trustgraph/tests/unit/test_gateway/test_auth.py
cybermaggedon 67b2fc448f
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model.  The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.

IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
  passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra.  Reached over the
  standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
  caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
  rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
  change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
  workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA).  Key rotation writes a new kid and
  retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed.  Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
  required startup argument with no permissive default.  Masked
  "auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
  due to mode, state, or authorisation.

Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator.  Distinguishes JWTs
  (three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
  locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
  IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache.  Every failure path
  surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
  enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
  traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.

Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
  OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
  assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*").  No "cross-workspace"
  pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
  authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
  active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
  caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value.  Cross-
  workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
  permissive default.  Construction fails fast if omitted.  Enterprise
  editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
  protocol.

WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
  runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
  with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
  The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
  — browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
  reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
  enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
  the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
  handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).

Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
  op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
  the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).

Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
  Authenticator.permitted contract.  The gateway cannot run without
  IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
  downgrade path.

CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces.  Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.

Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
  resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
  operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
  role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
  policy, enterprise extensibility.

Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
  Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
  role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
  unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
  explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon).  New tests pin
  the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
  auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00

312 lines
10 KiB
Python

"""
Tests for gateway/auth.py — IamAuth, JWT verification, API key
resolution cache.
JWTs are signed with real Ed25519 keypairs generated per-test, so
the crypto path is exercised end-to-end without mocks. API-key
resolution is tested against a stubbed IamClient since the real
one requires pub/sub.
"""
import base64
import json
import time
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, Mock, patch
import pytest
from aiohttp import web
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ed25519
from trustgraph.gateway.auth import (
IamAuth, Identity,
_b64url_decode, _verify_jwt_eddsa,
API_KEY_CACHE_TTL,
)
# -- helpers ---------------------------------------------------------------
def _b64url(data: bytes) -> str:
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
def make_keypair():
priv = ed25519.Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
public_pem = priv.public_key().public_bytes(
encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
format=serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
).decode("ascii")
return priv, public_pem
def sign_jwt(priv, claims, alg="EdDSA"):
header = {"alg": alg, "typ": "JWT", "kid": "kid-test"}
h = _b64url(json.dumps(header, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True).encode())
p = _b64url(json.dumps(claims, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True).encode())
signing_input = f"{h}.{p}".encode("ascii")
if alg == "EdDSA":
sig = priv.sign(signing_input)
else:
raise ValueError(f"test helper doesn't sign {alg}")
return f"{h}.{p}.{_b64url(sig)}"
def make_request(auth_header):
"""Minimal stand-in for an aiohttp request — IamAuth only reads
``request.headers["Authorization"]``."""
req = Mock()
req.headers = {}
if auth_header is not None:
req.headers["Authorization"] = auth_header
return req
# -- pure helpers ----------------------------------------------------------
class TestB64UrlDecode:
def test_round_trip_without_padding(self):
data = b"hello"
encoded = _b64url(data)
assert _b64url_decode(encoded) == data
def test_handles_various_lengths(self):
for s in (b"a", b"ab", b"abc", b"abcd", b"abcde"):
assert _b64url_decode(_b64url(s)) == s
# -- JWT verification -----------------------------------------------------
class TestVerifyJwtEddsa:
def test_valid_jwt_passes(self):
priv, pub = make_keypair()
claims = {
"sub": "user-1", "workspace": "default",
"roles": ["reader"],
"iat": int(time.time()),
"exp": int(time.time()) + 60,
}
token = sign_jwt(priv, claims)
got = _verify_jwt_eddsa(token, pub)
assert got["sub"] == "user-1"
assert got["workspace"] == "default"
def test_expired_jwt_rejected(self):
priv, pub = make_keypair()
claims = {
"sub": "user-1", "workspace": "default", "roles": [],
"iat": int(time.time()) - 3600,
"exp": int(time.time()) - 1,
}
token = sign_jwt(priv, claims)
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="expired"):
_verify_jwt_eddsa(token, pub)
def test_bad_signature_rejected(self):
priv_a, _ = make_keypair()
_, pub_b = make_keypair()
claims = {
"sub": "user-1", "workspace": "default", "roles": [],
"iat": int(time.time()),
"exp": int(time.time()) + 60,
}
token = sign_jwt(priv_a, claims)
# pub_b never signed this token.
with pytest.raises(Exception):
_verify_jwt_eddsa(token, pub_b)
def test_malformed_jwt_rejected(self):
_, pub = make_keypair()
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="malformed"):
_verify_jwt_eddsa("not-a-jwt", pub)
def test_unsupported_algorithm_rejected(self):
priv, pub = make_keypair()
# Manually build an "alg":"HS256" header — no signer needed
# since we expect it to bail before verifying.
header = {"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT", "kid": "x"}
payload = {
"sub": "user-1", "workspace": "default", "roles": [],
"iat": int(time.time()), "exp": int(time.time()) + 60,
}
h = _b64url(json.dumps(header, separators=(",", ":")).encode())
p = _b64url(json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode())
sig = _b64url(b"not-a-real-sig")
token = f"{h}.{p}.{sig}"
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="unsupported alg"):
_verify_jwt_eddsa(token, pub)
# -- Identity --------------------------------------------------------------
class TestIdentity:
def test_fields(self):
i = Identity(
user_id="u", workspace="w", roles=["reader"], source="api-key",
)
assert i.user_id == "u"
assert i.workspace == "w"
assert i.roles == ["reader"]
assert i.source == "api-key"
# -- IamAuth.authenticate --------------------------------------------------
class TestIamAuthDispatch:
"""``authenticate()`` chooses between the JWT and API-key paths
by shape of the bearer."""
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_no_authorization_header_raises_401(self):
auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
with pytest.raises(web.HTTPUnauthorized):
await auth.authenticate(make_request(None))
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_non_bearer_header_raises_401(self):
auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
with pytest.raises(web.HTTPUnauthorized):
await auth.authenticate(make_request("Basic whatever"))
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_empty_bearer_raises_401(self):
auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
with pytest.raises(web.HTTPUnauthorized):
await auth.authenticate(make_request("Bearer "))
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_unknown_format_raises_401(self):
# Not tg_... and not dotted-JWT shape.
auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
with pytest.raises(web.HTTPUnauthorized):
await auth.authenticate(make_request("Bearer garbage"))
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_valid_jwt_resolves_to_identity(self):
priv, pub = make_keypair()
claims = {
"sub": "user-1", "workspace": "default",
"roles": ["writer"],
"iat": int(time.time()),
"exp": int(time.time()) + 60,
}
token = sign_jwt(priv, claims)
auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
auth._signing_public_pem = pub
ident = await auth.authenticate(
make_request(f"Bearer {token}")
)
assert ident.user_id == "user-1"
assert ident.workspace == "default"
assert ident.roles == ["writer"]
assert ident.source == "jwt"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_jwt_without_public_key_fails(self):
# If the gateway hasn't fetched IAM's public key yet, JWTs
# must not validate — even ones that would otherwise pass.
priv, _ = make_keypair()
claims = {
"sub": "user-1", "workspace": "default", "roles": [],
"iat": int(time.time()), "exp": int(time.time()) + 60,
}
token = sign_jwt(priv, claims)
auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
# _signing_public_pem defaults to None
with pytest.raises(web.HTTPUnauthorized):
await auth.authenticate(make_request(f"Bearer {token}"))
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_api_key_path(self):
auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
async def fake_resolve(api_key):
assert api_key == "tg_testkey"
return ("user-xyz", "default", ["admin"])
async def fake_with_client(op):
return await op(Mock(resolve_api_key=fake_resolve))
with patch.object(auth, "_with_client", side_effect=fake_with_client):
ident = await auth.authenticate(
make_request("Bearer tg_testkey")
)
assert ident.user_id == "user-xyz"
assert ident.workspace == "default"
assert ident.roles == ["admin"]
assert ident.source == "api-key"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_api_key_rejection_masked_as_401(self):
auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
async def fake_with_client(op):
raise RuntimeError("auth-failed: unknown api key")
with patch.object(auth, "_with_client", side_effect=fake_with_client):
with pytest.raises(web.HTTPUnauthorized):
await auth.authenticate(
make_request("Bearer tg_bogus")
)
# -- API key cache ---------------------------------------------------------
class TestApiKeyCache:
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_cache_hit_skips_iam(self):
auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
calls = {"n": 0}
async def fake_with_client(op):
calls["n"] += 1
return await op(Mock(
resolve_api_key=AsyncMock(
return_value=("u", "default", ["reader"]),
)
))
with patch.object(auth, "_with_client", side_effect=fake_with_client):
await auth.authenticate(make_request("Bearer tg_k1"))
await auth.authenticate(make_request("Bearer tg_k1"))
await auth.authenticate(make_request("Bearer tg_k1"))
# Only the first lookup reaches IAM; the rest are cache hits.
assert calls["n"] == 1
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_different_keys_are_separately_cached(self):
auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
seen = []
async def fake_with_client(op):
async def resolve(plaintext):
seen.append(plaintext)
return ("u-" + plaintext, "default", ["reader"])
return await op(Mock(resolve_api_key=resolve))
with patch.object(auth, "_with_client", side_effect=fake_with_client):
a = await auth.authenticate(make_request("Bearer tg_a"))
b = await auth.authenticate(make_request("Bearer tg_b"))
assert a.user_id == "u-tg_a"
assert b.user_id == "u-tg_b"
assert seen == ["tg_a", "tg_b"]
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_cache_has_ttl_constant_set(self):
# Not a behaviour test — just ensures we don't accidentally
# set TTL to 0 (which would defeat the cache) or to a week.
assert 10 <= API_KEY_CACHE_TTL <= 3600