[codex] fix RFC-011 follow-up regressions (#258)

* fix rfc-011 follow-up regressions

* test(cli): remove served schema-apply tests obsoleted by the cluster 409

This PR disables server-side schema apply for cluster-backed serving (409 →
`omnigraph cluster apply`). Two system_local tests still drove *served* schema
apply against a spawned `--cluster` server and asserted the pre-409 behavior, so
they failed under `cargo test --workspace`:

- `local_cli_schema_apply_enforces_engine_layer_policy` — expected a per-actor
  policy `denied`/allow on the served route; the route now 409s for everyone
  before policy runs.
- `local_cli_schema_apply_rejects_stored_query_breakage_before_publish` —
  expected a served apply to reject a stored-query breakage; the route now 409s
  before any apply.

Both exercise a path the PR intentionally removed. Their surviving coverage:
the 409 itself is pinned by `schema_routes::schema_apply_route_refuses_cluster_backed_server_mode`
(asserts 409 + no mutation); stored-query-breakage-before-publish stays covered
by `schema_routes::schema_apply_route_rejects_stored_query_breakage_before_publish`
(single-mode); engine-layer schema_apply Cedar enforcement stays covered by
`policy_engine_chassis`. Remove the obsolete served versions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(server): report the cluster-backed schema-apply 409 after the Cedar gate

The 409 ("schema apply is disabled for cluster-backed serving") fired at the top
of `server_schema_apply`, before `authorize_request`. An authenticated-but-
unauthorized actor therefore learned the server is cluster-backed (409) instead
of getting a normal 403 — leaking topology before authorization, against the
same posture that keeps `GET /graphs` default-deny.

Move the 409 below the Cedar gate so the route reports 401 → 403 → 409: an
unauthorized actor gets 403, and only an actor authorized for `schema_apply`
sees the actionable "use `omnigraph cluster apply`" 409. (An open/unauthenticated
server still 409s, as it has no topology to protect.)

Regression: `schema_apply_route_cluster_backed_denies_unauthorized_actor_before_409`
(POLICY_YAML grants no schema_apply → act-ragnor gets 403, not 409). Addresses the
bot-review finding on #258.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Andrew Altshuler 2026-06-16 03:11:43 +03:00 committed by GitHub
parent 9513b076d2
commit b5658dc696
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
19 changed files with 429 additions and 261 deletions

View file

@ -98,13 +98,11 @@ pub(crate) fn command_capability(cmd: &Command) -> Capability {
/// The plane a subcommand belongs to. Exhaustive — a new `Command` variant
/// will not compile until classified. Descends into the nested enums where
/// the plane differs per subcommand (`schema plan` is storage while `schema
/// show`/`apply` are data; `queries validate` opens the graph while `queries
/// list` only reads config).
/// show`/`apply` are data; `queries`/`policy` read cluster applied state).
pub(crate) fn command_plane(cmd: &Command) -> Plane {
match cmd {
Command::Query { .. }
| Command::Mutate { .. }
| Command::Alias { .. }
| Command::Load { .. }
| Command::Ingest { .. }
| Command::Branch { .. }
@ -129,7 +127,8 @@ pub(crate) fn command_plane(cmd: &Command) -> Plane {
| Command::Cleanup { .. }
| Command::Lint { .. } => Plane::Storage,
Command::Cluster { .. } => Plane::Control,
Command::Embed(_)
Command::Alias { .. }
| Command::Embed(_)
| Command::Login { .. }
| Command::Logout { .. }
| Command::Profile { .. }
@ -175,12 +174,13 @@ pub(crate) fn command_label(cmd: &Command) -> &'static str {
}
}
/// The verbs that address an existing graph through a cluster scope
/// (`--cluster <root> --graph <id>`): the storage-maintenance commands.
/// `init` is storage-plane too but *creates* a graph (cluster graphs are born
/// from `cluster apply`, not `init`), and `schema plan` / `lint` take a
/// positional URI — none consume cluster addressing, so the guard rejects
/// `--cluster`/`--graph` on them rather than silently dropping the flag.
/// The verbs that consume a cluster scope. Maintenance/lint select a graph with
/// `--cluster <root> --graph <id>`; policy/queries inspect the cluster's
/// applied control-plane state and may optionally use `--graph` to select one
/// bundle/registry. `init` is storage-plane too but *creates* a graph (cluster
/// graphs are born from `cluster apply`, not `init`), and `schema plan` takes a
/// positional URI, so the guard rejects `--cluster`/`--graph` there rather than
/// silently dropping the flag.
pub(crate) fn accepts_cluster_addressing(cmd: &Command) -> bool {
matches!(
cmd,
@ -201,12 +201,43 @@ pub(crate) fn accepts_cluster_addressing(cmd: &Command) -> bool {
/// Reject a scope-addressing flag (`--server`/`--cluster`/`--graph`) on a verb
/// that cannot consume it, rather than silently dropping it (the old behavior:
/// e.g. `optimize --server prod` dropped `--server` and failed later with an
/// unrelated message). Each flag has a distinct valid surface:
/// unrelated message). `alias` gets an extra guard because its binding owns all
/// addressing and several ignored globals sit outside this three-flag guard.
/// Each flag has a distinct valid surface:
/// - `--server` → served-graph scopes (`any`/`served`);
/// - `--cluster` → the cluster-maintenance verbs (optimize/repair/cleanup);
/// - `--cluster` → cluster-scoped direct/control verbs;
/// - `--graph` → any multi-graph scope: a served scope *or* a cluster one.
/// RFC-010 Slice 1, generalized for RFC-011 cluster addressing.
pub(crate) fn guard_addressing(cli: &Cli) -> Result<()> {
if let Command::Alias { .. } = &cli.command {
let mut flags = Vec::new();
if cli.server.is_some() {
flags.push("--server");
}
if cli.graph.is_some() {
flags.push("--graph");
}
if cli.store.is_some() {
flags.push("--store");
}
if cli.cluster.is_some() {
flags.push("--cluster");
}
if cli.profile.is_some() {
flags.push("--profile");
}
if cli.as_actor.is_some() {
flags.push("--as");
}
if !flags.is_empty() {
bail!(
"`alias` uses the server, graph, and stored query declared in \
`aliases.<name>` in ~/.omnigraph/config.yaml; remove global scope \
flag(s): {}",
flags.join(", ")
);
}
}
if cli.server.is_none() && cli.cluster.is_none() && cli.graph.is_none() {
return Ok(());
}
@ -223,8 +254,8 @@ pub(crate) fn guard_addressing(cli: &Cli) -> Result<()> {
}
if cli.cluster.is_some() && !cluster_ok {
bail!(
"`{label}` is a {} command; --cluster addresses a cluster-managed graph for \
maintenance (optimize/repair/cleanup) and does not apply.{}",
"`{label}` is a {} command; --cluster addresses a cluster-scoped command \
and does not apply.{}",
capability.describe(),
remediation(capability, &cli.command),
);
@ -253,7 +284,15 @@ fn remediation(capability: Capability, cmd: &Command) -> &'static str {
}
_ => " Pass a storage URI.",
},
Capability::Control => " It operates on a cluster (pass --config <dir>).",
Capability::Control => match cmd {
Command::Cluster { .. } => {
" It operates on a cluster config directory (pass --config <dir>)."
}
Command::Policy { .. } | Command::Queries { .. } => {
" It operates on a cluster (pass --cluster <dir|uri>, or select a cluster profile)."
}
_ => " It operates on a cluster.",
},
Capability::Local => " It does not address a graph.",
Capability::Any | Capability::Served => "",
}
@ -286,6 +325,7 @@ mod tests {
// The one Data→Served refinement — if the `graphs` guard were deleted,
// every other assertion here would still pass.
assert_eq!(cap(&["omnigraph", "graphs", "list"]), Capability::Served);
assert_eq!(cap(&["omnigraph", "alias", "who"]), Capability::Local);
assert_eq!(cap(&["omnigraph", "optimize", "graph.omni"]), Capability::Direct);
assert_eq!(cap(&["omnigraph", "schema", "plan", "--schema", "s.pg", "graph.omni"]), Capability::Direct);
assert_eq!(cap(&["omnigraph", "cluster", "status", "--config", "."]), Capability::Control);