Security audit follow-up across the workspace:
- webclaw-core: keep the crate WASM-safe. quickjs/rquickjs is now a
cfg(not(wasm32)) target dependency and the extraction entry point uses
a direct call on wasm instead of spawning a thread, so it builds and
runs on wasm32 with or without default features.
- webclaw-core: bound the structured-data scrubber recursion (depth cap)
so deeply nested attacker JSON-LD / __NEXT_DATA__ cannot exhaust the
stack.
- webclaw-fetch: stream the response body with a running ceiling so a
small highly compressed payload cannot inflate to gigabytes in memory;
redact user:pass@ from proxy URLs before they reach error strings.
- webclaw-cli: contain output filenames inside the chosen directory
(reject .. / absolute, drop traversal path segments), run --webhook
URLs through the public-URL SSRF guard, clamp --watch-interval to >=1s,
and make research slug truncation char-safe.
- webclaw-mcp: char-safe slug truncation (no multibyte slice panic).
- setup.sh / deploy/hetzner.sh: replace eval on read input with
printf -v, and mask auth key / API token in console output.
- CI: enforce the wasm32 build invariant for webclaw-core.
Tests added for every behavioral change. Bump to 0.6.3 + CHANGELOG.
Embeds QuickJS (rquickjs) to execute inline <script> tags and extract
data hidden in JavaScript variable assignments. Captures window.__*
objects like __preloadedData (NYTimes), __PRELOADED_STATE__ (Wired),
and self.__next_f (Next.js RSC flight data).
Results:
- NYTimes: 1,552 → 4,162 words (+168%)
- Wired: 1,459 → 9,937 words (+580%)
- Zero measurable performance overhead (<15ms per page)
- Feature-gated: disable with --no-default-features for WASM
Smart text filtering rejects CSS, base64, file paths, code strings.
Only readable prose is appended under "## Additional Content".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
