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Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
312 lines
10 KiB
Python
312 lines
10 KiB
Python
"""
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Tests for gateway/auth.py — IamAuth, JWT verification, API key
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resolution cache.
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JWTs are signed with real Ed25519 keypairs generated per-test, so
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the crypto path is exercised end-to-end without mocks. API-key
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resolution is tested against a stubbed IamClient since the real
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one requires pub/sub.
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"""
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import base64
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import json
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import time
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from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, Mock, patch
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import pytest
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from aiohttp import web
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ed25519
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from trustgraph.gateway.auth import (
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IamAuth, Identity,
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_b64url_decode, _verify_jwt_eddsa,
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API_KEY_CACHE_TTL,
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)
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# -- helpers ---------------------------------------------------------------
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def _b64url(data: bytes) -> str:
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return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
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def make_keypair():
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priv = ed25519.Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
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public_pem = priv.public_key().public_bytes(
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encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
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format=serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
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).decode("ascii")
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return priv, public_pem
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def sign_jwt(priv, claims, alg="EdDSA"):
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header = {"alg": alg, "typ": "JWT", "kid": "kid-test"}
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h = _b64url(json.dumps(header, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True).encode())
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p = _b64url(json.dumps(claims, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True).encode())
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signing_input = f"{h}.{p}".encode("ascii")
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if alg == "EdDSA":
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sig = priv.sign(signing_input)
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else:
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raise ValueError(f"test helper doesn't sign {alg}")
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return f"{h}.{p}.{_b64url(sig)}"
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def make_request(auth_header):
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"""Minimal stand-in for an aiohttp request — IamAuth only reads
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``request.headers["Authorization"]``."""
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req = Mock()
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req.headers = {}
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if auth_header is not None:
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req.headers["Authorization"] = auth_header
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return req
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# -- pure helpers ----------------------------------------------------------
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class TestB64UrlDecode:
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def test_round_trip_without_padding(self):
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data = b"hello"
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encoded = _b64url(data)
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assert _b64url_decode(encoded) == data
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def test_handles_various_lengths(self):
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for s in (b"a", b"ab", b"abc", b"abcd", b"abcde"):
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assert _b64url_decode(_b64url(s)) == s
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# -- JWT verification -----------------------------------------------------
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class TestVerifyJwtEddsa:
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def test_valid_jwt_passes(self):
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priv, pub = make_keypair()
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claims = {
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"sub": "user-1", "workspace": "default",
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"roles": ["reader"],
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"iat": int(time.time()),
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"exp": int(time.time()) + 60,
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}
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token = sign_jwt(priv, claims)
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got = _verify_jwt_eddsa(token, pub)
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assert got["sub"] == "user-1"
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assert got["workspace"] == "default"
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def test_expired_jwt_rejected(self):
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priv, pub = make_keypair()
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claims = {
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"sub": "user-1", "workspace": "default", "roles": [],
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"iat": int(time.time()) - 3600,
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"exp": int(time.time()) - 1,
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}
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token = sign_jwt(priv, claims)
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with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="expired"):
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_verify_jwt_eddsa(token, pub)
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def test_bad_signature_rejected(self):
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priv_a, _ = make_keypair()
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_, pub_b = make_keypair()
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claims = {
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"sub": "user-1", "workspace": "default", "roles": [],
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"iat": int(time.time()),
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"exp": int(time.time()) + 60,
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}
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token = sign_jwt(priv_a, claims)
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# pub_b never signed this token.
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with pytest.raises(Exception):
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_verify_jwt_eddsa(token, pub_b)
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def test_malformed_jwt_rejected(self):
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_, pub = make_keypair()
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with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="malformed"):
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_verify_jwt_eddsa("not-a-jwt", pub)
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def test_unsupported_algorithm_rejected(self):
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priv, pub = make_keypair()
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# Manually build an "alg":"HS256" header — no signer needed
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# since we expect it to bail before verifying.
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header = {"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT", "kid": "x"}
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payload = {
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"sub": "user-1", "workspace": "default", "roles": [],
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"iat": int(time.time()), "exp": int(time.time()) + 60,
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}
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h = _b64url(json.dumps(header, separators=(",", ":")).encode())
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p = _b64url(json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode())
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sig = _b64url(b"not-a-real-sig")
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token = f"{h}.{p}.{sig}"
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with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="unsupported alg"):
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_verify_jwt_eddsa(token, pub)
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# -- Identity --------------------------------------------------------------
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class TestIdentity:
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def test_fields(self):
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i = Identity(
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user_id="u", workspace="w", roles=["reader"], source="api-key",
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)
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assert i.user_id == "u"
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assert i.workspace == "w"
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assert i.roles == ["reader"]
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assert i.source == "api-key"
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# -- IamAuth.authenticate --------------------------------------------------
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class TestIamAuthDispatch:
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"""``authenticate()`` chooses between the JWT and API-key paths
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by shape of the bearer."""
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_no_authorization_header_raises_401(self):
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auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
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with pytest.raises(web.HTTPUnauthorized):
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await auth.authenticate(make_request(None))
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_non_bearer_header_raises_401(self):
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auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
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with pytest.raises(web.HTTPUnauthorized):
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await auth.authenticate(make_request("Basic whatever"))
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_empty_bearer_raises_401(self):
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auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
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with pytest.raises(web.HTTPUnauthorized):
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await auth.authenticate(make_request("Bearer "))
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_unknown_format_raises_401(self):
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# Not tg_... and not dotted-JWT shape.
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auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
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with pytest.raises(web.HTTPUnauthorized):
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await auth.authenticate(make_request("Bearer garbage"))
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_valid_jwt_resolves_to_identity(self):
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priv, pub = make_keypair()
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claims = {
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"sub": "user-1", "workspace": "default",
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"roles": ["writer"],
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"iat": int(time.time()),
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"exp": int(time.time()) + 60,
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}
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token = sign_jwt(priv, claims)
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auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
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auth._signing_public_pem = pub
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ident = await auth.authenticate(
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make_request(f"Bearer {token}")
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)
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assert ident.user_id == "user-1"
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assert ident.workspace == "default"
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assert ident.roles == ["writer"]
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assert ident.source == "jwt"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_jwt_without_public_key_fails(self):
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# If the gateway hasn't fetched IAM's public key yet, JWTs
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# must not validate — even ones that would otherwise pass.
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priv, _ = make_keypair()
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claims = {
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"sub": "user-1", "workspace": "default", "roles": [],
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"iat": int(time.time()), "exp": int(time.time()) + 60,
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}
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token = sign_jwt(priv, claims)
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auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
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# _signing_public_pem defaults to None
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with pytest.raises(web.HTTPUnauthorized):
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await auth.authenticate(make_request(f"Bearer {token}"))
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_api_key_path(self):
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auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
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async def fake_resolve(api_key):
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assert api_key == "tg_testkey"
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return ("user-xyz", "default", ["admin"])
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async def fake_with_client(op):
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return await op(Mock(resolve_api_key=fake_resolve))
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with patch.object(auth, "_with_client", side_effect=fake_with_client):
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ident = await auth.authenticate(
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make_request("Bearer tg_testkey")
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)
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assert ident.user_id == "user-xyz"
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assert ident.workspace == "default"
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assert ident.roles == ["admin"]
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assert ident.source == "api-key"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_api_key_rejection_masked_as_401(self):
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auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
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async def fake_with_client(op):
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raise RuntimeError("auth-failed: unknown api key")
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with patch.object(auth, "_with_client", side_effect=fake_with_client):
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with pytest.raises(web.HTTPUnauthorized):
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await auth.authenticate(
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make_request("Bearer tg_bogus")
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)
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# -- API key cache ---------------------------------------------------------
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class TestApiKeyCache:
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_cache_hit_skips_iam(self):
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auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
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calls = {"n": 0}
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async def fake_with_client(op):
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calls["n"] += 1
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return await op(Mock(
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resolve_api_key=AsyncMock(
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return_value=("u", "default", ["reader"]),
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)
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))
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with patch.object(auth, "_with_client", side_effect=fake_with_client):
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await auth.authenticate(make_request("Bearer tg_k1"))
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await auth.authenticate(make_request("Bearer tg_k1"))
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await auth.authenticate(make_request("Bearer tg_k1"))
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# Only the first lookup reaches IAM; the rest are cache hits.
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assert calls["n"] == 1
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_different_keys_are_separately_cached(self):
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auth = IamAuth(backend=Mock())
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seen = []
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async def fake_with_client(op):
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async def resolve(plaintext):
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seen.append(plaintext)
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return ("u-" + plaintext, "default", ["reader"])
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return await op(Mock(resolve_api_key=resolve))
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with patch.object(auth, "_with_client", side_effect=fake_with_client):
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a = await auth.authenticate(make_request("Bearer tg_a"))
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b = await auth.authenticate(make_request("Bearer tg_b"))
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assert a.user_id == "u-tg_a"
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assert b.user_id == "u-tg_b"
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assert seen == ["tg_a", "tg_b"]
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_cache_has_ttl_constant_set(self):
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# Not a behaviour test — just ensures we don't accidentally
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# set TTL to 0 (which would defeat the cache) or to a week.
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assert 10 <= API_KEY_CACHE_TTL <= 3600
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