as to the follow-on Resolute Support Mission that provided training, advice, and other assistance to the Afghan security forces (2015-2021)
" + "text": "Mongolia has been engaged in dialogue and cooperation with NATO since 2005 and is considered by NATO to be a global partner; Mongolia supported the NATO-led Kosovo Force from 2005-2007 and contributed troops to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan from 2009-2014, as well as to the follow-on Resolute Support Mission that provided training, advice, and other assistance to the Afghan security forces (2015-2021) (2022)" } }, "Transnational Issues": { @@ -1279,7 +1279,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "stateless persons": { - "text": "17 (mid-year 2021)" + "text": "17 (2022)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json index 48a1bbe2..1da2a99e 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "Malaysia’s location has long made it an important cultural, economic, historical, social, and trade link between the islands of Southeast Asia and the mainland. Through the Strait of Malacca, which separates the Malay Peninsula from the archipelago, flowed maritime trade and with it influences from China, India, the Middle East, and the east coast of Africa. Prior to the 14th century, several powerful maritime empires existed in what is modern-day Malaysia, including the Srivijayan, which controlled much of the southern part of the peninsula between the 7th and 13th centuries, and the Majapahit Empire, which took control over most of the peninsula and the Malay Archipelago between the 13th and 14th centuries. The adoption of Islam between the 13th and 17th centuries also saw the rise of a number of powerful maritime states and sultanates on the Malay Peninsula and the island of Borneo, such as the port city of Malacca (Melaka), which at its height in the 15th century had a navy and hosted thousands of Chinese, Arab, Persian, and Indian merchants.
The Portuguese in the 16th century and the Dutch in the 17th century were the first European colonial powers to establish themselves on the Malay Peninsula and Southeast Asia. However, it was the British who ultimately secured their hegemony across the territory and during the late 18th and 19th centuries established colonies and protectorates in the area that is now Malaysia. These holdings were occupied by Japan from 1942 to 1945. In 1948, the British-ruled territories on the Malay Peninsula except Singapore formed the Federation of Malaya, which became independent in 1957. Malaysia was formed in 1963 when the former British colonies of Singapore, as well as Sabah and Sarawak on the northern coast of Borneo, joined the Federation. The first several years of the country's independence were marred by a communist insurgency, Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia, Philippine claims to Sabah, and Singapore's expulsion in 1965. During the 22-year term of Prime Minister MAHATHIR Mohamad (1981-2003), Malaysia was successful in diversifying its economy from dependence on exports of raw materials to the development of manufacturing, services, and tourism. Prime Minister MAHATHIR and a newly-formed coalition of opposition parties defeated Prime Minister Mohamed NAJIB bin Abdul Razak's United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in May 2018, ending over 60 years of uninterrupted rule by UMNO. MAHATHIR resigned in February 2020 amid a political dispute. King ABDULLAH then selected Tan Sri MUHYIDDIN Yassin as the new prime minister. MUHYIDDIN resigned in August 2021 after losing a majority of support in parliament. King ABDULLAH next selected ISMAIL SABRI Yakoob as the successor prime minister.
Malaysia’s location has long made it an important cultural, economic, historical, social, and trade link between the islands of Southeast Asia and the mainland. Through the Strait of Malacca, which separates the Malay Peninsula from the archipelago, flowed maritime trade and with it influences from China, India, the Middle East, and the east coast of Africa. Prior to the 14th century, several powerful maritime empires existed in what is modern-day Malaysia, including the Srivijayan, which controlled much of the southern part of the peninsula between the 7th and 13th centuries, and the Majapahit Empire, which took control over most of the peninsula and the Malay Archipelago between the 13th and 14th centuries. The adoption of Islam between the 13th and 17th centuries also saw the rise of a number of powerful maritime states and sultanates on the Malay Peninsula and the island of Borneo, such as the port city of Malacca (Melaka), which at its height in the 15th century had a navy and hosted thousands of Chinese, Arab, Persian, and Indian merchants.
The Portuguese in the 16th century and the Dutch in the 17th century were the first European colonial powers to establish themselves on the Malay Peninsula and Southeast Asia. However, it was the British who ultimately secured their hegemony across the territory and during the late 18th and 19th centuries established colonies and protectorates in the area that is now Malaysia. These holdings were occupied by Japan from 1942 to 1945. In 1948, the British-ruled territories on the Malay Peninsula except Singapore formed the Federation of Malaya, which became independent in 1957. Malaysia was formed in 1963 when the former British colonies of Singapore, as well as Sabah and Sarawak on the northern coast of Borneo, joined the Federation. The first several years of the country's independence were marred by a communist insurgency, Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia, Philippine claims to Sabah, and Singapore's expulsion in 1965. During the 22-year term of Prime Minister MAHATHIR Mohamad (1981-2003), Malaysia was successful in diversifying its economy from dependence on exports of raw materials to the development of manufacturing, services, and tourism. Prime Minister MAHATHIR and a newly formed coalition of opposition parties defeated Prime Minister Mohamed NAJIB bin Abdul Razak's United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in May 2018, ending over 60 years of uninterrupted rule by UMNO. Since 2018, Malaysia has undergone considerable political upheaval with a succession of coalition governments holding power.
the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the South China Sea as high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; numerous commercial vessels have been attacked and hijacked both at anchor and while underway; hijacked vessels are often disguised and cargo diverted to ports in East Asia; crews have been murdered or cast adrift; the Singapore Straits saw 35 attacks against commercial vessels in 2021, a 50% increase over 2020 and the highest number of incidents reported since 1992; vessels were boarded in 33 of the 35 incidents, one crew was injured, another assaulted and two threatened during these incidents
" @@ -1309,7 +1309,7 @@ "text": "123,282 (Burma) (mid-year 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { - "text": "112,003 (mid-year 2021); note - Malaysia's stateless population consists of Rohingya refugees from Burma, ethnic Indians, and the children of Filipino and Indonesian illegal migrants; Burma stripped the Rohingya of their nationality in 1982; Filipino and Indonesian children who have not been registered for birth certificates by their parents or who received birth certificates stamped \"foreigner\" are not eligible to attend government schools; these children are vulnerable to statelessness should they not be able to apply to their parents' country of origin for passports" + "text": "113,930 (2022); note - Malaysia's stateless population consists of Rohingya refugees from Burma, ethnic Indians, and the children of Filipino and Indonesian illegal migrants; Burma stripped the Rohingya of their nationality in 1982; Filipino and Indonesian children who have not been registered for birth certificates by their parents or who received birth certificates stamped \"foreigner\" are not eligible to attend government schools; these children are vulnerable to statelessness should they not be able to apply to their parents' country of origin for passports" } }, "Trafficking in persons": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json index 4949aead..042f8602 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json @@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "2.3% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "2.5% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.07 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -829,8 +829,8 @@ "text": "37% (2002 est.)" }, "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income": { - "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 1996": { - "text": "50.9 (1996)" + "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2009": { + "text": "41.9 (2009 est.)" } }, "Household income or consumption by percentage share": { @@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@ "text": "24,000 (natural disasters, tribal conflict, inter-communal violence, development projects) (2021)" }, "stateless persons": { - "text": "9 (mid-year 2021)" + "text": "15 (2022)" } }, "Trafficking in persons": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json index 8bc65507..d993e18c 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "4.1% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "5.1% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.77 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -856,8 +856,8 @@ "text": "16.7% (2018 est.)" }, "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income": { - "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2015": { - "text": "44.4 (2015 est.)" + "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2018": { + "text": "42.3 (2018 est.)" } }, "Household income or consumption by percentage share": { @@ -1296,7 +1296,7 @@ "text": "approximately 130,000 active duty personnel (90,000 Army; 25,000 Navy, including about 8,000 Marine Corps; 15,000 Air Force) (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the AFP is equipped with a mix of imported weapons systems, particularly secondhand equipment from the US; top weapons suppliers in recent years have included South Korea and the US (2022)" + "text": "the AFP is equipped with a mix of imported weapons systems, particularly secondhand equipment from the US; the top weapons suppliers in recent years have included South Korea and the US (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-25 (enlisted) and 21-29 (officers) years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; no conscription (2022)", @@ -1324,7 +1324,7 @@ "text": "108,000 (government troops fighting the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and the New People's Army; clan feuds; armed attacks, political violence, and communal tensions in Mindanao) (2021)" }, "stateless persons": { - "text": "392 (mid-year 2021); note - stateless persons are descendants of Indonesian migrants" + "text": "261 (2022); note - stateless persons are descendants of Indonesian migrants" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json index 0dd2d446..46aaec31 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "4.1% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "6.1% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "2.46 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -1219,13 +1219,13 @@ }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-21 years of age for compulsory military service for men; 16.5 years of age for voluntary enlistment (with parental consent); 24-month conscript service obligation, with a reserve obligation to age 40 (enlisted) or age 50 (officers); women are not conscripted, but they are allowed to volunteer for all services and branches, including combat arms (2022)", - "note": "note 1: under the Enlistment Act, all male Singaporean citizens and permanent residents, unless exempted, are required to enter National Service (NS) upon attaining the age of 18; most NS conscripts serve in the Armed Forces, but some go into the Police Force or Civil Defense Force; as of 2020, conscripts comprised over half of the defense establishmentTimor was actively involved in Southeast Asian trading networks for centuries, and by the 14th century exported aromatic sandalwood, slaves, honey, and wax. A number of local chiefdoms ruled the island in the early 16th century when Portuguese traders arrived, chiefly attracted by the relative abundance of sandalwood on Timor; by mid-century, the Portuguese had colonized the island. Skirmishing with the Dutch in the region eventually resulted in an 1859 treaty in which Portugal ceded the western portion of the island. Imperial Japan occupied Portuguese Timor from 1942 to 1945, but Portugal resumed colonial authority after the Japanese defeat in World War II. East Timor declared itself independent from Portugal on 28 November 1975 and was invaded and occupied by Indonesian forces nine days later. It was incorporated into Indonesia in July 1976 as the province of Timor Timur (East Timor). An unsuccessful campaign of pacification followed over the next two decades, during which an estimated 100,000 to 250,000 people died. In an August 1999 UN-supervised popular referendum, an overwhelming majority of the people of Timor-Leste voted for independence from Indonesia. However, in the next three weeks, anti-independence Timorese militias - organized and supported by the Indonesian military - commenced a large-scale, scorched-earth campaign of retribution. The militias killed approximately 1,400 Timorese and displaced nearly 500,000. Most of the country's infrastructure, including homes, irrigation systems, water supply systems, and schools, and nearly all of the country's electrical grid were destroyed. On 20 September 1999, Australian-led peacekeeping troops deployed to the country and brought the violence to an end. On 20 May 2002, Timor-Leste was internationally recognized as an independent state.
In 2006, internal tensions threatened the new nation's security when a military strike led to violence and a breakdown of law and order. At Dili's request, an Australian-led International Stabilization Force (ISF) deployed to Timor-Leste, and the UN Security Council established the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), which included an authorized police presence of over 1,600 personnel. The ISF and UNMIT restored stability, allowing for presidential and parliamentary elections in 2007 in a largely peaceful atmosphere. In February 2008, a rebel group staged an unsuccessful attack against the president and prime minister. The ringleader was killed in the attack, and most of the rebels surrendered in April 2008. Since the attack, the government has enjoyed one of its longest periods of post-independence stability, including successful 2012 elections for both the National Parliament and president and a successful transition of power in February 2015. In late 2012, the UN Security Council ended its peacekeeping mission in Timor-Leste and both the ISF and UNMIT departed the country.
" + "text": "Timor was actively involved in Southeast Asian trading networks for centuries, and by the 14th century exported aromatic sandalwood, slaves, honey, and wax. A number of local chiefdoms ruled the island in the early 16th century when Portuguese traders arrived, chiefly attracted by the relative abundance of sandalwood on Timor; by mid-century, the Portuguese had colonized the island. Skirmishing with the Dutch in the region eventually resulted in an 1859 treaty in which Portugal ceded the western portion of the island. Imperial Japan occupied Portuguese Timor from 1942 to 1945, but Portugal resumed colonial authority after the Japanese defeat in World War II. East Timor declared itself independent from Portugal on 28 November 1975 and was invaded and occupied by Indonesian forces nine days later. It was incorporated into Indonesia in July 1976 as the province of Timor Timur (East Timor). An unsuccessful campaign of pacification followed over the next two decades, during which an estimated 100,000 to 250,000 people died. In an August 1999 UN-supervised popular referendum, an overwhelming majority of the people of Timor-Leste voted for independence from Indonesia. However, in the next three weeks, anti-independence Timorese militias - organized and supported by the Indonesian military - commenced a large-scale, scorched-earth campaign of retribution. The militias killed approximately 1,400 Timorese and displaced nearly 500,000. Most of the country's infrastructure, including homes, irrigation systems, water supply systems, and schools, and nearly all of the country's electrical grid were destroyed. On 20 September 1999, Australian-led peacekeeping troops deployed to the country and brought the violence to an end. On 20 May 2002, Timor-Leste was internationally recognized as an independent state.
In 2006, internal tensions threatened the new nation's security when a military strike led to violence and a breakdown of law and order. At Dili's request, an Australian-led International Stabilization Force (ISF) deployed to Timor-Leste, and the UN Security Council established the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), which included an authorized police presence of over 1,600 personnel. The ISF and UNMIT restored stability, allowing for presidential and parliamentary elections in 2007 in a largely peaceful atmosphere. In 2008, rebels staged an unsuccessful attack against the president and prime minister. Since the attack, Timor-Leste has made considerable progress in building stability and democratic institutions, holding a series of successful parliamentary and presidential elections since 2012. Nonetheless, weak and unstable political coalitions have led to periodic episodes of political stalemate and crisis in governance. The ISF and UNMIT departed in 2012 but the UN continues to provide assistance on economic development and strengthening governing institutions. Currently, Timor-Leste is one of the world's poorest nations with an economy that relies heavily on energy resources in the Timor Sea.
" } }, "Geography": { @@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "7.2% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "9.9% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.76 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "8.215 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "8.2 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ "note": "note: the UN Justice System Programme, launched in 2003 and being rolled out in 4 phases through 2018, is helping strengthen the country's justice system; the Programme is aligned with the country's long-range Justice Sector Strategic Plan, which includes legal reforms" }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Democratic Party or PD [Mariano Assanami SABINO Lopes]the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) are comprised of the former Bosnian-Croat Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Vojska Federacije Bosne i Hercegovin, VF) and the Bosnian-Serb Republic of Serbia Army (Vojska Republike Srpske, VRS); the two forces were unified under the 2003 Law on Defense, which also established the country’s Ministry of Defense
the European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) has operated in the country to oversee implementation of the Dayton/Paris Agreement since taking over from NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 2004; in addition to its security mission, EUFOR supports the overall EU comprehensive strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the efforts of the AFBiH to attain NATO standards; as of 2022, it had about 600 troops from 19 countries
Bosnia and Herzegovina joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 2007 and was invited to join NATO’s Membership Action Plan in 2010; as of 2022, NATO maintained a military headquarters in Sarajevo with the mission of assisting Bosnia and Herzegovina with the PfP program and promoting closer integration with NATO, as well as providing logistics and other support to EUFOR
" @@ -1261,9 +1261,9 @@ "text": "92,000 (Bosnian Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks displaced by inter-ethnic violence, human rights violations, and armed conflict during the 1992-95 war) (2021)" }, "stateless persons": { - "text": "149 (mid-year 2021)" + "text": "48 (2022)" }, - "note": "note: 114,069 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-January 2023)" + "note": "note: 114,398 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-January 2023)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "
drug trafficking groups are major players in the procurement and transportation of large quantities of cocaine destined for European markets
" diff --git a/europe/bo.json b/europe/bo.json index b76bd100..b8af3929 100644 --- a/europe/bo.json +++ b/europe/bo.json @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "5.9% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "6.4% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "4.54 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "57.9 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "57.9 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -1270,10 +1270,10 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "19,415 (Ukraine) (as of 17 January 2023)" + "text": "19,673 (Ukraine) (as of 24 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { - "text": "6,104 (mid-year 2021)" + "text": "5,626 (2022)" } }, "Trafficking in persons": { diff --git a/europe/bu.json b/europe/bu.json index b202a12d..4b465991 100644 --- a/europe/bu.json +++ b/europe/bu.json @@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "7.1% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "8.5% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "4.2 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ "text": "President Rumen RADEV (since 22 January 2017); Vice President Iliana IOTOVA (since 22 January 2017)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Prime Minister Galab DONEV (since 2 August 2022)" + "text": "Interim Prime Minister Galab DONEV (since 2 August 2022)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Council of Ministers nominated by the prime minister, elected by the National Assembly" @@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ "text": "unicameral National Assembly or Narodno Sabranie (240 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote to serve 4-year terms)" }, "elections": { - "text": "last held on 2 October 2022 (next election to be held in 2026)" + "text": "last held on 2 October 2022 (next election to be held on 2 April 2023)" }, "election results": { "text": "percent of vote by party/coalition - GERB-SDS 24.5%, PP 19.5%, DPS 13.3%, Revival 9.8%, BSP for Bulgaria 9%, DB 7.2%, BV 4.5%, other 12.2%; seats by party/coalition GERB-SDS 67, PP 53, DPS 36, Revival 27, BSP for Bulgaria 25, DB 20, BV 12; composition - men NA, women NA, percent of women NA%" @@ -1272,10 +1272,10 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "22,226 (Syria) (mid-year 2022); 50,219 (Ukraine) (as of 21 January 2023)" + "text": "22,226 (Syria) (mid-year 2022); 49,805 (Ukraine) (as of 29 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { - "text": "1,143 (mid-year 2021)" + "text": "1,129 (2022)" }, "note": "note: 84,937 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-October 2022); Bulgaria is predominantly a transit country" }, diff --git a/europe/cy.json b/europe/cy.json index dfc296c7..7e1b59ff 100644 --- a/europe/cy.json +++ b/europe/cy.json @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "7% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "8.1% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "3.14 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ "text": "Council of Ministers appointed by the president; note - under the 1960 constitution, 3 of the ministerial posts reserved for Turkish Cypriots, appointed by the vice president; positions currently filled by Greek Cypriots" }, "elections/appointments": { - "text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term; election last held on 28 January 2018 with a runoff on 4 February 2018 (next to be held in February 2023)" + "text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term; election last held on 28 January 2018 with a runoff on 4 February 2018 (next to be held 5 February 2023 with a runoff on 12 February 2023)" }, "election results": { "text": "2018: Nikos ANASTASIADIS reelected president in second round; percent of vote in first round - Nikos ANASTASIADIS (DISY) 35.5%, Stavros MALAS (AKEL) 30.2%, Nicolas PAPADOPOULOS (DIKO) 25.7%, other 8.6%; percent of vote in second round - Nikos ANASTASIADIS 56%, Stavros MALAS 44%drug trafficking groups are major players in the procurement and transportation of large quantities of cocaine destined for European markets
" diff --git a/europe/ro.json b/europe/ro.json index a88675a7..f32b9be6 100644 --- a/europe/ro.json +++ b/europe/ro.json @@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "5.7% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "6.3% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "2.98 physicians/1,000 population (2017)" @@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "212.01 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "212 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -828,8 +828,8 @@ "text": "23.8% (2018 est.)" }, "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income": { - "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2017": { - "text": "36 (2017 est.)" + "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2019": { + "text": "34.8 (2019 est.)" } }, "Household income or consumption by percentage share": { @@ -1277,12 +1277,12 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "106,835 (Ukraine) (as of 22 January 2023)" + "text": "108,663 (Ukraine) (as of 29 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { - "text": "314 (mid-year 2021)" + "text": "297 (2022)" }, - "note": "note: 11,981 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-December 2022)" + "note": "note: 12,176 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-January 2023)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "a source country for cannabis
" diff --git a/europe/si.json b/europe/si.json index 025735ab..776fb273 100644 --- a/europe/si.json +++ b/europe/si.json @@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "8.5% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "9.5% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "3.28 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "31.87 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "31.9 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" } }, "Government": { diff --git a/europe/sm.json b/europe/sm.json index 19b4798f..d410897a 100644 --- a/europe/sm.json +++ b/europe/sm.json @@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "6.4% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "8.7% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "6.11 physicians/1,000 population (2014)" diff --git a/europe/sp.json b/europe/sp.json index a05850e5..ea12d372 100644 --- a/europe/sp.json +++ b/europe/sp.json @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "9.1% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "10.7% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "4.44 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -1299,12 +1299,12 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "14,994 (Syria) (mid-year 2022); 418,200 (Venezuela) (economic and political crisis; includes Venezuelans who have claimed asylum, are recognized as refugees, or have received alternative legal stay) (2021); 161,012 (Ukraine) (as of 24 January 2023)" + "text": "14,994 (Syria) (mid-year 2022); 418,200 (Venezuela) (economic and political crisis; includes Venezuelans who have claimed asylum, are recognized as refugees, or have received alternative legal stay) (2021); 161,012 (Ukraine) (as of 31 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { - "text": "692 (mid-year 2021)" + "text": "6,489 (2022)" }, - "note": "note: 279,992 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals, including Canary Islands (January 2015-January 2023)" + "note": "note: 280,020 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals, including Canary Islands (January 2015-January 2023)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "primary transit point in Europe for cocaine from South America and for hashish from Morocco; cocaine is shipped in raw or liquid form with mixed cargo to avoid detection; traffickers ship methamphetamine via express mail; increasing indoor cannabis production; illegal labs cutting, mixing, and reconstituting cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine labs; synthetic drugs, including ketamine and MDMA (ecstasy) transit from Spain to the US" diff --git a/europe/sw.json b/europe/sw.json index 60d2695a..187846e7 100644 --- a/europe/sw.json +++ b/europe/sw.json @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "10.9% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "11.4% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "7.09 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -1271,10 +1271,10 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "113,213 (Syria), 26,857 (Afghanistan), 25,849 (Eritrea), 10,464 (Iraq), 9,315 (Somalia), 7,146 (Iran) (mid-year 2022); 51,029 (Ukraine) (as of 20 January 2023)" + "text": "113,213 (Syria), 26,857 (Afghanistan), 25,849 (Eritrea), 10,464 (Iraq), 9,315 (Somalia), 7,146 (Iran) (mid-year 2022); 51,230 (Ukraine) (as of 27 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { - "text": "50,098 (mid-year 2021); note - the majority of stateless people are from the Middle East and Somalia" + "text": "46,515 (2022); note - the majority of stateless people are from the Middle East and Somalia" } } } diff --git a/europe/sz.json b/europe/sz.json index d8718aef..f8546d8e 100644 --- a/europe/sz.json +++ b/europe/sz.json @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "11.3% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "11.8% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "4.38 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -1274,10 +1274,10 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "14,726 (Eritrea), 11,441 (Afghanistan), 8,039 (Syria), (mid-year 2022); 78,467 (Ukraine) (as of 20 January 2023)" + "text": "14,726 (Eritrea), 11,441 (Afghanistan), 8,039 (Syria), (mid-year 2022); 78,888 (Ukraine) (as of 27 January 2023)" }, "stateless persons": { - "text": "684 (mid-year 2021)" + "text": "891 (2022)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/europe/uk.json b/europe/uk.json index 8c70354b..1c73eb1f 100644 --- a/europe/uk.json +++ b/europe/uk.json @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ "water": { "text": "1,680 sq km" }, - "note": "note 1: the percentage area breakdown of the four UK countries is: England 53%, Scotland 32%, Wales 9%, and Northern Ireland 6%Ukraine was the center of the first eastern Slavic state, Kyivan Rus, which during the 10th and 11th centuries was the largest and most powerful state in Europe. Weakened by internecine quarrels and Mongol invasions, Kyivan Rus was incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and eventually into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The cultural and religious legacy of Kyivan Rus laid the foundation for Ukrainian nationalism through subsequent centuries. A new Ukrainian state, the Cossack Hetmanate, was established during the mid-17th century after an uprising against the Poles. Despite continuous Muscovite pressure, the Hetmanate managed to remain autonomous for well over 100 years. During the latter part of the 18th century, most Ukrainian ethnographic territory was absorbed by the Russian Empire. Following the collapse of czarist Russia in 1917, Ukraine achieved a short-lived period of independence (1917-20) but was reconquered and endured a brutal Soviet rule that engineered two forced famines (1921-22 and 1932-33) in which over 8 million died. In World War II, German and Soviet armies were responsible for 7 to 8 million more deaths. Although Ukraine achieved independence in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR, democracy and prosperity remained elusive as the legacy of state control and endemic corruption stalled efforts at economic reform, privatization, and civil liberties.
A peaceful mass protest referred to as the \"Orange Revolution\" in the closing months of 2004 forced the authorities to overturn a rigged presidential election and to allow a new internationally monitored vote that swept into power a reformist slate under Viktor YUSHCHENKO. Subsequent internal squabbles in the YUSHCHENKO camp allowed his rival Viktor YANUKOVYCH to stage a comeback in parliamentary (Rada) elections, become prime minister in August 2006, and be elected president in February 2010. In October 2012, Ukraine held Rada elections, widely criticized by Western observers as flawed due to use of government resources to favor ruling party candidates, interference with media access, and harassment of opposition candidates. President YANUKOVYCH's backtracking on a trade and cooperation agreement with the EU in November 2013 - in favor of closer economic ties with Russia - and subsequent use of force against students, civil society activists, and other civilians in favor of the agreement led to a three-month protest occupation of Kyiv's central square. The government's use of violence to break up the protest camp in February 2014 led to all out pitched battles, scores of deaths, international condemnation, a failed political deal, and the president's abrupt departure for Russia. New elections in the spring allowed pro-West president Petro POROSHENKO to assume office in June 2014; he was succeeded by Volodymyr ZELENSKY in May 2019.
Shortly after YANUKOVYCH's departure in late February 2014, Russian President PUTIN ordered the invasion of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula falsely claiming the action was to protect ethnic Russians living there. Two weeks later, a \"referendum\" was held regarding the integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation. The \"referendum\" was condemned as illegitimate by the Ukrainian Government, the EU, the US, and the UN General Assembly (UNGA). In response to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, 100 members of the UN passed UNGA resolution 68/262, rejecting the \"referendum\" as baseless and invalid and confirming the sovereignty, political independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. In mid-2014, Russia began supplying proxies in two of Ukraine's eastern provinces with manpower, funding, and materiel driving an armed conflict with the Ukrainian Government that continues to this day. Representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and the unrecognized Russian proxy republics signed the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum in September 2014 to end the conflict. However, this agreement failed to stop the fighting or find a political solution. In a renewed attempt to alleviate ongoing clashes, leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany negotiated a follow-on Package of Measures in February 2015 to implement the Minsk agreements. Representatives from Ukraine, Russia, the unrecognized Russian proxy republics, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe also meet regularly to facilitate implementation of the peace deal. By early 2022, more than 14,000 civilians were killed or wounded as a result of the Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine.
On 24 February 2022, Russia escalated its conflict with Ukraine by invading the country on several fronts in what has become the largest conventional military attack on a sovereign state in Europe since World War II. The invasion has received near universal international condemnation, and many countries have imposed sanctions on Russia and supplied humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. Russia made substantial gains in the early weeks of the invasion but underestimated Ukrainian resolve and combat capabilities. By the end of 2022, Ukrainian forces had regained all territories in the north and northeast and made some advances in the east and south. Nonetheless, Russia in late September 2022 unilaterally declared its annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts - Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia - even though none was fully under Russian control. The annexations remain unrecognized by the international community.
The invasion has also created Europe's largest refugee crisis since World War II. As of 24 January, 2023, approximately 17.92 million people had fled Ukraine, and 5.91 million people were internally displaced as of 5 December 2022. Almost 18,500 civilian casualties had been reported, as of 22 January 2023. The invasion of Ukraine remains one of the two largest displacement crises worldwide (the other is the conflict in Syria).
" + "text": "
Ukraine was the center of the first eastern Slavic state, Kyivan Rus, which during the 10th and 11th centuries was the largest and most powerful state in Europe. Weakened by internecine quarrels and Mongol invasions, Kyivan Rus was incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and eventually into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The cultural and religious legacy of Kyivan Rus laid the foundation for Ukrainian nationalism through subsequent centuries. A new Ukrainian state, the Cossack Hetmanate, was established during the mid-17th century after an uprising against the Poles. Despite continuous Muscovite pressure, the Hetmanate managed to remain autonomous for well over 100 years. During the latter part of the 18th century, most Ukrainian ethnographic territory was absorbed by the Russian Empire. Following the collapse of czarist Russia in 1917, Ukraine achieved a short-lived period of independence (1917-20) but was reconquered and endured a brutal Soviet rule that engineered two forced famines (1921-22 and 1932-33) in which over 8 million died. In World War II, German and Soviet armies were responsible for 7 to 8 million more deaths. Although Ukraine achieved independence in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR, democracy and prosperity remained elusive as the legacy of state control and endemic corruption stalled efforts at economic reform, privatization, and civil liberties.
A peaceful mass protest referred to as the \"Orange Revolution\" in the closing months of 2004 forced the authorities to overturn a rigged presidential election and to allow a new internationally monitored vote that swept into power a reformist slate under Viktor YUSHCHENKO. Subsequent internal squabbles in the YUSHCHENKO camp allowed his rival Viktor YANUKOVYCH to stage a comeback in parliamentary (Rada) elections, become prime minister in August 2006, and be elected president in February 2010. In October 2012, Ukraine held Rada elections, widely criticized by Western observers as flawed due to use of government resources to favor ruling party candidates, interference with media access, and harassment of opposition candidates. President YANUKOVYCH's backtracking on a trade and cooperation agreement with the EU in November 2013 - in favor of closer economic ties with Russia - and subsequent use of force against students, civil society activists, and other civilians in favor of the agreement led to a three-month protest occupation of Kyiv's central square. The government's use of violence to break up the protest camp in February 2014 led to all out pitched battles, scores of deaths, international condemnation, a failed political deal, and the president's abrupt departure for Russia. New elections in the spring allowed pro-West president Petro POROSHENKO to assume office in June 2014; he was succeeded by Volodymyr ZELENSKY in May 2019.
Shortly after YANUKOVYCH's departure in late February 2014, Russian President PUTIN ordered the invasion of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula falsely claiming the action was to protect ethnic Russians living there. Two weeks later, a \"referendum\" was held regarding the integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation. The \"referendum\" was condemned as illegitimate by the Ukrainian Government, the EU, the US, and the UN General Assembly (UNGA). In response to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, 100 members of the UN passed UNGA resolution 68/262, rejecting the \"referendum\" as baseless and invalid and confirming the sovereignty, political independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. In mid-2014, Russia began supplying proxies in two of Ukraine's eastern provinces with manpower, funding, and materiel driving an armed conflict with the Ukrainian Government that continues to this day. Representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and the unrecognized Russian proxy republics signed the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum in September 2014 to end the conflict. However, this agreement failed to stop the fighting or find a political solution. In a renewed attempt to alleviate ongoing clashes, leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany negotiated a follow-on Package of Measures in February 2015 to implement the Minsk agreements. Representatives from Ukraine, Russia, the unrecognized Russian proxy republics, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe also meet regularly to facilitate implementation of the peace deal. By early 2022, more than 14,000 civilians were killed or wounded as a result of the Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine.
On 24 February 2022, Russia escalated its conflict with Ukraine by invading the country on several fronts in what has become the largest conventional military attack on a sovereign state in Europe since World War II. The invasion has received near universal international condemnation, and many countries have imposed sanctions on Russia and supplied humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. Russia made substantial gains in the early weeks of the invasion but underestimated Ukrainian resolve and combat capabilities. By the end of 2022, Ukrainian forces had regained all territories in the north and northeast and made some advances in the east and south. Nonetheless, Russia in late September 2022 unilaterally declared its annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts - Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia - even though none was fully under Russian control. The annexations remain unrecognized by the international community.
The invasion has also created Europe's largest refugee crisis since World War II. As of 31 January, 2023, approximately 18.16 million people had fled Ukraine, and 6.54 million people were internally displaced as of October 2022. Almost 18,500 civilian casualties had been reported, as of 22 January 2023. The invasion of Ukraine remains one of the two largest displacement crises worldwide (the other is the conflict in Syria).
" } }, "Geography": { @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "7.1% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "7.6% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "2.99 physicians/1,000 population (2014)" @@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "175.28 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "175.3 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@ "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { "text": "Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU; Zbroyni Syly Ukrayiny or ZSU): Ground Forces (Sukhoputni Viys’ka), Naval Forces (Viys’kovo-Mors’ki Syly, VMS), Air Forces (Povitryani Syly, PS), Air Assault Forces (Desantno-shturmovi Viyska, DShV), Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (UASOF), Territorial Defense Forces (Reserves); Ministry of Internal Affairs: National Guard of Ukraine, State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (includes Maritime Border Guard) (2022)", - "note": "note 1: in the event that martial law is declared, all National Guard units, with certain exceptions such as those tasked with providing for diplomatic security of embassies and consulates, would come under the command of the Ministry of Defense as auxiliary forces to the Armed Forces
1,461,700 (Russian-sponsored separatist violence in Crimea and eastern Ukraine) (2021); 5.91 million (Russian invasion), according to the UN (as of 5 December 2022); note – the more recent invasion total may reflect some double counting, since it is impossible to determine how many of the recent IDPs may also include IDPs from the earlier Russian-sponsored violence in Crimea and eastern Ukraine
" + "text": "1,461,700 (Russian-sponsored separatist violence in Crimea and eastern Ukraine) (2021); 6.54 million (Russian invasion), according to the UN (as of October 2022); note – the more recent invasion total may reflect some double counting, since it is impossible to determine how many of the recent IDPs may also include IDPs from the earlier Russian-sponsored violence in Crimea and eastern Ukraine
" }, "stateless persons": { - "text": "35,875 (mid-year 2021); note - citizens of the former USSR who were permanently resident in Ukraine were granted citizenship upon Ukraine's independence in 1991, but some missed this window of opportunity; people arriving after 1991, Crimean Tatars, ethnic Koreans, people with expired Soviet passports, and people with no documents have difficulty acquiring Ukrainian citizenship; following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, thousands of Crimean Tatars and their descendants deported from Ukraine under the STALIN regime returned to their homeland, some being stateless and others holding the citizenship of Uzbekistan or other former Soviet republics; a 1998 bilateral agreement between Ukraine and Uzbekistan simplified the process of renouncing Uzbek citizenship and obtaining Ukrainian citizenship" + "text": "36,459 (2022); note - citizens of the former USSR who were permanently resident in Ukraine were granted citizenship upon Ukraine's independence in 1991, but some missed this window of opportunity; people arriving after 1991, Crimean Tatars, ethnic Koreans, people with expired Soviet passports, and people with no documents have difficulty acquiring Ukrainian citizenship; following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, thousands of Crimean Tatars and their descendants deported from Ukraine under the STALIN regime returned to their homeland, some being stateless and others holding the citizenship of Uzbekistan or other former Soviet republics; a 1998 bilateral agreement between Ukraine and Uzbekistan simplified the process of renouncing Uzbek citizenship and obtaining Ukrainian citizenship" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/middle-east/ae.json b/middle-east/ae.json index 1526f59c..ce2170c9 100644 --- a/middle-east/ae.json +++ b/middle-east/ae.json @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "4.3% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "5.5% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "2.6 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -1231,7 +1231,7 @@ "text": "approximately 65,000 active personnel (45,000 Land Forces; 3,000 Navy; 5,000 Air Force; 12,000 Presidential Guard) (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the military's inventory is comprised of wide variety of mostly modern imported equipment; since 2010, the UAE has acquired military equipment from more than 20 countries with France, Russia, and the US as the leading suppliers; in recent years, the UAE has tried to boost its domestic defense industry (2022)" + "text": "the military's inventory is comprised of wide variety of mostly modern imported equipment; over the past decade, the UAE has acquired military equipment from more than 20 countries with France, Russia, and the US as the leading suppliers; in recent years, the UAE has tried to boost its domestic defense industry (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-30 years of age for compulsory military service for men (compulsory service initiated in 2014); 17 years of age for volunteers with parental approval; men can volunteer up to age 40; 24-month general service obligation, 16 months for secondary school graduates; women can volunteer to serve for 9 months regardless of education (2022)", diff --git a/middle-east/aj.json b/middle-east/aj.json index 6110b156..cfdc70ff 100644 --- a/middle-east/aj.json +++ b/middle-east/aj.json @@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "4% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "4.6% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "3.17 physicians/1,000 population (2019)" @@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "34.68 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "34.68 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -1257,7 +1257,7 @@ "text": "655,000 (conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh; IDPs are mainly ethnic Azerbaijanis but also include ethnic Kurds, Russians, and Turks predominantly from occupied territories around Nagorno-Karabakh; includes IDPs' descendants, returned IDPs, and people living in insecure areas and excludes people displaced by natural disasters; around half the IDPs live in the capital Baku) (2021)" }, "stateless persons": { - "text": "3,585 (mid-year 2021)" + "text": "3,585 (2022)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/middle-east/am.json b/middle-east/am.json index e49096d4..9d116596 100644 --- a/middle-east/am.json +++ b/middle-east/am.json @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "11.3% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "12.2% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "4.4 physicians/1,000 population (2017)" @@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "7.77 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "7.77 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -1226,7 +1226,7 @@ "text": "27,929 (Azerbaijan) (mid-year 2022)" }, "stateless persons": { - "text": "892 (mid-year 2021)" + "text": "816 (2022)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/middle-east/ba.json b/middle-east/ba.json index f0bb04af..9cca7333 100644 --- a/middle-east/ba.json +++ b/middle-east/ba.json @@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "4% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "4.2% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "0.93 physicians/1,000 population (2015)" @@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ } }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "116 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "120 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" } }, "Government": { diff --git a/middle-east/gg.json b/middle-east/gg.json index bfcd94fc..e395aad9 100644 --- a/middle-east/gg.json +++ b/middle-east/gg.json @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "6.7% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "7.6% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "5.11 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -1266,7 +1266,7 @@ "text": "305,000 (displaced in the 1990s as a result of armed conflict in the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; displaced in 2008 by fighting between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia) (2021)" }, "stateless persons": { - "text": "534 (mid-year 2021)" + "text": "530 (2022)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/middle-east/ir.json b/middle-east/ir.json index ad2d9791..2b5b2d46 100644 --- a/middle-east/ir.json +++ b/middle-east/ir.json @@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "6.7% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "5.3% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "1.58 physicians/1,000 population (2018)" @@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@ "text": "information varies; approximately 550-600,000 active armed forces personnel; approximately 400,000 Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (350,000 Ground Forces; 18,000 Navy; 40,000 Air Force/Air Defense Forces); approximately 150-190,000 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (100-150,000 Ground Forces; 20,000 Navy; 15,000 Aerospace Force; 5-15,000 Qods Force); estimated 90,000 active Basij Paramilitary Forces (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the Iranian military's inventory includes a mix of domestically-produced and mostly older foreign equipment largely of Chinese, Russian, Soviet, and US origin (US equipment acquired prior to the Islamic Revolution in 1979); Iran has also received some military equipment from North Korea, including midget submarines and ballistic missiles; Iran has a defense industry with the capacity to develop, produce, support, and sustain air, land, missile, and naval weapons programs (2021)" + "text": "the Iranian military's inventory includes a mix of domestically produced and mostly older foreign equipment largely of Chinese, Russian, Soviet, and US origin (US equipment acquired prior to the Islamic Revolution in 1979); Iran has also received some military equipment from North Korea, including midget submarines and ballistic missiles; Iran has a defense industry with the capacity to develop, produce, support, and sustain air, land, missile, and naval weapons programs (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18 years of age for men for compulsory military service; 16 years of age for volunteers; 17 years of age for Law Enforcement Forces; 15 years of age for Basij Forces (Popular Mobilization Army); conscript military service obligation is 18-24 months, depending on the location of service (soldiers serving in places of high security risk and deprived areas serve shorter terms); women exempt from military service (2021)", diff --git a/middle-east/is.json b/middle-east/is.json index 198549d2..43a9745d 100644 --- a/middle-east/is.json +++ b/middle-east/is.json @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ } }, "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "7.5% of GDP (2019)" + "text": "8.3% of GDP (2020)" }, "Physicians density": { "text": "3.63 physicians/1,000 population (2020)" @@ -1260,14 +1260,14 @@ "text": "approximately 173,000 active duty personnel (130,000 Ground Forces; 9,000 Naval; 34,000 Air Force) (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the majority of the IDF's inventory is comprised of weapons that are domestically-produced or imported from Europe and the US; since 2010, the US has been the leading supplier of arms to Israel; Israel has a broad defense industrial base that can develop, produce, support, and sustain a wide variety of weapons systems for both domestic use and export, particularly armored vehicles, unmanned aerial systems, air defense, and guided missiles (2022)" + "text": "the majority of the IDF's inventory is comprised of weapons that are domestically produced or imported from Europe and the US; the US has been the leading supplier of arms; Israel has a broad defense industrial base that can develop, produce, support, and sustain a wide variety of weapons systems for both domestic use and export, particularly armored vehicles, unmanned aerial systems, air defense, and guided missiles (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18 years of age for compulsory military service; 17 years of age for voluntary military service; Jews and Druze can be conscripted; Christians, Circassians, and Muslims may volunteer; both sexes are obligated to military service; conscript service obligation is 32 months for enlisted men and about 24 months for enlisted women (varies based on military occupation); officers serve 48 months; pilots commit to 9 years of service; reserve obligation to age 41-51 (men), age 24 (women) (2022)", "note": "note 1: women have served in the Israeli military since its establishment in 1948; as of 2021, women made up about 35% of IDF personnel; more than 90% of military specialties, including combat specialties, were open to women and more than 3,000 women were serving in combat units; the IDF's first mixed-gender infantry unit, the Caracal Battalion, was established in 2004The site of several advanced Amerindian civilizations - including the Olmec, Toltec, Teotihuacan, Zapotec, Maya, and Aztec - Mexico was conquered and colonized by Spain in the early 16th century. Administered as the Viceroyalty of New Spain for three centuries, it achieved independence early in the 19th century. Elections held in 2000 marked the first time since the 1910 Mexican Revolution that an opposition candidate - Vicente FOX of the National Action Party (PAN) - defeated the party in government, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). He was succeeded in 2006 by another PAN candidate Felipe CALDERON, but Enrique PENA NIETO regained the presidency for the PRI in 2012. Left-leaning anti-establishment politician and former mayor of Mexico City (2000-05) Andres Manuel LOPEZ OBRADOR, from the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA), became president in December 2018.
The global financial crisis in late 2008 caused a massive economic downturn in Mexico the following year. Growth rebounded to about 5% in 2010, but then averaged roughly half that for the rest of the decade. Notwithstanding this challenge, Mexico is currently the largest goods trading partner of the US – with $614.5 billion in two-way goods trade during 2019. US exports of goods and services to Mexico supported 1.2 million jobs in the US in 2015 (the latest data available) according to estimates from the Department of Commerce. Mexico's GDP contracted by 8.2% in 2020 due to pandemic-induced closures, its lowest level since the Great Depression, but Mexico’s economy rebounded in 2021 when it grew by 4.8%, driven largely by increased remittances, despite supply chain and pandemic-related challenges.
The US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA, or T-MEC by its Spanish acronym) entered into force on 1 July 2020 and replaced its predecessor, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Mexico amended its constitution on 1 May 2019 to facilitate the implementation of the labor components of USMCA.
Ongoing economic and social concerns include low real wages, high underemployment, inequitable income distribution, and few advancement opportunities for the largely indigenous population in the impoverished southern states. Since 2007, Mexico's powerful transnational criminal organizations have engaged in a struggle to control criminal markets, resulting in tens of thousands of drug-related homicides and forced disappearances.
" + "text": "The site of several advanced Amerindian civilizations - including the Olmec, Toltec, Teotihuacan, Zapotec, Maya, and Aztec - Mexico was conquered and colonized by Spain in the early 16th century. Administered as the Viceroyalty of New Spain for three centuries, it achieved independence early in the 19th century. Elections held in 2000 marked the first time since the 1910 Mexican Revolution that an opposition candidate - Vicente FOX of the National Action Party (PAN) - defeated the party in government, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). He was succeeded in 2006 by another PAN candidate Felipe CALDERON, but Enrique PEÑA NIETO regained the presidency for the PRI in 2012. Left-leaning anti-establishment politician and former mayor of Mexico City (2000-05) Andrés Manuel LÓPEZ OBRADOR, from the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA), became president in December 2018.
The global financial crisis in late 2008 caused a massive economic downturn in Mexico the following year. Growth rebounded to about 5% in 2010, but then averaged roughly half that for the rest of the decade. Notwithstanding this challenge, Mexico is currently the largest goods trading partner of the US – with $614.5 billion in two-way goods trade during 2019. US exports of goods and services to Mexico supported 1.2 million jobs in the US in 2015 (the latest data available) according to estimates from the Department of Commerce. Mexico's GDP contracted by 8.2% in 2020 due to pandemic-induced closures, its lowest level since the Great Depression, but Mexico’s economy rebounded in 2021 when it grew by 4.8%, driven largely by increased remittances, despite supply chain and pandemic-related challenges.
The US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA, or T-MEC by its Spanish acronym) entered into force on 1 July 2020 and replaced its predecessor, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Mexico amended its constitution on 1 May 2019 to facilitate the implementation of the labor components of USMCA.
Ongoing economic and social concerns include low real wages, high underemployment, inequitable income distribution, and few advancement opportunities for the largely indigenous population in the impoverished southern states. Since 2007, Mexico's powerful transnational criminal organizations have engaged in a struggle to control criminal markets, resulting in tens of thousands of drug-related homicides and forced disappearances.
" } }, "Geography": { @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ "text": "tsunamis along the Pacific coast, volcanoes and destructive earthquakes in the center and south, and hurricanes on the Pacific, Gulf of Mexico, and Caribbean coasts
volcanism: volcanic activity in the central-southern part of the country; the volcanoes in Baja California are mostly dormant; Colima (3,850 m), which erupted in 2010, is Mexico's most active volcano and is responsible for causing periodic evacuations of nearby villagers; it has been deemed a Decade Volcano by the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior, worthy of study due to its explosive history and close proximity to human populations; Popocatepetl (5,426 m) poses a threat to Mexico City; other historically active volcanoes include Barcena, Ceboruco, El Chichon, Michoacan-Guanajuato, Pico de Orizaba, San Martin, Socorro, and Tacana; see note 2 under \"Geography - note\"
" }, "Geography - note": { - "text": "note 1: strategic location on southern border of the US; Mexico is one of the countries along the Ring of Fire, a belt of active volcanoes and earthquake epicenters bordering the Pacific Ocean; up to 90% of the world's earthquakes and some 75% of the world's volcanoes occur within the Ring of Fire
note 2: some of the world's most important food crops were first domesticated in Mexico; the \"Three Sisters\" companion plants - winter squash, maize (corn), and climbing beans - served as the main agricultural crops for various North American Indian groups; all three apparently originated in Mexico but then were widely disseminated through much of North America; avocado, amaranth, and chili peppers also emanate from Mexico, as does vanilla, the world's most popular aroma and flavor spice; although cherry tomatoes originated in Ecuador, their domestication in Mexico transformed them into the larger modern tomato
note 3: the Sac Actun cave system at 348 km (216 mi) is the longest underwater cave in the world and the second longest cave worldwide, after Mammoth Cave in the United States (see \"Geography - note\" under United States)
note 4: the prominent Yucatan Peninsula that divides the Gulf of Mexico from the Caribbean Sea is shared by Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize; just on the northern coast of Yucatan, near the town of Chicxulub (pronounce cheek-sha-loob), lie the remnants of a massive crater (some 150 km in diameter and extending well out into the Gulf of Mexico); formed by an asteroid or comet when it struck the earth 66 million years ago, the impact is now widely accepted as initiating a worldwide climate disruption that caused a mass extinction of 75% of all the earth's plant and animal species - including the non-avian dinosaurs
note 1: strategic location on southern border of the US; Mexico is one of the countries along the Ring of Fire, a belt of active volcanoes and earthquake epicenters bordering the Pacific Ocean; up to 90% of the world's earthquakes and some 75% of the world's volcanoes occur within the Ring of Fire
note 2: some of the world's most important food crops were first domesticated in Mexico; the \"Three Sisters\" companion plants - winter squash, maize (corn), and climbing beans - served as the main agricultural crops for various North American Indian groups; all three apparently originated in Mexico but then were widely disseminated through much of North America; avocado, amaranth, and chili peppers also emanate from Mexico, as does vanilla, the world's most popular aroma and flavor spice; although cherry tomatoes originated in Ecuador, their domestication in Mexico transformed them into the larger modern tomato
note 3: the Sac Actun cave system at 348 km (216 mi) is the longest underwater cave in the world and the second longest cave worldwide, after Mammoth Cave in the United States (see \"Geography - note\" under United States)
note 4: the prominent Yucatán Peninsula that divides the Gulf of Mexico from the Caribbean Sea is shared by Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize; just on the northern coast of Yucatan, near the town of Chicxulub (pronounce cheek-sha-loob), lie the remnants of a massive crater (some 150 km in diameter and extending well out into the Gulf of Mexico); formed by an asteroid or comet when it struck the earth 66 million years ago, the impact is now widely accepted as initiating a worldwide climate disruption that caused a mass extinction of 75% of all the earth's plant and animal species - including the non-avian dinosaurs
Citizen's Movement (Movimiento Ciudadano) or MC [Clemente CASTANEDA Hoeflich]
Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) or PRI [Claudia RUIZ Massieu]
Labor Party (Partido del Trabajo) or PT [Alberto ANAYA Gutierrez]
Mexican Green Ecological Party (Partido Verde Ecologista de Mexico) or PVEM [Karen CASTREJON Trujillo]
Movement for National Regeneration (Movimiento Regeneracion Nacional) or MORENA [Mario DELGADO Carillo]
National Action Party (Partido Accion Nacional) or PAN [Antonio CORTES Mendoza]
Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolucion Democratica) or PRD [Jesus ZAMBRANO Grijalva]
This Is For Mexico (Va Por Mexico) (alliance that includes PAN, PRI, and PRD)
Together We Make History (Juntos Hacemos Historia) (alliance that included MORENA, PT, PVEM) (dissolved 23 December 2020)
Citizen's Movement (Movimiento Ciudadano) or MC [Clemente CASTAÑEDA Hoeflich]
Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) or PRI [Claudia RUIZ Massieu]
Labor Party (Partido del Trabajo) or PT [Alberto ANAYA Gutiérrez]
Mexican Green Ecological Party (Partido Verde Ecologista de México) or PVEM [Karen CASTREJÓN Trujillo]
Movement for National Regeneration (Movimiento Regeneración Nacional) or MORENA [Mario DELGADO Carillo]
National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional) or PAN [Antonio CORTÉS Mendoza]
Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática) or PRD [Jesús ZAMBRANO Grijalva]
This Is For Mexico (Va Por México) (alliance that includes PAN, PRI, and PRD)
Together We Make History (Juntos Hacemos Historia) (alliance that included MORENA, PT, PVEM) (dissolved 23 December 2020)
Following more than three centuries under Portuguese rule, Brazil gained its independence in 1822, maintaining a monarchical system of government until the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the subsequent proclamation of a republic by the military in 1889. Brazilian coffee exporters politically dominated the country until populist leader Getulio VARGAS rose to power in 1930. VARGAS governed over various versions of democratic and authoritarian regimes from 1930 to 1945. Democratic rule returned (including a democratically elected VARGAS administration from 1951 to 1955) and lasted until 1964, when the military overthrew President Joao GOULART. The military regime censored journalists and repressed and tortured dissidents in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The dictatorship lasted until 1985, when the military regime peacefully ceded power to civilian rulers, and the Brazilian Congress passed its current constitution in 1989.
By far the largest and most populous country in South America, Brazil continues to pursue industrial and agricultural growth and development of its interior. Having successfully weathered a period of global financial difficulty in the late 20th century, under President Luiz Inacio LULA da Silva (2003-2010) Brazil was seen as one of the world's strongest emerging markets and a contributor to global growth. The awarding of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympic Games, the first ever to be held in South America, was symbolic of the country's rise. However, from about 2013 to 2016, Brazil was plagued by a sagging economy, high unemployment, and high inflation, only emerging from recession in 2017. Former President Dilma ROUSSEFF (2011-2016) was removed from office in 2016 by Congress for having committed impeachable acts against Brazil's budgetary laws, and her vice president, Michel TEMER, served the remainder of her second term. A money-laundering investigation, Operation Lava Jato, uncovered a vast corruption scheme and prosecutors charged several high-profile Brazilian politicians with crimes. Former-President LULA was convicted of accepting bribes and served jail time (2018-19), although his conviction was overturned in early 2021. LULA's revival became complete in October 2022 when he narrowly defeated incumbent Jair BOLSONARO (2019-2022) in the presidential election.
Following more than three centuries under Portuguese rule, Brazil gained its independence in 1822, maintaining a monarchical system of government until the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the subsequent proclamation of a republic by the military in 1889. Brazilian coffee exporters politically dominated the country until populist leader Getúlio VARGAS rose to power in 1930. VARGAS governed over various versions of democratic and authoritarian regimes from 1930 to 1945. Democratic rule returned (including a democratically elected VARGAS administration from 1951 to 1955) and lasted until 1964, when the military overthrew President João GOULART. The military regime censored journalists and repressed and tortured dissidents in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The dictatorship lasted until 1985, when the military regime peacefully ceded power to civilian rulers, and the Brazilian Congress passed its current constitution in 1989.
By far the largest and most populous country in South America, Brazil continues to pursue industrial and agricultural growth and development of its interior. Having successfully weathered a period of global financial difficulty in the late 20th century, under President Luiz Inácio LULA da Silva (2003-2010) Brazil was seen as one of the world's strongest emerging markets and a contributor to global growth. The awarding of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympic Games, the first ever to be held in South America, was symbolic of the country's rise. However, from about 2013 to 2016, Brazil was plagued by a sagging economy, high unemployment, and high inflation, only emerging from recession in 2017. Former President Dilma ROUSSEFF (2011-2016) was removed from office in 2016 by Congress for having committed impeachable acts against Brazil's budgetary laws, and her vice president, Michel TEMER, served the remainder of her second term. A money-laundering investigation, Operation Lava Jato, uncovered a vast corruption scheme and prosecutors charged several high-profile Brazilian politicians with crimes. Former-President LULA was convicted of accepting bribes and served jail time (2018-19), although his conviction was overturned in early 2021. LULA's revival became complete in October 2022 when he narrowly defeated incumbent Jair BOLSONARO (2019-2022) in the presidential election.
2022: Luiz Inacio LULA da Silva elected president in second round; percent of vote in first round - Luiz Inacio LULA da Silva (PT) 48.4%, Jair BOLSONARO (PSL) 43.2%, Simone TEBET (MDB) 4.2%, Ciro GOMES (PDT) 3%, other 1.2%; percent of vote in second round - Luiz Inacio LULA da Silva (PT) 50.9%, Jair BOLSONARO (PSL) 49.1%
2018: Jair BOLSONARO elected president in second round; percent of vote in first round - Jair BOLSONARO (PSL) 46%, Fernando HADDAD (PT) 29.3%, Ciro GOMEZ (PDT) 12.5%, Geraldo ALCKMIN (PSDB) 4.8%, other 7.4%; percent of vote in second round - Jair BOLSONARO (PSL) 55.1%, Fernando HADDAD (PT) 44.9%
2022: Luiz Inácio LULA da Silva elected president in second round; percent of vote in first round - Luiz Inácio LULA da Silva (PT) 48.4%, Jair BOLSONARO (PSL) 43.2%, Simone Nassar TEBET (MDB) 4.2%, Ciro GOMES (PDT) 3%, other 1.2%; percent of vote in second round - Luiz Inácio LULA da Silva (PT) 50.9%, Jair BOLSONARO (PSL) 49.1%
2018: Jair BOLSONARO elected president in second round; percent of vote in first round - Jair BOLSONARO (PSL) 46%, Fernando HADDAD (PT) 29.3%, Ciro GOMEZ (PDT) 12.5%, Geraldo ALCKMIN (PSDB) 4.8%, other 7.4%; percent of vote in second round - Jair BOLSONARO (PSL) 55.1%, Fernando HADDAD (PT) 44.9%
Act (Agir) [Daniel TOURINHO] (formerly Christian Labor Party or PTC)
Avante [Luis Henrique de Oliveira RESENDE] (formerly Labor Party of Brazil or PTdoB)
Brazil Union (Uniao Brasil); note - founded from a merger between the Democrats (DEM) and the Social Liberal Party (PSL)
Brazilian Communist Party or PCB [Astrogildo PEREIRA]
Brazilian Democratic Movement or MDB [Luiz Felipe Baleia TENUTO Rossi]
Brazilian Labor Party or PTB [Kassyo Santos RAMOS]
Brazilian Renewal Labor Party or PRTB [Aiceia RODRIGUES and Hamilton MOURAO]
Brazilian Labor Party or PTB
Brazilian Social Democracy Party or PSDB [Bruno ARAUJO]
Brazilian Socialist Party or PSB [Carlos Roberto SIQUEIRA de Barros]
Christian Democracy or DC [Jose Maria EYMAEL] (formerly Christian Social
Cidadania [Roberto Joao Pereira FREIRE] (formerly Popular Socialist Party or PPS)
Communist Party of Brazil or PCdoB [Luciana SANTOS]
Democratic Labor Party or PDT [Carlos LUPI]
Democratic Party or PSDC
Democrats or DEM [Jose AGRIPINO] (formerly Liberal Front Party or PFL); note - dissolved in February 2022
Green Party or PV [Jose Luiz PENNA]
Liberal Party or PL [Luciano BIVAR and Antonio de RUEDA] (formerly Party of the Republic or PR)
National Mobilization Party or PMN [Antonio Carlos Bosco MASSAROLLO]
New Party or NOVO [Eduardo RIBEIRO]
Patriota [Adilson BAROSSO Oliveira] (formerly National Ecologic Party or PEN)
Podemos [Renata ABREU] (formerly National Labor Party or PTN)
Progressive Party (Progressistas) or PP [Ciro NOGUEIRA]
Republican Social Order Party or PROS [Euripedes JUNIOR]
Republicans (Republicanos) [Marcos Antonio PEREIRA] (formerly Brazilian Republican Party or PRB)
Social Christian Party or PSC [Everaldo Dias PEREIRA]
Social Democratic Party or PSD [Alfredo COATIT Neto]
Social Liberal Party or PSL [Luciano Caldas BIVAR]
Socialism and Freedom Party or PSOL [Juliano MEDEIROS]
Solidarity or SD [Paulinho DA FORCA]
Sustainability Network or REDE [Marina SILVA]
United Socialist Workers' Party or PSTU [Jose Maria DE ALMEIDA]
Workers' Cause Party or PCO [Rui Costa PIMENTA]
Workers' Party or PT [Gleisi HOFFMANN]
Act (Agir) [Daniel TOURINHO] (formerly Christian Labor Party or PTC)
Avante [Luis Henrique de Oliveira RESENDE] (formerly Labor Party of Brazil or PTdoB)
Brazil Union (União Brasil); note - founded from a merger between the Democrats (DEM) and the Social Liberal Party (PSL)
Brazilian Communist Party or PCB [Astrogildo PEREIRA]
Brazilian Democratic Movement or MDB [Luiz Felipe Baleia TENUTO Rossi]
Brazilian Labor Party or PTB [Kassyo Santos RAMOS]
Brazilian Renewal Labor Party or PRTB [Júlio Cezar FIDELIX da Cruz]
Brazilian Labor Party or PTB
Brazilian Social Democracy Party or PSDB [Bruno Cavalcanti de ARAÚJO]
Brazilian Socialist Party or PSB [Carlos Roberto SIQUEIRA de Barros]
Christian Democracy or DC [José Maria EYMAEL] (formerly Christian Social
Cidadania [Roberto João Pereira FREIRE] (formerly Popular Socialist Party or PPS)
Communist Party of Brazil or PCdoB [Luciana SANTOS]
Democratic Labor Party or PDT [Ciro FERREIRA Gomes]
Democratic Party or PSDC
Democrats or DEM [Jose AGRIPINO] (formerly Liberal Front Party or PFL); note - dissolved in February 2022
Green Party or PV [José Luiz PENNA]
Liberal Party or PL [Valdemar Costa Neto] (formerly Party of the Republic or PR)
National Mobilization Party or PMN [Antonio Carlos Bosco MASSAROLLO]
New Party or NOVO [Eduardo RIBEIRO]
Patriota [Ovasco RESENDE] (formerly National Ecologic Party or PEN)
Podemos [Renata ABREU] (formerly National Labor Party or PTN)
Progressive Party (Progressistas) or PP [Ciro NOGUEIRA Lima Filho]
Republican Social Order Party or PROS [Euripedes JUNIOR]
Republicans (Republicanos) [Marcos Antônio PEREIRA] (formerly Brazilian Republican Party or PRB)
Social Christian Party or PSC [Everaldo Dias PEREIRA]
Social Democratic Party or PSD [Alfredo COATIT Neto]
Social Liberal Party or PSL [Luciano Caldas BIVAR]
Socialism and Freedom Party or PSOL [Juliano MEDEIROS]
Solidarity or SD [Paulinho DA FORÇA]
Sustainability Network or REDE [Marina SILVA]
United Socialist Workers' Party or PSTU [José Maria DE ALMEIDA]
Workers' Cause Party or PCO [Rui Costa PIMENTA]
Workers' Party or PT [Gleisi Helena HOFFMANN]
most-spoken language: English 16.5%, Mandarin Chinese 14.6%, Hindi 8.3%, Spanish 7%, French 3.6%, Arabic 3.6%, Bengali 3.4%, Russian 3.4%, Portuguese 3.3%, Indonesian 2.6% (2020 est.)
most-spoken first language: Mandarin Chinese 12.3%, Spanish 6%, English 5.1%, Arabic 5.1%, Hindi 3.5%, Bengali 3.3%, Portuguese 3%, Russian 2.1%, Japanese 1.7%, Punjabi, Western 1.3%, Javanese 1.1% (2018 est.)
note 1: the six UN languages - Arabic, Chinese (Mandarin), English, French, Russian, and Spanish (Castilian) - are the mother tongue or second language of about 45% of the world's population, and are the official languages in more than half the states in the world; some 400 languages have more than a million first-language speakers (2018)
note 2: all told, there are estimated to be just over 7,151 languages spoken in the world (2022); approximately 80% of these languages are spoken by less than 100,000 people; about 150 languages are spoken by fewer than 10 people; communities that are isolated from each other in mountainous regions often develop multiple languages; Papua New Guinea, for example, boasts about 840 separate languages (2018)
note 3: approximately 2,300 languages are spoken in Asia, 2,140, in Africa, 1,310 in the Pacific, 1,060 in the Americas, and 290 in Europe (2020)
" + "text": "most-spoken language: English 18.8%, Mandarin Chinese 13.8%, Hindi 7.5%, Spanish 6.9%, French 3.4%, Arabic 3.4%, Bengali 3.4%, Russian 3.2%, Portuguese 3.2%, Urdu 2.9% (2022 est.)
most-spoken first language: Mandarin Chinese 12.3%, Spanish 6%, English 5.1%, Arabic 5.1%, Hindi 3.5%, Bengali 3.3%, Portuguese 3%, Russian 2.1%, Japanese 1.7%, Punjabi, Western 1.3%, Javanese 1.1% (2018 est.)
note 1: the six UN languages - Arabic, Chinese (Mandarin), English, French, Russian, and Spanish (Castilian) - are the mother tongue or second language of about 49.6% of the world's population (2022), and are the official languages in more than half the states in the world; some 400 languages have more than a million first-language speakers (2018)
note 2: all told, there are estimated to be just over 7,151 languages spoken in the world (2022); approximately 80% of these languages are spoken by less than 100,000 people; about 150 languages are spoken by fewer than 10 people; communities that are isolated from each other in mountainous regions often develop multiple languages; Papua New Guinea, for example, boasts about 840 separate languages (2018)
note 3: approximately 2,300 languages are spoken in Asia, 2,140, in Africa, 1,310 in the Pacific, 1,060 in the Americas, and 290 in Europe (2020)
" }, "Religions": { "text": "Christian 31.1%, Muslim 24.9%, Hindu 15.2%, Buddhist 6.6%, folk religions 5.6%, Jewish <1%, other <1%, unaffiliated 15.6% (2020 est.)" @@ -258,9 +258,6 @@ "text": "total: 8.9% of population (2015 est.)" } }, - "Current health expenditure": { - "text": "10% of GDP (2016)" - }, "Physicians density": { "text": "NA" }, @@ -376,7 +373,7 @@ "text": "summary statement: aquifers are underground layers of water-bearing permeable rock formations; they include alluvial formations such as unconsolidated sand and gravel aquifers, sedimentary rock formations of sandstone and karst (carbonate rocks such as limestone) aquifers, as well as volcanic aquifers, and basement aquifers (igneous and metamorphic rocks that underlie sedimentary and volcanic rock sequences); groundwater from aquifers can be extracted using a water well; The World Factbook lists 37 major aquifers across 52 countries; of these, 13 are in Africa, 10 in Asia, 5 in North America, 3 in South America, 4 in Europe, and 2 in Australia; although aquifers can vary in size, the major aquifers listed in The Factbook contain the bulk of the stored volume of groundwater; the fresh water held in these aquifers represents more than 30% of the World's fresh water; in the US, groundwater is primarily used for irrigation and globally, 70% of groundwater withdrawn is used for agriculture; groundwater also supplies almost half of all drinking water worldwide" }, "Total renewable water resources": { - "text": "53,789.3 cubic meters (2011)" + "text": "54 trillion cubic meters (2011 est.)" } }, "Government": { @@ -785,14 +782,14 @@ "note": "note: in 2021, the world's largest defense budgets belonged to the US, China, India, the UK, and Russia; total global military expenditures were estimated at more than $2 trillion" }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { - "text": "estimated 20 million active duty military personnel worldwide (2021)", - "note": "note: as of 2021, the largest militaries in the world based on personnel numbers belonged to China, India, the US, North Korea, and Russia" + "text": "approximately 20 million active-duty military personnel worldwide (2022)", + "note": "note: as of 2021, the largest militaries in the world based on personnel numbers belonged to China, India, the US, North Korea, and Russia" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "from 2010-2020, the US was assessed to be the world's leading arms exporter, followed by Russia; India and Saudi Arabia were the top arms importers for the same period" + "text": "the US is the world's leading arms exporter, followed by Russia (2022)" }, "Military deployments": { - "text": "as of early 2022, there were about 75,000 UN peacekeepers deployed worldwide" + "text": "there are about 75,000 uniformed UN peacekeepers deployed worldwide (2022)" }, "Maritime threats": { "text": "the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports that 2021 saw a decrease in global pirate activities; in 2021, pirates attacked a total of 132 ships worldwide including boarding 115 ships, hijacking one ship, and firing on five; this activity is a decrease from 195 incidents in 2020 and the lowest number recorded since 1994; in 2021, the number of hostages taken was eight, and the number of seafarers kidnapped for ransom decreased to 57 compared with 135 in 2020, with all taken off West Africa