nyx/tests/hostile_input_tests.rs
2026-06-05 10:16:30 -05:00

541 lines
22 KiB
Rust

//! Hostile-input / resource-exhaustion regression tests.
//!
//! Nyx scans untrusted repositories, so every file the scanner picks up is
//! potentially adversarial: arbitrarily large, pathologically nested,
//! binary-ish, or deliberately crafted to wedge tree-sitter or the CFG
//! builder. These tests exercise the user-facing size cap
//! (`scanner.max_file_size_mb`, default 16 MiB, enforced at the walker),
//! the per-file parse timeout (`analysis.engine.parse_timeout_ms`, default
//! 10 s), and
//! verify that the scanner survives several representative stress inputs
//! without panicking, stack-overflowing, or hanging CI.
//!
//! All tests stay well under the 10 s taint-termination guard used elsewhere
//! so they are safe for the default test job. Keep file sizes modest so
//! CI runners with limited RAM/disk are not penalised.
use nyx_scanner::ast::run_rules_on_bytes;
use nyx_scanner::utils::config::{AnalysisMode, Config};
use std::path::Path;
use std::thread;
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
/// Match the production rayon worker stack size (`performance.rayon_thread_stack_size`).
/// Tests that exercise recursive CFG construction must run here, not on the
/// default 2 MiB test thread, so they represent the real scan environment.
const PROD_STACK_SIZE: usize = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
/// Run `f` on a dedicated thread with a production-sized stack. Panics in
/// `f` are propagated so the test fails with the original message.
fn run_on_prod_stack<F, R>(f: F) -> R
where
F: FnOnce() -> R + Send + 'static,
R: Send + 'static,
{
thread::Builder::new()
.stack_size(PROD_STACK_SIZE)
.name("hostile-input-prod-stack".into())
.spawn(f)
.expect("spawn test thread")
.join()
.expect("test thread panicked")
}
// ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Helpers
// ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Minimal config tuned for deterministic, single-threaded scans in CI.
fn hostile_cfg() -> Config {
let mut cfg = Config::default();
cfg.scanner.mode = AnalysisMode::Full;
cfg.scanner.read_vcsignore = false;
cfg.scanner.require_git_to_read_vcsignore = false;
cfg.performance.worker_threads = Some(1);
cfg.performance.batch_size = 8;
cfg.performance.channel_multiplier = 1;
cfg
}
/// Run a closure and fail the test if it does not complete within `budget`.
/// Used to keep these regression tests from silently turning into CI hangs
/// if a bound regresses.
fn with_time_budget<F, R>(budget: Duration, label: &str, f: F) -> R
where
F: FnOnce() -> R,
{
let start = Instant::now();
let out = f();
let elapsed = start.elapsed();
assert!(
elapsed < budget,
"{label} took {elapsed:?}, exceeded budget {budget:?}",
);
out
}
// ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// File-size hardening (walker-level)
// ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// The walker's `max_file_size_mb` filter must drop oversize files before
/// the pipeline ever opens them. This is the sole file-size gate: once a
/// file is past the walker, the analysis pipeline does not re-check its
/// size, `max_file_size_mb = null` means truly unlimited parsing. The
/// pattern here (explicit `Some(1)`) is the interface every downstream
/// caller can use to tighten the default further.
#[test]
fn walker_max_file_size_drops_oversize_files_before_scan() {
use nyx_scanner::scan_no_index;
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let root = tmp.path();
std::fs::write(root.join("small.js"), b"var x = 1;\n").unwrap();
let big = vec![b'x'; 3 * 1024 * 1024];
std::fs::write(root.join("big.js"), big).unwrap();
let mut cfg = hostile_cfg();
cfg.scanner.max_file_size_mb = Some(1); // 1 MiB, drops big.js, keeps small.js
let diags =
scan_no_index(root, &cfg).expect("scan should succeed even with oversize files present");
assert!(
diags.iter().all(|d| !d.path.ends_with("big.js")),
"big.js should have been filtered by walker, got: {diags:?}",
);
}
/// Release-hardening regression: the default `ScannerConfig` must carry a
/// finite ceiling so a fresh install never tries to parse a multi-gigabyte
/// file from an untrusted repo. This test does not hard-code the exact
/// value, the property is that the default is *not* unlimited.
#[test]
fn default_config_has_finite_max_file_size() {
let cfg = Config::default();
assert!(
cfg.scanner.max_file_size_mb.is_some(),
"release default must not be unlimited; got {:?}",
cfg.scanner.max_file_size_mb,
);
let limit = cfg.scanner.max_file_size_mb.unwrap();
assert!(
(1..=64).contains(&limit),
"default file-size cap should live in [1, 64] MiB, got {limit} MiB",
);
}
/// A file above the default cap must be dropped by the walker when the
/// config is left at its defaults. End-to-end version of the property
/// asserted above.
#[test]
fn default_config_drops_file_above_cap() {
use nyx_scanner::scan_no_index;
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let root = tmp.path();
std::fs::write(root.join("small.js"), b"var x = 1;\n").unwrap();
// Write a file larger than the default cap. Size = default + 1 MiB so
// the test does not spuriously fail if the default is adjusted later.
let default_mb = Config::default()
.scanner
.max_file_size_mb
.expect("default cap must be set");
let oversize = ((default_mb + 1) as usize) * 1024 * 1024;
let mut big = b"// big generated file\n".to_vec();
big.resize(oversize, b' ');
std::fs::write(root.join("big.js"), &big).unwrap();
// Use the release default cap explicitly so the intent is clear.
let mut cfg = hostile_cfg();
cfg.scanner.max_file_size_mb = Config::default().scanner.max_file_size_mb;
let diags = with_time_budget(Duration::from_secs(10), "default-cap scan", || {
scan_no_index(root, &cfg).expect("scan must succeed with oversize file present")
});
assert!(
diags.iter().all(|d| !d.path.ends_with("big.js")),
"default cap should have filtered big.js: got {diags:?}",
);
}
/// Operators who explicitly set `max_file_size_mb = null` must actually get
/// unlimited scanning, no silent hard cap overrides their decision. This
/// locks in the contract: "unlimited means unlimited, trust the operator."
/// The test uses a deliberately unsafe-looking JS source and asserts that
/// the finding surfaces only in the unlimited run.
#[test]
fn explicit_unlimited_lifts_size_cap() {
use nyx_scanner::scan_no_index;
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let root = tmp.path();
// Build a 2 MiB file with a detectable vulnerability at the top.
// tight_cap (1 MiB) must hide it; unlimited must surface it.
let mut bytes = b"const cp = require('child_process');\n\
function run(cmd){ cp.exec(cmd); }\n"
.to_vec();
bytes.resize(2 * 1024 * 1024, b'\n');
std::fs::write(root.join("big.js"), &bytes).unwrap();
let mut cfg = hostile_cfg();
// 1 MiB cap, must drop big.js entirely.
cfg.scanner.max_file_size_mb = Some(1);
let tight = scan_no_index(root, &cfg).expect("tight-cap scan must succeed");
assert!(
tight.iter().all(|d| !d.path.ends_with("big.js")),
"sanity: tight cap must have dropped big.js: {tight:?}",
);
// Explicit unlimited, the same file must now be visible to the
// scanner. Any pipeline exception would surface as a non-success.
cfg.scanner.max_file_size_mb = None;
let unlimited = with_time_budget(Duration::from_secs(20), "unlimited scan", || {
scan_no_index(root, &cfg).expect("explicit-unlimited scan must succeed")
});
assert!(
unlimited.iter().any(|d| d.path.ends_with("big.js")),
"explicit unlimited must scan big.js; got {unlimited:?}",
);
}
// ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Binary / junk / encoding hardening
// ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Random binary noise (NUL-heavy) must be detected and skipped quickly.
#[test]
fn binary_null_heavy_input_is_skipped() {
// 256 KiB with every third byte NUL → well above the 1% NUL threshold.
let mut bytes = vec![0xCCu8; 256 * 1024];
for i in (0..bytes.len()).step_by(3) {
bytes[i] = 0;
}
let path = Path::new("junk.c");
let cfg = hostile_cfg();
let diags = with_time_budget(Duration::from_secs(2), "binary skip", || {
run_rules_on_bytes(&bytes, path, &cfg, None, None).expect("binary file should not error")
});
assert!(
diags.is_empty(),
"binary-looking files must be skipped, got {} diags",
diags.len()
);
}
/// Invalid UTF-8 in a recognised source extension must not panic.
/// tree-sitter can operate on raw bytes; we just check that it survives.
/// Budget widened from 2 s to 10 s after the pitboss parallel `cargo test`
/// invocation surfaced ~2.8 s wall time under shared-runner CPU pressure
/// even though the isolated test runs well under 100 ms. The point is
/// to catch a runaway, not to benchmark, so 10 s leaves clear headroom
/// without masking a real regression.
#[test]
fn invalid_utf8_does_not_panic() {
let bytes = b"\xff\xfe\xfd\xfc\n\xde\xad\xbe\xef\n// trailing\n".to_vec();
let path = Path::new("junk.rs");
let cfg = hostile_cfg();
let _ = with_time_budget(Duration::from_secs(10), "invalid utf8", || {
run_rules_on_bytes(&bytes, path, &cfg, None, None).expect("invalid UTF-8 should not error")
});
}
/// An empty file must produce no findings and no errors. Trivial, but it
/// was a historical source of div-by-zero bugs in `is_binary`.
#[test]
fn empty_file_is_noop() {
let path = Path::new("empty.js");
let cfg = hostile_cfg();
let diags = run_rules_on_bytes(b"", path, &cfg, None, None).expect("empty file should be ok");
assert!(diags.is_empty());
}
// ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Structural stress: long lines and deep nesting
// ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// A source file consisting of a single extremely long line must parse
/// without blowing up. Minified bundles routinely hit this shape. We
/// model it as ~10 000 independent short statements on one line (roughly
/// what you see after bundler output) rather than one 500k-deep
/// right-associative expression, the latter is a separate stress case
/// dominated by recursive descent and not representative of real input.
///
/// Generous debug-build budget (40 s) because the full analysis pipeline
/// runs on every statement; release builds are an order of magnitude
/// faster. The point is to guard against regressions that are
/// super-linear in statement count, not to benchmark. Budget widened
/// from 20 s after the pitboss parallel `cargo test` invocation surfaced
/// 24-25 s wall time under shared-runner CPU pressure even though the
/// isolated test runs in ~3.7 s.
#[test]
fn very_long_single_line_parses() {
run_on_prod_stack(|| {
let mut s = String::with_capacity(128 * 1024);
for i in 0..10_000 {
s.push_str(&format!("var a{i}=1;"));
}
s.push('\n');
let path = Path::new("long_line.js");
let cfg = hostile_cfg();
let _ = with_time_budget(Duration::from_secs(40), "long line parse", || {
run_rules_on_bytes(s.as_bytes(), path, &cfg, None, None)
.expect("long-line file should parse")
});
});
}
/// Deeply-nested parentheses exercise the recursive descent in tree-sitter
/// and the recursive `build_sub` in `cfg::build_cfg`. Runs on a thread
/// sized to match the production rayon stack so the test environment
/// matches the real scan environment. 500 levels leaves comfortable
/// headroom; a regression that doubled the per-frame cost would trip this.
#[test]
fn deeply_nested_parens_do_not_stack_overflow() {
run_on_prod_stack(|| {
const DEPTH: usize = 500;
let mut s = String::with_capacity(DEPTH * 4);
s.push_str("var x = ");
for _ in 0..DEPTH {
s.push('(');
}
s.push('1');
for _ in 0..DEPTH {
s.push(')');
}
s.push_str(";\n");
let path = Path::new("deep_parens.js");
let cfg = hostile_cfg();
let _ = with_time_budget(Duration::from_secs(10), "deep parens parse", || {
run_rules_on_bytes(s.as_bytes(), path, &cfg, None, None)
.expect("deeply nested parens should parse")
});
});
}
/// Deeply-nested `if` statements are the classical stress case for the CFG
/// builder. Each `if` frame in `build_sub` is ~10 KiB on debug builds, so
/// 100 levels fits comfortably inside the production 8 MiB stack with room
/// for the rest of the analysis pipeline above it. The goal is not to
/// probe the absolute limit, it is to lock in that a realistic generated-
/// code depth does not crash the scanner.
#[test]
fn deeply_nested_if_statements_do_not_stack_overflow() {
run_on_prod_stack(|| {
const DEPTH: usize = 100;
let mut s = String::with_capacity(DEPTH * 16);
s.push_str("function f(x){\n");
for i in 0..DEPTH {
for _ in 0..i {
s.push(' ');
}
s.push_str("if (x) {\n");
}
for i in (0..DEPTH).rev() {
for _ in 0..i {
s.push(' ');
}
s.push_str("}\n");
}
s.push_str("}\n");
let path = Path::new("deep_if.js");
let cfg = hostile_cfg();
let _ = with_time_budget(Duration::from_secs(10), "deep if parse", || {
run_rules_on_bytes(s.as_bytes(), path, &cfg, None, None)
.expect("deeply nested ifs should parse")
});
});
}
/// Lots of small functions in one file stresses the pass-1/pass-2 bookkeeping
/// (summary extraction, callgraph build). 2 000 functions is cheap but
/// plausible for generated code. Budget widened from 15 s after the
/// pitboss parallel `cargo test` invocation surfaced 15.3 s under
/// shared-runner CPU pressure even though the isolated test runs in
/// ~3.7 s.
#[test]
fn many_small_functions_do_not_explode() {
let mut s = String::with_capacity(2000 * 32);
for i in 0..2000 {
s.push_str(&format!("function f{i}(x) {{ return x + {i}; }}\n"));
}
let path = Path::new("many_funcs.js");
let cfg = hostile_cfg();
let _ = with_time_budget(Duration::from_secs(30), "many-funcs scan", || {
run_rules_on_bytes(s.as_bytes(), path, &cfg, None, None)
.expect("many-functions file should scan")
});
}
// ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// End-to-end: hostile directory scan
// ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// A tempdir mixing several adversarial files must scan to completion in
/// bounded time and produce a well-formed diag list. This is the smoke
/// test most likely to catch a regression that composes badly across files.
#[test]
fn scan_of_mixed_hostile_directory_is_bounded() {
use nyx_scanner::scan_no_index;
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let root = tmp.path();
// Legitimate file so the scan has real work to do.
std::fs::write(
root.join("normal.js"),
b"const cp = require('child_process');\n\
function run(cmd) { cp.exec(cmd); }\n",
)
.unwrap();
// Binary noise.
let mut junk = vec![0xAAu8; 64 * 1024];
for i in (0..junk.len()).step_by(3) {
junk[i] = 0;
}
std::fs::write(root.join("junk.c"), junk).unwrap();
// Long single line.
let mut long = b"var y = ".to_vec();
long.extend(std::iter::repeat_n(b'a', 256 * 1024));
long.extend_from_slice(b";\n");
std::fs::write(root.join("long.js"), &long).unwrap();
// Deeply-nested parens.
let mut deep = String::from("var z = ");
for _ in 0..200 {
deep.push('(');
}
deep.push('1');
for _ in 0..200 {
deep.push(')');
}
deep.push_str(";\n");
std::fs::write(root.join("deep.js"), deep).unwrap();
// Oversize-for-walker (2 MiB; walker configured to drop it).
let big = vec![b'x'; 2 * 1024 * 1024];
std::fs::write(root.join("big.js"), big).unwrap();
let mut cfg = hostile_cfg();
cfg.scanner.max_file_size_mb = Some(1);
let diags = with_time_budget(Duration::from_secs(30), "hostile dir scan", || {
scan_no_index(root, &cfg).expect("scan must not fail on hostile inputs")
});
// The walker must drop big.js.
assert!(
diags.iter().all(|d| !d.path.ends_with("big.js")),
"walker should have filtered big.js"
);
// The legitimate file should still yield its cmdi finding.
assert!(
diags.iter().any(|d| d.path.ends_with("normal.js")),
"normal.js should still produce findings: {diags:?}",
);
}
// ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Symlink loops, infinite-loop resistance
// ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// A self-referencing symlink (`a/self -> ../a`) is a classic hostile-input
/// shape: a naive follow-symlinks walker will recurse forever. The `ignore`
/// crate's `WalkBuilder` handles cycles, but the scanner wraps that behind
/// its own canonicalization + containment check; a regression that re-enables
/// a cyclic walk would hang CI indefinitely. The test enforces a hard wall-
/// clock budget so a hang is caught as a timeout rather than as silent CI
/// stall.
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn symlink_loop_does_not_hang_with_follow() {
use nyx_scanner::scan_no_index;
use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let root = tmp.path();
// Real file so the scan has legitimate work to do.
std::fs::write(root.join("real.js"), b"var x = 1;\n").unwrap();
// Nested directory with a self-referencing symlink: `a/self -> ../a`
// expands infinitely under a naive follow-symlinks walk.
let a = root.join("a");
std::fs::create_dir(&a).unwrap();
std::fs::write(a.join("inside.js"), b"var y = 2;\n").unwrap();
symlink("../a", a.join("self")).unwrap();
let mut cfg = hostile_cfg();
cfg.scanner.follow_symlinks = true;
let _diags = with_time_budget(Duration::from_secs(10), "symlink loop follow=true", || {
scan_no_index(root, &cfg).expect("scan of cyclic symlink tree must not error")
});
}
/// Same fixture with `follow_symlinks = false` must also terminate in
/// bounded time, the symlink is not followed, so the loop never expands,
/// but we pin the contract so flipping the default cannot introduce a hang
/// regression.
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn symlink_loop_does_not_hang_without_follow() {
use nyx_scanner::scan_no_index;
use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let root = tmp.path();
std::fs::write(root.join("real.js"), b"var x = 1;\n").unwrap();
let a = root.join("a");
std::fs::create_dir(&a).unwrap();
std::fs::write(a.join("inside.js"), b"var y = 2;\n").unwrap();
symlink("../a", a.join("self")).unwrap();
let mut cfg = hostile_cfg();
cfg.scanner.follow_symlinks = false;
let _diags = with_time_budget(Duration::from_secs(10), "symlink loop follow=false", || {
scan_no_index(root, &cfg).expect("scan must not error on cyclic symlink with follow=false")
});
}
/// Mutually-referencing symlinks (`dirA/link -> ../dirB`, `dirB/link -> ../dirA`)
/// are the second common loop shape. Like the self-loop, this must terminate.
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn mutual_symlink_loop_does_not_hang() {
use nyx_scanner::scan_no_index;
use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let root = tmp.path();
std::fs::write(root.join("real.js"), b"var x = 1;\n").unwrap();
let dir_a = root.join("dirA");
let dir_b = root.join("dirB");
std::fs::create_dir(&dir_a).unwrap();
std::fs::create_dir(&dir_b).unwrap();
std::fs::write(dir_a.join("a.js"), b"var a = 1;\n").unwrap();
std::fs::write(dir_b.join("b.js"), b"var b = 2;\n").unwrap();
symlink("../dirB", dir_a.join("to_b")).unwrap();
symlink("../dirA", dir_b.join("to_a")).unwrap();
let mut cfg = hostile_cfg();
cfg.scanner.follow_symlinks = true;
let _diags = with_time_budget(Duration::from_secs(10), "mutual symlink loop", || {
scan_no_index(root, &cfg).expect("scan must terminate on mutual symlink cycle")
});
}