Security Guide aktualisiert

Alpha Nerd 2026-04-18 15:42:22 +02:00
parent 2017d39a12
commit 752cc5c2c1

@ -162,6 +162,81 @@ Secure memory features:
- Guarantees zeroing of sensitive memory - Guarantees zeroing of sensitive memory
- Prevents memory dumps from containing sensitive data - Prevents memory dumps from containing sensitive data
## Hardware Attestation (TPM 2.0)
### What it is
When the server has a TPM 2.0 chip, every response includes a `tpm_attestation` block in `_metadata`. This is a cryptographically signed hardware quote proving:
- Which firmware and Secure Boot state the server is running (PCR 0, 7)
- Which application binary is running, when IMA is active (PCR 10)
The quote is signed by an ephemeral AIK (Attestation Identity Key) generated fresh for each request and tied to the `payload_id` nonce, so it cannot be replayed for a different request.
### Reading the attestation
```python
response = await client.create(
model="Qwen/Qwen3-0.6B",
messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "..."}],
security_tier="maximum"
)
tpm = response["_metadata"].get("tpm_attestation", {})
if tpm.get("is_available"):
print("PCR banks:", tpm["pcr_banks"]) # e.g. "sha256:0,7,10"
print("PCR values:", tpm["pcr_values"]) # {bank: {index: hex}}
print("AIK key:", tpm["aik_pubkey_b64"][:32], "...")
else:
print("TPM not available on this server")
```
### Verifying the quote
The response is self-contained: `aik_pubkey_b64` is the full public key of the AIK that signed the quote, so no separate key-fetch round-trip is needed.
Verification steps using `tpm2-pytss`:
```python
import base64
from tpm2_pytss.types import TPM2B_PUBLIC, TPMT_SIGNATURE, TPM2B_ATTEST
# 1. Decode the quote components
aik_pub = TPM2B_PUBLIC.unmarshal(base64.b64decode(tpm["aik_pubkey_b64"]))[0]
quote = TPM2B_ATTEST.unmarshal(base64.b64decode(tpm["quote_b64"]))[0]
sig = TPMT_SIGNATURE.unmarshal(base64.b64decode(tpm["signature_b64"]))[0]
# 2. Verify the signature over the quote using the AIK public key
# (use a TPM ESAPI verify_signature call or an offline RSA verify)
# 3. Inspect the qualifying_data inside the quote — it must match
# SHA-256(payload_id.encode())[:16] to confirm this quote is for this request
# 4. Check pcr_values against your known-good baseline
```
> Full verification requires `tpm2-pytss` on the client side (`pip install tpm2-pytss` + `sudo apt install libtss2-dev`). It is optional — the attestation is informational unless your deployment policy requires verification.
### Behaviour per security tier
| Tier | TPM unavailable |
|------|----------------|
| `standard` | `tpm_attestation: {"is_available": false}` — request proceeds |
| `high` | same as standard |
| `maximum` | `ServiceUnavailableError` (HTTP 503) — request rejected |
For `maximum` tier, the server enforces TPM availability as a hard requirement. If your server has no TPM and you request `maximum`, catch the error explicitly:
```python
from nomyo import ServiceUnavailableError
try:
response = await client.create(..., security_tier="maximum")
except ServiceUnavailableError as e:
print("Server does not meet TPM requirements for maximum tier:", e)
```
## Compliance Considerations ## Compliance Considerations
### HIPAA Compliance ### HIPAA Compliance
@ -207,9 +282,11 @@ response = await client.create(
messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"}] messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"}]
) )
print(response["_metadata"]) # Contains security-related information print(response["_metadata"]) # Contains security_tier, memory_protection, tpm_attestation, etc.
``` ```
See [Hardware Attestation](#hardware-attestation-tpm-20) for details on the `tpm_attestation` field.
### Logging ### Logging
Enable logging to see security operations: Enable logging to see security operations: