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Make invoke_query graph-scoped (one branch authority)
invoke_query gates reaching the curated stored-query surface — a graph-level capability. Per-branch/snapshot access is already enforced by the inner read/change gate in run_query/run_mutate (authorized against the resolved branch), so branch-scoping the outer gate was redundant AND wrong for snapshot reads (it defaulted to main). Drop the branch dimension: remove InvokeQuery from uses_branch_scope (it joins admin as graph-scoped) and authorize the boundary gate with branch: None. Lossless: an actor confined to branch X by their read/change rules can still only invoke a stored query that touches X. A rule that sets branch_scope on invoke_query is now rejected by validate() — write invoke_query in its own rule. Ripple (atomic): restructure the server invoke fixture so invoke_query sits in its own branch_scope-free rule; invert invoke_query_is_branch_scoped -> invoke_query_rejects_branch_scope; the per-graph authorize test uses branch: None; docs (policy.md, server.md, the InvokeQuery doc). No wire/OpenAPI change.
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@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ List the graph's **`mcp.expose`** stored queries as a typed tool catalog — eno
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Invoke a curated, server-side stored query by **name** — the source comes from the graph's `queries:` registry, so the client never sends `.gq`. Body (all fields optional): `{ "params": { … }, "branch": "main", "snapshot": null }`, where `params` keys match the query's declared parameters. The response is the **read envelope** (`ReadOutput`) for a stored read or the **mutation envelope** (`ChangeOutput`) for a stored mutation — serialized untagged, so the wire shape is identical to `/query` / `/mutate`.
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- **Gate:** `invoke_query` (per-graph, branch-scoped) at the boundary. A stored *mutation* is **double-gated** — it also passes the engine's `change` gate, so an actor with `invoke_query` but not `change` gets `403`.
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- **Gate:** `invoke_query` (per-graph, graph-scoped) at the boundary. A stored *mutation* is **double-gated** — it also passes the engine's `change` gate, so an actor with `invoke_query` but not `change` gets `403`.
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- **Deny == unknown, for callers without `invoke_query`:** for a caller lacking the grant, an `invoke_query` denial and an unknown query name return the **same `404`** (identical body), so the catalog can't be probed. A caller that *holds* `invoke_query` may still get the inner gate's `403` for an existing query it can't `read`/`change` (the double-gate, above) — so existence is visible to grant-holders by design.
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- **Requires an explicit policy grant when auth is on.** In default-deny mode (bearer tokens but no `policy.file`), only `read` is permitted, so *every* `/queries/{name}` call returns `404` until an `invoke_query` rule is configured.
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- A stored mutation cannot target a `snapshot` (`400`); a parameter type error is a structured `400` naming the parameter.
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