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3 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
cybermaggedon
67b2fc448f
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model.  The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.

IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
  passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra.  Reached over the
  standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
  caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
  rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
  change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
  workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA).  Key rotation writes a new kid and
  retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed.  Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
  required startup argument with no permissive default.  Masked
  "auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
  due to mode, state, or authorisation.

Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator.  Distinguishes JWTs
  (three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
  locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
  IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache.  Every failure path
  surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
  enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
  traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.

Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
  OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
  assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*").  No "cross-workspace"
  pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
  authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
  active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
  caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value.  Cross-
  workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
  permissive default.  Construction fails fast if omitted.  Enterprise
  editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
  protocol.

WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
  runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
  with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
  The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
  — browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
  reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
  enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
  the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
  handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).

Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
  op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
  the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).

Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
  Authenticator.permitted contract.  The gateway cannot run without
  IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
  downgrade path.

CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces.  Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.

Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
  resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
  operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
  role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
  policy, enterprise extensibility.

Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
  Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
  role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
  unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
  explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon).  New tests pin
  the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
  auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
cybermaggedon
ae9936c9cc
feat: pluggable bootstrap framework with ordered initialisers (#847)
A generic, long-running bootstrap processor that converges a
deployment to its configured initial state and then idles.
Replaces the previous one-shot `tg-init-trustgraph` container model
and provides an extension point for enterprise / third-party
initialisers.

See docs/tech-specs/bootstrap.md for the full design.

Bootstrapper
------------
A single AsyncProcessor (trustgraph.bootstrap.bootstrapper.Processor)
that:

  * Reads a list of initialiser specifications (class, name, flag,
    params) from either a direct `initialisers` parameter
    (processor-group embedding) or a YAML/JSON file (`-c`, CLI).
  * On each wake, runs a cheap service-gate (config-svc +
    flow-svc round-trips), then iterates the initialiser list,
    running each whose configured flag differs from the one stored
    in __system__/init-state/<name>.
  * Stores per-initialiser completion state in the reserved
    __system__ workspace.
  * Adapts cadence: ~5s on gate failure, ~15s while converging,
    ~300s in steady state.
  * Isolates failures — one initialiser's exception does not block
    others in the same cycle; the failed one retries next wake.

Initialiser contract
--------------------
  * Subclass trustgraph.bootstrap.base.Initialiser.
  * Implement async run(ctx, old_flag, new_flag).
  * Opt out of the service gate with class attr
    wait_for_services=False (only used by PulsarTopology, since
    config-svc cannot come up until Pulsar namespaces exist).
  * ctx carries short-lived config and flow-svc clients plus a
    scoped logger.

Core initialisers (trustgraph.bootstrap.initialisers.*)
-------------------------------------------------------
  * PulsarTopology   — creates Pulsar tenant + namespaces
                       (pre-gate, blocking HTTP offloaded to
                        executor).
  * TemplateSeed     — seeds __template__ from an external JSON
                       file; re-run is upsert-missing by default,
                       overwrite-all opt-in.
  * WorkspaceInit    — populates a named workspace from either
                       the full contents of __template__ or a
                       seed file; raises cleanly if the template
                       isn't seeded yet so the bootstrapper retries
                       on the next cycle.
  * DefaultFlowStart — starts a specific flow in a workspace;
                       no-ops if the flow is already running.

Enterprise or third-party initialisers plug in via fully-qualified
dotted class paths in the bootstrapper's configuration — no core
code change required.

Config service
--------------
  * push(): filter out reserved workspaces (ids starting with "_")
    from the change notifications.  Stored config is preserved; only
    the broadcast is suppressed, so bootstrap / template state lives
    in config-svc without live processors ever reacting to it.

Config client
-------------
  * ConfigClient.get_all(workspace): wraps the existing `config`
    operation to return {type: {key: value}} for a workspace.
    WorkspaceInit uses it to copy __template__ without needing a
    hardcoded types list.

pyproject.toml
--------------
  * Adds a `bootstrap` console script pointing at the new Processor.

* Remove tg-init-trustgraph, superceded by bootstrap processor
2026-04-22 18:03:46 +01:00
cybermaggedon
d35473f7f7
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.

Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
  proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
  captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.

Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
  DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
  Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
  service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.

API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.

Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
  scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
  positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
  no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.

CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
  library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.

MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
  keyed per user.

Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
  whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
  live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
  Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
    * {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
    * {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
      same blueprint exists
    * {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
      workspace exists
    * literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
  Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
  librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
  restart.

RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
  dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
  partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
  reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
  on a zombie connection.

Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
  ~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00