diff --git a/africa/ag.json b/africa/ag.json index 229c53ea..c89bcbe7 100644 --- a/africa/ag.json +++ b/africa/ag.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Algeria has known many empires and dynasties starting with the ancient Numidians (3rd century B.C.), Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, over a dozen different Arab and Berber dynasties, Spaniards, and Ottoman Turks. It was under the latter that the Barbary pirates operated from North Africa and preyed on shipping beginning in roughly 1500, peaking in the early to mid-17th century, until finally subdued by the French capture of Algiers in 1830. The French southward conquest of the entirety of Algeria proceeded throughout the 19th century and was marked by many atrocities. The country was heavily colonized by the French in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A bloody eight-year struggle culminated in Algerian independence in 1962.

Algeria's primary political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), was established in 1954 as part of the struggle for independence and has since largely dominated politics, though it is falling out of favor with the youth. The Government of Algeria in 1988 instituted a multi-party system in response to public unrest, but the surprising first round success of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the December 1991 legislative elections led the Algerian army to intervene and postpone the second round of elections to prevent what the secular elite feared would be an extremist-led government from assuming power. The army began a crackdown on the FIS that spurred FIS supporters to begin attacking government targets. Fighting escalated into an insurgency, which saw intense violence from 1992-98, resulting in over 100,000 deaths – many attributed to indiscriminate massacres of villagers by extremists. The government gained the upper hand by the late-1990s, and FIS’s armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, disbanded in January 2000. FIS membership is illegal.

Former president Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA, with the backing of the military, won the presidency in 1999 in an election that was boycotted by several candidates protesting alleged fraud, and won subsequent elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014. Protests broke out across the country in late February 2019 against President BOUTEFLIKA’s decision to seek a fifth term. BOUTEFLIKA resigned in April 2019, and in December 2019, Algerians elected former Prime Minister Abdelmadjid TEBBOUNE as the country's new president. A longtime FLN member, TEBBOUNE ran for president as an independent. In 2020, Algeria held a constitutional referendum, which President TEBBOUNE enacted in January 2021. Subsequent reforms to the national electoral law introduced open list voting to curb corruption. The new law also eliminated gender quotas in Parliament, and the June 2021 legislative elections saw female representation plummet. Local elections took place in November 2021. The referendum, parliamentary elections, and local elections saw record low voter turnout. Since 2014, Algeria’s reliance on hydrocarbon revenues to fund the government and finance the large subsidies for the population has fallen under stress because of declining oil prices.

" + "text": "

Algeria has known many empires and dynasties starting with the ancient Numidians (3rd century B.C.), Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, over a dozen different Arab and Berber dynasties, Spaniards, and Ottoman Turks. It was under the latter that the Barbary pirates operated from North Africa and preyed on shipping beginning in roughly 1500, peaking in the early to mid-17th century, until finally subdued by the French capture of Algiers in 1830. The French southward conquest of the entirety of Algeria proceeded throughout the 19th century and was marked by many atrocities. The country was heavily colonized by the French in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A bloody eight-year struggle culminated in Algerian independence in 1962.

Algeria's primary political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), was established in 1954 as part of the struggle for independence and has since largely dominated politics, though it is falling out of favor with the youth. The Government of Algeria in 1988 instituted a multi-party system in response to public unrest, but the surprising first round success of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the December 1991 legislative election led the Algerian military to intervene and postpone the second round of elections to prevent what the secular elite feared would be an extremist-led government from assuming power. The army began a crackdown on the FIS that spurred FIS supporters to begin attacking government targets. Fighting escalated into an insurgency, which saw intense violence from 1992-98, resulting in over 100,000 deaths – many attributed to indiscriminate massacres of villagers by extremists. The government gained the upper hand by the late-1990s, and FIS’s armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, disbanded in January 2000. FIS membership is illegal.

Former president Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA, with the backing of the military, won the presidency in 1999 in an election that was boycotted by several candidates protesting alleged fraud, and won subsequent elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014. Protests broke out across the country in late February 2019 against President BOUTEFLIKA’s decision to seek a fifth term. BOUTEFLIKA resigned in April 2019, and in December 2019, Algerians elected former Prime Minister Abdelmadjid TEBBOUNE as the country's new president. A longtime FLN member, TEBBOUNE ran for president as an independent. In 2020, Algeria held a constitutional referendum, which President TEBBOUNE enacted in January 2021. Subsequent reforms to the national electoral law introduced open list voting to curb corruption. The new law also eliminated gender quotas in Parliament, and the June 2021 legislative elections saw female representation plummet. Local elections took place in November 2021. The referendum, parliamentary elections, and local elections saw record low voter turnout. Since 2014, Algeria’s reliance on hydrocarbon export revenues to fund the government and finance the large subsidies for the population has fallen under stress because of volatile energy prices and increased domestic consumption of energy products.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ "text": "UTC+1 (6 hours ahead of Washington, DC, during Standard Time)" }, "etymology": { - "text": "name derives from the Arabic \"al-Jazair\" meaning \"the islands\" and refers to the four islands formerly off the coast but joined to the mainland since 1525" + "text": "name derives from the Arabic \"al-Jazair\" meaning \"the islands\" and refers to the four islands formerly off the coast of the capital but joined to the mainland since 1525" } }, "Administrative divisions": { @@ -1208,10 +1208,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "114" + "text": "119" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 1, container ship 2, general cargo 11, oil tanker 11, other 89 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 1, container ship 4, general cargo 11, oil tanker 14, other 89 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/ao.json b/africa/ao.json index bcdcc29c..c623cac7 100644 --- a/africa/ao.json +++ b/africa/ao.json @@ -1238,10 +1238,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "54" + "text": "58" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 13, oil tanker 8, other 33 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 13, oil tanker 8, other 37 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/bn.json b/africa/bn.json index 77824292..af18eb6a 100644 --- a/africa/bn.json +++ b/africa/bn.json @@ -1219,10 +1219,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "6" + "text": "7" }, "by type": { - "text": "other 6 (2021)" + "text": "other 7 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/cf.json b/africa/cf.json index 9e935de5..bcea5581 100644 --- a/africa/cf.json +++ b/africa/cf.json @@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ "text": "11" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 1, oil tanker 1, other 9 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 1, oil tanker 1, other 9 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/cg.json b/africa/cg.json index c0e08563..44948e6c 100644 --- a/africa/cg.json +++ b/africa/cg.json @@ -1284,10 +1284,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "22" + "text": "23" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 4, oil tanker 2, other 16 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 5, oil tanker 2, other 16 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1350,7 +1350,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "211,312 (Central African Republic), 208,389 (Rwanda), 56,192 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 43,623 (Burundi) (2023)" + "text": "211,409 (Central African Republic), 208,389 (Rwanda), 56,423 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 43,635 (Burundi) (2023)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "6.06 million (fighting between government forces and rebels since mid-1990s; conflict in Kasai region since 2016) (2023)" diff --git a/africa/cm.json b/africa/cm.json index 3b81db5d..d5df5ce9 100644 --- a/africa/cm.json +++ b/africa/cm.json @@ -1282,10 +1282,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "94" + "text": "121" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 3, container ship 1,general cargo 35, oil tanker 24, other 31 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 2, general cargo 45, oil tanker 33, other 41 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/cn.json b/africa/cn.json index ded28fe0..8e4de748 100644 --- a/africa/cn.json +++ b/africa/cn.json @@ -1095,10 +1095,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "236" + "text": "248" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 8, container ship 7, general cargo 112, oil tanker 31, other 78 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 10, container ship 6, general cargo 108, oil tanker 38, other 86 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/cv.json b/africa/cv.json index 29e25446..54d392b7 100644 --- a/africa/cv.json +++ b/africa/cv.json @@ -1131,10 +1131,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "46" + "text": "47" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 16, oil tanker 3, other 27 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 16, oil tanker 3, other 28 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/dj.json b/africa/dj.json index 152593c8..15d11e1e 100644 --- a/africa/dj.json +++ b/africa/dj.json @@ -1160,10 +1160,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "33" + "text": "42" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 1, container ship 1, general cargo 2, oil tanker 8, other 21 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 1, container ship 1, general cargo 4, oil tanker 15, other 21 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/eg.json b/africa/eg.json index f8e93789..e2584ce3 100644 --- a/africa/eg.json +++ b/africa/eg.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

The regularity and richness of the annual Nile River flood, coupled with semi-isolation provided by deserts to the east and west, allowed for the development of one of the world's great civilizations. A unified kingdom arose circa 3200 B.C., and a series of dynasties ruled in Egypt for the next three millennia. The last native dynasty fell to the Persians in 341 B.C., who in turn were replaced by the Greeks, Romans, and Byzantines. It was the Arabs who introduced Islam and the Arabic language in the 7th century and who ruled for the next six centuries. A local military caste, the Mamluks took control about 1250 and continued to govern after the conquest of Egypt by the Ottoman Turks in 1517. Completion of the Suez Canal in 1869 elevated Egypt as an important world transportation hub. Ostensibly to protect its investments, Britain seized control of Egypt's government in 1882, but nominal allegiance to the Ottoman Empire continued until 1914. Partially independent from the UK in 1922, Egypt acquired full sovereignty from Britain in 1952. The completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1971 and the resultant Lake Nasser have reaffirmed the time-honored place of the Nile River in the agriculture and ecology of Egypt. A rapidly growing population (the largest in the Arab world), limited arable land, and dependence on the Nile all continue to overtax resources and stress society. The government has struggled to meet the demands of Egypt's fast-growing population as it implements large-scale infrastructure projects, energy cooperation, and foreign direct investment appeals.

Inspired by the 2010 Tunisian revolution, Egyptian opposition groups led demonstrations and labor strikes countrywide, culminating in President Hosni MUBARAK's ouster in 2011. Egypt's military assumed national leadership until a new legislature was in place in early 2012; later that same year, Muhammad MURSI won the presidential election. Following protests throughout the spring of 2013 against MURSI's government and the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Armed Forces intervened and removed MURSI from power in July 2013 and replaced him with interim president Adly MANSOUR. Simultaneously, the government began enacting laws to limit freedoms of assembly and expression. In January 2014, voters approved a new constitution by referendum and in May 2014 elected former defense minister Abdelfattah ELSISI president. Egypt elected a new legislature in December 2015, its first House of Representatives since 2012. ELSISI was reelected to a second four-year term in March 2018. In April 2019, Egypt approved via national referendum a set of constitutional amendments extending ELSISI’s term in office through 2024 and possibly through 2030 if reelected for a third term. The amendments would also allow future presidents up to two consecutive six-year terms in office, reestablish an upper legislative house, allow for one or more vice presidents, establish a 25% quota for female legislators, reaffirm the military’s role as guardian of Egypt, and expand presidential authority to appoint the heads of judicial councils. Successful legislative elections were held in October-November 2020, having been delayed for six months.

 

 

" + "text": "

The regularity and richness of the annual Nile River flood, coupled with semi-isolation provided by deserts to the east and west, allowed for the development of one of the world's great civilizations. A unified kingdom arose circa 3200 B.C., and a series of dynasties ruled in Egypt for the next three millennia. The last native dynasty fell to the Persians in 341 B.C., who in turn were replaced by the Greeks, Romans, and Byzantines. Arab conquerors introduced Islam and the Arabic language in the 7th century and ruled for the next six centuries. A local military caste, the Mamluks took control about 1250 and continued to govern after the conquest of Egypt by the Ottoman Turks in 1517. Completion of the Suez Canal in 1869 elevated Egypt as an important world transportation hub. Ostensibly to protect its investments, Britain seized control of Egypt's government in 1882, but nominal allegiance to the Ottoman Empire continued until 1914. Egypt gained partial independence from the UK in 1922 and acquired full sovereignty from Britain in 1952. British forces evacuated the Suez Canal Zone in 1956. The completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1971 and the resultant Lake Nasser have reaffirmed the time-honored place of the Nile River in the agriculture and ecology of Egypt. A rapidly growing population (the largest in the Arab world), limited arable land, and dependence on the Nile all continue to overtax resources and stress society. The government has struggled to meet the demands of Egypt's fast-growing population as it implements large-scale infrastructure projects, energy cooperation, and foreign direct investment appeals.

Inspired by the 2010 Tunisian revolution, Egyptian opposition groups led demonstrations and labor strikes countrywide, culminating in President Hosni MUBARAK's ouster in 2011. Egypt's military assumed national leadership until a new legislature was in place in early 2012; later that same year, Muslim Brotherhood candidate Muhammad MURSI won the presidential election. Following protests throughout the spring of 2013 against MURSI's government and the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Armed Forces intervened and removed MURSI from power in July 2013 and replaced him with interim president Adly MANSOUR. Simultaneously, the government began enacting laws to limit freedoms of assembly and expression. In January 2014, voters approved a new constitution by referendum and in May 2014 elected former defense minister Abdelfattah ELSISI president. Egypt elected a new legislature in December 2015, its first House of Representatives since 2012. ELSISI was reelected to a second four-year term in March 2018. In April 2019, Egypt approved via national referendum a set of constitutional amendments extending ELSISI’s term in office through 2024 and possibly through 2030 if reelected for a third term. The amendments would also allow future presidents up to two consecutive six-year terms in office, reestablish an upper legislative house, allow for one or more vice presidents, establish a 25% quota for female legislators, reaffirm the military’s role as guardian of Egypt, and expand presidential authority to appoint the heads of judicial councils. Successful legislative elections were held in October-November 2020, having been delayed for six months.

 

 

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ "text": "United States 9%, United Arab Emirates 6%, Italy 6%, Turkey 6%, Saudi Arabia 6%, India 5% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "crude petroleum, refined petroleum, gold, natural gas, fertilizers (2019)" + "text": "refined petroleum, crude petroleum, natural gas, nitrogen fertilizers, gold (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1255,10 +1255,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "421" + "text": "436" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 14, container ship 8, general cargo 27, oil tanker 40, other 332 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 15, container ship 6, general cargo 27, oil tanker 41, other 347 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1279,8 +1279,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF): Army (includes Republican Guard), Navy (includes Coast Guard), Air Force, Air Defense Forces, Border Guard Forces; Interior Ministry: Public Security Sector Police, the Central Security Force, National Security Sector (2023)", - "note": "note 1: the Public Security Sector Police are responsible for law enforcement nationwide; the Central Security Force protects infrastructure and is responsible for crowd control; the National Security Sector is responsible for internal security threats and counterterrorism along with other security services

note 2: in addition to its external defense duties, the EAF also has a mandate to assist police in protecting vital infrastructure during a state of emergency; military personnel were granted full arrest authority in 2011 but normally only use this authority during states of emergency and “periods of significant turmoil”" + "text": "Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF): Army (includes Republican Guard), Navy (includes Coast Guard), Air Force, Air Defense Forces, Border Guard Forces; Interior Ministry: Public Security Sector Police, the Central Security Force, National Security Agency (2023)", + "note": "note 1: the Public Security Sector Police are responsible for law enforcement nationwide; the Central Security Force protects infrastructure and is responsible for crowd control; the National Security Agency is responsible for internal security threats and counterterrorism along with other security services

note 2: in addition to its external defense duties, the EAF also has a mandate to assist police in protecting vital infrastructure during a state of emergency; military personnel were granted full arrest authority in 2011 but normally only use this authority during states of emergency and “periods of significant turmoil”" }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2021": { @@ -1313,7 +1313,7 @@ "text": "1,000 Central African Republic (MINUSCA); 1,075 Mali (MINUSMA) (May 2022)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "since 2011, the Egyptian Armed Forces, police, and other security forces have been actively engaged in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations in the North Sinai governorate against several militant groups, particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – Sinai Province; as of 2022, Egypt had tens of thousands of military troops, police, and other security personnel deployed in the Sinai for internal security duties; in addition, tribal militias were assisting Egyptian security forces

the military has a large stake in the civilian economy, including running banks, businesses, gas stations, shipping lines, and utilities, and producing consumer and industrial goods, importing commodities, and building and managing infrastructure projects, such as bridges, roads, hospitals, and housing; the various enterprises are reportedly profitable enough to make the armed forces largely self-funded

Egypt has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments

the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) has operated in the Sinai since 1982 as a peacekeeping and monitoring force to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace; the MFO is an independent international organization, created by agreement between Egypt and Israel; as of 2022, it was composed of about 1,150 troops from 13 countries; Colombia, Fiji, and the US were the leading providers of troops to the MFO (2022)" + "text": "since 2011, the Egyptian Armed Forces, police, and other security forces have been actively engaged in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations in the North Sinai governorate against several militant groups, particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – Sinai Province; as of 2022, Egypt had tens of thousands of military troops, police, and other security personnel deployed in the Sinai for internal security duties; in addition, tribal militias were assisting Egyptian security forces

the military has a large stake in the civilian economy, including running banks, businesses, gas stations, shipping lines, and utilities, and producing consumer and industrial goods, importing commodities, and building and managing infrastructure projects, such as bridges, roads, hospitals, and housing; the various enterprises are reportedly profitable enough to make the armed forces largely self-funded

Egypt has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments

the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) has operated in the Sinai since 1982 as a peacekeeping and monitoring force to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace; the MFO is an independent international organization, created by agreement between Egypt and Israel; as of 2023, it was composed of about 1,150 troops from 13 countries; Colombia, Fiji, and the US were the leading providers of troops to the MFO (2023)" }, "Maritime threats": { "text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of Egypt are a risk for armed robbery against ships; in 2022, one attempted attack against a commercial vessel was reported, this was the first incident reported in four years; the reported incident occurred in port while the ship was anchored" diff --git a/africa/ek.json b/africa/ek.json index 0c7a7f44..4968924b 100644 --- a/africa/ek.json +++ b/africa/ek.json @@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ "text": "China 34%, India 19%, Spain 11%, United States 7% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "crude petroleum, natural gas, industrial alcohols, lumber, veneer sheeting (2019)" + "text": "crude petroleum, natural gas, industrial alcohols, lumber, veneer sheeting (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2019": { @@ -1121,10 +1121,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "42" + "text": "46" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 1, general cargo 8, oil tanker 6, other 27 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 1, general cargo 12, oil tanker 7, other 26 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/er.json b/africa/er.json index 98831449..8dae7375 100644 --- a/africa/er.json +++ b/africa/er.json @@ -830,7 +830,7 @@ "text": "China 62%, South Korea 28.3% (2017)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "gold and other minerals, livestock, sorghum, textiles, food, small industry manufactures" + "text": "zinc, copper, gold, clothing, stone grinders (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2017": { @@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ "text": "9" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 4, oil tanker 1, other 4 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 4, oil tanker 1, other 4 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/et.json b/africa/et.json index 958ae17f..c4120089 100644 --- a/africa/et.json +++ b/africa/et.json @@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ "text": "China 17%, United States 16%, United Arab Emirates 8%, Saudi Arabia 6%, South Korea 5%, Germany 5% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "coffee, sesame seeds, gold, cut flowers, zinc (2019)" + "text": "coffee, gold, sesame seeds, vegetables, cut flowers, aircraft parts (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1286,10 +1286,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "11" + "text": "12" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 9, oil tanker 2 (2020)" + "text": "general cargo 10, oil tanker 2 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/ga.json b/africa/ga.json index 05705073..bb6e5d00 100644 --- a/africa/ga.json +++ b/africa/ga.json @@ -894,7 +894,7 @@ "text": "China 38%, India 22%, Mali 7%, Chile 5% (2017)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "lumber, cashews, refined petroleum, fish oil, ground nut oil (2019)" + "text": "cashews, lumber, refined petroleum, shellfish, scrap iron, fish, sesame seeds (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1181,10 +1181,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "8" + "text": "9" }, "by type": { - "text": "other 8 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 1, other 8 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/gb.json b/africa/gb.json index 1631949c..dd220e6e 100644 --- a/africa/gb.json +++ b/africa/gb.json @@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ "text": "China 63%, Singapore 5% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "crude petroleum, manganese, lumber, veneer sheeting, refined petroleum (2019)" + "text": "crude petroleum, manganese, lumber, veneer sheeting, refined petroleum (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2019": { @@ -1196,10 +1196,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "62" + "text": "71" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 1, general cargo 17, oil tanker 17, other 27 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 2, general cargo 19, oil tanker 20, other 30 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/gh.json b/africa/gh.json index bf4c316c..32014d23 100644 --- a/africa/gh.json +++ b/africa/gh.json @@ -509,13 +509,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "300 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "300 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "100 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "100 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "1.07 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "1.07 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -929,7 +929,7 @@ "text": "Switzerland 23%, United Arab Emirates 12%, China 12%, India 9%, Netherlands 5% (2020)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "gold, crude petroleum, cocoa products, manganese, cashews (2019)" + "text": "gold, crude petroleum, cocoa products, cashews, manganese  (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1247,10 +1247,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "51" + "text": "52" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 7, oil tanker 3, other 41 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 7, oil tanker 3, other 42 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/gv.json b/africa/gv.json index 3005ee82..c15711df 100644 --- a/africa/gv.json +++ b/africa/gv.json @@ -501,13 +501,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "230 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "230 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "60 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "60 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "600 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "600 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1208,10 +1208,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "2" + "text": "3" }, "by type": { - "text": "other 2 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 1, other 2 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/iv.json b/africa/iv.json index 41bb181e..a7a4cc47 100644 --- a/africa/iv.json +++ b/africa/iv.json @@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@ "text": "25" }, "by type": { - "text": "oil tanker 2, other 23 (2021)" + "text": "oil tanker 2, other 23 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/ke.json b/africa/ke.json index df3d9fec..6f75bcf2 100644 --- a/africa/ke.json +++ b/africa/ke.json @@ -504,13 +504,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "495 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "500 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "303 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "300 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "3.234 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "3.23 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1264,10 +1264,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "26" + "text": "25" }, "by type": { - "text": "oil tanker 3, other 23 (2021)" + "text": "oil tanker 3, other 22 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1333,7 +1333,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "279,925 (Somalia), 153,289 (South Sudan), 21,620 (Ethiopia), 8,159 (Burundi), 5,540 (Sudan) (2022); 72,192 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2023)" + "text": "21,620 (Ethiopia), 8,159 (Burundi), 5,540 (Sudan) (2022); 281,319 (Somalia), 157,402 (South Sudan), 72,192 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2023)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "190,000 (election-related violence, intercommunal violence, resource conflicts, al-Shabaab attacks in 2017 and 2018) (2021)" diff --git a/africa/li.json b/africa/li.json index 77cad2bf..05d5884e 100644 --- a/africa/li.json +++ b/africa/li.json @@ -487,13 +487,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "80.2 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "80 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "53.4 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "50 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "12.3 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "10 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1105,10 +1105,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "1,314,996 (2020 est.)" + "text": "1.768 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "26% (2020 est.)" + "text": "34% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1180,10 +1180,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "3,942" + "text": "4,311" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 1,487, container ship 878, general cargo 131, oil tanker 851, other 595 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 1,673, container ship 962, general cargo 141, oil tanker 907, other 628 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/lt.json b/africa/lt.json index 5491a841..4bc4885f 100644 --- a/africa/lt.json +++ b/africa/lt.json @@ -473,10 +473,10 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "20 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "20 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "20 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "20 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { "text": "3.8 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" @@ -1109,10 +1109,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "921,168 (2020 est.)" + "text": "1.104 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "43% (2020 est.)" + "text": "48% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { diff --git a/africa/ly.json b/africa/ly.json index c6e73bc8..3ec1a6a4 100644 --- a/africa/ly.json +++ b/africa/ly.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Berbers have inhabited central north Africa since ancient times, but the region has been settled and ruled by Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians, Persians, Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, and Vandals. In the the 7th century, Islam spread through the region; in the mid-16th century, Ottoman rule began. The Italians supplanted the Ottoman Turks in the area around Tripoli in 1911 and did not relinquish their hold until 1943 when they were defeated in World War II. Libya then passed to UN administration and achieved independence in 1951. Following a 1969 military coup, Col. Muammar al-QADHAFI assumed leadership and began to espouse his political system at home, which was a combination of socialism and Islam. During the 1970s, QADHAFI used oil revenues to promote his ideology outside Libya, supporting subversive and terrorist activities that included the downing of two airliners - one over Scotland, another in Northern Africa - and a discotheque bombing in Berlin. UN sanctions in 1992 isolated QADHAFI politically and economically following the attacks; sanctions were lifted in 2003 following Libyan acceptance of responsibility for the bombings and agreement to claimant compensation. QADHAFI also agreed to end Libya's program to develop weapons of mass destruction, and he made significant strides in normalizing relations with Western nations.

Unrest that began in several Middle Eastern and North African countries in late 2010 erupted in Libyan cities in early 2011. QADHAFI's brutal crackdown on protesters spawned an eight-month civil war that saw the emergence of a National Transitional Council (NTC), UN authorization of air and naval intervention by the international community, and the toppling of the QADHAFI regime. In 2012, the NTC handed power to an elected parliament, the General National Congress (GNC). Voters chose a new parliament to replace the GNC in June 2014 - the House of Representatives (HoR) - which relocated to the eastern city of Tobruk after fighting broke out in Tripoli and Benghazi in July 2014.

In December 2015, the UN brokered an agreement among a broad array of Libyan political parties and social groups - known as the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) - establishing an interim executive body, the Government of National Accord (GNA). However, the HoR and defunct-GNC-affiliated political hardliners continued to oppose the GNA and hamper the LPA’s implementation, leaving Libya with eastern and western-based rival governments. In September 2017, UN Special Representative Ghassan SALAME announced a new roadmap for national political reconciliation. In November 2018, the international community supported SALAME’s recalibrated Action Plan for Libya that aimed to break the political deadlock by holding a National Conference in early 2019. These plans, however, were derailed when the eastern-based self-described Libyan National Army (LNA) launched an offensive to seize Tripoli in April 2019. Several countries sent armed personnel and advanced military equipment into Libya. The LNA's offensive collapsed in June 2020, and a subsequent UN-sponsored cease-fire in October 2020 helped formalize the pause in fighting between rival camps, although foreign forces, fighters, and mercenaries that aided eastern and western factions during the fighting remain in Libya.

In early 2021, the UN-facilitated Libyan Political Dialogue Forum selected a new prime minister for an interim government, the Government of National Unity (GNU), and a new presidential council charged with preparing for presidential and parliamentary elections in December 2021 and uniting the country’s state institutions. The HoR approved the GNU and its cabinet in March 2021, providing Libya with its first unified government since 2014. On 22 December 2021, Libya's parliament postponed the first round of the presidential election to an undetermined date in the future. Talks in June 2022 failed to reach agreement on eligibility requirements for presidential candidates.

" + "text": "

Berbers have inhabited central north Africa since ancient times, but the region has been settled and ruled by Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians, Persians, Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, and Vandals. In the the 7th century, Islam spread through the region; in the mid-16th century, Ottoman rule began. The Italians supplanted the Ottoman Turks in the area around Tripoli in 1911 and did not relinquish their hold until 1943 when they were defeated in World War II. Libya then passed to UN administration and achieved independence in 1951. Following a 1969 military coup, Col. Muammar al-QADHAFI assumed leadership and began to espouse his political system at home, which was a combination of socialism and Islam. During the 1970s, QADHAFI used oil revenues to promote his ideology outside Libya, supporting subversive and terrorist activities that included the downing of two airliners - one over Scotland, another in Northern Africa - and a discotheque bombing in Berlin. UN sanctions in 1992 isolated QADHAFI politically and economically following the attacks; sanctions were lifted in 2003 following Libyan acceptance of responsibility for the bombings and agreement to claimant compensation. QADHAFI also agreed to end Libya's program to develop weapons of mass destruction, and he made significant strides in normalizing relations with Western nations.

Unrest that began in several Middle Eastern and North African countries in late 2010 erupted in Libyan cities in early 2011. QADHAFI's brutal crackdown on protesters spawned an eight-month civil war that saw the emergence of a National Transitional Council (NTC), UN authorization of air and naval intervention by the international community, and the toppling of the QADHAFI regime. In 2012, the NTC handed power to an elected parliament, the General National Congress (GNC). Voters chose a new parliament to replace the GNC in June 2014 - the House of Representatives (HoR) - which relocated to the eastern city of Tobruk after fighting broke out in Tripoli and Benghazi in July 2014.

In December 2015, the UN brokered an agreement among a broad array of Libyan political parties and social groups - known as the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) - establishing an interim executive body, the Government of National Accord (GNA). However, the HoR and defunct-GNC-affiliated political hardliners continued to oppose the GNA and hamper the LPA’s implementation, leaving Libya with eastern and western-based rival governments. In September 2017, UN Special Representative Ghassan SALAME announced a new roadmap for national political reconciliation. In November 2018, the international community supported SALAME’s recalibrated Action Plan for Libya that aimed to break the political deadlock by holding a National Conference in early 2019. These plans, however, were derailed when the eastern-based self-described Libyan National Army (LNA) launched an offensive to seize Tripoli in April 2019. Several countries sent armed personnel and advanced military equipment into Libya. The LNA's offensive collapsed in June 2020, and a subsequent UN-sponsored cease-fire in October 2020 helped formalize the pause in fighting between rival camps, although some foreign forces, fighters, and mercenaries that aided eastern and western factions during the fighting remain in Libya.

In early 2021, the UN-facilitated Libyan Political Dialogue Forum selected a new prime minister for an interim government, the Government of National Unity (GNU), and a new presidential council charged with preparing for presidential and parliamentary elections in December 2021 and uniting the country’s state institutions. The HoR approved the GNU and its cabinet in March 2021, providing Libya with its first unified government since 2014. On 22 December 2021, Libya's parliament postponed the first round of the presidential election to an undetermined date in the future. In March 2022, Libya's HoR voted to replace the GNU's interim Prime Minister, Abdul Hamid DUBAYBAH, with a government led by Fathi BASHAGHA. GNU allegations of an illegitimate HoR vote have allowed Prime Minister DUBAYBAH to remain in office and rebuff BASHAGHA's attempts to seat his government in Tripoli. In late February 2023, Special Representative of the UN Security-General to Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, Abdoulaye BATHILY, announced a plan to enable Libyan presidential and legislative elections by the end of 2023.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -436,13 +436,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "700 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "700 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "280 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "280 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "4.85 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "4.85 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1036,10 +1036,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "1,491,040 (2019 est.)" + "text": "3,095,400 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "22% (2019 est.)" + "text": "46.2% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ "text": "94" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 2, oil tanker 12, other 80 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 2, oil tanker 12, other 80 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/ma.json b/africa/ma.json index 0ac7e899..b6ad801f 100644 --- a/africa/ma.json +++ b/africa/ma.json @@ -493,13 +493,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "395 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "400 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "161.9 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "160 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "13 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "13 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1119,10 +1119,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "2,696,931 (2019 est.)" + "text": "5.8 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "10% (2019 est.)" + "text": "20% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1207,10 +1207,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "27" + "text": "28" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 14, oil tanker 2, other 11 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 15, oil tanker 2, other 11 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/mi.json b/africa/mi.json index 488f3075..f1cea9bd 100644 --- a/africa/mi.json +++ b/africa/mi.json @@ -502,13 +502,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "143.1 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "140 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "47.7 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "50 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "1.166 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1.17 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1139,10 +1139,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "2,608,025 (2019 est.)" + "text": "4.8 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "14% (2019 est.)" + "text": "24% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { diff --git a/africa/ml.json b/africa/ml.json index 1df48326..5a2445df 100644 --- a/africa/ml.json +++ b/africa/ml.json @@ -525,13 +525,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "107 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "110 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "4 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "4 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "5.075 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "5.08 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1160,10 +1160,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "5,467,725 (2020 est.)" + "text": "7.48 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "27% (2020 est.)" + "text": "34% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { diff --git a/africa/mo.json b/africa/mo.json index 457ba7e1..94b38c60 100644 --- a/africa/mo.json +++ b/africa/mo.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

In 788, about a century after the Arab conquest of North Africa, a series of Moroccan Muslim dynasties began to rule in Morocco. In the 16th century, the Sa'adi monarchy, particularly under Ahmad al-MANSUR (1578-1603), repelled foreign invaders and inaugurated a golden age. The Alaouite Dynasty, to which the current Moroccan royal family belongs, dates from the 17th century. In 1860, Spain occupied northern Morocco and ushered in a half-century of trade rivalry among European powers that saw Morocco's sovereignty steadily erode; in 1912, the French imposed a protectorate over the country. A protracted independence struggle with France ended successfully in 1956. The internationalized city of Tangier and most Spanish possessions were turned over to the new country that same year. Sultan MOHAMMED V, the current monarch's grandfather, organized the new state as a constitutional monarchy and in 1957 assumed the title of king. Since Spain's 1976 withdrawal from Western Sahara, Morocco has extended its de facto administrative control to roughly 75% of this territory; however, the UN does not recognize Morocco as the administering power for Western Sahara. The UN since 1991 has monitored a cease-fire between Morocco and the Polisario Front - an organization advocating the territory’s independence - and restarted negotiations over the status of the territory in December 2018. On 10 December 2020, the US recognized Morocco's sovereignty over all of Western Sahara.

King MOHAMMED VI in early 2011 responded to the spread of pro-democracy protests in the North Africa region by implementing a reform program that included a new constitution, passed by popular referendum in July 2011, under which some new powers were extended to parliament and the prime minister, but ultimate authority remains in the hands of the monarch. In November 2011, the Justice and Development Party (PJD) - a moderate Islamist party - won the largest number of seats in parliamentary elections, becoming the first Islamist party to lead the Moroccan Government. In September 2015, Morocco held its first direct elections for regional councils, one of the reforms included in the 2011 constitution. The PJD again won the largest number of seats in nationwide parliamentary elections in October 2016, but it lost its plurality to the probusiness National Rally of Independents (RNI) in September 2021. In December 2020, Morocco signed a normalization agreement with Israel, similar to those that Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Sudan had concluded with Israel earlier in 2020.

" + "text": "

In 788, about a century after the Arab conquest of North Africa, a series of Moroccan Muslim dynasties began to rule in Morocco. In the 16th century, the Sa'adi monarchy, particularly under Ahmad al-MANSUR (1578-1603), repelled foreign invaders and inaugurated a golden age. The Alaouite Dynasty, to which the current Moroccan royal family belongs, dates from the 17th century. In 1860, Spain occupied northern Morocco and ushered in a half-century of trade rivalry among European powers that saw Morocco's sovereignty steadily erode; in 1912, the French imposed a protectorate over the country. A protracted independence struggle with France ended successfully in 1956. The internationalized city of Tangier and most Spanish possessions were turned over to the new country that same year. Sultan MOHAMMED V, the current monarch's grandfather, organized the new state as a constitutional monarchy and in 1957 assumed the title of king. Since Spain's 1976 withdrawal from Western Sahara, Morocco has extended its de facto administrative control to roughly 75% of this territory; however, the UN does not recognize Morocco as the administering power for Western Sahara. The UN since 1991 has monitored a cease-fire, which broke down in late 2020, between Morocco and the Polisario Front - an organization advocating the territory’s independence - and restarted negotiations over the status of the territory in December 2018. On 10 December 2020, the US recognized Morocco's sovereignty over all of Western Sahara.

King MOHAMMED VI in early 2011 responded to the spread of pro-democracy protests in the North Africa region by implementing a reform program that included a new constitution, passed by popular referendum in July 2011, under which some new powers were extended to parliament and the prime minister, but ultimate authority remains in the hands of the monarch. In November 2011, the Justice and Development Party (PJD) - a moderate Islamist party - won the largest number of seats in parliamentary elections, becoming the first Islamist party to lead the Moroccan Government. In September 2015, Morocco held its first direct elections for regional councils, one of the reforms included in the 2011 constitution. The PJD again won the largest number of seats in nationwide parliamentary elections in October 2016, but it lost its plurality to the probusiness National Rally of Independents (RNI) in September 2021. In December 2020, Morocco signed a normalization agreement with Israel, similar to those that Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Sudan had concluded with Israel earlier in 2020.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -502,13 +502,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "1.063 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1.06 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "212 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "210 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "9.156 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "9.16 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "note": "note:  data does not include former Western Sahara" }, @@ -1157,10 +1157,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "31,004,869 (2020 est.)" + "text": "32.56 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "84% (2020 est.)" + "text": "88% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1257,7 +1257,7 @@ "text": "93" }, "by type": { - "text": "container ship 6, general cargo 5, oil tanker 2, other 80 (2021)" + "text": "container ship 6, general cargo 5, oil tanker 2, other 80 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/mp.json b/africa/mp.json index 22a5d9e2..73c55810 100644 --- a/africa/mp.json +++ b/africa/mp.json @@ -433,13 +433,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "260 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "290 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "12 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "10 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "344 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "310 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1069,10 +1069,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "822,731 (2020 est.)" + "text": "884,000 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "65% (2020 est.)" + "text": "68% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1140,10 +1140,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "29" + "text": "31" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 1, oil tanker 4, other 24 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 1, oil tanker 5, other 25 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/mr.json b/africa/mr.json index 37d3617d..dea3a204 100644 --- a/africa/mr.json +++ b/africa/mr.json @@ -510,13 +510,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "95.4 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "100 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "31.8 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "30 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "1.223 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1.2 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1143,10 +1143,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "1,906,360 (2020 est.)" + "text": "2.714 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "41% (2020 est.)" + "text": "59% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1228,10 +1228,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "5" + "text": "11" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 2, other 3 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 2, other 9 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/mz.json b/africa/mz.json index 393d25c5..531875fa 100644 --- a/africa/mz.json +++ b/africa/mz.json @@ -506,13 +506,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "372 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "370 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "25 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "30 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "1.076 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1.08 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1156,10 +1156,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "5,313,424 (2020 est.)" + "text": "5.44 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "17% (2020 est.)" + "text": "17% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1259,7 +1259,7 @@ "text": "30" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 9, other 21 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 9, other 21 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/ng.json b/africa/ng.json index 591c623e..bb27f875 100644 --- a/africa/ng.json +++ b/africa/ng.json @@ -513,13 +513,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "178.9 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "190 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "36 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "40 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "1.536 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "2.35 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1150,10 +1150,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "2,331,072 (2019 est.)" + "text": "5.5 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "10% (2019 est.)" + "text": "22% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1230,10 +1230,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "1" + "text": "2" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 1 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 1, other 1 (2022)" } } }, @@ -1288,7 +1288,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "188,015 (Nigeria), 65,847 (Mali) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2023)" + "text": "188,006 (Nigeria), 65,847 (Mali) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2023)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "376,809 (includes the regions of Diffa, Tillaberi, and Tahoua; unknown how many of the 11,000 people displaced by clashes between government forces and the Tuareg militant group, Niger Movement for Justice, in 2007 are still displaced; inter-communal violence; Boko Haram attacks in southern Niger, 2015) (2022)" diff --git a/africa/ni.json b/africa/ni.json index 2e2b05d8..2a1b4241 100644 --- a/africa/ni.json +++ b/africa/ni.json @@ -519,13 +519,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "5 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "5 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "1.965 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1.97 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "5.51 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "5.51 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1170,10 +1170,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "74,210,251 (2020 est.)" + "text": "115.5 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "36% (2020 est.)" + "text": "55% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1274,10 +1274,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "791" + "text": "832" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 14, oil tanker 110, other 667 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 16, oil tanker 111, other 705 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1349,7 +1349,7 @@ "text": "87,220 (Cameroon) (2023)" }, "IDPs": { - "text": "3.17 million (northeast Nigeria; Boko Haram attacks and counterinsurgency efforts in northern Nigeria; communal violence between Christians and Muslims in the middle belt region, political violence; flooding; forced evictions; cattle rustling; competition for resources) (2023)" + "text": "3.3 million (northeast Nigeria; Boko Haram attacks and counterinsurgency efforts in northern Nigeria; communal violence between Christians and Muslims in the middle belt region, political violence; flooding; forced evictions; cattle rustling; competition for resources) (2023)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/africa/od.json b/africa/od.json index 1403a370..340c2f6e 100644 --- a/africa/od.json +++ b/africa/od.json @@ -969,10 +969,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "783,561 (2020 est.)" + "text": "869,000 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "7% (2020 est.)" + "text": "7.9% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { diff --git a/africa/pu.json b/africa/pu.json index 6f418ba8..a03d5a4b 100644 --- a/africa/pu.json +++ b/africa/pu.json @@ -470,13 +470,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "30 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "30 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "10 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "10 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "140 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "140 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1137,7 +1137,7 @@ "text": "8" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 5, other 3 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 5, other 3 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/rw.json b/africa/rw.json index 8cd2f9d7..5c452ca9 100644 --- a/africa/rw.json +++ b/africa/rw.json @@ -1123,10 +1123,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "3,497,096 (2020 est.)" + "text": "3.9 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "27% (2020 est.)" + "text": "30% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { diff --git a/africa/se.json b/africa/se.json index b2384a57..ae343465 100644 --- a/africa/se.json +++ b/africa/se.json @@ -1049,10 +1049,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "77,785 (2020 est.)" + "text": "90,200 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "79% (2020 est.)" + "text": "82% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1126,10 +1126,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "27" + "text": "31" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 5, oil tanker 6, other 16 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 6, oil tanker 7, other 18 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/sf.json b/africa/sf.json index f8e8dae0..320fe734 100644 --- a/africa/sf.json +++ b/africa/sf.json @@ -1156,10 +1156,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "41,516,083 (2020 est.)" + "text": "42.48 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "70% (2020 est.)" + "text": "72% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1259,10 +1259,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "105" + "text": "107" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 2, general cargo 1, oil tanker 7, other 95 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 3, general cargo 1, oil tanker 7, other 96 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/sg.json b/africa/sg.json index 996fb3ae..b9588432 100644 --- a/africa/sg.json +++ b/africa/sg.json @@ -1151,10 +1151,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "7,199,890 (2020 est.)" + "text": "9.86 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "43% (2020 est.)" + "text": "58% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1245,7 +1245,7 @@ "text": "35" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 5, oil tanker 1, other 29 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 5, oil tanker 1, other 29 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/sh.json b/africa/sh.json index 1599c7bf..3964a512 100644 --- a/africa/sh.json +++ b/africa/sh.json @@ -745,10 +745,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "2,302 (2019 est.)" + "text": "2,287 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "38% (2019 est.)" + "text": "37.6% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { diff --git a/africa/sl.json b/africa/sl.json index 02c87ec4..205b2aae 100644 --- a/africa/sl.json +++ b/africa/sl.json @@ -1113,10 +1113,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "1,435,857 (2020 est.)" + "text": "1,047,499 (2022 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "18% (2020 est.)" + "text": "12.7% (2022 est.)" } } }, @@ -1176,10 +1176,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "591" + "text": "605" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 30, container ship 9, general cargo 319, oil tanker 108, other 125 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 36, container ship 6, general cargo 325, oil tanker 104, other 134 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/so.json b/africa/so.json index 6460d705..2dbd488f 100644 --- a/africa/so.json +++ b/africa/so.json @@ -1059,10 +1059,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "308,858 (2019 est.)" + "text": "2.465 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "2% (2019 est.)" + "text": "14.5% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1133,7 +1133,7 @@ "text": "4" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 1, other 3 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 1, other 3 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/su.json b/africa/su.json index c27c198b..71838e3d 100644 --- a/africa/su.json +++ b/africa/su.json @@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ }, "Diplomatic representation from the US": { "chief of mission": { - "text": "Ambassador (vacant); Chargé d'Affaires Lucy TAMLYN  (since 3 February  2022)" + "text": "Ambassador (vacant); Chargé d'Affaires Lucy TAMLYN  (since 3 February 2022)" }, "embassy": { "text": "P.O. Box 699, Kilo 10, Soba, Khartoum" @@ -1125,10 +1125,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "12,277,795 (2020 est.)" + "text": "13.248 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "28% (2020 est.)" + "text": "28.8% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1229,7 +1229,7 @@ "text": "15" }, "by type": { - "text": "other 15 (2021)" + "text": "other 15 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1262,7 +1262,7 @@ "note": "note: many defense expenditures are probably off-budget" }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { - "text": "information varies widely; estimated 100-125,000 active duty armed forces personnel; approximately 30-40,000 Rapid Support Forces (2022)" + "text": "information varies widely; estimated 100-125,000 active duty armed forces personnel; estimated up to 50,000 Rapid Support Forces (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { "text": "the SAF's inventory includes a mix of Chinese, Russian, Soviet-era, and domestically produced weapons systems; in recent years, Russia has been the leading arms provider; Sudan has one of the largest defense industries in Africa, which includes state-owned companies with military involvement; it mostly manufactures weapons systems under license from China, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine (2022)" diff --git a/africa/to.json b/africa/to.json index 7c500d9b..88c6a105 100644 --- a/africa/to.json +++ b/africa/to.json @@ -1144,10 +1144,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "1,986,897 (2020 est.)" + "text": "3.01 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "24% (2020 est.)" + "text": "35% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1229,10 +1229,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "411" + "text": "403" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 1, container ship 9, general cargo 265, oil tanker 56, other 80 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 1, container ship 10, general cargo 254, oil tanker 57, other 81 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/tp.json b/africa/tp.json index 92698050..7637d5ad 100644 --- a/africa/tp.json +++ b/africa/tp.json @@ -1080,10 +1080,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "72,323 (2020 est.)" + "text": "112,200 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "33% (2020 est.)" + "text": "51% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1134,10 +1134,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "22" + "text": "25" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 13, oil tanker 2, other 7 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 15, oil tanker 2, other 8 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/ts.json b/africa/ts.json index efd7989b..6aa91d6d 100644 --- a/africa/ts.json +++ b/africa/ts.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Tunisia has been the nexus of many different colonizations including those of the Phoenicians (as early as the 12 century B.C.), the Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, various Arab and Berber kingdoms, and the Ottomans (16th to late 19th centuries). Rivalry between French and Italian interests in Tunisia culminated in a French invasion in 1881 and the creation of a protectorate. Agitation for independence in the decades following World War I was finally successful in convincing the French to recognize Tunisia as an independent state in 1956. The country's first president, Habib BOURGUIBA, established a strict one-party state. He dominated the country for 31 years, repressing Islamic fundamentalism and establishing rights for women unmatched by any other Arab nation. In November 1987, BOURGUIBA was removed from office and replaced by Zine el Abidine BEN ALI in a bloodless coup. Street protests that began in Tunis in December 2010 over high unemployment, corruption, widespread poverty, and high food prices escalated in January 2011, culminating in rioting that led to hundreds of deaths. On 14 January 2011, the same day BEN ALI dismissed the government, he fled the country, and by late January 2011, a \"national unity government\" was formed. Elections for the new Constituent Assembly were held in late October 2011, and in December, it elected human rights activist Moncef MARZOUKI as interim president. The Assembly began drafting a new constitution in February 2012 and, after several iterations and a months-long political crisis that stalled the transition, ratified the document in January 2014. Parliamentary and presidential elections for a permanent government were held at the end of 2014. Beji CAID ESSEBSI was elected as the first president under the country's new constitution. Following ESSEBSI’s death in office in July 2019, Tunisia moved its scheduled presidential election forward two months and after two rounds of voting, Kais SAIED was sworn in as president in October 2019. Tunisia also held legislative elections on schedule in October 2019. SAIED's term, as well as that of Tunisia's 217-member parliament, expires in 2024. On 25 July 2021, SAIED seized exceptional powers allowed under Tunisia's constitution to fire the prime minister and suspend the legislature.

" + "text": "

Tunisia has been the nexus of many different colonizations including those of the Phoenicians (as early as the 12 century B.C.), the Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, various Arab and Berber kingdoms, and the Ottomans (16th to late 19th centuries). Rivalry between French and Italian interests in Tunisia culminated in a French invasion in 1881 and the creation of a protectorate. Agitation for independence in the decades following World War I was finally successful in convincing the French to recognize Tunisia as an independent state in 1956. The country's first president, Habib BOURGUIBA, established a strict one-party state. He dominated the country for 31 years, repressing Islamic fundamentalism and establishing rights for women. In November 1987, BOURGUIBA was removed from office and replaced by Zine el Abidine BEN ALI in a bloodless coup. Street protests that began in Tunis in December 2010 over high unemployment, corruption, widespread poverty, and high food prices escalated in January 2011, culminating in rioting that led to hundreds of deaths. On 14 January 2011, the same day BEN ALI dismissed the government, he fled the country, and by late January 2011, a \"national unity government\" was formed. Elections for the new Constituent Assembly were held in late October 2011, and in December, it elected human rights activist Moncef MARZOUKI as interim president. The Assembly began drafting a new constitution in February 2012 and, after several iterations and a months-long political crisis that stalled the transition, ratified the document in January 2014. Parliamentary and presidential elections for a permanent government were held at the end of 2014. Beji CAID ESSEBSI was elected as the first president under the country's new constitution. Following ESSEBSI’s death in office in July 2019, Tunisia moved its scheduled presidential election forward two months and after two rounds of voting, Kais SAIED was sworn in as president in October 2019. Tunisia held legislative elections on schedule in October 2019. SAIED's term, as well as that of Tunisia's 217-member parliament, was set to expire in 2024. However, on 25 July 2021, SAIED seized exceptional powers allowed under Tunisia's constitution to fire the prime minister and suspend the legislature. Tunisians approved a new constitution through public referendum in July 2022 that expanded presidential powers and created a new bicameral legislature.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -1100,10 +1100,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "8,509,405 (2020 est.)" + "text": "9.48 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "72% (2020 est.)" + "text": "79% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1191,10 +1191,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "71" + "text": "70" }, "by type": { - "text": "container ship 1, general cargo 8 oil tanker 1, other 61 (2021)" + "text": "container ship 1, general cargo 8, oil tanker 1, other 60 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1205,7 +1205,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Tunisian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Tunisiennes, FAT): Tunisian Army (includes Air Defense Force), Tunisian Navy, Tunisia Air Force; Ministry of Interior: National Police, National Guard (2022)", + "text": "Tunisian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Tunisiennes, FAT): Tunisian Army (includes Air Defense Force), Tunisian Navy, Tunisia Air Force; Ministry of Interior: National Police, National Guard (2023)", "note": "note: the National Police has primary responsibility for law enforcement in the major cities, while the National Guard (gendarmerie) oversees border security and patrols smaller towns and rural areas" }, "Military expenditures": { @@ -1239,7 +1239,7 @@ "text": "325 Central African Republic (MINUSCA); 100 Mali (MINUSMA) (May 2022)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "as of 2022, the Tunisian military’s primary operational areas of focus were counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and border security; it was conducting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations against al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Islamic State of ash-Sham (ISIS)-linked militants who have been fighting a low-intensity insurgency, mostly in the mountainous region along the border with Algeria, particularly the Chaambi Mountains near the city of Kasserine; the military maintained the lead role for security in this area and also routinely conducted joint operations with Algerian security forces against these groups, as well to counter smuggling and trafficking activities; the military in recent years also has increased its role in securing the southern border against militant activity, smuggling, and trafficking from war-torn Libya; since 2015, Tunisia has constructed a complex structure of berms, trenches, and water-filled moats, complemented by electronic surveillance equipment such as motion detectors, ground surveillance radars, and infrared sensors along the 220-kilometer border with Libya; in the remote southern areas of the border with Libya, buffer/exclusion zones have also been established where the military has the lead for counterterrorism efforts; outside of these border areas, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) has the lead responsibility for counter-terrorism in Tunisia, particularly for urban areas; the National Police Anti-Terrorism Brigade (BAT) and the National Guard Special Unit have the lead for MOI counterterrorism operations

Tunisia has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments (2022)" + "text": "as of 2022, the Tunisian military’s primary operational areas of focus were counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and border security; it was conducting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations against al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Islamic State of ash-Sham (ISIS)-linked militants who have been fighting a low-intensity insurgency, mostly in the mountainous region along the border with Algeria, particularly the Chaambi Mountains near the city of Kasserine; the military maintained the lead role for security in this area and also routinely conducted joint operations with Algerian security forces against these groups, as well to counter smuggling and trafficking activities; the military in recent years also has increased its role in securing the southern border against militant activity, smuggling, and trafficking from war-torn Libya; since 2015, Tunisia has constructed a complex structure of berms, trenches, and water-filled moats, complemented by electronic surveillance equipment such as motion detectors, ground surveillance radars, and infrared sensors along the 220-kilometer border with Libya; in the remote southern areas of the border with Libya, buffer/exclusion zones have also been established where the military has the lead for counterterrorism efforts; outside of these border areas, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) has the lead responsibility for counter-terrorism in Tunisia, particularly for urban areas; the National Police Anti-Terrorism Brigade (BAT) and the National Guard Special Unit have the lead for MOI counterterrorism operations

Tunisia has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation (2022)" } }, "Terrorism": { diff --git a/africa/tz.json b/africa/tz.json index 076a7e0d..a2325af5 100644 --- a/africa/tz.json +++ b/africa/tz.json @@ -1172,10 +1172,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "13,141,527 (2020 est.)" + "text": "20.48 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "22% (2020 est.)" + "text": "32% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1275,10 +1275,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "314" + "text": "322" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 4, container ship 6, general cargo 144, oil tanker 49, other 111 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 4, container ship 9, general cargo 148, oil tanker 46, other 115 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1341,7 +1341,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": " 126,159 (Burundi), 79,823 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2023)" + "text": "126,238 (Burundi), 79,823 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2023)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/africa/ug.json b/africa/ug.json index 92620700..0a56d8d0 100644 --- a/africa/ug.json +++ b/africa/ug.json @@ -1147,10 +1147,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "9,148,200 (2020 est.)" + "text": "4.6 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "20% (2020 est.)" + "text": "10% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { diff --git a/africa/wa.json b/africa/wa.json index 8a140967..1c21f39e 100644 --- a/africa/wa.json +++ b/africa/wa.json @@ -487,13 +487,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "73 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "70 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "14 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "10 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "201 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "201 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1137,10 +1137,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "1,041,776 (2020 est.)" + "text": "1.325 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "41% (2020 est.)" + "text": "53% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1225,10 +1225,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "14" + "text": "15" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 1, other 13 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 1, other 14 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/wz.json b/africa/wz.json index 9a6ba196..277316c9 100644 --- a/africa/wz.json +++ b/africa/wz.json @@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ "text": "South Africa 94% (2017)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "soft drink concentrates, sugar, timber, cotton yarn, refrigerators, citrus, and canned fruit" + "text": "carbonated drink mixtures, sugar, gold, industrial additives, clothing, lumber (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { diff --git a/africa/za.json b/africa/za.json index 5a85f4be..fec03e30 100644 --- a/africa/za.json +++ b/africa/za.json @@ -1145,10 +1145,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "3,676,791 (2020 est.)" + "text": "3.99 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "20% (2020 est.)" + "text": "21% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ "text": "2" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 1, oil tanker 1 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 1, oil tanker 1 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/africa/zi.json b/africa/zi.json index 67c6404c..abec3f15 100644 --- a/africa/zi.json +++ b/africa/zi.json @@ -1133,10 +1133,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "4,310,249 (2020 est.)" + "text": "5.6 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "29% (2020 est.)" + "text": "35% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { diff --git a/antarctica/fs.json b/antarctica/fs.json index 8df6281e..daa1624c 100644 --- a/antarctica/fs.json +++ b/antarctica/fs.json @@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ "text": "2" }, "by type": { - "text": "other 2 (2021)" + "text": "other 2 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/aq.json b/australia-oceania/aq.json index d7f36950..ffd37cb6 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/aq.json +++ b/australia-oceania/aq.json @@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ } }, "Flag description": { - "text": "blue, with a white triangle edged in red that is based on the fly side and extends to the hoist side; a brown and white American bald eagle flying toward the hoist side is carrying 2 traditional Samoan symbols of authority, a war club known as a \"fa'alaufa'i\" (upper; left talon), and a coconut-fiber fly whisk known as a \"fue\" (lower; right talon); the combination of symbols broadly mimics that seen on the US Great Seal and reflects the relationship between the US and American Samoa" + "text": "a large white triangle edged in red that is based on the fly side and extends to the hoist side and is charged with an eagle, all on a blue field; the red, white, and blue colors are those traditionally used by both the United States and Samoa; the brown and white American bald eagle flies toward the hoist side and carries 2 traditional Samoan symbols of authority, a war club known as a \"fa'alaufa'i\" (upper; left talon), and a coconut-fiber fly whisk known as a \"fue\" (lower; right talon); the combination of symbols broadly mimics that seen on the US Great Seal and reflects the relationship between the US and American Samoa" }, "National symbol(s)": { "text": "a fue (coconut fiber fly whisk; representing wisdom) crossed with a to'oto'o (staff; representing authority); national colors: red, white, blue" diff --git a/australia-oceania/as.json b/australia-oceania/as.json index eb21d14e..ebfd0420 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/as.json +++ b/australia-oceania/as.json @@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ "note": "note: Data are in current year dollars and do not include illicit exports or re-exports." }, "Exports - partners": { - "text": "China 39%, Japan 15%, South Korea 7%, India 5% (2019)" + "text": "China 40%, Japan 14%, South Korea 9%, India 6%, Taiwan 4% (2021)" }, "Exports - commodities": { "text": "iron ore, coal, natural gas, gold, wheat (2021)" @@ -922,10 +922,10 @@ } }, "Imports - partners": { - "text": "China 25%, United States 12%, Japan 7%, Germany 5%, Thailand 5% (2019)" + "text": "China 28%, United States 10%, Japan 6%, Germany 5%, Thailand 5% (2021)" }, "Imports - commodities": { - "text": "refined petroleum, cars, crude petroleum, broadcasting equipment, delivery trucks (2019)" + "text": "refined petroleum, cars, delivery trucks, broadcasting equipment, computers and gold (2021)" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2021": { @@ -1239,10 +1239,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "581" + "text": "587" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 2, general cargo 76, oil tanker 7, other 496 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 2, general cargo 77, oil tanker 6, other 502 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/bp.json b/australia-oceania/bp.json index 40329d7d..c7d21505 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/bp.json +++ b/australia-oceania/bp.json @@ -1037,10 +1037,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "80,379 (2019 est.)" + "text": "255,600 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "12% (2019 est.)" + "text": "36% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1112,10 +1112,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "24" + "text": "27" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 8, oil tanker 1, other 15 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 9, oil tanker 1, other 17 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/cq.json b/australia-oceania/cq.json index a150f2b8..c8eb5073 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/cq.json +++ b/australia-oceania/cq.json @@ -761,10 +761,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "17,418 (2016 est.)" + "text": "12,299 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "31% (2016 est.)" + "text": "25.1% (2021 est.)" } } }, @@ -802,14 +802,6 @@ "text": "536 km (2008)" } }, - "Merchant marine": { - "total": { - "text": "1" - }, - "by type": { - "text": "other 1 (2019)" - } - }, "Ports and terminals": { "major seaport(s)": { "text": "Saipan, Tinian, Rota" diff --git a/australia-oceania/cw.json b/australia-oceania/cw.json index 4b1513e2..150af100 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/cw.json +++ b/australia-oceania/cw.json @@ -925,10 +925,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "194" + "text": "189" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 19, container ship 1, general cargo 57, oil tanker 54, other 63 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 20, general cargo 53, oil tanker 51, other 65 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/fj.json b/australia-oceania/fj.json index f9cdc0b2..b6fcd11b 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/fj.json +++ b/australia-oceania/fj.json @@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ "text": "United States 29%, Australia 14%, New Zealand 7%, Japan 6%, Tonga 6% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "water, refined petroleum, fish, raw sugar, gold (2019)" + "text": "water, fuel wood, gold, sugar, refined petroleum, fish (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1150,10 +1150,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "73" + "text": "75" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 20, oil tanker 4, other 49 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 21, oil tanker 4, other 50 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/fm.json b/australia-oceania/fm.json index 8332cdfd..d6b79b1c 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/fm.json +++ b/australia-oceania/fm.json @@ -934,10 +934,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "39,834 (2019 est.)" + "text": "44,000 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "35% (2019 est.)" + "text": "40% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -972,10 +972,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "38" + "text": "37" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 19, oil tanker 4, other 15 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 19, oil tanker 4, other 14 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/fp.json b/australia-oceania/fp.json index 99e76b2f..7707f6c6 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/fp.json +++ b/australia-oceania/fp.json @@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ "text": "Japan 23.1%, Hong Kong 21.5%, Kyrgyzstan 15.9%, US 15.9%, France 12.4% (2017)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "cultured pearls, coconut products, mother-of-pearl, vanilla, shark meat" + "text": "paintings, pearls, tuna, aircraft parts, coconut oil, vanilla, electrical panels (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2014": { @@ -970,10 +970,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "24" + "text": "25" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 14, other 10 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 14, other 11 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/gq.json b/australia-oceania/gq.json index ded76ce7..ab674208 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/gq.json +++ b/australia-oceania/gq.json @@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ "text": "South Korea 31%, Hong Kong 27%, Taiwan 18%, Philippines 7% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "scrap iron, electric batteries, gas turbines, scrap copper, beauty products (2019)" + "text": "scrap iron, scrap copper, boring/sinking machinery, leather handbags, rubber, scrap aluminum (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2016": { @@ -908,7 +908,7 @@ "text": "3" }, "by type": { - "text": "other 3 (2021)" + "text": "other 3 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/kr.json b/australia-oceania/kr.json index a95444fe..399574b1 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/kr.json +++ b/australia-oceania/kr.json @@ -1074,10 +1074,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "88" + "text": "90" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 3, general cargo 35, oil tanker 12, other 38 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 3, general cargo 35, oil tanker 11, other 41 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/nc.json b/australia-oceania/nc.json index 649fe0e2..66135a65 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nc.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nc.json @@ -899,10 +899,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "222,466 (2019 est.)" + "text": "237,800 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "82% (2019 est.)" + "text": "82% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -961,10 +961,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "24" + "text": "23" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 5, oil tanker 1, other 18 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 5, oil tanker 1, other 17 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/ne.json b/australia-oceania/ne.json index f15e8f9e..9aa59c43 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ne.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ne.json @@ -744,10 +744,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "1,292 (2019 est.)" + "text": "1,512 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "80% (2019 est.)" + "text": "79.6% (2021 est.)" } } }, @@ -776,10 +776,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "69" + "text": "71" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 3, container ship 2, general cargo 25, oil tanker 7, other 32 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 4, container ship 2, general cargo 29, oil tanker 4, other 32 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/nf.json b/australia-oceania/nf.json index 9995dac9..8921eeaf 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nf.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nf.json @@ -512,10 +512,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "612 (2016 est.)" + "text": "806 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "35% (2016 est.)" + "text": "46.1% (2021 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/nh.json b/australia-oceania/nh.json index b436f284..a4a5837e 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nh.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nh.json @@ -1035,10 +1035,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "77,969 (2019 est.)" + "text": "211,200 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "26% (2019 est.)" + "text": "66% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1109,10 +1109,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "306" + "text": "331" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 18, container ship 2, general cargo 55, oil tanker 2, other 229 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 16, container ship 4, general cargo 87, oil tanker 2, other 222 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/nr.json b/australia-oceania/nr.json index 7d4b94a6..b852b585 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nr.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nr.json @@ -944,10 +944,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "6,136 (2019 est.)" + "text": "10,920 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "57% (2019 est.)" + "text": "84% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1004,7 +1004,7 @@ "text": "3" }, "by type": { - "text": "oil tanker 1, other 2 (2021)" + "text": "other 3 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/nz.json b/australia-oceania/nz.json index dfd52955..07069374 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nz.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nz.json @@ -448,13 +448,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "810 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "500 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "1.184 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1.18 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "3.207 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "3.2 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1106,10 +1106,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "4,677,556 (2020 est.)" + "text": "4.896 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "92% (2020 est.)" + "text": "96% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1200,10 +1200,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "115" + "text": "116" }, "by type": { - "text": "container ship 1, general cargo 12, oil tanker 4, other 98 (2021)" + "text": "container ship 1, general cargo 12, oil tanker 5, other 98 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/pc.json b/australia-oceania/pc.json index e8787915..660a0d37 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/pc.json +++ b/australia-oceania/pc.json @@ -502,10 +502,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "50 (2022 est.)" + "text": "37 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "100% (2018 est.)" + "text": "96.2% (2021 est.)" } }, "Communications - note": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/ps.json b/australia-oceania/ps.json index 6ccd0597..e3a0d8a3 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ps.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ps.json @@ -893,10 +893,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "7,650 (2016 est.)" + "text": "6,696 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "36% (2016 est.)" + "text": "37.2% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -952,10 +952,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "264" + "text": "304" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 16, container ship 7, general cargo 107, oil tanker 40, other 94 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 29, container ship 6, general cargo 137, oil tanker 43, other 89 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/rm.json b/australia-oceania/rm.json index cdb938d7..dcfec5ca 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/rm.json +++ b/australia-oceania/rm.json @@ -904,10 +904,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "22,929 (2019 est.)" + "text": "16,254 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "39% (2019 est.)" + "text": "38.7% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -978,10 +978,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "3,817" + "text": "4,042" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 1,733, container ship 248, general cargo 66, oil tanker 970, other 800 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 1,879 container ship 276, general cargo 62, oil tanker 1023, other 802 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/tl.json b/australia-oceania/tl.json index c955b190..04d75225 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/tl.json +++ b/australia-oceania/tl.json @@ -564,10 +564,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "805 (2019 est.)" + "text": "800 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "58% (2019 est.)" + "text": "58.3% (2021 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/tn.json b/australia-oceania/tn.json index ba9b8bba..a2d6cf51 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/tn.json +++ b/australia-oceania/tn.json @@ -1046,10 +1046,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "42,844 (2019 est.)" + "text": "73,700 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "41% (2019 est.)" + "text": "67% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@ "text": "32" }, "by type": { - "text": "container ship 4, general cargo 13, oil tanker 1, other 14 (2021)" + "text": "container ship 4, general cargo 13, oil tanker 1, other 14 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/tv.json b/australia-oceania/tv.json index 67c1d915..4c21b48d 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/tv.json +++ b/australia-oceania/tv.json @@ -891,10 +891,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "5,711 (2019 est.)" + "text": "7,920 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "49% (2019 est.)" + "text": "49% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -931,10 +931,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "245" + "text": "260" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 22, container ship 3, general cargo 32, oil tanker 21, other 167 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 23, container ship 3, general cargo 39, oil tanker 24, other 171 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/wf.json b/australia-oceania/wf.json index 46790c8d..0e9abc76 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/wf.json +++ b/australia-oceania/wf.json @@ -644,10 +644,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "1,029 (2019 est.)" + "text": "5,496 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "9% (2019 est.)" + "text": "45.8% (2021 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/australia-oceania/ws.json b/australia-oceania/ws.json index 263488e5..72f33093 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ws.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ws.json @@ -1042,10 +1042,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "67,012 (2019 est.)" + "text": "171,600 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "34% (2019 est.)" + "text": "78% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1098,10 +1098,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "12" + "text": "15" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 3, oil tanker 3, other 6 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 3, oil tanker 5, other 7 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json index 242b8168..5e804903 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json @@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ "text": "1" }, "by type": { - "text": "other 1 (2021)" + "text": "other 1 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json index 5d9fc3a1..c15ebb69 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json @@ -1049,10 +1049,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "677" + "text": "638" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 24, container ship 123, general cargo 473, oil tanker 2, other 55 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 26, container ship 112, general cargo 443, oil tanker 4, other 53 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json index aafd4af6..ab8d7465 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/av.json @@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ "text": "2" }, "by type": { - "text": "other 2 (2021)" + "text": "other 2 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json index cc33144b..b4797681 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json @@ -1080,10 +1080,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "165" + "text": "195" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 46, general cargo 103, other 16 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 61, general cargo 114, other 20 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json index 5f2226ad..460f7418 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json @@ -770,7 +770,8 @@ "text": "Singapore 16%, US 16%, Poland 13%, Germany 12%, Ecuador 10% (2020)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "refined petroleum, ships, aluminum, lobsters and crawfish, styrene polymers (2021)" + "text": "refined petroleum, ships, aluminum, lobsters and crawfish, styrene polymers (2021)", + "note": "note: Bahamian cannabis production remains a significant illicit trade export" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1077,10 +1078,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "1,323" + "text": "1,307" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 333, container ship 45, general cargo 64, oil tanker 224, other 657 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 337, container ship 40, general cargo 63, oil tanker 213, other 654 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json index 698c1265..21045992 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json @@ -1166,10 +1166,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "813" + "text": "817" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 54, container ship 1, general cargo 428, oil tanker 70, other 260 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 51, general cargo 433, oil tanker 67, other 266 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json index 6b33b14c..c4bae618 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json @@ -950,10 +950,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "160" + "text": "139" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 32, container ship 1, general cargo 1, oil tanker 23, other 103 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 29, container ship 3, general cargo 1, oil tanker 20, other 86 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json index ec7934c0..fe8e965f 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json @@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ "text": "11" }, "by type": { - "text": "other 11 (2021)" + "text": "other 11 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json index d31a3259..51818149 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json @@ -1191,10 +1191,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "59" + "text": "64" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 12, oil tanker 7, other 40 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 13, oil tanker 10, other 41 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json index aea5985a..84b8ef99 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json @@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ "text": "Saudi Arabia 47%, Qatar 5% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "medical instruments, pharmaceuticals, low-voltage protection equipment, tropical fruits, bandages (2019)" + "text": "medical instruments, low-voltage protection equipment, sutures, soap, bandages (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -991,10 +991,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "93" + "text": "84" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 30, oil tanker 19, other 44 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 31, oil tanker 13, other 40 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json index f261bb47..5cdb8fa7 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json @@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ "text": "United States 54%, Switzerland 8%, Canada 5%, India 5%, China 5% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "gold, medical instruments, cigars, low-voltage protection equipment, bananas (2019)" + "text": "gold, medical instruments, cigars, low-voltage protection equipment, iron alloys, clothing (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1233,7 +1233,7 @@ "text": "38" }, "by type": { - "text": "container ship 1, general cargo 2, oil tanker 1, other 34 (2021)" + "text": "container ship 1, general cargo 2, oil tanker 1, other 34 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json index 2b48422e..a8f980f3 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json @@ -897,7 +897,7 @@ "text": "United States 40%, Guatemala 15%, Honduras 15%, Nicaragua 6% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "textiles and apparel, electrical capacitors, plastic lids, raw sugar, toilet paper (2019)" + "text": "clothing, electrical capacitors, plastic lids, sugar, packaged medicines, toilet paper (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1221,10 +1221,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "2" + "text": "4" }, "by type": { - "text": "other 2 (2021)" + "text": "other 4 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json index c02c7889..c015f438 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json @@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "10 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "10 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { "text": "0 cubic meters (2017 est.)" @@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ "text": "United States 40%, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 7%, Saint Lucia 7%, France 6%, Netherlands 5%, Germany 5%, Ireland 5%, Antigua and Barbuda 5% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "fish, nutmeg, cocoa beans, fruits, wheat, toilet paper (2019)" + "text": "nutmeg, tuna, cocoa beans, fruits, nuts, toilet paper, acrylic paints, beer (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1037,7 +1037,7 @@ "text": "6" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 3, other 3 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 3, other 3 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json index 750059c6..179d4fd5 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json @@ -477,13 +477,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "840 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "840 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "600 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "600 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "1.89 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "1.89 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -908,7 +908,7 @@ "text": "United States 33%, El Salvador 12%, Honduras 8%, Mexico 5%, Nicaragua 5% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "bananas, raw sugar, coffee, cardamom, palm oil (2019)" + "text": "clothing, bananas, coffee, palm oil, cardamoms, raw sugar, iron alloys (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1242,7 +1242,7 @@ "text": "9" }, "by type": { - "text": "oil tanker 1, other 8 (2021)" + "text": "oil tanker 1, other 8 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json index 97ab369a..ccf1639b 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

The native Taino - who inhabited the island of Hispaniola when Christopher COLUMBUS first landed on it in 1492 - were virtually wiped out by Spanish settlers within 25 years. In the early 17th century, the French established a presence on Hispaniola. In 1697, Spain ceded to the French the western third of the island, which later became Haiti. The French colony, based on forestry and sugar-related industries, became one of the wealthiest in the Caribbean but relied heavily on the forced labor of enslaved Africans and environmentally degrading practices. In the late 18th century, Toussaint L'OUVERTURE led a revolution of Haiti's nearly half a million slaves that ended France's rule on the island. After a prolonged struggle, and under the leadership of Jean-Jacques DESSALINES, Haiti became the first country in the world led by former slaves after declaring its independence in 1804, but it was forced to pay an indemnity of 100 million francs (equivalent to $21 billion USD in March 2022) to France for more than a century and was shunned by other countries for nearly 40 years. On 12 July 1862, the US officially recognized Haiti, but foreign economic influence and internal political instability induced the US to occupy Haiti from 1915-1934. Subsequently, Francois \"Papa Doc\" DUVALIER and then his son Jean-Claude \"Baby Doc\" DUVALIER led repressive and corrupt regimes that ruled Haiti in 1957-1971 and 1971-1986, respectively. President Jovenel MOISE was assassinated on 7 July 2021, leading the country further into an extra-constitutional governance structure and contributing to the country’s growing fragility. President MOISE's five-year term would have ended on 7 February 2022; his assassination plunged Haiti deeper into a political crisis that was not anticipated in its constitution. Thus, on 20 July 2021, the Government of Haiti installed Ariel HENRY - whom President MOISE had nominated - as prime minister. As of March 2022, Haiti had no president, no parliamentary quorum, and a dysfunctional high court due to a lack of judges. Haiti has long been plagued by natural disasters. In January 2010, a major 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti with an epicenter about 25 km (15 mi) west of the capital, Port-au-Prince. Estimates are that over 300,000 people were killed and some 1.5 million left homeless. The earthquake was assessed as the worst in this region over the last 200 years. A 7.2 magnitude earthquake hit Haiti’s southern peninsula in August 2021, causing well over 2,000 deaths; an estimated 500,000 required emergency humanitarian aid. Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, as well as one of the most unequal in wealth distribution.

" + "text": "

The native Taino - who inhabited the island of Hispaniola when Christopher COLUMBUS first landed on it in 1492 - were virtually wiped out by Spanish settlers within 25 years. In the early 17th century, the French established a presence on Hispaniola. In 1697, Spain ceded to the French the western third of the island, which later became Haiti. The French colony, based on forestry and sugar-related industries, became one of the wealthiest in the Caribbean but relied heavily on the forced labor of enslaved Africans and environmentally degrading practices. In the late 18th century, Toussaint L'OUVERTURE led a revolution of Haiti's nearly half a million slaves that ended France's rule on the island. After a prolonged struggle, and under the leadership of Jean-Jacques DESSALINES, Haiti became the first country in the world led by former slaves after declaring its independence in 1804, but it was forced to pay an indemnity of 100 million francs (equivalent to $22 billion USD in March 2023) to France for more than a century and was shunned by other countries for nearly 40 years. On 12 July 1862, the US officially recognized Haiti, but foreign economic influence and internal political instability induced the US to occupy Haiti from 1915-1934. Subsequently, Francois \"Papa Doc\" DUVALIER and then his son Jean-Claude \"Baby Doc\" DUVALIER led repressive and corrupt regimes that ruled Haiti in 1957-1971 and 1971-1986, respectively. President Jovenel MOISE was assassinated on 7 July 2021, leading the country further into an extra-constitutional governance structure and contributing to the country’s growing fragility. On 20 July 2021, the Government of Haiti installed Ariel HENRY - whom President MOISE had nominated shortly before his death - as prime minister. As of March 2023, Haiti had no sitting elected officials. The country has long been plagued by natural disasters. In January 2010, a major 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti with an epicenter about 25 km (15 mi) west of the capital, Port-au-Prince. Estimates are that over 300,000 people were killed and some 1.5 million left homeless. The earthquake was assessed as the worst in this region over the last 200 years. A 7.2 magnitude earthquake hit Haiti’s southern peninsula in August 2021, causing well over 2,000 deaths; an estimated 500,000 required emergency humanitarian aid. Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, as well as one of the most unequal in wealth distribution.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -473,13 +473,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "190 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "190 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "50 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "50 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "1.2 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "1.21 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1183,7 +1183,7 @@ "text": "4" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 3, other 1 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 3, other 1 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json index acb962c5..1148c788 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json @@ -469,13 +469,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "320 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "320 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "111 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "111 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "1.1 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "1.18 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ "text": "505" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 1, general cargo 244, oil tanker 82, other 178 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 246, oil tanker 82, other 177 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json index 6fd61acd..0a485c8a 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json @@ -438,13 +438,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "140 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "140 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "1.1 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1.1 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "114 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "110 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1147,10 +1147,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "43" + "text": "36" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 1, container ship 5, general cargo 9, oil tanker 1, other 27 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 1, general cargo 9, oil tanker 1, other 25 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json index 361fb3f3..7510563b 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json @@ -820,10 +820,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "2,744 (2019 est.)" + "text": "2,473 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "55% (2019 est.)" + "text": "56.2% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/nn.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/nn.json index d0d9ce86..a0b6d6a5 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/nn.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/nn.json @@ -610,10 +610,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "39,100 (March 2022)" + "text": "39,089 (2022)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "89.5% (March 2022)" + "text": "89.5% (2022)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json index 9d84253c..14852ae9 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json @@ -455,13 +455,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "286 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "286 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "73.6 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "50 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "1.185 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1.08 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1101,10 +1101,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "2,981,049 (2020 est.)" + "text": "3.933 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "45% (2020 est.)" + "text": "57% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1184,7 +1184,7 @@ "text": "5" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 1, oil tanker 1, other 3 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 1, oil tanker 1, other 3 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json index 551e5ac3..70b56167 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json @@ -473,13 +473,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "759.1 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "760 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "6.2 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "10 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "446.1 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "450 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1130,10 +1130,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "2,761,452 (2020 est.)" + "text": "2.992 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "64% (2020 est.)" + "text": "68% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1219,10 +1219,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "7,980" + "text": "8,025" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 2,697, container ship 643, general cargo 1,381, oil tanker 771, other 2,488 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 2,690, container ship 662, general cargo 1,418, oil tanker 785, other 2,470 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/rn.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/rn.json index f0583583..19939dbc 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/rn.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/rn.json @@ -486,10 +486,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "19,300 (March 2022 est.)" + "text": "19,284 (2022 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "48.5% (March 2022 est.)" + "text": "48.5% (2022 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json index 9c838cc1..3115688b 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json @@ -919,10 +919,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "2,559,600 (2020 est.)" + "text": "2,564,100 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "78% (2020 est.)" + "text": "77.7% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json index 99a1537c..93609f86 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json @@ -977,10 +977,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "42,796 (2019 est.)" + "text": "37,920 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "81% (2019 est.)" + "text": "79% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1031,10 +1031,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "244" + "text": "282" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 6, container ship 7, general cargo 45, oil tanker 53, other 133 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 9, container ship 11, general cargo 64, oil tanker 46, other 152 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json index 5382bd25..688484bc 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/st.json @@ -1027,10 +1027,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "97,323 (2020 est.)" + "text": "140,400 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "53% (2020 est.)" + "text": "78% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/tb.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/tb.json index 2b379c10..adb513ad 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/tb.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/tb.json @@ -429,10 +429,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "7,128 (2020 est.)" + "text": "7,077 (2022 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "72% (2020 est.)" + "text": "71.3% (2022 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json index 95497c01..41a5a02f 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/td.json @@ -1027,10 +1027,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "1,074,126 (2019 est.)" + "text": "1.185 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "77% (2019 est.)" + "text": "79% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1090,10 +1090,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "105" + "text": "102" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 1, other 104 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 1, other 101 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json index b8561e05..d45441cb 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/tk.json @@ -813,6 +813,14 @@ }, "Internet country code": { "text": ".tc" + }, + "Internet users": { + "total": { + "text": "37,008 (2022)" + }, + "percent of population": { + "text": "93.5% (2022)" + } } }, "Transportation": { @@ -871,7 +879,7 @@ "text": "3" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 1, other 2 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 1, other 2 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json index 62ed50f3..681f6ce9 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json @@ -796,10 +796,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "63" + "text": "59" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 6, oil tanker 1, other 56 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 5, oil tanker 1, other 53 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json index 8ffb68db..6c9052e5 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "Resistance by native Caribs prevented colonization on Saint Vincent until 1719. Disputed by France and the UK for most of the 18th century, the island was ceded to the latter in 1783. The British prized Saint Vincent due to its fertile soil, which allowed for thriving slave-run plantations of sugar, coffee, indigo, tobacco, cotton, and cocoa. In 1834, the British abolished slavery. Immigration of indentured servants eased the ensuing labor shortage, as did subsequent Portuguese immigrants from Madeira and East Indian laborers. Conditions remained harsh for both former slaves and immigrant agricultural workers, however, as depressed world sugar prices kept the economy stagnant until the early 1900s. The economy then went into a period of decline with many landowners abandoning their estates and leaving the land to be cultivated by liberated slaves. Between 1960 and 1962, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was a separate administrative unit of the Federation of the West Indies. Autonomy was granted in 1969 and independence in 1979. In April 2021, the explosive eruption of the La Soufrière volcano in the north of Saint Vincent destroyed much of Saint Vincent’s most productive agricultural lands. Unlike most of its tourism-dependent neighbors, the Vincentian economy is primarily agricultural. The US provided $4.7 million in humanitarian support after the eruption." + "text": "Resistance by native Caribs prevented colonization on Saint Vincent until 1719. Disputed by France and the UK for most of the 18th century, the island was ceded to Britain in 1783. The British prized Saint Vincent due to its fertile soil, which allowed for thriving slave-run plantations of sugar, coffee, indigo, tobacco, cotton, and cocoa. In 1834, the British abolished slavery. Immigration of indentured servants eased the ensuing labor shortage, as did subsequent Portuguese immigrants from Madeira and East Indian laborers. Conditions remained harsh for both former slaves and immigrant agricultural workers, however, as depressed world sugar prices kept the economy stagnant until the early 1900s. The economy then went into a period of decline with many landowners abandoning their estates and leaving the land to be cultivated by liberated slaves. Between 1960 and 1962, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was a separate administrative unit of the Federation of the West Indies. Autonomy was granted in 1969 and independence in 1979. In April 2021, the explosive eruption of the La Soufrière volcano in the north of Saint Vincent destroyed much of Saint Vincent’s most productive agricultural lands. Unlike most of its tourism-dependent neighbors, the Vincentian economy is primarily agricultural. The US provided $4.7 million in humanitarian support after the eruption." } }, "Geography": { @@ -1001,10 +1001,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "24,408 (2020 est.)" + "text": "85,000 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "22% (2020 est.)" + "text": "85% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1055,10 +1055,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "792" + "text": "832" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 27, container ship 17, general cargo 155, oil tanker 16, other 577 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 32, container ship 17, general cargo 148, oil tanker 14, other 621 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json index dedb2ffd..77eff384 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/vi.json @@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ "text": "30" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 3, other 27 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 3, other 27 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json index 0a1aaf9a..f606c1dd 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/vq.json @@ -819,10 +819,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "68,268 (2019 est.)" + "text": "67,508 (2022 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "64% (2019 est.)" + "text": "64.8% (2022 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/central-asia/kg.json b/central-asia/kg.json index efbd445c..f07b260c 100644 --- a/central-asia/kg.json +++ b/central-asia/kg.json @@ -466,13 +466,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "224 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "220 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "336 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "340 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "7.1 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "7.1 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { diff --git a/central-asia/kz.json b/central-asia/kz.json index b18c20c8..4090859e 100644 --- a/central-asia/kz.json +++ b/central-asia/kz.json @@ -471,13 +471,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "2.347 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "4.62 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "6.984 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "4.54 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "15.12 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "15.4 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1239,10 +1239,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "119" + "text": "120" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 3, oil tanker 7, other 109 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 3, oil tanker 7, other 110 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-asia/rs.json b/central-asia/rs.json index 4f350553..fc8ed5e7 100644 --- a/central-asia/rs.json +++ b/central-asia/rs.json @@ -1178,10 +1178,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "122,488,468 (2020 est.)" + "text": "132 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "85% (2020 est.)" + "text": "88% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1284,10 +1284,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "2,873" + "text": "2,917" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 13, container ship 17, general cargo 946, oil tanker 406, other 1,491 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 12, container ship 18, general cargo 987, oil tanker 392, other 1,508 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-asia/ti.json b/central-asia/ti.json index e89899e4..0a9969cc 100644 --- a/central-asia/ti.json +++ b/central-asia/ti.json @@ -1101,10 +1101,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "3,013,256 (July 2022 est.)" + "text": "3,009,054 (2022 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "30.4% (July 2022 est.)" + "text": "30.4% (2022 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { diff --git a/central-asia/tx.json b/central-asia/tx.json index cbdccce7..800b5951 100644 --- a/central-asia/tx.json +++ b/central-asia/tx.json @@ -1091,10 +1091,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "1,247,940 (July 2022 est.)" + "text": "1,563,023 (2022 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "25.3% (July 2022 est.)" + "text": "25.3% (2022 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1185,10 +1185,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "73" + "text": "72" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 6, oil tanker 8, other 59 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 6, oil tanker 8, other 58 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/central-asia/uz.json b/central-asia/uz.json index d719bcea..26140dcc 100644 --- a/central-asia/uz.json +++ b/central-asia/uz.json @@ -1108,10 +1108,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "17,161,534 (July 2022 est.)" + "text": "26.18 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "50.1% (July 2022 est.)" + "text": "77% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json index bb84129e..110c8417 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json @@ -930,7 +930,8 @@ "text": "China 24%, Thailand 24%, Japan 7%, Germany 5% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "natural gas, clothing products, dried legumes, precious stones, yttrium, scandium, rice, corn  (2021)" + "text": "natural gas, clothing products, dried legumes, precious stones, yttrium, scandium, rice, corn (2021)", + "note": "note: Burmese methamphetamine production and opiate production remain significant illicit trade commodities" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2019": { @@ -1261,10 +1262,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "95" + "text": "102" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 2, general cargo 39, oil tanker 5, other 49 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 1, general cargo 45, oil tanker 5, other 51 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1308,7 +1309,7 @@ "text": "18-35 years of age (men) and 18-27 years of age (women) for voluntary military service; no conscription (a 2010 law reintroducing conscription has not yet entered into force); 2-year service obligation; male (ages 18-45) and female (ages 18-35) professionals (including doctors, engineers, mechanics) serve up to 3 years; service terms may be stretched to 5 years in an officially declared emergency (2022)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "since the country’s founding, the Tatmadaw has been heavily involved in domestic politics and the national economy; it ran the country for five decades following a military coup in 1962; prior to the most recent coup in 2021, the military already controlled three key security ministries (Defense, Border, and Home Affairs), one of two vice presidential appointments, 25% of the parliamentary seats, and had a proxy political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP); it owns and operates two business conglomerates that have over 100 subsidiaries; the business activities of these conglomerates include banking and insurance, hotels, tourism, jade and ruby mining, timber, construction, real estate, and the production of palm oil, sugar, soap, cement, beverages, drinking water, coal, and gas; some of the companies supply goods and services to the military, such as food, clothing, insurance, and cellphone service; the military also manages a film industry, publishing houses, and television stations

the Tatmadaw's primary operational focus is internal security, and it is conducting widespread counterinsurgency operations against anti-regime forces that launched an armed rebellion following the 2021 coup and an array of ethnically-based separatist groups, some of which have considerable military capabilities; it has been accused of  committing atrocities in the conduct of its campaign against the insurgency

the Army is the dominant service and largely configured for counterinsurgency operations, although it has some conventional warfare capabilities; its principal combat forces are organized into 10 centrally-commanded light infantry/rapid reaction divisions, approximately 20 regionally-based, divisional-sized “military operations commands,” and several brigade-sized “regional operations commands”; the Army’s insurgency operations are supported by the National Police, which has dozens of paramilitary combat police battalions; the Air Force also has a large counterinsurgency role with more than 100 combat-capable aircraft and helicopters, mostly ground attack aircraft and helicopter gunships, complemented by some multipurpose fighters; the Navy has traditionally been a coastal defense force, and the majority of the combat fleet consists of fast attack and patrol vessels; however, in recent years the Navy has expanded its blue water capabilities and has a small force of frigates and corvettes, as well as a landing platform docking (LPD) amphibious assault ship and 2 attack submarines acquired since 2020

the military is supported by hundreds of pro-government militias; some are integrated within the Tatmadaw’s command structure as Border Guard Forces, which are organized as battalions with a mix of militia forces, ethnic armed groups, and government soldiers that are armed, supplied, and paid by the Tatmadaw; other pro-military government militias are not integrated within the Tatmadaw command structure but receive direction and some support from the military and are recognized as government militias; a third type of pro-government militias are small community-based units that are armed, coordinated, and trained by local Tatmadaw forces and activated as needed; the military junta has raised new militia units to help combat the popular uprising

ethnic-based armed groups have been fighting for self-rule against the Burmese Government since 1948; there are approximately 20 such groups operating in Burma with strengths of a few hundred up to more than 20,000 estimated fighters; some are organized along military lines with \"brigades\" and \"divisions\" and armed with heavy weaponry, including artillery; they control large tracts of the country’s territory, primarily in the border regions; key groups include the United Wa State Army, Karen National Union, Kachin Independence Army, Arakan Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army

the rebel National Unity Government claims its armed wing, the People's Defense Force (PDF), has more than 60,000 fighters loosely organized into battalions; in addition, several armed ethnic groups have added their support to anti-junta resistance groups or joined forces with local units of the PDF (2023)" + "text": "since the country’s founding, the Tatmadaw has been heavily involved in domestic politics and the national economy; it ran the country for five decades following a military coup in 1962; prior to the most recent coup in 2021, the military already controlled three key security ministries (Defense, Border, and Home Affairs), one of two vice presidential appointments, 25% of the parliamentary seats, and had a proxy political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP); it owns and operates two business conglomerates that have over 100 subsidiaries; the business activities of these conglomerates include banking and insurance, hotels, tourism, jade and ruby mining, timber, construction, real estate, and the production of palm oil, sugar, soap, cement, beverages, drinking water, coal, and gas; some of the companies supply goods and services to the military, such as food, clothing, insurance, and cellphone service; the military also manages a film industry, publishing houses, and television stations

the Tatmadaw's primary operational focus is internal security, and it is conducting widespread counterinsurgency operations against anti-regime forces that launched an armed rebellion following the 2021 coup and an array of ethnically-based separatist groups, some of which have considerable military capabilities; it has been accused of  committing atrocities in the conduct of its campaign against the insurgency

the Army is the dominant service and largely configured for counterinsurgency operations, although it has some conventional warfare capabilities; its principal combat forces are organized into 10 centrally-commanded light infantry/rapid reaction divisions, approximately 20 regionally-based, divisional-sized “military operations commands,” and several brigade-sized “regional operations commands”; the Army’s insurgency operations are supported by the National Police, which has dozens of paramilitary combat police battalions; the Air Force also has a large counterinsurgency role with more than 100 combat-capable aircraft and helicopters, mostly ground attack aircraft and helicopter gunships, complemented by some multipurpose fighters; the Navy has traditionally been a coastal defense force, and the majority of the combat fleet consists of fast attack and patrol vessels; however, in recent years the Navy has expanded its blue water capabilities and has a small force of frigates and corvettes, as well as a landing platform docking (LPD) amphibious assault ship and 2 attack submarines acquired since 2020

the military is supported by hundreds of pro-government militias; some are integrated within the Tatmadaw’s command structure as Border Guard Forces, which are organized as battalions with a mix of militia forces, ethnic armed groups, and government soldiers that are armed, supplied, and paid by the Tatmadaw; other pro-military government militias are not integrated within the Tatmadaw command structure but receive direction and some support from the military and are recognized as government militias; a third type of pro-government militias are small community-based units that are armed, coordinated, and trained by local Tatmadaw forces and activated as needed; the military junta has raised new militia units to help combat the popular uprising

ethnic-based armed groups have been fighting for self-rule against the Burmese Government since 1948; there are approximately 20 such groups operating in Burma with strengths of a few hundred up to more than 25,000 estimated fighters; some are organized along military lines with \"brigades\" and \"divisions\" and armed with heavy weaponry, including artillery; they control large tracts of the country’s territory, primarily in the border regions; key groups include the United Wa State Army, Karen National Union, Kachin Independence Army, Arakan Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army

the rebel National Unity Government claims its armed wing, the People's Defense Force (PDF), has more than 60,000 fighters loosely organized into battalions; in addition, several armed ethnic groups have added their support to anti-junta resistance groups or joined forces with local units of the PDF (2023)" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json index bfd50b92..0cf0e343 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json @@ -1109,10 +1109,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "96" + "text": "98" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 18, oil tanker 3, other 75 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 18, oil tanker 3, other 77 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json index 5928ea5c..3e394d1a 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ "text": "previous 1947; latest promulgated 21 September 1993" }, "amendments": { - "text": "proposed by the monarch, by the prime minister, or by the president of the National Assembly if supported by one fourth of the Assembly membership; passage requires two-thirds majority of the Assembly membership; constitutional articles on the multiparty democratic form of government and the monarchy cannot be amended; amended 1999, 2008, 2014, 2018, and 2021" + "text": "proposed by the monarch, by the prime minister, or by the president of the National Assembly if supported by one fourth of the Assembly membership; passage requires two-thirds majority of the Assembly membership; constitutional articles on the multiparty democratic form of government and the monarchy cannot be amended; amended 1999, 2008, 2014, 2018, and 2022" } }, "Legal system": { @@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ "text": "
Senate - last held on 25 February 2018 (next to be held in 2024); National Assembly - last held on 29 July 2018 (next to be held in July 2023)" }, "election results": { - "text": " 
Senate - percent of vote by party - CPP 96%, FUNCINPEC 2.4%, KNUP 1.6%; seats by party - CPP 58; composition - men 53, women 9, percent of women 14.5%
National Assembly - percent of vote by party - CPP 76.9%, FUNCINPEC 5.9%, LDP 4.9%, Khmer Will Party 3.4%, other 8.9%; seats by party - CPP 125; composition - men 100, women 25, percent of women 20%; note - total Parliament of Cambodia percent of women 18.2%" + "text": " 
Senate - percent of vote by party - CPP 96%, FUNCINPEC 2.4%, KNUP 1.6%; seats by party - CPP 58; FUNCINPEC 4; composition - percent of women 14.5%
National Assembly - percent of vote by party - CPP 76.9%, FUNCINPEC 5.9%, LDP 4.9%, Khmer Will Party 3.4%, other 8.9%; seats by party - CPP 125; composition - men 100, women 25, percent of women 20%; note - total Parliament of Cambodia percent of women 18.2%" } }, "Judicial branch": { @@ -609,8 +609,8 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Candlelight Party or CP (the latest incarnation of the Sam Rainsy Party or SRP and the former Human Rights Party or HRP, which joined to form the Cambodia National Rescue Party or CNRP in 2012; the CNRP was dissolved in 2017)
Cambodian People's Party or CPP [HUN SEN]
Khmer Will Party [KONG MONIKA]
Khmer National Unity Party or KNUP (an offshoot of FUNCINPEC) [NHEK BUN CHHAY]
League for Democracy Party or LDP [KHEM Veasna]
National United Front for Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia or FUNCINPEC [Prince NORODOM CHAKRAVUTH]

note - other minor parties that registered for the 2022 commune-level elections included: Cambodia National Love Party, Cambodia Nationality Party, Cambodian Youth Party, Cambodia Reform Party, Kampucheaniyum Party, Grassroots Democratic Party, Khmer United Party, Beehive Social Democratic Party, Cambodia Indigenous People's Democracy Party, Ekpheap Cheat Khmer Party, Reaksmey Khemara Party, Khmer Economic Development Party", - "note": "note: following the 2017 commune election, the CPP-led government arrested the CNRP president Kem SOKHA for treason, dissolved the party on similar grounds, and forced most of its senior leadership into exile, where the party’s former president, Sam RAINSY, had been living since late 2015; as of 2023, opposition parties, particularly the Candlelight Party, continue to report, intimidation, harassment, and arrests by the Cambodian Government" + "text": "Candlelight Party or CP (the latest incarnation of the Sam Rainsy Party or SRP, which joined with the Human Rights Party or HRP to form the Cambodia National Rescue Party or CNRP in 2012; the CNRP was dissolved in 2017)
Cambodian People's Party or CPP [HUN SEN]
Cambodian Youth Party [PICH Sros]
Grassroots Democratic Party [YENG Virak]
Khmer National Unity Party or KNUP (an offshoot of FUNCINPEC) [NHEK BUN CHHAY]
League for Democracy Party or LDP [KHEM Veasna]
National United Front for Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia or FUNCINPEC [Prince NORODOM CHAKRAVUTH]", + "note": "note 1: 42 parties had registered with the Cambodian Government at the beginning of 2023

note 2: following the 2017 commune election, the CPP-led government arrested the CNRP president Kem SOKHA for treason, dissolved the party on similar grounds, and forced most of its senior leadership into exile, where the party’s former president, Sam RAINSY, had been living since late 2015; as of 2023, opposition parties, particularly the Candlelight Party, continue to report, intimidation, harassment, and arrests by the Cambodian Government" }, "International organization participation": { "text": "ADB, ARF, ASEAN, CICA, EAS, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITU, MINUSMA, MIGA, NAM, OIF, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNISFA, UNMISS, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO" @@ -903,7 +903,8 @@ "text": "United States 21%, Singapore 8%, Thailand 8%, Germany 7%, Japan 6%, China 5%, Canada 5%, United Kingdom 5% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "clothing and footwear, trunks and cases, rice, rubber, light fixtures (2021)" + "text": "clothing and footwear, trunks and cases, rice, rubber, light fixtures (2021)", + "note": "note: Cambodian methamphetamine production remains a significant illicit trade export" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1225,10 +1226,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "245" + "text": "242" }, "by type": { - "text": "container ship 2, general cargo 162, oil tanker 18, other 63 (2021)" + "text": "container ship 2, general cargo 159, oil tanker 18, other 63 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1276,7 +1277,7 @@ "text": "225 Central African Republic (MINUSCA); 180 Lebanon (UNIFIL); 290 Mali (MINUSMA) (May 2022)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "outside of periodic border skirmishes with Thailand, the RCAF’s primary responsibilities are border, coastal, and internal security; since 2016, the RCAF has conducted a small annual training exercise known as “Golden Dragon” with the military of China, except for 2021-2022 when it was canceled because of the COVID-19 pandemic; the Army has a few infantry divisions and an estimated 10-15 brigades, including about 5 rapid reaction “intervention,” a border security, and a prime minister’s bodyguard brigade, as well as an airborne/special operations brigade under a special forces command created in 2020; the Navy maintains a small force of patrol boats and a naval infantry brigade for coastal defense; the Air Force has a small number of combat and transport helicopters; the Royal Gendarmerie is reportedly organized into battalions and several mobile response units

the RCAF was re-established in 1993 under the first coalition government from the merger of the Cambodian Government’s military forces (Cambodian People’s Armed Forces) and the two non-communist resistance forces (Sihanoukist National Army, aka National Army for Khmer Independence, and the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces); thousands of communist Khmer Rouge fighters began surrendering by 1994 under a government amnesty program and the last of the Khmer Rouge forces (National Army of Democratic Kampuchea) were demobilized or absorbed into the RCAF in 1999

Cambodia continues to be one of the most densely landmine-contaminated countries in the world; by the early 1990s, various aid organizations estimated there were 8 to 10 million landmines scattered throughout the country, with a particularly heavy concentration on a 1,000-km strip along the northwest Thai-Cambodia border known as the \"K5 belt\"; the mines were laid during Cambodia’s decades-long war by the Cambodian army, the Vietnamese, the Khmer Rouge, the non-communist fighters, and US forces; part of Cambodia's defense policy is demining the territory with the intent of having the entire country cleared of unexploded ordnances by 2035; over 1 million landmines and over 3 million explosives were discovered and removed from 1992 to 2018; in 2018, the Cambodian government and Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), a government agency, launched the National Mine Action Strategy for 2018-2025 (2023)" + "text": "outside of periodic border skirmishes with Thailand, the RCAF’s primary responsibilities are border, coastal, and internal security; since 2016, the RCAF has conducted a small annual training exercise known as “Golden Dragon” with the military of China, except for 2021-2022 when it was canceled because of the COVID-19 pandemic; the Army has a few infantry divisions and an estimated 10-15 brigades, including about 5 rapid reaction “intervention” brigades, a border security brigade, and a prime minister’s bodyguard brigade, as well as an airborne/special operations brigade under a special forces command created in 2020; the Navy maintains a small force of patrol boats and a naval infantry brigade for coastal defense; the Air Force has a small number of combat and transport helicopters; the Royal Gendarmerie is reportedly organized into battalions and several mobile response units

the RCAF was re-established in 1993 under the first coalition government from the merger of the Cambodian Government’s military forces (Cambodian People’s Armed Forces) and the two non-communist resistance forces (Sihanoukist National Army, aka National Army for Khmer Independence, and the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces); thousands of communist Khmer Rouge fighters began surrendering by 1994 under a government amnesty program and the last of the Khmer Rouge forces (National Army of Democratic Kampuchea) were demobilized or absorbed into the RCAF in 1999

Cambodia continues to be one of the most densely landmine-contaminated countries in the world; by the early 1990s, various aid organizations estimated there were 8 to 10 million landmines scattered throughout the country, with a particularly heavy concentration on a 1,000-km strip along the northwest Thai-Cambodia border known as the \"K5 belt\"; the mines were laid during Cambodia’s decades-long war by the Cambodian army, the Vietnamese, the Khmer Rouge, the non-communist fighters, and US forces; part of Cambodia's defense policy is demining the territory with the intent of having the entire country cleared of unexploded ordnances by 2035; over 1 million landmines and over 3 million explosives were discovered and removed from 1992 to 2018; in 2018, the Cambodian government and Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), a government agency, launched the National Mine Action Strategy for 2018-2025 (2023)" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json index e55c237b..efc9ff62 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json @@ -1283,10 +1283,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "6,662" + "text": "7,362" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 1,558, container ship 341, general cargo 957, oil tanker 1,061, other 2,745 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 1,684, container ship 355, general cargo 1,164, oil tanker 1,133, other 3,026 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json index 03d79c53..cfac75f3 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json @@ -1046,10 +1046,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "2,718" + "text": "2,661" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 1,158, container ship 558, general cargo 184, oil tanker 388, other 430 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 1,135, container ship 558, general cargo 155, oil tanker 394, other 419 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/id.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/id.json index 1165c0bd..8cfe1e7f 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/id.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/id.json @@ -501,13 +501,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "23.8 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "23.8 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "9.135 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "9.14 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "189.7 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "189.7 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ }, "Capital": { "name": { - "text": "Jakarta; note - Indonesian lawmakers on 18 January 2022 approved the relocation of the country’s capital from Jakarta to a site in East Kalimantan, a jungle area of Borneo; the move to Nusantara, the name of the new capital, will take several years" + "text": "Jakarta; note - Indonesian lawmakers on 18 January 2022 approved the relocation of the country’s capital from Jakarta to a site on the island of Borneo between Samarinda City and the port city of Balikpapan; Nusantara (\"archipelago\"), the name of the new capital, is expected to be established in August 2024" }, "geographic coordinates": { "text": "6 10 S, 106 49 E" @@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Berkarya Party [Muchdi PURWOPRANJONO]
Crescent Star Party or PBB [Yusril Ihza MAHENDRA]
Democrat Party or PD [Agus Harimurti YUDHOYONO]
Functional Groups Party or GOLKAR [Airlangga HARTARTO]
Great Indonesia Movement Party or GERINDRA [PRABOWO Subianto Djojohadikusumo]
Garuda Party or Change Indonesia Movement Party [Ahmad Ridha SABANA]
Indonesia Democratic Party-Struggle or PDI-P [MEGAWATI Sukarnoputri]
Indonesian Justice and Unity Party or PKPI [Yussuf SOLICHIEN]
Indonesian Solidarity Party or PSI [GIRING GANESHA]
National Awakening Party or PKB [Muhaiman ISKANDAR]
National Democratic Party or NasDem [Surya PALOH]
National Mandate Party or PAN [Zulkifli HASAN]
People's Conscience Party or Hanura [Oesman Sapta ODANG]
Perindo Party [Hary TANOESOEDIBJO]
Prosperous Justice Party or PKS [Ahmad SYAIKHU]
United Development Party or PPP [Muhamad MARDIONO]" + "text": "Democrat Party or PD [Agus Harimurti YUDHOYONO]
Functional Groups Party or GOLKAR [Airlangga HARTARTO]
Great Indonesia Movement Party or GERINDRA [PRABOWO Subianto Djojohadikusumo]
Indonesia Democratic Party-Struggle or PDI-P [MEGAWATI Sukarnoputri]
National Awakening Party or PKB [Muhaiman ISKANDAR]
National Democratic Party or NasDem [Surya PALOH]
National Mandate Party or PAN [Zulkifli HASAN]
Prosperous Justice Party or PKS [Ahmad SYAIKHU]
United Development Party or PPP [Muhamad MARDIONO]" }, "International organization participation": { "text": "ADB, APEC, ARF, ASEAN, BIS, CD, CICA (observer), CP, D-8, EAS, EITI (compliant country), FAO, G-11, G-15, G-20, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM (observer), IORA, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINURSO, MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, MSG (associate member), NAM, OECD (enhanced engagement), OIC, OPCW, PIF (partner), UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHRC, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNISFA, UNMIL, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO" @@ -1273,10 +1273,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "10,427" + "text": "11,015" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 148, container ship 226, general cargo 2,238, oil tanker 676, other 7,139 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 154, container ship 218, general cargo 2,310, oil tanker 700, other 7,633 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json index 1258d52a..f55f922c 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json @@ -455,13 +455,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "15.41 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "14.8 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "11.61 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "10.3 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "54.43 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "53.3 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "third-largest, trade-oriented, and diversified economy; highly indebted country; slow wage growth and declining labor force; still heavily hydrocarbon-reliant; central bank keeping low interest rates amid modest inflation; increased military spending; stagnant tourism sector" + "text": "fourth-largest, trade-oriented, and diversified economy; highly indebted country; slow wage growth and declining labor force; still heavily hydrocarbon-reliant; central bank keeping negative interest rates amid modest inflation; increased military spending; stagnant tourism sector" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2021": { @@ -884,10 +884,10 @@ } }, "Exports - partners": { - "text": "China 21%, United States 18%, South Korea 7%, Taiwan 7%, Hong Kong 4% (2020)" + "text": "China 21%, United States 18%, South Korea 7%, Taiwan 7%, Thailand 4% (2021)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "cars and vehicle parts, integrated circuits, personal appliances, photo equipment, ships (2020)" + "text": "cars and vehicle parts, integrated circuits, general machinery, photo lab equipment, construction vehicles, semiconductors  (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -901,10 +901,10 @@ } }, "Imports - partners": { - "text": "China 26%, United States 11%, Australia 5%, South Korea 4%, Taiwan 4% (2020)" + "text": "China 24%, United States 10%, Australia 7%, South Korea 4%, Taiwan 4% (2021)" }, "Imports - commodities": { - "text": "crude oil, natural gas, integrated circuits, broadcasting equipment, computers (2020)" + "text": "crude petroleum, natural gas, integrated circuits, coal, refined petroleum, iron (2021)" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2021": { @@ -1216,10 +1216,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "5,201" + "text": "5,590" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 148, container ship 45, general cargo 1,900, oil tanker 666, other 2,442 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 149, container ship 47, general cargo 2,071, oil tanker 690, other 2,633 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ "text": "approximately 180 Djibouti (2022)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "Japan was disarmed after its defeat in World War II; shortly after the Korean War began in 1950, US occupation forces in Japan created a 75,000-member lightly armed force called the National Police Reserve; the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) was founded in 1954

Japan’s alliance with the US (signed in 1951) is one of the cornerstones of the country’s security, as well as a large part of the US security role in Asia; approximately 55,000 US troops and other military assets, including aircraft and naval ships, are stationed in Japan and hav exclusive use of more than 80 bases and facilities; in exchange for their use, the US guarantees Japan’s security; the Japanese Government provides about $2 billion per year to offset the cost of stationing US forces in Japan; in addition, it pays compensation to localities hosting US troops, rent for bases, and costs for new facilities to support the US presence; Japan also has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation (2023)" + "text": "Japan was disarmed after its defeat in World War II; shortly after the Korean War began in 1950, US occupation forces in Japan created a 75,000-member lightly armed force called the National Police Reserve; the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) was founded in 1954

Japan’s alliance with the US (signed in 1951) is one of the cornerstones of the country’s security, as well as a large part of the US security role in Asia; approximately 55,000 US troops and other military assets, including aircraft and naval ships, are stationed in Japan and have exclusive use of more than 80 bases and facilities; in exchange for their use, the US guarantees Japan’s security; the Japanese Government provides about $2 billion per year to offset the cost of stationing US forces in Japan; in addition, it pays compensation to localities hosting US troops, rent for bases, and costs for new facilities to support the US presence; Japan also has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation (2023)" } }, "Terrorism": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json index dc4acd7a..0ea5eab4 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json @@ -428,13 +428,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "902.8 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "900 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "1.145 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1.15 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "6.61 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "6.61 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1067,10 +1067,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "264" + "text": "270" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 8, container ship 5, general cargo 189, oil tanker 33, other 29 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 9, container ship 5, general cargo 193, oil tanker 33, other 30 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json index b1812d25..93688b42 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json @@ -449,13 +449,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "6.672 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "6.672 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "4.45 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "4.45 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "15.96 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "15.96 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -880,10 +880,10 @@ } }, "Exports - partners": { - "text": "China 25%, United States 14%, Vietnam 9%, Hong Kong 6%, Japan 5% (2020)" + "text": "China 24%, United States 15%, Vietnam 9%, Hong Kong 6%, Japan 5% (2021)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "integrated circuits, cars and vehicle parts, refined petroleum, ships, office machinery (2020)" + "text": "integrated circuits, cars and vehicle parts, refined petroleum, ships, office machinery, telephones (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -897,10 +897,10 @@ } }, "Imports - partners": { - "text": "China 25%, United States 12%, Japan 10%, Germany 4%, Vietnam 4% (2020)" + "text": "China 24%, United States 12%, Japan 9%, Vietnam 4%, Taiwan 4% (2021)" }, "Imports - commodities": { - "text": "crude oil, integrated circuits, natural gas, refined petroleum, cars (2020)" + "text": "crude oil, integrated circuits, natural gas, refined petroleum, photo lab equipment, cars, iron (2021)" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2021": { @@ -1201,10 +1201,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "1,904" + "text": "2,063" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 78, container ship 91, general cargo 360, oil tanker 184, other 1,191 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 84, container ship 99, general cargo 358, oil tanker 200, other 1,322 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/la.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/la.json index c6ebb715..690ed61e 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/la.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/la.json @@ -482,13 +482,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "130 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "130 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "170 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "170 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "7.02 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "7.05 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ "text": "Lao People's Democratic Republic" }, "conventional short form": { - "text": "Laos" + "text": "Laos or Lao PDR" }, "local long form": { "text": "Sathalanalat Paxathipatai Paxaxon Lao" @@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ }, "Diplomatic representation in the US": { "chief of mission": { - "text": "Ambassador Sisavath INPHACHANH (since 7 June 2022)" + "text": "Ambassador SISAVATH Inphachanh (since 7 June 2022)" }, "chancery": { "text": "2222 S Street NW, Washington, DC 20008" @@ -1117,7 +1117,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Laos joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2013; one of the conditions of admittance was to establish an independent regulator for its telecom sector within two years; the government had committed to do so by February 2015 as part of the accession agreement; there still has been no sign of any firm plans being made to create an independent regulatory body; the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) retains the primary role in regulating the country’s telecom market; with the government also having a financial stake (in part or in whole) in every one of the major fixed-line and mobile operators, the MPT’s position and decision-making is far from what could be considered independent; sufficient returns on investment cannot be guaranteed with such strict pricing controls as well as the potential for political interference; fixed-line and mobile penetration levels have, as a result, remained much lower than what’s seen in neighboring South East Asian markets; there are signs of growth in the mobile broadband segment as LTE network coverage slowly widens and, more recently, the country’s first 5G services start to come on stream; residents in the capital will at least be able to enjoy high-speed services in the near future, while the rest of the country waits patiently to catch up with the rest of the world. (2022)" + "text": "Laos joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2013; one of the conditions of admittance was to establish an independent regulator for its telecom sector within two years; the government had committed to do so by February 2015 as part of the accession agreement; there still has been no sign of any firm plans being made to create an independent regulatory body; the Ministry of Technology and Communications retains the primary role in regulating the country’s telecom market; with the government also having a financial stake (in part or in whole) in every one of the major fixed-line and mobile operators, the MPT’s position and decision-making is far from what could be considered independent; sufficient returns on investment cannot be guaranteed with such strict pricing controls as well as the potential for political interference; fixed-line and mobile penetration levels have, as a result, remained much lower than what’s seen in neighboring South East Asian markets; there are signs of growth in the mobile broadband segment as LTE network coverage slowly widens and, more recently, the country’s first 5G services start to come on stream; residents in the capital will at least be able to enjoy high-speed services in the near future, while the rest of the country waits patiently to catch up with the rest of the world. (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line nearly 18 per 100 and 65 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2021)" @@ -1134,10 +1134,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "2,473,689 (2020 est.)" + "text": "4.588 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "34% (2020 est.)" + "text": "62% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1201,6 +1201,14 @@ "Pipelines": { "text": "540 km refined products (2013)" }, + "Railways": { + "total": { + "text": "422 km (2023)" + }, + "standard gauge": { + "text": "422 km (2023)" + } + }, "Roadways": { "total": { "text": "39,586 km (2009)" @@ -1220,7 +1228,7 @@ "text": "1" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 1 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 1 (2022)" } } }, @@ -1256,7 +1264,7 @@ "text": "18 years of age for compulsory or voluntary military service; minimum 18-month service obligation (2023)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the LPAF’s primary missions are border and internal security, including counterinsurgency and counterterrorism

Vietnam is the Laotian military's primary security partner, although in recent years, Laos has expanded defense ties with China (2022)" + "text": "the LPAF’s primary missions are border and internal security, including counterinsurgency and counterterrorism

Vietnam is the military's primary security partner, although in recent years, Laos has expanded defense ties with China and Russia (2023)" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json index 1574f706..a2a2c612 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json @@ -911,10 +911,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "571,421 (2020 est.)" + "text": "607,200 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "88% (2020 est.)" + "text": "88% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ "text": "1" }, "by type": { - "text": "other 1 (2021)" + "text": "other 1 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json index 9ab45d13..b697270b 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json @@ -468,13 +468,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "45.3 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "50 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "166.2 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "170 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "250.9 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "250 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1124,10 +1124,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "2,065,324 (2020 est.)" + "text": "2.772 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "63% (2020 est.)" + "text": "84% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1219,10 +1219,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "302" + "text": "314" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 4, container ship 7, general cargo 131, oil tanker 64, other 96 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 3, container ship 6, general cargo 151, oil tanker 57, other 97 (2022)" } } }, diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json index 71a80b69..a8879c3c 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json @@ -475,13 +475,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "1.342 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1.34 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "1.641 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1.64 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "2.505 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "2.51 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1131,10 +1131,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "29,129,398 (2020 est.)" + "text": "32.98 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "90% (2020 est.)" + "text": "97% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1231,10 +1231,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "1,769" + "text": "1,790" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 16, container ship 28, general cargo 174, oil tanker 153, other 1,398 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 14, container ship 33, general cargo 181, oil tanker 156, other 1,406 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json index 0a55bd5c..9566839a 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json @@ -474,13 +474,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "223.5 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "220 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "167.6 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "170 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "1 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1114,10 +1114,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "965,373 (2019 est.)" + "text": "3.168 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "11% (2019 est.)" + "text": "32% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1206,10 +1206,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "177" + "text": "199" }, "by type": { - "text": "container ship 6, general cargo 81, oil tanker 3, other 87 (2021)" + "text": "container ship 6, general cargo 87, oil tanker 3, other 103 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json index 61e893f5..a9107822 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json @@ -1152,10 +1152,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "54,790,543 (2020 est.)" + "text": "58.3 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "50% (2020 est.)" + "text": "53% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1255,10 +1255,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "1,805" + "text": "1,853" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 62, container ship 44, general cargo 716, oil tanker 205, other 778 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 59, container ship 43, general cargo 749, oil tanker 210, other 792 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json index 5c9dcb45..c99f37d2 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json @@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Democratic Progressive Party or DPP [Mohamad Hamim BIN ALIYA]
National Solidarity Party or NSP [Spencer NG]
People's Action Party or PAP [LEE Hsien Loong]
People's Power Party or PPP [Goh Meng SENG]
People's Voice or PV [Lim TEAN]
Progress Singapore Party or PSP [Francis YUEN]
Red Dot United or RDU [Ravi PHILEMON]
Reform Party or RP [Kenneth JEYARETNAM]
Singapore Democratic Alliance or SDA [Desmond LIM]
Singapore Democratic Party or SDP [Dr. CHEE Soon Juan]
Singapore Malay National Organisation or PKMS [Muhammad Hairullah AHMAD]
Singapore People's Party or SPP [Steve CHIA]
Singapore United Party or SUP [Andy ZHU]
Workers' Party or WP [Pritam SINGH]", + "text": "Democratic Progressive Party or DPP [Mohamad Hamim BIN ALIYA]
National Solidarity Party or NSP [Spencer NG]
People's Action Party or PAP [LEE Hsien Loong]
People's Power Party or PPP [Goh Meng SENG]
People's Voice or PV [Lim TEAN]
Progress Singapore Party or PSP [Francis YUEN]
Red Dot United or RDU [Ravi PHILEMON]
Reform Party or RP [Kenneth JEYARETNAM]
Singapore Democratic Alliance or SDA [Desmond LIM]
Singapore Democratic Party or SDP [Dr. CHEE Soon Juan]
Singapore People's Party or SPP [Steve CHIA]
Singapore United Party or SUP [Andy ZHU]
Workers' Party or WP [Pritam SINGH]", "note": "note: the PAP has won every general election since the end of the British colonial era in 1959" }, "International organization participation": { @@ -1102,10 +1102,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "5,230,942 (2020 est.)" + "text": "5.369 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "92% (2020 est.)" + "text": "91% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1171,10 +1171,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "3,321" + "text": "3,227" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 576, container ship 514, general cargo 113, oil tanker 699, other 1,419 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 574, container ship 542, general cargo 99, oil tanker 633, other 1,379 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1225,7 +1225,7 @@ "text": "maintains permanent training detachments of military personnel in Australia, France, and the US (2022)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "Singapore is a member of the Five Powers Defense Arrangements (FPDA), a series of mutual assistance agreements reached in 1971 embracing Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK; the FPDA commits the members to consult with one another in the event or threat of an armed attack on any of the members and to mutually decide what measures should be taken, jointly or separately; there is no specific obligation to intervene militarily

the SAF's roots go back to 1854 when the Singapore Volunteer Rifle Corps was formed under colonial rule; the first battalion of regular soldiers, the First Singapore Infantry Regiment, was organized in 1957; the modern SAF was established in 1965; the SAF is widely viewed as the best equipped military in southeast Asia; the Army is largely based on conscripts and reservists with a small cadre of professional soldiers, while the Air Force and Navy are primarily comprised of well-trained professionals (2022)" + "text": "Singapore is a member of the Five Powers Defense Arrangements (FPDA), a series of mutual assistance agreements reached in 1971 embracing Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK; the FPDA commits the members to consult with one another in the event or threat of an armed attack on any of the members and to mutually decide what measures should be taken, jointly or separately; there is no specific obligation to intervene militarily

the SAF's roots go back to 1854 when the Singapore Volunteer Rifle Corps was formed under colonial rule; the first battalion of regular soldiers, the First Singapore Infantry Regiment, was organized in 1957; the modern SAF was established in 1965; the SAF is widely viewed as the best equipped military in southeast Asia; it is largely based on conscripts and reservists with a small cadre of well-trained professional soldiers (2023)" }, "Maritime threats": { "text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported that incidents in the Singapore Straits continue to increase year on year with 38 in 2022 compared to 35 in 2021; vessels were successfully boarded in all 38 incidents in 2022; while the majority of vessels boarded reported incidents as predominately low-level opportunistic thefts, four crew were taken hostage and a further two threatened during these incidents; the majority of incidents were reported during the hours of darkness and while vessels were underway; the territorial and offshore waters in the South China Sea remain a high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; numerous commercial vessels have been attacked and hijacked both at anchor and while underway; hijacked vessels are often disguised and cargo diverted to ports in East Asia; crews have been murdered or cast adrift" diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json index 04775d76..6fe6292c 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/th.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Two unified Thai kingdoms emerged in the mid-13th century. The Sukhothai, located in the south-central plains, gained its independence from the Khmer Empire to the east. By the late 13th century, Sukhothai’s territory extended into present-day Burma and Laos. Sukhotai lasted until the mid-15th century. The Thai Lan Na Kingdom was established in the north with its capital at Chang Mai. Lan Na was conquered by the Burmese in the 16th century. The Ayutthaya Kingdom (14th-18th centuries) succeeded the Sukhothai and would become known as the Siamese Kingdom. During the Ayutthaya period, the Thai/Siamese peoples consolidated their hold on what is present-day central and north-central Thailand. Following a military defeat at the hands of the Burmese in 1767, the Siamese Kingdom rose to new heights under the military ruler TAKSIN, who defeated the Burmese occupiers and expanded the kingdom’s territory into modern-day northern Thailand (formerly the Lan Na Kingdom), Cambodia, Laos, and the Malay Peninsula. The kingdom fought off additional Burmese invasions and raids in the late 1700s and early 1800s. In the mid-1800s, Western pressure led to Siam signing trade treaties that reduced the country’s sovereignty and independence. In the 1890s and 1900s, the British and French forced the kingdom to cede Cambodian, Laotian, and Malay territories that had been under Siamese control.

A bloodless revolution in 1932 led to the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. After the Japanese invaded Thailand in 1941, the government split into a pro-Japan faction and a pro-Ally faction backed by the king. Following the war, Thailand became a US treaty ally in 1954 after sending troops to Korea and later fighting alongside the US in Vietnam. Thailand since 2005 has experienced several rounds of political turmoil including a military coup in 2006 that ousted then Prime Minister THAKSIN Chinnawat, followed by large-scale street protests by competing political factions in 2008, 2009, and 2010. THAKSIN's youngest sister, YINGLAK Chinnawat, in 2011 led the Puea Thai Party to an electoral win and assumed control of the government.

In early May 2014, after months of large-scale anti-government protests in Bangkok beginning in November 2013, YINGLAK was removed from office by the Constitutional Court and in late May 2014 the Royal Thai Army, led by Royal Thai Army Gen. PRAYUT Chan-ocha, staged a coup against the caretaker government. The military-affiliated National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), led by PRAYUT as the appointed minister, ruled the country for more than four years, during which time the NCPO drafted a new constitution guaranteeing military sway over Thai politics in future elections by allowing the military to appoint the entire 250-member Senate and requiring a joint meeting of the House and Senate to select the prime minister, effectively giving the military a veto over the top executive. King PHUMIPHON Adunyadet passed away in October 2016 after 70 years on the throne; his only son, WACHIRALONGKON Bodinthrathepphayawarangkun (aka King RAMA X), ascended the throne in December 2016. He signed the new constitution in April 2017. A long-delayed election in March 2019, disputed and widely viewed as skewed in favor of the party aligned with the military, allowed PRAYUT to continue his premiership. The country experienced large-scale pro-democracy protests in 2020.

" + "text": "

Two unified Thai kingdoms emerged in the mid-13th century. The Sukhothai, located in the south-central plains, gained its independence from the Khmer Empire to the east. By the late 13th century, Sukhothai’s territory extended into present-day Burma and Laos. Sukhothai lasted until the mid-15th century. The Thai Lan Na Kingdom was established in the north with its capital at Chang Mai. Lan Na was conquered by the Burmese in the 16th century. The Ayutthaya Kingdom (14th-18th centuries) succeeded the Sukhothai and would become known as the Siamese Kingdom. During the Ayutthaya period, the Thai/Siamese peoples consolidated their hold on what is present-day central and north-central Thailand. Following a military defeat at the hands of the Burmese in 1767, the Siamese Kingdom rose to new heights under the military ruler TAKSIN, who defeated the Burmese occupiers and expanded the kingdom’s territory into modern-day northern Thailand (formerly the Lan Na Kingdom), Cambodia, Laos, and the Malay Peninsula. The kingdom fought off additional Burmese invasions and raids in the late 1700s and early 1800s. In the mid-1800s, Western pressure led to Siam signing trade treaties that reduced the country’s sovereignty and independence. In the 1890s and 1900s, the British and French forced the kingdom to cede Cambodian, Laotian, and Malay territories that had been under Siamese control.

A bloodless revolution in 1932 led to the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. After the Japanese invaded Thailand in 1941, the government split into a pro-Japan faction and a pro-Ally faction backed by the king. Thailand became a US treaty ally in 1954 after sending troops to Korea and later fighting alongside the US in Vietnam. Thailand since 2005 has experienced several rounds of political turmoil including a military coup in 2006 that ousted then Prime Minister THAKSIN Chinnawat, followed by large-scale street protests by competing political factions in 2008, 2009, and 2010. THAKSIN's youngest sister, YINGLAK Chinnawat, in 2011 led the Puea Thai Party to an electoral win and assumed control of the government.

In early May 2014, after months of large-scale anti-government protests in Bangkok beginning in November 2013, YINGLAK was removed from office by the Constitutional Court and in late May 2014 the Royal Thai Army, led by Gen. PRAYUT Chan-ocha, staged a coup against the caretaker government. The military-affiliated National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), led by PRAYUT as the appointed minister, ruled the country for more than four years, during which time the NCPO drafted a new constitution guaranteeing military sway over Thai politics in future elections by allowing the military to appoint the entire 250-member Senate and requiring a joint meeting of the House and Senate to select the prime minister, effectively giving the military a veto over the choice for the top executive. King PHUMIPHON Adunyadet passed away in October 2016 after 70 years on the throne; his only son, WACHIRALONGKON (aka King RAMA X), formally ascended the throne in December 2019. He signed the new constitution in April 2017. A long-delayed election in March 2019, disputed and widely viewed as skewed in favor of the party aligned with the military, allowed PRAYUT to continue his premiership. The country experienced large-scale anti-government protests in 2020.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ "text": "Siam" }, "etymology": { - "text": "Land of the Tai [People]\"; the meaning of \"tai\" is uncertain, but may originally have meant \"human beings,\" \"people,\" or \"free people" + "text": "Land of the Tai [People]\"; the meaning of \"tai\" is uncertain, but may originally have meant \"human beings,\" \"people,\" or \"free people''" } }, "Government type": { @@ -605,16 +605,16 @@ "text": "Council of Ministers nominated by the prime minister, appointed by the king; a Privy Council advises the king" }, "elections/appointments": { - "text": "the monarchy is hereditary; the House of Representatives and Senate approves a person for prime minister who must then be appointed by the King (as stated in the transitory provision of the 2017 constitution); the office of prime minister can be held for up to a total of 8 years" + "text": "the monarchy is hereditary; the House of Representatives and Senate approves a person for prime minister who must then be appointed by the king (as stated in the transitory provision of the 2017 constitution); starting in 2024, only the approval of the House of Representatives will be required for the name of a prime minister to be forwarded for the king's approval; the office of prime minister can be held for up to a total of 8 years" }, - "note": "note:  PRAYUT Chan-ocha was appointed interim prime minister in August 2014, three months after he staged the coup that removed the previously elected government of Prime Minister YINGLAK Chinnawat; on 5 June 2019 PRAYUT (independent) was approved as prime minister by the parliament " + "note": "note:  PRAYUT Chan-ocha was appointed interim prime minister in August 2014, three months after he staged the coup that removed the previously elected government of Prime Minister YINGLAK Chinnawat; on 5 June 2019 PRAYUT (independent) was approved as prime minister by the parliament; the Constitutional Court in September 2022 ruled that PRAYUT's term as prime minister began in April 2017 with the promulgation of Thailand's most recent constitution, meaning he will not reach the statutory 8-year limit until 2025" }, "Legislative branch": { "description": { - "text": "bicameral National Assembly or Ratthasapha consists of:
Senate or Wuthisapha (250 seats; members appointed by the Royal Thai Army to serve 5-year terms)
House of Representatives or Saphaphuthan Ratsadon (500 seats; 375 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 150 members elected in a single nationwide constituency by party-list proportional representation vote; members serve 4-year terms)" + "text": "bicameral National Assembly or Ratthasapha consists of:
Senate or Wuthisapha (currently 250 seats; members appointed by the National Council for Peace and Order to serve 5-year terms; the Senate appointed in 2024 will consist of 200 members elected from various groups of professionals for a 5-year term)
House of Representatives or Saphaphuthan Ratsadon (500 seats; 400 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 100 members elected in a single nationwide constituency by party-list proportional representation vote; members serve 4-year terms)" }, "elections": { - "text": "Senate - last held on 14 May 2019 (next to be held in 2024)

House of Representatives - last held on 24 March 2019 (next to be held in 2023)" + "text": "Senate - last selections held on 14 May 2019 (next to be held in 2024)

House of Representatives - last held on 24 March 2019 (next to be held in May 2023)" }, "election results": { "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition (248 members as of mid-2022) - men 222, women 26, percent of women 10.5%
House of Representatives - percent of vote by party in 2019 election- PPRP 23.7%, PTP 22.2%, FFP* 17.8%, DP 11.1%, PJT 10.5%, TLP 2.3%, CTP 2.2%, NEP 1.4%, PCC 1.4%, ACT 1.2%, PCP 1.2%,  other 5.1%; seats by party - PTP 136, PPRP 116, FFP 81, DP 53, PJT 51, CTP 10, TLP 10, PCC 7, PCP 5, NEP 6, ACT 5, other 20; composition (489 members as of mid-2022) - men 412, women 77, percent of women 15.8%; note(s) - total National Assembly percent of women 14%; the FFP was dissolved by the Constitutional Court in February of 2020 and its representatives moved to the newly-formed Move Forward Party or to other political parties" @@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Action Coalition of Thailand Party or ACT [ANEK Laothamatas]
Bhumjaithai Party (aka Phumchai Thai Party or PJT; aka Thai Pride Party) or BJT [ANUTIN Charnvirakul]
Chat Phatthana Party (National Development Party) [THEWAN Liptaphanlop]
Chat Thai Phatthana Party (Thai Nation Development Party) or CTP [VARAWUT Silpa-archa]
New Economics Party or NEP [MINGKHWAN Sangsuwan]
Move Forward Party or MFP [PHITHA Limcharoenrat] (formed in 2020 from the disbanded Future Forward Party or FPP) 
Palang Pracharat Party (People's State Power Party) or PPRP [PRAWIT Wongsuwan] (a pro-military party formed in 2018 by members of the military junta’s cabinet) 
Prachachat Party of PCC [WAN Muhamad NOOR Matha]
Prachathipat Party (Democrat Party) or DP [JURIN Laksanawisit]
Puea Chat Party (For Nation Party) or PCP [SARUNWUT Sarunket]
Puea Thai Party (For Thais Party) or PTP [PAETHONGTARN Shinawatra]
Puea Tham Party (For Dharma Party) [NALINI Thawisin]
Seri Ruam Thai Party (Thai Liberal Party or TLP) [SERIPHISUT Temiyawet]
Thai Civilized Party or TCL [MONGKOLKIT Suksintharanon]
Thai Local Power Party or TLP [CHATCHAWAI Kong-udom]
Thai People Power Party or TLPT [NIKHOM Bunwiset]
Thai Raksa Chat Party (Thai National Preservation Party) [PRICHAPHON Phongpanit]" + "text": "Action Coalition Party or ACP [ANEK Laothammathast]
Bhumjaithai Party (aka Phumchai Thai Party or PJT; aka Thai Pride Party) or BJT [ANUTIN Chanwirakun]
Chat Phatthana Kla arty (National Development Party) [KON Chatikawanit]
Chat Thai Phatthana Party (Thai Nation Development Party) or CTP [VARAWUT Silpa-archa]
New Economics Party or NEP [MANUN Siwaphiromrat]
Move Forward Party or MFP [PHITHA Limcharoenrat] 
Palang Pracharat Party (People's State Power Party) or PPRP [PRAWIT Wongsuwan] 
Prachachat Party or PCC [WAN Muhamad NOOR Matha]
Prachathipat Party (Democrat Party) or DP [CHURIN Laksanawisit]
Puea Chat Party (For Nation Party) or PCP [SARUNWUT Sarunket]
Puea Thai Party (For Thais Party) or PTP [CHONLANAN Sikaew]
Puea Tham Party (For Dharma Party) [NALINI Thawisin]
Seri Ruam Thai Party (Thai Liberal Party or TLP) [SERIPHISUT Temiyawet]
Thai Civilized Party or TCL [MONGKOLKIT Suksintharanon]
Thai Local Power Party or TLP [CHATCHAWAI Kong-udom]
Thai People Power Party or TLPT [NIKHOM Bunwiset]
Thai Sang Thai Party [SUDARAT Keyuraphan]
United Thai Nation (Ruam Thai Sang Chat) or UTN [PHIRAPHAN Saliratthawiphak]" }, "International organization participation": { "text": "ADB, APEC, ARF, ASEAN, BIMSTEC, BIS, CD, CICA, CP, EAS, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OAS (observer), OIC (observer), OIF (observer), OPCW, OSCE (partner), PCA, PIF (partner), UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNMOGIP, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO" @@ -1143,7 +1143,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "Thailand’s telecom sector is relatively mature and hosts a mix of public and private sector players; the mobile market is highly developed and has experienced strong growth over the last seven years; the market returned to growth in 2021 after it contracted in 2020 driven by the Covid-19 pandemic, and a steep decline in inbound tourism; it remains highly saturated, owing to overall maturity and the popularity of multiple SIM card use, which has resulted in a particularly high penetration rate; in general, the sector retains considerable potential given the impetus of 5G, the recent spectrum auctions, and continued network deployments by the country’s network operators; further auctions of spectrum in the 700MHz band (being repurposed from digital TV broadcasting), and in the 3.6GHz range will further improve network capacity; in the wire line segment, the decline in fixed-line penetration is expected to continue as subscribers migrate to mobile networks for voice and data services; the emphasis among operators has been to bolster their fiber footprints in key high-value areas; the transition to fiber from DSL and cable has also been facilitated by changes to the regulatory structure that have removed some barriers to investment; this is supporting the cannibalization of older copper-based DSL lines by fiber; the returns from this investment remain a long-term prospect as consumers still favor entry-level packages; there is also strong interest from the government, as well as private vendors, in establishing Thailand as a data center hub to serve the region; the size, capacity and spread of existing data centers in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) outside of Thailand is small; Thailand retains some advantages to attract investment, including improved fiber connectivity and international bandwidth; increasing submarine capacity, such as the SJC2 cable to come online later in 2022, will considerably improve Thailand’s potential as a regional hub (2022)" + "text": "Thailand’s telecom sector is relatively mature and hosts a mix of public and private sector players; the mobile market is highly developed and has experienced strong growth over the last seven years; the market returned to growth in 2021 after it contracted in 2020 driven by the Covid-19 pandemic, and a steep decline in inbound tourism; it remains highly saturated, owing to overall maturity and the popularity of multiple SIM card use, which has resulted in a particularly high penetration rate; in general, the sector retains considerable potential given the impetus of 5G, the recent spectrum auctions, and continued network deployments by the country’s network operators; further auctions of spectrum in the 700MHz band (being repurposed from digital TV broadcasting), and in the 3.6GHz range will further improve network capacity; in the wire line segment, the decline in fixed-line penetration is expected to continue as subscribers migrate to mobile networks for voice and data services; the emphasis among operators has been to bolster their fiber footprints in key high-value areas; the transition to fiber from DSL and cable has also been facilitated by changes to the regulatory structure that have removed some barriers to investment; this is supporting the cannibalization of older copper-based DSL lines by fiber; the returns from this investment remain a long-term prospect as consumers still favor entry-level packages; there is also strong interest from the government, as well as private vendors, in establishing Thailand as a data center hub to serve the region; the size, capacity and spread of existing data centers in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) outside of Thailand is small; Thailand retains some advantages to attract investment, including improved fiber connectivity and international bandwidth; increasing submarine capacity, such as the SJC2 cable to come online later in 2023, will considerably improve Thailand’s potential as a regional hub (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line is 7 per 100 and mobile-cellular is 170 per 100 (2021)" @@ -1160,10 +1160,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "54,443,983 (2020 est.)" + "text": "61.2 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "78% (2020 est.)" + "text": "85% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1260,10 +1260,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "839" + "text": "829" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 26, container ship 27, general cargo 94, oil tanker 251, other 441 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 26, container ship 28, general cargo 91, oil tanker 246, other 438 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1314,7 +1314,7 @@ "text": "280 South Sudan (UNMISS) (May 2022)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "including the most recent in 2014, the military has attempted more than 20 coups since the fall of absolute monarchy in 1932

since 2004, the military has fought against separatist insurgents in the southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, as well as parts of Songkhla; the insurgency is rooted in ethnic Malay nationalist resistance to Thai rule that followed the extension of Siamese sovereignty over the Patani Sultanate in the 18th century; the insurgency consists of several armed groups, the largest of which is the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (BRN-C): since 2020, the Thai military has been negotiating with BRN, and has parallel talks with an umbrella organization, MARA Pattani, that claims to represent the insurgency groups; since 2004, violence associated with the insurgency has claimed more than 7,300 lives (as of 2023); the Thai Government has had as many as 100,000 military and paramilitary forces deployed in the south to combat the insurgency

Thailand has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments; the Thai and US militaries host the annual \"Cobra Gold\" multinational military exercises in Thailand; the exercise is one of the largest multinational exercises in the Pacific region (2023)" + "text": "including the most recent in 2014, the military has attempted more than 20 coups since the fall of absolute monarchy in 1932

since 2004, the military has fought against separatist insurgents in the southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, as well as parts of Songkhla; the insurgency is rooted in ethnic Malay nationalist resistance to Thai rule that followed the extension of Siamese sovereignty over the Patani Sultanate in the 18th century; the insurgency consists of several armed groups, the largest of which is the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (BRN-C): since 2020, Thai officials have been negotiating with BRN, and has parallel talks with an umbrella organization, MARA Pattani, that claims to represent the insurgency groups; since 2004, violence associated with the insurgency has claimed more than 7,300 lives (as of 2023); the Thai Government has had as many as 100,000 military and paramilitary forces deployed in the south to combat the insurgency

Thailand has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments; the Thai and US militaries host the annual \"Cobra Gold\" multinational military exercises in Thailand; the exercise is one of the largest multinational exercises in the Pacific region (2023)" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json index 40ae7a8f..b4a11a8f 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/tt.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Timor was actively involved in Southeast Asian trading networks for centuries, and by the 14th century exported aromatic sandalwood, slaves, honey, and wax. A number of local chiefdoms ruled the island in the early 16th century when Portuguese traders arrived, chiefly attracted by the relative abundance of sandalwood on Timor; by mid-century, the Portuguese had colonized the island. Skirmishing with the Dutch in the region eventually resulted in an 1859 treaty in which Portugal ceded the western portion of the island. Imperial Japan occupied Portuguese Timor from 1942 to 1945, but Portugal resumed colonial authority after the Japanese defeat in World War II. East Timor declared itself independent from Portugal on 28 November 1975 and was invaded and occupied by Indonesian forces nine days later. It was incorporated into Indonesia in July 1976 as the province of Timor Timur (East Timor). An unsuccessful campaign of pacification followed over the next two decades, during which an estimated 100,000 to 250,000 people died. In an August 1999 UN-supervised popular referendum, an overwhelming majority of the people of Timor-Leste voted for independence from Indonesia. However, in the next three weeks, anti-independence Timorese militias - organized and supported by the Indonesian military - commenced a large-scale, scorched-earth campaign of retribution. The militias killed approximately 1,400 Timorese and displaced nearly 500,000. Most of the country's infrastructure, including homes, irrigation systems, water supply systems, and schools, and nearly all of the country's electrical grid were destroyed. On 20 September 1999, Australian-led peacekeeping troops deployed to the country and brought the violence to an end. On 20 May 2002, Timor-Leste was internationally recognized as an independent state.

In 2006, internal tensions threatened the new nation's security when a military strike led to violence and a breakdown of law and order. At Dili's request, an Australian-led International Stabilization Force (ISF) deployed to Timor-Leste, and the UN Security Council established the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), which included an authorized police presence of over 1,600 personnel. The ISF and UNMIT restored stability, allowing for presidential and parliamentary elections in 2007 in a largely peaceful atmosphere. In 2008, rebels staged an unsuccessful attack against the president and prime minister. Since the attack, Timor-Leste has made considerable progress in building stability and democratic institutions, holding a series of successful parliamentary and presidential elections since 2012. Nonetheless, weak and unstable political coalitions have led to periodic episodes of political stalemate and crisis in governance. The ISF and UNMIT departed in 2012 but the UN continues to provide assistance on economic development and strengthening governing institutions. Currently, Timor-Leste is one of the world's poorest nations with an economy that relies heavily on energy resources in the Timor Sea.

" + "text": "

The island of Timor was actively involved in Southeast Asian trading networks for centuries, and by the 14th century exported aromatic sandalwood, slaves, honey, and wax. A number of local chiefdoms ruled the island in the early 16th century when Portuguese traders arrived, chiefly attracted by the relative abundance of sandalwood on Timor; by mid-century, the Portuguese had colonized the island. Skirmishing with the Dutch in the region eventually resulted in an 1859 treaty in which Portugal ceded the western portion of the island. Imperial Japan occupied Portuguese Timor from 1942 to 1945, but Portugal resumed colonial authority after the Japanese defeat in World War II. East Timor declared itself independent from Portugal on 28 November 1975 and was invaded and occupied by Indonesian forces nine days later. It was incorporated into Indonesia in July 1976 as the province of Timor Timur (East Timor or Timor Leste). An unsuccessful campaign of pacification followed over the next two decades, during which an estimated 100,000 to 250,000 people died. In an August 1999 UN-supervised popular referendum, an overwhelming majority of the people of Timor-Leste voted for independence from Indonesia. However, in the next three weeks, anti-independence Timorese militias - organized and supported by the Indonesian military - commenced a large-scale, scorched-earth campaign of retribution. The militias killed approximately 1,400 Timorese and displaced nearly 500,000. Most of the country's infrastructure, including homes, irrigation systems, water supply systems, and schools, and nearly all of the country's electrical grid were destroyed. On 20 September 1999, Australian-led peacekeeping troops deployed to the country and brought the violence to an end. On 20 May 2002, Timor-Leste was internationally recognized as an independent state.

In 2006, internal tensions threatened the new nation's security when a military strike led to violence and a breakdown of law and order. At Dili's request, an Australian-led International Stabilization Force (ISF) deployed to Timor-Leste, and the UN Security Council established the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), which included an authorized police presence of over 1,600 personnel. The ISF and UNMIT restored stability, allowing for presidential and parliamentary elections in 2007 in a largely peaceful atmosphere. In 2008, rebels staged an unsuccessful attack against the president and prime minister. Since the attack, Timor-Leste has made considerable progress in building stability and democratic institutions, holding a series of successful parliamentary and presidential elections since 2012. Nonetheless, weak and unstable political coalitions have led to periodic episodes of political stalemate and crisis in governance. The ISF and UNMIT departed in 2012 but the UN continues to provide assistance on economic development and strengthening governing institutions. Currently, Timor-Leste is one of the world's poorest nations with an economy that relies heavily on energy resources in the Timor Sea.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ "text": "unicameral National Parliament (65 seats; members directly elected in a single nationwide constituency by closed, party-list proportional representation vote using the D'Hondt method to serve 5-year terms)" }, "elections": { - "text": "last held on 12 May 2018 (next to be held in July 2023)" + "text": "last held on 12 May 2018 (next to be held in May 2023)" }, "election results": { "text": "percent of vote by party - AMP - 49.6%, FRETILIN 34.2%, PD 8.1%, DDF 5.5%, other 2.6%; seats by party - AMP 34, FRETILIN 23, PD 5, DDF 3; composition - men 39, women 26, percent of women 40%" @@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ "note": "note: the UN Justice System Programme, launched in 2003 and being rolled out in 4 phases through 2018, is helping strengthen the country's justice system; the Programme is aligned with the country's long-range Justice Sector Strategic Plan, which includes legal reforms" }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Democratic Party or PD [Mariano Assanami SABINO Lopes]
Frenti-Mudanca (Front for National Reconstruction of Timor-Leste - Change) or FM [Jose Luis GUTERRES]
Kmanek Haburas Unidade Nasional Timor Oan or KHUNTO [Armanda BERTA DOS SANTOS]
National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction or CNRT [Kay Rala Xanana GUSMAO]
People's Liberation Party or PLP [Taur Matan RUAK]
Revolutionary Front of Independent Timor-Leste or FRETILIN [Mari ALKATIRI]
Timorese Democratic Union or UDT [Gilman SANTOS]
United Party for Development and Democracy or PUDD [António de Sá BENEVIDES] 

Coalitions:
Alliance for Change and Progress (AMP) is a coalition of CRNT, PLP, and KHUNTO
Democratic Development Front (FDD) is a coalition of UDT, PUDD, FM " + "text": "Democratic Party or PD [Mariano Assanami SABINO Lopes]
Frenti-Mudanca (Front for National Reconstruction of Timor-Leste - Change) or FM [Jose Luis GUTERRES]
Kmanek Haburas Unidade Nasional Timor Oan or KHUNTO [Armanda BERTA DOS SANTOS]
National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction or CNRT [Kay Rala Xanana GUSMAO]
People's Liberation Party or PLP [Taur Matan RUAK]
Revolutionary Front of Independent Timor-Leste or FRETILIN [Franciso GUTERRES]
Timorese Democratic Union or UDT [Gilman SANTOS]
United Party for Development and Democracy or PUDD [António de Sá BENEVIDES] 

Coalitions:
Alliance for Change and Progress (AMP) is a coalition of CRNT, PLP, and KHUNTO
Democratic Development Front (FDD) is a coalition of UDT, PUDD, FM" }, "International organization participation": { "text": "ACP, ADB, AOSIS, ARF, ASEAN (observer), CPLP, EITI (compliant country), FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ITU, MIGA, NAM, OPCW, PIF (observer), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, Union Latina, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WMO" @@ -1086,10 +1086,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "382,348 (2020 est.)" + "text": "507,000 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "29% (2020 est.)" + "text": "39% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1157,7 +1157,7 @@ "text": "1" }, "by type": { - "text": "other 1 (2021)" + "text": "other 1 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1197,7 +1197,7 @@ "text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service; compulsory service was authorized in 2020 for men and women aged 18-30 for 18 months of service, but the level of implementation is unclear (2023)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "since achieving independence, Timor-Leste has received security assistance from or has made defense cooperation arrangements with Australia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Portugal, the UN, and the US; some F-FDTL personnel train with the Indonesian military and the two countries maintain a joint Border Security Task Force to jointly monitor and patrol the border, particularly the Oecussi exclave area where smuggling and trafficking are prevalent (2022)" + "text": "since achieving independence, Timor-Leste has received security assistance from or has made defense cooperation arrangements with Australia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Portugal, the UN, and the US; some Defense Force personnel train with the Indonesian military and the two countries maintain a joint Border Security Task Force to jointly monitor and patrol the border, particularly the Oecussi exclave area where smuggling and trafficking are prevalent (2023)" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json index fadd66ca..caa52b26 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json @@ -926,10 +926,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "21,158,750 (2019 est.)" + "text": "21.6 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "89% (2019 est.)" + "text": "90% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1018,10 +1018,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "429" + "text": "450" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 37, container ship 49, general cargo 57, oil tanker 33, other 253 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 34, container ship 53, general cargo 58, oil tanker 34, other 271 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json index 5fed0045..1e081b65 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "Ancient Vietnam was centered on the Red River Valley and was under Han Chinese rule until approximately the 10th century. The Ly Dynasty (11th-13th century) ruled the first independent Vietnamese state, which was known as Dai Viet, and established their capital at Thang Long (Hanoi). Under the Tran Dynasty (13th-15th century), Dai Viet forces led by one of Vietnam’s national heroes, TRAN Hang Dao, fought off Mongol invaders in 1279. Following a brief Chinese occupation in the early 1400s, the leader of Vietnamese resistance, LE Thai To, made himself emperor and established the Le Dynasty, which lasted until the late 18th century, although not without decades of political turmoil, civil war, and division. During this period, Dai Viet expanded southward to the Central Highlands and Mekong Delta, reaching the approximate boundaries of modern-day Vietnam by the 1750s. Dai Viet suffered additional civil war and division in the latter half of the 18th century, but was reunited and renamed Vietnam under Emperor NGUYEN Phuc Anh (aka Gia Long) in 1802.

The Nguyen Dynasty would be the last Vietnamese dynasty before the conquest by France, which began in 1858 and was completed by 1884. Vietnam became part of French Indochina in 1887. It declared independence after World War II, but France continued to rule until its 1954 defeat by communist forces under Ho Chi MINH. Under the Geneva Accords of 1954, Vietnam was divided into the communist North and anti-communist South. Fighting erupted between the two governments shortly afterwards with the North supporting communist rebels in the South and eventually committing thousands of combat troops, while the US provided large amounts of economic and military assistance, including combat forces, to the South. The US military presence reached a peak strength of over 500,000 troops in 1968. US forces were withdrawn following a cease-fire agreement in 1973. Two years later, North Vietnamese forces overran the South reuniting the country under communist rule. The conflict, known as the Second Indochina War (1955-1975), devastated the country, spilled over into the neighboring countries of Cambodia and Laos, and is estimated to have resulted in the deaths of up to 3 million Vietnamese civilians and soldiers. Despite the return of peace, for over a decade the country experienced little economic growth because of its diplomatic isolation, its conservative leadership policies, and the persecution and mass exodus of individuals, many of them successful South Vietnamese merchants. However, since the enactment of Vietnam's \"doi moi\" (renovation) policy in 1986, Vietnamese authorities have committed to increased economic liberalization and enacted structural reforms needed to modernize the economy and to produce more competitive, export-driven industries. Since implementation, the economy has seen strong growth, particularly in agricultural and industrial production, construction, exports, and foreign investment. Increased tourism has also become a key component of economic growth. Nevertheless, the Communist Party maintains tight political and social control of the country and Vietnam faces considerable challenges including rising income inequality, corruption, inadequate social welfare, and a poor human rights record.

Since withdrawing its military occupation forces from Cambodia in the late 1980s and the end of Soviet aid by 1991, Vietnam has practiced a non-aligned foreign policy that emphasizes friendly ties with all members of the international community. Relatedly, Vietnam adheres to a security doctrine called the \"Four Nos\" (no alliances, no siding with one country against another, no foreign bases, and no using force in international relations). Despite longstanding tensions with Beijing regarding its expansive claims that overlap with Hanoi's own claimed maritime boundaries in the South China Sea, Vietnam puts a priority on stable relations with China, given its proximity, size, and status as Vietnam's largest trading partner." + "text": "Vietnam's early history comprises of periods of occupation by outside forces and eventual power consolidation under Vietnamese dynastic families. Ancient Vietnam was centered on the Red River Valley and was ruled by a succession of Han Chinese emperors until approximately the 10th century. The Ly Dynasty (11th-13th century) ruled the first independent Vietnamese state, which was known as Dai Viet, and established their capital at Thang Long (Hanoi). Under the Tran Dynasty (13th-15th century), Dai Viet forces led by one of Vietnam’s national heroes, TRAN Hang Dao, fought off Mongol invaders in 1279. Following a brief Chinese occupation in the early 1400s, the leader of Vietnamese resistance, LE Thai To, made himself emperor and established the Le Dynasty, which lasted until the late 18th century, although not without decades of political turmoil, civil war, and division. During this period, Dai Viet expanded southward to the Central Highlands and Mekong Delta, reaching the approximate boundaries of modern-day Vietnam by the 1750s. Dai Viet suffered additional civil war and division in the latter half of the 18th century, but was reunited and renamed Vietnam under Emperor NGUYEN Phuc Anh (aka Gia Long) in 1802.

The Nguyen Dynasty would be the last Vietnamese dynasty before the conquest by France, which began in 1858 and was completed by 1884. Vietnam became part of French Indochina in 1887. It declared independence after World War II, but France continued to rule until its 1954 defeat by communist forces under Ho Chi MINH. Under the Geneva Accords of 1954, Vietnam was divided into the communist North and anti-communist South. Fighting erupted between the two governments shortly afterwards with the North supporting communist rebels in the South and eventually committing thousands of combat troops, while the US provided large amounts of economic and military assistance, including combat forces, to the South. The US military presence reached a peak strength of over 500,000 troops in 1968. US forces were withdrawn following a cease-fire agreement in 1973. Two years later, North Vietnamese forces overran the South reuniting the country under communist rule. The conflict, known as the Second Indochina War (1955-1975), devastated the country, spilled over into the neighboring countries of Cambodia and Laos, and is estimated to have resulted in the deaths of up to 3 million Vietnamese civilians and soldiers. Despite the return of peace, for over a decade the country experienced little economic growth because of its diplomatic isolation, its conservative leadership policies, and the persecution and mass exodus of individuals, many of them successful South Vietnamese merchants. However, since the enactment of Vietnam's \"doi moi\" (renovation) policy in 1986, Vietnamese authorities have committed to increased economic liberalization and enacted structural reforms needed to modernize the economy and to produce more competitive, export-driven industries. Since implementation, the economy has seen strong growth, particularly in agricultural and industrial production, construction, exports, and foreign investment. Increased tourism has also become a key component of economic growth. Nevertheless, the Communist Party maintains tight political and social control of the country and Vietnam faces considerable challenges including rising income inequality, corruption, inadequate social welfare, and a poor human rights record.

Since withdrawing its military occupation forces from Cambodia in the late 1980s and the end of Soviet aid by 1991, Vietnam has practiced a non-aligned foreign policy that emphasizes friendly ties with all members of the international community. Relatedly, Vietnam adheres to a security doctrine called the \"Four Nos\" (no alliances, no siding with one country against another, no foreign bases, and no using force in international relations). Despite longstanding tensions with Beijing regarding its expansive claims that overlap with Hanoi's own claimed maritime boundaries in the South China Sea, Vietnam puts a priority on stable relations with China, given its proximity, size, and status as Vietnam's largest trading partner." } }, "Geography": { @@ -1138,10 +1138,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "68,137,008 (2020 est.)" + "text": "71.78 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "70% (2020 est.)" + "text": "74% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1238,10 +1238,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "1,926" + "text": "1,975" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 116, container ship 41, general cargo 1,193, oil tanker 125, other 451 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 116, container ship 42, general cargo 1,194, oil tanker 137, other 486 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/al.json b/europe/al.json index 11097c35..5744b62d 100644 --- a/europe/al.json +++ b/europe/al.json @@ -892,7 +892,8 @@ "text": "Italy 45%, Spain 8%, Germany 6%, Greece 5%, France 4%, China 4% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "leather footwear and parts, electricity, crude petroleum, iron alloys, clothing, insulated wiring (2021)" + "text": "leather footwear and parts, electricity, crude petroleum, iron alloys, clothing, insulated wiring (2021)", + "note": "note: Albanian cannabis production remains a significant illicit trade export" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1179,10 +1180,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "70" + "text": "69" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 47, oil tanker 1, other 22 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 47, oil tanker 1, other 21 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/au.json b/europe/au.json index 23707d9f..c820e9ec 100644 --- a/europe/au.json +++ b/europe/au.json @@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@ "text": "1" }, "by type": { - "text": "other 1 (2021)" + "text": "other 1 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/be.json b/europe/be.json index 3c154c10..15987399 100644 --- a/europe/be.json +++ b/europe/be.json @@ -884,7 +884,8 @@ "text": "Germany 17%, France 14%, Netherlands 13%, United Kingdom 8%, United States 6%, Italy 5% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "vaccines and cultures, cars, packaged medicines, refined petroleum, diamonds, natural gas (2021)" + "text": "vaccines and cultures, cars, packaged medicines, refined petroleum, diamonds, natural gas (2021)", + "note": "note: Belgian amphetamine production and MDMA (ecstasy) production remain significant illicit trade commodities" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1196,10 +1197,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "201" + "text": "199" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 19, container ship 7, general cargo 16, oil tanker 21, other 138 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 18, container ship 3, general cargo 15, oil tanker 23, other 140 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/bk.json b/europe/bk.json index 32c07777..f3f72a8a 100644 --- a/europe/bk.json +++ b/europe/bk.json @@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "48 (2022)" }, - "note": "note: 117,822 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-March 2023)" + "note": "note: 118,538 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-April 2023)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "

drug trafficking groups are major players in the procurement and transportation of large quantities of cocaine  destined for  European markets

" diff --git a/europe/bo.json b/europe/bo.json index 4434dc94..d83c216c 100644 --- a/europe/bo.json +++ b/europe/bo.json @@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ "text": "President Alyaksandr LUKASHENKA (since 20 July 1994)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Prime Minister Raman HALOWCHENKA (since 4 June 2020); First Deputy Prime Minister Mikalay SNAPKOW (since 4 June 2020); Deputy Prime Ministers Uladzimir KUKHARAW, Ihar PETRYSHENKA (since 18 August 2018), Yuryy NAZARAW (since 3 March 2020), Alyaksandr SUBOTSIN (since 4 June 2020)" + "text": "Prime Minister Roman GOLOVCHENKO (since 4 June 2020); First Deputy Prime Minister Mikalay SNAPKOW (since 4 June 2020); Deputy Prime Ministers Ihar PETRYSHENKA (since 18 August 2018), Anatol SIVAK (since 1 September 2020), Leanid ZAYATS (since 21 March 2022), Petr PARKHOMCHYK (since 16 August 2022)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Council of Ministers appointed by the president" @@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ "text": "bicameral National Assembly or Natsyyalny Skhod consists of:
Council of the Republic or Savet Respubliki (64 seats; 56 members indirectly elected by regional and Minsk city councils and 8 members appointed by the president; members serve 4-year terms)
House of Representatives or Palata Pradstawnikow (110 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed; members serve 4-year terms)" }, "elections": { - "text": "
Council of the Republic - indirect election last held on 7 November 2019
House of Representatives - last held on 17 November 2019 (next to be held in 2023); OSCE observers determined that the election was neither free nor impartial and that vote counting was problematic in a number of polling stations; pro-LUKASHENKA candidates won every seat; international observers determined that the previous elections, on 28 September 2008, 23 September 2012, and 11 September 2016 also fell short of democratic standards, with pro-LUKASHENKA candidates winning every, or virtually every, seat" + "text": "
Council of the Republic - indirect election last held on 7 November 2019
House of Representatives - last held on 17 November 2019 (next to be held in 2024); OSCE observers determined that the election was neither free nor impartial and that vote counting was problematic in a number of polling stations; pro-LUKASHENKA candidates won every seat; international observers determined that the previous elections, on 28 September 2008, 23 September 2012, and 11 September 2016 also fell short of democratic standards, with pro-LUKASHENKA candidates winning every, or virtually every, seat" }, "election results": { "text": "
Council of the Republic - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - NA
House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - KPB 11, Republican Party of Labor and Justice 6, BPP 2, LDP 1, BAP 1, independent 89; composition - men 66, women 44, percent of women 40%" @@ -595,14 +595,14 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "pro-government parties:
Belarusian Agrarian Party or BAP [Mikhail RUSY]
Belarusian Patriotic Party or BPP [Mikalay ULAKHOVICH]
Belarusian Social Sport Party or BSSP [Uladzimir ALEKSANDROVICH]
Communist Party of Belarus or KPB [Alyaksey SOKOL]
Liberal Democratic Party or LDP [Aleh GAYDUKEVICH]
Republican Party [Uladzimir BELAZOR]
Republican Party of Labor and Justice [Alyaksandr STSYAPANAW]
Social Democratic Party of Popular Accord [Syarhey YERMAK]
opposition parties:
Belarusian Christian Democracy Party [Paval SEVYARYNETS, Volha KAVALKOVA, Vital RYMASHEWSKI] (unregistered)
Belarusian Party of the Green [Dzimtry KUCHUK]
Belarusian Party of the Left \"Just World\" [Syarhey KALYAKIN]
Belarusian Social-Democratic Assembly of BSDH [Syarhey CHERACHEN]
Belarusian Social Democratic Party (\"Assembly\") or BSDPH [Ihar BARYSAW]
Belarusian Social Democratic Party (People's Assembly) or BSDP [Mikalay STATKEVICH] (unregistered)
BPF Party [Ryhor KASTUSYOW]
Christian Conservative Party or BPF [Zyanon PAZNYAK]
United Civic Party or UCP [Mikalay KAZLOW]" + "text": "pro-government parties:
Belarusian Agrarian Party or BAP [Mikhail RUSY]
Belarusian Patriotic Party or BPP [Mikalay ULAKHOVICH]
Belarusian Social Sport Party or BSSP [Uladzimir ALEKSANDROVICH]
Belaya Rus [Henadz DAVYDKA]
Communist Party of Belarus or KPB [Alyaksey SOKOL]
Liberal Democratic Party or LDP [Aleh GAYDUKEVICH]
Republican Party [Uladzimir BELAZOR]
Republican Party of Labor and Justice [Alyaksandr STSYAPANAW]
Social Democratic Party of Popular Accord [Syarhey YERMAK]
opposition parties:
Belarusian Christian Democracy Party [Paval SEVYARYNETS, Volha KAVALKOVA, Vital RYMASHEWSKI] (unregistered)
Belarusian Party of the Green [Dzimtry KUCHUK]
Belarusian Party of the Left \"Just World\" [Syarhey KALYAKIN]
Belarusian Social-Democratic Assembly of BSDH [Syarhey CHERACHEN]
Belarusian Social Democratic Party (\"Assembly\") or BSDPH [Ihar BARYSAW]
Belarusian Social Democratic Party (People's Assembly) or BSDP [Mikalay STATKEVICH] (unregistered)
BPF Party [Ryhor KASTUSYOW]
Christian Conservative Party - BPF [Zyanon PAZNYAK]
United Civic Party or UCP [Mikalay KAZLOW]" }, "International organization participation": { "text": "BSEC (observer), CBSS (observer), CEI, CIS, CSTO, EAEC, EAEU, EAPC, EBRD, FAO, GCTU, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, NSG, OPCW, OSCE, PCA, PFP, SCO (dialogue member), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer), ZC" }, "Diplomatic representation in the US": { "chief of mission": { - "text": "Ambassador (vacant; recalled by Belarus in 2008); Chargé d'Affaires Pavel SHIDLOVSKY (since 9 August 2022)" + "text": "Ambassador (vacant; recalled by Belarus in 2008); Chargé d'Affaires Pavel SHYDLOWSKI (since 9 August 2022)" }, "chancery": { "text": "1619 New Hampshire Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20009" @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ }, "Diplomatic representation from the US": { "chief of mission": { - "text": "Ambassador Julie FISHER (since 23 December 2020)" + "text": "Ambassador (vacant); Chargé d’affaires ad interim, Deputy Chief of Mission – Ruben HARUTUNIAN (since 9 June 2022)" }, "embassy": { "text": "46 Starovilenskaya Street, Minsk 220002" @@ -1220,7 +1220,7 @@ "text": "4" }, "by type": { - "text": "other 4 (2021)" + "text": "other 4 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/bu.json b/europe/bu.json index aaa2fb05..d1d943b0 100644 --- a/europe/bu.json +++ b/europe/bu.json @@ -573,13 +573,13 @@ }, "Legislative branch": { "description": { - "text": "unicameral National Assembly or Narodno Sabranie (240 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote to serve 4-year terms)" + "text": "unicameral National Assembly or Narodno Sabranie (240 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by open list, proportional representation vote to serve 4-year terms)" }, "elections": { "text": "last held on 2 April 2023 (next election to be held in 2027)" }, "election results": { - "text": "percent of vote by party/coalition - GERB-SDS 25.4%, PP-DB 23.5%, Revival 13.6%, DPS 13.2%, BSP for Bulgaria 8.6%, ITN 3.9%, other 11.8%; seats by party/coalition GERB-SDS 69, PP-DB 64, Revival 37, DPS 36, BSP for Bulgaria 23, ITN 11; composition - men NA, women NA, percent of women NA%" + "text": "percent of vote by party/coalition - GERB-SDS 25.4%, PP-DB 23.5%, Revival 13.6%, DPS 13.2%, BSP for Bulgaria 8.6%, ITN 3.9%, other 11.8%; seats by party/coalition GERB-SDS 69, PP-DB 64, Revival 37, DPS 36, BSP for Bulgaria 23, ITN 11; composition - men 182, women 58, percent of women 24.2%" } }, "Judicial branch": { @@ -897,7 +897,8 @@ "text": "Germany 16%, Romania 8%, Italy 7%, Turkey 7%, Greece 6% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "copper, wheat, electricity, refined petroleum, packaged medicines (2021)" + "text": "copper, wheat, electricity, refined petroleum, packaged medicines (2021)", + "note": "note: Bulgarian amphetamine production remains a significant illicit trade export" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1213,10 +1214,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "79" + "text": "80" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 4, general cargo 14, oil tanker 8, other 53 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 3, general cargo 14, oil tanker 8, other 55 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/cy.json b/europe/cy.json index fc8fc1a5..0db9c8f5 100644 --- a/europe/cy.json +++ b/europe/cy.json @@ -1193,10 +1193,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "1,051" + "text": "1,030" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 269, container ship 182, general cargo 197, oil tanker 59, other 344 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 255, container ship 169, general cargo 200, oil tanker 61, other 345 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/da.json b/europe/da.json index 8bfbde77..8efe110f 100644 --- a/europe/da.json +++ b/europe/da.json @@ -1187,10 +1187,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "717" + "text": "731" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 8, container ship 148, general cargo 68, oil tanker 105, other 388 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 13, container ship 137, general cargo 70, oil tanker 118, other 393 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/ee.json b/europe/ee.json index 51e70f12..4e730251 100644 --- a/europe/ee.json +++ b/europe/ee.json @@ -607,10 +607,10 @@ "note": "note: external exports, excluding intra-EU trade" }, "Exports - partners": { - "text": "U.S. 20.7%, China 9.6%, Switzerland 8.1%, Turkey 4.4%, Russia 4.1% (2016 est.)" + "text": "United States 18%, United Kingdom 13%, China 10%, Switzerland 7%, Russia 4% (2021)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "machinery, motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals and other chemicals, fuels, aircraft, plastics, iron and steel, wood pulp and paper products, alcoholic beverages, furniture" + "text": "cars and vehicle parts, packaged medicines, vaccines and cultures, refined petroleum, aircraft, integrated circuits, medical instruments, gas turbines (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -625,10 +625,10 @@ "note": "note: external imports, excluding intra-EU trade" }, "Imports - partners": { - "text": "China 20.1%, United States 14.5%, Switzerland 7.1%, Russia 6.3% (2016 est.)" + "text": "China 22%, United States 11%, United Kingdom 8%, Russia 7%, Switzerland 6% (2021)" }, "Imports - commodities": { - "text": "fuels and crude oil, machinery, vehicles, pharmaceuticals and other chemicals, precious gemstones, textiles, aircraft, plastics, metals, ships" + "text": "crude petroleum, natural gas, refined petroleum, cars, broadcasting equipment, vaccines and cultures, computers (2021)" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2014": { diff --git a/europe/ei.json b/europe/ei.json index be5c20fb..d224faf7 100644 --- a/europe/ei.json +++ b/europe/ei.json @@ -436,13 +436,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "631 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "990 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "51 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "520 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "179 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "40 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1186,7 +1186,7 @@ "text": "96" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 12, general cargo 36, oil tanker 1, other 47 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 12, general cargo 34, oil tanker 1, other 49 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/en.json b/europe/en.json index eaaa4b49..ca9ef48f 100644 --- a/europe/en.json +++ b/europe/en.json @@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ "text": "Finland 13%, Sweden 9%, Latvia 8%, Russia 8%, United States 7%, Lithuania 6%, Germany 6% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "broadcasting equipment, refined petroleum, coal tar oil, cars, prefabricated buildings (2019)" + "text": "broadcasting equipment, coal tar oil, refined petroleum, cars, prefabricated buildings, lumber (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1215,10 +1215,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "68" + "text": "70" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 2, oil tanker 4, other 62 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 2, oil tanker 3, other 65 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/fi.json b/europe/fi.json index 60c128fd..8b26d9fd 100644 --- a/europe/fi.json +++ b/europe/fi.json @@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Aland Coalition (a coalition of several political parties on the Aland Islands)
Center Party or Kesk [Annika SAARIKKO]
Christian Democrats or KD [Sari ESSAYAH]
Finns Party or PS [Riikka PURRA]
Green League or Vihr [Maria OHISALO]
Left Alliance or Vas [Li ANDERSSON]
Movement Now or Liike Nyt [Harry HARKINO]
National Coalition Party or Kok [Petteri ORPO]
Social Democratic Party or SDP [Sanna MARIN]
Swedish People's Party or RKP or SFP [Anna-Maja HENRIKSSON]" + "text": "Aland Coalition (a coalition of several political parties on the Aland Islands)
Center Party or Kesk [Annika SAARIKKO]
Christian Democrats or KD [Sari ESSAYAH]
Finns Party or PS [Riikka PURRA]
Green League or Vihr 
Left Alliance or Vas [Li ANDERSSON]
Movement Now or Liike Nyt [Harry HARKINO]
National Coalition Party or Kok [Petteri ORPO]
Social Democratic Party or SDP [Sanna MARIN]
Swedish People's Party or RKP or SFP [Anna-Maja HENRIKSSON]" }, "International organization participation": { "text": "ADB (nonregional member), AfDB (nonregional member), Arctic Council, Australia Group, BIS, CBSS, CD, CE, CERN, EAPC, EBRD, ECB, EIB, EITI (implementing country), EMU, ESA, EU, FAO, FATF, G-9, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IEA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINUSMA, NATO, NC, NEA, NIB, NSG, OAS (observer), OECD, OPCW, OSCE, Pacific Alliance (observer), Paris Club, PCA, PFP, Schengen Convention, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNHRC, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNMIL, UNMOGIP, UNRWA, UNSOM, UNTSO, UPU, Wassenaar Arrangement, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO, ZC" @@ -893,7 +893,7 @@ "text": "Germany 14%, Sweden 10%, United States 8%, Netherlands 6%, China 6%, Russia 5% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "refined petroleum, paper and wood pulp products, cars, stainless steel, lumber (2019)" + "text": "refined petroleum, kaolin coated paper, cars, lumber, stainless steel, wood pulp (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1212,10 +1212,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "272" + "text": "278" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 9, container ship 1, general cargo 74, oil tanker 4, other 184 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 9, container ship 1, general cargo 74, oil tanker 5, other 189 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/fo.json b/europe/fo.json index b25d06b9..c8b1dc45 100644 --- a/europe/fo.json +++ b/europe/fo.json @@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ "text": "Russia 26.4%, UK 14.1%, Germany 8.4%, China 7.9%, Spain 6.8%, Denmark 6.2%, US 4.7%, Poland 4.4%, Norway 4.1% (2017)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "fish and fish products (97%) (2017 est.)" + "text": "fish and fish products (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2016": { @@ -911,10 +911,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "101" + "text": "91" }, "by type": { - "text": "container ships 6, general cargo 48, oil tanker 1, other 46 (2021)" + "text": "container ships 6, general cargo 43, other 42 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/fr.json b/europe/fr.json index 3fdd31a9..43a192c9 100644 --- a/europe/fr.json +++ b/europe/fr.json @@ -932,7 +932,7 @@ "text": "Germany 14%, United States 8%, Italy 7%, Spain 7%, Belgium 7%, United Kingdom 7% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "aircraft, packaged medicines, cars and vehicle parts, gas turbines, wine (2019)" + "text": "aircraft, packaged medicines, cars and vehicle parts, wine, beauty products, gas turbines (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1259,10 +1259,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "548" + "text": "549" }, "by type": { - "text": "container ship 29, general cargo 50, oil tanker 28, other 441 (2021)" + "text": "container ship 32, general cargo 49, oil tanker 26, other 442 (2022)" }, "note": "note: includes Monaco" }, diff --git a/europe/gi.json b/europe/gi.json index dbaacc1c..dd576687 100644 --- a/europe/gi.json +++ b/europe/gi.json @@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ "text": "Poland 31%, Netherlands 27%, France 11%, Germany 8%, United States 6% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "cars, ships, refined petroleum, fish, recreational boats (2019)" + "text": "cars and vehicle parts, ships, refined petroleum, recreational boats, designer watches (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2004": { @@ -806,10 +806,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "202" + "text": "155" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 8, container ship 19, general cargo 55, oil tanker 20, other 100 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 8, container ship 12, general cargo 36, oil tanker 16, other 83 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/gk.json b/europe/gk.json index c2a8251c..0d0a33c7 100644 --- a/europe/gk.json +++ b/europe/gk.json @@ -467,9 +467,13 @@ "text": "$2.742 billion (2005 est.)" }, "Inflation rate (consumer prices)": { + "Inflation rate (consumer prices) 2022": { + "text": "6.8% (2022 est.)" + }, "Inflation rate (consumer prices) June 2006": { "text": "3.4% (June 2006 est.)" - } + }, + "note": "note: data represent Retail Price Index inflation rates" }, "GDP - composition, by sector of origin": { "agriculture": { diff --git a/europe/gm.json b/europe/gm.json index 82ed1d18..72f32483 100644 --- a/europe/gm.json +++ b/europe/gm.json @@ -474,13 +474,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "10.4 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "10.4 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "17.68 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "17.68 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "400 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "400 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -909,7 +909,7 @@ "text": "United States 9%, China 8%, France 8%, Netherlands 6%, United Kingdom 6%  (2020)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "cars and vehicle parts, packaged medicines, medical cultures/vaccines, aircraft, industrial machinery (2020)" + "text": "cars and vehicle parts, packaged medicines, medical cultures/vaccines, aircraft, industrial machinery, medical instruments (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1015,7 +1015,8 @@ }, "biomass and waste": { "text": "10.4% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" - } + }, + "note": "note: as of April 2023, Germany has closed its three remaining nuclear power plants" }, "Coal": { "production": { @@ -1229,10 +1230,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "599" + "text": "592" }, "by type": { - "text": "container ship 77, general cargo 85, oil tanker 36, other 401 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 1, container ship 72, general cargo 79, oil tanker 34, other 406 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/gr.json b/europe/gr.json index b92a6ae4..a5045947 100644 --- a/europe/gr.json +++ b/europe/gr.json @@ -446,13 +446,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "1.69 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "1.69 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "320 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "330 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "8.11 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "8.11 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -886,7 +886,7 @@ "text": "Italy 10%, Germany 7%, Turkey 5%, Cyprus 5%, Bulgaria 5% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "refined petroleum, packaged medicines, aluminum plating, computers, cotton (2019)" + "text": "refined petroleum, packaged medicines, aluminum plating, cotton, cheese, copper piping (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1198,10 +1198,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "1,236" + "text": "1,234" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 158, container ship 5, general cargo 89, oil tanker 337, other 647 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 146, container ship 5, general cargo 83, oil tanker 311, other 689 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/hr.json b/europe/hr.json index 19be56bb..c1da578c 100644 --- a/europe/hr.json +++ b/europe/hr.json @@ -1228,10 +1228,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "354" + "text": "376" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 14, general cargo 32, oil tanker 16, other 292 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 12, general cargo 33, oil tanker 14, other 317 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/hu.json b/europe/hu.json index 172d13c9..56f57261 100644 --- a/europe/hu.json +++ b/europe/hu.json @@ -475,13 +475,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "640 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "660 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "3.22 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "3.45 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "490 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "550 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1230,7 +1230,7 @@ "text": "1" }, "by type": { - "text": "other 1 (2021)" + "text": "other 1 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/ic.json b/europe/ic.json index f5806033..933889bd 100644 --- a/europe/ic.json +++ b/europe/ic.json @@ -437,10 +437,10 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "80 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "80 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "200 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "200 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { "text": "300,000 cubic meters (2017 est.)" @@ -1152,10 +1152,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "41" + "text": "40" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 5, oil tanker 2, other 34 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 5, oil tanker 2, other 33 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/it.json b/europe/it.json index e9a279f8..c24bfb6b 100644 --- a/europe/it.json +++ b/europe/it.json @@ -449,13 +449,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "9.488 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "9.19 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "7.7 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "7.7 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "17 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "17 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1207,10 +1207,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "1,296" + "text": "1,266" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 36, container ship 7, general cargo 111, oil tanker 103, other 1,039 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 20, container ship 6, general cargo 107, oil tanker 102, other 1,031 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1288,7 +1288,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "3,000 (2022)" }, - "note": "note: 724,284 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-April 2023)" + "note": "note: 727,542 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-April 2023)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "important gateway for drug trafficking; organized crime groups allied with Colombian and Spanish groups trafficking cocaine to Europe" diff --git a/europe/lg.json b/europe/lg.json index f4f5de2e..c746bf07 100644 --- a/europe/lg.json +++ b/europe/lg.json @@ -464,13 +464,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "94.4 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "90 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "25.2 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "40 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "61.5 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "60 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1116,10 +1116,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "1,663,739 (July 2022 est.)" + "text": "1.729 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "89.8% (July 2022 est.)" + "text": "91% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1207,10 +1207,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "70" + "text": "80" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 22, oil tanker 9, other 39 (2021)" + "text": "container ship 2, general cargo 30, oil tanker 9, other 39 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/lh.json b/europe/lh.json index 8eed9579..d87425b5 100644 --- a/europe/lh.json +++ b/europe/lh.json @@ -467,13 +467,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "130.4 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "140 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "69.7 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "60 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "58.9 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "60 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1125,10 +1125,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "2,603,900 (July 2022 est.)" + "text": "2.436 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "97.8% (July 2022 est.)" + "text": "87% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1216,10 +1216,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "64" + "text": "62" }, "by type": { - "text": "container ship 4, general cargo 24, oil tanker 2, other 34 (2021)" + "text": "container ship 4, general cargo 22, oil tanker 2, other 34 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/lo.json b/europe/lo.json index 5b520595..d11c3e13 100644 --- a/europe/lo.json +++ b/europe/lo.json @@ -1105,10 +1105,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "4,917,528 (July 2022 est.)" + "text": "4.806 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "90% (July 2022 est.)" + "text": "89% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { diff --git a/europe/ls.json b/europe/ls.json index 5ce70545..f4ec59e9 100644 --- a/europe/ls.json +++ b/europe/ls.json @@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "7.9 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "10 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -769,10 +769,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "37,260 (2019 est.)" + "text": "37,440 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "98% (2019 est.)" + "text": "96% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -813,7 +813,7 @@ "text": "20" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 16, general cargo 1, other 3 (includes Switzerland) (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 16, general cargo 1, other 3 (includes Switzerland) (2022)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/lu.json b/europe/lu.json index 407925b6..5d7ed2f6 100644 --- a/europe/lu.json +++ b/europe/lu.json @@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "43.6 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "50 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { "text": "1.6 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" @@ -1080,10 +1080,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "624,115 (2020 est.)" + "text": "633,600 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "99% (2020 est.)" + "text": "99% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1153,10 +1153,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "153" + "text": "149" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 4, container ship 1, general cargo 23, oil tanker 3, other 122 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 4, container ship 1, general cargo 27, oil tanker 3, other 114 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/md.json b/europe/md.json index 1ee196e9..c9b9aea5 100644 --- a/europe/md.json +++ b/europe/md.json @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ }, "Languages": { "Languages": { - "text": "Moldovan/Romanian 80.2% (official) (56.7% identify their mother tongue as Moldovan, which is virtually the same as Romanian; 23.5% identify Romanian as their mother tongue), Russian 9.7%, Gagauz 4.2% (a Turkish language), Ukrainian 3.9%, Bulgarian 1.5%, Romani 0.3%, other 0.2% (2014 est.); note - data represent mother tongue" + "text": "Moldovan/Romanian 80.2% (official) (56.7% identify their mother tongue as Moldovan, which is virtually the same as Romanian; 23.5% identify Romanian as their mother tongue), Russian 9.7%, Gagauz 4.2% (a Turkish language), Ukrainian 3.9%, Bulgarian 1.5%, Romani 0.3%, other 0.2% (2014 est.); note - data represent mother tongue; as of March 2023, Romanian replaced Moldovan as the name of Moldova's official language" }, "major-language sample(s)": { "text": "
Cartea informativa a lumii, sursa indispensabila pentru informatii de baza. (Moldovan/Romanian)

The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information." @@ -451,13 +451,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "148 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "160 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "650 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "580 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "42 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "60 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1095,10 +1095,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "3,067,466 (July 2022 est.)" + "text": "1.891 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "76.3% (July 2022 est.)" + "text": "61% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1186,10 +1186,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "147" + "text": "126" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 5, container ship 5, general cargo 97, oil tanker 7, other 33 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 5, container ship 2, general cargo 79, oil tanker 7, other 33 (2022)" } } }, diff --git a/europe/mj.json b/europe/mj.json index 1debbae7..f53c0957 100644 --- a/europe/mj.json +++ b/europe/mj.json @@ -493,10 +493,10 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "96.4 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "100 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "62.8 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "60 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { "text": "1.7 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" @@ -1143,10 +1143,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "484,619 (2020 est.)" + "text": "516,600 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "78% (2020 est.)" + "text": "82% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1220,10 +1220,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "17" + "text": "18" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 4, other 13 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 4, other 14 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1280,7 +1280,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "468 (2022)" }, - "note": "note: 29,905 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-March 2023)" + "note": "note: 29,948 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-April 2023)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "

drug trafficking groups are major players in the procurement and transportation of large quantities of cocaine  destined for  European markets

" diff --git a/europe/mk.json b/europe/mk.json index 01d63f01..e2d27c22 100644 --- a/europe/mk.json +++ b/europe/mk.json @@ -443,13 +443,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "277.5 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "310 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "225,809,581.6 cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "20 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "329,217,707.7 cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "140 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1096,10 +1096,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "1,678,750 (2020 est.)" + "text": "1.743 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "81% (2020 est.)" + "text": "83% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { diff --git a/europe/mn.json b/europe/mn.json index 8fc58af0..3c7759a1 100644 --- a/europe/mn.json +++ b/europe/mn.json @@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "5 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "10 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { "text": "0 cubic meters (2017 est.)" @@ -777,10 +777,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "37,798 (2019 est.)" + "text": "31,820 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "97% (2019 est.)" + "text": "86% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { diff --git a/europe/mt.json b/europe/mt.json index 1aecb215..0ca4a612 100644 --- a/europe/mt.json +++ b/europe/mt.json @@ -440,13 +440,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "37.4 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "40 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "1 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "25.4 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "20 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1078,10 +1078,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "448,339 (2020 est.)" + "text": "461,100 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "87% (2020 est.)" + "text": "87% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1144,10 +1144,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "2,137" + "text": "2,047" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 601, container ship 310, general cargo 218, oil tanker 412, other 596 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 545, container ship 312, general cargo 182, oil tanker 395, other 613 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/nl.json b/europe/nl.json index 8cf9c9c6..3dc69634 100644 --- a/europe/nl.json +++ b/europe/nl.json @@ -458,13 +458,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "1.26 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "2.05 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "14.74 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "5.94 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "76.5 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "31 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1117,10 +1117,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "15,871,765 (2020 est.)" + "text": "16.56 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "91% (2020 est.)" + "text": "92% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1205,10 +1205,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "1,199" + "text": "1,175" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 10, container ship 40, general cargo 559, oil tanker 26, other 564 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 11, container ship 37, general cargo 543, oil tanker 26, other 558 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/no.json b/europe/no.json index d8fb9910..25f7be5c 100644 --- a/europe/no.json +++ b/europe/no.json @@ -451,13 +451,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "775.3 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "780 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "1.071 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1.07 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "844.9 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "840 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1104,10 +1104,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "5,218,091 (2020 est.)" + "text": "5.346 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "97% (2020 est.)" + "text": "99% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1183,10 +1183,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "1,644" + "text": "1,710" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 109, container ship 1, general cargo 242, oil tanker 96, other 1,196 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 105, container ship 1, general cargo 273, oil tanker 95, other 1,236 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/pl.json b/europe/pl.json index d9f23903..0bea3438 100644 --- a/europe/pl.json +++ b/europe/pl.json @@ -1143,10 +1143,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "31,456,228 (2020 est.)" + "text": "32.3 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "83% (2020 est.)" + "text": "85% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1240,10 +1240,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "143" + "text": "149" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 7, oil tanker 6, other 130 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 7, oil tanker 6, other 136 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/po.json b/europe/po.json index 7bf98ea7..d116c06c 100644 --- a/europe/po.json +++ b/europe/po.json @@ -1109,10 +1109,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "8,031,723 (2020 est.)" + "text": "8.2 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "78% (2020 est.)" + "text": "82% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1200,10 +1200,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "726" + "text": "820" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 86, container ship 267, general cargo 137, oil tanker 27, other 209 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 103, container ship 290, general cargo 175, oil tanker 28, other 224 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/ri.json b/europe/ri.json index be64576f..849b1146 100644 --- a/europe/ri.json +++ b/europe/ri.json @@ -1141,10 +1141,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "5,381,318 (2020 est.)" + "text": "5.589 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "78% (2020 est.)" + "text": "81% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1292,7 +1292,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "2,594 (includes stateless persons in Kosovo) (2022)" }, - "note": "note: 948,336 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-March 2023); Serbia is predominantly a transit country and hosts an estimated 7,271 migrants and asylum seekers as of November 2022" + "note": "note: 951,905 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-March 2023); Serbia is predominantly a transit country and hosts an estimated 7,271 migrants and asylum seekers as of November 2022" }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { diff --git a/europe/ro.json b/europe/ro.json index 52240044..c735c574 100644 --- a/europe/ro.json +++ b/europe/ro.json @@ -1122,10 +1122,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "15,020,866 (2020 est.)" + "text": "15.96 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "78% (2020 est.)" + "text": "84% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1213,10 +1213,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "121" + "text": "125" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 11, oil tanker 6, other 104 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 11, oil tanker 6, other 108 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1282,7 +1282,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "297 (2022)" }, - "note": "note: 12,969 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-March 2023)" + "note": "note: 13,070 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-April 2023)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "

a source country for cannabis

" diff --git a/europe/si.json b/europe/si.json index a8519104..55e61c1a 100644 --- a/europe/si.json +++ b/europe/si.json @@ -1099,10 +1099,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "1,829,105 (2020 est.)" + "text": "1.869 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "87% (2020 est.)" + "text": "89% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1187,7 +1187,7 @@ "text": "9" }, "by type": { - "text": "other 9 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 1, other 8 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "10 (2020)" }, - "note": "note:  572,520 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-February 2023)" + "note": "note:  575,533 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-March 2023)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "minor transit point for cocaine and Southwest Asian heroin bound for Western Europe, and for precursor chemicals" diff --git a/europe/sm.json b/europe/sm.json index 6f533f3d..3532f9b1 100644 --- a/europe/sm.json +++ b/europe/sm.json @@ -837,10 +837,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "20,318 (2019 est.)" + "text": "25,500 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "60% (2019 est.)" + "text": "75% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { diff --git a/europe/sp.json b/europe/sp.json index c1c21cf4..6d989627 100644 --- a/europe/sp.json +++ b/europe/sp.json @@ -1122,10 +1122,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "44,047,980 (2020 est.)" + "text": "44.18 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "93% (2020 est.)" + "text": "94% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1213,10 +1213,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "478" + "text": "494" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 1, general cargo 36, oil tanker 24, other 417 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 1, general cargo 35, oil tanker 23, other 435 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1292,7 +1292,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "6,489 (2022)" }, - "note": "note: 283,183 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals, including Canary Islands (January 2015-March 2023)" + "note": "note: 283,666 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals, including Canary Islands (January 2015-April 2023)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "primary transit point in Europe for cocaine from South America and for hashish from Morocco; cocaine is shipped in raw or liquid form with mixed cargo to avoid detection; traffickers ship methamphetamine via express mail; increasing indoor cannabis production; illegal labs cutting, mixing, and reconstituting cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine labs; synthetic drugs, including ketamine and MDMA (ecstasy) transit from Spain to the US" diff --git a/europe/sw.json b/europe/sw.json index 1046eb1c..81a2a0f7 100644 --- a/europe/sw.json +++ b/europe/sw.json @@ -1110,10 +1110,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "9,835,769 (2020 est.)" + "text": "8.8 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "95% (2020 est.)" + "text": "88% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1202,10 +1202,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "370" + "text": "368" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 49, oil tanker 22, other 299 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 46, oil tanker 21, other 301 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/sz.json b/europe/sz.json index 0369b9ad..40795b41 100644 --- a/europe/sz.json +++ b/europe/sz.json @@ -1124,10 +1124,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "8,118,367 (2020 est.)" + "text": "8.352 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "94% (2020 est.)" + "text": "96% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ "text": "20" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 16, general cargo 1, other 3 (includes Liechtenstein) (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 16, general cargo 1, other 3 (includes Liechtenstein) (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/uk.json b/europe/uk.json index 5c3716e3..5e9b832c 100644 --- a/europe/uk.json +++ b/europe/uk.json @@ -1117,10 +1117,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "63,854,528 (2020 est.)" + "text": "64.99 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "95% (2020 est.)" + "text": "97% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1214,10 +1214,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "1,249" + "text": "1,174" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 140, container ship 59, general cargo 109, oil tanker 84, other 857 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 133, container ship 58, general cargo 97, oil tanker 73, other 813 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/europe/up.json b/europe/up.json index 4980f15c..6582f79b 100644 --- a/europe/up.json +++ b/europe/up.json @@ -1133,10 +1133,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "40,912,381 (July 2022 est.)" + "text": "3.239 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "94.5% (July 2022 est.)" + "text": "79% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1239,10 +1239,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "409" + "text": "410" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 1, container ship 1, general cargo 84, oil tanker 15, other 308 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 1, container ship 1, general cargo 84, oil tanker 15, other 309 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/middle-east/ae.json b/middle-east/ae.json index 9c8248dc..d376988f 100644 --- a/middle-east/ae.json +++ b/middle-east/ae.json @@ -1078,10 +1078,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "9,890,400 (2020 est.)" + "text": "9.4 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "100% (2020 est.)" + "text": "100% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1170,10 +1170,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "623" + "text": "636" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 1, container ship 3, general cargo 117, oil tanker 19, other 483 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 2, container ship 3, general cargo 121, oil tanker 16, other 494 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1190,8 +1190,8 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "United Arab Emirates Armed Forces: Land Forces, Navy Forces, Air Force, Presidential Guard (includes special operations forces); Ministry of Interior: Critical Infrastructure and Coastal Patrol Agency (CICPA) (2022)", - "note": "note: each emirate maintains a local police force called a general directorate, which is officially a branch of the federal Ministry of Interior; all emirate-level general directorates of police enforce their respective emirate’s laws autonomously; they also enforce federal laws within their emirate in coordination with one another under the federal ministry" + "text": "United Arab Emirates Armed Forces: Land Forces, Navy Forces, Air Force, Presidential Guard (includes special operations forces); Ministry of Interior: Coast Guard Forces, Critical Infrastructure and Coastal Patrol Agency (CICPA) (2023)", + "note": "note: each emirate maintains a local police force called a general directorate, which is officially a branch of the federal Ministry of Interior; all emirate-level general directorates of police enforce their respective emirate’s laws autonomously; they also enforce federal laws within their emirate in coordination with one another under the federal ministry; the State Security Directorate (SSD) in Abu Dhabi and Dubai State Security (DSS) have primary responsible for counterterrorism law enforcement efforts; local, emirate-level police forces, especially Abu Dhabi Police and Dubai Police, are the first responders in such cases and provide technical assistance to SSD and DSS " }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2020": { @@ -1214,17 +1214,18 @@ "text": "approximately 65,000 active personnel (45,000 Land Forces; 3,000 Navy; 5,000 Air Force; 12,000 Presidential Guard) (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the military's inventory is comprised of wide variety of mostly modern imported equipment; over the past decade, the UAE has acquired military equipment from more than 20 countries with France, Russia, and the US as the leading suppliers; in recent years, the UAE has tried to boost its domestic defense industry (2022)" + "text": "the military's inventory is comprised of a wide variety of mostly modern imported equipment; over the past decade, the UAE has acquired military equipment from more than 20 countries with France, Russia, and the US as the leading suppliers; in recent years, the UAE has tried to boost its domestic defense industry (2023)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18-30 years of age for compulsory military service for men (compulsory service initiated in 2014); 17 years of age for volunteers with parental approval; men can volunteer up to age 40; 24-month general service obligation, 16 months for secondary school graduates; women can volunteer to serve for 9 months regardless of education (2022)", - "note": "note 1: compulsory service may be completed in the uniformed military, the Ministry of Interior, the State Security Service, or other institutions designated by the military leadership

note 2: the UAE military employs a considerable number—estimates range from a low of about 30% to as much as 70% of the force—of foreign personnel on contract; the UAE has also hired foreign mercenaries for some operations during its intervention in Yemen" + "note": "note 1: compulsory service may be completed in the uniformed military, the Ministry of Interior, or other security institutions designated by the military leadership

note 2: the UAE military employs a considerable number—estimates range from a low of about 30% to as much as 70% of the force—of foreign personnel on contract; the UAE has also hired foreign mercenaries for some operations during its intervention in Yemen" }, "Military deployments": { - "text": "estimates vary; reportedly a few hundred remain in Yemen; has maintained some troops at military bases in Eritrea and Somalia (Somaliland) (2022)" + "text": "estimates vary; reportedly a few hundred remain in Yemen; has maintained some troops at military bases in Eritrea and Somalia (Somaliland) (2022)", + "note": "note: in 2015, UAE intervened militarily in Yemen as part of the Saudi-led coalition in support of the Republic of Yemen Government with an estimated 3,500 troops, as well as supporting air and naval forces; UAE withdrew its main military force from Yemen in 2019, but has retained a small military presence while working with proxies in southern Yemen, most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the UAE hosts a multi-service French military base, which includes the French naval command for the Indian Ocean (ALINDIEN); the UAE has a defense cooperation agreement with the US and hosts about 3,500 US troops, mostly air and naval personnel

in 2015, UAE intervened militarily in Yemen as part of the Saudi-led coalition in support of the Republic of Yemen Government with an estimated 3,500 troops, as well as supporting air and naval forces; UAE withdrew its main military force from Yemen in 2019, but has retained a small military presence while working with proxies in southern Yemen, most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC)

the UAE's military traces its origins to the establishment of the Trucial Oman Scouts in 1951, a joint UK-Abu Dhabi organization modeled after Jordan’s Arab Legion, which became the Abu Dhabi Defense Force in 1965; the modern Emirati armed forces were formed in 1976 (2022)" + "text": "the UAE hosts a multi-service French military base, which includes the French naval command for the Indian Ocean (ALINDIEN); the UAE has a defense cooperation agreement with the US and hosts about 3,500 US troops, mostly air and naval personnel

the UAE's military traces its origins to the establishment of the Trucial Oman Scouts in 1951, a joint UK-Abu Dhabi organization modeled after Jordan’s Arab Legion, which became the Abu Dhabi Defense Force in 1965; the modern Emirati armed forces were formed in 1976 (2022)" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/middle-east/aj.json b/middle-east/aj.json index 4c250fb2..321f24de 100644 --- a/middle-east/aj.json +++ b/middle-east/aj.json @@ -552,13 +552,13 @@ "text": "President Ilham ALIYEV (since 31 October 2003); First Vice President Mehriban ALIYEVA (since 21 February 2017)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Prime Minister Ali ASADOV (since 8 October 2019); First Deputy Prime Minister Yaqub EYYUBOV (since June 2006)" + "text": "Prime Minister Ali ASADOV (since 8 October 2019); First Deputy Prime Minister Yaqub EYYUBOV (since 13 February 2003)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Council of Ministers appointed by the president and confirmed by the National Assembly" }, "elections/appointments": { - "text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds (if needed) for a 7-year term; a single individual is eligible for unlimited terms; election last held on 11 April 2018 (next to be held in 2025); prime minister and first deputy prime minister appointed by the president and confirmed by the National Assembly; note - a constitutional amendment approved in a September 2016 referendum expanded the presidential term from 5 to 7 years; a separate constitutional amendment approved in the same referendum also introduced the post of first vice-president and additional vice-presidents, who are directly appointed by the president" + "text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds (if needed) for a 7-year term; a single individual is eligible for unlimited terms; election last held on 11 April 2018 (next to be held in 2025); prime minister and first deputy prime minister appointed by the president and confirmed by the National Assembly; note - a constitutional amendment approved in a September 2016 referendum extended the presidential term from 5 to 7 years; a separate constitutional amendment approved in the same referendum also introduced the post of first vice-president and additional vice-presidents, who are directly appointed by the president; however, no additional vice-presidents have been appointed since the constitutional amendment was passed" }, "election results": { "text": "Ilham ALIYEV reelected president (11 April 2018) in first round; percent of vote - Ilham ALIYEV (YAP) 86%, Zahid ORUJ (independent) 3.1%, other 10.9%" @@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Azerbaijan Democratic Enlightenment Party or ADMP [Elshan MASAYEV]
Civic Solidarity Party or VHP [Sabir RUSTAMKHANLI]
Civic Unity Party or CUP [Sabir HAJIYEV]
Great Order Party [Fazil MUSTAFA]
Islamic Party of Azerbaijan or AiP [Mavsum SAMADOV]
Musavat [Arif HAJILI]
Popular Front Party [Ali KARIMLI]
Motherland Party or AVP [Fazail AGAMALI]
National Front Party [Razi NURULLAYEV]
National Revival Movement Party [Faraj GULIYEV]
Party for Democratic Reforms or PDR [Asim MOLLAZADE]
Republican Alternative Party or REAL [Ilgar MAMMADOV]
Social Democratic Party [Ayaz MUTALIBOV]
Social Prosperity Party [Asli KAZIMOVA]
Unity Party or VP [Tahir KARIMLI]
Whole Azerbaijan Popular Front Party [Gudrat HASANGULIYEV]
New Azerbaijan Party (Yeni Azərbaycan Partiyasi) or YAP [Ilham ALIYEV]" + "text": "Azerbaijan Democratic Enlightenment Party or ADMP [Elshan MASAYEV]
Civic Solidarity Party or VHP [Sabir RUSTAMKHANLI]
Civic Unity Party or VBP [Sabir HAJIYEV]
Great Order Party [Fazil MUSTAFA]
Islamic Party of Azerbaijan or AiP [Mavsum SAMADOV]
Musavat (Equity) Party [Arif HAJILI]
Popular Front Party [Ali KARIMLI]
Motherland Party or AVP [Fazail AGAMALI]
National Front Party [Razi NURULLAYEV]
National Revival Movement Party [Faraj GULIYEV]
Party for Democratic Reforms or DIP [Asim MOLLAZADE]
Republican Alternative Party or REAL [Ilgar MAMMADOV]
Social Democratic Party [Ayaz MUTALIBOV]
Social Prosperity Party [Asli KAZIMOVA]
Unity Party or VP [Tahir KARIMLI]
Whole Azerbaijan Popular Front Party [Gudrat HASANGULIYEV]
New Azerbaijan Party (Yeni Azərbaycan Partiyasi) or YAP [Ilham ALIYEV]" }, "International organization participation": { "text": "ADB, BSEC, CD, CE, CICA, CIS, EAPC, EBRD, ECO, FAO, GCTU, GUAM, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OAS (observer), OIC, OPCW, OSCE, PFP, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)" @@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ }, "Diplomatic representation from the US": { "chief of mission": { - "text": "Ambassador Lee LITZENBERGER (since 12 March 2019)" + "text": "Ambassador (vacant); Chargé d'Affaires ad interium (since 29 June 2022)" }, "embassy": { "text": "111 Azadlig Avenue, AZ1007 Baku" @@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@ "text": "in spite of the telecom sector being one of the major contributors to Azerbaijan’s non-oil GDP, overall development, growth, and investment in the sector has been held back by years of political and civil unrest coupled with endemic corruption; mobile penetration rates reached 100% as far back as 2011 but have largely stagnated since then; the Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) are slowly extending the reach of their LTE networks around the country, and this increased coverage (along with access to faster data-based services) is expected to produce a moderate resurgence for both mobile and mobile broadband over the next few years as customers migrate from 3G to 4G. 5G services are still some ways off, as the demand for high-speed data and fast broadband can easily be met by existing capacity on LTE networks; fixed-line teledensity continues to drop down each year as customers consolidate their telecommunications services around the mobile platform; the rate of decline is comparatively slower than other countries, since Azerbaijan has a relatively high proportion of (87%) of fixed-line broadband customers still on DSL; fiber is gradually being rolled out in urban areas, and this makes up the bulk of the growth being seen in the overall fixed broadband market; DSL’s predominance, however, will serve to keep Azerbaijan’s average access speeds in the sub-10Mbps range for the foreseeable future (2020)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "16 fixed-lines subsciptions per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscriptions of 105 telephones per 100 persons (2021)" + "text": "16 fixed-lines subscriptions per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscriptions of 105 telephones per 100 persons (2021)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 994; Azerbaijan’s largest mobile network operator (MNO)  launched trial 5G mobile services in Baku on 27 December 2022 (2023)" @@ -1195,10 +1195,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "305" + "text": "309" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 38, oil tanker 43, other 224 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 38, oil tanker 44, other 227 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/middle-east/am.json b/middle-east/am.json index 2cf5724c..cfba1e4e 100644 --- a/middle-east/am.json +++ b/middle-east/am.json @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ } }, "Religions": { - "text": "Armenian Apostolic 92.6%, Evangelical 1%, other 2.4%, none 1.1%, unspecified 2.9% (2011 est.)" + "text": "Armenian Apostolic Christian 92.6%, Evangelical Christian 1%, other 2.4%, none 1.1%, unspecified 2.9% (2011 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { "text": "

Armenia’s population peaked at nearly 3.7 million in the late 1980s but has declined sharply since independence in 1991, to just over 3 million in 2021, largely as a result of its decreasing fertility rate, increasing death rate, and negative net emigration rate.  The total fertility rate (the average number of children born per woman) first fell below the 2.1 replacement level in the late 1990s and has hovered around 1.6-1.65 for over 15 years.  In an effort to increase the country’s birth rate, the government has expanded its child benefits, including a substantial increase in the lump sum payment for having a first and second child and a boost in the monthly payment to mothers of children under two.  Reversing net negative migration, however, remains the biggest obstacle to stabilizing or increasing population growth.  Emigration causes Armenia not only lose individuals but also the children they might have. 

The emigration of a significant number of working-age people combined with decreased fertility and increased life expectancy is causing the elderly share of Armenia’s population to grow.  The growing elderly population will put increasing pressure on the government’s ability to fund the pension system, health care, and other services for seniors.  Improving education, creating more jobs (particularly in the formal sector), promoting labor market participation, and increasing productivity would mitigate the financial impact of supporting a growing elderly population.

Armenia has a long history of migration, some forced and some voluntary.  Its large diaspora is diverse and dispersed around the world.  Widely varying estimates suggest the Armenian diaspora may number anywhere from 5-9 million, easily outnumbering the number of Armenians living in Armenia.  Armenians forged communities abroad from ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome to Russia and to the Americas, where they excelled as craftsmen, merchants, and in other occupations. 

Several waves of Armenian migration occurred in the 20th century.  In the aftermath of the 1915 Armenian genocide, hundreds of thousands of survivors fled to communities in the Caucasus (including present day Armenia), Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Europe, and Russia and established new communities in Africa and the Americas.  In the 1930s, the Soviets deported thousands of Armenians to Siberia and Central Asia.  After World War II, the Soviets encouraged the Armenian diaspora in France, the Middle East, and Iran to return the Armenian homeland in order to encourage population growth after significant losses in the male workforce during the war. 

Following Armenian independence in 1991, the economic downturn and high unemployment prompted hundreds of thousands of Armenians to seek better economic opportunities primarily in Russia but also in the US, former Soviet states, and Europe.  In the early 1990s, hundreds of thousands of Armenians fled from Azerbaijan to Armenia because of the ongoing Nagorno-Karbakh conflict, but many of them then emigrated again, mainly to Russia and the US.  When the economy became more stable in the late 1990s, permanent emigration slowed, but Armenians continued to seek temporary seasonal work in Russia.  The remittances families receive from relatives working abroad is vital to Armenian households and the country’s economy." @@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ "text": "previous 1915, 1978; latest adopted 5 July 1995" }, "amendments": { - "text": "proposed by the president of the republic or by the National Assembly; passage requires approval by the president, by the National Assembly, and by a referendum with at least 25% registered voter participation and more than 50% of votes; constitutional articles on the form of government and democratic procedures are not amendable; amended 2005, 2015, last in 2020; note - a constitutional referendum originally scheduled for 4 May 2020 was indefinitely postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic that began in early 2020, the Nagorno-Karabakh war in the fall of 2020, and the postwar political crisis of early 2021" + "text": "proposed by the president of the republic or by the National Assembly; passage requires approval by the president, by the National Assembly, and by a referendum with at least 25% registered voter participation and more than 50% of votes; constitutional articles on the form of government and democratic procedures are not amendable; amended 2005, 2015, last in 2020" } }, "Legal system": { @@ -553,13 +553,13 @@ "text": "President Vahagn KHACHATURYAN (since 13 March 2022)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Prime Minister Nikol PASHINYAN (since 10 September 2021); Deputy Prime Ministers Mher GRIGORYAN (since 3 August 2021) and Hambardzum MATEVOSYAN (since 25 November 2021); note - Prime Minister Nikol PASHINYAN resigned on 25 April 2021; he was reappointed by the president on 2 August 2021 and sworn in on 10 September 2021" + "text": "Prime Minister Nikol PASHINYAN (since 10 September 2021); Deputy Prime Ministers Mher GRIGORYAN (since 3 August 2021) and Tigran KHACHATRYAN (since 19 December 2022); note - Prime Minister Nikol PASHINYAN resigned on 25 April 2021 in advance of the 20 June 2021 parliamentary election; he was reappointed by the president on 2 August 2021 and sworn in on 10 September 2021" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Council of Ministers appointed by the prime minister" }, "elections/appointments": { - "text": "president indirectly elected by the National Assembly in 3 rounds if needed for a single 7-year term; election last held on 2-3 March 2022; prime minister elected by majority vote in 2 rounds if needed by the National Assembly; election last held 2 August 2021; the next parliamentary elections are expected to be held in Armenia by 2026" + "text": "president indirectly elected by the National Assembly in 3 rounds if needed for a single 7-year term; election last held on 2-3 March 2022; prime minister elected by majority vote in 2 rounds if needed by the National Assembly; election last held 20 June 2021; the next parliamentary elections are expected to be held in Armenia by 2026" }, "election results": { "text": "  2022: Vahagn KHACHATURYAN elected president in second round; note - Vahagn KHACHATURYAN ran unopposed and won the Assembly vote 71-0

2018:
Armen SARKISSIAN elected president in first round; note - Armen SARKISSIAN ran unopposed and won the Assembly vote 90-10" @@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ "text": "last held early on 20 June 2021 (next to be held in June 2026)" }, "election results": { - "text": "percent of vote by party - Civil Contract 53.9%, Armenia Alliance 21.0%, I Have Honour Alliance 5.2%; seats by party - Civil Contract 71 of 107 seats, Armenia Alliance 29, I Have Honour Alliance 7; composition (as of February 2022) - men 69, women 38, percent of women 35.5%" + "text": "percent of vote by party - Civil Contract 53.9%, Armenia Alliance 21.0%, I Have Honour Alliance 5.2%; seats by party - Civil Contract 71 of 107 seats, Armenia Alliance 29, I Have Honour Alliance 7; composition (as of April 2023) - men 69, women 38, percent of women 35.5%" } }, "Judicial branch": { @@ -589,10 +589,10 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "5165 National Conservative Movement Party [Karin TONOYAN]
Alliance of Democrats [Arman BABAJANYAN]
Armenia Alliance or HD [Robert KOCHARYAN]
(alliance of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and the Reborn Armenia Party)
Armenian National Congress or ANC [Levon TER-PETROSSIAN] (bloc of independent and opposition parties)
Bright Armenia [Edmon MARUKYAN]
Civil Contract or KP [Nikol PASHINYAN]
Homeland of Armenians [Artak GALSTYAN]
Homeland Party [Artur VANETSYAN]
I Have Honor Alliance (alliance of the RPA and the Homeland Party, [Serzh SARGSIAN and Artur VANETSYAN]
Liberal Party [Samvel BABAYAN]
National Democratic Party [Vahe GASPARYAN]
Prosperous Armenia or BHK [Gagik TSARUKYAN]
Republic Party (Hanrapetutyun Party) [Aram SARGSYAN]
Republican Party of Armenia or RPA [Serzh SARGSIAN]" + "text": "5165 National Conservative Movement Party [Karin TONOYAN]
Alliance of Democrats [Arman BABAJANYAN]
Armenia Alliance or HD [Robert KOCHARYAN]
(formerly known as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation)
Armenian National Congress or ANC [Levon TER-PETROSSIAN] (bloc of independent and opposition parties)
Bright Armenia [Edmon MARUKYAN]
Civil Contract or KP [Nikol PASHINYAN]
Country To Live In [Mane TANDILYAN]
Homeland of Armenians [Artak GALSTYAN]
Homeland Party [Artur VANETSYAN]
I Have Honor Alliance (formerly known as the Republican Party of Armenia, [Serzh SARGSIAN]
Liberal Party [Samvel BABAYAN]
National Democratic Party [Vahe GASPARYAN]
Prosperous Armenia or BHK [Gagik TSARUKYAN]
Republic Party (Hanrapetutyun Party) [Aram SARGSYAN]" }, "International organization participation": { - "text": "ADB, BSEC, CD, CE, CIS, CSTO, EAEC (observer), EAEU, EAPC, EBRD, FAO, GCTU, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, MIGA, NAM (observer), OAS (observer), OIF, OPCW, OSCE, PFP, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHRC, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO" + "text": "ADB, BSEC, CE, CIS, CSTO, EAEC (observer), EAEU, EAPC, EBRD, FAO, GCTU, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, MIGA, NAM (observer), OAS (observer), OIF, OPCW, OSCE, PFP, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO" }, "Diplomatic representation in the US": { "chief of mission": { @@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ }, "Diplomatic representation from the US": { "chief of mission": { - "text": "Ambassador Lynne M. TRACEY (since 5 March 2019)" + "text": "Ambassador Kristina A. KVIEN (since 21 February 2023)" }, "embassy": { "text": "

1 American Ave., Yerevan 0082

" diff --git a/middle-east/ba.json b/middle-east/ba.json index 7433ac3a..bbad37f6 100644 --- a/middle-east/ba.json +++ b/middle-east/ba.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

In 1783, the Sunni Al-KHALIFA family took power in Bahrain. In order to secure these holdings, it entered into a series of treaties with the UK during the 19th century that made Bahrain a British protectorate. The archipelago attained its independence in 1971. A steady decline in oil production and reserves since 1970 prompted Bahrain to take steps to diversify its economy, in the process developing petroleum processing and refining, aluminum production, and hospitality and retail sectors. It has also endeavored to become a leading regional banking center, especially with respect to Islamic finance. Bahrain's small size, central location among Gulf countries, economic dependence on Saudi Arabia, and proximity to Iran require it to play a delicate balancing act in foreign affairs among its larger neighbors. Its foreign policy activities usually fall in line with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The Sunni royal family has long struggled to manage relations with its large Shia-majority population. In early 2011, amid Arab uprisings elsewhere in the region, the Bahraini Government confronted similar pro-democracy and reform protests at home with police and military action, including deploying Gulf Cooperation Council security forces to Bahrain. Failed political talks prompted opposition political societies to boycott 2014 legislative and municipal council elections. In 2018, a law preventing members of political societies dissolved by the courts from participating in elections effectively sidelined the majority of opposition figures from taking part in national elections. As a result, most members of parliament are independents. Ongoing dissatisfaction with the political status quo continues to factor into sporadic clashes between demonstrators and security forces. On 15 September 2020, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates signed peace agreements (the Abraham Accords) with Israel – brokered by the US – in Washington DC. Bahrain and the UAE thus became the third and fourth Middle Eastern countries, along with Egypt and Jordan, to recognize Israel.

" + "text": "

In 1783, the Sunni Al-KHALIFA family took power in Bahrain. In order to secure these holdings, it entered into a series of treaties with the UK during the 19th century that made Bahrain a British protectorate. The archipelago attained its independence in 1971. A steady decline in oil production and reserves since 1970 prompted Bahrain to take steps to diversify its economy, in the process developing petroleum processing and refining, aluminum production, and hospitality and retail sectors. It has also endeavored to become a leading regional banking center, especially with respect to Islamic finance. Bahrain's small size, central location among Gulf countries, economic dependence on Saudi Arabia, and proximity to Iran require it to play a delicate balancing act in foreign affairs among its larger neighbors. Its foreign policy activities usually fall in line with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In 2022, the United States designated Bahrain as a major non-NATO ally.

The Sunni royal family has long struggled to manage relations with its large Shia-majority population. In early 2011, amid Arab uprisings elsewhere in the region, the Bahraini Government confronted similar pro-democracy and reform protests at home with police and military action, including deploying Gulf Cooperation Council security forces to Bahrain. Failed political talks prompted opposition political societies to boycott 2014 legislative and municipal council elections. In 2018, a law preventing members of political societies dissolved by the courts from participating in elections effectively sidelined the majority of opposition figures from taking part in national elections. As a result, most members of parliament are independents. Ongoing dissatisfaction with the political status quo continues to factor into sporadic clashes between demonstrators and security forces. On 15 September 2020, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates signed peace agreements (the Abraham Accords) with Israel – brokered by the US – in Washington DC. Bahrain and the UAE thus became the third and fourth Middle Eastern countries, along with Egypt and Jordan, to recognize Israel.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -1143,10 +1143,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "205" + "text": "190" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 12, oil tanker 4, other 189 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 11, oil tanker 3, other 176 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@ "note": "note: the BDF hires foreign nationals, Sunni Muslims primarily from Arabic countries and Pakistan, to serve under contract; as of 2020, foreigners were estimated to comprise as much as 80% of the military; the policy has become a controversial issue with the primarily Shia population; during the 2011, the BDF reportedly deployed mostly foreign personnel against protesters" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "Bahrain hosts the US Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT; established 1983), which includes the US 5th Fleet, several subordinate naval task forces, and the Combined Maritime Forces (established 2002), a coalition of more than 30 nations providing maritime security for regional shipping lanes; in 2018, the UK opened a naval support base in Bahrain

in addition to the US and UK, Bahrain maintains close security ties to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE); both Saudi Arabia and the UAE sent forces to Bahrain to assist with internal security following the 2011 uprising; in 2015, Bahrain joined the Saudi Arabia-led military action to try to restore the Government of Yemen that was ousted by Iranian-backed Huthi rebels, supplying a few hundred troops and combat aircraft

Bahrain has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments (2023)" + "text": "Bahrain hosts the US Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT; established 1983), which includes the US 5th Fleet, several subordinate naval task forces, and the Combined Maritime Forces (established 2002), a coalition of more than 30 nations providing maritime security for regional shipping lanes; in 2018, the UK opened a naval support base in Bahrain

in addition to the US and UK, Bahrain maintains close security ties to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE); both Saudi Arabia and the UAE sent forces to Bahrain to assist with internal security following the 2011 uprising; in 2015, Bahrain joined the Saudi Arabia-led military action to try to restore the Government of Yemen that was ousted by Iranian-backed Houthi rebels, supplying a few hundred troops and combat aircraft

Bahrain has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments (2023)" } }, "Terrorism": { diff --git a/middle-east/gg.json b/middle-east/gg.json index a8fd0ace..d8ade359 100644 --- a/middle-east/gg.json +++ b/middle-east/gg.json @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ } }, "Religions": { - "text": "Orthodox (official) 83.4%, Muslim 10.7%, Armenian Apostolic 2.9%, other 1.2% (includes Catholic, Jehovah's Witness, Yazidi, Protestant, Jewish), none 0.5%, unspecified/no answer 1.2% (2014 est.)" + "text": "Eastern Orthodox Christian (official) 83.4%, Muslim 10.7%, Armenian Apostolic 2.9%, other 1.2% (includes Roman Catholic Christian, Jehovah's Witness, Yazidi, Protestant Christian, Jewish), none 0.5%, unspecified/no answer 1.2% (2014 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { "text": "

Analyzing population trends in Georgia since independence in 1991 has proven difficult due to a lack of reliable demographic statistics.  Censuses were fairly accurately and regularly updated through a vital statistics system during Georgia’s period of Soviet rule, but from independence until about 2010, the system broke down as a result of institutional and economic change, social unrest, and large-scale outmigration.  The 2002 census is believed to have significantly overestimated the size of Georgia’s population, in part because respondents continued to include relatives living abroad as part of their household count.  The 2014 census indicates that Georgia’s population is decreasing and aging.  Census data shows that the median age increased from 34.5 years in 2002 to 37.7 years in 2014.  The working-age population (ages 15-65 years) was fairly high in 2002 and rose between 2005 and 2011. Nonetheless, Georgia did not reap economic benefits from this age structure, since the working-age population increase seems to have stimulated labor outmigration to Russia, Ukraine, and other neighboring countries.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Georgia has seen its economy grow to its highest level in years due to the influx of Russian businesses, information and communications technology specialists, and money transfers.  This growth may only be temporary and conditions could still easily change depending on future events.  Meanwhile, the Russian inflow is also a source of concern, as some Georgians fear it could prompt Putin to target their country next.  In addition, Ukrainian refugees use Georgia not just as a transit country but also as a destination.  Some 25,000 Ukrainians remain in the country as of November 2022; they pose an additional strain on resources in Georgia, which has a significant population of its own displaced citizens – from the 2008 Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – who continue to need government support.

" @@ -456,13 +456,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "660 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "610 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "330 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "340 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "590 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "710 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -888,7 +888,7 @@ "text": "Russia 12%, Azerbaijan 12%, Armenia 9%, Bulgaria 8%, China 6%, Turkey 6%, Ukraine 6% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "copper, cars, iron alloys, wine, packaged medicines (2019)" + "text": "copper, iron alloys, cars, wine, refined petroleum, nitrogen fertilizers, liquors (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1206,10 +1206,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "25" + "text": "24" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 2, general cargo 3, other 20 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 3, other 21 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/middle-east/gz.json b/middle-east/gz.json index dc1c3569..2320a710 100644 --- a/middle-east/gz.json +++ b/middle-east/gz.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

The Gaza Strip has been under the de facto governing authority of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) since 2007, and has faced years of conflict, poverty, and humanitarian crises. Inhabited since at least the 15th century B.C., the Gaza Strip area has been dominated by many different peoples and empires throughout its history; it was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in the early 16th century. The Gaza Strip fell to British forces during World War I, becoming a part of the British Mandate of Palestine. Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt administered the newly formed Gaza Strip; Israel captured it in the Six-Day War in 1967. Under a series of agreements known as the Oslo accords signed between 1993 and 1999, Israel transferred to the newly-created Palestinian Authority (PA) security and civilian responsibility for many Palestinian-populated areas of the Gaza Strip as well as the West Bank.

In 2000, a violent intifada or uprising began, and in 2001 negotiations to determine the permanent status of the West bank and Gaza Strip stalled. Subsequent attempts to re-start negotiations have not resulted in progress toward determining final status of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel in late 2005 unilaterally withdrew all of its settlers and soldiers and dismantled its military facilities in the Gaza Strip, but it continues to control the Gaza Strip’s land and maritime borders and airspace. In early 2006, HAMAS won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council election. Fatah, the dominant Palestinian political faction in the West Bank, and HAMAS failed to maintain a unity government, leading to violent clashes between their respective supporters and HAMAS’s violent seizure of all PA military and governmental institutions in the Gaza Strip in June 2007. Since HAMAS’s takeover, Israel and Egypt have enforced tight restrictions on movement and access of goods and individuals into and out of the territory. Fatah and HAMAS have since reached a series of agreements aimed at restoring political unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank but have struggled to enact them.

Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip and the Israel Defense Forces periodically exchange projectiles and air strikes, respectively, threatening broader conflict. In May 2021, HAMAS launched rockets at Israel, sparking an 11-day conflict that also involved other Gaza-based militant groups. Egypt, Qatar, and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process have negotiated ceasefires to avert a broader conflict. Since 2018, HAMAS has also coordinated demonstrations along the Gaza-Israel security fence. Many of these protests have turned violent, resulting in several Israeli soldiers’ deaths and injuries as well as more than 200 Palestinian deaths and thousands of injuries, most of which occurred during weekly March of Return protests from 2018 to the end of 2019. 

" + "text": "

The Gaza Strip has been under the de facto governing authority of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) since 2007, and has faced years of conflict, poverty, and humanitarian crises. Inhabited since at least the 15th century B.C., the Gaza Strip area has been dominated by many different peoples and empires throughout its history; it was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in the early 16th century. The Gaza Strip fell to British forces during World War I, becoming a part of the British Mandate of Palestine. Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt administered the newly formed Gaza Strip; Israel captured it in the Six-Day War in 1967. Under a series of agreements known as the Oslo Accords signed between 1993 and 1999, Israel transferred to the newly-created Palestinian Authority (PA) security and civilian responsibility for many Palestinian-populated areas of the Gaza Strip as well as the West Bank.

In 2000, a violent intifada or uprising began, and in 2001 negotiations to determine the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip stalled. Subsequent attempts to re-start negotiations have not resulted in progress toward determining final status of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel in late 2005 unilaterally withdrew all of its settlers and soldiers and dismantled its military facilities in the Gaza Strip, but it continues to control the Gaza Strip’s land and maritime borders and airspace. In early 2006, HAMAS won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council election. Fatah, the dominant Palestinian political faction in the West Bank, and HAMAS failed to maintain a unity government, leading to violent clashes between their respective supporters and HAMAS’s violent seizure of all PA military and governmental institutions in the Gaza Strip in June 2007. Since HAMAS’s takeover, Israel and Egypt have enforced tight restrictions on movement and access of goods and individuals into and out of the territory. Fatah and HAMAS have since reached a series of agreements aimed at restoring political unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank but have struggled to enact them.

Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip and the Israel Defense Forces periodically exchange projectiles and air strikes, respectively, threatening broader conflict. In May 2021, HAMAS launched rockets at Israel, sparking an 11-day conflict that also involved other Gaza-based militant groups. Egypt, Qatar, and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process have negotiated ceasefires to avert a broader conflict. Since 2018, HAMAS has also coordinated demonstrations along the Gaza-Israel security fence. Many of these protests have turned violent, resulting in several Israeli soldiers’ deaths and injuries as well as more than 200 Palestinian deaths and thousands of injuries, most of which occurred during weekly March of Return protests from 2018 to the end of 2019. 

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -599,7 +599,8 @@ } }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "strawberries, carnations, vegetables, fish (small and irregular shipments, as permitted to transit the Israeli-controlled Kerem Shalom crossing)" + "text": "building stone, scrap iron, plastic lids, furniture, seating, dates, olive oil (2021)", + "note": "note: data includes both Gaza Strip and West Bank export commodities" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { diff --git a/middle-east/ir.json b/middle-east/ir.json index aa358ca7..ae937806 100644 --- a/middle-east/ir.json +++ b/middle-east/ir.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Known as Persia until 1935, Iran became an Islamic republic in 1979 after the ruling monarchy was overthrown and Shah Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI was forced into exile. Conservative clerical forces led by Ayatollah Ruhollah KHOMEINI established a theocratic system of government with ultimate political authority vested in a learned religious scholar referred to commonly as the Supreme Leader who, according to the constitution, is accountable only to the Assembly of Experts - a popularly elected 88-member body of clerics. US-Iranian relations became strained when a group of Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and held embassy personnel hostage until mid-January 1981. The US cut off diplomatic relations with Iran in April 1980. During the period 1980-88, Iran fought a bloody, indecisive war with Iraq that eventually expanded into the Persian Gulf and led to clashes between US Navy and Iranian military forces. Iran has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism and was subject to US, UN, and EU economic sanctions and export controls because of its continued involvement in terrorism and concerns over possible military dimensions of its nuclear program until Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Implementation Day in 2016. The US began gradually re-imposing sanctions on Iran after the US withdrawal from JCPOA in May 2018.

Following the election of reformer Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad KHATAMI as president in 1997 and a reformist Majles (legislature) in 2000, a campaign to foster political reform in response to popular dissatisfaction was initiated. The movement floundered as conservative politicians, supported by the Supreme Leader, unelected institutions of authority like the Council of Guardians, and the security services reversed and blocked reform measures while increasing security repression. Starting with nationwide municipal elections in 2003 and continuing through Majles elections in 2004, conservatives reestablished control over Iran's elected government institutions, which culminated with the August 2005 inauguration of hardliner Mahmud AHMADI-NEJAD as president. His controversial reelection in June 2009 sparked nationwide protests over allegations of electoral fraud, but the protests were quickly suppressed. Deteriorating economic conditions due primarily to government mismanagement and international sanctions prompted at least two major economically based protests in July and October 2012, but Iran's internal security situation remained stable. President AHMADI-NEJAD's independent streak angered regime establishment figures, including the Supreme Leader, leading to conservative opposition to his agenda for the last year of his presidency, and an alienation of his political supporters. In June 2013, Iranians elected a centrist cleric Dr. Hasan Fereidun RUHANI to the presidency. A longtime senior member in the regime, he made promises of reforming society and Iran's foreign policy. In July 2015, Iran and the five permanent members, plus Germany (P5+1) signed the JCPOA under which Iran agreed to restrictions on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief; however, the US reimposed sanctions in 2018 dealing a blow to RUHANI's legacy and the Iranian economy. Negotiations to restore the deal started in 2021 and are ongoing. Iran held elections in February 2020 for the Majles and the president in June 2021, resulting in a hardline and conservative monopoly across the regime's elected and unelected institutions. President Ebrahim RAISI is a hardline cleric with a decades-long career in Iran's judiciary and has had limited foreign policy and economic experience.

" + "text": "

Known as Persia until 1935, Iran became an Islamic republic in 1979 after the ruling monarchy was overthrown and Shah Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI was forced into exile. Conservative clerical forces led by Ayatollah Ruhollah KHOMEINI established a theocratic system of government with ultimate political authority vested in a learned religious scholar referred to commonly as the Supreme Leader who, according to the constitution, is accountable only to the Assembly of Experts - a popularly elected 88-member body of clerics. US-Iranian relations became strained when a group of Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and held embassy personnel hostage until mid-January 1981. The US cut off diplomatic relations with Iran in April 1980. During the period 1980-88, Iran fought a bloody, indecisive war with Iraq that eventually expanded into the Persian Gulf and led to clashes between US Navy and Iranian military forces. Iran has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism and was subject to US, UN, and EU economic sanctions and export controls because of its continued involvement in terrorism and concerns over possible military dimensions of its nuclear program until Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Implementation Day in 2016. The US began gradually re-imposing sanctions on Iran after the US withdrawal from JCPOA in May 2018.

Following the election of reformer Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad KHATAMI as president in 1997 and a reformist Majles (legislature) in 2000, a campaign to foster political reform in response to popular dissatisfaction was initiated. The movement floundered as conservative politicians, supported by the Supreme Leader, unelected institutions of authority like the Guardians Council, and the security services reversed and blocked reform measures while increasing security repression. Starting with nationwide municipal elections in 2003 and continuing through Majles elections in 2004, conservatives reestablished control over Iran's elected government institutions, which culminated with the August 2005 inauguration of hardliner Mahmud AHMADI-NEJAD as president. His controversial reelection in June 2009 sparked nationwide protests over allegations of electoral fraud, which persisted until early 2011. President AHMADI-NEJAD's independent streak angered regime establishment figures, including the Supreme Leader, leading to conservative opposition to his agenda for the last year of his presidency, and an alienation of his political supporters. In June 2013, Iranians elected a centrist cleric Dr. Hasan Fereidun RUHANI to the presidency. A longtime senior member in the regime, he made promises of reforming society and Iran's foreign policy. In July 2015, Iran and the five UNSC permanent members, plus Germany (P5+1) finalized the JCPOA under which Iran agreed to restrictions on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief; however, the US reimposed sanctions in 2018 dealing a blow to RUHANI's legacy and the Iranian economy. In November 2019, Tehran's decision to increase the price of gasoline overnight sparked nationwide protests, which the regime violently suppressed within a week. Conservatives won the majority of seats in Iranian Majles elections in elections in February 2020 and hardline cleric Ebrahim RAISI - who had a decades-long career in Iran's judiciary - was elected president in June 2021, resulting in a hardline and conservative monopoly across the regime's elected and unelected institutions.

As president, RAISI has concentrated on deepening Iran's foreign relations with anti-US states - particularly China and Russia - to weather US sanctions and diplomatic pressure, while supporting negotiations to restore a nuclear deal that began in 2021. RAISI contended with nationwide protests that began in September 2022 and persisted for over three months following the death of a Kurdish Iranian woman, Mahsa AMINI, in morality police custody. Young people and women led the protests and in contrast to previous periods of unrest, this latest bout focused on demands for regime change rather than reform within the system or the redressal of economic grievances.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -491,13 +491,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "6.2 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "6.2 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "1.1 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1.1 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "86 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "86 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1205,10 +1205,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "893" + "text": "942" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 32, container ship 31, general cargo 371, oil tanker 84, other 375 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 32, container ship 31, general cargo 393, oil tanker 83, other 403 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "the military forces of Iran are divided between the Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah)

Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces or Islamic Republic of Iran Army (Artesh): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Air Force, Air Defense Forces; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC or Sepah): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Aerospace Force (controls strategic missile force), Qods Force (aka Quds Force; special operations), Cyber Electronic Command, Basij Paramilitary Forces; Internal security forces (2022)", + "text": "the military forces of Iran are divided between the Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah)

Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces or Islamic Republic of Iran Army (Artesh): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Air Force, Air Defense Forces; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC or Sepah): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Aerospace Force (controls strategic missile force), Qods Force (aka Quds Force; special operations), Cyber Electronic Command, Basij Paramilitary Forces; Interior Ministry: Law Enforcement; Ministry of Intelligence and Security (2022)", "note": "note 1: the Artesh Navy operates Iran’s larger warships and operates in the Gulf of Oman, the Caspian Sea, and deep waters in the region and beyond; the IRGC Navy has responsibility for the closer-in Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz

note 2: the Basij is a volunteer paramilitary group under the IRGC with local organizations across the country, which sometimes acts as an auxiliary law enforcement unit for the IRGC; it is formally known as the Organization for the Mobilization of the Oppressed; it is also known as the Popular Mobilization Army

note 3: the Ministry of Intelligence and Security and law enforcement forces under the Interior Ministry, which report to the president, and the IRGC, which reports to the supreme leader, share responsibility for law enforcement and maintaining order; law enforcement forces include border and other security troops" }, "Military expenditures": { diff --git a/middle-east/is.json b/middle-east/is.json index dd2bdcb6..8542204f 100644 --- a/middle-east/is.json +++ b/middle-east/is.json @@ -458,13 +458,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "983 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "72 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "100 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "1.249 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1.2 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1216,10 +1216,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "41" + "text": "45" }, "by type": { - "text": "container ship 6, general cargo 2, oil tanker 4, other 29 (2021)" + "text": "container ship 6, general cargo 2, oil tanker 4, other 33 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/middle-east/iz.json b/middle-east/iz.json index 3de69698..499260b7 100644 --- a/middle-east/iz.json +++ b/middle-east/iz.json @@ -483,13 +483,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "1.23 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "6.9 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "2.05 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "5.49 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "35.27 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "44.23 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1239,10 +1239,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "68" + "text": "75" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 1, oil tanker 6, other 61 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 1, oil tanker 7, other 67 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Ministry of Defense: Iraqi Army, Army Aviation Command, Iraqi Navy, Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi Air Defense Command, Special Forces Command, Special Security Division (Green Zone protection)

National-Level Security Forces: Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS; reports to the Prime Minister), Prime Minister's Special Forces Division, Presidential Brigades

Ministry of Interior: Federal Police Forces Command, Border Guard Forces Command, Federal Intelligence and Investigations Agency, Emergency Response Division, Facilities Protection Directorate, and Provincial Police

Ministry of Oil: Energy Police Directorate

Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Peshmerga: Regional Guard Brigades, Unit (or Division) 70 Forces, Unit (or Division) 80 Forces, special operations/counter-terrorism forces (Counter Terrorism Group, CTG and Counter Terrorism Directorate, CTD); note - Unit 70 and the CTG are associated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) political party, while Unit 80 and the CTD are associated with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP); Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior: Zeravani and Emergency Response Forces (paramilitary internal security forces)

Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC): Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Tribal Mobilization Forces (TMF); the PMF and TMF are a collection of approximately 60 militias of widely varied sizes and political interests (2022)" + "text": "Ministry of Defense: Iraqi Army, Army Aviation Command, Iraqi Navy, Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi Air Defense Command, Special Forces Command, Special Security Division (Green Zone protection)

National-Level Security Forces: Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS; reports to the Prime Minister), Prime Minister's Special Forces Division, Presidential Brigades--Ministry of Interior: Federal Police Forces Command, Border Guard Forces Command, Federal Intelligence and Investigations Agency, Emergency Response Division, Facilities Protection Directorate, and Provincial Police;
Ministry of Oil: Energy Police Directorate

Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC): Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Tribal Mobilization Forces (TMF); the PMF and TMF are a collection of approximately 60 militias of widely varied sizes and political interests

the two main Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), each maintain an independent security apparatus; the federal constitution provides the Kurdistan Regional Government the right to maintain internal security forces, but the KDP and the PUK separately controlled additional Peshmerga military units, as well as separate police forces under nominal Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior control; the constitution also allows for a centralized, separate internal security/intelligence (Asayish) service; however, the KDP and PUK also each maintain Asayish forces

Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Peshmerga: Regional Guard Brigades; Unit (or Division) 70 Forces and Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) of the PUK; Unit (or Division) 80 Forces and Counterterrorism Directorate (CTD) of the KDP; Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior: internal security forces include the Zeravani (KDP) and Emergency Response Forces (PUK) (2022)" }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2021": { diff --git a/middle-east/jo.json b/middle-east/jo.json index be94fe66..ce01adb6 100644 --- a/middle-east/jo.json +++ b/middle-east/jo.json @@ -477,13 +477,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "456.9 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "500 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "32.5 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "40 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "554.7 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "570 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ "text": "35" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 6, oil tanker 1, other 28 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 6, other 29 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/middle-east/ku.json b/middle-east/ku.json index 6830bbe3..241f0c41 100644 --- a/middle-east/ku.json +++ b/middle-east/ku.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Kuwait has been ruled by the AL-SABAH dynasty since the 18th century. The threat of Ottoman invasion in 1899 prompted Amir Mubarak AL-SABAH to seek protection from Britain, ceding foreign and defense responsibility to Britain until 1961, when the country attained its independence. Kuwait was attacked and overrun by Iraq in August 1990. Following several weeks of aerial bombardment, a US-led UN coalition began a ground assault in February 1991 that liberated Kuwait in four days. In 1992, the Amir reconstituted the parliament that he had dissolved in 1986. Amid the 2010-11 uprisings and protests across the Arab world, stateless Arabs, known as Bidoon, staged small protests in early 2011 demanding citizenship, jobs, and other benefits available to Kuwaiti nationals. Other demographic groups, notably Islamists and Kuwaitis from tribal backgrounds, soon joined the growing protest movements, which culminated in late 2011 with the resignation of the prime minister amidst allegations of corruption. Demonstrations renewed in late 2012 in response to an amiri decree amending the electoral law that lessened the voting power of the tribal blocs.

An opposition coalition of Sunni Islamists, tribal populists, and some liberals, largely boycotted legislative elections in 2012 and 2013, which ushered in a legislature more amenable to the government's agenda. Faced with the prospect of painful subsidy cuts, oppositionists and independents actively participated in the November 2016 election, winning nearly half of the seats, but a cohesive opposition alliance largely ceased to exist with the 2016 election and the opposition became increasingly factionalized. Since coming to power in 2006, the Amir has dissolved the National Assembly on seven occasions (the Constitutional Court annulled the Assembly elections in June 2012 and again in June 2013) and shuffled the cabinet over a dozen times, usually citing political stagnation and gridlock between the legislature and the government.

The current Amir, who assumed his role in 2020, launched a \"National Dialogue\" in September 2021 meant to resolve political gridlock. As part of the \"National Dialogue,\" the Amir pardoned several opposition figures who had been living in exile, and they returned to Kuwait. Legislative challenges remain, and the cabinet was reshuffled in March 2022.

" + "text": "

Kuwait has been ruled by the AL-SABAH dynasty since the 18th century. The threat of Ottoman invasion in 1899 prompted Amir Mubarak AL-SABAH to seek protection from Britain, ceding foreign and defense responsibility to Britain until 1961, when the country attained its independence. Kuwait was attacked and overrun by Iraq in August 1990. Following several weeks of aerial bombardment, a US-led UN coalition began a ground assault in February 1991 that liberated Kuwait in four days. In 1992, the Amir reconstituted the parliament that he had dissolved in 1986. Amid the 2010-11 uprisings and protests across the Arab world, stateless Arabs, known as Bidoon, staged small protests in early 2011 demanding citizenship, jobs, and other benefits available to Kuwaiti nationals. Other demographic groups, notably Islamists and Kuwaitis from tribal backgrounds, soon joined the growing protest movements, which culminated in late 2011 with the resignation of the prime minister amidst allegations of corruption. Demonstrations renewed in late 2012 in response to an amiri decree amending the electoral law that lessened the voting power of the tribal blocs.

An opposition coalition of Sunni Islamists, tribal populists, and some liberals, largely boycotted legislative elections in 2012 and 2013, which ushered in a legislature more amenable to the government's agenda. Faced with the prospect of painful subsidy cuts, oppositionists and independents actively participated in the November 2016 election, winning nearly half of the seats, but a cohesive opposition alliance largely ceased to exist with the 2016 election and the opposition became increasingly factionalized. Between 2006 and his death in 2020, the previous Kuwaiti Amir dissolved the National Assembly on seven occasions (the Constitutional Court annulled the Assembly elections in June 2012 and again in June 2013) and shuffled the cabinet over a dozen times, usually citing political stagnation and gridlock between the legislature and the government.

The current Amir, who assumed his role in 2020, launched a \"National Dialogue\" in September 2021 meant to resolve political gridlock. As part of the \"National Dialogue,\" the Amir pardoned several opposition figures who had been living in exile, and they returned to Kuwait. Legislative challenges remain, and the cabinet has been reshuffled six times since late 2020. 

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -446,13 +446,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "448.3 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "450 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "23.3 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "20 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "778.4 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "780 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -557,7 +557,8 @@ }, "election results": { "text": "50 nonpartisans elected, of which 28 were opposition candidates; composition - men 48, women 2, percent of women 4%" - } + }, + "note": "Note: the Kuwait Constitutional Court, on 19 March 2023, annulled the 29 September 2022 National Assembly election and ordered reinstatement of the previous Assembly" }, "Judicial branch": { "highest court(s)": { @@ -1158,10 +1159,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "165" + "text": "166" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 15, oil tanker 28, other 122 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 15, oil tanker 29, other 122 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/middle-east/le.json b/middle-east/le.json index 94ced8b7..288f82dc 100644 --- a/middle-east/le.json +++ b/middle-east/le.json @@ -453,13 +453,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "240 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "240 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "900 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "900 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "700 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "700 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1110,10 +1110,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "6,825,442 (2020 est.)" + "text": "4.872 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "84% (2020 est.)" + "text": "87% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1199,10 +1199,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "48" + "text": "49" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 2, general cargo 31, oil tanker 1, other 14 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 2, general cargo 32, oil tanker 1, other 14 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1262,7 +1262,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "479,537 (Palestinian refugees) (2020); 814,715 (Syria) (2022)" + "text": "479,537 (Palestinian refugees) (2020); 805,326 (Syria) (2023)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "7,000 (2020)" diff --git a/middle-east/mu.json b/middle-east/mu.json index 7fadf90f..f84c1193 100644 --- a/middle-east/mu.json +++ b/middle-east/mu.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

The inhabitants of the area of Oman have long prospered from Indian Ocean trade. In the late 18th century, the nascent sultanate in Muscat signed the first in a series of friendship treaties with Britain. Over time, Oman's dependence on British political and military advisors increased, although the sultanate never became a British colony. In 1970, QABOOS bin Said Al-Said overthrew his father, and ruled as sultan for the next five decades. His extensive modernization program opened the country to the outside world. He prioritized strategic ties with the UK and US, and his moderate, independent foreign policy allowed Oman to maintain good relations with its neighbors and to avoid external entanglements.

Inspired by the popular uprisings that swept the Middle East and North Africa beginning in January 2011, some Omanis staged demonstrations, calling for more jobs and economic benefits and an end to corruption. In response to those protester demands, QABOOS in 2011 pledged to implement economic and political reforms, such as granting Oman’s bicameral legislative body more power and authorizing direct elections for its lower house, which took place in November 2011. Additionally, the sultan increased unemployment benefits, and, in August 2012, issued a royal directive mandating the speedy implementation of a national job creation plan for thousands of public and private sector Omani jobs. As part of the government's efforts to decentralize authority and allow greater citizen participation in local governance, Oman successfully conducted its first municipal council elections in December 2012. Announced by the sultan in 2011, the municipal councils have the power to advise the Royal Court on the needs of local districts across Oman's 11 governorates. Sultan QABOOS, Oman's longest reigning monarch, died on 11 January 2020. His cousin, HAYTHAM bin Tariq bin Taimur Al-Said, former Minister of Heritage and Culture, was sworn in as Oman's new sultan the same day.

" + "text": "

The inhabitants of the area of Oman have long prospered from Indian Ocean trade. In the late 18th century, the nascent sultanate in Muscat signed the first in a series of friendship treaties with Britain. Over time, Oman's dependence on British political and military advisors increased, although the sultanate never became a British colony. In 1970, QABOOS bin Said Al Said overthrew his father, and ruled as sultan for the next five decades. His extensive modernization program opened the country to the outside world. He prioritized strategic ties with the UK and US, and his moderate, independent foreign policy allowed Oman to maintain good relations with its neighbors and to avoid external entanglements.

Inspired by the popular uprisings that swept the Middle East and North Africa beginning in January 2011, some Omanis staged demonstrations, calling for more jobs and economic benefits and an end to corruption. In response to those protester demands, QABOOS in 2011 pledged to implement economic and political reforms, such as granting Oman’s bicameral legislative body more power and authorizing direct elections for its lower house, which took place in November 2011. Additionally, the sultan increased unemployment benefits, and, in August 2012, issued a royal directive mandating the speedy implementation of a national job creation plan for thousands of public and private sector Omani jobs. As part of the government's efforts to decentralize authority and allow greater citizen participation in local governance, Oman successfully conducted its first municipal council elections in December 2012. Announced by the sultan in 2011, the municipal councils have the power to advise the Royal Court on the needs of local districts across Oman's 11 governorates. Sultan QABOOS, Oman's longest reigning monarch, died on 11 January 2020. His cousin, HAYTHAM bin Tariq Al Said, former Minister of Heritage and Culture, was sworn in as Oman's new sultan the same day.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -446,13 +446,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "130 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "130 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "135 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "240 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "1.607 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1.55 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -539,10 +539,10 @@ }, "Executive branch": { "chief of state": { - "text": "Sultan and Prime Minister HAYTHAM bin Tariq bin Taimur Al-Said (since 11 January 2020); note - the monarch is both chief of state and head of government" + "text": "Sultan and Prime Minister HAYTHAM bin Tariq Al Said (since 11 January 2020); note - the monarch is both chief of state and head of government" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Sultan and Prime Minister HAYTHAM bin Tariq bin Taimur Al-Said (since 11 January 2020)" + "text": "Sultan and Prime Minister HAYTHAM bin Tariq Al Said (since 11 January 2020)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Cabinet appointed by the monarch" @@ -1091,10 +1091,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "4,851,291 (2020 est.)" + "text": "4.32 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "95% (2020 est.)" + "text": "96% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1183,7 +1183,7 @@ "text": "57" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 10, other 47 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 11, other 46 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/middle-east/qa.json b/middle-east/qa.json index ba3b85ce..bf2e2912 100644 --- a/middle-east/qa.json +++ b/middle-east/qa.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Ruled by the Al Thani family since the mid-1800s, Qatar within the last 60 years transformed itself from a poor British protectorate noted mainly for pearling into an independent state with significant oil and natural gas revenues. Former Amir HAMAD bin Khalifa Al Thani, who overthrew his father in a bloodless coup in 1995, ushered in wide-sweeping political and media reforms, unprecedented economic investment, and a growing Qatari regional leadership role, in part through the creation of the pan-Arab satellite news network Al-Jazeera and Qatar's mediation of some regional conflicts. In the 2000s, Qatar resolved its longstanding border disputes with both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and by 2007 had attained the highest per capita income in the world. Qatar did not experience domestic unrest or violence like that seen in other Near Eastern and North African countries in 2011, due in part to its immense wealth and patronage network. In mid-2013, HAMAD peacefully abdicated, transferring power to his son, the current Amir TAMIM bin Hamad. TAMIM is popular with the Qatari public, for his role in shepherding the country through an economic embargo by some other regional countries, for his efforts to improve the country's healthcare and education systems, and for his expansion of the country's infrastructure in anticipation of Doha's hosting of the 2022 FIFA Men’s World Cup.

Following the outbreak of regional unrest in 2011, Doha prided itself on its support for many popular revolutions, particularly in Libya and Syria. This stance was to the detriment of Qatar’s relations with Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which temporarily recalled their respective ambassadors from Doha in March 2014. TAMIM later oversaw a warming of Qatar’s relations with Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in November 2014 following Kuwaiti mediation and signing of the Riyadh Agreement. This reconciliation, however, was short-lived. In June 2017, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (the \"Quartet\") cut diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar in response to alleged violations of the agreement, among other complaints. They restored ties in January 2021 after signing a declaration at the Gulf Cooperation Council Summit in Al Ula, Saudi Arabia.

 

" + "text": "

Ruled by the Al Thani family since the mid-1800s, Qatar within the last 60 years transformed itself from a poor British protectorate noted mainly for pearling into an independent state with significant hydrocarbon revenues. Former Amir HAMAD bin Khalifa Al Thani, who overthrew his father in a bloodless coup in 1995, ushered in wide-sweeping political and media reforms, unprecedented economic investment, and a growing Qatari regional leadership role, in part through the creation of the pan-Arab satellite news network Al-Jazeera and Qatar's mediation of some regional conflicts. In the 2000s, Qatar resolved its longstanding border disputes with both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and by 2007, Doha had attained the highest per capita income in the world. Qatar did not experience domestic unrest or violence like that seen in other Near Eastern and North African countries in 2011, due in part to its immense wealth and patronage network. In mid-2013, HAMAD peacefully abdicated, transferring power to his son, the current Amir TAMIM bin Hamad. TAMIM is popular with the Qatari public, for his role in shepherding the country through an economic embargo by some other regional countries, for his efforts to improve the country's healthcare and education systems, and for his expansion of the country's infrastructure in anticipation of Doha's hosting international sporting events. Qatar became the first country in the Arab world to host the FIFA Men’s World Cup in 2022.

Following the outbreak of regional unrest in 2011, Doha prided itself on its support for many popular revolutions, particularly in Libya and Syria. This stance was to the detriment of Qatar’s relations with Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which temporarily recalled their respective ambassadors from Doha in March 2014. TAMIM later oversaw a warming of Qatar’s relations with Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in November 2014 following Kuwaiti mediation and signing of the Riyadh Agreement. This reconciliation, however, was short-lived. In June 2017, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (the \"Quartet\") cut diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar in response to alleged violations of the agreement, among other complaints. They restored ties in January 2021 after signing a declaration at the Gulf Cooperation Council Summit in Al Ula, Saudi Arabia. In 2022, the United States designated Qatar as a major non-NATO ally.

 

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -1086,10 +1086,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "2,881,060 (2020 est.)" + "text": "2.7 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "100% (2020 est.)" + "text": "100% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1157,10 +1157,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "129" + "text": "123" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 9, container ship 4, general cargo 4, oil tanker 5, other 107 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 6, container ship 4, general cargo 4, oil tanker 3, other 106 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/middle-east/sa.json b/middle-east/sa.json index d8b2c2cb..fc114078 100644 --- a/middle-east/sa.json +++ b/middle-east/sa.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam and home to Islam's two holiest shrines in Mecca and Medina. The king's official title is the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. The modern Saudi state was founded in 1932 by ABD AL-AZIZ bin Abd al-Rahman AL SAUD (Ibn Saud) after a 30-year campaign to unify most of the Arabian Peninsula. One of his male descendants rules the country today, as required by the country's 1992 Basic Law. Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saudi Arabia accepted the Kuwaiti royal family and 400,000 refugees while allowing Western and Arab troops to deploy on its soil for the liberation of Kuwait the following year. The continuing presence of foreign troops on Saudi soil after the liberation of Kuwait became a source of tension between the royal family and the public until all operational US troops left the country in 2003. Major terrorist attacks in May and November 2003 spurred a strong ongoing campaign against domestic terrorism and extremism. US troops returned to the Kingdom in October 2019 after attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure.

From 2005 to 2015, King ABDALLAH bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud incrementally modernized the Kingdom. Driven by personal ideology and political pragmatism, he introduced a series of social and economic initiatives, including expanding employment and social opportunities for women, attracting foreign investment, increasing the role of the private sector in the economy, and discouraging businesses from hiring foreign workers. These reforms have accelerated under King SALMAN bin Abd al-Aziz, who ascended to the throne in 2015, and has since lifted the Kingdom's ban on women driving, implemented education reforms, funded green initiatives, and allowed cinemas to operate for the first time in decades. Saudi Arabia saw some protests during the 2011 Arab Spring but not the level of bloodshed seen in protests elsewhere in the region. Shia Muslims in the Eastern Province protested primarily against the detention of political prisoners, endemic discrimination, and Bahraini and Saudi Government actions in Bahrain. Riyadh took a cautious but firm approach by arresting some protesters but releasing most of them quickly and by using its state-sponsored clerics to counter political and Islamist activism.

The government held its first-ever elections in 2005 and 2011, when Saudis went to the polls to elect municipal councilors. In December 2015, women were allowed to vote and stand as candidates for the first time in municipal council elections, with 19 women winning seats. After King SALMAN ascended to the throne in 2015, he placed the first next-generation prince, MUHAMMAD BIN NAYIF bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, in the line of succession as Crown Prince. He designated his son, MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, as the Deputy Crown Prince. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia led a coalition of 10 countries in a military campaign to restore the legitimate government of Yemen, which had been ousted by Huthi forces allied with former president ALI ABDULLAH al-Salih. The war in Yemen has drawn international criticism for civilian casualties and its effect on the country’s dire humanitarian situation. In December 2015, then Deputy Crown Prince MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN announced Saudi Arabia would lead a 34-nation Islamic Coalition to fight terrorism (it has since grown to 41 nations). In May 2017, Saudi Arabia inaugurated the Global Center for Combatting Extremist Ideology (also known as \"Etidal\") as part of its ongoing efforts to counter violent extremism. In June 2017, King SALMAN elevated MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN to Crown Prince. Since then, he has jockeyed for influence with neighboring countries in a bid to be the region’s main power broker.

The country remains a leading producer of oil and natural gas and holds about 17% of the world's proven oil reserves as of 2020. The government continues to pursue economic reform and diversification, particularly since Saudi Arabia's accession to the WTO in 2005, and promotes foreign investment in the Kingdom. In April 2016, the Saudi Government announced a broad set of socio-economic reforms, known as Vision 2030. Low global oil prices throughout 2015 and 2016 significantly lowered Saudi Arabia’s governmental revenue. In response, the government cut subsidies on water, electricity, and gasoline; reduced government employee compensation packages; and announced limited new land taxes. In coordination with OPEC and some key non-OPEC countries, Saudi Arabia agreed to cut oil output in early 2017 to regulate supply and help elevate global prices. In early 2020, this agreement by the so-called OPEC+ coalition collapsed. Saudi Arabia launched a price war by flooding the market with low-priced oil before returning to the negotiating table to agree to OPEC+’s largest and longest-lasting output cut. This cut helped to buoy prices that had collapsed as a result of the price war and the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic. 

" + "text": "

Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam and home to Islam's two holiest shrines in Mecca and Medina. The king's official title is the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. The modern Saudi state was founded in 1932 by ABD AL-AZIZ bin Abd al-Rahman AL SAUD (Ibn Saud) after a 30-year campaign to unify most of the Arabian Peninsula. One of his male descendants rules the country today, as required by the country's 1992 Basic Law. Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saudi Arabia accepted the Kuwaiti royal family and 400,000 refugees while allowing Western and Arab troops to deploy on its soil for the liberation of Kuwait the following year. The continuing presence of foreign troops on Saudi soil after the liberation of Kuwait became a source of tension between the royal family and the public until all operational US troops left the country in 2003. Major terrorist attacks in May and November 2003 spurred a strong ongoing campaign against domestic terrorism and extremism. US troops returned to the Kingdom in October 2019 after attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure.

From 2005 to 2015, King ABDALLAH bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud incrementally modernized the Kingdom. Driven by personal ideology and political pragmatism, he introduced a series of social and economic initiatives, including expanding employment and social opportunities for women, attracting foreign investment, increasing the role of the private sector in the economy, and discouraging businesses from hiring foreign workers. These reforms have accelerated under King SALMAN bin Abd al-Aziz, who ascended to the throne in 2015, and has since lifted the Kingdom's ban on women driving, implemented education reforms, funded green initiatives, and allowed cinemas to operate for the first time in decades. Saudi Arabia saw some protests during the 2011 Arab Spring but not the level of bloodshed seen in protests elsewhere in the region. Shia Muslims in the Eastern Province protested primarily against the detention of political prisoners, endemic discrimination, and Bahraini and Saudi Government actions in Bahrain. Riyadh took a cautious but firm approach by arresting some protesters but releasing most of them quickly and by using its state-sponsored clerics to counter political and Islamist activism.

The government held its first-ever elections in 2005 and 2011, when Saudis went to the polls to elect municipal councilors. In December 2015, women were allowed to vote and stand as candidates for the first time in municipal council elections, with 19 women winning seats. After King SALMAN ascended to the throne in 2015, he placed the first next-generation prince, MUHAMMAD BIN NAYIF bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, in the line of succession as Crown Prince. He designated his son, MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, as the Deputy Crown Prince. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia led a coalition of 10 countries in a military campaign to restore the legitimate government of Yemen, which had been ousted by Houthi forces allied with former president ALI ABDULLAH al-Salih. The war in Yemen has drawn international criticism for civilian casualties and its effect on the country’s dire humanitarian situation. In December 2015, then Deputy Crown Prince MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN announced Saudi Arabia would lead a 34-nation Islamic Coalition to fight terrorism (it has since grown to 41 nations). In May 2017, Saudi Arabia inaugurated the Global Center for Combatting Extremist Ideology (also known as \"Etidal\") as part of its ongoing efforts to counter violent extremism. In June 2017, King SALMAN elevated MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN to Crown Prince. Since then, he has jockeyed for influence with neighboring countries in a bid to be the region’s main power broker.

The country remains a leading producer of oil and natural gas and holds about 17% of the world's proven oil reserves as of 2020. The government continues to pursue economic reform and diversification, particularly since Saudi Arabia's accession to the WTO in 2005, and promotes foreign investment in the Kingdom. In April 2016, the Saudi Government announced a broad set of socio-economic reforms, known as Vision 2030. Low global oil prices throughout 2015 and 2016 significantly lowered Saudi Arabia’s governmental revenue. In response, the government cut subsidies on water, electricity, and gasoline; reduced government employee compensation packages; and announced limited new land taxes. In coordination with OPEC and some key non-OPEC countries, Saudi Arabia agreed to cut oil output in early 2017 to regulate supply and help elevate global prices. In early 2020, this agreement by the so-called OPEC+ coalition collapsed. Saudi Arabia launched a price war by flooding the market with low-priced oil before returning to the negotiating table to agree to OPEC+’s largest and longest-lasting output cut. This cut helped to buoy prices that had collapsed as a result of the price war and the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic. 

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -1105,10 +1105,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "34,117,590 (2020 est.)" + "text": "36 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "98% (2020 est.)" + "text": "100% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1208,10 +1208,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "392" + "text": "413" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 5, container ship 1, general cargo 21, oil tanker 58, other 307 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 6, container ship 1, general cargo 21, oil tanker 58, other 327 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1225,7 +1225,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Ministry of Defense: Royal Saudi Land Forces, Royal Saudi Naval Forces (includes marines, special forces, naval aviation), Royal Saudi Air Force, Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces, Royal Saudi Strategic Missiles Force; Ministry of the National Guard (SANG); Ministry of Interior: police, Border Guard, Facilities Security Force; State Security Presidency: General Directorate of Investigation (Mabahith), Special Security Forces, Special Emergency Forces (2022)", + "text": "Saudi Arabian Armed Forces (SAAF): Ministry of Defense: Royal Saudi Land Forces, Royal Saudi Naval Forces (includes marines, special forces, naval aviation), Royal Saudi Air Force, Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces, Royal Saudi Strategic Missiles Force; Ministry of the National Guard (SANG)

Ministry of Interior: police, Border Guard, Facilities Security Force; State Security Presidency: General Directorate of Investigation (Mabahith), Special Security Forces, Special Emergency Forces (2023)", "note": "note: SANG (also known as the White Army) is a land force separate from the Ministry of Defense that is responsible for internal security, protecting the royal family, and external defense" }, "Military expenditures": { @@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { - "text": "the Saudi military forces have about 225,000 total active troops; approximately 125,000 under the Ministry of Defense (75,000 Land Forces; 15,000 Naval Forces, including about 3,000 marines; 35,000 Air Force/Air Defense/Strategic Missile Forces) and approximately 100,000 in the Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG) (2022)", + "text": "the Saudi Armed Forces have about 250,000 total active troops; approximately 125,000 under the Ministry of Defense (75,000 Land Forces; 15,000 Naval Forces, including about 3,000 marines; 35,000 Air Force/Air Defense/Strategic Missile Forces) and up to 130,000 in the Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG) (2022)", "note": "note: SANG also has an irregular force (Fowj), primarily Bedouin tribal volunteers, with a total strength of approximately 25,000" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { @@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ "text": "estimated 2,500-5,000 Yemen (varies depending on operations) (2022)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "in 2015, a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states intervened militarily in Yemen in support of the Republic of Yemen Government against the separatist Huthis; Saudi Arabia also has raised and equipped paramilitary/militia security forces in Yemen--based largely on tribal or regional affiliation--to deploy along the Saudi-Yemen border, especially the areas bordering the governorates of Saada and Al-Jawf (2022)" + "text": "in 2015, a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states intervened militarily in Yemen in support of the Republic of Yemen Government against the separatist Houthis; Saudi Arabia also has raised and equipped paramilitary/militia security forces in Yemen--based largely on tribal or regional affiliation--to deploy along the Saudi-Yemen border, especially the areas bordering the governorates of Saada and Al-Jawf (2022)" } }, "Terrorism": { diff --git a/middle-east/sy.json b/middle-east/sy.json index 25bfab03..38fd2f8d 100644 --- a/middle-east/sy.json +++ b/middle-east/sy.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Following World War I, France acquired a mandate over the northern portion of the former Ottoman Empire province of Syria. The French administered the area as Syria until granting it independence in 1946. The new country lacked political stability and experienced a series of military coups. Syria united with Egypt in February 1958 to form the United Arab Republic. In September 1961, the two entities separated, and the Syrian Arab Republic was reestablished. In the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Syria lost the Golan Heights region to Israel. During the 1990s, Syria and Israel held occasional, albeit unsuccessful, peace talks over its return. In November 1970, Hafiz al-ASAD, a member of the socialist Ba'ath Party and the minority Alawi sect, seized power in a bloodless coup and brought political stability to the country. Following the death of President Hafiz al-ASAD, his son, Bashar al-ASAD, was approved as president by popular referendum in July 2000. Syrian troops - stationed in Lebanon since 1976 in an ostensible peacekeeping role - were withdrawn in April 2005. During the July-August 2006 conflict between Israel and Hizballah, Syria placed its military forces on alert but did not intervene directly on behalf of its ally Hizballah. In May 2007, Bashar al-ASAD's second term as president was approved by popular referendum.

Influenced by major uprisings that began elsewhere in the region, and compounded by additional social and economic factors, antigovernment protests broke out first in the southern province of Dar'a in March 2011 with protesters calling for the repeal of the restrictive Emergency Law allowing arrests without charge, the legalization of political parties, and the removal of corrupt local officials. Demonstrations and violent unrest spread across Syria with the size and intensity of protests fluctuating. The government responded to unrest with a mix of concessions - including the repeal of the Emergency Law, new laws permitting new political parties, and liberalizing local and national elections - and with military force and detentions. The government's efforts to quell unrest and armed opposition activity led to extended clashes and eventually civil war between government forces, their allies, and oppositionists.

International pressure on the ASAD regime intensified after late 2011, as the Arab League, the EU, Turkey, and the US expanded economic sanctions against the regime and those entities that support it. In December 2012, the Syrian National Coalition, was recognized by more than 130 countries as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people. In September 2015, Russia launched a military intervention on behalf of the ASAD regime, and domestic and foreign government-aligned forces recaptured swaths of territory from opposition forces, and eventually the country’s second largest city, Aleppo, in December 2016, shifting the conflict in the regime’s favor. The regime, with this foreign support, also recaptured opposition strongholds in the Damascus suburbs and the southern province of Dar’a in 2018. The government lacks territorial control over much of the northeastern part of the country, which is dominated by the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and a smaller area dominated by Turkey. The SDF expanded its territorial hold beyond its traditional homelands, subsuming much of the northeast since 2014 as it battled the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Since 2016, Turkey has been engaged in northern Syria and has conducted three large-scale military operations to capture territory along Syria's northern border in the provinces of Aleppo, Ar Raqqah, and Al Hasakah. Some opposition forces organized under the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army and Turkish forces have maintained control of northwestern Syria along the Turkish border with the Afrin area of Aleppo Province since 2018. In 2019, Turkey and its opposition allies occupied formerly SDF-controlled territory between the cities of Tall Abyad to Ra’s Al ‘Ayn along Syria’s northern border. The extremist organization Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (formerly the Nusrah Front) in 2017 emerged as the predominate opposition force in Idlib Province, and still dominates an area also hosting additional Turkish forces. Negotiations between the government and opposition delegations at UN-sponsored Geneva conferences since 2014 and separately held discussions between Iran, Russia, and Turkey since early 2017 have failed to produce a resolution to the conflict. According to a September 2021 UN estimate, the death toll resulting from the past 10 years of civil war is more than 350,000, although the UN acknowledges that this is the minimum number of verifiable deaths and is an undercount. According to a June 2022 UN estimate, the death toll resulting from the past 10 plus years of civil war is more than 306,000. As of early 2022, approximately 6.66 million Syrians were internally displaced and 14.6 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance across the country. An additional 5.6 million Syrians were registered refugees in Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and North Africa. The conflict in Syria remains one of the two largest displacement crises worldwide (the other is the invasion of Ukraine).

" + "text": "

Following World War I, France acquired a mandate over the northern portion of the former Ottoman Empire province of Syria. The French administered the area as Syria until granting it independence in 1946. The new country lacked political stability and experienced a series of military coups. Syria united with Egypt in February 1958 to form the United Arab Republic. In September 1961, the two entities separated, and the Syrian Arab Republic was reestablished. In the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Syria lost the Golan Heights region to Israel. During the 1990s, Syria and Israel held occasional, albeit unsuccessful, peace talks over its return. In November 1970, Hafiz al-ASAD, a member of the socialist Ba'ath Party and the minority Alawi sect, seized power in a bloodless coup and brought political stability to the country. Following the death of President Hafiz al-ASAD, his son, Bashar al-ASAD, was approved as president by popular referendum in July 2000. Syrian troops - stationed in Lebanon since 1976 in an ostensible peacekeeping role - were withdrawn in April 2005. During the July-August 2006 conflict between Israel and Hizballah, Syria placed its military forces on alert but did not intervene directly on behalf of its ally Hizballah. In May 2007, Bashar al-ASAD's second term as president was approved by popular referendum.

Influenced by major uprisings that began elsewhere in the region, and compounded by additional social and economic factors, antigovernment protests broke out first in the southern province of Dar'a in March 2011 with protesters calling for the repeal of the restrictive Emergency Law allowing arrests without charge, the legalization of political parties, and the removal of corrupt local officials. Demonstrations and violent unrest spread across Syria with the size and intensity of protests fluctuating. The government responded to unrest with a mix of concessions - including the repeal of the Emergency Law, new laws permitting new political parties, and liberalizing local and national elections - and with military force and detentions. The government's efforts to quell unrest and armed opposition activity led to extended clashes and eventually civil war between government forces, their allies, and oppositionists.

International pressure on the ASAD regime intensified after late 2011, as the Arab League, the EU, Turkey, and the US expanded economic sanctions against the regime and those entities that support it. In December 2012, the Syrian National Coalition, was recognized by more than 130 countries as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people. In September 2015, Russia launched a military intervention on behalf of the ASAD regime, and domestic and foreign government-aligned forces recaptured swaths of territory from opposition forces, and eventually the country’s second largest city, Aleppo, in December 2016, shifting the conflict in the regime’s favor. With this foreign support, the regime also recaptured opposition strongholds in the Damascus suburbs and the southern province of Dar’a in 2018. The regime continued to periodically regain opposition held territory until early 2020 when Turkish firepower halted a regime advance and forced a stalemate between regime and opposition forces that has prevented any subsequent advances. The government lacks territorial control over much of the northeastern part of the country, which is dominated by the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and a smaller area dominated by Turkey. The SDF expanded its territorial hold beyond its traditional homelands, subsuming much of the northeast since 2014 as it battled the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Since 2016, Turkey has been engaged in northern Syria and has conducted three large-scale military operations to capture territory along Syria's northern border in the provinces of Aleppo, Ar Raqqah, and Al Hasakah. Some opposition forces organized under the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army and Turkish forces have maintained control of northwestern Syria along the Turkish border with the Afrin area of Aleppo Province since 2018. In 2019, Turkey and its opposition allies occupied formerly SDF-controlled territory between the cities of Tall Abyad to Ra’s Al ‘Ayn along Syria’s northern border. The extremist organization Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (formerly the Nusrah Front) in 2017 emerged as the predominate opposition force in Idlib Province, and still dominates an area also hosting additional Turkish forces. Negotiations between the government and opposition delegations at UN-sponsored Geneva conferences since 2014 and separately held discussions between Iran, Russia, and Turkey since early 2017 have failed to produce a resolution to the conflict. According to a September 2021 UN estimate, the death toll resulting from the past 10 years of civil war is more than 350,000, although the UN acknowledges that this is the minimum number of verifiable deaths and is an undercount. According to a June 2022 UN estimate, the death toll resulting from the past 10 plus years of civil war is more than 306,000. As of early 2022, approximately 6.66 million Syrians were internally displaced and 14.6 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance across the country. An additional 5.6 million Syrians were registered refugees in Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and North Africa. The conflict in Syria remains one of the two largest displacement crises worldwide (the other is the invasion of Ukraine).

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -1043,10 +1043,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "6,300,237 (2020 est.)" + "text": "8,492,468 (2022 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "36% (2020 est.)" + "text": "46.6% (2022 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1143,10 +1143,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "28" + "text": "22" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 1, general cargo 11, other 16 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 1, general cargo 8, other 13 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1189,7 +1189,7 @@ "note": "note: the military is comprised largely of conscripts" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has operated in the Golan between Israel and Syria since 1974 to monitor the ceasefire following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and supervise the areas of separation between the two countries; as of 2022, UNDOF consisted of about 1,000 military personnel

as of 2022, multiple actors were conducting military operations in Syria in support of the ASAD government or Syrian opposition forces, as well in pursuit of their own security goals, such counterterrorism; operations have included air strikes, direct ground combat, and sponsoring proxy forces, as well as providing non-lethal military support, including advisors, technicians, arms and equipment, funding, intelligence, and training:

pro-ASAD elements operating in Syria have included Lebanese Hizbollah, Iranian, Iranian-backed Shia militia, and Russian forces; since early in the civil war, the ASAD government has relied on Lebanese Hizballah (see Appendix T for further information), as well as Iran and Iranian-backed irregular forces, for combat operations and to hold territory; Iran has provided military advisors and combat troops from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (including the Qods Force; see Appendix T for further information), as well as intelligence, logistical, material, technical, and financial support; it has funded, trained, equipped, and led Shia militia/paramilitary units comprised of both Syrian and non-Syrian personnel, primarily from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan; Russia intervened at the request of the ASAD government in 2015 and has since provided air support, special operations forces, military advisors, private military contractors, training, arms, and equipment; Iranian and Russian support has also included assisting Syria in combating the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS; see Appendix T) terrorist group

Turkey intervened militarily in 2016 to combat Kurdish militants and ISIS, support select Syrian opposition forces, and establish a buffer along portions of its border with Syria; as of 2022, Turkey continued to maintain a considerable military presence in northern Syria; it has armed and trained militia/proxy forces, such as the Syrian National Army, which was formed in late 2017 of Syrian Arab and Turkmen rebel factions in the Halab (Aleppo) province and northwestern Syria

the US and some regional and European states have at times backed Syrian opposition forces militarily and/or conducted military operations, primarily against ISIS; the US has operated in Syria since 2015 with ground forces and air strikes; as of 2022, the majority the ground forces were deployed in the Eastern Syria Security Area (ESSA, which includes parts of Hasakah and Dayr az Zawr provinces east of the Euphrates River) in support of operations by the Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS, while the remainder were in southeast Syria around At Tanf supporting counter-ISIS operations by the Jaysh Mughawir al-Thawra (MaT, or Revolutionary Commando Army) Syrian opposition force; the US has also conducted air strikes against Syrian military targets in response to Syrian Government use of chemical weapons against opposition forces and civilians; in addition, France, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UK have provided forms of military assistance to opposition forces and/or conducted operations against ISIS, including air strikes

Israel has conducted hundreds of military air strikes in Syria against Syrian military, Hizbollah, Iranian, and/or Iranian-backed militia targets

the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are an anti-ASAD regime coalition of forces composed primarily of Kurdish, Sunni Arab, and Syriac Christian fighters; it is dominated and led by Kurdish forces, particularly the People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia; the SDF began to receive US support in 2015 and as of 2022 was the main local US partner in its counter-ISIS campaign; the SDF has internal security, counterterrorism, and commando units; Turkey views the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a US-designated terrorist organization (see Appendix T)

the ISIS terrorist group (see Appendix T) lost its last territorial stronghold to SDF forces in 2019, but continued to maintain a low-level insurgency as of 2022; in addition, the SDF held about 10,000 captured suspected ISIS fighters in detention facilities across northern Syria, including 2,000 from countries other than Iraq and Syria

as of 2022, the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS; formerly known as al-Nusrah Front) terrorist organization (see Appendix T) was the dominant militant group in northwest Syria and asserted considerable influence and control over the so-called Syrian Salvation Government in the Iblib de-escalation zone (2022)" + "text": "the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has operated in the Golan between Israel and Syria since 1974 to monitor the ceasefire following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and supervise the areas of separation between the two countries; as of 2022, UNDOF consisted of about 1,000 military personnel

multiple actors are conducting military operations in Syria in support of the ASAD government or Syrian opposition forces, as well in pursuit of their own security goals, such counterterrorism; operations have included air strikes, direct ground combat, and sponsoring proxy forces, as well as providing non-lethal military support, including advisors, technicians, arms and equipment, funding, intelligence, and training:

pro-ASAD elements operating in Syria have included Lebanese Hizbollah, Iranian, Iranian-backed Shia militia, and Russian forces; since early in the civil war, the ASAD government has relied on Lebanese Hizballah (see Appendix T for further information), as well as Iran and Iranian-backed irregular forces, for combat operations and to hold territory; Iran has provided military advisors and combat troops from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (including the Qods Force; see Appendix T for further information), as well as intelligence, logistical, material, technical, and financial support; it has funded, trained, equipped, and led Shia militia/paramilitary units comprised of both Syrian and non-Syrian personnel, primarily from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan; Russia intervened at the request of the ASAD government in 2015 and has since provided air support, special operations forces, military advisors, private military contractors, training, arms, and equipment; Iranian and Russian support has also included assisting Syria in combating the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS; see Appendix T) terrorist group

Turkey intervened militarily in 2016 to combat Kurdish militants and ISIS, support select Syrian opposition forces, and establish a buffer along portions of its border with Syria; Turkey continues to maintain a considerable military presence in northern Syria; it has armed and trained militia/proxy forces, such as the Syrian National Army, which was formed in late 2017 of Syrian Arab and Turkmen rebel factions in the Halab (Aleppo) province and northwestern Syria

the US and some regional and European states have at times backed Syrian opposition forces militarily and/or conducted military operations, primarily against ISIS; the US has operated in Syria since 2015 with ground forces and air strikes; the majority the US ground forces are deployed in the Eastern Syria Security Area (ESSA, which includes parts of Hasakah and Dayr az Zawr provinces east of the Euphrates River) in support of operations by the Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS, while the remainder are in southeast Syria around At Tanf supporting counter-ISIS operations by the Jaysh Mughawir al-Thawra (MaT, or Revolutionary Commando Army) Syrian opposition force; the US has also conducted air strikes against Syrian military targets in response to Syrian Government use of chemical weapons against opposition forces and civilians; in addition, France, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UK have provided forms of military assistance to opposition forces and/or conducted operations against ISIS, including air strikes

Israel has conducted hundreds of military air strikes in Syria against Syrian military, Hizbollah, Iranian, and/or Iranian-backed militia targets

the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are an anti-ASAD regime coalition of forces composed primarily of Kurdish, Sunni Arab, and Syriac Christian fighters; it is dominated and led by Kurdish forces, particularly the People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia; the SDF began to receive US support in 2015 and as of 2023 was the main local US partner in its counter-ISIS campaign; the SDF has internal security, counterterrorism, and commando units; Turkey views the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a US-designated terrorist organization (see Appendix T)

the ISIS terrorist group (see Appendix T) lost its last territorial stronghold to SDF forces in 2019, but continues to maintain a low-level insurgency; in addition, the SDF holds about 10,000 captured suspected ISIS fighters in detention facilities across northern Syria, including 2,000 from countries other than Iraq and Syria

the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS; formerly known as al-Nusrah Front) terrorist organization (see Appendix T) is the dominant militant group in northwest Syria and asserted considerable influence and control over the so-called Syrian Salvation Government in the Iblib de-escalation zone (2023)" } }, "Terrorism": { diff --git a/middle-east/tu.json b/middle-east/tu.json index 70e270a2..bd5541f2 100644 --- a/middle-east/tu.json +++ b/middle-east/tu.json @@ -1136,10 +1136,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "65,784,472 (2020 est.)" + "text": "68.85 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "78% (2020 est.)" + "text": "81% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1236,10 +1236,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "1,217" + "text": "1,237" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 39, container ship 41, general cargo 317, oil tanker 126, other 694 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 37, container ship 41, general cargo 288, oil tanker 130, other 741 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/middle-east/we.json b/middle-east/we.json index a893578b..082a7a9e 100644 --- a/middle-east/we.json +++ b/middle-east/we.json @@ -669,7 +669,8 @@ "note": "note: excludes Gaza Strip" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "stone, olives, fruit, vegetables, limestone" + "text": "building stone, scrap iron, plastic lids, furniture, seating, dates, olive oil (2021)", + "note": "note: data includes both Gaza Strip and West Bank export commodities" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -878,10 +879,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "3,602,452 (2020 est.)" + "text": "3,938,199 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "75% (2020 est.)" + "text": "80% (2021 est.)" }, "note": "note: includes the Gaza Strip" }, diff --git a/middle-east/ym.json b/middle-east/ym.json index 5478cf14..9c62003b 100644 --- a/middle-east/ym.json +++ b/middle-east/ym.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

The Kingdom of Yemen (colloquially known as North Yemen) became independent from the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and in 1962 became the Yemen Arab Republic. The British, who had set up a protectorate area around the southern port of Aden in the 19th century, withdrew in 1967 from what became the People's Republic of Southern Yemen (colloquially known as South Yemen). Three years later, the southern government adopted a Marxist orientation and changed the country's name to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The massive exodus of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis from the south to the north contributed to two decades of hostility between the states. The two countries were formally unified as the Republic of Yemen in 1990. A southern secessionist movement and brief civil war in 1994 was quickly subdued. In 2000, Saudi Arabia and Yemen agreed to delineate their border.

Fighting in the northwest between the government and the Huthis, a Zaydi Shia Muslim minority, continued intermittently from 2004 to 2010, and then again from 2014-present. The southern secessionist movement was revitalized in 2007.

Public rallies in Sana'a against then President Ali Abdallah SALIH - inspired by similar Arab Spring demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt - slowly built momentum starting in late January 2011 fueled by complaints over high unemployment, poor economic conditions, and corruption. By the following month, some protests had resulted in violence, and the demonstrations had spread to other major cities. By March the opposition had hardened its demands and was unifying behind calls for SALIH's immediate ouster. In April 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in an attempt to mediate the crisis in Yemen, proposed the GCC Initiative, an agreement in which the president would step down in exchange for immunity from prosecution. SALIH's refusal to sign an agreement led to further violence. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 2014 in October 2011 calling for an end to the violence and completing a power transfer deal. In November 2011, SALIH signed the GCC Initiative to step down and to transfer some of his powers to Vice President Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI. Following HADI's uncontested election victory in February 2012, SALIH formally transferred all presidential powers. In accordance with the GCC Initiative, Yemen launched a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) in March 2013 to discuss key constitutional, political, and social issues. HADI concluded the NDC in January 2014 and planned to begin implementing subsequent steps in the transition process, including constitutional drafting, a constitutional referendum, and national elections.

The Huthis, perceiving their grievances were not addressed in the NDC, joined forces with SALIH and expanded their influence in northwestern Yemen, which culminated in a major offensive against military units and rival tribes and enabled their forces to overrun the capital, Sanaa, in September 2014. In January 2015, the Huthis surrounded the presidential palace, HADI's residence, and key government facilities, prompting HADI and the cabinet to submit their resignations. HADI fled to Aden in February 2015 and rescinded his resignation. He subsequently escaped to Oman and then moved to Saudi Arabia and asked the GCC to intervene militarily in Yemen to protect the legitimate government from the Huthis. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition of Arab militaries and began airstrikes against the Huthis and Huthi-affiliated forces. Ground fighting between Huthi-aligned forces and anti-Huthi groups backed by the Saudi-led coalition continued through 2016. In 2016, the UN brokered a months-long cessation of hostilities that reduced airstrikes and fighting, and initiated peace talks in Kuwait. However, the talks ended without agreement. The Huthis and SALIH’s political party announced a Supreme Political Council in August 2016 and a National Salvation Government, including a prime minister and several dozen cabinet members, in November 2016, to govern in Sanaa and further challenge the legitimacy of HADI’s government. However, amid rising tensions between the Huthis and SALIH, sporadic clashes erupted in mid-2017, and escalated into open fighting that ended when Huthi forces killed SALIH in early December 2017. In 2018, anti-Huthi forces made the most battlefield progress in Yemen since early 2016, most notably in Al Hudaydah Governorate. In December 2018, the Huthis and Yemeni Government participated in the first UN-brokered peace talks since 2016, agreeing to a limited cease-fire in Al Hudaydah Governorate and the establishment of a UN Mission to monitor the agreement. In April 2019, Yemen’s parliament convened in Say'un for the first time since the conflict broke out in 2014. In August 2019, violence erupted between HADI's government and the pro-secessionist Southern Transition Council (STC) in southern Yemen. In November 2019, HADI's government and the STC signed a power-sharing agreement to end the fighting between them, and in December 2020, the signatories formed a new cabinet. In 2020 and 2021, fighting continued on the ground in Yemen as the Huthis gained territory, and also conducted regular UAV and missile attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia. 

" + "text": "

The Kingdom of Yemen (colloquially known as North Yemen) became independent from the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and in 1962 became the Yemen Arab Republic. The British, who had set up a protectorate area around the southern port of Aden in the 19th century, withdrew in 1967 from what became the People's Republic of Southern Yemen (colloquially known as South Yemen). Three years later, the southern government adopted a Marxist orientation and changed the country's name to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The massive exodus of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis from the south to the north contributed to two decades of hostility between the states. The two countries were formally unified as the Republic of Yemen in 1990. A southern secessionist movement and brief civil war in 1994 was quickly subdued. In 2000, Saudi Arabia and Yemen agreed to delineate their border. Fighting in the northwest between the government and the Houthis, a Zaydi Shia Muslim minority, continued intermittently from 2004 to 2010, and then again from 2014-present. The southern secessionist movement was revitalized in 2007.

Public rallies in Sana'a against then President Ali Abdallah SALIH - inspired by similar Arab Spring demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt - slowly built momentum starting in late January 2011 fueled by complaints over high unemployment, poor economic conditions, and corruption. By the following month, some protests had resulted in violence, and the demonstrations had spread to other major cities. By March the opposition had hardened its demands and was unifying behind calls for SALIH's immediate ouster. In April 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in an attempt to mediate the crisis in Yemen, proposed the GCC Initiative, an agreement in which the president would step down in exchange for immunity from prosecution. SALIH's refusal to sign an agreement led to further violence. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 2014 in October 2011 calling for an end to the violence and completing a power transfer deal. In November 2011, SALIH signed the GCC Initiative to step down and to transfer some of his powers to Vice President Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI. Following HADI's uncontested election victory in February 2012, SALIH formally transferred all presidential powers. In accordance with the GCC Initiative, Yemen launched a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) in March 2013 to discuss key constitutional, political, and social issues. HADI concluded the NDC in January 2014 and planned to begin implementing subsequent steps in the transition process, including constitutional drafting, a constitutional referendum, and national elections.

The Houthis, perceiving their grievances were not addressed in the NDC, joined forces with SALIH and expanded their influence in northwestern Yemen, which culminated in a major offensive against military units and rival tribes and enabled their forces to overrun the capital, Sanaa, in September 2014. In January 2015, the Houthis surrounded the presidential palace, HADI's residence, and key government facilities, prompting HADI and the cabinet to submit their resignations. HADI fled to Aden in February 2015 and rescinded his resignation. He subsequently escaped to Oman and then moved to Saudi Arabia and asked the GCC to intervene militarily in Yemen to protect the legitimate government from the Houthis. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition of Arab militaries and began airstrikes against the Houthis and Houthi-affiliated forces. Ground fighting between Houthi-aligned forces and anti-Houthi groups backed by the Saudi-led coalition continued through 2016. In 2016, the UN brokered a months-long cessation of hostilities that reduced airstrikes and fighting, and initiated peace talks in Kuwait. However, the talks ended without agreement. The Houthis and SALIH’s political party announced a Supreme Political Council in August 2016 and a National Salvation Government, including a prime minister and several dozen cabinet members, in November 2016, to govern in Sanaa and further challenge the legitimacy of HADI’s government. However, amid rising tensions between the Houthis and SALIH, sporadic clashes erupted in mid-2017, and escalated into open fighting that ended when Houthi forces killed SALIH in early December 2017. In 2018, anti-Houthi forces made the most battlefield progress in Yemen since early 2016, most notably in Al Hudaydah Governorate. In December 2018, the Houthis and Yemeni Government participated in the first UN-brokered peace talks since 2016, agreeing to a limited cease-fire in Al Hudaydah Governorate and the establishment of a UN Mission to monitor the agreement. In April 2019, Yemen’s parliament convened in Say'un for the first time since the conflict broke out in 2014. In August 2019, violence erupted between HADI's government and the pro-secessionist Southern Transition Council (STC) in southern Yemen. In November 2019, HADI's government and the STC signed a power-sharing agreement to end the fighting between them, and in December 2020, the signatories formed a new cabinet. In 2020 and 2021, fighting continued on the ground in Yemen as the Houthis gained territory, and also conducted regular UAV and missile attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia. In April 2022, the UN brokered a temporary truce between the Houthis and Saudi-led coalition that resulted in an extended pause of large-scale fighting and cessation of cross-border attacks. Also in April 2022, HADI and his vice-president resigned and were replaced by an eight-person Presidential Leadership Council with the executive powers of the president and vice president.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -1086,10 +1086,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "7,873,719 (2019 est.)" + "text": "8,229,624 (2022 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "27% (2019 est.)" + "text": "26.6% (2022 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1175,10 +1175,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "34" + "text": "30" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 2, oil tanker 4, other 28 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 2, oil tanker 1, other 27 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { @@ -1189,23 +1189,23 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) forces; Ministry of Defense: Yemeni National Army, Air Force and Air Defense, Navy and Coastal Defense Forces, Border Guard, Strategic Reserve Forces (includes Special Forces and Presidential Protection Brigades, which are under the Ministry of Defense but responsible to the president), Popular Committee Forces (government-backed tribal militia); Ministry of Interior: Special Security Forces (paramilitary; formerly known as Central Security Forces), Political Security Organization (state security), National Security Bureau (intelligence), Counterterrorism Unit

Saudi-backed forces: paramilitary/militia border security brigades based largely on tribal or regional affiliation (deployed along the Saudi-Yemen border, especially the areas bordering the governorates of Saada and Al-Jawf)

United Arab Emirates-backed forces include tribal and regionally-based militia and paramilitary forces (concentrated in the southern governates):  Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces, including the Security Belt Forces, the Shabwani and Hadrami “Elite” Forces, the Support and Backup Forces (aka Logistics and Support Forces), Facilities Protection Forces, and Anti-Terrorism Forces; Republican Forces; Joint Forces

Huthi: ground, aerospace (air, missile), naval/coastal defense, presidential protection, special operations, and militia/tribal auxiliary forces (2022)", - "note": "note 1: under the 2019 Riyadh Agreement, the STC forces were to be incorporated into Yemen’s Ministries of Defense and Interior under the authority of the HADI government 

note 2:
a considerable portion--up to 70 percent by some estimates--of Yemen’s military and security forces defected in whole or in part to former president SALAH and the Huthi opposition in 2011-2015" + "text": "Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) forces; Ministry of Defense: Yemeni National Army, Air Force and Air Defense, Navy and Coastal Defense Forces, Border Guard, Strategic Reserve Forces (includes Special Forces and Presidential Protection Brigades, which are under the Ministry of Defense but responsible to the president), Popular Committee Forces (government-backed tribal militia); Ministry of Interior: Special Security Forces (paramilitary; formerly known as Central Security Forces), Political Security Organization (state security), National Security Bureau (intelligence), Counterterrorism Unit

Saudi-backed forces: paramilitary/militia border security brigades based largely on tribal or regional affiliation (deployed along the Saudi-Yemen border)

United Arab Emirates-backed forces include tribal and regionally-based militia and paramilitary forces (concentrated in the southern governates): Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces, including the Security Belt Forces, the Shabwani and Hadrami “Elite” Forces, the Support and Backup Forces (aka Logistics and Support Forces), Facilities Protection Forces, and Anti-Terrorism Forces; Republican Forces; Joint Forces

Houthi: ground, aerospace (air, missile), naval/coastal defense, presidential protection, special operations, and militia/tribal auxiliary forces (2022)", + "note": "note 1: under the 2019 Riyadh Agreement, the STC forces were to be incorporated into Yemen’s Ministries of Defense and Interior under the authority of the HADI government 

note 2:
a considerable portion--up to 70 percent by some estimates--of Yemen’s military and security forces defected in whole or in part to former president SALAH and the Houthi opposition in 2011-2015" }, "Military expenditures": { "text": "

prior to the start of the civil war in 2014, annual military expenditures were approximately 4-5% of Yemen's GDP 

" }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { - "text": "information limited and widely varied; Yemen Government: up to 300,000 estimated military, paramilitary, militia, and other security forces; UAE- and Saudi-backed forces: estimated 150-200,000 trained militia and paramilitary fighters; Huthis: up to 200,000 estimated fighters (2021)" + "text": "information limited and widely varied; Yemen Government: up to 300,000 estimated military, paramilitary, militia, and other security forces; UAE- and Saudi-backed forces: estimated 150-200,000 trained militia and paramilitary fighters; Houthis: up to 200,000 estimated fighters (2021)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the inventory of the Yemeni Government forces consists primarily of Russian and Soviet-era equipment, although much of it has been lost in the current conflict; since the start of the civil war in 2014, it has received limited amounts of donated equipment from some Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and UAE

Huthi forces are armed largely with weapons seized from Yemeni Government forces; they are also reported to have received military hardware from Iran (2022)" + "text": "the inventory of the Yemeni Government forces consists primarily of Russian and Soviet-era equipment, although much of it has been lost in the current conflict; since the start of the civil war in 2014, it has received limited amounts of donated equipment from some Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and UAE

Houthi forces are armed largely with weapons seized from Yemeni Government forces; they are also reported to have received military hardware from Iran (2022)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary military service; conscription abolished in 2001; 2-year service obligation (note - limited information since the start of the civil war in 2014) (2021)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "in 2015, a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states intervened militarily in Yemen in support of the Republic of Yemen Government against the separatist Huthis; as of 2022, Saudi military forces continued to conduct operations in Yemen; Saudi Arabia also has raised and equipped paramilitary/militia security forces in Yemen based largely on tribal or regional affiliation to deploy along the Saudi-Yemen border, especially the areas bordering the governorates of Saada and Al-Jawf

the United Arab Emirates (UAE) intervened in Yemen in 2015 as part of the Saudi-led coalition with about 3,500 troops, as well as supporting air and naval forces; UAE withdrew its main military force from Yemen in 2019, but has retained a smaller military presence while working with proxies in southern Yemen, most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC); as of 2021, UAE had recruited, trained, and equipped an estimated 150-200,000 Yemeni fighters and formed them into dozens of militia and paramilitary units

Iran has provided some military and political support to the Huthis (2022)" + "text": "in 2015, a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states intervened militarily in Yemen in support of the Republic of Yemen Government against the separatist Houthis; as of 2022, Saudi military forces continued to conduct operations in Yemen; Saudi Arabia also has raised and equipped paramilitary/militia security forces in Yemen based largely on tribal or regional affiliation to deploy along the Saudi-Yemen border

the United Arab Emirates (UAE) intervened in Yemen in 2015 as part of the Saudi-led coalition with about 3,500 troops, as well as supporting air and naval forces; UAE withdrew its main military force from Yemen in 2019, but has retained a smaller military presence while working with proxies in southern Yemen, most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC); as of 2021, UAE had recruited, trained, and equipped an estimated 150-200,000 Yemeni fighters and formed them into dozens of militia and paramilitary units

Iran has provided some military and political support to the Houthis (2022)" }, "Maritime threats": { "text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports a significant security risk to vessels transiting off Yemen and the Gulf of Aden due to the civil war in Yemen; vessels have been fired upon and approached, not piracy related; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-003 - Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin-Threats to Commercial Vessels) effective 23 February 2023, which states in part that \"Regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas\"" diff --git a/north-america/bd.json b/north-america/bd.json index c42616f7..df3a9c1c 100644 --- a/north-america/bd.json +++ b/north-america/bd.json @@ -1001,10 +1001,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "147" + "text": "135" }, "by type": { - "text": "container ship 12, oil tanker 18, other 117 (2021)" + "text": "container ship 14, oil tanker 15, other 106 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/north-america/ca.json b/north-america/ca.json index 27562b1a..fbbade6e 100644 --- a/north-america/ca.json +++ b/north-america/ca.json @@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Bloc Quebecois [Yves-Francois BLANCHET]
Conservative Party of Canada or CPC [Candice BERGEN (interim)]
Green Party [Amita KUTTNER (interim)]
Liberal Party [Justin TRUDEAU]
New Democratic Party or NDP [Jagmeet SINGH]
People's Party of Canada [Maxime BERNIER]" + "text": "Bloc Quebecois [Yves-Francois BLANCHET]
Conservative Party of Canada or CPC [Pierre POILIEVRE]
Green Party [Elizabeth MAY]
Liberal Party [Justin TRUDEAU]
New Democratic Party or NDP [Jagmeet SINGH]
People's Party of Canada [Maxime BERNIER]" }, "International organization participation": { "text": "ADB (nonregional member), AfDB (nonregional member), APEC, Arctic Council, ARF, ASEAN (dialogue partner), Australia Group, BIS, C, CD, CDB, CE (observer), EAPC, EBRD, EITI (implementing country), FAO, FATF, G-7, G-8, G-10, G-20, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IEA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IGAD (partners), IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, NAFTA, NATO, NEA, NSG, OAS, OECD, OIF, OPCW, OSCE, Pacific Alliance (observer), Paris Club, PCA, PIF (partner), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNFICYP, UNHCR, UNMISS, UNRWA, UNTSO, UPU, USMCA, Wassenaar Arrangement, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO, ZC" @@ -1134,7 +1134,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "the Canadian telecom market continues to show steady development as operators invest in network upgrades; much of the investment among telcos has been channelled into LTE infrastructure to capitalize on consumer demand for mobile data services, while there has also been further investment in 5G; investment programs have also been supported by regulatory efforts to ensure that operators have spectrum available to develop 5G services; an investment in fixed-line infrastructure, focused on FttP and, among cable broadband providers; government policy has encouraged the extension of broadband to rural and regional areas, with the result that services are almost universally available and the emphasis now is on improving service speeds to enable the entire population to benefit from the digital economy and society; cable broadband is the principal access platform, followed by DSL; the mobile rate remains comparatively low by international standards; Canadians have provided for LTE and LTE-A infrastructure; despite topographical challenges and the remoteness of many areas, the major players effectively offer 99% population coverage with LTE; operators now provide up to 70% population coverage with 5G (2022)" + "text": "the Canadian telecom market continues to show steady development as operators invest in network upgrades; much of the investment among telcos has been channeled into LTE infrastructure to capitalize on consumer demand for mobile data services, while there has also been further investment in 5G; investment programs have also been supported by regulatory efforts to ensure that operators have spectrum available to develop 5G services; an investment in fixed-line infrastructure, focused on FttP and, among cable broadband providers; government policy has encouraged the extension of broadband to rural and regional areas, with the result that services are almost universally available and the emphasis now is on improving service speeds to enable the entire population to benefit from the digital economy and society; cable broadband is the principal access platform, followed by DSL; the mobile rate remains comparatively low by international standards; Canadians have provided for LTE and LTE-A infrastructure; despite topographical challenges and the remoteness of many areas, the major players effectively offer 99% population coverage with LTE; operators now provide up to 70% population coverage with 5G (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "Nearly 34 per 100 fixed-line and 86 per 100 mobile-cellular teledensity (2021)" @@ -1251,10 +1251,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "679" + "text": "689" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 22, container ship 1, general cargo 66, oil tanker 15, other 575 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 21, container ship 1, general cargo 65, oil tanker 15, other 587 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/north-america/gl.json b/north-america/gl.json index 6b91ee76..1a87fd4f 100644 --- a/north-america/gl.json +++ b/north-america/gl.json @@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ "text": "Denmark 55%, China 22%, Japan 6% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "fish, crustaceans, fishing ships (2019)" + "text": "shrimp, halibut, fish fillets, crabs, cod, mackerel (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2015": { @@ -954,10 +954,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "8" + "text": "6" }, "by type": { - "text": "other 8 (2021)" + "text": "other 6 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/north-america/mx.json b/north-america/mx.json index 76230380..43d0e858 100644 --- a/north-america/mx.json +++ b/north-america/mx.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

The site of several advanced Amerindian civilizations - including the Olmec, Toltec, Teotihuacan, Zapotec, Maya, and Aztec - Mexico was conquered and colonized by Spain in the early 16th century. Administered as the Viceroyalty of New Spain for three centuries, it achieved independence early in the 19th century. Elections held in 2000 marked the first time since the 1910 Mexican Revolution that an opposition candidate - Vicente FOX of the National Action Party (PAN) - defeated the party in government, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). He was succeeded in 2006 by another PAN candidate Felipe CALDERON, but Enrique PEÑA NIETO regained the presidency for the PRI in 2012. Left-leaning anti-establishment politician and former mayor of Mexico City (2000-05) Andrés Manuel LÓPEZ OBRADOR, from the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA), became president in December 2018.

The global financial crisis in late 2008 caused a massive economic downturn in Mexico the following year. Growth rebounded to about 5% in 2010, but then averaged roughly half that for the rest of the decade. Notwithstanding this challenge, Mexico is currently the largest goods trading partner of the US – with $614.5 billion in two-way goods trade during 2019. US exports of goods and services to Mexico supported 1.2 million jobs in the US in 2015 (the latest data available) according to estimates from the Department of Commerce. Mexico's GDP contracted by 8.2% in 2020 due to pandemic-induced closures, its lowest level since the Great Depression, but Mexico’s economy rebounded in 2021 when it grew by 4.8%, driven largely by increased remittances, despite supply chain and pandemic-related challenges.

The US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA, or T-MEC by its Spanish acronym) entered into force on 1 July 2020 and replaced its predecessor, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Mexico amended its constitution on 1 May 2019 to facilitate the implementation of the labor components of USMCA.

Ongoing economic and social concerns include low real wages, high underemployment, inequitable income distribution, and few advancement opportunities for the largely indigenous population in the impoverished southern states. Since 2007, Mexico's powerful transnational criminal organizations have engaged in a struggle to control criminal markets, resulting in tens of thousands of drug-related homicides and forced disappearances.

" + "text": "

The site of several advanced Amerindian civilizations - including the Olmec, Toltec, Teotihuacan, Zapotec, Maya, and Aztec - Mexico was conquered and colonized by Spain in the early 16th century. Administered as the Viceroyalty of New Spain for three centuries, it achieved independence early in the 19th century. Elections held in 2000 marked the first time since the 1910 Mexican Revolution that an opposition candidate - Vicente FOX of the National Action Party (PAN) - defeated the party in government, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). He was succeeded in 2006 by another PAN candidate Felipe CALDERON, but Enrique PEÑA NIETO regained the presidency for the PRI in 2012. Left-leaning anti-establishment politician and former mayor of Mexico City (2000-05) Andrés Manuel LÓPEZ OBRADOR, from the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA), became president in December 2018.

Mexico is currently the second-largest (after Canada) goods trading partner of the US with nearly $780 billion in two-way goods trade in 2022. Mexico's GDP contracted by 8.2% in 2020 due to pandemic-induced closures, its lowest level since the Great Depression. Mexico’s economy is rebounding; it grew by 4.8% in 2021, driven largely by increased remittances, despite supply chain and pandemic-related challenges, and grew by 3% in 2022.

The US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA, or T-MEC by its Spanish acronym) entered into force on 1 July 2020 and replaced its predecessor, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Mexico amended its constitution on 1 May 2019 to facilitate the implementation of the labor components of USMCA.

Ongoing economic and social concerns include low real wages, high underemployment, inequitable income distribution, and few advancement opportunities, particularly for the largely indigenous population in the impoverished southern states. Since 2007, Mexico's powerful transnational criminal organizations have engaged in a struggle to control criminal markets, resulting in tens of thousands of drug-related homicides and forced disappearances.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -516,13 +516,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "14.23 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "13.17 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "6.814 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "8.56 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "66.8 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "67.83 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1185,10 +1185,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "92,831,582 (2020 est.)" + "text": "98.8 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "72% (2020 est.)" + "text": "76% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1291,10 +1291,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "671" + "text": "669" }, "by type": { - "text": "container ship 1, bulk carrier 4, general cargo 11, oil tanker 31, other 624 (2021)" + "text": "container ship 1, bulk carrier 5, general cargo 10, oil tanker 32, other 621 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/north-america/sb.json b/north-america/sb.json index aa774fc8..6d396e4c 100644 --- a/north-america/sb.json +++ b/north-america/sb.json @@ -777,10 +777,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "4,500 (2016 est.)" + "text": "5,099 (2022 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "79.5% (2016 est.)" + "text": "88.7% (2022 est.)" } } }, diff --git a/north-america/us.json b/north-america/us.json index 4b9a143a..c7d9767e 100644 --- a/north-america/us.json +++ b/north-america/us.json @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ "text": "63.72% (male 108,346,275/female 108,100,830)" }, "65 years and over": { - "text": "18.12% (2023 est.) (male 27,589,149/female 3,3965,270)" + "text": "18.12% (2023 est.) (male 27,589,149/female 33,965,270)" } }, "Dependency ratios": { @@ -1133,10 +1133,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "301,665,983 (2020 est.)" + "text": "312.8 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "91% (2020 est.)" + "text": "92% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ "text": "178 (2022)" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 4, container ship 61, general cargo 19, oil tanker 65, Roll on/Roll off 29 (2022)" + "text": "bulk carrier 4, container ship 61, general cargo 19, oil tanker 65, other (roll on/roll off 29) (2022)" }, "note": "note - oceangoing self-propelled, cargo-carrying vessels of 1,000 gross tons and above" }, diff --git a/south-america/ar.json b/south-america/ar.json index bcfea88b..78be1bcf 100644 --- a/south-america/ar.json +++ b/south-america/ar.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

In 1816, the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata declared their independence from Spain. After Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay went their separate ways, the area that remained became Argentina. The country's population and culture were heavily shaped by immigrants from throughout Europe, with Italy and Spain providing the largest percentage of newcomers from 1860 to 1930. Up until about the mid-20th century, much of Argentina's history was dominated by periods of internal political unrest and conflict between civilian and military factions.

After World War II, an era of populism under former President Juan Domingo PERÓN - the founder of the Peronist political movement - and direct and indirect military interference in subsequent governments was followed by a military junta that took power in 1976. Democracy returned in 1983 after a failed bid to seize the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) by force, and has persisted despite numerous challenges, the most formidable of which was a severe economic crisis in 2001-02 that led to violent public protests and the successive resignations of several presidents. The years 2003-15 saw Peronist rule by Néstor KIRCHNER (2003-07) and his spouse Cristina FERNÁNDEZ DE KIRCHNER (2007-15), who oversaw several years of strong economic growth (2003-11) followed by a gradual deterioration in the government’s fiscal situation and eventual economic stagnation and isolation. Argentina underwent a brief period of economic reform and international reintegration under Mauricio MACRI (2015-19), but a recession in 2018-19 and frustration with MACRI’s economic policies ushered in a new Peronist government in 2019 led by President Alberto FERNÁNDEZ and Vice President FERNÁNDEZ DE KIRCHNER. Presidential elections will take place next in 2023.

" + "text": "

In 1816, the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata declared their independence from Spain. After Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay went their separate ways, the area that remained became Argentina. The country's population and culture were heavily shaped by immigrants from throughout Europe, with Italy and Spain providing the largest percentage of newcomers from 1860 to 1930. Up until about the mid-20th century, much of Argentina's history was dominated by periods of internal political unrest and conflict between civilian and military factions.

After World War II, an era of populism under former President Juan Domingo PERÓN - the founder of the Peronist political movement - and direct and indirect military interference in subsequent governments was followed by a military junta that took power in 1976. Democracy returned in 1983 after a failed bid to seize the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) by force, and has persisted despite numerous challenges, the most formidable of which was a severe economic crisis in 2001-02 that led to violent public protests and the successive resignations of several presidents. The years 2003-15 saw Peronist rule by Néstor KIRCHNER (2003-07) and his spouse Cristina FERNÁNDEZ DE KIRCHNER (2007-15), who oversaw several years of strong economic growth (2003-11) followed by a gradual deterioration in the government’s fiscal situation and eventual economic stagnation and isolation. Argentina underwent a brief period of economic reform and international reintegration under Mauricio MACRI (2015-19), but a recession in 2018-19 and frustration with MACRI’s economic policies ushered in a new Peronist government in 2019 led by President Alberto FERNÁNDEZ and Vice President FERNÁNDEZ DE KIRCHNER. Presidential elections will take place next in October 2023.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -1240,10 +1240,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "202" + "text": "203" }, "by type": { - "text": "container ship 1,bulk carrier 1 general cargo 8, oil tanker 33, other 159 (2021)" + "text": "container ship 1, bulk carrier 1 general cargo 8, oil tanker 33, other 160 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/south-america/bl.json b/south-america/bl.json index 304d2cee..9cebf198 100644 --- a/south-america/bl.json +++ b/south-america/bl.json @@ -925,7 +925,8 @@ "text": "Argentina 16%, Brazil 15%, United Arab Emirates 12%, India 10%, United States 6%, South Korea 5%, Peru 5%, Colombia 5% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "gold, natural gas, zinc, silver, soy products, tin (2021)" + "text": "gold, natural gas, zinc, silver, soy products, tin (2021)", + "note": "note: Bolivian cocaine production remains a significant illicit trade commodity" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1255,10 +1256,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "45" + "text": "46" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 29, oil tanker 2, other 14 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 29, oil tanker 3, other 14 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/south-america/br.json b/south-america/br.json index 699a5e58..f29782c7 100644 --- a/south-america/br.json +++ b/south-america/br.json @@ -1285,10 +1285,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "864" + "text": "877" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 11, container ship 19, general cargo 42, oil tanker 31, other 761 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 11, container ship 20, general cargo 40, oil tanker 27, other 779 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/south-america/ci.json b/south-america/ci.json index 366667f1..eae1fb61 100644 --- a/south-america/ci.json +++ b/south-america/ci.json @@ -1215,10 +1215,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "231" + "text": "239" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 6, container ship 5, general cargo 58, oil tanker 14, other 148 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 4, container ship 5, general cargo 64, oil tanker 14, other 152 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/south-america/co.json b/south-america/co.json index 61ff5620..41d3bfc9 100644 --- a/south-america/co.json +++ b/south-america/co.json @@ -1256,10 +1256,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "122" + "text": "148" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 23, oil tanker 7, other 92 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 28, oil tanker 12, other 108 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/south-america/ec.json b/south-america/ec.json index 12a6a428..20c10b24 100644 --- a/south-america/ec.json +++ b/south-america/ec.json @@ -919,7 +919,7 @@ "text": "United States 30%, China 13%, Panama 8%, Chile 7% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "crude petroleum, crustaceans, bananas, fish, refined petroleum (2019)" + "text": "crude petroleum, shrimp, bananas, refined petroleum, tuna (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2021": { @@ -1246,10 +1246,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "145" + "text": "147" }, "by type": { - "text": "container ship 1, general cargo 7, oil tanker 27, other 110 (2021)" + "text": "container ship 1, general cargo 8, oil tanker 28, other 110 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/south-america/fk.json b/south-america/fk.json index 87089d2a..cd162df2 100644 --- a/south-america/fk.json +++ b/south-america/fk.json @@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ "text": "Spain 78%, United States 6% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { - "text": "mollusks, fish, wool, sheep/goat meats, engine parts (2019)" + "text": "mollusks, fish, wool, sheep and goat meats, aircraft parts (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2004": { @@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ "text": "2" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 1, other 1 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 1, other 1 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/south-america/gy.json b/south-america/gy.json index 821aaab7..bbc7dd59 100644 --- a/south-america/gy.json +++ b/south-america/gy.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "Originally a Dutch colony in the 17th century, by 1815 Guyana had become a British possession. The abolition of slavery led to settlement of urban areas by former slaves and the importation of indentured servants from India to work the sugar plantations. The resulting ethnocultural divide has persisted and has led to turbulent politics. Guyana achieved independence from the UK in 1966, and since then it has been ruled mostly by socialist-oriented governments. In 1992, Cheddi JAGAN was elected president in what is considered the country's first free and fair election since independence. After his death five years later, his wife, Janet JAGAN, became president but resigned in 1999 due to poor health. Her successor, Bharrat JAGDEO, was elected in 2001 and again in 2006. Early elections held in May 2015 resulted in the first change in governing party and the replacement of President Donald RAMOTAR by current President David GRANGER. After a December 2018 no-confidence vote against the GRANGER government, national elections were constitutionally required to take place within three months. After over a year of extra-constitutional rule by the GRANGER administration, elections were held, though voting irregularities led to a nationwide recount. The current Irfaan ALI administration was sworn in to office in August 2020. The discovery of oil in 2015 has been the primary economic and political focus, with many hoping the significant reserves will transform one of the poorest countries in the region." + "text": "Originally a Dutch colony in the 17th century, by 1815 Guyana had become a British possession. The abolition of slavery led to settlement of urban areas by former slaves and the importation of indentured servants from India to work the sugar plantations. The resulting ethnocultural divide has persisted and has led to turbulent politics. Guyana achieved independence from the UK in 1966, and since then it has been ruled mostly by socialist-oriented governments. In 1992, Cheddi JAGAN was elected president in what is considered the country's first free and fair election since independence. After his death five years later, his wife, Janet JAGAN, became president but resigned in 1999 due to poor health. Her successor, Bharrat JAGDEO, was elected in 2001 and again in 2006. Early elections held in May 2015 resulted in the first change in governing party and the replacement of President Donald RAMOTAR by current President David GRANGER. After a December 2018 no-confidence vote against the GRANGER government, national elections were constitutionally required to take place within three months. After over a year of extra-constitutional rule by the GRANGER administration, elections were held, though voting irregularities led to a nationwide recount. The current Irfaan ALI administration was sworn in to office in August 2020. The discovery of oil in 2015 has been the primary economic and political focus, with many hoping the significant reserves will transform one of the poorest countries in the region. Guyana is the only English-speaking country in South America and shares cultural and historical bonds with the Anglophone Caribbean." } }, "Geography": { @@ -474,13 +474,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "60 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "60 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "20 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "20 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "1.36 billion cubic meters (2019 est.)" + "text": "1.36 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1163,10 +1163,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "56" + "text": "89" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 26, oil tanker 7, other 23 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 1, general cargo 45, oil tanker 12, other 31 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/south-america/ns.json b/south-america/ns.json index 26f3530f..267dcfdd 100644 --- a/south-america/ns.json +++ b/south-america/ns.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "First explored by the Spaniards in the 16th century and then settled by the English in the mid-17th century, Suriname became a Dutch colony in 1667. With the abolition of African slavery in 1863, workers were brought in from India and Java. The Netherlands granted the colony independence in 1975. Five years later, the civilian government was replaced by a military regime that soon declared Suriname a socialist republic. It continued to exert control through a succession of nominally civilian administrations until 1987, when international pressure finally forced a democratic election. In 1990, the military overthrew the civilian leadership, but a democratically elected government - a four-party coalition - returned to power in 1991. The coalition expanded to eight parties in 2005 and ruled until August 2010, when voters returned former military leader Desire BOUTERSE and his opposition coalition to power. President BOUTERSE was reelected unopposed in 2015. Opposition parties campaigned hard against BOUTERSE in the lead up to the May 2020 elections and, in July 2020, a coalition led by Chandrikapersad SANTOKHI’s VHP and Ronnie Brunswijk’s ABOP was installed. The SANTOKHI government promised to tackle COVID-19, the economic crisis it inherited, and corruption." + "text": "First explored by the Spaniards in the 16th century and then settled by the English in the mid-17th century, Suriname became a Dutch colony in 1667. With the abolition of African slavery in 1863, workers were brought in from India and Java. The Netherlands granted the colony independence in 1975. Five years later, the civilian government was replaced by a military regime that soon declared Suriname a socialist republic. It continued to exert control through a succession of nominally civilian administrations until 1987, when international pressure finally forced a democratic election. In 1990, the military overthrew the civilian leadership, but a democratically elected government - a four-party coalition - returned to power in 1991. The coalition expanded to eight parties in 2005 and ruled until August 2010, when voters returned former military leader Desire BOUTERSE and his opposition coalition to power. President BOUTERSE was reelected unopposed in 2015. Opposition parties campaigned hard against BOUTERSE in the lead up to the May 2020 elections and, in July 2020, a multi-party coalition led by Chandrikapersad SANTOKHI’s VHP and Ronnie Brunswijk’s ABOP was installed. The SANTOKHI government promised to tackle COVID-19, the economic crisis it inherited, and corruption." } }, "Geography": { @@ -1099,10 +1099,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "410,644 (2020 est.)" + "text": "402,600 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "70% (2020 est.)" + "text": "66% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1179,7 +1179,7 @@ "text": "10" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 5, oil tanker 3, other 2 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 5, oil tanker 3, other 2 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/south-america/pa.json b/south-america/pa.json index 754b7400..17850ee6 100644 --- a/south-america/pa.json +++ b/south-america/pa.json @@ -474,13 +474,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "362 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "360 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "154 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "150 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "1.897 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1.9 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1126,10 +1126,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "4.92 million (2021 est.)" + "text": "5.159 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "64% (2021 est.)" + "text": "77% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1214,10 +1214,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "110" + "text": "105" }, "by type": { - "text": "container ship 3, general cargo 25, oil tanker 5, other 77 (2021)" + "text": "container ship 2, general cargo 24, oil tanker 5, other 74 (2022)" }, "note": "note: as of 2017, Paraguay registered 2,012 fluvial vessels of which 1,741 were commercial barges" }, diff --git a/south-america/pe.json b/south-america/pe.json index ae1778d2..c4c1d81a 100644 --- a/south-america/pe.json +++ b/south-america/pe.json @@ -509,13 +509,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "2.797 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "2.24 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "206.6 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "3.51 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "13.1 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "32.8 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1172,10 +1172,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "21,431,700 (2020 est.)" + "text": "24.14 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "65% (2020 est.)" + "text": "71% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1276,10 +1276,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "98" + "text": "101" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 1, oil tanker 8, other 89 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 1, oil tanker 8, other 92 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/south-america/uy.json b/south-america/uy.json index 8393307b..a3f660e5 100644 --- a/south-america/uy.json +++ b/south-america/uy.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Montevideo, founded by the Spanish in 1726 as a military stronghold, soon became an important commercial center due to its natural harbor. Claimed by Argentina but annexed by Brazil in 1821, Uruguay declared its independence in 1825 and secured its freedom in 1828 after a three-year struggle. The administrations of President Jose BATLLE in the early 20th century launched widespread political, social, and economic reforms that established a statist tradition. A violent Marxist urban guerrilla movement named the Tupamaros (or Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros (MLN-T)), launched in the late 1960s, led Uruguay's president to cede control of the government to the military in 1973. By yearend, the rebels had been crushed, but the military continued to expand its hold over the government. Civilian rule was restored in 1985. In 2004, the left-of-center Frente Amplio Coalition won national elections that effectively ended 170 years of political control previously held by the Colorado and National (Blanco) parties. The left-of-center retained the presidency and control of both chambers of congress until 2019. Uruguay's political and labor conditions are among the freest on the continent.

" + "text": "

Montevideo, founded by the Spanish in 1726 as a military stronghold, soon became an important commercial center due to its natural harbor. Claimed by Argentina but annexed by Brazil in 1821, Uruguay declared its independence in 1825 and secured its freedom in 1828 after a three-year struggle. The administrations of President Jose BATLLE in the early 20th century launched widespread political, social, and economic reforms that established a statist tradition. A violent Marxist urban guerrilla movement named the Tupamaros (or Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros (MLN-T)), launched in the late 1960s, led Uruguay's president to cede control of the government to the military in 1973. By yearend, the rebels had been crushed, but the military continued to expand its hold over the government. Civilian rule was restored in 1985. In 2004, the left-of-center Frente Amplio (FA) Coalition won national elections that effectively ended 170 years of political control previously held by the Colorado and National (Blanco) parties. The left-of-center retained the presidency and control of both chambers of congress until 2019. Uruguay's political and labor conditions are among the freest on the continent.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -1130,10 +1130,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "2,987,405 (2020 est.)" + "text": "3.06 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "86% (2020 est.)" + "text": "90% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1218,10 +1218,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "61" + "text": "60" }, "by type": { - "text": "container ship 1, general cargo 4, oil tanker 4, other 52 (2021)" + "text": "container ship 1, general cargo 4, oil tanker 4, other 51 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/south-america/ve.json b/south-america/ve.json index be71b658..6961d401 100644 --- a/south-america/ve.json +++ b/south-america/ve.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Venezuela was one of three countries that emerged from the collapse of Gran Colombia in 1830 (the others being Ecuador and New Granada, which became Colombia). For most of the first half of the 20th century, Venezuela was ruled by military strongmen who promoted the oil industry and allowed for some social reforms. Although democratically elected governments largely held sway since 1959, the executive branch under Hugo CHAVEZ, president from 1999 to 2013, exercised increasingly authoritarian control over other branches of government.  This undemocratic trend continued in 2018 when Nicolas MADURO claimed the presidency for his second term in an election boycotted by most opposition parties and widely viewed as fraudulent.

The last democratically-elected institution is the 2015 National Assembly. The president of the 2015 National Assembly, Juan GUAIDO is currently recognized by several countries - including the United States - as the interim president of Venezuela, while MADURO is recognized by most countries. In 2020, legislative elections were held for a new National Assembly, which the opposition boycotted and which were widely condemned as fraudulent. The resulting assembly is viewed by GUAIDO, most opposition parties, and many international actors as illegitimate. In November 2021, most opposition parties broke a three-year election boycott to participate in mayoral and gubernatorial elections, despite flawed conditions. As a result, the opposition more than doubled its representation at the mayoral level and retained four of 23 governorships. The 2021 regional elections marked the first time since 2006 that the EU was allowed to send an electoral observation mission to Venezuela.

The MADURO regime places strong restrictions on freedoms of expression and the press. Since CHAVEZ, the ruling party's economic policies expanded the state's role in the economy through expropriations of major enterprises, strict currency exchange and price controls that discourage private sector investment and production, and overdependence on the petroleum industry for revenues, among others. Years of economic mismanagement left Venezuela ill-prepared to weather the global drop in oil prices in 2014, sparking an economic decline that has resulted in reduced government social spending, shortages of basic goods, and high inflation. Worsened living conditions have prompted over 6 million Venezuelans to migrate, mainly settling in nearby countries. Since 2017, the US has imposed financial and sectoral sanctions on the MADURO regime. Since mid-2020, and despite MADURO regime mismanagement and faltering infrastructure, oil production has begun to rise primarily due to strengthened MADURO regime trade relations with China, Russia, Iran, and the illicit oil trade. Caracas has more recently relaxed some economic controls to mitigate the impact of its sustained economic crisis, such as allowing increased currency and liberalizing import flexibility for private citizens and companies. Other concerns include human rights abuses, rampant violent crime, political manipulation of the judicial and electoral systems, and corruption.

" + "text": "

Venezuela was one of three countries that emerged from the collapse of Gran Colombia in 1830 (the others being Ecuador and New Granada, which became Colombia). For most of the first half of the 20th century, Venezuela was ruled by military strongmen who promoted the oil industry and allowed for some social reforms. Although democratically elected governments largely held sway since 1959, the executive branch under Hugo CHAVEZ, president from 1999 to 2013, exercised increasingly authoritarian control over other branches of government.  This undemocratic trend continued in 2018 when Nicolas MADURO claimed the presidency for his second term in an election boycotted by most opposition parties and widely viewed as fraudulent.

The last democratically-elected institution is the 2015 National Assembly. In 2020, legislative elections were held for a new National Assembly, which the opposition boycotted, and which were widely condemned as fraudulent. The resulting assembly is viewed by most opposition parties and many international actors as illegitimate. In November 2021, most opposition parties broke a three-year election boycott to participate in mayoral and gubernatorial elections, despite flawed conditions. As a result, the opposition more than doubled its representation at the mayoral level and retained four of 23 governorships. The 2021 regional elections marked the first time since 2006 that the EU was allowed to send an electoral observation mission to Venezuela.

The MADURO regime places strong restrictions on freedoms of expression and the press. Since CHAVEZ, the ruling party's economic policies expanded the state's role in the economy through expropriations of major enterprises, strict currency exchange and price controls that discourage private sector investment and production, and overdependence on the petroleum industry for revenues, among others. Years of economic mismanagement left Venezuela ill-prepared to weather the global drop in oil prices in 2014, sparking an economic decline that has resulted in reduced government social spending, shortages of basic goods, and high inflation. Worsened living conditions have prompted over 7 million Venezuelans to migrate, mainly settling in nearby countries. Since 2017, the US has imposed financial and sectoral sanctions on the MADURO regime, and the regime's mismanagement and lack of investment in infrastructure has debilitated the country's oil sector. Caracas has more recently relaxed some economic controls to mitigate the impact of its sustained economic crisis, such as allowing increased currency and liberalizing import flexibility for private citizens and companies. Other concerns include human rights abuses, rampant violent crime, political manipulation of the judicial and electoral systems, and corruption.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -1085,10 +1085,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "20,531,397 (2019 est.)" + "text": "22,734,162 (2022 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "72% (2019 est.)" + "text": "78.7% (2022 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1182,10 +1182,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "281" + "text": "272" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 4, container ship 1, general cargo 26, oil tanker 18, other 232 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 3, container ship 1, general cargo 25, oil tanker 17, other 226 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/south-asia/af.json b/south-asia/af.json index 09f61590..e11a1bdf 100644 --- a/south-asia/af.json +++ b/south-asia/af.json @@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ }, "Exports - commodities": { "text": "gold, figs, grapes, cotton, fruits and nuts, coal (2021)", - "note": "note: despite a de facto ban on cultivation, production, usage, transportation, and trade, Afghan opium production continues to be a large-scale illicit trade commodity" + "note": "note: Afghan opium production remains a significant illicit trade export" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2020": { diff --git a/south-asia/bg.json b/south-asia/bg.json index d3e0486d..0642b729 100644 --- a/south-asia/bg.json +++ b/south-asia/bg.json @@ -1265,10 +1265,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "468" + "text": "511" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 48, container ship 6, general cargo 140, oil tanker 144, other 130 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 56, container ship 10, general cargo 150, oil tanker 152, other 143 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/south-asia/ce.json b/south-asia/ce.json index a7be2bc0..3a02b416 100644 --- a/south-asia/ce.json +++ b/south-asia/ce.json @@ -1138,10 +1138,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "7,671,650 (2020 est.)" + "text": "14.74 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "35% (2020 est.)" + "text": "67% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1232,10 +1232,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "90" + "text": "92" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 6, general cargo 13, oil tanker 11, other 60 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 5, general cargo 13, oil tanker 11, other 63 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/south-asia/in.json b/south-asia/in.json index d70cf7f5..3dcb203b 100644 --- a/south-asia/in.json +++ b/south-asia/in.json @@ -1293,10 +1293,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "1,801" + "text": "1,810" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 63, container ship 22, general cargo 587, oil tanker 136, other 993 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 65, container ship 23, general cargo 594, oil tanker 134, other 994 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/south-asia/mv.json b/south-asia/mv.json index 1e0238bb..5313512e 100644 --- a/south-asia/mv.json +++ b/south-asia/mv.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

A sultanate since the 12th century, the Maldives became a British protectorate in 1887. The islands became a republic in 1968, three years after independence. President Maumoon Abdul GAYOOM dominated Maldives' political scene for 30 years, elected to six successive terms by single-party referendums. Following political demonstrations in the capital Male in August 2003, GAYOOM and his government pledged to embark upon a process of liberalization and democratic reforms, including a more representative political system and expanded political freedoms. Political parties were legalized in 2005.

In June 2008, a constituent assembly - termed the \"Special Majlis\" - finalized a new constitution ratified by GAYOOM in August 2008. The first-ever presidential elections under a multi-candidate, multi-party system were held in October 2008. GAYOOM was defeated in a runoff poll by Mohamed NASHEED, a political activist who had been jailed several years earlier by the GAYOOM regime. In early February 2012, after several weeks of street protests in response to his ordering the arrest of a top judge, NASHEED purportedly resigned the presidency and handed over power to Vice President Mohammed WAHEED Hassan Maniku. A government-appointed Commission of National Inquiry concluded there was no evidence of a coup, but NASHEED contends that police and military personnel forced him to resign. NASHEED, WAHEED, and Abdulla YAMEEN Abdul Gayoom ran in the 2013 elections with YAMEEN ultimately winning the presidency after three rounds of voting. As president, YAMEEN weakened democratic institutions, curtailed civil liberties, jailed his political opponents, restricted the press, and exerted control over the judiciary to strengthen his hold on power and limit dissent. In September 2018, YAMEEN lost his reelection bid to Ibrahim Mohamed SOLIH, a parliamentarian of the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP), who had the support of a coalition of four parties that came together to defeat YAMEEN and restore democratic norms to Maldives. In April 2019, SOLIH's MDP won 65 of 87 seats in parliament.

" + "text": "

A sultanate since the 12th century, the Maldives became a British protectorate in 1887. The islands became a republic in 1968, three years after independence. President Maumoon Abdul GAYOOM dominated Maldives' political scene for 30 years, elected to six successive terms by single-party referendums. Following political demonstrations in the capital Male in August 2003, GAYOOM and his government pledged to embark upon a process of liberalization and democratic reforms, including a more representative political system and expanded political freedoms. Political parties were legalized in 2005.

In June 2008, a constituent assembly - termed the \"Special Majlis\" - finalized a new constitution ratified by GAYOOM in August 2008. The first-ever presidential elections under a multi-candidate, multi-party system were held in October 2008. GAYOOM was defeated in a runoff poll by Mohamed NASHEED, a political activist who had been jailed several years earlier by the GAYOOM regime. In early February 2012, after several weeks of street protests in response to his ordering the arrest of a top judge, NASHEED purportedly resigned the presidency and handed over power to Vice President Mohammed WAHEED Hassan Maniku. A government-appointed Commission of National Inquiry concluded there was no evidence of a coup, but NASHEED contends that police and military personnel forced him to resign. NASHEED, WAHEED, and Abdulla YAMEEN Abdul Gayoom ran in the 2013 elections with YAMEEN ultimately winning the presidency after three rounds of voting. As president, YAMEEN weakened democratic institutions, curtailed civil liberties, jailed his political opponents, restricted the press, and exerted control over the judiciary to strengthen his hold on power and limit dissent. In September 2018, YAMEEN lost his reelection bid to Ibrahim Mohamed SOLIH, a parliamentarian of the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP), who had the support of a coalition of four parties that came together to defeat YAMEEN and restore democratic norms to Maldives. In April 2019, SOLIH's MDP won 65 of 87 seats in parliament. YAMEEN was arrested and jailed in December 2022 on corruption charges; however, he remains his party's candidate to challenge SOLIH in the presidential election, scheduled for 9 September 2023. 

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "5.6 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "10 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { "text": "300,000 cubic meters (2017 est.)" @@ -1057,10 +1057,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "340,542 (2020 est.)" + "text": "447,200 (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "63% (2020 est.)" + "text": "86% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1129,10 +1129,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "68" + "text": "80" }, "by type": { - "text": "general cargo 21, oil tanker 19, other 28 (2021)" + "text": "general cargo 30, oil tanker 20, other 30 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/south-asia/np.json b/south-asia/np.json index 0672ccd6..d40cf1c3 100644 --- a/south-asia/np.json +++ b/south-asia/np.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

During the late 18th-early 19th centuries, the principality of Gorkha united many of the other principalities and states of the sub-Himalayan region into a Nepali Kingdom. Nepal retained its independence following the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814-16 and the subsequent peace treaty laid the foundations for two centuries of amicable relations between Britain and Nepal. (The Brigade of Gurkhas continues to serve in the British Army to the present day.) In 1951, the Nepali monarch ended the century-old system of rule by hereditary premiers and instituted a cabinet system that brought political parties into the government. That arrangement lasted until 1960, when political parties were again banned, but was reinstated in 1990 with the establishment of a multiparty democracy within the framework of a constitutional monarchy.

An insurgency led by Maoists broke out in 1996. During the ensuing 10-year civil war between Maoist and government forces, the monarchy dissolved the cabinet and parliament and re-assumed absolute power in 2002, after the crown prince massacred the royal family in 2001. A peace accord in 2006 led to the promulgation of an interim constitution in 2007. Following a nationwide Constituent Assembly (CA) election in 2008, the newly formed CA declared Nepal a federal democratic republic, abolished the monarchy, and elected the country's first president. After the CA failed to draft a constitution by a 2012 deadline set by the Supreme Court, then-Prime Minister Baburam BHATTARAI dissolved the CA. Months of negotiations ensued until 2013 when the major political parties agreed to create an interim government headed by then-Chief Justice Khil Raj REGMI with a mandate to hold elections for a new CA. Elections were held in 2013, in which the Nepali Congress (NC) won the largest share of seats in the CA and in 2014 formed a coalition government with the second-place Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (UML) with NC President Sushil KOIRALA serving as prime minister. Nepal's new constitution came into effect in 2015, at which point the CA became the Parliament. Khagda Prasad Sharma OLI served as the first post-constitution prime minister from 2015 to 2016. OLI resigned ahead of a no-confidence motion against him, and Parliament elected Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) leader Pushpa Kamal DAHAL (aka \"Prachanda\") prime minister. The constitution provided for a transitional period during which three sets of elections – local, provincial, and national – needed to take place. The first local elections in 20 years occurred in three phases between May and September 2017, and state and federal elections proceeded in two phases in November and December 2017. The parties headed by OLI and DAHAL ran in coalition and swept the parliamentary elections, and OLI, who led the larger of the two parties, was sworn in as prime minister in February 2018. In May 2018, OLI and DAHAL announced the merger of their parties - the UML and CPN-M - to establish the Nepal Communist Party (NCP), which headed the government for roughly two years before infighting led the party to split. OLI from late 2020 sought to dissolve parliament and hold elections. The supreme court in July 2021 declared OLI's efforts unconstitutional and called for an appointment of the opposition-supported NC leader Sher Bahadur DEUBA as prime minister.

 

" + "text": "

During the late 18th-early 19th centuries, the principality of Gorkha united many of the other principalities and states of the sub-Himalayan region into a Nepali Kingdom. Nepal retained its independence following the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814-16 and the subsequent peace treaty laid the foundations for two centuries of amicable relations between Britain and Nepal. (The Brigade of Gurkhas continues to serve in the British Army to the present day.) In 1951, the Nepali monarch ended the century-old system of rule by hereditary premiers and instituted a cabinet system that brought political parties into the government. That arrangement lasted until 1960, when political parties were again banned, but was reinstated in 1990 with the establishment of a multiparty democracy within the framework of a constitutional monarchy.

An insurgency led by Maoists broke out in 1996. During the ensuing 10-year civil war between Maoist and government forces, the monarchy dissolved the cabinet and parliament and re-assumed absolute power in 2002, after the crown prince massacred the royal family in 2001. A peace accord in 2006 led to the promulgation of an interim constitution in 2007. Following a nationwide Constituent Assembly (CA) election in 2008, the newly formed CA declared Nepal a federal democratic republic, abolished the monarchy, and elected the country's first president. After the CA failed to draft a constitution by a 2012 deadline set by the Supreme Court, then-Prime Minister Baburam BHATTARAI dissolved the CA. Months of negotiations ensued until 2013 when the major political parties agreed to create an interim government headed by then-Chief Justice Khil Raj REGMI with a mandate to hold elections for a new CA. Elections were held in 2013, in which the Nepali Congress (NC) won the largest share of seats in the CA and in 2014 formed a coalition government with the second-place Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (UML) with NC President Sushil KOIRALA serving as prime minister. Nepal's new constitution came into effect in 2015, at which point the CA became the Parliament. Khagda Prasad Sharma OLI served as the first post-constitution prime minister from 2015 to 2016. OLI resigned ahead of a no-confidence motion against him, and Parliament elected Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) leader Pushpa Kamal DAHAL (aka \"Prachanda\") prime minister. The constitution provided for a transitional period during which three sets of elections – local, provincial, and national – needed to take place. The first local elections in 20 years occurred in three phases between May and September 2017, and state and federal elections proceeded in two phases in November and December 2017. The parties headed by OLI and DAHAL ran in coalition and swept the parliamentary elections, and OLI, who led the larger of the two parties, was sworn in as prime minister in February 2018. In May 2018, OLI and DAHAL announced the merger of their parties - the UML and CPN-M - to establish the Nepal Communist Party (NCP), which headed the government for roughly two years before infighting led the party to split. OLI from late 2020 sought to dissolve parliament and hold elections. The supreme court in July 2021 declared OLI's efforts unconstitutional and called for an appointment of the opposition-supported NC leader Sher Bahadur DEUBA as prime minister. DEUBA led Nepal with the support of his party and DAHAL's Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Centre (CPN-MC) until December 2022. The NC won a majority of seats in the parliamentary elections on November 2022, but in late December 2022, DAHAL broke with the ruling coalition and sought a partnership with OLI and the CPN-UML to become prime minister. DAHAL's first post-election cabinet lasted approximately two months, until disagreements over ministerial assignments across the coalition caused OLI to withdraw his support. In March 2023, DAHAL survived a vote of confidence and formed a coalition with the NC to remain prime minister.

 

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -480,13 +480,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "147.6 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "150 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "29.5 million cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "30 million cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "9.32 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "9.32 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1116,10 +1116,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "11,071,987 (2020 est.)" + "text": "15.6 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "38% (2020 est.)" + "text": "52% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { diff --git a/south-asia/pk.json b/south-asia/pk.json index 3689b0c4..20254cb7 100644 --- a/south-asia/pk.json +++ b/south-asia/pk.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

The Indus Valley civilization, one of the oldest in the world and dating back at least 5,000 years, spread over much of what is presently Pakistan. During the second millennium B.C., remnants of this culture fused with the migrating Indo-Aryan peoples. The area underwent successive invasions in subsequent centuries from the Persians, Greeks, Scythians, Arabs (who brought Islam), Afghans, and Turks. The Mughal Empire flourished in the 16th and 17th centuries; the British came to dominate the region in the 18th century. The separation in 1947 of British India into the Muslim state of Pakistan (with West and East sections) and largely Hindu India was never satisfactorily resolved, and India and Pakistan fought two wars and a limited conflict - in 1947-48, 1965, and 1999 respectively - over the disputed Kashmir territory. A third war between these countries in 1971 - in which India assisted an indigenous movement reacting to the marginalization of Bengalis in Pakistani politics - resulted in East Pakistan becoming the separate nation of Bangladesh.

In response to Indian nuclear weapons testing, Pakistan conducted its own tests in mid-1998. India-Pakistan relations improved in the mid-2000s but have been rocky since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks and have been further strained by Indian reports of cross-border militancy. Imran KHAN took office as prime minister in 2018 after the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) party won a plurality of seats in the July 2018 general elections. Pakistan has been engaged in a decades-long armed conflict with militant groups that target government institutions and civilians, including the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant networks.

" + "text": "

The Indus Valley civilization, one of the oldest in the world and dating back at least 5,000 years, spread over much of what is presently Pakistan. During the second millennium B.C., remnants of this culture fused with the migrating Indo-Aryan peoples. The area underwent successive invasions in subsequent centuries from the Persians, Greeks, Scythians, Arabs (who brought Islam), Afghans, and Turks. The Mughal Empire flourished in the 16th and 17th centuries; the British came to dominate the region in the 18th century. The separation in 1947 of British India into the Muslim state of Pakistan (with West and East sections) and largely Hindu India created lasting tension between the two countries, and India and Pakistan fought two wars and a limited conflict - in 1947-48, 1965, and 1999 respectively - over the disputed Kashmir territory. A third war between these countries in 1971 - in which India assisted an indigenous movement reacting to the marginalization of Bengalis in Pakistani politics - resulted in East Pakistan becoming the separate nation of Bangladesh.

In response to Indian nuclear weapons testing, Pakistan conducted its own tests in mid-1998. Major bilateral disputes, including the status of Kashmir, remain unresolved, but in early 2021 the two countries reaffirmed their commitment to maintain the cease-fire along the Line of Control in Kashmir that began in 2003. Pakistan has been engaged in a decades-long armed conflict with militant groups, including the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant networks, that target government institutions and civilians.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -516,13 +516,13 @@ }, "Total water withdrawal": { "municipal": { - "text": "9.65 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "9.65 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "industrial": { - "text": "1.4 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "1.4 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "agricultural": { - "text": "172.4 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)" + "text": "172.4 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)" } }, "Total renewable water resources": { @@ -1181,10 +1181,10 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "55,223,083 (2020 est.)" + "text": "48.3 million (2021 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "25% (2020 est.)" + "text": "21% (2021 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { @@ -1284,10 +1284,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "57" + "text": "58" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 5, oil tanker 7, other 45 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 5, oil tanker 7, other 46 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { diff --git a/world/xx.json b/world/xx.json index e7ef2dff..1cdad34a 100644 --- a/world/xx.json +++ b/world/xx.json @@ -118,13 +118,13 @@ }, "Age structure": { "0-14 years": { - "text": "25.18% (male 1,010,373,278/female 946,624,579)" + "text": "24.7% (male 1,013,862,872/female 954,310,632)" }, "15-64 years": { - "text": "15.29% (male 614,046,344/female 574,513,854)" + "text": "65.2% (male 2,632,261,828/female 2,569,677,967)" }, "65 years and over": { - "text": "9.69% (male 337,244,947/female 415,884,753) (2021 est.)" + "text": "10.1% (male 359,529,609/female 448,106,332) (2023 est.)" } }, "Dependency ratios": { @@ -712,12 +712,12 @@ }, "Internet users": { "total": { - "text": "4.9 billion (2021 est.)" + "text": "5.3 billion (2022 est.)" }, "percent of population": { - "text": "63% (2021 est.)" + "text": "66% (2022 est.)" }, - "note": "top ten countries by Internet usage (in millions): 730.7 China; 374.3 India; 246.8 United States; 122.8 Brazil; 116.6 Japan; 108.8 Russia; 73.3 Mexico; 72.3 Germany; 65.5 Indonesia; 61 United Kingdom (2017)" + "note": "top ten countries by Internet usage (in millions): 854 China; 560 India; 293 United States; 171 Indonesia; 149 Brazil; 123 Nigeria; 119 Japan; 116 Russia; 96 Bangladesh; 88 Mexico (2023)" }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { @@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ } }, "Communications - note": { - "text": "data centers consist of a dedicated space within a building or a group of buildings used to house computing resources and other components, such as telecommunications and storage systems; the ongoing worldwide boom in data generation is responsible for the mushrooming of data centers; the three largest data center facilities by area as of the first half of 2022 are:
 
no. 1. - the China Telecom data center located in the Inner Mongolia Information Park, Hohhot, China, reportedly covers 1 million sq m (10.7 million sq ft); the largest Internet data center in the world, it has over 50% market share in the Chinese data center market, with an extensive network of over 400 data centers located in prime regions in mainland China and overseas markets

no. 2. - the China Mobile data center located in the Inner Mongolia Information Park, Hohhot, China, covers 720,000 sq m (7.7 million sq ft); it is one of the world's biggest cloud computing data centers

no. 3. - The Citadel data center owned by US-based Switch, in Tahoe Reno, Nevada, covers 670,000 sq m (7.2 million sq ft); called the world’s largest technology ecosystem, the facility runs on 100% renewable (solar and wind) energy" + "text": "a data center is a centralized facility that uses networked computers and storage systems in its infrastructure; they exist to provide shared access to applications and data and high-level computing; the worlds ten largest data center facilities are:
 
1. China Unicom

2. Amazon Web Services

3. China Telecom

4. NTT Communications

5. Equinix

6. Digital Reality

7. Cyxtera Technologies

8. Coresite

9. Switch (The Citadel Campus)

10. 365 Data Centers (2023)" } }, "Transportation": { @@ -750,10 +750,10 @@ }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { - "text": "98,202" + "text": "101,158" }, "by type": { - "text": "bulk carrier 12,319, container ship 5,428, general cargo 18,993, oil tanker 11,243, other 50,219 (2021)" + "text": "bulk carrier 12,707, container ship 5,583, general cargo 19,647, oil tanker 11,396, other 51,825 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": {