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Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
109 lines
3.8 KiB
Python
109 lines
3.8 KiB
Python
"""Tests for Gateway i18n pack endpoint.
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Production registers this endpoint with ``capability=PUBLIC``: the
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login UI needs to render its own i18n strings before any user has
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authenticated, so the endpoint is deliberately pre-auth. These
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tests exercise the PUBLIC configuration — that is the production
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contract. Behaviour of authenticated endpoints is covered by the
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IamAuth tests in ``test_auth.py``.
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"""
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import json
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from unittest.mock import MagicMock
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import pytest
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from aiohttp import web
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from trustgraph.gateway.endpoint.i18n import I18nPackEndpoint
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from trustgraph.gateway.capabilities import PUBLIC
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class TestI18nPackEndpoint:
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def test_i18n_endpoint_initialization(self):
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mock_auth = MagicMock()
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endpoint = I18nPackEndpoint(
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endpoint_path="/api/v1/i18n/packs/{lang}",
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auth=mock_auth,
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capability=PUBLIC,
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)
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assert endpoint.path == "/api/v1/i18n/packs/{lang}"
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assert endpoint.auth == mock_auth
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assert endpoint.capability == PUBLIC
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_i18n_endpoint_start_method(self):
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mock_auth = MagicMock()
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endpoint = I18nPackEndpoint(
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"/api/v1/i18n/packs/{lang}", mock_auth, capability=PUBLIC,
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)
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await endpoint.start()
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def test_add_routes_registers_get_handler(self):
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mock_auth = MagicMock()
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mock_app = MagicMock()
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endpoint = I18nPackEndpoint(
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"/api/v1/i18n/packs/{lang}", mock_auth, capability=PUBLIC,
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)
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endpoint.add_routes(mock_app)
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mock_app.add_routes.assert_called_once()
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call_args = mock_app.add_routes.call_args[0][0]
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assert len(call_args) == 1
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_handle_returns_pack_without_authenticating(self):
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"""The PUBLIC endpoint serves the language pack without
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invoking the auth handler at all — pre-login UI must be
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reachable. The test uses an auth mock that raises if
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touched, so any auth attempt by the endpoint is caught."""
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mock_auth = MagicMock()
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def _should_not_be_called(*args, **kwargs):
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raise AssertionError(
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"PUBLIC endpoint must not invoke auth.authenticate"
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)
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mock_auth.authenticate = _should_not_be_called
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endpoint = I18nPackEndpoint(
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"/api/v1/i18n/packs/{lang}", mock_auth, capability=PUBLIC,
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)
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request = MagicMock()
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request.path = "/api/v1/i18n/packs/en"
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# A caller-supplied Authorization header of any form should
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# be ignored — PUBLIC means we don't look at it.
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request.headers = {"Authorization": "Token abc"}
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request.match_info = {"lang": "en"}
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resp = await endpoint.handle(request)
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assert resp.status == 200
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payload = json.loads(resp.body.decode("utf-8"))
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assert isinstance(payload, dict)
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assert "cli.verify_system_status.title" in payload
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_handle_rejects_path_traversal(self):
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"""The ``lang`` path parameter is reflected through to the
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filesystem-backed pack loader. The endpoint contains an
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explicit defense against ``/`` and ``..`` in the value; this
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test pins that defense in place."""
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mock_auth = MagicMock()
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endpoint = I18nPackEndpoint(
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"/api/v1/i18n/packs/{lang}", mock_auth, capability=PUBLIC,
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)
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for bad in ("../../etc/passwd", "en/../fr", "a/b"):
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request = MagicMock()
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request.path = f"/api/v1/i18n/packs/{bad}"
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request.headers = {}
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request.match_info = {"lang": bad}
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resp = await endpoint.handle(request)
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assert isinstance(resp, web.HTTPBadRequest), (
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f"path-traversal defense did not reject lang={bad!r}"
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)
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