trustgraph/tests/unit/test_gateway/test_endpoint_i18n.py
cybermaggedon 67b2fc448f
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model.  The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.

IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
  passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra.  Reached over the
  standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
  caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
  rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
  change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
  workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA).  Key rotation writes a new kid and
  retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed.  Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
  required startup argument with no permissive default.  Masked
  "auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
  due to mode, state, or authorisation.

Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator.  Distinguishes JWTs
  (three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
  locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
  IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache.  Every failure path
  surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
  enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
  traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.

Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
  OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
  assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*").  No "cross-workspace"
  pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
  authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
  active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
  caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value.  Cross-
  workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
  permissive default.  Construction fails fast if omitted.  Enterprise
  editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
  protocol.

WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
  runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
  with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
  The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
  — browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
  reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
  enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
  the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
  handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).

Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
  op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
  the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).

Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
  Authenticator.permitted contract.  The gateway cannot run without
  IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
  downgrade path.

CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces.  Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.

Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
  resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
  operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
  role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
  policy, enterprise extensibility.

Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
  Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
  role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
  unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
  explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon).  New tests pin
  the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
  auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00

109 lines
3.8 KiB
Python

"""Tests for Gateway i18n pack endpoint.
Production registers this endpoint with ``capability=PUBLIC``: the
login UI needs to render its own i18n strings before any user has
authenticated, so the endpoint is deliberately pre-auth. These
tests exercise the PUBLIC configuration — that is the production
contract. Behaviour of authenticated endpoints is covered by the
IamAuth tests in ``test_auth.py``.
"""
import json
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
import pytest
from aiohttp import web
from trustgraph.gateway.endpoint.i18n import I18nPackEndpoint
from trustgraph.gateway.capabilities import PUBLIC
class TestI18nPackEndpoint:
def test_i18n_endpoint_initialization(self):
mock_auth = MagicMock()
endpoint = I18nPackEndpoint(
endpoint_path="/api/v1/i18n/packs/{lang}",
auth=mock_auth,
capability=PUBLIC,
)
assert endpoint.path == "/api/v1/i18n/packs/{lang}"
assert endpoint.auth == mock_auth
assert endpoint.capability == PUBLIC
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_i18n_endpoint_start_method(self):
mock_auth = MagicMock()
endpoint = I18nPackEndpoint(
"/api/v1/i18n/packs/{lang}", mock_auth, capability=PUBLIC,
)
await endpoint.start()
def test_add_routes_registers_get_handler(self):
mock_auth = MagicMock()
mock_app = MagicMock()
endpoint = I18nPackEndpoint(
"/api/v1/i18n/packs/{lang}", mock_auth, capability=PUBLIC,
)
endpoint.add_routes(mock_app)
mock_app.add_routes.assert_called_once()
call_args = mock_app.add_routes.call_args[0][0]
assert len(call_args) == 1
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_handle_returns_pack_without_authenticating(self):
"""The PUBLIC endpoint serves the language pack without
invoking the auth handler at all — pre-login UI must be
reachable. The test uses an auth mock that raises if
touched, so any auth attempt by the endpoint is caught."""
mock_auth = MagicMock()
def _should_not_be_called(*args, **kwargs):
raise AssertionError(
"PUBLIC endpoint must not invoke auth.authenticate"
)
mock_auth.authenticate = _should_not_be_called
endpoint = I18nPackEndpoint(
"/api/v1/i18n/packs/{lang}", mock_auth, capability=PUBLIC,
)
request = MagicMock()
request.path = "/api/v1/i18n/packs/en"
# A caller-supplied Authorization header of any form should
# be ignored — PUBLIC means we don't look at it.
request.headers = {"Authorization": "Token abc"}
request.match_info = {"lang": "en"}
resp = await endpoint.handle(request)
assert resp.status == 200
payload = json.loads(resp.body.decode("utf-8"))
assert isinstance(payload, dict)
assert "cli.verify_system_status.title" in payload
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_handle_rejects_path_traversal(self):
"""The ``lang`` path parameter is reflected through to the
filesystem-backed pack loader. The endpoint contains an
explicit defense against ``/`` and ``..`` in the value; this
test pins that defense in place."""
mock_auth = MagicMock()
endpoint = I18nPackEndpoint(
"/api/v1/i18n/packs/{lang}", mock_auth, capability=PUBLIC,
)
for bad in ("../../etc/passwd", "en/../fr", "a/b"):
request = MagicMock()
request.path = f"/api/v1/i18n/packs/{bad}"
request.headers = {}
request.match_info = {"lang": bad}
resp = await endpoint.handle(request)
assert isinstance(resp, web.HTTPBadRequest), (
f"path-traversal defense did not reject lang={bad!r}"
)