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auto-update week 16
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Yo Robot
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612c093bf0
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@ -1078,10 +1078,10 @@
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},
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"Internet users": {
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"total": {
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"text": "9,890,400 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "9.4 million (2021 est.)"
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},
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"percent of population": {
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"text": "100% (2020 est.)"
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"text": "100% (2021 est.)"
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}
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},
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"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
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@ -1170,10 +1170,10 @@
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},
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"Merchant marine": {
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"total": {
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"text": "623"
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"text": "636"
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},
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"by type": {
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"text": "bulk carrier 1, container ship 3, general cargo 117, oil tanker 19, other 483 (2021)"
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"text": "bulk carrier 2, container ship 3, general cargo 121, oil tanker 16, other 494 (2022)"
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}
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},
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"Ports and terminals": {
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@ -1190,8 +1190,8 @@
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "United Arab Emirates Armed Forces: Land Forces, Navy Forces, Air Force, Presidential Guard (includes special operations forces); Ministry of Interior: Critical Infrastructure and Coastal Patrol Agency (CICPA) (2022)",
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> each emirate maintains a local police force called a general directorate, which is officially a branch of the federal Ministry of Interior; all emirate-level general directorates of police enforce their respective emirate’s laws autonomously; they also enforce federal laws within their emirate in coordination with one another under the federal ministry"
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"text": "United Arab Emirates Armed Forces: Land Forces, Navy Forces, Air Force, Presidential Guard (includes special operations forces); Ministry of Interior: Coast Guard Forces, Critical Infrastructure and Coastal Patrol Agency (CICPA) (2023)",
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> each emirate maintains a local police force called a general directorate, which is officially a branch of the federal Ministry of Interior; all emirate-level general directorates of police enforce their respective emirate’s laws autonomously; they also enforce federal laws within their emirate in coordination with one another under the federal ministry; the State Security Directorate (SSD) in Abu Dhabi and Dubai State Security (DSS) have primary responsible for counterterrorism law enforcement efforts; local, emirate-level police forces, especially Abu Dhabi Police and Dubai Police, are the first responders in such cases and provide technical assistance to SSD and DSS "
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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"Military Expenditures 2020": {
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@ -1214,17 +1214,18 @@
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"text": "approximately 65,000 active personnel (45,000 Land Forces; 3,000 Navy; 5,000 Air Force; 12,000 Presidential Guard) (2022)"
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},
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"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
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"text": "the military's inventory is comprised of wide variety of mostly modern imported equipment; over the past decade, the UAE has acquired military equipment from more than 20 countries with France, Russia, and the US as the leading suppliers; in recent years, the UAE has tried to boost its domestic defense industry (2022)"
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"text": "the military's inventory is comprised of a wide variety of mostly modern imported equipment; over the past decade, the UAE has acquired military equipment from more than 20 countries with France, Russia, and the US as the leading suppliers; in recent years, the UAE has tried to boost its domestic defense industry (2023)"
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},
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"Military service age and obligation": {
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"text": "18-30 years of age for compulsory military service for men (compulsory service initiated in 2014); 17 years of age for volunteers with parental approval; men can volunteer up to age 40; 24-month general service obligation, 16 months for secondary school graduates; women can volunteer to serve for 9 months regardless of education (2022)",
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"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> compulsory service may be completed in the uniformed military, the Ministry of Interior, the State Security Service, or other institutions designated by the military leadership<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the UAE military employs a considerable number—estimates range from a low of about 30% to as much as 70% of the force—of foreign personnel on contract; the UAE has also hired foreign mercenaries for some operations during its intervention in Yemen"
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"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> compulsory service may be completed in the uniformed military, the Ministry of Interior, or other security institutions designated by the military leadership<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the UAE military employs a considerable number—estimates range from a low of about 30% to as much as 70% of the force—of foreign personnel on contract; the UAE has also hired foreign mercenaries for some operations during its intervention in Yemen"
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},
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"Military deployments": {
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"text": "estimates vary; reportedly a few hundred remain in Yemen; has maintained some troops at military bases in Eritrea and Somalia (Somaliland) (2022)"
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"text": "estimates vary; reportedly a few hundred remain in Yemen; has maintained some troops at military bases in Eritrea and Somalia (Somaliland) (2022)",
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> in 2015, UAE intervened militarily in Yemen as part of the Saudi-led coalition in support of the Republic of Yemen Government with an estimated 3,500 troops, as well as supporting air and naval forces; UAE withdrew its main military force from Yemen in 2019, but has retained a small military presence while working with proxies in southern Yemen, most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC)"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "the UAE hosts a multi-service French military base, which includes the French naval command for the Indian Ocean (ALINDIEN); the UAE has a defense cooperation agreement with the US and hosts about 3,500 US troops, mostly air and naval personnel<br><br>in 2015, UAE intervened militarily in Yemen as part of the Saudi-led coalition in support of the Republic of Yemen Government with an estimated 3,500 troops, as well as supporting air and naval forces; UAE withdrew its main military force from Yemen in 2019, but has retained a small military presence while working with proxies in southern Yemen, most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC)<br><br>the UAE's military traces its origins to the establishment of the Trucial Oman Scouts in 1951, a joint UK-Abu Dhabi organization modeled after Jordan’s Arab Legion, which became the Abu Dhabi Defense Force in 1965; the modern Emirati armed forces were formed in 1976 (2022)"
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"text": "the UAE hosts a multi-service French military base, which includes the French naval command for the Indian Ocean (ALINDIEN); the UAE has a defense cooperation agreement with the US and hosts about 3,500 US troops, mostly air and naval personnel<br><br>the UAE's military traces its origins to the establishment of the Trucial Oman Scouts in 1951, a joint UK-Abu Dhabi organization modeled after Jordan’s Arab Legion, which became the Abu Dhabi Defense Force in 1965; the modern Emirati armed forces were formed in 1976 (2022)"
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}
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},
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"Transnational Issues": {
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@ -552,13 +552,13 @@
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"text": "President Ilham ALIYEV (since 31 October 2003); First Vice President Mehriban ALIYEVA (since 21 February 2017)"
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},
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"head of government": {
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"text": "Prime Minister Ali ASADOV (since 8 October 2019); First Deputy Prime Minister Yaqub EYYUBOV (since June 2006)"
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"text": "Prime Minister Ali ASADOV (since 8 October 2019); First Deputy Prime Minister Yaqub EYYUBOV (since 13 February 2003)"
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},
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"cabinet": {
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"text": "Council of Ministers appointed by the president and confirmed by the National Assembly"
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},
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"elections/appointments": {
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"text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds (if needed) for a 7-year term; a single individual is eligible for unlimited terms; election last held on 11 April 2018 (next to be held in 2025); prime minister and first deputy prime minister appointed by the president and confirmed by the National Assembly; note - a constitutional amendment approved in a September 2016 referendum expanded the presidential term from 5 to 7 years; a separate constitutional amendment approved in the same referendum also introduced the post of first vice-president and additional vice-presidents, who are directly appointed by the president"
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"text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds (if needed) for a 7-year term; a single individual is eligible for unlimited terms; election last held on 11 April 2018 (next to be held in 2025); prime minister and first deputy prime minister appointed by the president and confirmed by the National Assembly; note - a constitutional amendment approved in a September 2016 referendum extended the presidential term from 5 to 7 years; a separate constitutional amendment approved in the same referendum also introduced the post of first vice-president and additional vice-presidents, who are directly appointed by the president; however, no additional vice-presidents have been appointed since the constitutional amendment was passed"
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},
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"election results": {
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"text": "Ilham ALIYEV reelected president (11 April 2018) in first round; percent of vote - Ilham ALIYEV (YAP) 86%, Zahid ORUJ (independent) 3.1%, other 10.9%"
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@ -588,7 +588,7 @@
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}
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},
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"Political parties and leaders": {
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"text": "Azerbaijan Democratic Enlightenment Party or ADMP [Elshan MASAYEV]<br>Civic Solidarity Party or VHP [Sabir RUSTAMKHANLI]<br>Civic Unity Party or CUP [Sabir HAJIYEV]<br>Great Order Party [Fazil MUSTAFA]<br>Islamic Party of Azerbaijan or AiP [Mavsum SAMADOV]<br>Musavat [Arif HAJILI]<br>Popular Front Party [Ali KARIMLI]<br>Motherland Party or AVP [Fazail AGAMALI]<br>National Front Party [Razi NURULLAYEV]<br>National Revival Movement Party [Faraj GULIYEV]<br>Party for Democratic Reforms or PDR [Asim MOLLAZADE]<br>Republican Alternative Party or REAL [Ilgar MAMMADOV]<br>Social Democratic Party [Ayaz MUTALIBOV]<br>Social Prosperity Party [Asli KAZIMOVA]<br>Unity Party or VP [Tahir KARIMLI]<br>Whole Azerbaijan Popular Front Party [Gudrat HASANGULIYEV]<br>New Azerbaijan Party (Yeni Azərbaycan Partiyasi) or YAP [Ilham ALIYEV]"
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"text": "Azerbaijan Democratic Enlightenment Party or ADMP [Elshan MASAYEV]<br>Civic Solidarity Party or VHP [Sabir RUSTAMKHANLI]<br>Civic Unity Party or VBP [Sabir HAJIYEV]<br>Great Order Party [Fazil MUSTAFA]<br>Islamic Party of Azerbaijan or AiP [Mavsum SAMADOV]<br>Musavat (Equity) Party [Arif HAJILI]<br>Popular Front Party [Ali KARIMLI]<br>Motherland Party or AVP [Fazail AGAMALI]<br>National Front Party [Razi NURULLAYEV]<br>National Revival Movement Party [Faraj GULIYEV]<br>Party for Democratic Reforms or DIP [Asim MOLLAZADE]<br>Republican Alternative Party or REAL [Ilgar MAMMADOV]<br>Social Democratic Party [Ayaz MUTALIBOV]<br>Social Prosperity Party [Asli KAZIMOVA]<br>Unity Party or VP [Tahir KARIMLI]<br>Whole Azerbaijan Popular Front Party [Gudrat HASANGULIYEV]<br>New Azerbaijan Party (Yeni Azərbaycan Partiyasi) or YAP [Ilham ALIYEV]"
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},
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"International organization participation": {
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"text": "ADB, BSEC, CD, CE, CICA, CIS, EAPC, EBRD, ECO, FAO, GCTU, GUAM, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OAS (observer), OIC, OPCW, OSCE, PFP, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)"
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},
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"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
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"chief of mission": {
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"text": "Ambassador Lee LITZENBERGER (since 12 March 2019)"
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"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Chargé d'Affaires ad interium (since 29 June 2022)"
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},
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"embassy": {
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"text": "111 Azadlig Avenue, AZ1007 Baku"
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"text": "in spite of the telecom sector being one of the major contributors to Azerbaijan’s non-oil GDP, overall development, growth, and investment in the sector has been held back by years of political and civil unrest coupled with endemic corruption; mobile penetration rates reached 100% as far back as 2011 but have largely stagnated since then; the Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) are slowly extending the reach of their LTE networks around the country, and this increased coverage (along with access to faster data-based services) is expected to produce a moderate resurgence for both mobile and mobile broadband over the next few years as customers migrate from 3G to 4G. 5G services are still some ways off, as the demand for high-speed data and fast broadband can easily be met by existing capacity on LTE networks; fixed-line teledensity continues to drop down each year as customers consolidate their telecommunications services around the mobile platform; the rate of decline is comparatively slower than other countries, since Azerbaijan has a relatively high proportion of (87%) of fixed-line broadband customers still on DSL; fiber is gradually being rolled out in urban areas, and this makes up the bulk of the growth being seen in the overall fixed broadband market; DSL’s predominance, however, will serve to keep Azerbaijan’s average access speeds in the sub-10Mbps range for the foreseeable future (2020)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "16 fixed-lines subsciptions per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscriptions of 105 telephones per 100 persons (2021)"
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"text": "16 fixed-lines subscriptions per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscriptions of 105 telephones per 100 persons (2021)"
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},
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"international": {
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"text": "country code - 994; Azerbaijan’s largest mobile network operator (MNO) launched trial 5G mobile services in Baku on 27 December 2022 (2023)"
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},
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"Merchant marine": {
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"total": {
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"text": "305"
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"text": "309"
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},
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"by type": {
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"text": "general cargo 38, oil tanker 43, other 224 (2021)"
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"text": "general cargo 38, oil tanker 44, other 227 (2022)"
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}
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},
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"Ports and terminals": {
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}
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},
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"Religions": {
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"text": "Armenian Apostolic 92.6%, Evangelical 1%, other 2.4%, none 1.1%, unspecified 2.9% (2011 est.)"
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"text": "Armenian Apostolic Christian 92.6%, Evangelical Christian 1%, other 2.4%, none 1.1%, unspecified 2.9% (2011 est.)"
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},
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"Demographic profile": {
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"text": "<p>Armenia’s population peaked at nearly 3.7 million in the late 1980s but has declined sharply since independence in 1991, to just over 3 million in 2021, largely as a result of its decreasing fertility rate, increasing death rate, and negative net emigration rate. The total fertility rate (the average number of children born per woman) first fell below the 2.1 replacement level in the late 1990s and has hovered around 1.6-1.65 for over 15 years. In an effort to increase the country’s birth rate, the government has expanded its child benefits, including a substantial increase in the lump sum payment for having a first and second child and a boost in the monthly payment to mothers of children under two. Reversing net negative migration, however, remains the biggest obstacle to stabilizing or increasing population growth. Emigration causes Armenia not only lose individuals but also the children they might have. </p> <p>The emigration of a significant number of working-age people combined with decreased fertility and increased life expectancy is causing the elderly share of Armenia’s population to grow. The growing elderly population will put increasing pressure on the government’s ability to fund the pension system, health care, and other services for seniors. Improving education, creating more jobs (particularly in the formal sector), promoting labor market participation, and increasing productivity would mitigate the financial impact of supporting a growing elderly population.</p> <p>Armenia has a long history of migration, some forced and some voluntary. Its large diaspora is diverse and dispersed around the world. Widely varying estimates suggest the Armenian diaspora may number anywhere from 5-9 million, easily outnumbering the number of Armenians living in Armenia. Armenians forged communities abroad from ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome to Russia and to the Americas, where they excelled as craftsmen, merchants, and in other occupations. </p> <p>Several waves of Armenian migration occurred in the 20th century. In the aftermath of the 1915 Armenian genocide, hundreds of thousands of survivors fled to communities in the Caucasus (including present day Armenia), Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Europe, and Russia and established new communities in Africa and the Americas. In the 1930s, the Soviets deported thousands of Armenians to Siberia and Central Asia. After World War II, the Soviets encouraged the Armenian diaspora in France, the Middle East, and Iran to return the Armenian homeland in order to encourage population growth after significant losses in the male workforce during the war. </p> Following Armenian independence in 1991, the economic downturn and high unemployment prompted hundreds of thousands of Armenians to seek better economic opportunities primarily in Russia but also in the US, former Soviet states, and Europe. In the early 1990s, hundreds of thousands of Armenians fled from Azerbaijan to Armenia because of the ongoing Nagorno-Karbakh conflict, but many of them then emigrated again, mainly to Russia and the US. When the economy became more stable in the late 1990s, permanent emigration slowed, but Armenians continued to seek temporary seasonal work in Russia. The remittances families receive from relatives working abroad is vital to Armenian households and the country’s economy."
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"text": "previous 1915, 1978; latest adopted 5 July 1995"
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},
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"amendments": {
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"text": "proposed by the president of the republic or by the National Assembly; passage requires approval by the president, by the National Assembly, and by a referendum with at least 25% registered voter participation and more than 50% of votes; constitutional articles on the form of government and democratic procedures are not amendable; amended 2005, 2015, last in 2020; note - a constitutional referendum originally scheduled for 4 May 2020 was indefinitely postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic that began in early 2020, the Nagorno-Karabakh war in the fall of 2020, and the postwar political crisis of early 2021"
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"text": "proposed by the president of the republic or by the National Assembly; passage requires approval by the president, by the National Assembly, and by a referendum with at least 25% registered voter participation and more than 50% of votes; constitutional articles on the form of government and democratic procedures are not amendable; amended 2005, 2015, last in 2020"
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}
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},
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"Legal system": {
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"text": "President Vahagn KHACHATURYAN (since 13 March 2022)"
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},
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"head of government": {
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"text": "Prime Minister Nikol PASHINYAN (since 10 September 2021); Deputy Prime Ministers Mher GRIGORYAN (since 3 August 2021) and Hambardzum MATEVOSYAN (since 25 November 2021); note - Prime Minister Nikol PASHINYAN resigned on 25 April 2021; he was reappointed by the president on 2 August 2021 and sworn in on 10 September 2021"
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"text": "Prime Minister Nikol PASHINYAN (since 10 September 2021); Deputy Prime Ministers Mher GRIGORYAN (since 3 August 2021) and Tigran KHACHATRYAN (since 19 December 2022); note - Prime Minister Nikol PASHINYAN resigned on 25 April 2021 in advance of the 20 June 2021 parliamentary election; he was reappointed by the president on 2 August 2021 and sworn in on 10 September 2021"
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},
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"cabinet": {
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"text": "Council of Ministers appointed by the prime minister"
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},
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"elections/appointments": {
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"text": "president indirectly elected by the National Assembly in 3 rounds if needed for a single 7-year term; election last held on 2-3 March 2022; prime minister elected by majority vote in 2 rounds if needed by the National Assembly; election last held 2 August 2021; the next parliamentary elections are expected to be held in Armenia by 2026"
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"text": "president indirectly elected by the National Assembly in 3 rounds if needed for a single 7-year term; election last held on 2-3 March 2022; prime minister elected by majority vote in 2 rounds if needed by the National Assembly; election last held 20 June 2021; the next parliamentary elections are expected to be held in Armenia by 2026"
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},
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"election results": {
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"text": " <em>2022: </em>Vahagn KHACHATURYAN elected president in second round; note - Vahagn KHACHATURYAN ran unopposed and won the Assembly vote 71-0<em><br><br>2018:</em> Armen SARKISSIAN elected president in first round; note - Armen SARKISSIAN ran unopposed and won the Assembly vote 90-10"
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"text": "last held early on 20 June 2021 (next to be held in June 2026)"
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},
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"election results": {
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"text": "percent of vote by party - Civil Contract 53.9%, Armenia Alliance 21.0%, I Have Honour Alliance 5.2%; seats by party - Civil Contract 71 of 107 seats, Armenia Alliance 29, I Have Honour Alliance 7; composition (as of February 2022) - men 69, women 38, percent of women 35.5%"
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"text": "percent of vote by party - Civil Contract 53.9%, Armenia Alliance 21.0%, I Have Honour Alliance 5.2%; seats by party - Civil Contract 71 of 107 seats, Armenia Alliance 29, I Have Honour Alliance 7; composition (as of April 2023) - men 69, women 38, percent of women 35.5%"
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}
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},
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"Judicial branch": {
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}
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},
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"Political parties and leaders": {
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"text": "5165 National Conservative Movement Party [Karin TONOYAN]<br>Alliance of Democrats [Arman BABAJANYAN]<br>Armenia Alliance or HD [Robert KOCHARYAN]<br>(alliance of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and the Reborn Armenia Party)<br>Armenian National Congress or ANC [Levon TER-PETROSSIAN] (bloc of independent and opposition parties)<br>Bright Armenia [Edmon MARUKYAN]<br>Civil Contract or KP [Nikol PASHINYAN]<br>Homeland of Armenians [Artak GALSTYAN]<br>Homeland Party [Artur VANETSYAN]<br>I Have Honor Alliance (alliance of the RPA and the Homeland Party, [Serzh SARGSIAN and Artur VANETSYAN]<br>Liberal Party [Samvel BABAYAN]<br>National Democratic Party [Vahe GASPARYAN]<br>Prosperous Armenia or BHK [Gagik TSARUKYAN]<br>Republic Party (Hanrapetutyun Party) [Aram SARGSYAN]<br>Republican Party of Armenia or RPA [Serzh SARGSIAN]"
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"text": "5165 National Conservative Movement Party [Karin TONOYAN]<br>Alliance of Democrats [Arman BABAJANYAN]<br>Armenia Alliance or HD [Robert KOCHARYAN]<br>(formerly known as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation)<br>Armenian National Congress or ANC [Levon TER-PETROSSIAN] (bloc of independent and opposition parties)<br>Bright Armenia [Edmon MARUKYAN]<br>Civil Contract or KP [Nikol PASHINYAN]<br>Country To Live In [Mane TANDILYAN]<br>Homeland of Armenians [Artak GALSTYAN]<br>Homeland Party [Artur VANETSYAN]<br>I Have Honor Alliance (formerly known as the Republican Party of Armenia, [Serzh SARGSIAN]<br>Liberal Party [Samvel BABAYAN]<br>National Democratic Party [Vahe GASPARYAN]<br>Prosperous Armenia or BHK [Gagik TSARUKYAN]<br>Republic Party (Hanrapetutyun Party) [Aram SARGSYAN]"
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},
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"International organization participation": {
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"text": "ADB, BSEC, CD, CE, CIS, CSTO, EAEC (observer), EAEU, EAPC, EBRD, FAO, GCTU, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, MIGA, NAM (observer), OAS (observer), OIF, OPCW, OSCE, PFP, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHRC, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
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"text": "ADB, BSEC, CE, CIS, CSTO, EAEC (observer), EAEU, EAPC, EBRD, FAO, GCTU, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, MIGA, NAM (observer), OAS (observer), OIF, OPCW, OSCE, PFP, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
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},
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"Diplomatic representation in the US": {
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"chief of mission": {
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},
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"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
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"chief of mission": {
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"text": "Ambassador Lynne M. TRACEY (since 5 March 2019)"
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"text": "Ambassador Kristina A. KVIEN (since 21 February 2023)"
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},
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"embassy": {
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"text": "<p>1 American Ave., Yerevan 0082</p>"
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{
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"Introduction": {
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"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>In 1783, the Sunni Al-KHALIFA family took power in Bahrain. In order to secure these holdings, it entered into a series of treaties with the UK during the 19th century that made Bahrain a British protectorate. The archipelago attained its independence in 1971. A steady decline in oil production and reserves since 1970 prompted Bahrain to take steps to diversify its economy, in the process developing petroleum processing and refining, aluminum production, and hospitality and retail sectors. It has also endeavored to become a leading regional banking center, especially with respect to Islamic finance. Bahrain's small size, central location among Gulf countries, economic dependence on Saudi Arabia, and proximity to Iran require it to play a delicate balancing act in foreign affairs among its larger neighbors. Its foreign policy activities usually fall in line with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.</p> <p>The Sunni royal family has long struggled to manage relations with its large Shia-majority population. In early 2011, amid Arab uprisings elsewhere in the region, the Bahraini Government confronted similar pro-democracy and reform protests at home with police and military action, including deploying Gulf Cooperation Council security forces to Bahrain. Failed political talks prompted opposition political societies to boycott 2014 legislative and municipal council elections. In 2018, a law preventing members of political societies dissolved by the courts from participating in elections effectively sidelined the majority of opposition figures from taking part in national elections. As a result, most members of parliament are independents. Ongoing dissatisfaction with the political status quo continues to factor into sporadic clashes between demonstrators and security forces. On 15 September 2020, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates signed peace agreements (the Abraham Accords) with Israel – brokered by the US – in Washington DC. Bahrain and the UAE thus became the third and fourth Middle Eastern countries, along with Egypt and Jordan, to recognize Israel.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>In 1783, the Sunni Al-KHALIFA family took power in Bahrain. In order to secure these holdings, it entered into a series of treaties with the UK during the 19th century that made Bahrain a British protectorate. The archipelago attained its independence in 1971. A steady decline in oil production and reserves since 1970 prompted Bahrain to take steps to diversify its economy, in the process developing petroleum processing and refining, aluminum production, and hospitality and retail sectors. It has also endeavored to become a leading regional banking center, especially with respect to Islamic finance. Bahrain's small size, central location among Gulf countries, economic dependence on Saudi Arabia, and proximity to Iran require it to play a delicate balancing act in foreign affairs among its larger neighbors. Its foreign policy activities usually fall in line with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In 2022, the United States designated Bahrain as a major non-NATO ally.</p> <p>The Sunni royal family has long struggled to manage relations with its large Shia-majority population. In early 2011, amid Arab uprisings elsewhere in the region, the Bahraini Government confronted similar pro-democracy and reform protests at home with police and military action, including deploying Gulf Cooperation Council security forces to Bahrain. Failed political talks prompted opposition political societies to boycott 2014 legislative and municipal council elections. In 2018, a law preventing members of political societies dissolved by the courts from participating in elections effectively sidelined the majority of opposition figures from taking part in national elections. As a result, most members of parliament are independents. Ongoing dissatisfaction with the political status quo continues to factor into sporadic clashes between demonstrators and security forces. On 15 September 2020, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates signed peace agreements (the Abraham Accords) with Israel – brokered by the US – in Washington DC. Bahrain and the UAE thus became the third and fourth Middle Eastern countries, along with Egypt and Jordan, to recognize Israel.</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1143,10 +1143,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Merchant marine": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "205"
|
||||
"text": "190"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by type": {
|
||||
"text": "general cargo 12, oil tanker 4, other 189 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "general cargo 11, oil tanker 3, other 176 (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Ports and terminals": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the BDF hires foreign nationals, Sunni Muslims primarily from Arabic countries and Pakistan, to serve under contract; as of 2020, foreigners were estimated to comprise as much as 80% of the military; the policy has become a controversial issue with the primarily Shia population; during the 2011, the BDF reportedly deployed mostly foreign personnel against protesters"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "Bahrain hosts the US Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT; established 1983), which includes the US 5th Fleet, several subordinate naval task forces, and the Combined Maritime Forces (established 2002), a coalition of more than 30 nations providing maritime security for regional shipping lanes; in 2018, the UK opened a naval support base in Bahrain<br><br>in addition to the US and UK, Bahrain maintains close security ties to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE); both Saudi Arabia and the UAE sent forces to Bahrain to assist with internal security following the 2011 uprising; in 2015, Bahrain joined the Saudi Arabia-led military action to try to restore the Government of Yemen that was ousted by Iranian-backed Huthi rebels, supplying a few hundred troops and combat aircraft<br><br>Bahrain has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments (2023)"
|
||||
"text": "Bahrain hosts the US Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT; established 1983), which includes the US 5th Fleet, several subordinate naval task forces, and the Combined Maritime Forces (established 2002), a coalition of more than 30 nations providing maritime security for regional shipping lanes; in 2018, the UK opened a naval support base in Bahrain<br><br>in addition to the US and UK, Bahrain maintains close security ties to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE); both Saudi Arabia and the UAE sent forces to Bahrain to assist with internal security following the 2011 uprising; in 2015, Bahrain joined the Saudi Arabia-led military action to try to restore the Government of Yemen that was ousted by Iranian-backed Houthi rebels, supplying a few hundred troops and combat aircraft<br><br>Bahrain has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments (2023)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Religions": {
|
||||
"text": "Orthodox (official) 83.4%, Muslim 10.7%, Armenian Apostolic 2.9%, other 1.2% (includes Catholic, Jehovah's Witness, Yazidi, Protestant, Jewish), none 0.5%, unspecified/no answer 1.2% (2014 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "Eastern Orthodox Christian (official) 83.4%, Muslim 10.7%, Armenian Apostolic 2.9%, other 1.2% (includes Roman Catholic Christian, Jehovah's Witness, Yazidi, Protestant Christian, Jewish), none 0.5%, unspecified/no answer 1.2% (2014 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Demographic profile": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Analyzing population trends in Georgia since independence in 1991 has proven difficult due to a lack of reliable demographic statistics. Censuses were fairly accurately and regularly updated through a vital statistics system during Georgia’s period of Soviet rule, but from independence until about 2010, the system broke down as a result of institutional and economic change, social unrest, and large-scale outmigration. The 2002 census is believed to have significantly overestimated the size of Georgia’s population, in part because respondents continued to include relatives living abroad as part of their household count. The 2014 census indicates that Georgia’s population is decreasing and aging. Census data shows that the median age increased from 34.5 years in 2002 to 37.7 years in 2014. The working-age population (ages 15-65 years) was fairly high in 2002 and rose between 2005 and 2011. Nonetheless, Georgia did not reap economic benefits from this age structure, since the working-age population increase seems to have stimulated labor outmigration to Russia, Ukraine, and other neighboring countries.</p> <p>Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Georgia has seen its economy grow to its highest level in years due to the influx of Russian businesses, information and communications technology specialists, and money transfers. This growth may only be temporary and conditions could still easily change depending on future events. Meanwhile, the Russian inflow is also a source of concern, as some Georgians fear it could prompt Putin to target their country next. In addition, Ukrainian refugees use Georgia not just as a transit country but also as a destination. Some 25,000 Ukrainians remain in the country as of November 2022; they pose an additional strain on resources in Georgia, which has a significant population of its own displaced citizens – from the 2008 Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – who continue to need government support.</p>"
|
||||
|
|
@ -456,13 +456,13 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Total water withdrawal": {
|
||||
"municipal": {
|
||||
"text": "660 million cubic meters (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "610 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"industrial": {
|
||||
"text": "330 million cubic meters (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "340 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"agricultural": {
|
||||
"text": "590 million cubic meters (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "710 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Total renewable water resources": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -888,7 +888,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Russia 12%, Azerbaijan 12%, Armenia 9%, Bulgaria 8%, China 6%, Turkey 6%, Ukraine 6% (2019)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Exports - commodities": {
|
||||
"text": "copper, cars, iron alloys, wine, packaged medicines (2019)"
|
||||
"text": "copper, iron alloys, cars, wine, refined petroleum, nitrogen fertilizers, liquors (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Imports": {
|
||||
"Imports 2021": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1206,10 +1206,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Merchant marine": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "25"
|
||||
"text": "24"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by type": {
|
||||
"text": "bulk carrier 2, general cargo 3, other 20 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "general cargo 3, other 21 (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Ports and terminals": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"Introduction": {
|
||||
"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>The Gaza Strip has been under the de facto governing authority of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) since 2007, and has faced years of conflict, poverty, and humanitarian crises. Inhabited since at least the 15th century B.C., the Gaza Strip area has been dominated by many different peoples and empires throughout its history; it was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in the early 16th century. The Gaza Strip fell to British forces during World War I, becoming a part of the British Mandate of Palestine. Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt administered the newly formed Gaza Strip; Israel captured it in the Six-Day War in 1967. Under a series of agreements known as the Oslo accords signed between 1993 and 1999, Israel transferred to the newly-created Palestinian Authority (PA) security and civilian responsibility for many Palestinian-populated areas of the Gaza Strip as well as the West Bank.</p> <p>In 2000, a violent intifada or uprising began, and in 2001 negotiations to determine the permanent status of the West bank and Gaza Strip stalled. Subsequent attempts to re-start negotiations have not resulted in progress toward determining final status of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel in late 2005 unilaterally withdrew all of its settlers and soldiers and dismantled its military facilities in the Gaza Strip, but it continues to control the Gaza Strip’s land and maritime borders and airspace. In early 2006, HAMAS won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council election. Fatah, the dominant Palestinian political faction in the West Bank, and HAMAS failed to maintain a unity government, leading to violent clashes between their respective supporters and HAMAS’s violent seizure of all PA military and governmental institutions in the Gaza Strip in June 2007. Since HAMAS’s takeover, Israel and Egypt have enforced tight restrictions on movement and access of goods and individuals into and out of the territory. Fatah and HAMAS have since reached a series of agreements aimed at restoring political unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank but have struggled to enact them.</p> <p>Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip and the Israel Defense Forces periodically exchange projectiles and air strikes, respectively, threatening broader conflict. In May 2021, HAMAS launched rockets at Israel, sparking an 11-day conflict that also involved other Gaza-based militant groups. Egypt, Qatar, and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process have negotiated ceasefires to avert a broader conflict. Since 2018, HAMAS has also coordinated demonstrations along the Gaza-Israel security fence. Many of these protests have turned violent, resulting in several Israeli soldiers’ deaths and injuries as well as more than 200 Palestinian deaths and thousands of injuries, most of which occurred during weekly March of Return protests from 2018 to the end of 2019. </p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>The Gaza Strip has been under the de facto governing authority of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) since 2007, and has faced years of conflict, poverty, and humanitarian crises. Inhabited since at least the 15th century B.C., the Gaza Strip area has been dominated by many different peoples and empires throughout its history; it was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in the early 16th century. The Gaza Strip fell to British forces during World War I, becoming a part of the British Mandate of Palestine. Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt administered the newly formed Gaza Strip; Israel captured it in the Six-Day War in 1967. Under a series of agreements known as the Oslo Accords signed between 1993 and 1999, Israel transferred to the newly-created Palestinian Authority (PA) security and civilian responsibility for many Palestinian-populated areas of the Gaza Strip as well as the West Bank.</p> <p>In 2000, a violent intifada or uprising began, and in 2001 negotiations to determine the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip stalled. Subsequent attempts to re-start negotiations have not resulted in progress toward determining final status of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel in late 2005 unilaterally withdrew all of its settlers and soldiers and dismantled its military facilities in the Gaza Strip, but it continues to control the Gaza Strip’s land and maritime borders and airspace. In early 2006, HAMAS won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council election. Fatah, the dominant Palestinian political faction in the West Bank, and HAMAS failed to maintain a unity government, leading to violent clashes between their respective supporters and HAMAS’s violent seizure of all PA military and governmental institutions in the Gaza Strip in June 2007. Since HAMAS’s takeover, Israel and Egypt have enforced tight restrictions on movement and access of goods and individuals into and out of the territory. Fatah and HAMAS have since reached a series of agreements aimed at restoring political unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank but have struggled to enact them.</p> <p>Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip and the Israel Defense Forces periodically exchange projectiles and air strikes, respectively, threatening broader conflict. In May 2021, HAMAS launched rockets at Israel, sparking an 11-day conflict that also involved other Gaza-based militant groups. Egypt, Qatar, and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process have negotiated ceasefires to avert a broader conflict. Since 2018, HAMAS has also coordinated demonstrations along the Gaza-Israel security fence. Many of these protests have turned violent, resulting in several Israeli soldiers’ deaths and injuries as well as more than 200 Palestinian deaths and thousands of injuries, most of which occurred during weekly March of Return protests from 2018 to the end of 2019. </p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -599,7 +599,8 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Exports - commodities": {
|
||||
"text": "strawberries, carnations, vegetables, fish (small and irregular shipments, as permitted to transit the Israeli-controlled Kerem Shalom crossing)"
|
||||
"text": "building stone, scrap iron, plastic lids, furniture, seating, dates, olive oil (2021)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> data includes both Gaza Strip and West Bank export commodities"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Imports": {
|
||||
"Imports 2021": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"Introduction": {
|
||||
"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Known as Persia until 1935, Iran became an Islamic republic in 1979 after the ruling monarchy was overthrown and Shah Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI was forced into exile. Conservative clerical forces led by Ayatollah Ruhollah KHOMEINI established a theocratic system of government with ultimate political authority vested in a learned religious scholar referred to commonly as the Supreme Leader who, according to the constitution, is accountable only to the Assembly of Experts - a popularly elected 88-member body of clerics. US-Iranian relations became strained when a group of Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and held embassy personnel hostage until mid-January 1981. The US cut off diplomatic relations with Iran in April 1980. During the period 1980-88, Iran fought a bloody, indecisive war with Iraq that eventually expanded into the Persian Gulf and led to clashes between US Navy and Iranian military forces. Iran has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism and was subject to US, UN, and EU economic sanctions and export controls because of its continued involvement in terrorism and concerns over possible military dimensions of its nuclear program until Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Implementation Day in 2016. The US began gradually re-imposing sanctions on Iran after the US withdrawal from JCPOA in May 2018.</p> <p>Following the election of reformer Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad KHATAMI as president in 1997 and a reformist Majles (legislature) in 2000, a campaign to foster political reform in response to popular dissatisfaction was initiated. The movement floundered as conservative politicians, supported by the Supreme Leader, unelected institutions of authority like the Council of Guardians, and the security services reversed and blocked reform measures while increasing security repression. Starting with nationwide municipal elections in 2003 and continuing through Majles elections in 2004, conservatives reestablished control over Iran's elected government institutions, which culminated with the August 2005 inauguration of hardliner Mahmud AHMADI-NEJAD as president. His controversial reelection in June 2009 sparked nationwide protests over allegations of electoral fraud, but the protests were quickly suppressed. Deteriorating economic conditions due primarily to government mismanagement and international sanctions prompted at least two major economically based protests in July and October 2012, but Iran's internal security situation remained stable. President AHMADI-NEJAD's independent streak angered regime establishment figures, including the Supreme Leader, leading to conservative opposition to his agenda for the last year of his presidency, and an alienation of his political supporters. In June 2013, Iranians elected a centrist cleric Dr. Hasan Fereidun RUHANI to the presidency. A longtime senior member in the regime, he made promises of reforming society and Iran's foreign policy. In July 2015, Iran and the five permanent members, plus Germany (P5+1) signed the JCPOA under which Iran agreed to restrictions on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief; however, the US reimposed sanctions in 2018 dealing a blow to RUHANI's legacy and the Iranian economy. Negotiations to restore the deal started in 2021 and are ongoing. Iran held elections in February 2020 for the Majles and the president in June 2021, resulting in a hardline and conservative monopoly across the regime's elected and unelected institutions. President Ebrahim RAISI is a hardline cleric with a decades-long career in Iran's judiciary and has had limited foreign policy and economic experience.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Known as Persia until 1935, Iran became an Islamic republic in 1979 after the ruling monarchy was overthrown and Shah Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI was forced into exile. Conservative clerical forces led by Ayatollah Ruhollah KHOMEINI established a theocratic system of government with ultimate political authority vested in a learned religious scholar referred to commonly as the Supreme Leader who, according to the constitution, is accountable only to the Assembly of Experts - a popularly elected 88-member body of clerics. US-Iranian relations became strained when a group of Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and held embassy personnel hostage until mid-January 1981. The US cut off diplomatic relations with Iran in April 1980. During the period 1980-88, Iran fought a bloody, indecisive war with Iraq that eventually expanded into the Persian Gulf and led to clashes between US Navy and Iranian military forces. Iran has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism and was subject to US, UN, and EU economic sanctions and export controls because of its continued involvement in terrorism and concerns over possible military dimensions of its nuclear program until Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Implementation Day in 2016. The US began gradually re-imposing sanctions on Iran after the US withdrawal from JCPOA in May 2018.</p> <p>Following the election of reformer Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad KHATAMI as president in 1997 and a reformist Majles (legislature) in 2000, a campaign to foster political reform in response to popular dissatisfaction was initiated. The movement floundered as conservative politicians, supported by the Supreme Leader, unelected institutions of authority like the Guardians Council, and the security services reversed and blocked reform measures while increasing security repression. Starting with nationwide municipal elections in 2003 and continuing through Majles elections in 2004, conservatives reestablished control over Iran's elected government institutions, which culminated with the August 2005 inauguration of hardliner Mahmud AHMADI-NEJAD as president. His controversial reelection in June 2009 sparked nationwide protests over allegations of electoral fraud, which persisted until early 2011. President AHMADI-NEJAD's independent streak angered regime establishment figures, including the Supreme Leader, leading to conservative opposition to his agenda for the last year of his presidency, and an alienation of his political supporters. In June 2013, Iranians elected a centrist cleric Dr. Hasan Fereidun RUHANI to the presidency. A longtime senior member in the regime, he made promises of reforming society and Iran's foreign policy. In July 2015, Iran and the five UNSC permanent members, plus Germany (P5+1) finalized the JCPOA under which Iran agreed to restrictions on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief; however, the US reimposed sanctions in 2018 dealing a blow to RUHANI's legacy and the Iranian economy. In November 2019, Tehran's decision to increase the price of gasoline overnight sparked nationwide protests, which the regime violently suppressed within a week. Conservatives won the majority of seats in Iranian Majles elections in elections in February 2020 and hardline cleric Ebrahim RAISI - who had a decades-long career in Iran's judiciary - was elected president in June 2021, resulting in a hardline and conservative monopoly across the regime's elected and unelected institutions. <br><br>As president, RAISI has concentrated on deepening Iran's foreign relations with anti-US states - particularly China and Russia - to weather US sanctions and diplomatic pressure, while supporting negotiations to restore a nuclear deal that began in 2021. RAISI contended with nationwide protests that began in September 2022 and persisted for over three months following the death of a Kurdish Iranian woman, Mahsa AMINI, in morality police custody. Young people and women led the protests and in contrast to previous periods of unrest, this latest bout focused on demands for regime change rather than reform within the system or the redressal of economic grievances.</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -491,13 +491,13 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Total water withdrawal": {
|
||||
"municipal": {
|
||||
"text": "6.2 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "6.2 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"industrial": {
|
||||
"text": "1.1 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "1.1 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"agricultural": {
|
||||
"text": "86 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "86 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Total renewable water resources": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1205,10 +1205,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Merchant marine": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "893"
|
||||
"text": "942"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by type": {
|
||||
"text": "bulk carrier 32, container ship 31, general cargo 371, oil tanker 84, other 375 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "bulk carrier 32, container ship 31, general cargo 393, oil tanker 83, other 403 (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Ports and terminals": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "the military forces of Iran are divided between the Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah)<br><br>Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces or Islamic Republic of Iran Army (Artesh): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Air Force, Air Defense Forces; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC or Sepah): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Aerospace Force (controls strategic missile force), Qods Force (aka Quds Force; special operations), Cyber Electronic Command, Basij Paramilitary Forces; Internal security forces (2022)",
|
||||
"text": "the military forces of Iran are divided between the Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah)<br><br>Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces or Islamic Republic of Iran Army (Artesh): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Air Force, Air Defense Forces; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC or Sepah): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Aerospace Force (controls strategic missile force), Qods Force (aka Quds Force; special operations), Cyber Electronic Command, Basij Paramilitary Forces; Interior Ministry: Law Enforcement; Ministry of Intelligence and Security (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the Artesh Navy operates Iran’s larger warships and operates in the Gulf of Oman, the Caspian Sea, and deep waters in the region and beyond; the IRGC Navy has responsibility for the closer-in Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the Basij is a volunteer paramilitary group under the IRGC with local organizations across the country, which sometimes acts as an auxiliary law enforcement unit for the IRGC; it is formally known as the Organization for the Mobilization of the Oppressed; it is also known as the Popular Mobilization Army<br><br><strong>note 3: </strong>the Ministry of Intelligence and Security and law enforcement forces under the Interior Ministry, which report to the president, and the IRGC, which reports to the supreme leader, share responsibility for law enforcement and maintaining order; law enforcement forces include border and other security troops"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -458,13 +458,13 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Total water withdrawal": {
|
||||
"municipal": {
|
||||
"text": "983 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "1 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"industrial": {
|
||||
"text": "72 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "100 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"agricultural": {
|
||||
"text": "1.249 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "1.2 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Total renewable water resources": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1216,10 +1216,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Merchant marine": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "41"
|
||||
"text": "45"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by type": {
|
||||
"text": "container ship 6, general cargo 2, oil tanker 4, other 29 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "container ship 6, general cargo 2, oil tanker 4, other 33 (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Ports and terminals": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -483,13 +483,13 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Total water withdrawal": {
|
||||
"municipal": {
|
||||
"text": "1.23 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "6.9 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"industrial": {
|
||||
"text": "2.05 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "5.49 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"agricultural": {
|
||||
"text": "35.27 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "44.23 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Total renewable water resources": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1239,10 +1239,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Merchant marine": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "68"
|
||||
"text": "75"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by type": {
|
||||
"text": "general cargo 1, oil tanker 6, other 61 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "general cargo 1, oil tanker 7, other 67 (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Ports and terminals": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Ministry of Defense: Iraqi Army, Army Aviation Command, Iraqi Navy, Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi Air Defense Command, Special Forces Command, Special Security Division (Green Zone protection)<br><br>National-Level Security Forces: Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS; reports to the Prime Minister), Prime Minister's Special Forces Division, Presidential Brigades<br><br>Ministry of Interior: Federal Police Forces Command, Border Guard Forces Command, Federal Intelligence and Investigations Agency, Emergency Response Division, Facilities Protection Directorate, and Provincial Police<br><br>Ministry of Oil: Energy Police Directorate<br><br>Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Peshmerga: Regional Guard Brigades, Unit (or Division) 70 Forces, Unit (or Division) 80 Forces, special operations/counter-terrorism forces (Counter Terrorism Group, CTG and Counter Terrorism Directorate, CTD); note - Unit 70 and the CTG are associated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) political party, while Unit 80 and the CTD are associated with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP); Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior: Zeravani and Emergency Response Forces (paramilitary internal security forces)<br><br>Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC): Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Tribal Mobilization Forces (TMF); the PMF and TMF are a collection of approximately 60 militias of widely varied sizes and political interests (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Ministry of Defense: Iraqi Army, Army Aviation Command, Iraqi Navy, Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi Air Defense Command, Special Forces Command, Special Security Division (Green Zone protection)<br><br>National-Level Security Forces: Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS; reports to the Prime Minister), Prime Minister's Special Forces Division, Presidential Brigades--Ministry of Interior: Federal Police Forces Command, Border Guard Forces Command, Federal Intelligence and Investigations Agency, Emergency Response Division, Facilities Protection Directorate, and Provincial Police;<br>Ministry of Oil: Energy Police Directorate<br><br>Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC): Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Tribal Mobilization Forces (TMF); the PMF and TMF are a collection of approximately 60 militias of widely varied sizes and political interests<br><br>the two main Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), each maintain an independent security apparatus; the federal constitution provides the Kurdistan Regional Government the right to maintain internal security forces, but the KDP and the PUK separately controlled additional Peshmerga military units, as well as separate police forces under nominal Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior control; the constitution also allows for a centralized, separate internal security/intelligence (Asayish) service; however, the KDP and PUK also each maintain Asayish forces<br><br>Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Peshmerga: Regional Guard Brigades; Unit (or Division) 70 Forces and Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) of the PUK; Unit (or Division) 80 Forces and Counterterrorism Directorate (CTD) of the KDP; Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior: internal security forces include the Zeravani (KDP) and Emergency Response Forces (PUK) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -477,13 +477,13 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Total water withdrawal": {
|
||||
"municipal": {
|
||||
"text": "456.9 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "500 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"industrial": {
|
||||
"text": "32.5 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "40 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"agricultural": {
|
||||
"text": "554.7 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "570 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Total renewable water resources": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "35"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by type": {
|
||||
"text": "general cargo 6, oil tanker 1, other 28 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "general cargo 6, other 29 (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Ports and terminals": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"Introduction": {
|
||||
"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Kuwait has been ruled by the AL-SABAH dynasty since the 18th century. The threat of Ottoman invasion in 1899 prompted Amir Mubarak AL-SABAH to seek protection from Britain, ceding foreign and defense responsibility to Britain until 1961, when the country attained its independence. Kuwait was attacked and overrun by Iraq in August 1990. Following several weeks of aerial bombardment, a US-led UN coalition began a ground assault in February 1991 that liberated Kuwait in four days. In 1992, the Amir reconstituted the parliament that he had dissolved in 1986. Amid the 2010-11 uprisings and protests across the Arab world, stateless Arabs, known as Bidoon, staged small protests in early 2011 demanding citizenship, jobs, and other benefits available to Kuwaiti nationals. Other demographic groups, notably Islamists and Kuwaitis from tribal backgrounds, soon joined the growing protest movements, which culminated in late 2011 with the resignation of the prime minister amidst allegations of corruption. Demonstrations renewed in late 2012 in response to an amiri decree amending the electoral law that lessened the voting power of the tribal blocs. <br><br>An opposition coalition of Sunni Islamists, tribal populists, and some liberals, largely boycotted legislative elections in 2012 and 2013, which ushered in a legislature more amenable to the government's agenda. Faced with the prospect of painful subsidy cuts, oppositionists and independents actively participated in the November 2016 election, winning nearly half of the seats, but a cohesive opposition alliance largely ceased to exist with the 2016 election and the opposition became increasingly factionalized. Since coming to power in 2006, the Amir has dissolved the National Assembly on seven occasions (the Constitutional Court annulled the Assembly elections in June 2012 and again in June 2013) and shuffled the cabinet over a dozen times, usually citing political stagnation and gridlock between the legislature and the government.<br><br>The current Amir, who assumed his role in 2020, launched a \"National Dialogue\" in September 2021 meant to resolve political gridlock. As part of the \"National Dialogue,\" the Amir pardoned several opposition figures who had been living in exile, and they returned to Kuwait. Legislative challenges remain, and the cabinet was reshuffled in March 2022.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Kuwait has been ruled by the AL-SABAH dynasty since the 18th century. The threat of Ottoman invasion in 1899 prompted Amir Mubarak AL-SABAH to seek protection from Britain, ceding foreign and defense responsibility to Britain until 1961, when the country attained its independence. Kuwait was attacked and overrun by Iraq in August 1990. Following several weeks of aerial bombardment, a US-led UN coalition began a ground assault in February 1991 that liberated Kuwait in four days. In 1992, the Amir reconstituted the parliament that he had dissolved in 1986. Amid the 2010-11 uprisings and protests across the Arab world, stateless Arabs, known as Bidoon, staged small protests in early 2011 demanding citizenship, jobs, and other benefits available to Kuwaiti nationals. Other demographic groups, notably Islamists and Kuwaitis from tribal backgrounds, soon joined the growing protest movements, which culminated in late 2011 with the resignation of the prime minister amidst allegations of corruption. Demonstrations renewed in late 2012 in response to an amiri decree amending the electoral law that lessened the voting power of the tribal blocs. <br><br>An opposition coalition of Sunni Islamists, tribal populists, and some liberals, largely boycotted legislative elections in 2012 and 2013, which ushered in a legislature more amenable to the government's agenda. Faced with the prospect of painful subsidy cuts, oppositionists and independents actively participated in the November 2016 election, winning nearly half of the seats, but a cohesive opposition alliance largely ceased to exist with the 2016 election and the opposition became increasingly factionalized. Between 2006 and his death in 2020, the previous Kuwaiti Amir dissolved the National Assembly on seven occasions (the Constitutional Court annulled the Assembly elections in June 2012 and again in June 2013) and shuffled the cabinet over a dozen times, usually citing political stagnation and gridlock between the legislature and the government.<br><br>The current Amir, who assumed his role in 2020, launched a \"National Dialogue\" in September 2021 meant to resolve political gridlock. As part of the \"National Dialogue,\" the Amir pardoned several opposition figures who had been living in exile, and they returned to Kuwait. Legislative challenges remain, and the cabinet has been reshuffled six times since late 2020. </p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -446,13 +446,13 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Total water withdrawal": {
|
||||
"municipal": {
|
||||
"text": "448.3 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "450 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"industrial": {
|
||||
"text": "23.3 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "20 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"agricultural": {
|
||||
"text": "778.4 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "780 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Total renewable water resources": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -557,7 +557,8 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "50 nonpartisans elected, of which 28 were opposition candidates; composition - men 48, women 2, percent of women 4%"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>Note</strong>: the Kuwait Constitutional Court, on 19 March 2023, annulled the 29 September 2022 National Assembly election and ordered reinstatement of the previous Assembly"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
"highest court(s)": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1158,10 +1159,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Merchant marine": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "165"
|
||||
"text": "166"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by type": {
|
||||
"text": "general cargo 15, oil tanker 28, other 122 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "general cargo 15, oil tanker 29, other 122 (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Ports and terminals": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -453,13 +453,13 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Total water withdrawal": {
|
||||
"municipal": {
|
||||
"text": "240 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "240 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"industrial": {
|
||||
"text": "900 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "900 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"agricultural": {
|
||||
"text": "700 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "700 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Total renewable water resources": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1110,10 +1110,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Internet users": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "6,825,442 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "4.872 million (2021 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"percent of population": {
|
||||
"text": "84% (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "87% (2021 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1199,10 +1199,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Merchant marine": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "48"
|
||||
"text": "49"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by type": {
|
||||
"text": "bulk carrier 2, general cargo 31, oil tanker 1, other 14 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "bulk carrier 2, general cargo 32, oil tanker 1, other 14 (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Ports and terminals": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1262,7 +1262,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "479,537 (Palestinian refugees) (2020); 814,715 (Syria) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "479,537 (Palestinian refugees) (2020); 805,326 (Syria) (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "7,000 (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"Introduction": {
|
||||
"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>The inhabitants of the area of Oman have long prospered from Indian Ocean trade. In the late 18th century, the nascent sultanate in Muscat signed the first in a series of friendship treaties with Britain. Over time, Oman's dependence on British political and military advisors increased, although the sultanate never became a British colony. In 1970, QABOOS bin Said Al-Said overthrew his father, and ruled as sultan for the next five decades. His extensive modernization program opened the country to the outside world. He prioritized strategic ties with the UK and US, and his moderate, independent foreign policy allowed Oman to maintain good relations with its neighbors and to avoid external entanglements.<br><br>Inspired by the popular uprisings that swept the Middle East and North Africa beginning in January 2011, some Omanis staged demonstrations, calling for more jobs and economic benefits and an end to corruption. In response to those protester demands, QABOOS in 2011 pledged to implement economic and political reforms, such as granting Oman’s bicameral legislative body more power and authorizing direct elections for its lower house, which took place in November 2011. Additionally, the sultan increased unemployment benefits, and, in August 2012, issued a royal directive mandating the speedy implementation of a national job creation plan for thousands of public and private sector Omani jobs. As part of the government's efforts to decentralize authority and allow greater citizen participation in local governance, Oman successfully conducted its first municipal council elections in December 2012. Announced by the sultan in 2011, the municipal councils have the power to advise the Royal Court on the needs of local districts across Oman's 11 governorates. Sultan QABOOS, Oman's longest reigning monarch, died on 11 January 2020. His cousin, HAYTHAM bin Tariq bin Taimur Al-Said, former Minister of Heritage and Culture, was sworn in as Oman's new sultan the same day.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>The inhabitants of the area of Oman have long prospered from Indian Ocean trade. In the late 18th century, the nascent sultanate in Muscat signed the first in a series of friendship treaties with Britain. Over time, Oman's dependence on British political and military advisors increased, although the sultanate never became a British colony. In 1970, QABOOS bin Said Al Said overthrew his father, and ruled as sultan for the next five decades. His extensive modernization program opened the country to the outside world. He prioritized strategic ties with the UK and US, and his moderate, independent foreign policy allowed Oman to maintain good relations with its neighbors and to avoid external entanglements.<br><br>Inspired by the popular uprisings that swept the Middle East and North Africa beginning in January 2011, some Omanis staged demonstrations, calling for more jobs and economic benefits and an end to corruption. In response to those protester demands, QABOOS in 2011 pledged to implement economic and political reforms, such as granting Oman’s bicameral legislative body more power and authorizing direct elections for its lower house, which took place in November 2011. Additionally, the sultan increased unemployment benefits, and, in August 2012, issued a royal directive mandating the speedy implementation of a national job creation plan for thousands of public and private sector Omani jobs. As part of the government's efforts to decentralize authority and allow greater citizen participation in local governance, Oman successfully conducted its first municipal council elections in December 2012. Announced by the sultan in 2011, the municipal councils have the power to advise the Royal Court on the needs of local districts across Oman's 11 governorates. Sultan QABOOS, Oman's longest reigning monarch, died on 11 January 2020. His cousin, HAYTHAM bin Tariq Al Said, former Minister of Heritage and Culture, was sworn in as Oman's new sultan the same day.</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -446,13 +446,13 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Total water withdrawal": {
|
||||
"municipal": {
|
||||
"text": "130 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "130 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"industrial": {
|
||||
"text": "135 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "240 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"agricultural": {
|
||||
"text": "1.607 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "1.55 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Total renewable water resources": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -539,10 +539,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Executive branch": {
|
||||
"chief of state": {
|
||||
"text": "Sultan and Prime Minister HAYTHAM bin Tariq bin Taimur Al-Said (since 11 January 2020); note - the monarch is both chief of state and head of government"
|
||||
"text": "Sultan and Prime Minister HAYTHAM bin Tariq Al Said (since 11 January 2020); note - the monarch is both chief of state and head of government"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"head of government": {
|
||||
"text": "Sultan and Prime Minister HAYTHAM bin Tariq bin Taimur Al-Said (since 11 January 2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Sultan and Prime Minister HAYTHAM bin Tariq Al Said (since 11 January 2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"cabinet": {
|
||||
"text": "Cabinet appointed by the monarch"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1091,10 +1091,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Internet users": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "4,851,291 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "4.32 million (2021 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"percent of population": {
|
||||
"text": "95% (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "96% (2021 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1183,7 +1183,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "57"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by type": {
|
||||
"text": "general cargo 10, other 47 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "general cargo 11, other 46 (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Ports and terminals": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"Introduction": {
|
||||
"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Ruled by the Al Thani family since the mid-1800s, Qatar within the last 60 years transformed itself from a poor British protectorate noted mainly for pearling into an independent state with significant oil and natural gas revenues. Former Amir HAMAD bin Khalifa Al Thani, who overthrew his father in a bloodless coup in 1995, ushered in wide-sweeping political and media reforms, unprecedented economic investment, and a growing Qatari regional leadership role, in part through the creation of the pan-Arab satellite news network Al-Jazeera and Qatar's mediation of some regional conflicts. In the 2000s, Qatar resolved its longstanding border disputes with both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and by 2007 had attained the highest per capita income in the world. Qatar did not experience domestic unrest or violence like that seen in other Near Eastern and North African countries in 2011, due in part to its immense wealth and patronage network. In mid-2013, HAMAD peacefully abdicated, transferring power to his son, the current Amir TAMIM bin Hamad. TAMIM is popular with the Qatari public, for his role in shepherding the country through an economic embargo by some other regional countries, for his efforts to improve the country's healthcare and education systems, and for his expansion of the country's infrastructure in anticipation of Doha's hosting of the 2022 FIFA Men’s World Cup.</p> Following the outbreak of regional unrest in 2011, Doha prided itself on its support for many popular revolutions, particularly in Libya and Syria. This stance was to the detriment of Qatar’s relations with Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which temporarily recalled their respective ambassadors from Doha in March 2014. TAMIM later oversaw a warming of Qatar’s relations with Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in November 2014 following Kuwaiti mediation and signing of the Riyadh Agreement. This reconciliation, however, was short-lived. In June 2017, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (the \"Quartet\") cut diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar in response to alleged violations of the agreement, among other complaints. They restored ties in January 2021 after signing a declaration at the Gulf Cooperation Council Summit in Al Ula, Saudi Arabia. <p> </p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Ruled by the Al Thani family since the mid-1800s, Qatar within the last 60 years transformed itself from a poor British protectorate noted mainly for pearling into an independent state with significant hydrocarbon revenues. Former Amir HAMAD bin Khalifa Al Thani, who overthrew his father in a bloodless coup in 1995, ushered in wide-sweeping political and media reforms, unprecedented economic investment, and a growing Qatari regional leadership role, in part through the creation of the pan-Arab satellite news network Al-Jazeera and Qatar's mediation of some regional conflicts. In the 2000s, Qatar resolved its longstanding border disputes with both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and by 2007, Doha had attained the highest per capita income in the world. Qatar did not experience domestic unrest or violence like that seen in other Near Eastern and North African countries in 2011, due in part to its immense wealth and patronage network. In mid-2013, HAMAD peacefully abdicated, transferring power to his son, the current Amir TAMIM bin Hamad. TAMIM is popular with the Qatari public, for his role in shepherding the country through an economic embargo by some other regional countries, for his efforts to improve the country's healthcare and education systems, and for his expansion of the country's infrastructure in anticipation of Doha's hosting international sporting events. Qatar became the first country in the Arab world to host the FIFA Men’s World Cup in 2022.</p> Following the outbreak of regional unrest in 2011, Doha prided itself on its support for many popular revolutions, particularly in Libya and Syria. This stance was to the detriment of Qatar’s relations with Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which temporarily recalled their respective ambassadors from Doha in March 2014. TAMIM later oversaw a warming of Qatar’s relations with Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in November 2014 following Kuwaiti mediation and signing of the Riyadh Agreement. This reconciliation, however, was short-lived. In June 2017, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (the \"Quartet\") cut diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar in response to alleged violations of the agreement, among other complaints. They restored ties in January 2021 after signing a declaration at the Gulf Cooperation Council Summit in Al Ula, Saudi Arabia. In 2022, the United States designated Qatar as a major non-NATO ally. <p> </p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1086,10 +1086,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Internet users": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "2,881,060 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "2.7 million (2021 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"percent of population": {
|
||||
"text": "100% (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "100% (2021 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1157,10 +1157,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Merchant marine": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "129"
|
||||
"text": "123"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by type": {
|
||||
"text": "bulk carrier 9, container ship 4, general cargo 4, oil tanker 5, other 107 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "bulk carrier 6, container ship 4, general cargo 4, oil tanker 3, other 106 (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Ports and terminals": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
|
|
@ -1136,10 +1136,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Internet users": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "65,784,472 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "68.85 million (2021 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"percent of population": {
|
||||
"text": "78% (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "81% (2021 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1236,10 +1236,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Merchant marine": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "1,217"
|
||||
"text": "1,237"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by type": {
|
||||
"text": "bulk carrier 39, container ship 41, general cargo 317, oil tanker 126, other 694 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "bulk carrier 37, container ship 41, general cargo 288, oil tanker 130, other 741 (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Ports and terminals": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -669,7 +669,8 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> excludes Gaza Strip"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Exports - commodities": {
|
||||
"text": "stone, olives, fruit, vegetables, limestone"
|
||||
"text": "building stone, scrap iron, plastic lids, furniture, seating, dates, olive oil (2021)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> data includes both Gaza Strip and West Bank export commodities"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Imports": {
|
||||
"Imports 2021": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -878,10 +879,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Internet users": {
|
||||
"total": {
|
||||
"text": "3,602,452 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "3,938,199 (2021 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"percent of population": {
|
||||
"text": "75% (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "80% (2021 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> includes the Gaza Strip"
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
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Add table
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Reference in a new issue