trustgraph/tests/unit/test_gateway/test_capabilities.py
cybermaggedon 67b2fc448f
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model.  The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.

IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
  passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra.  Reached over the
  standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
  caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
  rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
  change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
  workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA).  Key rotation writes a new kid and
  retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed.  Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
  required startup argument with no permissive default.  Masked
  "auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
  due to mode, state, or authorisation.

Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator.  Distinguishes JWTs
  (three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
  locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
  IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache.  Every failure path
  surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
  enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
  traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.

Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
  OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
  assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*").  No "cross-workspace"
  pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
  authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
  active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
  caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value.  Cross-
  workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
  permissive default.  Construction fails fast if omitted.  Enterprise
  editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
  protocol.

WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
  runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
  with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
  The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
  — browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
  reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
  enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
  the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
  handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).

Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
  op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
  the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).

Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
  Authenticator.permitted contract.  The gateway cannot run without
  IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
  downgrade path.

CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces.  Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.

Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
  resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
  operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
  role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
  policy, enterprise extensibility.

Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
  Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
  role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
  unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
  explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon).  New tests pin
  the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
  auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00

203 lines
6.8 KiB
Python

"""
Tests for gateway/capabilities.py — the capability + role + workspace
model that underpins all gateway authorisation.
"""
import pytest
from aiohttp import web
from trustgraph.gateway.capabilities import (
PUBLIC, AUTHENTICATED,
KNOWN_CAPABILITIES, ROLE_DEFINITIONS,
check, enforce_workspace, access_denied, auth_failure,
)
# -- test fixtures ---------------------------------------------------------
class _Identity:
"""Minimal stand-in for auth.Identity — the capability module
accesses ``.workspace`` and ``.roles``."""
def __init__(self, workspace, roles):
self.user_id = "user-1"
self.workspace = workspace
self.roles = list(roles)
def reader_in(ws):
return _Identity(ws, ["reader"])
def writer_in(ws):
return _Identity(ws, ["writer"])
def admin_in(ws):
return _Identity(ws, ["admin"])
# -- role table sanity -----------------------------------------------------
class TestRoleTable:
def test_oss_roles_present(self):
assert set(ROLE_DEFINITIONS.keys()) == {"reader", "writer", "admin"}
def test_admin_is_cross_workspace(self):
assert ROLE_DEFINITIONS["admin"]["workspace_scope"] == "*"
def test_reader_writer_are_assigned_scope(self):
assert ROLE_DEFINITIONS["reader"]["workspace_scope"] == "assigned"
assert ROLE_DEFINITIONS["writer"]["workspace_scope"] == "assigned"
def test_admin_superset_of_writer(self):
admin = ROLE_DEFINITIONS["admin"]["capabilities"]
writer = ROLE_DEFINITIONS["writer"]["capabilities"]
assert writer.issubset(admin)
def test_writer_superset_of_reader(self):
writer = ROLE_DEFINITIONS["writer"]["capabilities"]
reader = ROLE_DEFINITIONS["reader"]["capabilities"]
assert reader.issubset(writer)
def test_admin_has_users_admin(self):
assert "users:admin" in ROLE_DEFINITIONS["admin"]["capabilities"]
def test_writer_does_not_have_users_admin(self):
assert "users:admin" not in ROLE_DEFINITIONS["writer"]["capabilities"]
def test_every_bundled_capability_is_known(self):
for role in ROLE_DEFINITIONS.values():
for cap in role["capabilities"]:
assert cap in KNOWN_CAPABILITIES
# -- check() ---------------------------------------------------------------
class TestCheck:
def test_reader_has_reader_cap_in_own_workspace(self):
assert check(reader_in("default"), "graph:read", "default")
def test_reader_does_not_have_writer_cap(self):
assert not check(reader_in("default"), "graph:write", "default")
def test_reader_cannot_act_in_other_workspace(self):
assert not check(reader_in("default"), "graph:read", "acme")
def test_writer_has_write_in_own_workspace(self):
assert check(writer_in("default"), "graph:write", "default")
def test_writer_cannot_act_in_other_workspace(self):
assert not check(writer_in("default"), "graph:write", "acme")
def test_admin_has_everything_everywhere(self):
for cap in ("graph:read", "graph:write", "config:write",
"users:admin", "metrics:read"):
assert check(admin_in("default"), cap, "acme"), (
f"admin should have {cap} in acme"
)
def test_admin_has_caps_without_explicit_workspace(self):
assert check(admin_in("default"), "users:admin")
def test_default_target_is_identity_workspace(self):
# Reader with no target workspace → should check against own
assert check(reader_in("default"), "graph:read")
def test_unknown_capability_returns_false(self):
assert not check(admin_in("default"), "nonsense:cap", "default")
def test_unknown_role_contributes_nothing(self):
ident = _Identity("default", ["made-up-role"])
assert not check(ident, "graph:read", "default")
def test_multi_role_union(self):
# If a user is both reader and admin, they inherit admin's
# cross-workspace powers.
ident = _Identity("default", ["reader", "admin"])
assert check(ident, "users:admin", "acme")
# -- enforce_workspace() ---------------------------------------------------
class TestEnforceWorkspace:
def test_reader_in_own_workspace_allowed(self):
data = {"workspace": "default", "operation": "x"}
enforce_workspace(data, reader_in("default"))
assert data["workspace"] == "default"
def test_reader_no_workspace_injects_assigned(self):
data = {"operation": "x"}
enforce_workspace(data, reader_in("default"))
assert data["workspace"] == "default"
def test_reader_mismatched_workspace_denied(self):
data = {"workspace": "acme", "operation": "x"}
with pytest.raises(web.HTTPForbidden):
enforce_workspace(data, reader_in("default"))
def test_admin_can_target_any_workspace(self):
data = {"workspace": "acme", "operation": "x"}
enforce_workspace(data, admin_in("default"))
assert data["workspace"] == "acme"
def test_admin_no_workspace_defaults_to_assigned(self):
data = {"operation": "x"}
enforce_workspace(data, admin_in("default"))
assert data["workspace"] == "default"
def test_writer_same_workspace_specified_allowed(self):
data = {"workspace": "default"}
enforce_workspace(data, writer_in("default"))
assert data["workspace"] == "default"
def test_non_dict_passthrough(self):
# Non-dict bodies are returned unchanged (e.g. streaming).
result = enforce_workspace("not-a-dict", reader_in("default"))
assert result == "not-a-dict"
def test_with_capability_tightens_check(self):
# Reader lacks graph:write; workspace-only check would pass
# (scope is fine), but combined check must reject.
data = {"workspace": "default"}
with pytest.raises(web.HTTPForbidden):
enforce_workspace(
data, reader_in("default"), capability="graph:write",
)
def test_with_capability_passes_when_granted(self):
data = {"workspace": "default"}
enforce_workspace(
data, reader_in("default"), capability="graph:read",
)
assert data["workspace"] == "default"
# -- helpers ---------------------------------------------------------------
class TestResponseHelpers:
def test_auth_failure_is_401(self):
exc = auth_failure()
assert exc.status == 401
assert "auth failure" in exc.text
def test_access_denied_is_403(self):
exc = access_denied()
assert exc.status == 403
assert "access denied" in exc.text
class TestSentinels:
def test_public_and_authenticated_are_distinct(self):
assert PUBLIC != AUTHENTICATED
assert PUBLIC not in KNOWN_CAPABILITIES
assert AUTHENTICATED not in KNOWN_CAPABILITIES