- Reduced maximum document size for the editor from 5MB to 1MB.
- Introduced a new line limit of 5000 for documents in the editor.
- Implemented a PlateErrorBoundary component to handle rendering errors gracefully in the editor panel.
- Updated logic in the editor panel to check both size and line count for document limits.
Some OpenAI-compatible image backends (e.g. Xinference) return a relative
URL like /files/image.png in data[0].url instead of an absolute one.
Browsers cannot resolve these, causing images to fail to load.
Track the provider's api_base after resolving model config via to_litellm().
When the returned URL starts with "/", extract the origin (scheme + host + port)
from api_base and prepend it to produce a full absolute URL.
No behaviour change for providers that return absolute URLs (OpenAI, Azure, etc).
Closes#1496
The long-running ingestion/podcast/video tasks run on a separate Celery
engine (NullPool), so the web engine's idle_in_transaction_session_timeout
did not cover them — which is exactly where the original 11h zombie
(INSERT INTO chunks) came from. Apply the same protection to the Celery
engine with a generous 60-minute default so a worker that hangs/crashes
mid-transaction can't hold locks on documents/chunks indefinitely, while
never reaping a legitimate per-document embed window.
- config + .env.example: DB_CELERY_IDLE_IN_TX_TIMEOUT_MS (default 3600000).
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
A single abandoned "idle in transaction" session held locks on the
documents table, which blocked the non-concurrent CREATE INDEX (hnsw)
run inside the FastAPI lifespan. Each API restart queued another
CREATE INDEX behind an advisory lock, leaving the server stuck at
"Waiting for application startup." indefinitely and freezing ingestion
writes.
Changes:
- setup_indexes(): build every index with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY
(non-blocking ShareUpdateExclusiveLock) under a per-session
lock_timeout, and make each statement non-fatal so a contended/slow
build is retried next boot instead of wedging startup. Drop leftover
invalid indexes before rebuilding.
- create_db_and_tables(): apply lock_timeout to extension/create_all
DDL and gate the whole bootstrap behind DB_BOOTSTRAP_ON_STARTUP.
- engine: set idle_in_transaction_session_timeout (asyncpg) so an
abandoned transaction is reaped automatically.
- config + .env.example: DB_BOOTSTRAP_ON_STARTUP, DB_DDL_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS,
DB_IDLE_IN_TX_TIMEOUT_MS.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Two integration tests pinning the connector index endpoint's authorization:
- cross-space index (attacker owns space B, connector lives in victim's
space A, request passes search_space_id=B) is rejected with 404 at the
search-space reconciliation, before the permission check (which would
otherwise pass for the attacker's own space).
- same-space index authorizes check_permission against the connector's
own search space, not the caller-supplied query param.
Mirrors the existing tests/integration harness (direct handler calls with
the savepoint-rolled-back db_session; check_permission patched so the test
needs no real RBAC wiring).
The POST /search-source-connectors/{connector_id}/index endpoint loaded
the connector by id and then called check_permission() against the
client-supplied search_space_id query parameter (the caller's own space)
rather than the connector's own search_space_id, and never verified that
the two matched.
A user could therefore index another user's connector by passing their
own search_space_id: the indexer ran with the victim connector's stored
credentials and wrote the fetched content into the attacker's search
space. The read/update/delete handlers already authorize against
connector.search_space_id; this brings the index handler in line.
Reject a connector that does not belong to the requested search space
(404, to avoid disclosing connectors in other spaces) and authorize the
permission check against connector.search_space_id.
