Updated CLI

This commit is contained in:
Cyber MacGeddon 2026-04-24 12:41:46 +01:00
parent 3bdb677607
commit 9ae79ff712
16 changed files with 558 additions and 105 deletions

252
iam-testing.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation": "bootstrap"}'
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation": "resolve-api-key", "api_key": "tg_r-n43hDWV9WOY06w6o5YpevAxirlS33D"}'
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation": "resolve-api-key", "api_key": "asdalsdjasdkasdasda"}'
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation":"list-users","workspace":"default"}'
# 1. Admin creates a writer user "alice"
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"operation": "create-user",
"workspace": "default",
"user": {
"username": "alice",
"name": "Alice",
"email": "alice@example.com",
"password": "changeme",
"roles": ["writer"]
}
}'
# expect: {"user": {"id": "<alice-uuid>", ...}} — grab alice's uuid
# 2. Issue alice an API key
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"operation": "create-api-key",
"workspace": "default",
"key": {
"user_id": "f2363a10-3b83-44ea-a008-43caae8ba607",
"name": "alice-laptop"
}
}'
# expect: {"api_key_plaintext": "tg_...", "api_key": {"id": "<key-uuid>", "prefix": "tg_xxxx", ...}}
# 3. Resolve alice's key — should return alice's id + workspace + writer role
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation":"resolve-api-key","api_key":"tg_gt4buvk5NG-QS7oP_0Gk5yTWyj1qensf"}'
# expect: {"resolved_user_id":"<alice-uuid>","resolved_workspace":"default","resolved_roles":["writer"]}
# 4. List alice's keys (admin view of alice's keys)
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation":"list-api-keys","workspace":"default","user_id":"f2363a10-3b83-44ea-a008-43caae8ba607"}'
# expect: {"api_keys": [{"id":"<key-uuid>","user_id":"<alice-uuid>","name":"alice-laptop","prefix":"tg_xxxx",...}]}
# 5. Revoke alice's key
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation":"revoke-api-key","workspace":"default","key_id":"55f1c1f7-5448-49fd-9eda-56c192b61177"}'
# expect: {} (empty, no error)
# 6. Confirm the revoked key no longer resolves
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation":"resolve-api-key","api_key":"tg_gt4buvk5NG-QS7oP_0Gk5yTWyj1qensf"}'
# expect: {"error":{"type":"auth-failed","message":"unknown api key"}}
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
You'll want to re-bootstrap a fresh deployment to pick up the new signing-key row (or accept that login will lazily generate one on first
call). Then:
# 1. Create a user with a known password (admin's password is random)
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation":"create-user","workspace":"default","user":{"username":"alice","password":"s3cret","roles":["writer"]}}'
# 2. Log alice in
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation":"login","username":"alice","password":"s3cret"}'
# expect: {"jwt":"eyJ...","jwt_expires":"2026-..."}
# 3. Fetch the public key (what the gateway will use later to verify)
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation":"get-signing-key-public"}'
# expect: {"signing_key_public":"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n..."}
# 4. Wrong password
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $GATEWAY_SECRET" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation":"login","username":"alice","password":"nope"}'
# expect: {"error":{"type":"auth-failed","message":"bad credentials"}}
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAseLB/a9Bo/RN/Rb/x763
+vdxmUKG75oWsXBmbwZGDXyN6fwqZ3L7cEje93qK0PYFuCHxhY1Hn0gW7FZ8ovH+
qEksekUlpfPYqKGiT5Mb0DKk49D4yKkIbJFugWalpwIilvRbQO0jy3V8knqGQ1xL
NfNYFrI2Rxe0Tq2OHVYc5YwYbyj1nz2TY5fd9qrzXtGRv5HZztkl25lWhRvG9G0K
urKDdBDbi894gIYorXvcwZw/b1GDXG/aUy/By1Oy3hXnCLsN8pA3nA437TTTWxHx
QgPH15jIF9hezO+3/ESZ7EhVEtgmwTxPddfXRa0ZoT6JyWOgcloKtnP4Lp9eQ4va
yQIDAQAB
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
New operations:
- change-password — self-service. Requires current + new password.
- reset-password — admin-driven. Generates a random temporary, sets must_change_password=true, returns plaintext once.
- get-user, update-user, disable-user — workspace-scoped. update-user refuses to change username (immutable — error if different) and refuses
password-via-update. disable-user also revokes all the user's API keys, per spec.
- create-workspace, list-workspaces, get-workspace, update-workspace, disable-workspace — system-level. disable-workspace cascades: disables
all users + revokes all their keys. Rejects ids starting with _ (reserved, per the bootstrap framework convention).
- rotate-signing-key — generates a new Ed25519 key, retires the current one (sets retired timestamp; row stays for future grace-period
validation), switches the in-memory cache.
Touched files:
- trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/tables/iam.py — added retire_signing_key, update_user_profile, update_user_password, update_user_enabled,
update_workspace.
- trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam/service/iam.py — 12 new handlers + dispatch entries.
- trustgraph-base/trustgraph/base/iam_client.py — matching client helpers for all of them.
Smoke-test suggestions:
# change password for alice (from "s3cret" → "n3wer")
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation":"change-password","user_id":"b2960feb-caef-401d-af65-01bdb6960cad","password":"s3cret","new_password":"n3wer"}'
# login with new password
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation":"login","username":"alice","password":"n3wer"}'
# admin resets alice's password
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation":"reset-password","workspace":"default","user_id":"b2960feb-caef-401d-af65-01bdb6960cad"}'
# → {"temporary_password":"..."}
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation":"login","username":"alice","password":"fH2ttyrIcVXCIkH_"}'
# create a second workspace
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation":"create-workspace","workspace_record":{"id":"acme","name":"Acme Corp","enabled":true}}'
# rotate signing key (next login produces a JWT signed by a new kid)
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation":"rotate-signing-key"}'
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8088/api/v1/flow" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer tg_bs_kBAhfejiEJmbcO1gElbxk3MpV7wQFygP" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation":"list-flows"}'
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer tg_bs_kBAhfejiEJmbcO1gElbxk3MpV7wQFygP" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation":"list-users"}'
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/v1/iam \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer tg_bs_kBAhfejiEJmbcO1gElbxk3MpV7wQFygP" \
-d '{
"operation": "create-user",
"workspace": "default",
"user": {
"username": "alice",
"name": "Alice",
"email": "alice@example.com",
"password": "s3cret",
"roles": ["writer"]
}
}'
# Login (public, no token needed) → returns a JWT
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8088/api/v1/auth/login" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"alice","password":"s3cret"}'
export TRUSTGRAPH_TOKEN=$(tg-bootstrap-iam) # on fresh bootstrap-mode deployment
# or set to your existing admin API key
tg-create-user --username alice --roles writer
# → prints alice's user id
ALICE_ID=<uuid from above>
ALICE_KEY=$(tg-create-api-key --user-id $ALICE_ID --name alice-laptop)
# → alice's plaintext API key
tg-list-users
tg-list-api-keys --user-id $ALICE_ID
tg-revoke-api-key --key-id <...>
tg-disable-user --user-id $ALICE_ID
# User self-service:
tg-login --username alice # prompts for password, prints JWT
tg-change-password # prompts for current + new

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@ -191,6 +191,16 @@ class IamClient(RequestResponse):
timeout=timeout,
)
async def enable_user(self, workspace, user_id, actor="",
timeout=IAM_TIMEOUT):
await self._request(
operation="enable-user",
workspace=workspace,
actor=actor,
user_id=user_id,
timeout=timeout,
)
async def create_workspace(self, workspace_record, actor="",
timeout=IAM_TIMEOUT):
resp = await self._request(

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@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ tg-login = "trustgraph.cli.login:main"
tg-create-user = "trustgraph.cli.create_user:main"
tg-list-users = "trustgraph.cli.list_users:main"
tg-disable-user = "trustgraph.cli.disable_user:main"
tg-enable-user = "trustgraph.cli.enable_user:main"
tg-change-password = "trustgraph.cli.change_password:main"
tg-reset-password = "trustgraph.cli.reset_password:main"
tg-create-api-key = "trustgraph.cli.create_api_key:main"

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@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ def do_create_api_key(args):
if args.expires:
key["expires"] = args.expires
resp = call_iam(args.api_url, args.token, {
"operation": "create-api-key",
"key": key,
})
req = {"operation": "create-api-key", "key": key}
if args.workspace:
req["workspace"] = args.workspace
resp = call_iam(args.api_url, args.token, req)
plaintext = resp.get("api_key_plaintext", "")
rec = resp.get("api_key", {})
@ -57,6 +57,13 @@ def main():
"--expires", default=None,
help="ISO-8601 expiry (optional; empty = no expiry)",
)
parser.add_argument(
"-w", "--workspace", default=None,
help=(
"Target workspace (admin only; defaults to caller's "
"assigned workspace)"
),
)
run_main(do_create_api_key, parser)

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@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ def do_create_user(args):
user["must_change_password"] = True
req = {"operation": "create-user", "user": user}
if args.workspace:
req["workspace"] = args.workspace
resp = call_iam(args.api_url, args.token, req)
rec = resp.get("user", {})
@ -71,6 +73,13 @@ def main():
"--must-change-password", action="store_true",
help="Force password change on next login",
)
parser.add_argument(
"-w", "--workspace", default=None,
help=(
"Target workspace (admin only; defaults to caller's "
"assigned workspace)"
),
)
run_main(do_create_user, parser)

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@ -9,10 +9,10 @@ from ._iam import DEFAULT_URL, DEFAULT_TOKEN, call_iam, run_main
def do_disable_user(args):
call_iam(args.api_url, args.token, {
"operation": "disable-user",
"user_id": args.user_id,
})
req = {"operation": "disable-user", "user_id": args.user_id}
if args.workspace:
req["workspace"] = args.workspace
call_iam(args.api_url, args.token, req)
print(f"Disabled user {args.user_id}")
@ -31,6 +31,13 @@ def main():
parser.add_argument(
"--user-id", required=True, help="User id to disable",
)
parser.add_argument(
"-w", "--workspace", default=None,
help=(
"Target workspace (admin only; defaults to caller's "
"assigned workspace)"
),
)
run_main(do_disable_user, parser)

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@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
"""
Re-enable a previously disabled user. Does not restore their API
keys those must be re-issued by an admin.
"""
import argparse
from ._iam import DEFAULT_URL, DEFAULT_TOKEN, call_iam, run_main
def do_enable_user(args):
req = {"operation": "enable-user", "user_id": args.user_id}
if args.workspace:
req["workspace"] = args.workspace
call_iam(args.api_url, args.token, req)
print(f"Enabled user {args.user_id}")
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
prog="tg-enable-user", description=__doc__,
)
parser.add_argument(
"-u", "--api-url", default=DEFAULT_URL,
help=f"API URL (default: {DEFAULT_URL})",
)
parser.add_argument(
"-t", "--token", default=DEFAULT_TOKEN,
help="Auth token (default: $TRUSTGRAPH_TOKEN)",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--user-id", required=True, help="User id to enable",
)
parser.add_argument(
"-w", "--workspace", default=None,
help=(
"Target workspace (admin only; defaults to caller's "
"assigned workspace)"
),
)
run_main(do_enable_user, parser)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()

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@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ from ._iam import DEFAULT_URL, DEFAULT_TOKEN, call_iam, run_main
def do_list_api_keys(args):
resp = call_iam(args.api_url, args.token, {
"operation": "list-api-keys",
"user_id": args.user_id,
})
req = {"operation": "list-api-keys", "user_id": args.user_id}
if args.workspace:
req["workspace"] = args.workspace
resp = call_iam(args.api_url, args.token, req)
keys = resp.get("api_keys", [])
if not keys:
@ -55,6 +55,13 @@ def main():
"--user-id", required=True,
help="Owner user id",
)
parser.add_argument(
"-w", "--workspace", default=None,
help=(
"Target workspace (admin only; defaults to caller's "
"assigned workspace)"
),
)
run_main(do_list_api_keys, parser)

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@ -10,9 +10,10 @@ from ._iam import DEFAULT_URL, DEFAULT_TOKEN, call_iam, run_main
def do_list_users(args):
resp = call_iam(
args.api_url, args.token, {"operation": "list-users"},
)
req = {"operation": "list-users"}
if args.workspace:
req["workspace"] = args.workspace
resp = call_iam(args.api_url, args.token, req)
users = resp.get("users", [])
if not users:
@ -50,6 +51,13 @@ def main():
"-t", "--token", default=DEFAULT_TOKEN,
help="Auth token (default: $TRUSTGRAPH_TOKEN)",
)
parser.add_argument(
"-w", "--workspace", default=None,
help=(
"Target workspace (admin only; defaults to caller's "
"assigned workspace)"
),
)
run_main(do_list_users, parser)

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@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ from ._iam import DEFAULT_URL, DEFAULT_TOKEN, call_iam, run_main
def do_reset_password(args):
resp = call_iam(args.api_url, args.token, {
"operation": "reset-password",
"user_id": args.user_id,
})
req = {"operation": "reset-password", "user_id": args.user_id}
if args.workspace:
req["workspace"] = args.workspace
resp = call_iam(args.api_url, args.token, req)
tmp = resp.get("temporary_password", "")
if not tmp:
@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ def main():
"--user-id", required=True,
help="Target user id",
)
parser.add_argument(
"-w", "--workspace", default=None,
help=(
"Target workspace (admin only; defaults to caller's "
"assigned workspace)"
),
)
run_main(do_reset_password, parser)

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@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ from ._iam import DEFAULT_URL, DEFAULT_TOKEN, call_iam, run_main
def do_revoke_api_key(args):
call_iam(args.api_url, args.token, {
"operation": "revoke-api-key",
"key_id": args.key_id,
})
req = {"operation": "revoke-api-key", "key_id": args.key_id}
if args.workspace:
req["workspace"] = args.workspace
call_iam(args.api_url, args.token, req)
print(f"Revoked key {args.key_id}")
@ -30,6 +30,13 @@ def main():
parser.add_argument(
"--key-id", required=True, help="Key id to revoke",
)
parser.add_argument(
"-w", "--workspace", default=None,
help=(
"Target workspace (admin only; defaults to caller's "
"assigned workspace)"
),
)
run_main(do_revoke_api_key, parser)

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@ -1,18 +1,36 @@
"""
Capability vocabulary and OSS role bundles.
Capability vocabulary, role definitions, and authorisation helpers.
See docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md for the authoritative description.
The mapping below is the data form of the OSS bundle table in that
spec. Enterprise editions may replace this module with their own
role table; the vocabulary (capability strings) is shared.
The data here is the OSS bundle table in that spec. Enterprise
editions may replace this module with their own role table; the
vocabulary (capability strings) is shared.
The module also exposes:
Role model
----------
A role has two dimensions:
- ``PUBLIC`` a sentinel indicating an endpoint requires no
authentication (login, bootstrap).
- ``AUTHENTICATED`` a sentinel indicating an endpoint requires a
valid identity but no specific capability (e.g. change-password).
- ``check(roles, capability)`` the union-of-bundles membership test.
1. **capability set** which operations the role grants.
2. **workspace scope** which workspaces the role is active in.
The authorisation question is: *given the caller's roles, a required
capability, and a target workspace, does any role grant the
capability AND apply to the target workspace?*
Workspace scope values recognised here:
- ``"assigned"`` the role applies only to the caller's own
assigned workspace (stored on their user record).
- ``"*"`` the role applies to every workspace.
Enterprise editions can add richer scopes (explicit permitted-set,
patterns, etc.) without changing the wire protocol.
Sentinels
---------
- ``PUBLIC`` endpoint requires no authentication.
- ``AUTHENTICATED`` endpoint requires a valid identity, no
specific capability.
"""
from aiohttp import web
@ -23,8 +41,8 @@ AUTHENTICATED = "__authenticated__"
# Capability vocabulary. Mirrors the "Capability list" tables in
# capabilities.md. Kept as a set of valid strings so the gateway can
# fail-closed on an endpoint that declares an unknown capability.
# capabilities.md. Kept as a set so the gateway can fail-closed on
# an endpoint that declares an unknown capability.
KNOWN_CAPABILITIES = {
# Data plane
"agent",
@ -47,7 +65,7 @@ KNOWN_CAPABILITIES = {
}
# OSS role → capability set. Enterprise overrides this mapping.
# Capability sets used below.
_READER_CAPS = {
"agent",
"graph:read",
@ -81,23 +99,62 @@ _ADMIN_CAPS = _WRITER_CAPS | {
"metrics:read",
}
ROLE_CAPABILITIES = {
"reader": _READER_CAPS,
"writer": _WRITER_CAPS,
"admin": _ADMIN_CAPS,
# Role definitions. Each role has a capability set and a workspace
# scope. Enterprise overrides this mapping.
ROLE_DEFINITIONS = {
"reader": {
"capabilities": _READER_CAPS,
"workspace_scope": "assigned",
},
"writer": {
"capabilities": _WRITER_CAPS,
"workspace_scope": "assigned",
},
"admin": {
"capabilities": _ADMIN_CAPS,
"workspace_scope": "*",
},
}
def check(roles, capability):
"""Return True if any of ``roles`` grants ``capability``.
Unknown roles contribute zero capabilities (deterministic fail-
closed behaviour per the spec)."""
if capability not in KNOWN_CAPABILITIES:
# Endpoint misconfiguration. Fail closed.
def _scope_permits(role_name, target_workspace, assigned_workspace):
"""Does the given role apply to ``target_workspace``?"""
role = ROLE_DEFINITIONS.get(role_name)
if role is None:
return False
for r in roles:
if capability in ROLE_CAPABILITIES.get(r, ()):
scope = role["workspace_scope"]
if scope == "*":
return True
if scope == "assigned":
return target_workspace == assigned_workspace
# Future scope types (lists, patterns) extend here.
return False
def check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None):
"""Is ``identity`` permitted to invoke ``capability`` on
``target_workspace``?
Passes iff some role held by the caller both (a) grants
``capability`` and (b) is active in ``target_workspace``.
``target_workspace`` defaults to the caller's assigned workspace,
which makes this function usable for system-level operations and
for authenticated endpoints that don't take a workspace argument
(the call collapses to "do any of my roles grant this cap?")."""
if capability not in KNOWN_CAPABILITIES:
return False
target = target_workspace or identity.workspace
for role_name in identity.roles:
role = ROLE_DEFINITIONS.get(role_name)
if role is None:
continue
if capability not in role["capabilities"]:
continue
if _scope_permits(role_name, target, identity.workspace):
return True
return False
@ -117,18 +174,21 @@ def auth_failure():
async def enforce(request, auth, capability):
"""Authenticate + capability-check in one step. Returns an
``Identity`` (or ``None`` for ``PUBLIC`` endpoints) or raises
the appropriate HTTPException.
"""Authenticate + capability-check for endpoints that carry no
workspace dimension on the request (metrics, i18n, etc.).
Usage in an endpoint handler:
For endpoints that carry a workspace field on the body, call
:func:`enforce_workspace` *after* parsing the body to validate
the workspace and re-check the capability in that scope. Most
endpoints do both.
identity = await enforce(request, self.auth, self.capability)
- ``PUBLIC``: no authentication attempted, returns ``None``.
- ``AUTHENTICATED``: any valid identity is accepted.
- any capability string: identity must carry a role granting it.
"""
- ``PUBLIC``: no authentication, returns ``None``.
- ``AUTHENTICATED``: any valid identity.
- capability string: identity must have it, checked against the
caller's assigned workspace (adequate for endpoints whose
capability is system-level, e.g. ``metrics:read``, or where
the real workspace-aware check happens in
:func:`enforce_workspace` after body parsing)."""
if capability == PUBLIC:
return None
@ -137,27 +197,42 @@ async def enforce(request, auth, capability):
if capability == AUTHENTICATED:
return identity
if not check(identity.roles, capability):
if not check(identity, capability):
raise access_denied()
return identity
def enforce_workspace(data, identity):
"""Validate + inject the workspace field on a request body.
def enforce_workspace(data, identity, capability=None):
"""Resolve + validate the workspace on a request body.
OSS behaviour:
- If ``data["workspace"]`` is present and differs from the
caller's assigned workspace → 403.
- Otherwise, set ``data["workspace"]`` to the caller's assigned
workspace.
- Target workspace = ``data["workspace"]`` if supplied, else the
caller's assigned workspace.
- At least one of the caller's roles must (a) be active in the
target workspace and, if ``capability`` is given, (b) grant
``capability``. Otherwise 403.
- On success, ``data["workspace"]`` is overwritten with the
resolved value callers can rely on the outgoing message
having the gateway's chosen workspace rather than any
caller-supplied value.
Enterprise editions will plug in a different resolver that
checks a permitted-set instead of a single value; the wire
protocol is unchanged."""
requested = data.get("workspace", "") if isinstance(data, dict) else ""
if requested and requested != identity.workspace:
raise access_denied()
if isinstance(data, dict):
data["workspace"] = identity.workspace
return data
For ``capability=None`` the workspace scope alone is checked
useful when the body has a workspace but the endpoint already
passed its capability check (e.g. via :func:`enforce`)."""
if not isinstance(data, dict):
return data
requested = data.get("workspace", "")
target = requested or identity.workspace
for role_name in identity.roles:
role = ROLE_DEFINITIONS.get(role_name)
if role is None:
continue
if capability is not None and capability not in role["capabilities"]:
continue
if _scope_permits(role_name, target, identity.workspace):
data["workspace"] = target
return data
raise access_denied()

View file

@ -122,35 +122,34 @@ class Mux:
})
return
# Workspace resolution. Authenticated sockets override
# any client-supplied workspace — on both the envelope and
# the inner request payload — with the resolved value from
# the identity. A mismatched value at either layer is an
# access-denied error. Injecting into the inner request
# means clients don't have to repeat the workspace in
# every payload; the same convenience HTTP callers get
# via enforce_workspace.
# Workspace resolution. On authenticated sockets the
# gateway's role-scope rules apply: role workspace scope
# determines which target workspaces are permitted. The
# resolved value is written to both the envelope and the
# inner request payload so clients don't have to repeat it
# per-message (same convenience HTTP callers get via
# enforce_workspace).
if self.identity is not None:
for layer, blob in (
("envelope", data),
("inner", data.get("request")),
):
if not isinstance(blob, dict):
continue
req = blob.get("workspace", "")
if req and req != self.identity.workspace:
await self.ws.send_json({
"id": request_id,
"error": {
"message": "access denied",
"type": "access-denied",
},
"complete": True,
})
return
blob["workspace"] = self.identity.workspace
from ..capabilities import enforce_workspace
from aiohttp import web as _web
workspace = self.identity.workspace
try:
enforce_workspace(data, self.identity)
inner = data.get("request")
if isinstance(inner, dict):
enforce_workspace(inner, self.identity)
except _web.HTTPForbidden:
await self.ws.send_json({
"id": request_id,
"error": {
"message": "access denied",
"type": "access-denied",
},
"complete": True,
})
return
workspace = data["workspace"]
else:
workspace = data.get("workspace", "default")

View file

@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ class _RoutedSocketEndpoint:
)
except web.HTTPException as e:
return e
if not check(identity.roles, cap):
if not check(identity, cap):
return access_denied()
# Delegate the websocket handling to a standalone SocketEndpoint

View file

@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ class SocketEndpoint:
except web.HTTPException as e:
return e
if self.capability != AUTHENTICATED:
if not check(identity.roles, self.capability):
if not check(identity, self.capability):
return access_denied()
# 50MB max message size

View file

@ -234,6 +234,8 @@ class IamService:
return await self.handle_update_user(v)
if op == "disable-user":
return await self.handle_disable_user(v)
if op == "enable-user":
return await self.handle_enable_user(v)
if op == "create-workspace":
return await self.handle_create_workspace(v)
if op == "list-workspaces":
@ -711,6 +713,23 @@ class IamService:
return IamResponse()
async def handle_enable_user(self, v):
"""Re-enable a previously disabled user. Does not restore
API keys those have to be re-issued by the admin."""
if not v.workspace:
return _err("invalid-argument", "workspace required")
if not v.user_id:
return _err("invalid-argument", "user_id required")
_, err = await self._user_in_workspace(v.user_id, v.workspace)
if err is not None:
return err
await self.table_store.update_user_enabled(
id=v.user_id, enabled=True,
)
return IamResponse()
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Workspace CRUD
# ------------------------------------------------------------------