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auto-update week 17
This commit is contained in:
Yo Robot
parent
0ffb286901
commit
bb26bded90
228 changed files with 862 additions and 825 deletions
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@ -109,7 +109,7 @@
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"People and Society": {
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"Population": {
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"text": "9,915,803 (2022 est.)",
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the UN estimated the country's total population was 9,771,000 as of mid-year 2019; immigrants make up 87.9% of the total population, according to UN data (2019)"
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the UN estimated the country's total population was 10,082,000 as of 2022; immigrants make up 88.1% of the total population, according to UN data (2020)"
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},
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"Nationality": {
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"noun": {
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@ -120,7 +120,8 @@
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}
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},
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"Ethnic groups": {
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"text": "Emirati 11.6%, South Asian 59.4% (includes Indian 38.2%, Bangladeshi 9.5%, Pakistani 9.4%, other 2.3%), Egyptian 10.2%, Filipino 6.1%, other 12.8% (2015 est.)"
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"text": "Emirati 11.6%, South Asian 59.4% (includes Indian 38.2%, Bangladeshi 9.5%, Pakistani 9.4%, other 2.3%), Egyptian 10.2%, Filipino 6.1%, other 12.8% (2015 est.)",
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"note": "<strong>note</strong><strong>:</strong> data represent the total population; as of 2019, immigrants make up about 87.9% of the total population, according to UN data"
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},
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"Languages": {
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"Languages": {
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@ -132,7 +133,7 @@
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},
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"Religions": {
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"text": "Muslim (official) 76%, Christian 9%, other (primarily Hindu and Buddhist, less than 5% of the population consists of Parsi, Baha'i, Druze, Sikh, Ahmadi, Ismaili, Dawoodi Bohra Muslim, and Jewish) 15% (2005 est.)",
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> data represent the total population; as of 2019, immigrants make up about 87.9% of the total population, according to UN data"
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"note": "<strong>note</strong><strong>:</strong> data represent the total population; as of 2020, immigrants make up about 88.1% of the total population, according to UN data"
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},
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"Age structure": {
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"0-14 years": {
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@ -1020,10 +1021,10 @@
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},
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"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
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"total": {
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"text": "3,245,123 (2020)"
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"text": "3,245,123 (2021)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "32.81 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "32.81 (2021 est.)"
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}
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}
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},
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@ -1091,7 +1092,7 @@
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}
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},
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"Heliports": {
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"text": "5 (2013)"
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"text": "5 (2021)"
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},
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"Pipelines": {
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"text": "533 km condensate, 3277 km gas, 300 km liquid petroleum gas, 3287 km oil, 24 km oil/gas/water, 218 km refined products, 99 km water (2013)"
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@ -1079,7 +1079,7 @@
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}
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},
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"Heliports": {
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"text": "1 (2012)"
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"text": "1 (2021)"
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},
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"Pipelines": {
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"text": "89 km condensate, 3890 km gas, 2446 km oil (2013)"
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@ -996,10 +996,10 @@
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},
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"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
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"total": {
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"text": "148,595 (2020)"
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"text": "148,928 (2021)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "8.73 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "8.75 (2021)"
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}
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}
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},
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@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@
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}
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},
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"Heliports": {
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"text": "1 (2013)"
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"text": "1 (2021)"
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},
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"Pipelines": {
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"text": "20 km gas, 54 km oil (2013)"
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@ -1010,10 +1010,10 @@
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},
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"Internet users": {
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"total": {
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"text": "2.74 million (2021 est.)"
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"text": "2.88 million (2022 est.)"
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},
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"percent of population": {
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"text": "72.53% (2020 est.)"
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"text": "72.5% (2022 est.)"
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}
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},
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"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
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@ -1021,7 +1021,7 @@
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"text": "972,162 (2021)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "24.37 (2021 est.)"
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"text": "24.37 (2021)"
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}
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}
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},
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@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@
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}
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},
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"Heliports": {
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"text": "2 (2013)"
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"text": "2 (2021)"
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},
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"Pipelines": {
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"text": "1596 km gas, 1175 km oil (2013)"
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@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@
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},
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"Ports and terminals": {
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"major seaport(s)": {
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"text": "Black Sea - Bat'umi, P'ot'i"
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"text": "Black Sea - Batumi, Poti"
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}
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}
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},
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@ -700,7 +700,7 @@
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"note": "<strong>note</strong> - non-operational"
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},
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"Heliports": {
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"text": "1 (2013)"
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"text": "1 (2021)"
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},
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"Roadways": {
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"text": "<p><strong>note:</strong> see entry for the West Bank</p>"
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@ -980,10 +980,10 @@
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},
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"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
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"total subscriptions": {
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"text": "127,624,951 (2020)"
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"text": "119 million (2022)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "152 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "139.1 (2022 est.)"
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}
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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@ -1006,18 +1006,18 @@
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},
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"Internet users": {
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"total": {
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"text": "59.16 million (2021 est.)"
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"text": "71.94 million (2022)"
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},
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"percent of population": {
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"text": "84.11% (2020 est.)"
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"text": "84.1% (2022)"
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}
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},
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"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
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"total": {
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"text": "9,564,195 (2020)"
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"text": "9,564,195 (2021)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "11.39 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "11.39 (2021)"
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}
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}
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},
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@ -1085,7 +1085,7 @@
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}
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},
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"Heliports": {
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"text": "26 (2013)"
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"text": "26 (2021)"
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},
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"Pipelines": {
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"text": "7 km condensate, 973 km condensate/gas, 20794 km gas, 570 km liquid petroleum gas, 8625 km oil, 7937 km refined products (2013)"
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@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@
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"note": "note - as of 2019, approximately 80% of Artesh ground forces personnel were conscripts, while Navy and Air/Air Defense Force personnel were primarily volunteers; conscripts reportedly comprised more than 50 percent of the IRGC"
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},
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"Military deployments": {
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"text": "est. 1-3,000 Syria (2021)",
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"text": "estimated 1-3,000 Syria (2022)",
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"note": "note - Iran has recruited, trained, and funded thousands of Syrian and foreign fighters to support the ASAD regime during the Syrian civil war"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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@ -569,7 +569,7 @@
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"text": "last held on 23 March 2021 (next to be held in 2025)"
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},
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"election results": {
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"text": "percent by party - Likud 24.2%, Yesh Atid 13.9%, Shas 7.2%, Blue and White 6.6%, Yamina 6.2%, Labor 6.1%, UTJ 5.6%, Yisrael Beiteinu 5.6%, Religious Zionist Party 5.1%, Joint List 4.8%, New Hope 4.7%, Meretz 4.6%, Ra'am 3.8%, other 0.5%; seats by party - Likud 30, Yesh Atid 17, Shas 9, Blue and White 8, Yamina 7, Labor 7, UTJ 7, Yisrael Beiteinu 7, Religious Zionist Party 6, Joint List 6, New Hope 6, Meretz 6, Ra'am 4 - NA"
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"text": "percent by party - Likud 24.2%, Yesh Atid 13.9%, Shas 7.2%, Blue and White 6.6%, Yamina 6.2%, Labor 6.1%, UTJ 5.6%, Yisrael Beiteinu 5.6%, Religious Zionist Party 5.1%, Joint List 4.8%, New Hope 4.7%, Meretz 4.6%, Ra'am 3.8%, other 0.5%; seats by party - Likud 30, Yesh Atid 17, Shas 9, Blue and White 8, Yamina 7, Labor 7, UTJ 7, Yisrael Beiteinu 7, Religious Zionist Party 6, Joint List 6, New Hope 6, Meretz 6, Ra'am 4; composition as of March 2022 - men 84, women 36, percentage of women 30%"
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}
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},
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"Judicial branch": {
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@ -1022,10 +1022,10 @@
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},
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"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
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"total subscriptions": {
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"text": "11.4 million (2020)"
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"text": "10.39 million (2022)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "131.7 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "117.3 (2022 est.)"
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}
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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@ -1048,18 +1048,18 @@
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},
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"Internet users": {
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"total": {
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"text": "7.68 million (2021 est.)"
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"text": "7.97 million (2022)"
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},
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"percent of population": {
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"text": "86.79% (2019 est.)"
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"text": "90% (2022 est.)"
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}
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},
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"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
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"total": {
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"text": "2,602,079 (2020)"
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"text": "2,602,079 (2021)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "30.06 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "30.06 (2021 est.)"
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}
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}
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},
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@ -1118,7 +1118,7 @@
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}
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},
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"Heliports": {
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"text": "3 (2013)"
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"text": "3 (2021)"
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},
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"Pipelines": {
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"text": "763 km gas, 442 km oil, 261 km refined products (2013)"
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@ -1189,7 +1189,7 @@
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"note": "note(s) - women have served in the Israeli military since its establishment in 1948; as of 2021, women made up about 35% of IDF personnel; more than 90% of military specialties, including combat specialties, were open to women and more than 3,000 women were serving in combat units; the IDF's first mixed-gender infantry unit, the Caracal Battalion, was established in 2004; as of 2021, conscripts comprised about 70% of the IDF ground forces"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has operated in the Golan between Israel and Syria since 1974 to monitor the ceasefire following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and supervise the areas of separation between the two countries; as of November 2021, UNDOF consisted of about 1,250 personnel<br><br> <p>as of 2021 and since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Israel has routinely carried out air strikes in Syria targeting Iranian, Iranian-backed militia and Hizballah forces, and some Syrian Government troops; over the same period, the IDF has carried out numerous strikes against Hizballah in Lebanon in response to attacks on Israeli territory; Israel fought a month-long war in Lebanon with Hizballah in 2006 (see Appendix-T for details on Hizballah)</p> <p>as of 2021, the IDF also conducted frequent operations against the HAMAS and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorist groups operating out of the Gaza Strip; since seizing control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, HAMAS has claimed responsibility for numerous rocket attacks into Israel and organized protests at the border between Gaza and Israel, resulting in violent clashes, casualties, and reprisal military actions by the IDF; HAMAS and Israel fought an 11-day conflict in May of 2021, which ended in an informal truce; sporadic clashes continued through 2021, including incendiary balloon attacks from Palestinian territory and retaliatory IDF strikes; PIJ has conducted numerous attacks on Israel since the 1980s, including a barrage of mortar and rocket strikes in February 2020 (see Appendix-T for more details on HAMAS and Palestine Islamic Jihad)<br><br>Israel has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments</p>"
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"text": "the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has operated in the Golan between Israel and Syria since 1974 to monitor the ceasefire following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and supervise the areas of separation between the two countries; as of February 2022, UNDOF consisted of about 1,100 personnel<br><br> <p>as of 2022 and since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Israel has routinely carried out air strikes in Syria targeting Iranian, Iranian-backed militia and Hizballah forces, and some Syrian Government troops; over the same period, the IDF has carried out numerous strikes against Hizballah in Lebanon in response to attacks on Israeli territory; Israel fought a month-long war in Lebanon with Hizballah in 2006 (see Appendix-T for details on Hizballah)</p> <p>as of 2021, the IDF also conducted frequent operations against the HAMAS and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorist groups operating out of the Gaza Strip; since seizing control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, HAMAS has claimed responsibility for numerous rocket attacks into Israel and organized protests at the border between Gaza and Israel, resulting in violent clashes, casualties, and reprisal military actions by the IDF; HAMAS and Israel fought an 11-day conflict in May of 2021, which ended in an informal truce; sporadic clashes continued through 2021, including incendiary balloon attacks from Palestinian territory and retaliatory IDF strikes; PIJ has conducted numerous attacks on Israel since the 1980s, including a barrage of mortar and rocket strikes in February 2020 (see Appendix-T for more details on HAMAS and Palestine Islamic Jihad)<br><br>Israel has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments</p>"
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}
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},
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"Terrorism": {
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@ -1013,10 +1013,10 @@
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},
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"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
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"total subscriptions": {
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"text": "36,946,600 (2020)"
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"text": "42.54 million (2022)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "91.86 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "102.1 (2022)"
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}
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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@ -1039,18 +1039,18 @@
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},
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"Internet users": {
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"total": {
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"text": "30.52 million (2021 est.)"
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"text": "20.58 million (2022)"
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},
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"percent of population": {
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"text": "49.36% (2019 est.)"
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"text": "49.4% (2022)"
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}
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},
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"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
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"total": {
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"text": "5,453,799 (2020)"
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"text": "6,254,099 (2021)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "13.56 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "15.55 (2021)"
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}
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}
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},
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@ -1118,7 +1118,7 @@
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}
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},
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"Heliports": {
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"text": "16 (2013)"
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"text": "16 (2021)"
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},
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"Pipelines": {
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"text": "2455 km gas, 913 km liquid petroleum gas, 5432 km oil, 1637 km refined products (2013)"
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@ -1042,10 +1042,10 @@
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},
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"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
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"total": {
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"text": "625,657 (2020)"
|
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"text": "630,545 (2021)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
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"text": "6.13 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "6.18 (2021)"
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}
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}
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},
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@ -1098,7 +1098,7 @@
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}
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},
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"Heliports": {
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"text": "1 (2012)"
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"text": "1 (2021)"
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},
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"Pipelines": {
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"text": "473 km gas, 49 km oil (2013)"
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@ -1165,7 +1165,7 @@
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"note": "note - most women serve in the medical service; outside the medical service, women comprised about 1.5% of the military as of 2019; the Jordanian Government intended to raise this to 3%"
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},
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"Military deployments": {
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"text": "325 Mali (MINUSMA) (Oct 2021)"
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"text": "330 Mali (MINUSMA) (Feb 2022)"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "<p>the Jordanian military traces its origins back to the Arab Legion, which was formed under the British protectorate of Transjordan in the 1920s</p> <p>due largely to its proximity to regional conflicts in Iraq and Syria, the presence of major terrorist organizations in both of those countries, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the highest priorities of Jordan’s military and security services in 2021 included securing its borders and the potential for domestic terrorist attacks; the terrorist group Hizballah and Iranian-backed militia forces were operating in southwestern Syria near Jordan’s border while fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) terrorist group continued operating in both Iraq and Syria; ISIS fighters included Jordanian nationals, some of whom have returned to Jordan; meanwhile, individuals and groups sympathetic to Palestine have planned and conducted terrorist attacks in Jordan</p> <p>Jordan has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments<br><br>Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994</p>"
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|
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@ -981,10 +981,10 @@
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},
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"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
|
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"total": {
|
||||
"text": "73,948 (2020)"
|
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"text": "73,948 (2021)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "1.73 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "1.73 (2021 est.)"
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}
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}
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},
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@ -1037,7 +1037,7 @@
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}
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},
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"Heliports": {
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"text": "4 (2013)"
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"text": "4 (2021)"
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},
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"Pipelines": {
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"text": "261 km gas, 540 km oil, 57 km refined products (2013)"
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|
|
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@ -1019,10 +1019,10 @@
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},
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"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
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||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "432,070 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "432,070 (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "6.33 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "6.33 (2021)"
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}
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}
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},
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@ -1078,7 +1078,7 @@
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}
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},
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"Heliports": {
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"text": "1 (2013)"
|
||||
"text": "1 (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Pipelines": {
|
||||
"text": "88 km gas (2013)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1150,7 +1150,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "note - as of 2020, women comprised about 5% of the active duty military"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>as of late 2021, the Lebanese military faced multiple challenges, including securing the border with war-torn Syria from infiltrations of militants linked to the Islamic State and al-Qa’ida terrorist groups and maintaining stability along its volatile border with Israel, where the Iranian-backed and Lebanon-based militant group Hizballah conducted a war with Israel in 2006 and tensions remained high, including occasional armed skirmishes; in 2021, the military also faced a financial crisis as government debt and national economic difficulties undercut its ability to fully pay and supply personnel, which has sparked domestic and international fears that the armed forces may disintegrate <br><br></p> the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) has operated in the country since 1978, originally under UNSCRs 425 and 426 to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area; following the July-August 2006 war, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1701 enhancing UNIFIL and deciding that in addition to the original mandate, it would, among other things, monitor the cessation of hostilities; accompany and support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they deploy throughout the south of Lebanon; and extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons; UNIFIL had about 10,500 personnel deployed in the country as of November 2021"
|
||||
"text": "<p>as of 2022, the Lebanese military faced multiple challenges, including securing the border with war-torn Syria from infiltrations of militants linked to the Islamic State and al-Qa’ida terrorist groups and maintaining stability along its volatile border with Israel, where the Iranian-backed and Lebanon-based militant group Hizballah conducted a war with Israel in 2006 and tensions remained high, including occasional armed skirmishes; in 2021, the military also faced a financial crisis as government debt and national economic difficulties undercut its ability to fully pay and supply personnel, which has sparked domestic and international fears that the armed forces may disintegrate <br><br>the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) has operated in the country since 1978, originally under UNSCRs 425 and 426 to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area; following the July-August 2006 war, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1701 enhancing UNIFIL and deciding that in addition to the original mandate, it would, among other things, monitor the cessation of hostilities; accompany and support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they deploy throughout the south of Lebanon; and extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons; UNIFIL had about 10,000 personnel deployed in the country as of February 2022</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -991,10 +991,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "508,949 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "508,949 (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "10.85 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "10.85 (2021 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
|
@ -1056,7 +1056,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Heliports": {
|
||||
"text": "3 (2013)"
|
||||
"text": "3 (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Pipelines": {
|
||||
"text": "106 km condensate, 4224 km gas, 3558 km oil, 33 km oil/gas/water, 264 km refined products (2013)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -998,10 +998,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "296,126 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "296,126 (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "10.28 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "10.28 (2021)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
|
@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Heliports": {
|
||||
"text": "1 (2013)"
|
||||
"text": "1 (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Pipelines": {
|
||||
"text": "288 km condensate, 221 km condensate/gas, 2383 km gas, 90 km liquid petroleum gas, 745 km oil, 103 km refined products (2013)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1016,10 +1016,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "7,890,261 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "7,890,261 (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "22.66 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "22.66 (2021 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Communications - note": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1087,7 +1087,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Heliports": {
|
||||
"text": "10 (2013)"
|
||||
"text": "10 (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Pipelines": {
|
||||
"text": "209 km condensate, 2940 km gas, 1183 km liquid petroleum gas, 5117 km oil, 1151 km refined products (2013)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1161,7 +1161,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "17-40 for men; no conscription; as of 2021, women (aged 18-40) were allowed to serve in the Army, Air Defense, Navy, Strategic Missile Force, medical services, and internal security forces up to the rank of non-commissioned officer (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "est. 2,500-5,000 Yemen (varies depending on operations, which continued into 2021) (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "est. 2,500-5,000 Yemen (varies depending on operations, which continued into 2022) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>in 2015, a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states intervened militarily in Yemen in support of the Republic of Yemen Government against the separatist Huthis; as of 2022, the coalition (consisting largely of Saudi forces) and the Huthis continued to engage in fighting, mostly with air and missile forces, although heavy ground fighting was also reportedly taking place over the key province of Marib; the Saudis have conducted numerous air strikes in northern Yemen, while the Huthis have launched attacks into Saudi territory with ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles armed with explosives; the Saudi-led coalition controlled the country’s airspace and the port of Hodeida; Saudi Arabia also has raised and equipped paramilitary/militia security forces in Yemen--based largely on tribal or regional affiliation--to deploy along the Saudi-Yemen border, especially the areas bordering the governorates of Saada and Al-Jawf</p>"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -986,10 +986,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "1,548,100 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "1,549,356 (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "8.85 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "8.85 (2021)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
|
@ -1048,7 +1048,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Heliports": {
|
||||
"text": "6 (2013)"
|
||||
"text": "6 (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Pipelines": {
|
||||
"text": "3170 km gas, 2029 km oil (2013)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1126,7 +1126,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "note - the SAF is largely comprised of conscripts"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has operated in the Golan between Israel and Syria since 1974 to monitor the ceasefire following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and supervise the areas of separation between the two countries; as of November 2021, UNDOF consisted of about 1,250 personnel<br><br>as of 2022, multiple actors were conducting military operations in Syria in support of the ASAD government or Syrian opposition forces, as well in pursuit of their own security goals, such counterterrorism; operations have included air strikes, direct ground combat, and sponsoring proxy forces, as well as providing non-lethal military support, including advisors, technicians, arms and equipment, funding, intelligence, and training: <p><strong>pro-ASAD elements</strong> operating in Syria have included<strong> Lebanese Hezbollah, Iranian, Iranian-backed Shia militia, and Russian forces</strong>; since early in the civil war, the ASAD government has relied on Lebanese Hezbollah (see Appendix T for further information), as well as Iran and Iranian-backed forces, for combat operations and to hold territory; Iran has provided military advisors and combat troops from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (including the Qods Force; see Appendix T for further information), as well as intelligence, logistical, material, technical, and financial support; it has funded, trained, equipped, and led Shia militia/paramilitary units comprised of both Syrian and non-Syrian personnel, primarily from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan; Russia intervened at the request of the ASAD government in 2015 and has since provided air support, special operations forces, military advisors, private military contractors, training, arms, and equipment; Iranian and Russian support has also included assisting Syria in combating the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS; see Appendix T) terrorist group</p> <p><strong>Turkey </strong>intervened militarily in 2016 to combat Kurdish militants and ISIS, support select Syrian opposition forces, and establish a buffer along portions of its border with Syria; as of 2022, Turkey continued to maintain a considerable military presence in northern Syria; it has armed and trained militia/proxy forces, such as the Syrian National Army, which was formed in late 2017 of Syrian Arab and Turkmen rebel factions in the Halab (Aleppo) province and northwestern Syria</p> <p>the <strong>US and some regional and European states</strong> have at times backed Syrian opposition forces militarily and/or conducted military operations, primarily against ISIS; the US has operated in Syria since 2015 with ground forces and air strikes; as of 2022, the majority the ground forces were deployed in the Eastern Syria Security Area (ESSA, which includes parts of Hasakah and Dayr az Zawr provinces east of the Euphrates River) in support of operations by the Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS, while the remainder were in southeast Syria around Tanf supporting counter-ISIS operations by the Jaysh Mughawir al-Thawra (MaT, or Revolutionary Commando Army) Syrian opposition force; the US has also conducted air strikes against Syrian military targets in response to Syrian Government use of chemical weapons against opposition forces and civilians; in addition, France, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UK have provided forms of military assistance to opposition forces and/or conducted operations against ISIS, including air strikes</p> <p><strong>Israel</strong> has conducted hundreds of military air strikes in Syria, mostly targeting Hezbollah, Iranian, and/or Iranian-backed militia targets</p> <p>the<strong> Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) </strong>are an anti-ASAD regime coalition of forces composed primarily of Kurdish, Sunni Arab, and Syriac Christian fighters; it is dominated and led by Kurdish forces, particularly the People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia; the SDF began to receive US support in 2015 and as of 2022 was the main local US partner in its counter-ISIS campaign; the SDF has internal security, anti-terror, and commando units; Turkey views the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a US-designated terrorist organization (see Appendix T)</p> <p>the <strong>ISIS</strong> terrorist group (see Appendix T) lost its last territorial stronghold to SDF forces in 2019, but continued to maintain a low-level insurgency as of 2022; in addition, the SDF held about 10,000 captured suspected ISIS fighters in detention facilities across northern Syria, including 2,000 from countries other than Iraq and Syria</p> <p>as of 2021, the <strong>Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham </strong>(HTS; formerly known as al-Nusrah Front) terrorist organization (see Appendix T) was the dominate militant group in northwest Syria and asserted considerable influence and control over the so-called Syrian Salvation Government in the Iblib de-escalation zone; as of 2021, the group had an estimated 10,000 fighters</p>"
|
||||
"text": "the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has operated in the Golan between Israel and Syria since 1974 to monitor the ceasefire following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and supervise the areas of separation between the two countries; as of February 2022, UNDOF consisted of about 1,100 personnel<br><br>as of 2022, multiple actors were conducting military operations in Syria in support of the ASAD government or Syrian opposition forces, as well in pursuit of their own security goals, such counterterrorism; operations have included air strikes, direct ground combat, and sponsoring proxy forces, as well as providing non-lethal military support, including advisors, technicians, arms and equipment, funding, intelligence, and training: <p><strong>pro-ASAD elements</strong> operating in Syria have included<strong> Lebanese Hezbollah, Iranian, Iranian-backed Shia militia, and Russian forces</strong>; since early in the civil war, the ASAD government has relied on Lebanese Hezbollah (see Appendix T for further information), as well as Iran and Iranian-backed forces, for combat operations and to hold territory; Iran has provided military advisors and combat troops from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (including the Qods Force; see Appendix T for further information), as well as intelligence, logistical, material, technical, and financial support; it has funded, trained, equipped, and led Shia militia/paramilitary units comprised of both Syrian and non-Syrian personnel, primarily from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan; Russia intervened at the request of the ASAD government in 2015 and has since provided air support, special operations forces, military advisors, private military contractors, training, arms, and equipment; Iranian and Russian support has also included assisting Syria in combating the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS; see Appendix T) terrorist group</p> <p><strong>Turkey </strong>intervened militarily in 2016 to combat Kurdish militants and ISIS, support select Syrian opposition forces, and establish a buffer along portions of its border with Syria; as of 2022, Turkey continued to maintain a considerable military presence in northern Syria; it has armed and trained militia/proxy forces, such as the Syrian National Army, which was formed in late 2017 of Syrian Arab and Turkmen rebel factions in the Halab (Aleppo) province and northwestern Syria</p> <p>the <strong>US and some regional and European states</strong> have at times backed Syrian opposition forces militarily and/or conducted military operations, primarily against ISIS; the US has operated in Syria since 2015 with ground forces and air strikes; as of 2022, the majority the ground forces were deployed in the Eastern Syria Security Area (ESSA, which includes parts of Hasakah and Dayr az Zawr provinces east of the Euphrates River) in support of operations by the Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS, while the remainder were in southeast Syria around Tanf supporting counter-ISIS operations by the Jaysh Mughawir al-Thawra (MaT, or Revolutionary Commando Army) Syrian opposition force; the US has also conducted air strikes against Syrian military targets in response to Syrian Government use of chemical weapons against opposition forces and civilians; in addition, France, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UK have provided forms of military assistance to opposition forces and/or conducted operations against ISIS, including air strikes</p> <p><strong>Israel</strong> has conducted hundreds of military air strikes in Syria, mostly targeting Hezbollah, Iranian, and/or Iranian-backed militia targets</p> <p>the<strong> Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) </strong>are an anti-ASAD regime coalition of forces composed primarily of Kurdish, Sunni Arab, and Syriac Christian fighters; it is dominated and led by Kurdish forces, particularly the People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia; the SDF began to receive US support in 2015 and as of 2022 was the main local US partner in its counter-ISIS campaign; the SDF has internal security, anti-terror, and commando units; Turkey views the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a US-designated terrorist organization (see Appendix T)</p> <p>the <strong>ISIS</strong> terrorist group (see Appendix T) lost its last territorial stronghold to SDF forces in 2019, but continued to maintain a low-level insurgency as of 2022; in addition, the SDF held about 10,000 captured suspected ISIS fighters in detention facilities across northern Syria, including 2,000 from countries other than Iraq and Syria</p> <p>as of 2022, the <strong>Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham </strong>(HTS; formerly known as al-Nusrah Front) terrorist organization (see Appendix T) was the dominant militant group in northwest Syria and asserted considerable influence and control over the so-called Syrian Salvation Government in the Iblib de-escalation zone</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1058,10 +1058,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "16,734,853 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "16,734,853 (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "19.84 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "19.84 (2021)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
|
@ -1123,7 +1123,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Heliports": {
|
||||
"text": "20 (2013)"
|
||||
"text": "20 (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Pipelines": {
|
||||
"text": "14,666 km gas, 3,293 km oil (2017)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1203,7 +1203,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "note - as of 2019, women made up about .3% of the military's full-time personnel"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "est. 200 (Azerbaijan; monitoring cease-fire, clearing mines); 250 Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR); est. 25-35,000 Cyprus; 300 Kosovo (NATO/KFOR); 100 Lebanon (UNIFIL); est. 3-5,000 Qatar; est. 200 Somalia (training mission); est. 10-20,000 Syria (2021)",
|
||||
"text": "est. 200 (Azerbaijan; monitoring cease-fire, clearing mines); 250 Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR); est. 25-35,000 Cyprus; 300 Kosovo (NATO/KFOR); 100 Lebanon (UNIFIL); est. 3-5,000 Qatar; est. 200 Somalia (training mission); est. 10-20,000 Syria (2021-2022)",
|
||||
"note": "note(s) - between 2016 and 2020, Turkey conducted four major military campaigns in northern Syria; Turkey also has deployed troops into northern Iraq on numerous occasions to combat the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), including large operations involving thousands of troops in 2007, 2011, and 2018, and smaller-scale incursions in 2021 and early 2022; in 2020, Turkey deployed an undetermined number of Turkish military troops and an estimated 3,500-5,000 Syrian fighters to Libya to support the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)<br><br>in October of 2021, Turkey’s parliament extended the military’s mandate to launch cross-border operations in Iraq and Syria by two more years"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -864,7 +864,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Heliports": {
|
||||
"text": "1 (2013)"
|
||||
"text": "1 (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Roadways": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1033,10 +1033,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "386,330 (2018)"
|
||||
"text": "391,000 (2021 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "1.68 (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "1.31 (2021 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
|
@ -1164,7 +1164,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "75,315 (Somalia), 17,407 (Ethiopia) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "68,874 (Somalia), 17,407 (Ethiopia) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "4,002,012 (conflict in Sa'ada Governorate; clashes between al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula and government forces) (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue