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Author SHA1 Message Date
cybermaggedon
9fc1d4527b
iam: self-service ops, optional workspace filters, Mux service routing (#855)
Three threads, all reinforcing the contract's system-level vs.
workspace-association distinction.

WS Mux service routing
- tg-show-flows (and any workspace-level service over the WS) was
  failing with "unknown service" because the post-refactor Mux
  unconditionally looked up flow-service:<kind>.  Now branches on
  the envelope's flow field: with flow → flow-service:<kind>;
  without flow → <kind>:<op> from the inner body; with bare op
  lookup for service=iam.  Resource and parameters come from the
  matched op's own extractors — same path the HTTP endpoints take.

Optional workspace on system-level user/key ops
- list-users returns the deployment-wide list when no workspace is
  supplied, filters when one is.  get-user, update-user,
  disable-user, enable-user, delete-user, reset-password,
  create-api-key, list-api-keys, revoke-api-key all treat workspace
  as an optional integrity check rather than a required argument.
- create-user keeps workspace required — there it's the new user's
  home-workspace binding, a parameter rather than an address.
- API keys reclassified as SYSTEM-level resources.  By the same
  reasoning that makes users system-level, an API key is a
  credential record on a deployment-wide registry; the workspace it
  authenticates to is a property, not a containment.

Self-service surface
- whoami: returns the caller's own user record.  AUTHENTICATED-only;
  no users:read capability required.  Foundation for UI affordances
  that depend on the caller's permissions.
- bootstrap-status: POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap-status, PUBLIC,
  side-effect-free.  Returns {bootstrap_available: bool} so a
  first-run UI can decide whether to render setup without consuming
  the bootstrap op.
- Gateway now injects actor=identity.handle on every authenticated
  forward to iam-svc (IamEndpoint and WS Mux iam path), overwriting
  any caller-supplied value.  Underpins whoami, audit logging, and
  future regime-side decisions that need actor identity.
- tg-whoami and tg-update-user CLIs.

Spec polish
- iam-contract.md: actor-injection rule documented; whoami /
  bootstrap-status added to operations list; permission-scope
  framing tightened (workspace scope is a property of the grant,
  not the user or role).
- iam.md: self-service section; gateway flow gains the actor-
  injection step; role section reframed so iam-svc constraints
  don't leak into contract-level prose.
- iam-protocol.md: ops table updated for whoami, bootstrap-status,
  optional-workspace pattern; bootstrap_available added to the
  IamResponse listing.
2026-04-28 22:13:12 +01:00
cybermaggedon
5e28d3cce0
refactor(iam): pluggable IAM regime via authenticate/authorise contract (#853)
The gateway no longer holds any policy state — capability sets, role
definitions, workspace scope rules.  Per the IAM contract it asks the
regime "may this identity perform this capability on this resource?"
per request.  That moves the OSS role-based regime entirely into
iam-svc, which can be replaced (SSO, ABAC, ReBAC) without changing
the gateway, the wire protocol, or backend services.

Contract:
- authenticate(credential) -> Identity (handle, workspace,
  principal_id, source).  No roles, claims, or policy state surface
  to the gateway.
- authorise(identity, capability, resource, parameters) -> (allow,
  ttl).  Cached per-decision (regime TTL clamped above; fail-closed
  on regime errors).
- authorise_many available as a fan-out variant.

Operation registry drives every authorisation decision:
- /api/v1/iam -> IamEndpoint, looks up bare op name (create-user,
  list-workspaces, ...).
- /api/v1/{kind} -> RegistryRoutedVariableEndpoint, <kind>:<op>
  (config:get, flow:list-blueprints, librarian:add-document, ...).
- /api/v1/flow/{flow}/service/{kind} -> flow-service:<kind>.
- /api/v1/flow/{flow}/{import,export}/{kind} ->
  flow-{import,export}:<kind>.
- WS Mux per-frame -> flow-service:<kind>; closes a gap where
  authenticated users could hit any service kind.
85 operations registered across the surface.

JWT carries identity only — sub + workspace.  The roles claim is gone;
the gateway never reads policy state from a credential.

The three coarse *_KIND_CAPABILITY maps are removed.  The registry is
the only source of truth for the capability + resource shape of an
operation.  Tests migrated to the new Identity shape and to
authorise()-mocked auth doubles.

Specs updated: docs/tech-specs/iam-contract.md (Identity surface,
caching, registry-naming conventions), iam.md (JWT shape, gateway
flow, role section reframed as OSS-regime detail), iam-protocol.md
(positioned as one implementation of the contract).
2026-04-28 16:19:41 +01:00