2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
Tests for Gateway Dispatcher Manager
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
import pytest
|
|
|
|
|
import asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
from unittest.mock import Mock, patch, AsyncMock, MagicMock
|
|
|
|
|
import uuid
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
from trustgraph.gateway.dispatch.manager import DispatcherManager, DispatcherWrapper
|
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|
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|
|
|
# Keep the real methods intact for proper testing
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
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|
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|
|
class TestDispatcherWrapper:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test cases for DispatcherWrapper class"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dispatcher_wrapper_initialization(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test DispatcherWrapper initialization"""
|
|
|
|
|
mock_handler = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
wrapper = DispatcherWrapper(mock_handler)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert wrapper.handler == mock_handler
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_dispatcher_wrapper_process(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test DispatcherWrapper process method"""
|
|
|
|
|
mock_handler = AsyncMock()
|
|
|
|
|
wrapper = DispatcherWrapper(mock_handler)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
result = await wrapper.process("arg1", "arg2")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mock_handler.assert_called_once_with("arg1", "arg2")
|
|
|
|
|
assert result == mock_handler.return_value
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestDispatcherManager:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test cases for DispatcherManager class"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dispatcher_manager_initialization(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test DispatcherManager initialization"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
assert manager.backend == mock_backend
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
assert manager.config_receiver == mock_config_receiver
|
|
|
|
|
assert manager.prefix == "api-gateway" # default prefix
|
|
|
|
|
assert manager.flows == {}
|
|
|
|
|
assert manager.dispatchers == {}
|
2026-04-06 15:43:59 +05:30
|
|
|
assert isinstance(manager.dispatcher_lock, asyncio.Lock)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
# Verify manager was added as handler to config receiver
|
|
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver.add_handler.assert_called_once_with(manager)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dispatcher_manager_initialization_with_custom_prefix(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test DispatcherManager initialization with custom prefix"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(
|
|
|
|
|
mock_backend, mock_config_receiver,
|
|
|
|
|
auth=Mock(), prefix="custom-prefix",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert manager.prefix == "custom-prefix"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_start_flow(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test start_flow method"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
flow_data = {"name": "test_flow", "steps": []}
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
await manager.start_flow("default", "flow1", flow_data)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert ("default", "flow1") in manager.flows
|
|
|
|
|
assert manager.flows[("default", "flow1")] == flow_data
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_stop_flow(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test stop_flow method"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Pre-populate with a flow
|
|
|
|
|
flow_data = {"name": "test_flow", "steps": []}
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
manager.flows[("default", "flow1")] = flow_data
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
await manager.stop_flow("default", "flow1", flow_data)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert ("default", "flow1") not in manager.flows
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dispatch_global_service_returns_wrapper(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test dispatch_global_service returns DispatcherWrapper"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wrapper = manager.dispatch_global_service()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert isinstance(wrapper, DispatcherWrapper)
|
|
|
|
|
assert wrapper.handler == manager.process_global_service
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dispatch_core_export_returns_wrapper(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test dispatch_core_export returns DispatcherWrapper"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wrapper = manager.dispatch_core_export()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert isinstance(wrapper, DispatcherWrapper)
|
|
|
|
|
assert wrapper.handler == manager.process_core_export
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dispatch_core_import_returns_wrapper(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test dispatch_core_import returns DispatcherWrapper"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wrapper = manager.dispatch_core_import()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert isinstance(wrapper, DispatcherWrapper)
|
|
|
|
|
assert wrapper.handler == manager.process_core_import
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_process_core_import(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test process_core_import method"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
with patch('trustgraph.gateway.dispatch.manager.CoreImport') as mock_core_import:
|
|
|
|
|
mock_importer = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_importer.process = AsyncMock(return_value="import_result")
|
|
|
|
|
mock_core_import.return_value = mock_importer
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
result = await manager.process_core_import("data", "error", "ok", "request")
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_core_import.assert_called_once_with(mock_backend)
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_importer.process.assert_called_once_with("data", "error", "ok", "request")
|
|
|
|
|
assert result == "import_result"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_process_core_export(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test process_core_export method"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
with patch('trustgraph.gateway.dispatch.manager.CoreExport') as mock_core_export:
|
|
|
|
|
mock_exporter = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_exporter.process = AsyncMock(return_value="export_result")
|
|
|
|
|
mock_core_export.return_value = mock_exporter
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
result = await manager.process_core_export("data", "error", "ok", "request")
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_core_export.assert_called_once_with(mock_backend)
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_exporter.process.assert_called_once_with("data", "error", "ok", "request")
|
|
|
|
|
assert result == "export_result"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_process_global_service(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test process_global_service method"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
manager.invoke_global_service = AsyncMock(return_value="global_result")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
params = {"kind": "test_kind"}
|
|
|
|
|
result = await manager.process_global_service("data", "responder", params)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
manager.invoke_global_service.assert_called_once_with("data", "responder", "test_kind")
|
|
|
|
|
assert result == "global_result"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_invoke_global_service_with_existing_dispatcher(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test invoke_global_service with existing dispatcher"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Pre-populate with existing dispatcher
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.process = AsyncMock(return_value="cached_result")
|
|
|
|
|
manager.dispatchers[(None, "config")] = mock_dispatcher
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
result = await manager.invoke_global_service("data", "responder", "config")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.process.assert_called_once_with("data", "responder")
|
|
|
|
|
assert result == "cached_result"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_invoke_global_service_creates_new_dispatcher(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test invoke_global_service creates new dispatcher"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
with patch('trustgraph.gateway.dispatch.manager.global_dispatchers') as mock_dispatchers:
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher_class = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.start = AsyncMock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.process = AsyncMock(return_value="new_result")
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher_class.return_value = mock_dispatcher
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatchers.__getitem__.return_value = mock_dispatcher_class
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
result = await manager.invoke_global_service("data", "responder", "config")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Verify dispatcher was created with correct parameters
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher_class.assert_called_once_with(
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
backend=mock_backend,
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
timeout=120,
|
|
|
|
|
consumer="api-gateway-config-request",
|
2025-12-06 11:01:20 +00:00
|
|
|
subscriber="api-gateway-config-request",
|
|
|
|
|
request_queue=None,
|
|
|
|
|
response_queue=None
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.start.assert_called_once()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.process.assert_called_once_with("data", "responder")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Verify dispatcher was cached
|
|
|
|
|
assert manager.dispatchers[(None, "config")] == mock_dispatcher
|
|
|
|
|
assert result == "new_result"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dispatch_flow_import_returns_method(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test dispatch_flow_import returns correct method"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
result = manager.dispatch_flow_import()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert result == manager.process_flow_import
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dispatch_flow_export_returns_method(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test dispatch_flow_export returns correct method"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
result = manager.dispatch_flow_export()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert result == manager.process_flow_export
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dispatch_socket_returns_method(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test dispatch_socket returns correct method"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
result = manager.dispatch_socket()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert result == manager.process_socket
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dispatch_flow_service_returns_wrapper(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test dispatch_flow_service returns DispatcherWrapper"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wrapper = manager.dispatch_flow_service()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert isinstance(wrapper, DispatcherWrapper)
|
|
|
|
|
assert wrapper.handler == manager.process_flow_service
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_process_flow_import_with_valid_flow_and_kind(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test process_flow_import with valid flow and kind"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Setup test flow
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
manager.flows[("default", "test_flow")] = {
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
"interfaces": {
|
2026-04-16 17:19:39 +01:00
|
|
|
"triples-store": {"flow": "test_queue"}
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
with patch('trustgraph.gateway.dispatch.manager.import_dispatchers') as mock_dispatchers, \
|
|
|
|
|
patch('uuid.uuid4') as mock_uuid:
|
|
|
|
|
mock_uuid.return_value = "test-uuid"
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher_class = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.start = AsyncMock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher_class.return_value = mock_dispatcher
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatchers.__getitem__.return_value = mock_dispatcher_class
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatchers.__contains__.return_value = True
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
params = {"flow": "test_flow", "kind": "triples"}
|
|
|
|
|
result = await manager.process_flow_import("ws", "running", params)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher_class.assert_called_once_with(
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
backend=mock_backend,
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
ws="ws",
|
|
|
|
|
running="running",
|
2026-04-16 17:19:39 +01:00
|
|
|
queue="test_queue"
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.start.assert_called_once()
|
|
|
|
|
assert result == mock_dispatcher
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_process_flow_import_with_invalid_flow(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test process_flow_import with invalid flow"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
params = {"flow": "invalid_flow", "kind": "triples"}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="Invalid flow"):
|
|
|
|
|
await manager.process_flow_import("ws", "running", params)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_process_flow_import_with_invalid_kind(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test process_flow_import with invalid kind"""
|
|
|
|
|
import warnings
|
|
|
|
|
with warnings.catch_warnings():
|
|
|
|
|
warnings.simplefilter("ignore", RuntimeWarning)
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Setup test flow
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
manager.flows[("default", "test_flow")] = {
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
"interfaces": {
|
2026-04-16 17:19:39 +01:00
|
|
|
"triples-store": {"flow": "test_queue"}
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
with patch('trustgraph.gateway.dispatch.manager.import_dispatchers') as mock_dispatchers:
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatchers.__contains__.return_value = False
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
params = {"flow": "test_flow", "kind": "invalid_kind"}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="Invalid kind"):
|
|
|
|
|
await manager.process_flow_import("ws", "running", params)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_process_flow_export_with_valid_flow_and_kind(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test process_flow_export with valid flow and kind"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Setup test flow
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
manager.flows[("default", "test_flow")] = {
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
"interfaces": {
|
2026-04-16 17:19:39 +01:00
|
|
|
"triples-store": {"flow": "test_queue"}
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
with patch('trustgraph.gateway.dispatch.manager.export_dispatchers') as mock_dispatchers, \
|
|
|
|
|
patch('uuid.uuid4') as mock_uuid:
|
|
|
|
|
mock_uuid.return_value = "test-uuid"
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher_class = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher_class.return_value = mock_dispatcher
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatchers.__getitem__.return_value = mock_dispatcher_class
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatchers.__contains__.return_value = True
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
params = {"flow": "test_flow", "kind": "triples"}
|
|
|
|
|
result = await manager.process_flow_export("ws", "running", params)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher_class.assert_called_once_with(
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
backend=mock_backend,
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
ws="ws",
|
|
|
|
|
running="running",
|
2026-04-16 17:19:39 +01:00
|
|
|
queue="test_queue",
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
consumer="api-gateway-test-uuid",
|
|
|
|
|
subscriber="api-gateway-test-uuid"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
assert result == mock_dispatcher
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_process_socket(self):
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
"""process_socket constructs a Mux with the manager's auth
|
|
|
|
|
instance passed through — this is the gateway's trust path
|
|
|
|
|
for first-frame WebSocket authentication. A Mux cannot be
|
|
|
|
|
built without auth (tested separately); this test pins that
|
|
|
|
|
the dispatcher-manager threads the correct auth value into
|
|
|
|
|
the Mux constructor call."""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_auth = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(
|
|
|
|
|
mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=mock_auth,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
with patch('trustgraph.gateway.dispatch.manager.Mux') as mock_mux:
|
|
|
|
|
mock_mux_instance = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_mux.return_value = mock_mux_instance
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
result = await manager.process_socket("ws", "running", {})
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mock_mux.assert_called_once_with(
|
|
|
|
|
manager, "ws", "running", auth=mock_auth,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
assert result == mock_mux_instance
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
def test_dispatcher_manager_requires_auth(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Constructing a DispatcherManager without an auth argument
|
|
|
|
|
must fail — a no-auth DispatcherManager would produce a
|
|
|
|
|
Mux without authentication, silently downgrading the socket
|
|
|
|
|
auth path."""
|
|
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="auth"):
|
|
|
|
|
DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=None)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_process_flow_service(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test process_flow_service method"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
manager.invoke_flow_service = AsyncMock(return_value="flow_result")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
params = {"flow": "test_flow", "kind": "agent"}
|
|
|
|
|
result = await manager.process_flow_service("data", "responder", params)
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
manager.invoke_flow_service.assert_called_once_with("data", "responder", "default", "test_flow", "agent")
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
assert result == "flow_result"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_invoke_flow_service_with_existing_dispatcher(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test invoke_flow_service with existing dispatcher"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Add flow to the flows dictionary
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
manager.flows[("default", "test_flow")] = {"services": {"agent": {}}}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
# Pre-populate with existing dispatcher
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.process = AsyncMock(return_value="cached_result")
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
manager.dispatchers[("default", "test_flow", "agent")] = mock_dispatcher
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
result = await manager.invoke_flow_service("data", "responder", "default", "test_flow", "agent")
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.process.assert_called_once_with("data", "responder")
|
|
|
|
|
assert result == "cached_result"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_invoke_flow_service_creates_request_response_dispatcher(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test invoke_flow_service creates request-response dispatcher"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Setup test flow
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
manager.flows[("default", "test_flow")] = {
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
"interfaces": {
|
|
|
|
|
"agent": {
|
|
|
|
|
"request": "agent_request_queue",
|
|
|
|
|
"response": "agent_response_queue"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
with patch('trustgraph.gateway.dispatch.manager.request_response_dispatchers') as mock_dispatchers:
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher_class = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.start = AsyncMock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.process = AsyncMock(return_value="new_result")
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher_class.return_value = mock_dispatcher
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatchers.__getitem__.return_value = mock_dispatcher_class
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatchers.__contains__.return_value = True
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
result = await manager.invoke_flow_service("data", "responder", "default", "test_flow", "agent")
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
# Verify dispatcher was created with correct parameters
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher_class.assert_called_once_with(
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
backend=mock_backend,
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
request_queue="agent_request_queue",
|
|
|
|
|
response_queue="agent_response_queue",
|
|
|
|
|
timeout=120,
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
consumer="api-gateway-default-test_flow-agent-request",
|
|
|
|
|
subscriber="api-gateway-default-test_flow-agent-request"
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.start.assert_called_once()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.process.assert_called_once_with("data", "responder")
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
# Verify dispatcher was cached
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
assert manager.dispatchers[("default", "test_flow", "agent")] == mock_dispatcher
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
assert result == "new_result"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_invoke_flow_service_creates_sender_dispatcher(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test invoke_flow_service creates sender dispatcher"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Setup test flow
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
manager.flows[("default", "test_flow")] = {
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
"interfaces": {
|
2026-04-16 17:19:39 +01:00
|
|
|
"text-load": {"flow": "text_load_queue"}
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
with patch('trustgraph.gateway.dispatch.manager.request_response_dispatchers') as mock_rr_dispatchers, \
|
|
|
|
|
patch('trustgraph.gateway.dispatch.manager.sender_dispatchers') as mock_sender_dispatchers:
|
|
|
|
|
mock_rr_dispatchers.__contains__.return_value = False
|
|
|
|
|
mock_sender_dispatchers.__contains__.return_value = True
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher_class = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.start = AsyncMock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.process = AsyncMock(return_value="sender_result")
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher_class.return_value = mock_dispatcher
|
|
|
|
|
mock_sender_dispatchers.__getitem__.return_value = mock_dispatcher_class
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
result = await manager.invoke_flow_service("data", "responder", "default", "test_flow", "text-load")
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
# Verify dispatcher was created with correct parameters
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher_class.assert_called_once_with(
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
backend=mock_backend,
|
2026-04-16 17:19:39 +01:00
|
|
|
queue="text_load_queue"
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.start.assert_called_once()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.process.assert_called_once_with("data", "responder")
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
# Verify dispatcher was cached
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
assert manager.dispatchers[("default", "test_flow", "text-load")] == mock_dispatcher
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
assert result == "sender_result"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_invoke_flow_service_invalid_flow(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test invoke_flow_service with invalid flow"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="Invalid flow"):
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
await manager.invoke_flow_service("data", "responder", "default", "invalid_flow", "agent")
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_invoke_flow_service_unsupported_kind_by_flow(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test invoke_flow_service with kind not supported by flow"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Setup test flow without agent interface
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
manager.flows[("default", "test_flow")] = {
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
"interfaces": {
|
|
|
|
|
"text-completion": {"request": "req", "response": "resp"}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="This kind not supported by flow"):
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
await manager.invoke_flow_service("data", "responder", "default", "test_flow", "agent")
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_invoke_flow_service_invalid_kind(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Test invoke_flow_service with invalid kind"""
|
2025-12-19 08:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2026-04-06 15:43:59 +05:30
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
# Setup test flow with interface but unsupported kind
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
manager.flows[("default", "test_flow")] = {
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
"interfaces": {
|
|
|
|
|
"invalid-kind": {"request": "req", "response": "resp"}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-04-06 15:43:59 +05:30
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
with patch('trustgraph.gateway.dispatch.manager.request_response_dispatchers') as mock_rr_dispatchers, \
|
|
|
|
|
patch('trustgraph.gateway.dispatch.manager.sender_dispatchers') as mock_sender_dispatchers:
|
|
|
|
|
mock_rr_dispatchers.__contains__.return_value = False
|
|
|
|
|
mock_sender_dispatchers.__contains__.return_value = False
|
2026-04-06 15:43:59 +05:30
|
|
|
|
2025-07-14 14:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="Invalid kind"):
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
await manager.invoke_flow_service("data", "responder", "default", "test_flow", "invalid-kind")
|
2026-04-06 15:43:59 +05:30
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_invoke_global_service_concurrent_calls_create_single_dispatcher(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Concurrent calls for the same service must create exactly one dispatcher.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Before the fix, await dispatcher.start() yielded to the event loop and
|
|
|
|
|
multiple coroutines could all pass the 'key not in self.dispatchers' check
|
|
|
|
|
before any of them wrote the result back, creating duplicate Pulsar consumers.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2026-04-06 15:43:59 +05:30
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def slow_start():
|
|
|
|
|
# Yield to the event loop so other coroutines get a chance to run,
|
|
|
|
|
# reproducing the window that caused the original race condition.
|
|
|
|
|
await asyncio.sleep(0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
with patch('trustgraph.gateway.dispatch.manager.global_dispatchers') as mock_dispatchers:
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher_class = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.start = AsyncMock(side_effect=slow_start)
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.process = AsyncMock(return_value="result")
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher_class.return_value = mock_dispatcher
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatchers.__getitem__.return_value = mock_dispatcher_class
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
results = await asyncio.gather(*[
|
|
|
|
|
manager.invoke_global_service("data", "responder", "config")
|
|
|
|
|
for _ in range(5)
|
|
|
|
|
])
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert mock_dispatcher_class.call_count == 1, (
|
|
|
|
|
"Dispatcher class instantiated more than once — duplicate consumer bug"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
assert mock_dispatcher.start.call_count == 1
|
|
|
|
|
assert manager.dispatchers[(None, "config")] is mock_dispatcher
|
|
|
|
|
assert all(r == "result" for r in results)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_invoke_flow_service_concurrent_calls_create_single_dispatcher(self):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Concurrent calls for the same flow+kind must create exactly one dispatcher.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
invoke_flow_service has the same check-then-create pattern as
|
|
|
|
|
invoke_global_service and is protected by the same dispatcher_lock.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
mock_backend = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_config_receiver = Mock()
|
feat: IAM service, gateway auth middleware, capability model, and CLIs (#849)
Replaces the legacy GATEWAY_SECRET shared-token gate with an IAM-backed
identity and authorisation model. The gateway no longer has an
"allow-all" or "no auth" mode; every request is authenticated via the
IAM service, authorised against a capability model that encodes both
the operation and the workspace it targets, and rejected with a
deliberately-uninformative 401 / 403 on any failure.
IAM service (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/iam, trustgraph-base/schema/iam)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* New backend service (iam-svc) owning users, workspaces, API keys,
passwords and JWT signing keys in Cassandra. Reached over the
standard pub/sub request/response pattern; gateway is the only
caller.
* Operations: bootstrap, resolve-api-key, login, get-signing-key-public,
rotate-signing-key, create/list/get/update/disable/delete/enable-user,
change-password, reset-password, create/list/get/update/disable-
workspace, create/list/revoke-api-key.
* Ed25519 JWT signing (alg=EdDSA). Key rotation writes a new kid and
retires the previous one; validation is grace-period friendly.
* Passwords: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256, 600k iterations, per-user salt.
* API keys: 128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed. Plaintext returned once.
* Bootstrap is explicit: --bootstrap-mode {token,bootstrap} is a
required startup argument with no permissive default. Masked
"auth failure" errors hide whether a refused bootstrap request was
due to mode, state, or authorisation.
Gateway authentication (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/auth.py)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
* IamAuth replaces the legacy Authenticator. Distinguishes JWTs
(three-segment dotted) from API keys by shape; verifies JWTs
locally using the cached IAM public key; resolves API keys via
IAM with a short-TTL hash-keyed cache. Every failure path
surfaces the same 401 body ("auth failure") so callers cannot
enumerate credential state.
* Public key is fetched at gateway startup with a bounded retry loop;
traffic does not begin flowing until auth has started.
Capability model (trustgraph-flow/trustgraph/gateway/capabilities.py)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Roles have two dimensions: a capability set and a workspace scope.
OSS ships reader / writer / admin; the first two are workspace-
assigned, admin is cross-workspace ("*"). No "cross-workspace"
pseudo-capability — workspace permission is a property of the role.
* check(identity, capability, target_workspace=None) is the single
authorisation test: some role must grant the capability *and* be
active in the target workspace.
* enforce_workspace validates a request-body workspace against the
caller's role scopes and injects the resolved value. Cross-
workspace admin is permitted by role scope, not by a bypass.
* Gateway endpoints declare a required capability explicitly — no
permissive default. Construction fails fast if omitted. Enterprise
editions can replace the role table without changing the wire
protocol.
WebSocket first-frame auth (dispatch/mux.py, endpoint/socket.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* /api/v1/socket handshake unconditionally accepts; authentication
runs on the first WebSocket frame ({"type":"auth","token":"..."})
with {"type":"auth-ok","workspace":"..."} / {"type":"auth-failed"}.
The socket stays open on failure so the client can re-authenticate
— browsers treat a handshake-time 401 as terminal, breaking
reconnection.
* Mux.receive rejects every non-auth frame before auth succeeds,
enforces the caller's workspace (envelope + inner payload) using
the role-scope resolver, and supports mid-session re-auth.
* Flow import/export streaming endpoints keep the legacy ?token=
handshake (URL-scoped short-lived transfers; no re-auth need).
Auth surface
------------
* POST /api/v1/auth/login — public, returns a JWT.
* POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap — public; forwards to IAM's bootstrap
op which itself enforces mode + tables-empty.
* POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — any authenticated user.
* POST /api/v1/iam — admin-only generic forwarder for the rest of
the IAM API (per-op REST endpoints to follow in a later change).
Removed / breaking
------------------
* GATEWAY_SECRET / --api-token / default_api_token and the legacy
Authenticator.permitted contract. The gateway cannot run without
IAM.
* ?token= on /api/v1/socket.
* DispatcherManager and Mux both raise on auth=None — no silent
downgrade path.
CLI tools (trustgraph-cli)
--------------------------
tg-bootstrap-iam, tg-login, tg-create-user, tg-list-users,
tg-disable-user, tg-enable-user, tg-delete-user, tg-change-password,
tg-reset-password, tg-create-api-key, tg-list-api-keys,
tg-revoke-api-key, tg-create-workspace, tg-list-workspaces. Passwords
read via getpass; tokens / one-time secrets written to stdout with
operator context on stderr so shell composition works cleanly.
AsyncSocketClient / SocketClient updated to the first-frame auth
protocol.
Specifications
--------------
* docs/tech-specs/iam.md updated with the error policy, workspace
resolver extension point, and OSS role-scope model.
* docs/tech-specs/iam-protocol.md (new) — transport, dataclasses,
operation table, error taxonomy, bootstrap modes.
* docs/tech-specs/capabilities.md (new) — capability vocabulary, OSS
role bundles, agent-as-composition note, enforcement-boundary
policy, enterprise extensibility.
Tests
-----
* test_auth.py (rewritten) — IamAuth + JWT round-trip with real
Ed25519 keypairs + API-key cache behaviour.
* test_capabilities.py (new) — role table sanity, check across
role x workspace combinations, enforce_workspace paths,
unknown-cap / unknown-role fail-closed.
* Every endpoint test construction now names its capability
explicitly (no permissive defaults relied upon). New tests pin
the fail-closed invariants: DispatcherManager / Mux refuse
auth=None; i18n path-traversal defense is exercised.
* test_socket_graceful_shutdown rewritten against IamAuth.
2026-04-24 17:29:10 +01:00
|
|
|
manager = DispatcherManager(mock_backend, mock_config_receiver, auth=Mock())
|
2026-04-06 15:43:59 +05:30
|
|
|
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
manager.flows[("default", "test_flow")] = {
|
2026-04-06 15:43:59 +05:30
|
|
|
"interfaces": {
|
|
|
|
|
"agent": {
|
|
|
|
|
"request": "agent_request_queue",
|
|
|
|
|
"response": "agent_response_queue",
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def slow_start():
|
|
|
|
|
await asyncio.sleep(0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
with patch('trustgraph.gateway.dispatch.manager.request_response_dispatchers') as mock_rr_dispatchers:
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher_class = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher = Mock()
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.start = AsyncMock(side_effect=slow_start)
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher.process = AsyncMock(return_value="result")
|
|
|
|
|
mock_dispatcher_class.return_value = mock_dispatcher
|
|
|
|
|
mock_rr_dispatchers.__getitem__.return_value = mock_dispatcher_class
|
|
|
|
|
mock_rr_dispatchers.__contains__.return_value = True
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
results = await asyncio.gather(*[
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
|
|
|
manager.invoke_flow_service("data", "responder", "default", "test_flow", "agent")
|
2026-04-06 15:43:59 +05:30
|
|
|
for _ in range(5)
|
|
|
|
|
])
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert mock_dispatcher_class.call_count == 1, (
|
|
|
|
|
"Dispatcher class instantiated more than once — duplicate consumer bug"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
assert mock_dispatcher.start.call_count == 1
|
feat: workspace-based multi-tenancy, replacing user as tenancy axis (#840)
Introduces `workspace` as the isolation boundary for config, flows,
library, and knowledge data. Removes `user` as a schema-level field
throughout the code, API specs, and tests; workspace provides the
same separation more cleanly at the trusted flow.workspace layer
rather than through client-supplied message fields.
Design
------
- IAM tech spec (docs/tech-specs/iam.md) documents current state,
proposed auth/access model, and migration direction.
- Data ownership model (docs/tech-specs/data-ownership-model.md)
captures the workspace/collection/flow hierarchy.
Schema + messaging
------------------
- Drop `user` field from AgentRequest/Step, GraphRagQuery,
DocumentRagQuery, Triples/Graph/Document/Row EmbeddingsRequest,
Sparql/Rows/Structured QueryRequest, ToolServiceRequest.
- Keep collection/workspace routing via flow.workspace at the
service layer.
- Translators updated to not serialise/deserialise user.
API specs
---------
- OpenAPI schemas and path examples cleaned of user fields.
- Websocket async-api messages updated.
- Removed the unused parameters/User.yaml.
Services + base
---------------
- Librarian, collection manager, knowledge, config: all operations
scoped by workspace. Config client API takes workspace as first
positional arg.
- `flow.workspace` set at flow start time by the infrastructure;
no longer pass-through from clients.
- Tool service drops user-personalisation passthrough.
CLI + SDK
---------
- tg-init-workspace and workspace-aware import/export.
- All tg-* commands drop user args; accept --workspace.
- Python API/SDK (flow, socket_client, async_*, explainability,
library) drop user kwargs from every method signature.
MCP server
----------
- All tool endpoints drop user parameters; socket_manager no longer
keyed per user.
Flow service
------------
- Closure-based topic cleanup on flow stop: only delete topics
whose blueprint template was parameterised AND no remaining
live flow (across all workspaces) still resolves to that topic.
Three scopes fall out naturally from template analysis:
* {id} -> per-flow, deleted on stop
* {blueprint} -> per-blueprint, kept while any flow of the
same blueprint exists
* {workspace} -> per-workspace, kept while any flow in the
workspace exists
* literal -> global, never deleted (e.g. tg.request.librarian)
Fixes a bug where stopping a flow silently destroyed the global
librarian exchange, wedging all library operations until manual
restart.
RabbitMQ backend
----------------
- heartbeat=60, blocked_connection_timeout=300. Catches silently
dead connections (broker restart, orphaned channels, network
partitions) within ~2 heartbeat windows, so the consumer
reconnects and re-binds its queue rather than sitting forever
on a zombie connection.
Tests
-----
- Full test refresh: unit, integration, contract, provenance.
- Dropped user-field assertions and constructor kwargs across
~100 test files.
- Renamed user-collection isolation tests to workspace-collection.
2026-04-21 23:23:01 +01:00
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assert manager.dispatchers[("default", "test_flow", "agent")] is mock_dispatcher
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2026-04-06 15:43:59 +05:30
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assert all(r == "result" for r in results)
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