setup.sh and deploy/hetzner.sh emitted WEBCLAW_AUTH_KEY into the server's
.env, but webclaw-server reads WEBCLAW_API_KEY (env = "WEBCLAW_API_KEY").
The generated key was silently ignored — and since hetzner.sh binds
0.0.0.0, the server refused to start at all (it rejects a public bind
without WEBCLAW_API_KEY). Fix both .env writers, plus the hetzner help
line that told users to grep the wrong name and the env.example sample.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit follow-up across the workspace:
- webclaw-core: keep the crate WASM-safe. quickjs/rquickjs is now a
cfg(not(wasm32)) target dependency and the extraction entry point uses
a direct call on wasm instead of spawning a thread, so it builds and
runs on wasm32 with or without default features.
- webclaw-core: bound the structured-data scrubber recursion (depth cap)
so deeply nested attacker JSON-LD / __NEXT_DATA__ cannot exhaust the
stack.
- webclaw-fetch: stream the response body with a running ceiling so a
small highly compressed payload cannot inflate to gigabytes in memory;
redact user:pass@ from proxy URLs before they reach error strings.
- webclaw-cli: contain output filenames inside the chosen directory
(reject .. / absolute, drop traversal path segments), run --webhook
URLs through the public-URL SSRF guard, clamp --watch-interval to >=1s,
and make research slug truncation char-safe.
- webclaw-mcp: char-safe slug truncation (no multibyte slice panic).
- setup.sh / deploy/hetzner.sh: replace eval on read input with
printf -v, and mask auth key / API token in console output.
- CI: enforce the wasm32 build invariant for webclaw-core.
Tests added for every behavioral change. Bump to 0.6.3 + CHANGELOG.
