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67b2fc448f
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
142 lines
3.4 KiB
Python
142 lines
3.4 KiB
Python
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from dataclasses import dataclass, field
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from ..core.topic import queue
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from ..core.primitives import Error
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############################################################################
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# IAM service — see docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md for the full protocol.
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#
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# Transport: request/response pub/sub, correlated by the `id` message
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# property. Caller is the API gateway only; the IAM service trusts
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# the bus per the enforcement-boundary policy (no per-request auth
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# against the caller).
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@dataclass
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class UserInput:
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username: str = ""
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name: str = ""
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email: str = ""
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# Only populated on create-user; never on update-user.
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password: str = ""
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roles: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
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enabled: bool = True
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must_change_password: bool = False
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@dataclass
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class UserRecord:
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id: str = ""
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workspace: str = ""
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username: str = ""
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name: str = ""
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email: str = ""
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roles: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
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enabled: bool = True
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must_change_password: bool = False
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created: str = ""
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@dataclass
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class WorkspaceInput:
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id: str = ""
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name: str = ""
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enabled: bool = True
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@dataclass
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class WorkspaceRecord:
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id: str = ""
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name: str = ""
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enabled: bool = True
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created: str = ""
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@dataclass
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class ApiKeyInput:
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user_id: str = ""
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name: str = ""
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expires: str = ""
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@dataclass
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class ApiKeyRecord:
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id: str = ""
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user_id: str = ""
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name: str = ""
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# First 4 chars of the plaintext token, for operator identification
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# in list-api-keys. Never enough to reconstruct the key.
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prefix: str = ""
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expires: str = ""
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created: str = ""
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last_used: str = ""
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@dataclass
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class IamRequest:
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operation: str = ""
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# Workspace scope. Required on workspace-scoped operations;
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# omitted for system-level ops (workspace CRUD, signing-key
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# ops, bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login).
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workspace: str = ""
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# Acting user id for audit. Empty for internal-origin and for
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# operations that resolve an identity (login, resolve-api-key).
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actor: str = ""
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user_id: str = ""
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username: str = ""
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key_id: str = ""
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api_key: str = ""
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password: str = ""
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new_password: str = ""
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user: UserInput | None = None
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workspace_record: WorkspaceInput | None = None
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key: ApiKeyInput | None = None
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@dataclass
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class IamResponse:
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user: UserRecord | None = None
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users: list[UserRecord] = field(default_factory=list)
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workspace: WorkspaceRecord | None = None
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workspaces: list[WorkspaceRecord] = field(default_factory=list)
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# create-api-key returns the plaintext once; never populated
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# on any other operation.
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api_key_plaintext: str = ""
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api_key: ApiKeyRecord | None = None
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api_keys: list[ApiKeyRecord] = field(default_factory=list)
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# login, rotate-signing-key
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jwt: str = ""
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jwt_expires: str = ""
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# get-signing-key-public
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signing_key_public: str = ""
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# resolve-api-key
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resolved_user_id: str = ""
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resolved_workspace: str = ""
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resolved_roles: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
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# reset-password
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temporary_password: str = ""
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# bootstrap
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bootstrap_admin_user_id: str = ""
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bootstrap_admin_api_key: str = ""
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error: Error | None = None
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iam_request_queue = queue('iam', cls='request')
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iam_response_queue = queue('iam', cls='response')
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############################################################################
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