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middle-east/ae.json
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@ -61,7 +61,7 @@
},
"Elevation": {
"highest point": {
"text": "Jabal Bil 'Ays 1,905 m<br>note - the Factbook map is incorrect; it shows the wrong location of the high elevation"
"text": "Jabal Bil 'Ays 1,905 m"
},
"lowest point": {
"text": "Persian Gulf 0 m"
@ -515,7 +515,7 @@
"text": "UTC+4 (9 hours ahead of Washington, DC, during Standard Time)"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "in Arabic, \"abu\" means \"father\" and \"dhabi\" refers to \"gazelle\"; the name may derive from an abundance of gazelles that used to live in the area, as well as a folk tale involving the \"Father of the Gazelle,\" Shakhbut bin Dhiyab al Nahyan, whose hunting party tracked a gazelle to a spring on the island where Abu Dhabi was founded"
"text": "in Arabic, \"abu\" means \"father\" and \"dhabi\" refers to \"gazelle\"; the name may derive from an abundance of gazelles that used to live in the area, as well as a folk tale involving the \"Father of the Gazelle,\" Shakhbut BIN DHIYAB AL NAHYAN, whose hunting party tracked a gazelle to a spring on the island where Abu Dhabi was founded"
}
},
"Administrative divisions": {
@ -1227,17 +1227,17 @@
"text": "approximately 65,000 active personnel (45,000 Land Forces; 3,000 Navy; 5,000 Air Force; 12,000 Presidential Guard) (2022)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the UAE Armed Forces inventory is comprised of wide variety of mostly modern imported equipment; since 2010, the UAE has acquired military equipment from more than 20 countries with France, Russia, and the US as the leading suppliers; in recent years, the UAE has tried to boost its domestic defense industry (2022)"
"text": "the military's inventory is comprised of wide variety of mostly modern imported equipment; since 2010, the UAE has acquired military equipment from more than 20 countries with France, Russia, and the US as the leading suppliers; in recent years, the UAE has tried to boost its domestic defense industry (2022)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "18-30 years of age for compulsory military service for men (compulsory service initiated in 2014); 17 years of age for male volunteers with parental approval; males can volunteer up to age 40; 24-month general service obligation, 16 months for secondary school graduates; women can volunteer to serve for 9 months regardless of education (2022)",
"text": "18-30 years of age for compulsory military service for men (compulsory service initiated in 2014); 17 years of age for volunteers with parental approval; men can volunteer up to age 40; 24-month general service obligation, 16 months for secondary school graduates; women can volunteer to serve for 9 months regardless of education (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> compulsory service may be completed in the uniformed military, the Ministry of Interior, the State Security Service, or other institutions designated by the military leadership"
},
"Military deployments": {
"text": "estimates vary; reportedly a few hundred remain in Yemen; maintains military bases in Eritrea and Somalia (2022)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the UAE hosts a multi-service French military base, which includes the French naval command for the Indian Ocean (ALINDIEN); the UAE has a defense cooperation agreement with the US and hosted about 3,500 US troops, mostly air and naval personnel<br><br>in 2015, UAE intervened militarily in Yemen as part of the Saudi-led coalition in support of the Republic of Yemen Government with an estimated 3,500 troops, as well as supporting air and naval forces; UAE withdrew its main military force from Yemen in 2019, but has retained a small military presence while working with proxies in southern Yemen, most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC)<br><br>the UAE's military traces its origins to the establishment of the Trucial Oman Scouts in 1951, a joint UK-Abu Dhabi organization modeled after Jordan’s Arab Legion, which became the Abu Dhabi Defense Force in 1965; the modern Emirati armed forces were formed in 1976 (2022)"
"text": "the UAE hosts a multi-service French military base, which includes the French naval command for the Indian Ocean (ALINDIEN); the UAE has a defense cooperation agreement with the US and hosts about 3,500 US troops, mostly air and naval personnel<br><br>in 2015, UAE intervened militarily in Yemen as part of the Saudi-led coalition in support of the Republic of Yemen Government with an estimated 3,500 troops, as well as supporting air and naval forces; UAE withdrew its main military force from Yemen in 2019, but has retained a small military presence while working with proxies in southern Yemen, most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC)<br><br>the UAE's military traces its origins to the establishment of the Trucial Oman Scouts in 1951, a joint UK-Abu Dhabi organization modeled after Jordan’s Arab Legion, which became the Abu Dhabi Defense Force in 1965; the modern Emirati armed forces were formed in 1976 (2022)"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

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middle-east/am.json
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@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@
"text": "the inventory of the Armenian Armed Forces includes mostly Russian and Soviet-era equipment (2022)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "18-27 years of age for voluntary (men and women) or compulsory (men only) military service; 2-year conscript service obligation, which can be served as an officer upon deferment for university studies if enrolled in officer-producing program; 17-year-olds are eligible to become cadets at military higher education institutes, where they are classified as military personnel; citizens aged 27 to 50 are registered in the military reserve and may be called to serve if mobilization is declared (2021)",
"text": "18-36 years of age for voluntary/contractual (men and women) or compulsory (men only) military service; contractual military service contracts are concluded for 3-12 months, or for a term of 3-5 years; 2-year conscript service obligation, which can be served as an officer upon deferment for university studies if enrolled in officer-producing program; 17-year-olds are eligible to become cadets at military higher education institutes, where they are classified as military personnel; citizens aged 27 to 50 are registered in the military reserve and may be called to serve if mobilization is declared (2021)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> as of 2021, conscripts comprised about half of the military's active personnel; as of 2018, women made up about 13% of the active duty military"
},
"Military - note": {

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middle-east/gg.json
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@ -1247,7 +1247,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "26,232 (Ukraine) (as of 6 September 2022)"
"text": "26,031 (Ukraine) (as of 13 September 2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "305,000 (displaced in the 1990s as a result of armed conflict in the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; displaced in 2008 by fighting between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia) (2021)"

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middle-east/iz.json
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@ -1290,7 +1290,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "15,272 (Turkey), 7,881 (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (mid-year 2021); 263,783 (Syria) (2022)"
"text": "15,272 (Turkey), 7,881 (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (mid-year 2021); 265,384 (Syria) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "1,184,818 (displacement in central and northern Iraq since January 2014) (2022)"

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middle-east/le.json
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@ -613,7 +613,7 @@
}
},
"Political parties and leaders": {
"text": "<p>Al-Ahbash or Association of Islamic Charitable Projects or AICP [Adnan TARABULSI]<br>Amal Movement (\"Hope Movement\") [Nabih BERRI]<br>Azm Movement [Najib MIQATI]<br>Ba’th Arab Socialist Party of Lebanon [Fayiz SHUKR]<br>Free Patriotic Movement or FPM [Gibran BASSIL]<br>Future Movement Bloc or FM [Sa'ad al-HARIRI]<br>Hizballah [Hassan NASRALLAH]<br>Islamic Action Front or IAF [Sheikh Zuhayr al-JU’AYD]<br>Kata'ib Party [Sami GEMAYEL]<br>Lebanese Democratic Party [Talal ARSLAN]<br>Lebanese Forces or LF [Samir JA'JA]<br>Marada Movement [Sulayman FRANJIEH]<br>Progressive Socialist Party or PSP [Walid JUNBLATT]<br>Social Democrat Hunshaqian Party [Sabuh KALPAKIAN]<br>Syrian Social Nationalist Party or SSNP [Rabi BANAT]<br>Tashnaq or Armenian Revolutionary Federation [Hagop PAKRADOUNIAN]</p>"
"text": "<p>Al-Ahbash or Association of Islamic Charitable Projects or AICP [Shaykh Hussam QARAQIRA]<br>Amal Movement (\"Hope Movement\") [Nabih BERRI]<br>Azm Movement [Najib MIQATI]<br>Ba’th Arab Socialist Party of Lebanon [leader disputed]<br>Free Patriotic Movement or FPM [Gibran BASSIL]<br>Future Movement Bloc or FM [Sa'ad al-HARIRI]<br>Hizballah [Hassan NASRALLAH]<br>Islamic Action Front or IAF [Sheikh Zuhayr al-JU’AYD]<br>Kata'ib Party [Sami GEMAYEL]<br>Lebanese Democratic Party [Talal ARSLAN]<br>Lebanese Forces or LF [Samir JA'JA]<br>Marada Movement [Sulayman FRANJIEH]<br>Progressive Socialist Party or PSP [Walid JUNBLATT]<br>Social Democrat Hunshaqian Party [Sabuh KALPAKIAN]<br>Syrian Social Nationalist Party or SSNP [Rabi BANAT]<br>Tashnaq or Armenian Revolutionary Federation [Hagop PAKRADOUNIAN]</p>"
},
"International organization participation": {
"text": "ABEDA, AFESD, AMF, CAEU, FAO, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, LAS, MIGA, NAM, OAS (observer), OIC, OIF, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNRWA, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)"

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middle-east/mu.json
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@ -513,7 +513,7 @@
"text": "UTC+4 (9 hours ahead of Washington, DC, during Standard Time)"
},
"etymology": {
"text": "the name, whose meaning is uncertain, traces back almost two millennia; two 2nd century A.D. scholars, the geographer Ptolemy and the historian Arrian, both mention an Arabian Sea coastal town of Moscha, which most likely referred to Muscat"
"text": "the name, whose meaning is uncertain, traces back almost two millennia; two 2nd century A.D. scholars, the geographer PTOLEMY and the historian ARRIAN, both mention an Arabian Sea coastal town of Moscha, which most likely referred to Muscat"
}
},
"Administrative divisions": {

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middle-east/sa.json
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> SANG also has an irregular force (Fowj), primarily Bedouin tribal volunteers, with a total strength of approximately 25,000"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the inventory of the Saudi military forces, including the SANG, includes a mix of mostly modern weapons systems from the US and Europe; since 2010, the US has been the leading supplier of armaments; as of 2020-21, Saudi Arabia was the world's largest arms importer (2021)"
"text": "the inventory of the Saudi military forces, including the SANG, includes a mix of mostly modern weapons systems from the US and Europe; since 2010, the US has been the leading supplier of armaments; as of 2020-21, Saudi Arabia was the world's largest arms importer (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> as of 2022, the Saudi Navy was in the midst of a multi-year and multi-billion dollar expansion and modernization program to purchase new frigates, corvettes, and other naval craft; in 2022, it received two of an expected five corvettes as part of a joint construction effort with Spain; in 2018, it signed a contract to acquire four US-built multi-purpose littoral mission ships, which will be comparable to frigates in capabilities"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "17-40 for voluntary military service for men; no conscription; as of 2021, women (aged 18-40) were allowed to serve in the Army, Air Defense, Navy, Strategic Missile Force, medical services, and internal security forces up to the rank of non-commissioned officer (2021)"

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middle-east/sy.json
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the military is comprised largely of conscripts"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has operated in the Golan between Israel and Syria since 1974 to monitor the ceasefire following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and supervise the areas of separation between the two countries; as of mid-2022, UNDOF consisted of about 1,000 personnel<br><br>as of 2022, multiple actors were conducting military operations in Syria in support of the ASAD government or Syrian opposition forces, as well in pursuit of their own security goals, such counterterrorism; operations have included air strikes, direct ground combat, and sponsoring proxy forces, as well as providing non-lethal military support, including advisors, technicians, arms and equipment, funding, intelligence, and training:<br><br><strong>pro-ASAD elements</strong> operating in Syria have included<strong> Lebanese Hezbollah, Iranian, Iranian-backed Shia militia, and Russian forces</strong>; since early in the civil war, the ASAD government has relied on Lebanese Hizballah (see Appendix T for further information), as well as Iran and Iranian-backed forces, for combat operations and to hold territory; Iran has provided military advisors and combat troops from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (including the Qods Force; see Appendix T for further information), as well as intelligence, logistical, material, technical, and financial support; it has funded, trained, equipped, and led Shia militia/paramilitary units comprised of both Syrian and non-Syrian personnel, primarily from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan; Russia intervened at the request of the ASAD government in 2015 and has since provided air support, special operations forces, military advisors, private military contractors, training, arms, and equipment; Iranian and Russian support has also included assisting Syria in combating the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS; see Appendix T) terrorist group<br><br><strong>Turkey </strong>intervened militarily in 2016 to combat Kurdish militants and ISIS, support select Syrian opposition forces, and establish a buffer along portions of its border with Syria; as of 2022, Turkey continued to maintain a considerable military presence in northern Syria; it has armed and trained militia/proxy forces, such as the Syrian National Army, which was formed in late 2017 of Syrian Arab and Turkmen rebel factions in the Halab (Aleppo) province and northwestern Syria<br><br>the <strong>US and some regional and European states</strong> have at times backed Syrian opposition forces militarily and/or conducted military operations, primarily against ISIS; the US has operated in Syria since 2015 with ground forces and air strikes; as of 2022, the majority the ground forces were deployed in the Eastern Syria Security Area (ESSA, which includes parts of Hasakah and Dayr az Zawr provinces east of the Euphrates River) in support of operations by the Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS, while the remainder were in southeast Syria around At Tanf supporting counter-ISIS operations by the Jaysh Mughawir al-Thawra (MaT, or Revolutionary Commando Army) Syrian opposition force; the US has also conducted air strikes against Syrian military targets in response to Syrian Government use of chemical weapons against opposition forces and civilians; in addition, France, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UK have provided forms of military assistance to opposition forces and/or conducted operations against ISIS, including air strikes<br><br><strong>Israel</strong> has conducted hundreds of military air strikes in Syria against Syrian military, Hezbollah, Iranian, and/or Iranian-backed militia targets<br><br>the<strong> Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) </strong>are an anti-ASAD regime coalition of forces composed primarily of Kurdish, Sunni Arab, and Syriac Christian fighters; it is dominated and led by Kurdish forces, particularly the People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia; the SDF began to receive US support in 2015 and as of 2022 was the main local US partner in its counter-ISIS campaign; the SDF has internal security, anti-terror, and commando units; Turkey views the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a US-designated terrorist organization (see Appendix T)<br><br>the <strong>ISIS</strong> terrorist group (see Appendix T) lost its last territorial stronghold to SDF forces in 2019, but continued to maintain a low-level insurgency as of 2022; in addition, the SDF held about 10,000 captured suspected ISIS fighters in detention facilities across northern Syria, including 2,000 from countries other than Iraq and Syria<br><br>as of 2022, the <strong>Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham </strong>(HTS; formerly known as al-Nusrah Front) terrorist organization (see Appendix T) was the dominant militant group in northwest Syria and asserted considerable influence and control over the so-called Syrian Salvation Government in the Iblib de-escalation zone (2022)"
"text": "the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has operated in the Golan between Israel and Syria since 1974 to monitor the ceasefire following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and supervise the areas of separation between the two countries; as of mid-2022, UNDOF consisted of about 1,000 personnel<br><br>as of 2022, multiple actors were conducting military operations in Syria in support of the ASAD government or Syrian opposition forces, as well in pursuit of their own security goals, such counterterrorism; operations have included air strikes, direct ground combat, and sponsoring proxy forces, as well as providing non-lethal military support, including advisors, technicians, arms and equipment, funding, intelligence, and training:<br><br><strong>pro-ASAD elements</strong> operating in Syria have included<strong> Lebanese Hizbollah, Iranian, Iranian-backed Shia militia, and Russian forces</strong>; since early in the civil war, the ASAD government has relied on Lebanese Hizballah (see Appendix T for further information), as well as Iran and Iranian-backed irregular forces, for combat operations and to hold territory; Iran has provided military advisors and combat troops from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (including the Qods Force; see Appendix T for further information), as well as intelligence, logistical, material, technical, and financial support; it has funded, trained, equipped, and led Shia militia/paramilitary units comprised of both Syrian and non-Syrian personnel, primarily from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan; Russia intervened at the request of the ASAD government in 2015 and has since provided air support, special operations forces, military advisors, private military contractors, training, arms, and equipment; Iranian and Russian support has also included assisting Syria in combating the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS; see Appendix T) terrorist group<br><br><strong>Turkey </strong>intervened militarily in 2016 to combat Kurdish militants and ISIS, support select Syrian opposition forces, and establish a buffer along portions of its border with Syria; as of 2022, Turkey continued to maintain a considerable military presence in northern Syria; it has armed and trained militia/proxy forces, such as the Syrian National Army, which was formed in late 2017 of Syrian Arab and Turkmen rebel factions in the Halab (Aleppo) province and northwestern Syria<br><br>the <strong>US and some regional and European states</strong> have at times backed Syrian opposition forces militarily and/or conducted military operations, primarily against ISIS; the US has operated in Syria since 2015 with ground forces and air strikes; as of 2022, the majority the ground forces were deployed in the Eastern Syria Security Area (ESSA, which includes parts of Hasakah and Dayr az Zawr provinces east of the Euphrates River) in support of operations by the Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS, while the remainder were in southeast Syria around At Tanf supporting counter-ISIS operations by the Jaysh Mughawir al-Thawra (MaT, or Revolutionary Commando Army) Syrian opposition force; the US has also conducted air strikes against Syrian military targets in response to Syrian Government use of chemical weapons against opposition forces and civilians; in addition, France, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UK have provided forms of military assistance to opposition forces and/or conducted operations against ISIS, including air strikes<br><br><strong>Israel</strong> has conducted hundreds of military air strikes in Syria against Syrian military, Hizbollah, Iranian, and/or Iranian-backed militia targets<br><br>the<strong> Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) </strong>are an anti-ASAD regime coalition of forces composed primarily of Kurdish, Sunni Arab, and Syriac Christian fighters; it is dominated and led by Kurdish forces, particularly the People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia; the SDF began to receive US support in 2015 and as of 2022 was the main local US partner in its counter-ISIS campaign; the SDF has internal security, counterterrorism, and commando units; Turkey views the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a US-designated terrorist organization (see Appendix T)<br><br>the <strong>ISIS</strong> terrorist group (see Appendix T) lost its last territorial stronghold to SDF forces in 2019, but continued to maintain a low-level insurgency as of 2022; in addition, the SDF held about 10,000 captured suspected ISIS fighters in detention facilities across northern Syria, including 2,000 from countries other than Iraq and Syria<br><br>as of 2022, the <strong>Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham </strong>(HTS; formerly known as al-Nusrah Front) terrorist organization (see Appendix T) was the dominant militant group in northwest Syria and asserted considerable influence and control over the so-called Syrian Salvation Government in the Iblib de-escalation zone (2022)"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

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middle-east/tu.json
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@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Turkish Armed Forces (TSK): Turkish Land Forces (Turk Kara Kuvvetleri), Turkish Naval Forces (Turk Deniz Kuvvetleri; includes naval air and naval infantry), Turkish Air Forces (Turk Hava Kuvvetleri); Ministry of Interior: Gendarmerie of the Turkish Republic (aka Gendarmerie General Command), Turkish Coast Guard Command, National Police (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the Gendarmerie is responsible for the maintenance of the public order in areas that fall outside the jurisdiction of police forces (generally in rural areas); in wartime, the Gendarmerie and Coast Guard would be placed under the operational control of the Land Forces and Naval Forces, respectively"
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the Gendarmerie (Jandarma) is responsible for the maintenance of the public order in areas that fall outside the jurisdiction of police forces (generally in rural areas); in wartime, the Gendarmerie and Coast Guard would be placed under the operational control of the Land Forces and Naval Forces, respectively"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
@ -1285,11 +1285,11 @@
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> in 2019, a new law cut the men’s mandatory military service period in half, as well as making paid military service permanent; with the new system, the period of conscription was reduced from 12 months to six months for privates and non-commissioned soldiers (the service term for reserve officers chosen among university or college graduates remained 12 months); after completing six months of service, if a conscripted soldier wants to and is suitable for extending his military service, he may do so for an additional six months in return for a monthly salary; under the new law, all male Turkish citizens over the age of 20 are required to undergo a one month military training period, but they can obtain an exemption from the remaining five months of their mandatory service by paying 31,000 Turkish Liras<br><strong><br>note 2:</strong> as of 2019, women made up about 0.3% of the military's full-time personnel"
},
"Military deployments": {
"text": "approximately 150 (Azerbaijan; monitoring cease-fire, clearing mines); 250 Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR); approximately 30,000 Cyprus; estimated 5,000 Iraq; 300 Kosovo (NATO/KFOR); 110 Lebanon (UNIFIL); estimated 500 Libya; approximately 3,000 Qatar; approximately 200 Somalia (training mission); estimated 5,000-10,000 Syria (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> between 2016 and 2020, Turkey conducted four major military campaigns in northern Syria; Turkey also has deployed troops into northern Iraq on numerous occasions to combat the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), including large operations involving thousands of troops in 2007, 2011, and 2018, and smaller-scale incursions in 2021 and 2022; in October of 2021, Turkey’s parliament extended the military’s mandate to launch cross-border operations in Iraq and Syria by two more years<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> in 2020, Turkey deployed hundreds of Turkish troops and as many as 5,000 Syrian fighters to Libya to support the Libyan Government of National Accord"
"text": "approximately 150 (Azerbaijan; monitoring cease-fire, clearing mines); 250 Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR); approximately 30,000 Cyprus; estimated 5,000 Iraq; 300 Kosovo (NATO/KFOR); 110 Lebanon (UNIFIL); estimated 500 Libya; up to 5,000 Qatar; approximately 200 Somalia (training mission); estimated 5,000-10,000 Syria (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> between 2016 and 2020, Turkey conducted four significant military campaigns in northern Syria; Turkey also has deployed troops into northern Iraq on numerous occasions to combat the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), including large operations involving thousands of troops in 2007, 2011, and 2018, and smaller-scale operations in 2021 and 2022; in October of 2021, Turkey’s parliament extended the military’s mandate to launch cross-border operations in Iraq and Syria by two more years<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> in 2020, Turkey deployed hundreds of Turkish troops and as many as 5,000 Syrian fighters to Libya to support the Libyan Government of National Accord"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952 and hosts NATO's Land Forces Command in Izmir, as well as a NATO/US airbase at Incirlik and a NATO missile defense radar system in eastern Turkey<br><br>under a long-range (2033) strategic plan, the Turkish Armed Forces continued efforts to modernize its equipment and force structure; Land Forces sought to produce a 20-30% smaller, more highly trained force characterized by greater mobility and firepower and capable of joint and combined operations<br><br>the Turkish Navy is a regional naval power that wants to develop the capability to project power beyond Turkey's coastal waters; it is planning to launch new frigates, submarines, and a light aircraft carrier/amphibious assault ship in the next few years, adding to its current force of about 16 frigates and 12 submarines; the Navy is heavily involved in NATO, multinational, and UN operations; its roles include control of territorial waters and security for sea lines of communications <br><br>the Turkish Air Force adopted an \"Aerospace and Missile Defense Concept\" in 2002 and is developing an integrated missile defense system; in a controversial move that complicated its relationship with NATO, it purchased the Russian S-400 air defense system for an estimated $2.5 billion in 2019; Air Force priorities include attaining a modern deployable, survivable, and sustainable force structure, and establishing a sustainable command and control system <br><br>in recent years, Turkey has taken on a greater level of international peacekeeping responsibilities, including keeping a substantial force under NATO in Afghanistan until withdrawing in 2021; Turkey also has built expeditionary military bases in Qatar, Somalia, northern Cyprus, and Sudan<br><br>the military has a substantial stake in Turkey's economy through a holding company that is involved in the automotive, energy, finance, and logistics sectors, as well as iron and steel production (2022)"
"text": "Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952 and hosts NATO's Land Forces Command in Izmir, as well as a NATO/US airbase at Incirlik and a NATO missile defense radar system in eastern Turkey<br><br>under a long-range (2033) strategic plan, the Turkish Armed Forces continued efforts to modernize its equipment and force structure; Land Forces sought to produce a 20-30% smaller, more highly trained force characterized by greater mobility and firepower and capable of joint and combined operations<br><br>the Turkish Navy is a regional naval power that wants to develop the capability to project power beyond Turkey's coastal waters; it is planning to launch new frigates, submarines, and a light aircraft carrier/amphibious assault ship in the next few years, adding to its current force of about 16 frigates and 12 submarines; the Navy is heavily involved in NATO, multinational, and UN operations; its roles include control of territorial waters and security for sea lines of communications <br><br>the Turkish Air Force adopted an \"Aerospace and Missile Defense Concept\" in 2002 and is developing an integrated missile defense system; in a controversial move that complicated its relationship with NATO and the US, it purchased the Russian S-400 air defense system for an estimated $2.5 billion in 2019; Air Force priorities include attaining a modern deployable, survivable, and sustainable force structure, and establishing a sustainable command and control system <br><br>in recent years, Turkey has taken on a greater level of international peacekeeping responsibilities, including keeping a substantial force under NATO in Afghanistan until withdrawing in 2021; Turkey also has built expeditionary military bases in Qatar, Somalia, northern Cyprus, and Sudan<br><br>the military has a substantial stake in Turkey's economy through a holding company that is involved in the automotive, energy, finance, and logistics sectors, as well as iron and steel production (2022)"
}
},
"Terrorism": {
@ -1304,7 +1304,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "3,654,866 (Syria) (2022); 145,000 (Ukraine) (as of 19 May 2022)"
"text": "3,655,489 (Syria) (2022); 145,000 (Ukraine) (as of 19 May 2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "1.099 million (displaced from 1984-2005 because of fighting between the Kurdish PKK and Turkish military; most IDPs are Kurds from eastern and southeastern provinces; no information available on persons displaced by development projects) (2021)"

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"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "per the Oslo Accords, the PA is not permitted a conventional military but maintains security and police forces; PA security personnel have operated almost exclusively in the West Bank since HAMAS seized power in the Gaza Strip in 2007; PA forces include National Security Forces, Presidential Guard, Civil Police, Civil Defense, Preventive Security Organization, the General Intelligence Organization, and the Military Intelligence Organization (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the National Security Forces conduct gendarmerie-style security operations in circumstances that exceed the capabilities of the civil police; it is the largest branch of the Palestinian Authority security service and acts as the Palestinian army; the Presidential Guard protects facilities and provides dignitary protection; the Preventive Security Organization is responsible for internal intelligence gathering and investigations related to internal security cases, including political dissent"
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the National Security Forces conduct gendarmerie-style security operations in circumstances that exceed the capabilities of the Civil Police; it is the largest branch of the PA security services and acts as the Palestinian army; the Presidential Guard protects facilities and provides dignitary protection; the Preventive Security Organization is responsible for internal intelligence gathering and investigations related to internal security cases, including political dissent"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"text": "not available"
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
"text": "the Palestinian Authority Security Forces have approximately 30,000 active personnel (2022)"
"text": "the PA Security Forces have approximately 30,000 active personnel (2022)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the security services are armed mostly with small arms and light weapons, although since 2007, they have received limited amounts of heavier equipment from Jordan (armored personnel carriers) and Russia (armored personnel carriers and transport helicopters) (2022)"
"text": "the security services are armed mostly with small arms and light weapons, although since 2010, they have received small amounts of heavier equipment from Jordan (armored personnel carriers) and Russia (armored personnel carriers and transport helicopters) (2022)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "not available"

2
middle-east/ym.json
View file

@ -1218,7 +1218,7 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "note - military and security forces operating in Yemen consist of a patchwork of government, non-state, and foreign-backed regular, semi-regular/militia, and paramilitary forces, often with informal command organizations and conflicting, fluid, or overlapping agendas, loyalties, and relationships; in addition, the Huthis maintain opposition military and security forces <br><br>Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) forces; Ministry of Defense: Yemeni National Army, Air Force and Air Defense, Navy and Coastal Defense Forces, Border Guard, Strategic Reserve Forces (includes Special Forces and Presidential Protection Brigades, which are under the Ministry of Defense but responsible to the president), Popular Committee Forces (government-backed tribal militia); Ministry of Interior: Special Security Forces (paramilitary; formerly known as Central Security Forces), Political Security Organization (state security), National Security Bureau (intelligence), Counterterrorism Unit <br><br>Saudi-backed forces: paramilitary/militia border security brigades based largely on tribal or regional affiliation (deployed along the Saudi-Yemen border, especially the areas bordering the governorates of Saada and Al-Jawf) <br><br>United Arab Emirates-backed forces included tribal and regionally-based militia and paramilitary forces (concentrated in the southern governates):  Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces, including the Security Belt Forces, the Shabwani and Hadrami “Elite” Forces, the Support and Backup Forces (aka Logistics and Support Forces), Facilities Protection Forces, and Anti-Terrorism Forces; Republican Forces; Joint Forces; note – under the 2019 Riyadh Agreement, the STC forces were to be incorporated into Yemen’s Ministries of Defense and Interior under the authority of the HADI government <br><br>Huthi: ground, air/air defense, coastal defense, presidential protection, special operations, missile, and tribal militia forces (2022)",
"text": "Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) forces; Ministry of Defense: Yemeni National Army, Air Force and Air Defense, Navy and Coastal Defense Forces, Border Guard, Strategic Reserve Forces (includes Special Forces and Presidential Protection Brigades, which are under the Ministry of Defense but responsible to the president), Popular Committee Forces (government-backed tribal militia); Ministry of Interior: Special Security Forces (paramilitary; formerly known as Central Security Forces), Political Security Organization (state security), National Security Bureau (intelligence), Counterterrorism Unit <br><br>Saudi-backed forces: paramilitary/militia border security brigades based largely on tribal or regional affiliation (deployed along the Saudi-Yemen border, especially the areas bordering the governorates of Saada and Al-Jawf) <br><br>United Arab Emirates-backed forces include tribal and regionally-based militia and paramilitary forces (concentrated in the southern governates):  Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces, including the Security Belt Forces, the Shabwani and Hadrami “Elite” Forces, the Support and Backup Forces (aka Logistics and Support Forces), Facilities Protection Forces, and Anti-Terrorism Forces; Republican Forces; Joint Forces; note – under the 2019 Riyadh Agreement, the STC forces were to be incorporated into Yemen’s Ministries of Defense and Interior under the authority of the HADI government <br><br>Huthi: ground, air/air defense, coastal defense, presidential protection, special operations, missile, and tribal militia forces (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>a considerable portion--up to 70 percent by some estimates--of Yemen’s military and security forces defected in whole or in part to former president SALAH and the Huthi opposition in 2011-2015"
},
"Military expenditures": {