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Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
94 lines
2.3 KiB
Python
94 lines
2.3 KiB
Python
"""
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Bootstraps the IAM service. Only works when iam-svc is running in
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bootstrap mode with empty tables. Prints the initial admin API key
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to stdout.
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This is a one-time, trust-sensitive operation. The resulting token
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is shown once and never again — capture it on use. Rotate and
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revoke it as soon as a real admin API key has been issued.
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"""
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import argparse
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import json
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import os
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import sys
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import requests
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default_url = os.getenv("TRUSTGRAPH_URL", "http://localhost:8088/")
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def bootstrap(url):
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# Unauthenticated public endpoint — IAM refuses the bootstrap
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# operation unless the service is running in bootstrap mode with
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# empty tables, so the safety gate lives on the server side.
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endpoint = url.rstrip("/") + "/api/v1/auth/bootstrap"
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headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json"}
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resp = requests.post(
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endpoint,
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headers=headers,
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data=json.dumps({}),
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)
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if resp.status_code != 200:
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raise RuntimeError(
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f"HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text}"
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)
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body = resp.json()
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if "error" in body:
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raise RuntimeError(
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f"IAM {body['error'].get('type', 'error')}: "
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f"{body['error'].get('message', '')}"
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)
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api_key = body.get("bootstrap_admin_api_key")
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user_id = body.get("bootstrap_admin_user_id")
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if not api_key:
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raise RuntimeError(
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"IAM response did not contain a bootstrap token — the "
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"service may already be bootstrapped, or may be running "
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"in token mode."
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)
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return user_id, api_key
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def main():
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parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
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prog="tg-bootstrap-iam",
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description=__doc__,
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)
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parser.add_argument(
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"-u", "--api-url",
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default=default_url,
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help=f"API URL (default: {default_url})",
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)
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args = parser.parse_args()
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try:
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user_id, api_key = bootstrap(args.api_url)
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except Exception as e:
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print("Exception:", e, file=sys.stderr, flush=True)
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sys.exit(1)
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# Stdout gets machine-readable output (the key). Any operator
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# context goes to stderr.
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print(f"Admin user id: {user_id}", file=sys.stderr)
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print(
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"Admin API key (shown once, capture now):",
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file=sys.stderr,
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)
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print(api_key)
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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main()
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