Memory protection (step 3 of the Python parity work):
NodeSecureMemory has implemented lockMemory/unlockMemory since the
native addon landed, but nothing ever called them — mlock was dead code
while getProtectionInfo() reported method: 'mlock' and canLock: true.
The library claimed a protection it was not applying.
- SecureByteContext now locks on entry and unlocks on exit, mirroring
Python's secure_bytearray(lock=True). Zeroing happens *before*
unlocking, so cleartext cannot reach swap in between.
- lockMemory/unlockMemory are part of the SecureMemory interface, so
the browser implementation must answer for them explicitly (false).
- Locking is best-effort throughout: a refused or throwing lock
degrades to zeroing only, which still has value.
getProtectionInfo() now probes rather than assumes. Having the addon
loaded is not the same as being allowed to lock: mlock is routinely
refused by RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, which is small by default and 0 in some
containers. canLock reflects a real mlock attempt, and 'mlock' is only
claimed when locking genuinely works — otherwise it reports zero-only
and says why. ProtectionInfo also carries platform, hasSecureZeroing
and pageSize, closer to Python's get_protection_info().
SAST (ts.code_exec.new_function, ERROR):
JwtQuoteVerifier loaded ESM-only jose via new Function('s', 'return
import(s)'). No user input reached it, so it was not code injection —
but new Function is blocked by any CSP without 'unsafe-eval', and this
package ships a browser bundle, so the failure would land in the
attestation path. Removed in favour of injection: pass the module as
options.jose when require('jose') cannot work. The error message says
so. No eval-equivalent remains in src/.
.nyx/triage.json records the two native/src/mlock.cc cfg-resource-leak
warnings as false positives, scoped to that file rather than the rule,
so a genuine leak in future C++ still surfaces.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
BREAKING CHANGE: keyDir now defaults to null (ephemeral) instead of
'client_keys'. Clients that relied on keys persisting across restarts
must now pass keyDir explicitly.
The Python SDK defaults to key_dir=None: a key pair is generated in
memory for the session and never written to disk. The JS port defaulted
to 'client_keys' and always persisted, so merely constructing a client
wrote an RSA private key into the working directory. That is a weaker
default than the client it ports, and one users never asked for.
- keyDir?: string | null, defaulting to undefined. null and undefined
both mean ephemeral, matching Python's None.
- Persistent mode is unchanged when keyDir is set: load the existing
pair from that directory, otherwise generate and save one there.
- Browsers are always ephemeral; they have no filesystem.
Key rotation follows the same rule. It previously hardcoded
'client_keys' as its fallback directory, so an ephemeral client would
have started writing private keys to disk on the first rotation tick.
Rotated keys are now persisted only where keyDir or keyRotationDir is
explicitly configured.
Tests assert the intent (that saveKeys is never called) rather than
probing the filesystem, since a leftover client_keys/ from the old
default would otherwise make them pass or fail for the wrong reason.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
