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* feat: Introduce function-scoped variable interning for state analysis with new tests and fixtures * feat: Add Phase 26 symbolic execution enhancements with bitwise operator support, abstract interpretation refinements, and new taint analysis tests * feat: Refine state analysis to handle factory-pattern resource returns with mixed-path tests and leak detection enhancements * feat: Add Phase 27 debug views with symbolic execution, abstract interpretation, SSA, and call graph viewers; integrate with debug layout and styles * feat: Add Phase 31 type-qualified symbolic resolution with receiver-based callee disambiguation and testing * feat: Extend symbolic execution with state iteration, enhanced debug views, and debounced input handling * feat: Add Phase 13 resource and auth pattern extensions with new tests and fixtures * feat: Introduce CFG debug graph renderer with compact mode, toolbar, and DAG layout integration * feat: Add Phase 28 encoding and decoding transform modeling with structural symex enhancements and new taint analysis tests * feat: Extend abstract interpretation with type facts and constant value tracking in debug views and server logic * feat: Add linear path handling and witness extraction to symbolic execution with Phase 28 transform mismatch detection * feat: Refine Go auth and sanitizer handling with enhanced rules, state updates, and benchmark improvements * feat: Enable auth-state analysis by default and update relevant tests in benchmark config * test: Update state_tests to reflect default enablement of auth-state analysis and add auth suppression test * docs: update CHANGELOG.md * feat: Introduce per-index taint tracking in `HeapState` with `HeapSlot`, overflow handling, and revised SSA transfers * feat: Introduce C/C++ language labels and refine heap state tracking in SSA transfers * feat: Implement per-index array slot tracking in symbolic heap with overflow collapse * feat: Add implicit definition handling for uninitialized declarations in SSA value allocation * feat: Refactor function parameters and constants for improved clarity and maintainability * refactor: Reorder module imports and improve formatting for consistency * refactor: Fix formatting erorrs * refactor: Fix clippy warnings * refactor: Fix fmt warnings (again) * chore: Update dependencies and improve feature configuration * Add comprehensive tests for undertested modules (#36) (COPILOT) * Add comprehensive tests for undertested modules Co-authored-by: elicpeter <54954007+elicpeter@users.noreply.github.com> Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/elicpeter/nyx/sessions/f3fc877e-f386-49ba-9793-fc93d3805083 * Add comprehensive tests for ext, project, walk, and errors modules Co-authored-by: elicpeter <54954007+elicpeter@users.noreply.github.com> Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/elicpeter/nyx/sessions/f3fc877e-f386-49ba-9793-fc93d3805083 --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: elicpeter <54954007+elicpeter@users.noreply.github.com> * chore: Update dependencies and improve feature configuration * fix: formatting errors in new tests * chore: Update license list in about.toml * chore: made functions input inline * chore: updated cfg graph to take up the full page * chore: add Prettier configuration and update code formatting * Add frontend test suite with Vitest (111 tests) (#37) * Add Vitest test suite for frontend - 111 tests across utils, components, hooks, and graph utilities Co-authored-by: elicpeter <54954007+elicpeter@users.noreply.github.com> Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/elicpeter/nyx/sessions/7cf0dba2-ecff-4740-ba4d-92717e74a0b7 * ci: add frontend test step to CI workflow Co-authored-by: elicpeter <54954007+elicpeter@users.noreply.github.com> Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/elicpeter/nyx/sessions/5bc0ac9f-0a32-4d03-9cb7-7a15aea53fca --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: elicpeter <54954007+elicpeter@users.noreply.github.com> * chore: simplify array initialization in test files for consistency * ran typecheck * feat: add AnalysisWorkspace component and integrate it into CfgViewerPage * feat: update routing in AppLayout and improve empty state message in ExplorerPage * feat: enhance scan progress tracking with additional metrics and stages * feat: update license information and add license check script * feat: implement cross-file symbolic execution with callee body persistence * feat: replace dagre graphs with Graphology + ELK + Sigma for more advanced call stack and cfg rendering * feat: ensure CFG function view is scoped to the selected function, preventing bleed into sibling functions * feat: enhance resource tracking with proxy method summaries and improve finding extraction * feat: add terminal function exit detection for accurate resource leak analysis * feat: add warnings for loops and functions without bodies to improve error recovery * feat: update lambda expression handling to ensure proper function classification and control flow * feat: remove bounded formatting/string ops and add JSON.parse sanitizer for improved data handling * feat: add inline return taint analysis and regression tests for improved security checks * feat: add engine version management and migration handling for database schema updates * feat: enhance first_call_ident to skip nested function bodies and add regression tests * feat: enhance callee name resolution with two-segment normalization and disambiguation * feat: add cross-file context flags and debug assertions for taint analysis * feat: refactor taint analysis structure to unify context handling and improve clarity * feat: enhance dead code elimination to preserve Sink, Source, and Sanitizer labels with new tests * docs: updated CHANGELOG.md * fmt: formatting fixes * fix: fixed frontend formatting and lint warnings * fix: optimized ci * fix: optimized ci * Add comprehensive multi-file test coverage to Nyx (#38) * Initial checklist for multi-file test suite expansion Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/elicpeter/nyx/sessions/e550cb88-9767-4442-94d4-101bf5bb0e23 Co-authored-by: elicpeter <54954007+elicpeter@users.noreply.github.com> * Add 12 new multi-file test fixtures with TP/TN/near-miss coverage Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/elicpeter/nyx/sessions/e550cb88-9767-4442-94d4-101bf5bb0e23 Co-authored-by: elicpeter <54954007+elicpeter@users.noreply.github.com> * deleted root repo * rebuilt to test for regressions --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: elicpeter <54954007+elicpeter@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: elipeter <elicpeter@gmail.com> * feat: enhance import alias resolution and taint tracking * feat: implement security hardening with CSRF protection and path validation * feat: add support for import alias bindings in Python, PHP, and Rust * feat: enhance CFG analysis modes and improve code readability * feat: add detection for parameterized SQL queries to enhance security * feat: add safe internal redirect handling and enhance session destroy validation * feat: implement security improvements by addressing vulnerabilities in execAsync, session management, and file downloads * feat: enhance taint detection by adding support for inline source member expressions in call arguments * feat: implement pre-emission of Source nodes for inline source member expressions in call arguments * feat: add support for Throw statement in control flow and error handling * feat: add debug and echo endpoints with potential information leakage * feat: implement internal redirect suppression and enhance taint detection * feat: implement module alias tracking for dynamic dispatch in JS/TS * feat: add authorization analysis module with Express support * feat: add authorization analysis module with Express support * feat: add tests for admin guard requirements and clean checks in authorization analysis * feat: integrate Koa and Fastify frameworks into authorization analysis * feat: add Flask and Django support to authorization analysis module * feat: add support for Rails and Sinatra frameworks in authorization analysis * feat: add support for Axum, ActixWeb, and Rocket frameworks in authorization analysis * feat: add support for ActixWeb, Axum, and Rocket frameworks in authorization analysis * feat: add support for Rails and Sinatra in authorization analysis * chore: add .DS_Store to .gitignore * refactor: simplify conditional checks and improve readability in multiple files * refactor: update usage of Option methods for improved clarity and consistency * refactor: improve code readability by simplifying conditional checks and formatting * refactor: improve code formatting and readability by simplifying conditional checks * refactor: simplify conditional checks and improve readability in multiple files * refactor: simplify conditional checks in axum.rs for improved readability * feat: add CodeQL analysis configuration for enhanced security scanning * test: add comprehensive tests for `src/output.rs` SARIF builder (#39) * chore: start test coverage improvement work Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/elicpeter/nyx/sessions/cd7ff398-134e-4728-a5e7-0353a0744423 Co-authored-by: elicpeter <54954007+elicpeter@users.noreply.github.com> * test: add comprehensive tests for src/output.rs SARIF builder Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/elicpeter/nyx/sessions/cd7ff398-134e-4728-a5e7-0353a0744423 Co-authored-by: elicpeter <54954007+elicpeter@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor: improve code formatting and readability in output.rs --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: elicpeter <54954007+elicpeter@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: elipeter <elicpeter@gmail.com> * refactor: improve code formatting and readability in output.rs * Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 210: Uncontrolled data used in path expression Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 211: Uncontrolled data used in path expression Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor: enhance triage file path handling with improved error management and validation * refactor: updated func summaries for richer detail * refactor: update SSA summary extraction to use canonical FuncKey for distinct entries * refactor: enhance callee metadata structure to support arity, receiver, and qualifier for better overload resolution * refactor: add support for keyword arguments in function calls and enhance receiver extraction for method-style calls * refactor: implement new Flask routes for safe and unsafe shell command execution * refactor: separate receiver handling in SSA operations and enhance taint propagation * refactor: improve arity handling by using arg_uses for positional argument count and enhance witness scoring for tainted arguments * refactor: implement auth decorator extraction and classification for multiple languages * refactor: enhance Rust module path resolution and use map handling for cross-file disambiguation * refactor: introduce CalleeQuery struct for structured callee resolution and enhance resolver logic * refactor: implement same-file identity collision handling for `runTask` to ensure correct resolver behavior * refactor: standardize default struct initialization across multiple files * feat: add scripts for formatting checks and auto-fixes with test summaries * refactor: simplify character splitting and enhance namespace qualifier handling * refactor: improve documentation clarity and enhance code readability in resolver logic * refactor: replace default struct initialization with explicit field assignments for clarity * feat: enhance anonymous function naming by deriving context-based bindings * refactor: streamline match expressions for improved readability and performance * refactor: streamline match expressions for improved readability and performance * refactor: replace loop with while let for improved clarity and performance * feat: add SSA constant propagation support to analysis context for improved accuracy * feat: add SSA constant propagation support to analysis context for improved accuracy * feat: implement shell metacharacter validation and bounded-length checks in Rust analysis * feat: add static map analysis for command injection suppression and type safety * refactor: simplify match statements and reduce line breaks for improved readability * feat(summary): phase 1/5 SinkSite data model for primary sink-location attribution Introduce SinkSite (file_rel, line, col, snippet, cap) carrying the primary sink source-location through function summaries. Swap SsaFuncSummary.param_to_sink and FuncSummary.param_to_sink from a coarse Cap map to a deduped SmallVec<[SinkSite; 1]> per parameter, with a backward-compatible cap_sites() helper and serde defaults so pre-phase-1 on-disk rows continue to deserialise cleanly. Extraction: SinkSiteLocator bundles the tree/bytes/file_rel needed by extract_ssa_func_summary; ParsedFile::extract_ssa_artifacts wires the locator in for the persisted pass-1 path, while pass-2 intra-file transient summaries fall back to cap-only sites (behavior unchanged). Merge: GlobalSummaries::insert now unions sink sites with (file_rel, line, col, cap) dedup via shared union_param_sink_sites helper. Database: JSON-serialised summary columns carry the new shape automatically; no schema change needed. Phase 2 will consume SinkSite in build_taint_diag() to overwrite the caller-site Finding.line with the callee's sink line when resolved via summary. Phase 1 keeps behavior unchanged: scanning tests/benchmark/corpus/rust/cmdi/cmdi_indirect.rs still produces the same (wrong) line 10 finding. Adds round-trip tests covering SinkSite solo, SsaFuncSummary with sink sites, legacy-JSON default handling for both summary types, and merge dedup. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(taint): phase 2/5 thread SinkSite into SsaTaintEvent and Finding Plumb Phase 1's SinkSite through the event pipeline into Findings, no output change yet. SsaTaintEvent gains `primary_sink_site: Option<SinkSite>`; when the main or callback sink-emission path has non-empty `param_to_sink_sites`, filter to sites whose `(line != 0) && (cap ∩ sink_caps != ∅)` and emit one event per distinct site — the multi-primary collapse keeps each downstream Finding single-primary. Resolution: ResolvedSummary and SinkInfo gain mirror `param_to_sink_sites` fields, populated from `SsaFuncSummary.param_to_sink` (SSA + callback paths) and `FuncSummary.param_to_sink` (global paths). Label, local-summary, and interop resolution paths leave the field empty — they only ever had cap-level info to begin with. Finding: new `primary_location: Option<SinkLocation>` with `file_rel/line/col`. `ssa_events_to_findings` maps `event.primary_sink_site` → `Finding.primary_location`, filtering cap-only sites (`line == 0`) to `None` so the (0,0) sentinel never leaks to formatters. Dedup key extended with the primary location so multi-site events aren't collapsed back together. Invariants (debug_assert!): * every SinkSite reaching emission has `line != 0 && cap ∩ sink_caps != ∅` — enforced by the pick_primary_sink_sites* filters; * every populated Finding.primary_location has `line != 0` AND non-empty `file_rel` — the cap-only → None translation upstream guarantees this. Deliberately independent of `uses_summary`: that flag tracks whether the *taint chain* used a summary, whereas primary attribution requires only that the *sink* itself was summary-resolved. A local source reaching a cross-file sink produces `uses_summary=false` alongside a populated primary_location — documented on Finding.primary_location, covered by `cross_file_sink_finding_carries_primary_location`. build_taint_diag, SARIF/JSON/explanation formatters, and the benchmark scorer remain untouched: finding.line still comes from `cfg_graph[finding.sink]`, so cmdi_indirect.rs still reports line 10 and the benchmark's rs-cmdi-003 row still shows FN in the LOC column. Tests: `cross_file_sink_finding_carries_primary_location` (proves plumbing via a synthetic FuncSummary carrying a SinkSite at 42:5) and `cross_file_sink_cap_only_site_leaves_primary_location_none` (regression guard against cap-only sites surfacing). All 1566 lib tests + integration tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(output): phase 3/5 consume primary sink location in diag + SARIF When a finding's primary_location (populated in phase 2 from a callee summary's SinkSite) names the dangerous instruction inside a callee body, attribute the diagnostic line to that location instead of the caller's call site. The call site is demoted to a Call step in flow_steps, and a synthetic Sink step at the primary location is appended so analysts still see the full trace. Changes: - Add scan_root parameter to build_taint_diag so file_rel can be resolved back to an absolute path via a shared resolve_file_rel helper. Empty file_rel (single-file scans where namespace == "") resolves to the file under analysis. - Extend SinkLocation with snippet, carried from the upstream SinkSite so the formatter needs no second file read. - Relax the ssa_events_to_findings debug_assert to allow empty file_rel, which is valid when scan root equals the file itself. - SARIF: emit data-flow as codeFlows[0].threadFlows[0].locations[]; locations[0] already reflects the primary sink position via the updated diag line/col. Acceptance: scan on tests/benchmark/corpus/rust/cmdi/cmdi_indirect.rs now reports line 5 (Command::new) as the primary sink, with the call site at line 10 visible in flow_steps. Two expect.json fixtures updated (must_match line_range widened): - javascript/taint/context_sensitive_call: 12-14 -> 7-14 (line 8 is the real sink inside run()). - rust/cfg/closure_async: 10-10 -> 10-11 (line 11 is Command::new inside the closure). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(bench): phase 4/5 validate primary sink attribution across corpus Extend the benchmark scorer and ground truth to lock in phase 3's primary-location behavior, and add fixtures that exercise the new capability end-to-end. Scorer (tests/benchmark_test.rs): - Add optional `expected_call_site_lines: Option<Vec<[usize; 2]>>` on Case. When present, score_location_level additionally requires at least one flow_step in the finding's evidence trace to fall within ±2 of the call-site range. When absent, the check is skipped — fully forward-compatible with existing fixtures. - Retain ±2 tolerance on expected_sink_lines (compared against the now-primary Diag.line post-phase-3). Ground truth edits: - rs-cmdi-cross-001: expected_sink_lines [8,8] -> [9,9]. Line 8 is the transform::wrap call site (a cross-file propagator, not a sink); line 9 is Command::new, the real sink. The ±2 tolerance happened to mask this stale attribution but it was semantically wrong — phase 4 is the right time to correct it. Also adds expected_call_site_lines [8,8] so the new field is exercised on an existing cross-file case. - rs-cmdi-003: adds expected_call_site_lines [10,10] (run_cmd call). This fixture's sink (Command::new inside run_cmd at line 5) was the motivating case for phases 1-3; adding the call-site assertion guards against regression to caller-line attribution. New fixtures: - rust/cmdi/cmdi_indirect_multisink.rs (rs-cmdi-009): helper run_both takes two tainted params and invokes two Command sinks on consecutive lines. Locks in that primary line lands inside the helper (lines 5-6), not at the caller (line 12). Notes document that SinkSite is currently one-per-callee so both findings today collapse onto the first sink; expected_sink_lines=[5,6] and expected_call_site_lines=[12,12] stay valid either way. - python/cmdi/cross_indirect_sink/{app.py,helper.py} (py-cmdi-cross- 004): sink os.system lives in helper.py (cross-file), caller in app.py reads env source and calls run_cmd. Verifies phase 3's cross-file primary attribution: Diag.path = helper.py, Diag.line = 5, with app.py:7 recorded in flow_steps as a Call step. Acceptance: - `cargo test --test benchmark_test -- --ignored --nocapture` passes. - rs-cmdi-003 is TP/TP/TP (the target flip FN->TP at LOC). All pre-existing TP/TP/TP fixtures remain TP/TP/TP; 2 new fixtures are TP/TP/TP. - Aggregate rule-level: TP=158 FP=10 FN=1 TN=97, P=0.940 R=0.994 F1=0.966 on the 266-case corpus (was TP=156 FP=10 FN=1 TN=97 on 264 pre-phase-4, delta is the +2 new cases both resolving TP). - Full `cargo test` green (1566 lib tests + all integration tests). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(taint): phase 5/5 lock Finding.primary_location contract via regression test Add a regression test in src/taint/ssa_transfer.rs that wires up a synthetic SsaFuncSummary with a SinkSite at other.rs:42:10 and drives the three emission stages (pick_primary_sink_sites → emit_ssa_taint_events → ssa_events_to_findings) against a minimal caller SSA body. Asserts the resulting Finding.primary_location is exactly that triple. The existing integration tests in src/taint/tests.rs cover the coarse FuncSummary path end-to-end through analyse_file. This test locks in the lower-level SSA-side plumbing so a future refactor that silently drops the site between pick → emit → findings fails here rather than only at the benchmark layer. Also refreshes tests/benchmark/results/latest.json (timestamp only; rs-cmdi-003 remains TP/TP/TP and the aggregate P/R/F1 are unchanged from phase 4). Closes the primary sink-location attribution feature (phases 1-5/5): * Phase 1 — SinkSite data model on summaries. * Phase 2 — SinkSite threaded into SsaTaintEvent and Finding. * Phase 3 — diag + SARIF consume primary_location. * Phase 4 — benchmark validates primary_call_site_lines across corpus. * Phase 5 — regression test locks the event→finding contract. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: clean up formatting and improve readability in multiple files * refactor: simplify type definition for deduplication key in findings * test(harness): add must_not_match expectation for FP regression guards Extends ExpectedFinding with must_not_match field that asserts a diagnostic must NOT fire — presence is a hard failure. Non-consuming scan so it coexists with must_match entries on the same rule_id. Adds forbidden_violations accumulator and updates summary line. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(regression): update expectations to ensure must_not_match for various taint and resource leak rules * feat: implement auto-seeding for JS/TS handler parameters to enhance taint tracking * feat: update switch statement handling to improve control flow analysis * feat: implement promisify alias handling for JS/TS to enhance taint tracking * feat: enhance taint tracking by refining expectation handling and adding mode filtering * feat: refine SQL handling in stream processing and enhance auto-seeding for handler parameters * feat: update taint tracking rules to enforce full mode matching and improve flow analysis * feat: enhance Ruby subshell handling to improve taint tracking and flow analysis * feat: update xss_response expectations to refine taint flow analysis and enhance regression guarding * feat: refine framework detection and update expectation handling for Echo and Sinatra * feat: implement max_count for taint tracking expectations and deduplicate findings * feat: add strict_unexpected handling for taint-unsanitised-flow in expectation files * feat: enhance deduplication of taint-unsanitised-flow findings by collapsing based on line and severity * feat: add strict_unexpected handling for taint-unsanitised-flow in multiple expectation files * feat: add structural invariant checks for SSA bodies * feat: ensure deterministic phi emission order using BTreeSet * feat: enhance handling of terminators to ensure authoritative flow through successor edges * feat: enhance Goto terminator handling to ensure all successors are marked executable * feat: refactor code for improved readability and organization * feat: simplify predicate checks and enhance readability in SSA handling * feat: implement per-file parse timeout and enhance file size handling * feat: migrate analysis engine toggles from environment variables to configuration file * feat: remove unnecessary whitespace in hostile_input_tests.rs * feat: remove unnecessary whitespace in hostile_input_tests.rs * feat: update dependencies and enhance documentation on language maturity * feat: enhance security headers and improve request body limits * feat: implement sink capability bits for deduplication and enhance evidence tagging * feat: implement dynamic activation handling for gated sinks and enhance validation logic * feat: enhance configuration documentation and clarify inline analysis cache behavior * feat: implement panic recovery during analysis to continue scans past errors * feat: add expectations configuration for taint analysis and performance metrics * feat: enhance error handling and logging during file reading and mutex locking * feat: add cross-file body loading tests and plumbing for CF-1 phase * feat: implement cross-file k=1 context-sensitive inline taint analysis with new tests and fixtures * feat: implement indexed-scan parity in cross-file inline analysis with new dropdown and copy functionality * feat: enhance classification span handling in CFG and AST for improved source attribution * feat: add new Express routes for handling user input and telemetry data * feat: implement ternary expression handling in CFG with diamond structure for JS/TS * feat: implement Phase CF-3 abstract-domain transfer channels in summaries * feat: add support for string-prefix transfer in cross-file calls and update tests * docs: reduce RESULTS.md doc size * feat: implement Phase CF-4 per-return-path summary decomposition with tests * feat: update parameter handling in pass1 and refactor SsaFuncSummary initialization * feat: implement Phase CF-5 for cross-file SCC joint fixed-point convergence with new flags and tests * feat: implement Phase CF-6 with parameter-granularity points-to summaries and associated tests * refactor: update comments and documentation for clarity and consistency * style: format code for consistency and readability * refactor: simplify verdict handling and improve edge checking logic * refactor: optimize path and identifier collection by avoiding unnecessary cloning * chore: update Cargo.toml for Rust version 1.85 and add ignored files; modify CHANGELOG and README for clarity on state analysis defaults * refactor: update documentation and improve clarity in configuration files * refactor: update documentation and improve clarity in configuration files * feat: add JS/TS pass-2 convergence tests and expectations configuration * feat: add Phase 5 regression tests for inline cache origin attribution and update related logic * feat: implement Phase 7 deduplication and alternative path linking for taint findings * feat: implement structural DFS index for anonymous functions and update naming conventions * feat: add Phase 8 regression tests for container-element taint in JS and Python * feat: add engine-depth profiles and explain-engine option for CLI * feat: update expectations and add new README fixtures for multi-file scan regression * feat: implement Phase 11 callback-alias and factory patterns with regression tests * feat: implement Terminator::Switch for multi-way dispatch and add regression tests * feat: add real-CVE benchmark fixtures for CVE-2023-48022, CVE-2019-14939, and CVE-2023-26159 with corresponding patched variants * refactor: extract cfg and ssa_transfer to submodules * refactor: cargo fmt * refactor: remove unnecessary blank line in cfg_tests.rs * refactor: remove unnecessary planning file * chore: update Rust version to 1.88 and bump dependencies in Cargo files * feat: enhance triage UI with new layout and controls, update README for clarity * feat: enhance triage UI with new layout and controls, update README for clarity * chore: remove outdated section from README for version 0.5.0 * docs: improve clarity and consistency in README content * chore: add "GPL-3.0-or-later" to license options in about.toml * chore: update license handling in about.toml and check-licenses.mjs * style: format code for improved readability in TriagePage component * style: format code for improved readability in TriagePage component * chore: enhance license handling and improve body_id scoping in seed lookup * feat: introduce owner and parent body IDs for enhanced seed scoping * feat: implement direction-aware engine provenance with new CLI flag for strict CI gating * feat: add Undef SSA operation for improved control-flow handling * style: improve code formatting for consistency and readability in multiple files * feat: add 16-function chain SCC across multiple files for enhanced analysis * style: simplify code formatting for improved readability in multiple files * fix: update CapHitReason default implementation and improve README clarity * docs: enhance README with detailed explanations of taint analysis and limitations * docs: refine README for clarity and consistency in taint analysis section * style: improve code formatting for better readability in NewScanModal and scans * fix: update cargo-about command to use --offline for deterministic license generation * fix: update cargo-about command to use --offline for deterministic license generation * ci: add step to prime cargo registry cache for deterministic license generation * feat: add support for non-sink collections in authorization analysis * feat: enhance authorization checks with row-level ownership equality and binding tracking * feat: implement self-scoped user handling and enhance ownership checks * refactor: simplify assertions and formatting in authorization analysis tests * fix: normalize line endings in THIRDPARTY-LICENSES.html generation and update README with AI disclosure * docs: update AI disclosure section for clarity and conciseness * feat: add AI Contribution Policy and update contributing guidelines for AI assistance disclosure * feat: enhance authorization analysis with SSA-derived variable type classification * feat: implement auth_finding_to_diag function for enhanced security diagnostics * feat: add args_value_refs to CallSite struct for enhanced argument tracking * feat: add args_value_refs to CallSite struct for enhanced argument tracking * feat: add direction-aware engine provenance with LossDirection classification and new CLI flag * feat: simplify strip_cap_from_call_args call by removing unnecessary line breaks * feat: enhance error message handling in cli_validation_tests for better Windows compatibility * feat: optimize release profile settings in Cargo.toml and update CodeQL configuration * feat: enhance release build process with SBOM generation and SLSA provenance * feat: update actions/checkout and actions/setup-node to v6, enhance CLI options, and improve auth-check summaries * feat: introduce PathFact handling for path safety checks and rejection logic * feat: introduce PathFact handling for path safety checks and rejection logic * feat: update benchmark data and enhance path sanitization logic with new safety checks * feat: document AI assistance in frontend UI development and human review process * feat: add return path facts for enhanced path safety checks and update documentation * chore: update release date for version 0.5.0 in CHANGELOG.md * chore: clean up ci.yml by removing outdated comments and clarifying steps * feat: implement cross-language path sanitizers and validators for enhanced security * feat: enhance SSA value usage tracking by including block terminators and improve path safety checks * feat: enhance switch statement handling by adding per-case path constraints and support for exclusive cases * refactor: simplify conditional formatting and improve code readability in executor and lower modules * feat: add vulnerable examples for various languages demonstrating authentication and sanitization issues * feat: enhance actor context recognition for self-actor identifiers and add support for global non-sink receivers * feat: enhance actor context recognition for self-actor identifiers and add support for global non-sink receivers * feat: add transform classifiers for Java, Go, and Ruby with corresponding tests * refactor: clarify comments on reassign-to-constant idiom and sink behavior in guards.rs --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1952 lines
67 KiB
Rust
1952 lines
67 KiB
Rust
mod c;
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mod cpp;
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mod go;
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mod java;
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mod javascript;
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mod php;
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mod python;
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mod ruby;
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mod rust;
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mod typescript;
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use bitflags::bitflags;
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use once_cell::sync::Lazy;
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use phf::Map;
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
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use smallvec::SmallVec;
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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/// A single rule: if the AST text equals (or ends with) one of the `matchers`,
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/// the node gets `label`.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
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pub struct LabelRule {
|
|
pub matchers: &'static [&'static str],
|
|
pub label: DataLabel,
|
|
pub case_sensitive: bool,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Sentinel returned by [`classify_gated_sink`] for the dynamic/unknown-activation
|
|
/// branch: the gate fires conservatively and every positional argument must be
|
|
/// considered a potential tainted payload, not just the explicit `payload_args`.
|
|
/// Downstream code (`cfg.rs` node construction) detects this sentinel and
|
|
/// expands it to `(0..arity)` using the actual call arity.
|
|
///
|
|
/// The value `usize::MAX` is used because `args.get(usize::MAX)` is a guaranteed
|
|
/// miss for any real argument list — an accidental direct-lookup would be a no-op
|
|
/// rather than silently aliasing position 0.
|
|
pub const ALL_ARGS_PAYLOAD: &[usize] = &[usize::MAX];
|
|
|
|
/// How a gate decides to activate.
|
|
///
|
|
/// A gate's activation determines whether the callee is treated as a sink at
|
|
/// a given call site. `ValueMatch` inspects a literal/kwarg for dangerous
|
|
/// values; `Destination` fires unconditionally on taint reaching declared
|
|
/// destination-bearing positions or fields.
|
|
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
|
|
pub enum GateActivation {
|
|
/// Legacy literal-value activation. The gate fires when the constant
|
|
/// value at `arg_index` (or keyword arg, if `keyword_name`/`dangerous_kwargs`
|
|
/// is set) matches `dangerous_values` / `dangerous_prefixes`, or when that
|
|
/// value is dynamic/unknown (conservative).
|
|
///
|
|
/// Used for argument-role-aware sinks like `setAttribute` (activation arg
|
|
/// selects which attribute is being set) and `parseFromString` (activation
|
|
/// arg selects the MIME type).
|
|
ValueMatch,
|
|
/// Destination-bearing flow activation. The gate fires when taint reaches
|
|
/// a declared destination location at the call site — no literal
|
|
/// inspection, no prefix heuristic.
|
|
///
|
|
/// For callees whose destination is a positional argument (e.g. `fetch`'s
|
|
/// first arg, `axios.post`'s first arg), set `object_destination_fields`
|
|
/// to `&[]`: the whole positional argument at each index in the gate's
|
|
/// `payload_args` is treated as the destination.
|
|
///
|
|
/// For callees that accept a config/options object whose fields designate
|
|
/// the destination (`axios({url,baseURL,...})`, `http.request({host,path,port})`,
|
|
/// `got({url,prefixUrl,...})`, `undici.request({origin,path,...})`), list
|
|
/// the destination-bearing field names here. When the positional arg is
|
|
/// an object literal at call time, sink taint checks are restricted to
|
|
/// identifiers found under those fields; non-destination fields (`body`,
|
|
/// `data`, `json`, `headers`, ...) are silenced.
|
|
///
|
|
/// When the positional arg is not an object literal (plain string / ident
|
|
/// / expression), the whole arg is treated as the destination (same as
|
|
/// the empty-field case). This keeps `http.request(urlString, cb)` and
|
|
/// `http.request({host,path}, cb)` both covered by a single gate.
|
|
Destination {
|
|
object_destination_fields: &'static [&'static str],
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Argument-sensitive sink activation. Whether a call becomes a sink is
|
|
/// determined by the gate's [`GateActivation`] mode — literal-value matching
|
|
/// for traditional role-selector APIs, or destination-flow activation for
|
|
/// outbound HTTP clients and other APIs where a specific location in the
|
|
/// call carries the attacker-controlled destination.
|
|
///
|
|
/// `payload_args` specifies which argument positions carry the tainted payload.
|
|
/// When non-empty, only variables from those argument positions are checked for
|
|
/// taint at the sink. When empty, all arguments are considered payloads
|
|
/// (backward-compatible default for `ValueMatch`).
|
|
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
|
|
pub struct SinkGate {
|
|
pub callee_matcher: &'static str,
|
|
pub arg_index: usize,
|
|
pub dangerous_values: &'static [&'static str],
|
|
pub dangerous_prefixes: &'static [&'static str],
|
|
pub label: DataLabel,
|
|
pub case_sensitive: bool,
|
|
pub payload_args: &'static [usize],
|
|
/// Optional keyword argument name for languages that support keyword args
|
|
/// (e.g. Python `shell=True` in `subprocess.Popen`). When set, the
|
|
/// activation value is extracted from the named keyword argument instead
|
|
/// of the positional argument at `arg_index`.
|
|
pub keyword_name: Option<&'static str>,
|
|
/// Multi-keyword activation rules. Each entry is `(kwarg_name, values)`
|
|
/// where any listed value makes the call dangerous. Gate semantics when
|
|
/// non-empty:
|
|
/// * A listed kwarg with a matching literal value → activate.
|
|
/// * A listed kwarg present with a non-literal (dynamic) value →
|
|
/// activate conservatively.
|
|
/// * A listed kwarg present but with an explicitly safe literal → does
|
|
/// not by itself activate.
|
|
/// * No listed kwarg present → does not activate (matches the language
|
|
/// default, e.g. Python `shell=False` implicit for `subprocess.run`).
|
|
///
|
|
/// When both `keyword_name` and `dangerous_kwargs` are set, `keyword_name`
|
|
/// wins (back-compat for existing single-kwarg gates). `&[]` is the
|
|
/// default and disables this branch.
|
|
pub dangerous_kwargs: &'static [(&'static str, &'static [&'static str])],
|
|
/// Activation mode. [`GateActivation::ValueMatch`] is the legacy default;
|
|
/// [`GateActivation::Destination`] is used for destination-flow modeling
|
|
/// (outbound HTTP clients etc.).
|
|
pub activation: GateActivation,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bitflags! {
|
|
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
|
pub struct Cap: u16 {
|
|
const ENV_VAR = 0b0000_0000_0000_0001; // bit 0
|
|
const HTML_ESCAPE = 0b0000_0000_0000_0010; // bit 1
|
|
const SHELL_ESCAPE = 0b0000_0000_0000_0100; // bit 2
|
|
const URL_ENCODE = 0b0000_0000_0000_1000; // bit 3
|
|
const JSON_PARSE = 0b0000_0000_0001_0000; // bit 4
|
|
const FILE_IO = 0b0000_0000_0010_0000; // bit 5
|
|
const FMT_STRING = 0b0000_0000_0100_0000; // bit 6
|
|
const SQL_QUERY = 0b0000_0000_1000_0000; // bit 7
|
|
const DESERIALIZE = 0b0000_0001_0000_0000; // bit 8
|
|
const SSRF = 0b0000_0010_0000_0000; // bit 9
|
|
const CODE_EXEC = 0b0000_0100_0000_0000; // bit 10
|
|
const CRYPTO = 0b0000_1000_0000_0000; // bit 11
|
|
/// Request-bound, caller-supplied identifier that has not yet been
|
|
/// validated against an ownership/membership check. Used as the
|
|
/// carrier cap for folding `auth_analysis` into the SSA/taint
|
|
/// engine.
|
|
const UNAUTHORIZED_ID = 0b0001_0000_0000_0000; // bit 12
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl Default for Cap {
|
|
fn default() -> Self {
|
|
Cap::empty()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl serde::Serialize for Cap {
|
|
fn serialize<S: serde::Serializer>(&self, s: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error> {
|
|
s.serialize_u16(self.bits())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl<'de> serde::Deserialize<'de> for Cap {
|
|
fn deserialize<D: serde::Deserializer<'de>>(d: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error> {
|
|
let bits = u16::deserialize(d)?;
|
|
Ok(Cap::from_bits_truncate(bits))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
|
pub enum Kind {
|
|
If,
|
|
InfiniteLoop,
|
|
While,
|
|
For,
|
|
CallFn,
|
|
CallMethod,
|
|
CallMacro,
|
|
Break,
|
|
Continue,
|
|
Return,
|
|
Block,
|
|
SourceFile,
|
|
Function,
|
|
Assignment,
|
|
CallWrapper,
|
|
Try,
|
|
Throw,
|
|
/// Multi-way dispatch (switch/match): a discriminant evaluates and routes
|
|
/// control to one of many case bodies. Cases with no terminating jump fall
|
|
/// through to the next case (where the surface language allows). The CFG
|
|
/// builder gives each case body the dispatch header as a predecessor so
|
|
/// reachability does not depend on sibling-case execution order.
|
|
Switch,
|
|
Trivia,
|
|
/// Simple sequential expression (e.g. cast/type-assertion) — treated like
|
|
/// any other sequential statement in the CFG but explicitly classified so
|
|
/// code that inspects `Kind` can recognise it.
|
|
Seq,
|
|
Other,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
|
|
pub enum DataLabel {
|
|
Source(Cap),
|
|
Sanitizer(Cap),
|
|
Sink(Cap),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Configuration for extracting parameter names from function AST nodes.
|
|
pub struct ParamConfig {
|
|
/// Field name on the function node that holds the parameter list
|
|
/// (e.g. "parameters", "formal_parameters").
|
|
pub params_field: &'static str,
|
|
/// Tree-sitter node kinds that represent individual parameters.
|
|
pub param_node_kinds: &'static [&'static str],
|
|
/// Node kinds representing self/this parameters (e.g. "self_parameter" in Rust).
|
|
pub self_param_kinds: &'static [&'static str],
|
|
/// Field names tried in order to extract the identifier from a parameter node.
|
|
pub ident_fields: &'static [&'static str],
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static DEFAULT_PARAM_CONFIG: ParamConfig = ParamConfig {
|
|
params_field: "parameters",
|
|
param_node_kinds: &["parameter", "identifier"],
|
|
self_param_kinds: &[],
|
|
ident_fields: &["name", "pattern"],
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/// Describes taint propagation from input arguments to output arguments
|
|
/// for known C/C++ functions (e.g., inet_pton copies network address from arg 1 to arg 2).
|
|
pub struct ArgPropagation {
|
|
pub callee: &'static str,
|
|
pub from_args: &'static [usize],
|
|
pub to_args: &'static [usize],
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Look up output-parameter positions for Source-labeled C/C++ functions.
|
|
/// Returns argument indices that receive taint alongside the return value.
|
|
pub fn output_param_source_positions(lang: &str, callee: &str) -> Option<&'static [usize]> {
|
|
let registry: &[(&str, &[usize])] = match lang {
|
|
"c" => c::OUTPUT_PARAM_SOURCES,
|
|
"cpp" => cpp::OUTPUT_PARAM_SOURCES,
|
|
_ => return None,
|
|
};
|
|
let normalized = callee
|
|
.rsplit("::")
|
|
.next()
|
|
.unwrap_or(callee)
|
|
.rsplit('.')
|
|
.next()
|
|
.unwrap_or(callee);
|
|
registry
|
|
.iter()
|
|
.find(|(name, _)| name.eq_ignore_ascii_case(normalized))
|
|
.map(|(_, positions)| *positions)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Look up arg-to-arg propagation rules for known C/C++ functions.
|
|
pub fn arg_propagation(lang: &str, callee: &str) -> Option<&'static ArgPropagation> {
|
|
let registry: &[ArgPropagation] = match lang {
|
|
"c" => c::ARG_PROPAGATIONS,
|
|
"cpp" => cpp::ARG_PROPAGATIONS,
|
|
_ => return None,
|
|
};
|
|
let normalized = callee
|
|
.rsplit("::")
|
|
.next()
|
|
.unwrap_or(callee)
|
|
.rsplit('.')
|
|
.next()
|
|
.unwrap_or(callee);
|
|
registry
|
|
.iter()
|
|
.find(|p| p.callee.eq_ignore_ascii_case(normalized))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static REGISTRY: Lazy<HashMap<&'static str, &'static [LabelRule]>> = Lazy::new(|| {
|
|
let mut m = HashMap::new();
|
|
m.insert("rust", rust::RULES);
|
|
m.insert("rs", rust::RULES);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("javascript", javascript::RULES);
|
|
m.insert("js", javascript::RULES);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("typescript", typescript::RULES);
|
|
m.insert("ts", typescript::RULES);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("python", python::RULES);
|
|
m.insert("py", python::RULES);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("go", go::RULES);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("java", java::RULES);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("c", c::RULES);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("cpp", cpp::RULES);
|
|
m.insert("c++", cpp::RULES);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("php", php::RULES);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("ruby", ruby::RULES);
|
|
m.insert("rb", ruby::RULES);
|
|
|
|
m
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
static GATED_REGISTRY: Lazy<HashMap<&'static str, &'static [SinkGate]>> = Lazy::new(|| {
|
|
let mut m = HashMap::new();
|
|
m.insert("javascript", javascript::GATED_SINKS);
|
|
m.insert("js", javascript::GATED_SINKS);
|
|
m.insert("typescript", typescript::GATED_SINKS);
|
|
m.insert("ts", typescript::GATED_SINKS);
|
|
m.insert("python", python::GATED_SINKS);
|
|
m.insert("py", python::GATED_SINKS);
|
|
m
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
/// Per-language exclusion patterns: callee text that must never be classified.
|
|
static EXCLUDES: Lazy<HashMap<&'static str, &'static [&'static str]>> = Lazy::new(|| {
|
|
let mut m = HashMap::new();
|
|
m.insert("javascript", javascript::EXCLUDES);
|
|
m.insert("js", javascript::EXCLUDES);
|
|
m.insert("typescript", typescript::EXCLUDES);
|
|
m.insert("ts", typescript::EXCLUDES);
|
|
m
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
/// Check whether `text` matches a per-language exclusion pattern.
|
|
pub(crate) fn is_excluded(lang: &str, trimmed: &[u8]) -> bool {
|
|
let excludes = match EXCLUDES.get(lang).or_else(|| {
|
|
let key = lang.to_ascii_lowercase();
|
|
EXCLUDES.get(key.as_str())
|
|
}) {
|
|
Some(e) => *e,
|
|
None => return false,
|
|
};
|
|
for &pat in excludes {
|
|
if match_suffix_cs(trimmed, pat.as_bytes(), false) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type FastMap = &'static Map<&'static str, Kind>;
|
|
|
|
pub(crate) static CLASSIFIERS: Lazy<HashMap<&'static str, FastMap>> = Lazy::new(|| {
|
|
let mut m = HashMap::new();
|
|
m.insert("rust", &rust::KINDS);
|
|
m.insert("rs", &rust::KINDS);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("javascript", &javascript::KINDS);
|
|
m.insert("js", &javascript::KINDS);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("typescript", &typescript::KINDS);
|
|
m.insert("ts", &typescript::KINDS);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("python", &python::KINDS);
|
|
m.insert("py", &python::KINDS);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("go", &go::KINDS);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("java", &java::KINDS);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("c", &c::KINDS);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("cpp", &cpp::KINDS);
|
|
m.insert("c++", &cpp::KINDS);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("php", &php::KINDS);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("ruby", &ruby::KINDS);
|
|
m.insert("rb", &ruby::KINDS);
|
|
|
|
m
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
static PARAM_CONFIGS: Lazy<HashMap<&'static str, &'static ParamConfig>> = Lazy::new(|| {
|
|
let mut m = HashMap::new();
|
|
m.insert("rust", &rust::PARAM_CONFIG);
|
|
m.insert("rs", &rust::PARAM_CONFIG);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("javascript", &javascript::PARAM_CONFIG);
|
|
m.insert("js", &javascript::PARAM_CONFIG);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("typescript", &typescript::PARAM_CONFIG);
|
|
m.insert("ts", &typescript::PARAM_CONFIG);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("python", &python::PARAM_CONFIG);
|
|
m.insert("py", &python::PARAM_CONFIG);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("go", &go::PARAM_CONFIG);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("java", &java::PARAM_CONFIG);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("c", &c::PARAM_CONFIG);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("cpp", &cpp::PARAM_CONFIG);
|
|
m.insert("c++", &cpp::PARAM_CONFIG);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("php", &php::PARAM_CONFIG);
|
|
|
|
m.insert("ruby", &ruby::PARAM_CONFIG);
|
|
m.insert("rb", &ruby::PARAM_CONFIG);
|
|
|
|
m
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
/// Return the parameter extraction config for the given language, with a sensible default.
|
|
pub fn param_config(lang: &str) -> &'static ParamConfig {
|
|
PARAM_CONFIGS
|
|
.get(lang)
|
|
.copied()
|
|
.unwrap_or(&DEFAULT_PARAM_CONFIG)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Lowercase names whose use as a JS/TS function parameter strongly suggests
|
|
/// the binding carries attacker-controlled input (handler dispatch functions,
|
|
/// controller methods, command wrappers). When the taint engine enters a
|
|
/// function whose formal parameter matches one of these names and no caller
|
|
/// taint has been supplied, it auto-seeds the parameter as a `UserInput`
|
|
/// source so sinks downstream of the parameter still fire.
|
|
const JS_TS_HANDLER_PARAM_NAMES: &[&str] = &["userinput", "userid", "payload", "cmd", "input"];
|
|
|
|
/// Check whether a JS/TS formal parameter name strongly implies user input.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Matches the curated exact-name list (case-insensitive) *and* any identifier
|
|
/// that begins with a `user` prefix followed by an uppercase letter (camelCase)
|
|
/// or underscore (snake_case). The prefix rule captures common handler
|
|
/// parameter names such as `userCmd`, `userPath`, `userData`, and `user_input`
|
|
/// without broadening into generic words that just contain "user".
|
|
pub fn is_js_ts_handler_param_name(name: &str) -> bool {
|
|
if name.is_empty() || !name.is_ascii() {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if JS_TS_HANDLER_PARAM_NAMES
|
|
.iter()
|
|
.any(|candidate| candidate.eq_ignore_ascii_case(name))
|
|
{
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
// camelCase / snake_case `user*` prefix: requires at least one
|
|
// distinguishing character after the prefix so `user` alone does not match.
|
|
let bytes = name.as_bytes();
|
|
if bytes.len() >= 5
|
|
&& bytes[..4].eq_ignore_ascii_case(b"user")
|
|
&& (bytes[4].is_ascii_uppercase() || bytes[4] == b'_')
|
|
{
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[inline(always)]
|
|
pub fn lookup(lang: &str, raw: &str) -> Kind {
|
|
CLASSIFIERS
|
|
.get(lang)
|
|
.and_then(|m| m.get(raw).copied())
|
|
.unwrap_or(Kind::Other)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// The kind of taint source, used to refine finding severity.
|
|
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
|
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
|
|
pub enum SourceKind {
|
|
/// Direct user input (request params, argv, stdin, form data)
|
|
UserInput,
|
|
/// Environment variables and configuration
|
|
EnvironmentConfig,
|
|
/// File system reads
|
|
FileSystem,
|
|
/// Database query results
|
|
Database,
|
|
/// Caught exception — may carry user-controlled data
|
|
CaughtException,
|
|
/// Could not determine — treat conservatively
|
|
Unknown,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Infer the source kind from capabilities and callee name.
|
|
pub fn infer_source_kind(caps: Cap, callee: &str) -> SourceKind {
|
|
let cl = callee.to_ascii_lowercase();
|
|
|
|
// User input patterns
|
|
if cl.contains("argv")
|
|
|| cl.contains("stdin")
|
|
|| cl.contains("request")
|
|
|| cl.contains("form")
|
|
|| cl.contains("query")
|
|
|| cl.contains("params")
|
|
|| cl.contains("input")
|
|
|| cl.contains("body")
|
|
|| cl.contains("header")
|
|
|| cl.contains("cookie")
|
|
|| cl.contains("location")
|
|
|| cl.contains("document.url")
|
|
|| cl.contains("document.referrer")
|
|
{
|
|
return SourceKind::UserInput;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Environment / config patterns
|
|
if cl.contains("env")
|
|
|| cl.contains("getenv")
|
|
|| cl.contains("environ")
|
|
|| cl.contains("config")
|
|
{
|
|
return SourceKind::EnvironmentConfig;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// File system patterns
|
|
if cl.contains("read") || cl.contains("fopen") || cl.contains("open") {
|
|
// Distinguish from db reads — file reads typically have FILE_IO cap
|
|
if caps.contains(Cap::FILE_IO) {
|
|
return SourceKind::FileSystem;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Database patterns
|
|
if cl.contains("fetchone")
|
|
|| cl.contains("fetchall")
|
|
|| cl.contains("fetch_row")
|
|
|| cl.contains("query")
|
|
|| cl.contains("execute")
|
|
{
|
|
// Queries that read back from db
|
|
return SourceKind::Database;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SourceKind::Unknown
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Map a source kind to its appropriate severity level.
|
|
pub fn severity_for_source_kind(kind: SourceKind) -> crate::patterns::Severity {
|
|
match kind {
|
|
SourceKind::UserInput => crate::patterns::Severity::High,
|
|
SourceKind::EnvironmentConfig => crate::patterns::Severity::High,
|
|
SourceKind::FileSystem => crate::patterns::Severity::Medium,
|
|
SourceKind::Database => crate::patterns::Severity::Medium,
|
|
SourceKind::CaughtException => crate::patterns::Severity::Medium,
|
|
SourceKind::Unknown => crate::patterns::Severity::High,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// A runtime (config-derived) label rule with owned matchers.
|
|
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
|
|
pub struct RuntimeLabelRule {
|
|
pub matchers: Vec<String>,
|
|
pub label: DataLabel,
|
|
pub case_sensitive: bool,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Parse a capability name string into a `Cap` bitflag.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Prefer `CapName` enum for config values; this remains for ad-hoc string parsing.
|
|
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
|
pub fn parse_cap(s: &str) -> Option<Cap> {
|
|
match s.to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
|
|
"env_var" => Some(Cap::ENV_VAR),
|
|
"html_escape" => Some(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE),
|
|
"shell_escape" => Some(Cap::SHELL_ESCAPE),
|
|
"url_encode" => Some(Cap::URL_ENCODE),
|
|
"json_parse" => Some(Cap::JSON_PARSE),
|
|
"file_io" => Some(Cap::FILE_IO),
|
|
"fmt_string" => Some(Cap::FMT_STRING),
|
|
"sql_query" => Some(Cap::SQL_QUERY),
|
|
"deserialize" => Some(Cap::DESERIALIZE),
|
|
"ssrf" => Some(Cap::SSRF),
|
|
"code_exec" => Some(Cap::CODE_EXEC),
|
|
"crypto" => Some(Cap::CRYPTO),
|
|
"unauthorized_id" => Some(Cap::UNAUTHORIZED_ID),
|
|
"all" => Some(Cap::all()),
|
|
_ => None,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Pre-built analysis rules for a specific language, derived from config.
|
|
/// Built once per file and threaded through the pipeline.
|
|
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
|
|
pub struct LangAnalysisRules {
|
|
pub extra_labels: Vec<RuntimeLabelRule>,
|
|
pub terminators: Vec<String>,
|
|
pub event_handlers: Vec<String>,
|
|
pub frameworks: Vec<crate::utils::project::DetectedFramework>,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Build `LangAnalysisRules` from a `Config` for a given language slug.
|
|
pub fn build_lang_rules(
|
|
config: &crate::utils::config::Config,
|
|
lang_slug: &str,
|
|
) -> LangAnalysisRules {
|
|
let mut extra_labels: Vec<RuntimeLabelRule> = Vec::new();
|
|
let mut terminators = Vec::new();
|
|
let mut event_handlers = Vec::new();
|
|
|
|
if let Some(lang_cfg) = config.analysis.languages.get(lang_slug) {
|
|
extra_labels.extend(lang_cfg.rules.iter().map(|r| {
|
|
use crate::utils::config::RuleKind;
|
|
let cap = r.cap.to_cap();
|
|
let label = match r.kind {
|
|
RuleKind::Source => DataLabel::Source(cap),
|
|
RuleKind::Sanitizer => DataLabel::Sanitizer(cap),
|
|
RuleKind::Sink => DataLabel::Sink(cap),
|
|
};
|
|
RuntimeLabelRule {
|
|
matchers: r.matchers.clone(),
|
|
label,
|
|
case_sensitive: r.case_sensitive,
|
|
}
|
|
}));
|
|
terminators = lang_cfg.terminators.clone();
|
|
event_handlers = lang_cfg.event_handlers.clone();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Append framework-conditional rules when frameworks are detected.
|
|
let frameworks = if let Some(ref fw_ctx) = config.framework_ctx {
|
|
extra_labels.extend(framework_rules_for_lang(lang_slug, fw_ctx));
|
|
fw_ctx.frameworks.clone()
|
|
} else {
|
|
Vec::new()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Phase C: fold `auth_analysis` into the taint engine by injecting
|
|
// `Cap::UNAUTHORIZED_ID` sink/sanitizer rules. Gated by config; default
|
|
// OFF so the standalone `auth_analysis` subsystem remains authoritative.
|
|
if config.scanner.enable_auth_as_taint {
|
|
extra_labels.extend(phase_c_auth_rules_for_lang(lang_slug));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
LangAnalysisRules {
|
|
extra_labels,
|
|
terminators,
|
|
event_handlers,
|
|
frameworks,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Return Phase C auth-as-taint rules for a given language (currently Rust-only).
|
|
fn phase_c_auth_rules_for_lang(lang_slug: &str) -> Vec<RuntimeLabelRule> {
|
|
match lang_slug {
|
|
"rust" | "rs" => rust::phase_c_auth_rules(),
|
|
_ => Vec::new(),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Public re-export used by [`crate::ast::ParsedFile::from_source`] to
|
|
/// augment per-file rule sets when imports reveal frameworks that the
|
|
/// manifest-level detector missed.
|
|
pub fn framework_rules_for_lang_pub(
|
|
lang_slug: &str,
|
|
ctx: &crate::utils::project::FrameworkContext,
|
|
) -> Vec<RuntimeLabelRule> {
|
|
framework_rules_for_lang(lang_slug, ctx)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Return framework-conditional label rules for a given language.
|
|
fn framework_rules_for_lang(
|
|
lang_slug: &str,
|
|
ctx: &crate::utils::project::FrameworkContext,
|
|
) -> Vec<RuntimeLabelRule> {
|
|
match lang_slug {
|
|
"go" => go::framework_rules(ctx),
|
|
"ruby" | "rb" => ruby::framework_rules(ctx),
|
|
"java" => java::framework_rules(ctx),
|
|
"php" => php::framework_rules(ctx),
|
|
"python" | "py" => python::framework_rules(ctx),
|
|
"rust" | "rs" => rust::framework_rules(ctx),
|
|
"javascript" | "js" => javascript::framework_rules(ctx),
|
|
"typescript" | "ts" => typescript::framework_rules(ctx),
|
|
_ => Vec::new(),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Suffix check with configurable case sensitivity.
|
|
#[inline]
|
|
fn ends_with_cs(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8], case_sensitive: bool) -> bool {
|
|
if needle.len() > haystack.len() {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
let start = haystack.len() - needle.len();
|
|
if case_sensitive {
|
|
haystack[start..] == *needle
|
|
} else {
|
|
haystack[start..]
|
|
.iter()
|
|
.zip(needle)
|
|
.all(|(h, n)| h.eq_ignore_ascii_case(n))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Prefix check with configurable case sensitivity.
|
|
#[inline]
|
|
fn starts_with_cs(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8], case_sensitive: bool) -> bool {
|
|
if needle.len() > haystack.len() {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if case_sensitive {
|
|
haystack[..needle.len()] == *needle
|
|
} else {
|
|
haystack[..needle.len()]
|
|
.iter()
|
|
.zip(needle)
|
|
.all(|(h, n)| h.eq_ignore_ascii_case(n))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Word-boundary suffix match with configurable case sensitivity.
|
|
#[inline]
|
|
fn match_suffix_cs(text: &[u8], matcher: &[u8], case_sensitive: bool) -> bool {
|
|
if ends_with_cs(text, matcher, case_sensitive) {
|
|
let start = text.len() - matcher.len();
|
|
start == 0 || matches!(text[start - 1], b'.' | b':')
|
|
} else {
|
|
false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Try to classify a piece of syntax text.
|
|
/// `lang` is the canonicalised language key ("rust", "javascript", ...).
|
|
///
|
|
/// If `extra` runtime rules are provided, they are checked **first** (config
|
|
/// takes priority over built-in rules).
|
|
///
|
|
/// **Two-pass matching** -- exact / suffix matches are checked across *all*
|
|
/// rules before any prefix (`foo_`) match is attempted. This prevents a
|
|
/// greedy prefix like `sanitize_` from shadowing a more specific exact
|
|
/// match like `sanitize_shell`.
|
|
pub fn classify(lang: &str, text: &str, extra: Option<&[RuntimeLabelRule]>) -> Option<DataLabel> {
|
|
let head = text.split(['(', '<']).next().unwrap_or("");
|
|
let trimmed = head.trim().as_bytes();
|
|
|
|
// Early out: exclude known-benign framework patterns.
|
|
if is_excluded(lang, trimmed) {
|
|
return None;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// For chained calls like `r.URL.Query().Get`, also strip internal
|
|
// `().` segments to produce a normalized form like `r.URL.Query.Get`.
|
|
let full_normalized = normalize_chained_call(text);
|
|
let full_norm_bytes = full_normalized.as_bytes();
|
|
|
|
// ── Check runtime (config) rules first — they take priority ──────
|
|
if let Some(extras) = extra {
|
|
// Pass 1: exact / suffix
|
|
for rule in extras {
|
|
for raw in &rule.matchers {
|
|
let m = raw.as_bytes();
|
|
if m.last() == Some(&b'_') {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if match_suffix_cs(trimmed, m, rule.case_sensitive)
|
|
|| match_suffix_cs(full_norm_bytes, m, rule.case_sensitive)
|
|
{
|
|
return Some(rule.label);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Pass 2: prefix
|
|
for rule in extras {
|
|
for raw in &rule.matchers {
|
|
let m = raw.as_bytes();
|
|
if m.last() == Some(&b'_')
|
|
&& (starts_with_cs(trimmed, m, rule.case_sensitive)
|
|
|| starts_with_cs(full_norm_bytes, m, rule.case_sensitive))
|
|
{
|
|
return Some(rule.label);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Built-in static rules ────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
let rules = REGISTRY.get(lang).or_else(|| {
|
|
let key = lang.to_ascii_lowercase();
|
|
REGISTRY.get(key.as_str())
|
|
})?;
|
|
|
|
// Pass 1: exact / suffix matches (high confidence)
|
|
for rule in *rules {
|
|
for raw in rule.matchers {
|
|
let m = raw.as_bytes();
|
|
if m.last() == Some(&b'_') {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if match_suffix_cs(trimmed, m, rule.case_sensitive)
|
|
|| match_suffix_cs(full_norm_bytes, m, rule.case_sensitive)
|
|
{
|
|
return Some(rule.label);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Pass 2: prefix matches (catch-all, lower priority)
|
|
for rule in *rules {
|
|
for raw in rule.matchers {
|
|
let m = raw.as_bytes();
|
|
if m.last() == Some(&b'_')
|
|
&& (starts_with_cs(trimmed, m, rule.case_sensitive)
|
|
|| starts_with_cs(full_norm_bytes, m, rule.case_sensitive))
|
|
{
|
|
return Some(rule.label);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
None
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Classify a piece of syntax text, returning **all** matching labels.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Same two-pass (exact/suffix then prefix) structure as [`classify()`], but
|
|
/// collects every match instead of returning on first hit. Deduplicates
|
|
/// exact `(variant, caps)` pairs.
|
|
pub fn classify_all(
|
|
lang: &str,
|
|
text: &str,
|
|
extra: Option<&[RuntimeLabelRule]>,
|
|
) -> SmallVec<[DataLabel; 2]> {
|
|
let head = text.split(['(', '<']).next().unwrap_or("");
|
|
let trimmed = head.trim().as_bytes();
|
|
|
|
// Early out: exclude known-benign framework patterns.
|
|
if is_excluded(lang, trimmed) {
|
|
return SmallVec::new();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let full_normalized = normalize_chained_call(text);
|
|
let full_norm_bytes = full_normalized.as_bytes();
|
|
|
|
let mut out: SmallVec<[DataLabel; 2]> = SmallVec::new();
|
|
|
|
// Helper: push if not already present (dedup by variant+caps equality).
|
|
#[inline]
|
|
fn push_dedup(out: &mut SmallVec<[DataLabel; 2]>, label: DataLabel) {
|
|
if !out.contains(&label) {
|
|
out.push(label);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Check runtime (config) rules first — they take priority ──────
|
|
if let Some(extras) = extra {
|
|
// Pass 1: exact / suffix
|
|
for rule in extras {
|
|
for raw in &rule.matchers {
|
|
let m = raw.as_bytes();
|
|
if m.last() == Some(&b'_') {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if match_suffix_cs(trimmed, m, rule.case_sensitive)
|
|
|| match_suffix_cs(full_norm_bytes, m, rule.case_sensitive)
|
|
{
|
|
push_dedup(&mut out, rule.label);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Pass 2: prefix
|
|
for rule in extras {
|
|
for raw in &rule.matchers {
|
|
let m = raw.as_bytes();
|
|
if m.last() == Some(&b'_')
|
|
&& (starts_with_cs(trimmed, m, rule.case_sensitive)
|
|
|| starts_with_cs(full_norm_bytes, m, rule.case_sensitive))
|
|
{
|
|
push_dedup(&mut out, rule.label);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Built-in static rules ────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
let rules = REGISTRY.get(lang).or_else(|| {
|
|
let key = lang.to_ascii_lowercase();
|
|
REGISTRY.get(key.as_str())
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
if let Some(rules) = rules {
|
|
// Pass 1: exact / suffix matches (high confidence)
|
|
for rule in *rules {
|
|
for raw in rule.matchers {
|
|
let m = raw.as_bytes();
|
|
if m.last() == Some(&b'_') {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if match_suffix_cs(trimmed, m, rule.case_sensitive)
|
|
|| match_suffix_cs(full_norm_bytes, m, rule.case_sensitive)
|
|
{
|
|
push_dedup(&mut out, rule.label);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Pass 2: prefix matches (catch-all, lower priority)
|
|
for rule in *rules {
|
|
for raw in rule.matchers {
|
|
let m = raw.as_bytes();
|
|
if m.last() == Some(&b'_')
|
|
&& (starts_with_cs(trimmed, m, rule.case_sensitive)
|
|
|| starts_with_cs(full_norm_bytes, m, rule.case_sensitive))
|
|
{
|
|
push_dedup(&mut out, rule.label);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Result of a gated-sink classification.
|
|
///
|
|
/// `label` is the sink capability the callee contributes at this site.
|
|
/// `payload_args` identifies positional args that carry the tainted payload
|
|
/// (or [`ALL_ARGS_PAYLOAD`] for dynamic-activation conservative fallback).
|
|
/// `object_destination_fields`, when non-empty, restricts sink-taint checks
|
|
/// to identifiers found under those field names within an object-literal
|
|
/// positional argument — used by destination-aware outbound-HTTP gates so
|
|
/// `fetch({url, body})` fires only when taint reaches `url`, not `body`.
|
|
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
|
pub struct GateMatch {
|
|
pub label: DataLabel,
|
|
pub payload_args: &'static [usize],
|
|
pub object_destination_fields: &'static [&'static str],
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Classify a call against gated sink rules.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Returns `Some(GateMatch)` if the callee matches a gated rule AND the
|
|
/// activation conditions fire. Returns `None` if the callee doesn't match
|
|
/// any gated rule, or matches but the activation is provably safe.
|
|
///
|
|
/// `const_arg_at` extracts positional argument values.
|
|
/// `const_keyword_arg` extracts keyword argument values (for languages like Python).
|
|
pub fn classify_gated_sink(
|
|
lang: &str,
|
|
callee_text: &str,
|
|
const_arg_at: impl Fn(usize) -> Option<String>,
|
|
const_keyword_arg: impl Fn(&str) -> Option<String>,
|
|
kwarg_present: impl Fn(&str) -> bool,
|
|
) -> Option<GateMatch> {
|
|
let gates = GATED_REGISTRY.get(lang).or_else(|| {
|
|
let key = lang.to_ascii_lowercase();
|
|
GATED_REGISTRY.get(key.as_str())
|
|
})?;
|
|
|
|
let callee_bytes = callee_text.as_bytes();
|
|
|
|
for gate in *gates {
|
|
let matcher = gate.callee_matcher.as_bytes();
|
|
if !match_suffix_cs(callee_bytes, matcher, gate.case_sensitive) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Destination-flow activation: always fires. Downstream filters sink
|
|
// taint checks to `payload_args` (and, for object-literal args, further
|
|
// to `object_destination_fields`).
|
|
if let GateActivation::Destination {
|
|
object_destination_fields,
|
|
} = gate.activation
|
|
{
|
|
return Some(GateMatch {
|
|
label: gate.label,
|
|
payload_args: gate.payload_args,
|
|
object_destination_fields,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── ValueMatch activation (legacy) ───────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
// Multi-kwarg gate path. Takes precedence over positional / single-kwarg
|
|
// inspection when populated. Semantics are presence-aware: an absent
|
|
// kwarg is treated as the language default (safe) and does not alone
|
|
// activate the gate.
|
|
if !gate.dangerous_kwargs.is_empty() && gate.keyword_name.is_none() {
|
|
let mut any_dangerous = false;
|
|
let mut any_dynamic_present = false;
|
|
for (name, values) in gate.dangerous_kwargs {
|
|
if !kwarg_present(name) {
|
|
continue; // absent → takes language default (safe)
|
|
}
|
|
match const_keyword_arg(name) {
|
|
Some(v) => {
|
|
let lower = v.to_ascii_lowercase();
|
|
if values.iter().any(|dv| lower == dv.to_ascii_lowercase()) {
|
|
any_dangerous = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
// Present with a safe literal — continue checking other kwargs.
|
|
}
|
|
None => {
|
|
any_dynamic_present = true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if any_dangerous {
|
|
return Some(GateMatch {
|
|
label: gate.label,
|
|
payload_args: gate.payload_args,
|
|
object_destination_fields: &[],
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if any_dynamic_present {
|
|
// Dynamic kwarg value — we can't prove safe. Conservatively
|
|
// flag every positional arg so the activation pathway isn't
|
|
// silently narrowed to the gate's declared `payload_args`.
|
|
return Some(GateMatch {
|
|
label: gate.label,
|
|
payload_args: ALL_ARGS_PAYLOAD,
|
|
object_destination_fields: &[],
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
return None; // all listed kwargs absent or safe-literal → suppress
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Single-kwarg / positional gate path (original semantics).
|
|
let activation_value = if let Some(kw) = gate.keyword_name {
|
|
const_keyword_arg(kw)
|
|
} else {
|
|
const_arg_at(gate.arg_index)
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
match activation_value {
|
|
Some(value) => {
|
|
let lower = value.to_ascii_lowercase();
|
|
let is_dangerous = gate
|
|
.dangerous_values
|
|
.iter()
|
|
.any(|v| lower == v.to_ascii_lowercase())
|
|
|| gate
|
|
.dangerous_prefixes
|
|
.iter()
|
|
.any(|p| lower.starts_with(&p.to_ascii_lowercase()));
|
|
if is_dangerous {
|
|
return Some(GateMatch {
|
|
label: gate.label,
|
|
payload_args: gate.payload_args,
|
|
object_destination_fields: &[],
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
return None; // safe constant → suppress
|
|
}
|
|
// Unknown / dynamic activation arg: the gate fires conservatively,
|
|
// but we can't prove that only the declared `payload_args` carry
|
|
// risk — a tainted activation arg (e.g. `setAttribute(userAttr, …)`
|
|
// where `userAttr` is user-controlled) is itself a vulnerability
|
|
// path. Return ALL_ARGS_PAYLOAD so downstream sink scanning
|
|
// considers every positional argument.
|
|
None => {
|
|
return Some(GateMatch {
|
|
label: gate.label,
|
|
payload_args: ALL_ARGS_PAYLOAD,
|
|
object_destination_fields: &[],
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
None
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Public wrapper for [`normalize_chained_call`] so callers outside the module
|
|
/// can share the same normalization used by the label classifier.
|
|
pub fn normalize_chained_call_for_classify(text: &str) -> String {
|
|
normalize_chained_call(text)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Normalize a chained method call: strip `()` between `.` segments.
|
|
/// e.g. `r.URL.Query().Get` → `r.URL.Query.Get`
|
|
/// e.g. `r.URL.Query().Get("host")` → `r.URL.Query.Get`
|
|
fn normalize_chained_call(text: &str) -> String {
|
|
let mut result = String::with_capacity(text.len());
|
|
let bytes = text.as_bytes();
|
|
let mut i = 0;
|
|
while i < bytes.len() {
|
|
match bytes[i] {
|
|
b'(' => {
|
|
// Skip from `(` to matching `)`, but only if followed by `.`
|
|
// This handles `Query().Get` → `Query.Get`
|
|
let mut depth = 1u32;
|
|
let mut j = i + 1;
|
|
while j < bytes.len() && depth > 0 {
|
|
if bytes[j] == b'(' {
|
|
depth += 1;
|
|
} else if bytes[j] == b')' {
|
|
depth -= 1;
|
|
}
|
|
j += 1;
|
|
}
|
|
// If we're at end or next char is `.`, skip the parens
|
|
if j >= bytes.len() || bytes[j] == b'.' {
|
|
i = j;
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Keep the paren content (unusual case)
|
|
result.push('(');
|
|
i += 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
b'<' => break, // Stop at generic args
|
|
_ => {
|
|
result.push(bytes[i] as char);
|
|
i += 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
result
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Rule enumeration ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
/// All canonical language slugs (no aliases).
|
|
const CANONICAL_LANGS: &[&str] = &[
|
|
"javascript",
|
|
"typescript",
|
|
"python",
|
|
"go",
|
|
"java",
|
|
"c",
|
|
"cpp",
|
|
"php",
|
|
"ruby",
|
|
"rust",
|
|
];
|
|
|
|
/// Map alias slugs to canonical language name.
|
|
pub fn canonical_lang(slug: &str) -> &str {
|
|
// Check exact matches first (fast path, no allocation)
|
|
match slug {
|
|
"javascript" | "js" => "javascript",
|
|
"typescript" | "ts" => "typescript",
|
|
"python" | "py" => "python",
|
|
"go" => "go",
|
|
"java" => "java",
|
|
"c" => "c",
|
|
"cpp" | "c++" => "cpp",
|
|
"php" => "php",
|
|
"ruby" | "rb" => "ruby",
|
|
"rust" | "rs" => "rust",
|
|
// For unknown slugs, return as-is (the caller's borrow keeps it alive)
|
|
_ => slug,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Human-readable name for a Cap bitflag value.
|
|
pub fn cap_to_name(cap: Cap) -> &'static str {
|
|
if cap == Cap::all() {
|
|
return "all";
|
|
}
|
|
match cap {
|
|
Cap::ENV_VAR => "env_var",
|
|
Cap::HTML_ESCAPE => "html_escape",
|
|
Cap::SHELL_ESCAPE => "shell_escape",
|
|
Cap::URL_ENCODE => "url_encode",
|
|
Cap::JSON_PARSE => "json_parse",
|
|
Cap::FILE_IO => "file_io",
|
|
Cap::FMT_STRING => "fmt_string",
|
|
Cap::SQL_QUERY => "sql_query",
|
|
Cap::DESERIALIZE => "deserialize",
|
|
Cap::SSRF => "ssrf",
|
|
Cap::CODE_EXEC => "code_exec",
|
|
Cap::CRYPTO => "crypto",
|
|
Cap::UNAUTHORIZED_ID => "unauthorized_id",
|
|
_ => "unknown",
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Generate a stable rule ID from language, kind, and matchers.
|
|
pub fn rule_id(lang: &str, kind: &str, matchers: &[&str]) -> String {
|
|
let mut sorted: Vec<&str> = matchers.to_vec();
|
|
sorted.sort_unstable();
|
|
let joined = sorted.join("\0");
|
|
let hash = blake3::hash(joined.as_bytes());
|
|
let hex = hash.to_hex();
|
|
format!("{}.{}.{}", lang, kind, &hex[..8])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Metadata-enriched view of a label rule (built-in or custom).
|
|
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
|
|
pub struct RuleInfo {
|
|
pub id: String,
|
|
pub title: String,
|
|
pub language: String,
|
|
pub kind: String,
|
|
pub cap: String,
|
|
pub cap_bits: u16,
|
|
pub matchers: Vec<String>,
|
|
pub case_sensitive: bool,
|
|
pub is_custom: bool,
|
|
pub is_gated: bool,
|
|
pub enabled: bool,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Enumerate all built-in rules across all languages.
|
|
pub fn enumerate_builtin_rules() -> Vec<RuleInfo> {
|
|
let mut out = Vec::new();
|
|
|
|
for &lang in CANONICAL_LANGS {
|
|
if let Some(rules) = REGISTRY.get(lang) {
|
|
for rule in *rules {
|
|
let (kind_str, cap) = match rule.label {
|
|
DataLabel::Source(c) => ("source", c),
|
|
DataLabel::Sanitizer(c) => ("sanitizer", c),
|
|
DataLabel::Sink(c) => ("sink", c),
|
|
};
|
|
let matchers_strs: Vec<&str> = rule.matchers.to_vec();
|
|
let id = rule_id(lang, kind_str, &matchers_strs);
|
|
let first = rule.matchers.first().copied().unwrap_or("?");
|
|
let title = format!("{} ({})", first, kind_str);
|
|
out.push(RuleInfo {
|
|
id,
|
|
title,
|
|
language: lang.to_string(),
|
|
kind: kind_str.to_string(),
|
|
cap: cap_to_name(cap).to_string(),
|
|
cap_bits: cap.bits(),
|
|
matchers: rule.matchers.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect(),
|
|
case_sensitive: rule.case_sensitive,
|
|
is_custom: false,
|
|
is_gated: false,
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Include gated sink entries
|
|
if let Some(gates) = GATED_REGISTRY.get(lang) {
|
|
for gate in *gates {
|
|
let cap = match gate.label {
|
|
DataLabel::Source(c) | DataLabel::Sanitizer(c) | DataLabel::Sink(c) => c,
|
|
};
|
|
let kind_str = "sink";
|
|
let matchers_strs = &[gate.callee_matcher];
|
|
let id = rule_id(lang, &format!("gated_{}", kind_str), matchers_strs);
|
|
let title = format!("{} (gated {})", gate.callee_matcher, kind_str);
|
|
out.push(RuleInfo {
|
|
id,
|
|
title,
|
|
language: lang.to_string(),
|
|
kind: kind_str.to_string(),
|
|
cap: cap_to_name(cap).to_string(),
|
|
cap_bits: cap.bits(),
|
|
matchers: vec![gate.callee_matcher.to_string()],
|
|
case_sensitive: gate.case_sensitive,
|
|
is_custom: false,
|
|
is_gated: true,
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Generate a custom rule ID with `custom.` prefix.
|
|
pub fn custom_rule_id(lang: &str, kind: &str, matchers: &[String]) -> String {
|
|
let refs: Vec<&str> = matchers.iter().map(|s| s.as_str()).collect();
|
|
format!("custom.{}", rule_id(lang, kind, &refs))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod tests {
|
|
use super::*;
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn handler_param_names_exact_and_prefix() {
|
|
// Exact names still match.
|
|
assert!(is_js_ts_handler_param_name("cmd"));
|
|
assert!(is_js_ts_handler_param_name("input"));
|
|
assert!(is_js_ts_handler_param_name("userId"));
|
|
assert!(is_js_ts_handler_param_name("USERID"));
|
|
// camelCase `user*` prefix.
|
|
assert!(is_js_ts_handler_param_name("userCmd"));
|
|
assert!(is_js_ts_handler_param_name("userData"));
|
|
assert!(is_js_ts_handler_param_name("userPath"));
|
|
// snake_case prefix.
|
|
assert!(is_js_ts_handler_param_name("user_cmd"));
|
|
// Bare `user` does not match (no distinguishing suffix).
|
|
assert!(!is_js_ts_handler_param_name("user"));
|
|
assert!(!is_js_ts_handler_param_name("userx"));
|
|
// Other names unaffected.
|
|
assert!(!is_js_ts_handler_param_name("url"));
|
|
assert!(!is_js_ts_handler_param_name("value"));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn classify_none_extra_unchanged() {
|
|
// Built-in rule: innerHTML → Sink(HTML_ESCAPE)
|
|
let result = classify("javascript", "innerHTML", None);
|
|
assert_eq!(result, Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE)));
|
|
|
|
// Non-existent should still be None
|
|
let result = classify("javascript", "myCustomFunc", None);
|
|
assert_eq!(result, None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn classify_extra_rules_take_priority() {
|
|
let extras = vec![RuntimeLabelRule {
|
|
matchers: vec!["escapeHtml".into()],
|
|
label: DataLabel::Sanitizer(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE),
|
|
case_sensitive: false,
|
|
}];
|
|
|
|
let result = classify("javascript", "escapeHtml", Some(&extras));
|
|
assert_eq!(result, Some(DataLabel::Sanitizer(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE)));
|
|
|
|
// Built-in rules still work
|
|
let result = classify("javascript", "innerHTML", Some(&extras));
|
|
assert_eq!(result, Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE)));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn classify_extra_overrides_builtin() {
|
|
// Override innerHTML to be a sanitizer (contrived but tests priority)
|
|
let extras = vec![RuntimeLabelRule {
|
|
matchers: vec!["innerHTML".into()],
|
|
label: DataLabel::Sanitizer(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE),
|
|
case_sensitive: false,
|
|
}];
|
|
|
|
let result = classify("javascript", "innerHTML", Some(&extras));
|
|
assert_eq!(result, Some(DataLabel::Sanitizer(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE)));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn classify_location_href_is_sink() {
|
|
let result = classify("javascript", "location.href", None);
|
|
assert_eq!(result, Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::URL_ENCODE)));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn classify_bare_href_is_none() {
|
|
// Bare "href" should NOT be a sink — only "location.href" and variants
|
|
let result = classify("javascript", "href", None);
|
|
assert_eq!(result, None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn classify_case_insensitive_is_default() {
|
|
let extras = vec![RuntimeLabelRule {
|
|
matchers: vec!["myCustomSink".into()],
|
|
label: DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE),
|
|
case_sensitive: false,
|
|
}];
|
|
// Default case_sensitive=false: case-insensitive match
|
|
let result = classify("javascript", "MYCUSTOMSINK", Some(&extras));
|
|
assert_eq!(result, Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE)));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn classify_case_sensitive_exact_match() {
|
|
let extras = vec![RuntimeLabelRule {
|
|
matchers: vec!["MyExactSink".into()],
|
|
label: DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE),
|
|
case_sensitive: true,
|
|
}];
|
|
// Exact case matches
|
|
let result = classify("javascript", "MyExactSink", Some(&extras));
|
|
assert_eq!(result, Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE)));
|
|
// Wrong case does NOT match
|
|
let result = classify("javascript", "myexactsink", Some(&extras));
|
|
assert_eq!(result, None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn classify_case_sensitive_prefix() {
|
|
let extras = vec![RuntimeLabelRule {
|
|
matchers: vec!["Sanitize_".into()],
|
|
label: DataLabel::Sanitizer(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE),
|
|
case_sensitive: true,
|
|
}];
|
|
// Correct case prefix matches
|
|
let result = classify("javascript", "Sanitize_input", Some(&extras));
|
|
assert_eq!(result, Some(DataLabel::Sanitizer(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE)));
|
|
// Wrong case does NOT match
|
|
let result = classify("javascript", "sanitize_input", Some(&extras));
|
|
assert_eq!(result, None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn classify_case_sensitive_suffix_boundary() {
|
|
let extras = vec![RuntimeLabelRule {
|
|
matchers: vec!["RunQuery".into()],
|
|
label: DataLabel::Sink(Cap::SQL_QUERY),
|
|
case_sensitive: true,
|
|
}];
|
|
// Correct case with dot boundary
|
|
let result = classify("javascript", "db.RunQuery", Some(&extras));
|
|
assert_eq!(result, Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::SQL_QUERY)));
|
|
// Wrong case does NOT match
|
|
let result = classify("javascript", "db.runquery", Some(&extras));
|
|
assert_eq!(result, None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn parse_cap_works() {
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_cap("html_escape"), Some(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE));
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_cap("shell_escape"), Some(Cap::SHELL_ESCAPE));
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_cap("url_encode"), Some(Cap::URL_ENCODE));
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_cap("json_parse"), Some(Cap::JSON_PARSE));
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_cap("env_var"), Some(Cap::ENV_VAR));
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_cap("file_io"), Some(Cap::FILE_IO));
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_cap("all"), Some(Cap::all()));
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_cap("ALL"), Some(Cap::all()));
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_cap("sql_query"), Some(Cap::SQL_QUERY));
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_cap("deserialize"), Some(Cap::DESERIALIZE));
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_cap("ssrf"), Some(Cap::SSRF));
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_cap("code_exec"), Some(Cap::CODE_EXEC));
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_cap("crypto"), Some(Cap::CRYPTO));
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_cap("invalid"), None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// No-op keyword arg extractor for tests (JS/TS have no keyword gates).
|
|
fn no_kw(_: &str) -> Option<String> {
|
|
None
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// No-op kwarg presence check for tests that don't exercise the multi-kwarg path.
|
|
fn no_kw_present(_: &str) -> bool {
|
|
false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn gated_sink_dangerous_exact() {
|
|
let result = classify_gated_sink(
|
|
"javascript",
|
|
"setAttribute",
|
|
|_| Some("href".to_string()),
|
|
no_kw,
|
|
no_kw_present,
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
result,
|
|
Some(GateMatch {
|
|
label: DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE),
|
|
payload_args: [1usize].as_slice(),
|
|
object_destination_fields: &[],
|
|
})
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn gated_sink_dangerous_prefix() {
|
|
let result = classify_gated_sink(
|
|
"javascript",
|
|
"setAttribute",
|
|
|_| Some("onclick".to_string()),
|
|
no_kw,
|
|
no_kw_present,
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
result,
|
|
Some(GateMatch {
|
|
label: DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE),
|
|
payload_args: [1usize].as_slice(),
|
|
object_destination_fields: &[],
|
|
})
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn gated_sink_safe_suppressed() {
|
|
let result = classify_gated_sink(
|
|
"javascript",
|
|
"setAttribute",
|
|
|_| Some("class".to_string()),
|
|
no_kw,
|
|
no_kw_present,
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(result, None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn gated_sink_dynamic_conservative() {
|
|
// Dynamic activation (e.g. `setAttribute(attrVar, val)`) returns the
|
|
// ALL_ARGS_PAYLOAD sentinel so callers expand payload tracking to
|
|
// every positional arg — the activation arg itself is a vulnerability
|
|
// path when attacker-controlled.
|
|
let result =
|
|
classify_gated_sink("javascript", "setAttribute", |_| None, no_kw, no_kw_present);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
result,
|
|
Some(GateMatch {
|
|
label: DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE),
|
|
payload_args: ALL_ARGS_PAYLOAD,
|
|
object_destination_fields: &[],
|
|
})
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn gated_sink_no_match() {
|
|
let result = classify_gated_sink(
|
|
"rust",
|
|
"setAttribute",
|
|
|_| Some("href".to_string()),
|
|
no_kw,
|
|
no_kw_present,
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(result, None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn gated_sink_returns_payload_args() {
|
|
// setAttribute: payload is arg 1
|
|
let result = classify_gated_sink(
|
|
"javascript",
|
|
"setAttribute",
|
|
|_| Some("href".to_string()),
|
|
no_kw,
|
|
no_kw_present,
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(result.unwrap().payload_args, &[1]);
|
|
|
|
// parseFromString: payload is arg 0
|
|
let result = classify_gated_sink(
|
|
"javascript",
|
|
"parseFromString",
|
|
|idx| {
|
|
if idx == 1 {
|
|
Some("text/html".to_string())
|
|
} else {
|
|
None
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
no_kw,
|
|
no_kw_present,
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(result.unwrap().payload_args, &[0]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn gated_sink_parse_from_string_safe_mime() {
|
|
let result = classify_gated_sink(
|
|
"javascript",
|
|
"parseFromString",
|
|
|idx| {
|
|
if idx == 1 {
|
|
Some("text/xml".to_string())
|
|
} else {
|
|
None
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
no_kw,
|
|
no_kw_present,
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(result, None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn gated_sink_python_popen_shell_true() {
|
|
let result = classify_gated_sink(
|
|
"python",
|
|
"Popen",
|
|
|_| None,
|
|
|kw| {
|
|
if kw == "shell" {
|
|
Some("True".to_string())
|
|
} else {
|
|
None
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
|kw| kw == "shell",
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
result,
|
|
Some(GateMatch {
|
|
label: DataLabel::Sink(Cap::SHELL_ESCAPE),
|
|
payload_args: [0usize].as_slice(),
|
|
object_destination_fields: &[],
|
|
})
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn gated_sink_python_popen_shell_false() {
|
|
let result = classify_gated_sink(
|
|
"python",
|
|
"Popen",
|
|
|_| None,
|
|
|kw| {
|
|
if kw == "shell" {
|
|
Some("False".to_string())
|
|
} else {
|
|
None
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
|kw| kw == "shell",
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(result, None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn gated_sink_python_popen_no_shell_conservative() {
|
|
// `Popen(cmd)` uses the single-kwarg / positional gate path: no `shell`
|
|
// literal available → unknown activation → ALL_ARGS_PAYLOAD sentinel.
|
|
let result = classify_gated_sink("python", "Popen", |_| None, |_| None, no_kw_present);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
result,
|
|
Some(GateMatch {
|
|
label: DataLabel::Sink(Cap::SHELL_ESCAPE),
|
|
payload_args: ALL_ARGS_PAYLOAD,
|
|
object_destination_fields: &[],
|
|
})
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── New multi-kwarg gate path (dangerous_kwargs) tests ─────────────────
|
|
|
|
/// `subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True)` → activates via multi-kwarg gate.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn gated_sink_subprocess_run_shell_true() {
|
|
let result = classify_gated_sink(
|
|
"python",
|
|
"subprocess.run",
|
|
|_| None,
|
|
|kw| {
|
|
if kw == "shell" {
|
|
Some("True".to_string())
|
|
} else {
|
|
None
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
|kw| kw == "shell",
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
result,
|
|
Some(GateMatch {
|
|
label: DataLabel::Sink(Cap::SHELL_ESCAPE),
|
|
payload_args: [0usize].as_slice(),
|
|
object_destination_fields: &[],
|
|
})
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// `subprocess.run(cmd, shell=False)` → explicit safe literal suppresses the gate.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn gated_sink_subprocess_run_shell_false() {
|
|
let result = classify_gated_sink(
|
|
"python",
|
|
"subprocess.run",
|
|
|_| None,
|
|
|kw| {
|
|
if kw == "shell" {
|
|
Some("False".to_string())
|
|
} else {
|
|
None
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
|kw| kw == "shell",
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(result, None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// `subprocess.run(cmd)` → no shell kwarg → presence-aware gate suppresses.
|
|
/// This is the behavioural difference from the legacy `Popen` gate path.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn gated_sink_subprocess_run_shell_absent_suppresses() {
|
|
let result = classify_gated_sink(
|
|
"python",
|
|
"subprocess.run",
|
|
|_| None,
|
|
|_| None,
|
|
no_kw_present,
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(result, None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// `subprocess.run(cmd, shell=flag)` → shell kwarg present but dynamic →
|
|
/// conservative activate. Multi-kwarg dynamic-present branch also returns
|
|
/// ALL_ARGS_PAYLOAD so the activation pathway is not narrowed.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn gated_sink_subprocess_run_shell_dynamic_conservative() {
|
|
let result = classify_gated_sink(
|
|
"python",
|
|
"subprocess.run",
|
|
|_| None,
|
|
|_| None, // dynamic: no literal available
|
|
|kw| kw == "shell",
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
result,
|
|
Some(GateMatch {
|
|
label: DataLabel::Sink(Cap::SHELL_ESCAPE),
|
|
payload_args: ALL_ARGS_PAYLOAD,
|
|
object_destination_fields: &[],
|
|
})
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Destination-flow gate always fires; returns `object_destination_fields`
|
|
/// verbatim for the caller to apply object-literal field filtering.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn gated_sink_destination_positional_always_fires() {
|
|
// `fetch(url)` — arg 0 is the URL (positional destination) OR an
|
|
// object with a `url` field. The gate fires unconditionally, with
|
|
// `url` declared as the object-literal destination-field for the
|
|
// `fetch({url, body})` shape.
|
|
let result = classify_gated_sink(
|
|
"javascript",
|
|
"fetch",
|
|
|_| None, // no literal — Destination mode doesn't inspect it
|
|
no_kw,
|
|
no_kw_present,
|
|
);
|
|
let m = result.expect("fetch gate should fire");
|
|
assert_eq!(m.label, DataLabel::Sink(Cap::SSRF));
|
|
assert_eq!(m.payload_args, &[0]);
|
|
assert_eq!(m.object_destination_fields, &["url"]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Destination gate with `object_destination_fields` surfaces them for
|
|
/// the CFG caller to drive object-literal field filtering.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn gated_sink_destination_object_fields_surfaced() {
|
|
// `http.request(opts, cb)` — opts is an object with destination fields.
|
|
let result =
|
|
classify_gated_sink("javascript", "http.request", |_| None, no_kw, no_kw_present);
|
|
let m = result.expect("http.request gate should fire");
|
|
assert_eq!(m.label, DataLabel::Sink(Cap::SSRF));
|
|
assert_eq!(m.payload_args, &[0]);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
m.object_destination_fields
|
|
.iter()
|
|
.any(|&f| f == "host" || f == "hostname"),
|
|
"expected host/hostname in destination fields, got {:?}",
|
|
m.object_destination_fields,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn classify_all_single_label() {
|
|
let result = classify_all("javascript", "innerHTML", None);
|
|
assert_eq!(result.len(), 1);
|
|
assert_eq!(result[0], DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn classify_all_dual_label_php() {
|
|
let result = classify_all("php", "file_get_contents", None);
|
|
assert!(result.len() >= 2, "expected dual label, got {:?}", result);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
result.contains(&DataLabel::Source(Cap::all())),
|
|
"expected Source(all), got {:?}",
|
|
result
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
result.contains(&DataLabel::Sink(Cap::SSRF)),
|
|
"expected Sink(SSRF), got {:?}",
|
|
result
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn classify_all_dual_label_java() {
|
|
let result = classify_all("java", "readObject", None);
|
|
assert!(result.len() >= 2, "expected dual label, got {:?}", result);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
result.contains(&DataLabel::Source(Cap::all())),
|
|
"expected Source(all), got {:?}",
|
|
result
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
result.contains(&DataLabel::Sink(Cap::DESERIALIZE)),
|
|
"expected Sink(DESERIALIZE), got {:?}",
|
|
result
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn classify_go_echo_sinks_with_runtime_rules() {
|
|
use crate::utils::project::{DetectedFramework, FrameworkContext};
|
|
|
|
let ctx = FrameworkContext {
|
|
frameworks: vec![DetectedFramework::Echo],
|
|
};
|
|
let rules = go::framework_rules(&ctx);
|
|
let extras = rules.to_vec();
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("go", "c.String", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE)),
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("go", "c.HTML", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE)),
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("go", "c.JSON", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE)),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Without Echo framework, these should not match
|
|
let empty = go::framework_rules(&FrameworkContext::default());
|
|
assert_eq!(classify("go", "c.String", Some(&empty)), None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn classify_javascript_koa_runtime_rules() {
|
|
use crate::utils::project::{DetectedFramework, FrameworkContext};
|
|
|
|
let ctx = FrameworkContext {
|
|
frameworks: vec![DetectedFramework::Koa],
|
|
};
|
|
let extras = javascript::framework_rules(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("javascript", "ctx.query", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Source(Cap::all())),
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("javascript", "ctx.cookies.get", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Source(Cap::all())),
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("javascript", "ctx.body", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE)),
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("javascript", "ctx.redirect", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::SSRF)),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let empty = javascript::framework_rules(&FrameworkContext::default());
|
|
assert_eq!(classify("javascript", "ctx.query", Some(&empty)), None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn classify_typescript_fastify_runtime_rules() {
|
|
use crate::utils::project::{DetectedFramework, FrameworkContext};
|
|
|
|
let ctx = FrameworkContext {
|
|
frameworks: vec![DetectedFramework::Fastify],
|
|
};
|
|
let extras = typescript::framework_rules(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("typescript", "request.query", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Source(Cap::all())),
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("typescript", "reply.send", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE)),
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("typescript", "reply.redirect", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::SSRF)),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let empty = typescript::framework_rules(&FrameworkContext::default());
|
|
assert_eq!(classify("typescript", "request.query", Some(&empty)), None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn classify_ruby_sinatra_template_sinks() {
|
|
use crate::utils::project::{DetectedFramework, FrameworkContext};
|
|
|
|
let ctx = FrameworkContext {
|
|
frameworks: vec![DetectedFramework::Sinatra],
|
|
};
|
|
let rules = ruby::framework_rules(&ctx);
|
|
let extras = rules.to_vec();
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("ruby", "erb", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE)),
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("ruby", "haml", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE)),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Without Sinatra, erb should not match
|
|
let empty = ruby::framework_rules(&FrameworkContext::default());
|
|
assert_eq!(classify("ruby", "erb", Some(&empty)), None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn classify_rust_axum_runtime_rules() {
|
|
use crate::utils::project::{DetectedFramework, FrameworkContext};
|
|
|
|
let ctx = FrameworkContext {
|
|
frameworks: vec![DetectedFramework::Axum],
|
|
};
|
|
let extras = rust::framework_rules(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("rust", "Path<String>", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Source(Cap::all())),
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("rust", "HeaderMap.get(\"x-user\")", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Source(Cap::all())),
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("rust", "Html(name)", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE)),
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("rust", "Redirect::to(next)", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::SSRF)),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let empty = rust::framework_rules(&FrameworkContext::default());
|
|
assert_eq!(classify("rust", "Html(name)", Some(&empty)), None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn classify_rust_actix_runtime_rules() {
|
|
use crate::utils::project::{DetectedFramework, FrameworkContext};
|
|
|
|
let ctx = FrameworkContext {
|
|
frameworks: vec![DetectedFramework::ActixWeb],
|
|
};
|
|
let extras = rust::framework_rules(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("rust", "web::Json<String>", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Source(Cap::all())),
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("rust", "HttpRequest.match_info()", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Source(Cap::all())),
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("rust", "HttpResponse.body(payload)", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE)),
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn classify_rust_rocket_runtime_rules() {
|
|
use crate::utils::project::{DetectedFramework, FrameworkContext};
|
|
|
|
let ctx = FrameworkContext {
|
|
frameworks: vec![DetectedFramework::Rocket],
|
|
};
|
|
let extras = rust::framework_rules(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("rust", "CookieJar.get_private(\"sid\")", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Source(Cap::all())),
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("rust", "content::RawHtml(name)", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE)),
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
classify("rust", "Redirect::to(next)", Some(&extras)),
|
|
Some(DataLabel::Sink(Cap::SSRF)),
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|