nyx/tests/benchmark_test.rs
Eli Peter 58f1794a4e
Added Cap::DATA_EXFIL and taint fp and fn fixes on real repos (#59)
* feat: Enhance data exfiltration detection with source sensitivity gating for cookies and headers

* feat: Implement cross-file data exfiltration detection with parameter-specific gate filters

* feat: Add calibration tests and refine DATA_EXFIL severity scoring logic

* feat: Introduce per-detector configuration for data exfiltration suppression

* feat: Enhance DATA_EXFIL findings with destination field tracking in diagnostics and SARIF output

* feat: Add tainted body and URL handling for data exfiltration detection

* feat: Add integration tests and fixtures for DATA_EXFIL and SSRF detection in Go

* feat: Add Java integration tests and fixtures for DATA_EXFIL detection across multiple HTTP clients

* feat: Add synthetic externals handling for closure-captured variables in SSA

* feat: Implement closure-based suppression for resource leak findings

* feat: Add regression guards for shell-injection and taint propagation in for-of destructure patterns

* feat: Implement constructor cap narrowing for data exfiltration detection in HTTP request builders

* feat: Add gated sinks for data exfiltration detection in C and C++ using curl_easy_setopt

* feat: Implement DATA_EXFIL cap parity for backwards analysis and add integration tests

* feat: Add data exfiltration sinks for various languages and enhance documentation

* refactor: Simplify formatting and improve readability in various files

* refactor: Improve readability by simplifying conditional statements and adding clippy linting

* docs: Update CHANGELOG and comments for data exfiltration features and configuration

* docs: Clarify configuration instructions for data exfiltration trusted destinations

* docs: Enhance comments for evidence routing logic in data exfiltration
2026-05-01 10:59:52 -04:00

841 lines
27 KiB
Rust

//! Nyx Benchmark Evaluation Framework
//!
//! Run with: `cargo test benchmark_evaluation -- --ignored --nocapture`
//!
//! Filter with env vars:
//! NYX_BENCH_LANG=python
//! NYX_BENCH_CLASS=sqli
//! NYX_BENCH_CASE=js-sqli-001
//! NYX_BENCH_POSITIVE_ONLY=1
//! NYX_BENCH_NEGATIVE_ONLY=1
//! NYX_BENCH_TAG=express
mod common;
use common::test_config;
use nyx_scanner::commands::scan::Diag;
use nyx_scanner::evidence::Confidence;
use nyx_scanner::patterns::FindingCategory;
use nyx_scanner::utils::config::AnalysisMode;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
// ── Ground-truth schema ──────────────────────────────────────────────
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct GroundTruth {
#[allow(dead_code)]
schema_version: String,
#[allow(dead_code)]
metadata: Metadata,
cases: Vec<Case>,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct Metadata {
#[allow(dead_code)]
description: String,
#[allow(dead_code)]
created: String,
#[allow(dead_code)]
corpus_size: usize,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct Case {
case_id: String,
file: String,
language: String,
is_vulnerable: bool,
vuln_class: String,
#[allow(dead_code)]
cwe: String,
#[allow(dead_code)]
provenance: String,
#[allow(dead_code)]
equivalence_tier: String,
#[allow(dead_code)]
match_mode: String,
expected_rule_ids: Vec<String>,
allowed_alternative_rule_ids: Vec<String>,
forbidden_rule_ids: Vec<String>,
#[allow(dead_code)]
expected_severity: Option<String>,
#[allow(dead_code)]
expected_category: Option<String>,
expected_sink_lines: Option<Vec<[usize; 2]>>,
#[allow(dead_code)]
expected_source_lines: Option<Vec<[usize; 2]>>,
/// Optional: line ranges where the *call site* leading to the sink
/// appears. When present, at least one `flow_step` in the finding's
/// trace must fall within ±2 of one of these ranges. When absent,
/// the check is skipped (forward-compatible with existing fixtures).
#[serde(default)]
expected_call_site_lines: Option<Vec<[usize; 2]>>,
#[allow(dead_code)]
tags: Vec<String>,
#[serde(default)]
disabled: bool,
#[allow(dead_code)]
notes: String,
}
// ── Result types ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[derive(Clone, Serialize)]
enum Outcome {
TP,
FP,
FN,
TN,
}
impl std::fmt::Display for Outcome {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
match self {
Outcome::TP => write!(f, "TP"),
Outcome::FP => write!(f, "FP"),
Outcome::FN => write!(f, "FN"),
Outcome::TN => write!(f, "TN"),
}
}
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
struct CaseOutcome {
case_id: String,
file: String,
language: String,
vuln_class: String,
is_vulnerable: bool,
outcome_file_level: Outcome,
outcome_rule_level: Outcome,
outcome_location_level: Option<Outcome>,
matched_rule_ids: Vec<String>,
unexpected_rule_ids: Vec<String>,
all_finding_ids: Vec<String>,
security_finding_count: usize,
non_security_finding_count: usize,
#[serde(skip)]
diags: Vec<Diag>,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
struct Metrics {
tp: usize,
fp: usize,
fn_: usize,
tn: usize,
precision: f64,
recall: f64,
f1: f64,
}
impl Metrics {
fn compute(tp: usize, fp: usize, fn_: usize, tn: usize) -> Self {
let precision = if tp + fp == 0 {
1.0
} else {
tp as f64 / (tp + fp) as f64
};
let recall = if tp + fn_ == 0 {
1.0
} else {
tp as f64 / (tp + fn_) as f64
};
let f1 = if precision + recall == 0.0 {
0.0
} else {
2.0 * precision * recall / (precision + recall)
};
Metrics {
tp,
fp,
fn_,
tn,
precision,
recall,
f1,
}
}
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
struct ScannerConfig {
analysis_mode: String,
taint_enabled: bool,
ast_patterns_enabled: bool,
state_analysis_enabled: bool,
worker_threads: usize,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
struct BenchmarkResults {
benchmark_version: String,
timestamp: String,
scanner_version: String,
scanner_config: ScannerConfig,
ground_truth_hash: String,
corpus_size: usize,
cases_run: usize,
cases_skipped: usize,
outcomes: Vec<CaseOutcome>,
aggregate_file_level: Metrics,
aggregate_rule_level: Metrics,
by_language: BTreeMap<String, Metrics>,
by_vuln_class: BTreeMap<String, Metrics>,
by_confidence: BTreeMap<String, Metrics>,
}
// ── Scanning ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
fn scan_corpus_file(corpus_root: &Path, relative_path: &str) -> Vec<Diag> {
// `cve_corpus/*` cases live in a sibling of `corpus/`, see
// `tests/benchmark/cve_corpus/`.
let source = if relative_path.starts_with("cve_corpus/") {
corpus_root
.parent()
.expect("corpus_root has a parent")
.join(relative_path)
} else {
corpus_root.join(relative_path)
};
assert!(
source.exists(),
"Corpus path not found: {}",
source.display()
);
let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::with_prefix("nyx_bench_").expect("tempdir");
if source.is_dir() {
copy_dir_recursive(&source, tmp.path());
} else {
let dest = tmp.path().join(source.file_name().unwrap());
std::fs::copy(&source, &dest).expect("copy corpus file");
}
let cfg = test_config(AnalysisMode::Full);
let mut diags =
nyx_scanner::scan_no_index(tmp.path(), &cfg).expect("scan_no_index should succeed");
// Normalize paths to filename only.
for d in &mut diags {
if let Some(fname) = Path::new(&d.path).file_name() {
d.path = fname.to_string_lossy().to_string();
}
}
// Sort deterministically.
diags.sort_by(|a, b| {
a.path
.cmp(&b.path)
.then(a.line.cmp(&b.line))
.then(a.id.cmp(&b.id))
.then(a.col.cmp(&b.col))
});
diags
}
fn copy_dir_recursive(src: &Path, dst: &Path) {
for entry in std::fs::read_dir(src).expect("read corpus dir") {
let entry = entry.expect("dir entry");
let dest_path = dst.join(entry.file_name());
if entry.file_type().expect("file type").is_dir() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(&dest_path).expect("create subdir");
copy_dir_recursive(&entry.path(), &dest_path);
} else {
std::fs::copy(entry.path(), &dest_path).expect("copy file");
}
}
}
// ── Scoring helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
fn is_security(d: &Diag) -> bool {
d.category == FindingCategory::Security
}
fn rule_matches(finding_id: &str, expected_id: &str) -> bool {
if finding_id == expected_id {
return true;
}
// Substring fallback: the expected id is contained in the finding id.
finding_id.contains(expected_id)
}
fn score_file_level(case: &Case, diags: &[Diag]) -> Outcome {
let has_security = diags.iter().any(is_security);
match (case.is_vulnerable, has_security) {
(true, true) => Outcome::TP,
(true, false) => Outcome::FN,
(false, true) => Outcome::FP,
(false, false) => Outcome::TN,
}
}
fn score_rule_level(case: &Case, diags: &[Diag]) -> (Outcome, Vec<String>, Vec<String>) {
let security_diags: Vec<&Diag> = diags.iter().filter(|d| is_security(d)).collect();
// Check forbidden rules.
if case.is_vulnerable {
for d in &security_diags {
for forbidden in &case.forbidden_rule_ids {
if rule_matches(&d.id, forbidden) {
// Wrong-reason detection counts as FP.
let matched = vec![];
let unexpected = security_diags.iter().map(|d| d.id.clone()).collect();
return (Outcome::FP, matched, unexpected);
}
}
}
}
if !case.is_vulnerable {
if security_diags.is_empty() {
return (Outcome::TN, vec![], vec![]);
} else {
let unexpected = security_diags.iter().map(|d| d.id.clone()).collect();
return (Outcome::FP, vec![], unexpected);
}
}
// Positive case: check expected + alternative rule matches.
let all_acceptable: Vec<&str> = case
.expected_rule_ids
.iter()
.chain(case.allowed_alternative_rule_ids.iter())
.map(|s| s.as_str())
.collect();
let mut matched = Vec::new();
let mut unexpected = Vec::new();
for d in &security_diags {
let is_expected = all_acceptable.iter().any(|exp| rule_matches(&d.id, exp));
if is_expected {
matched.push(d.id.clone());
} else {
unexpected.push(d.id.clone());
}
}
if matched.is_empty() {
(Outcome::FN, matched, unexpected)
} else {
(Outcome::TP, matched, unexpected)
}
}
fn score_location_level(
case: &Case,
diags: &[Diag],
matched_rule_ids: &[String],
) -> Option<Outcome> {
let expected_sinks = case.expected_sink_lines.as_ref()?;
if expected_sinks.is_empty() {
return None;
}
if !case.is_vulnerable {
let has_security = diags.iter().any(is_security);
return Some(if has_security {
Outcome::FP
} else {
Outcome::TN
});
}
// Check if any matched finding has a line within tolerance of expected sinks.
let all_acceptable: Vec<&str> = case
.expected_rule_ids
.iter()
.chain(case.allowed_alternative_rule_ids.iter())
.map(|s| s.as_str())
.collect();
let security_diags: Vec<&Diag> = diags.iter().filter(|d| is_security(d)).collect();
if matched_rule_ids.is_empty() {
return Some(Outcome::FN);
}
for d in &security_diags {
let is_expected = all_acceptable.iter().any(|exp| rule_matches(&d.id, exp));
if !is_expected {
continue;
}
let primary_ok = expected_sinks.iter().any(|r| {
let lo = r[0].saturating_sub(2);
let hi = r[1] + 2;
d.line >= lo && d.line <= hi
});
if !primary_ok {
continue;
}
// Optional: require at least one flow_step to fall within the
// caller's call-site range. Only active when the fixture opts in.
if let Some(call_ranges) = case.expected_call_site_lines.as_ref()
&& !call_ranges.is_empty()
{
let steps = d
.evidence
.as_ref()
.map(|e| e.flow_steps.as_slice())
.unwrap_or(&[]);
let call_ok = steps.iter().any(|s| {
call_ranges.iter().any(|r| {
let lo = r[0].saturating_sub(2);
let hi = r[1] + 2;
(s.line as usize) >= lo && (s.line as usize) <= hi
})
});
if !call_ok {
continue;
}
}
return Some(Outcome::TP);
}
// Rule matched but location didn't.
Some(Outcome::FN)
}
// ── Filtering ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
fn should_run(case: &Case) -> bool {
if case.disabled {
return false;
}
if let Ok(lang) = std::env::var("NYX_BENCH_LANG")
&& case.language != lang
{
return false;
}
if let Ok(class) = std::env::var("NYX_BENCH_CLASS")
&& case.vuln_class != class
{
return false;
}
if let Ok(id) = std::env::var("NYX_BENCH_CASE")
&& case.case_id != id
{
return false;
}
if std::env::var("NYX_BENCH_POSITIVE_ONLY").is_ok() && !case.is_vulnerable {
return false;
}
if std::env::var("NYX_BENCH_NEGATIVE_ONLY").is_ok() && case.is_vulnerable {
return false;
}
if let Ok(tag) = std::env::var("NYX_BENCH_TAG")
&& !case.tags.iter().any(|t| t == &tag)
{
return false;
}
true
}
// ── Aggregation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
fn aggregate(outcomes: &[CaseOutcome], level: &str) -> Metrics {
let (mut tp, mut fp, mut fn_, mut tn) = (0, 0, 0, 0);
for o in outcomes {
let outcome = match level {
"file" => &o.outcome_file_level,
"rule" => &o.outcome_rule_level,
_ => &o.outcome_file_level,
};
match outcome {
Outcome::TP => tp += 1,
Outcome::FP => fp += 1,
Outcome::FN => fn_ += 1,
Outcome::TN => tn += 1,
}
}
Metrics::compute(tp, fp, fn_, tn)
}
fn aggregate_by_key(
outcomes: &[CaseOutcome],
key_fn: impl Fn(&CaseOutcome) -> &str,
) -> BTreeMap<String, Metrics> {
let mut groups: BTreeMap<String, Vec<&CaseOutcome>> = BTreeMap::new();
for o in outcomes {
groups.entry(key_fn(o).to_string()).or_default().push(o);
}
groups
.into_iter()
.map(|(k, cases)| {
let (mut tp, mut fp, mut fn_, mut tn) = (0, 0, 0, 0);
for o in &cases {
match &o.outcome_rule_level {
Outcome::TP => tp += 1,
Outcome::FP => fp += 1,
Outcome::FN => fn_ += 1,
Outcome::TN => tn += 1,
}
}
(k, Metrics::compute(tp, fp, fn_, tn))
})
.collect()
}
// ── Printing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
fn print_case_table(outcomes: &[CaseOutcome]) {
println!(
"\n{:<25} {:<40} {:<6} {:<6} {:<6} {:<4} {:<4}",
"CASE_ID", "FILE", "FILE", "RULE", "LOC", "SEC", "OTH"
);
println!("{}", "-".repeat(100));
for o in outcomes {
let loc = match &o.outcome_location_level {
Some(out) => format!("{}", out),
None => "-".to_string(),
};
println!(
"{:<25} {:<40} {:<6} {:<6} {:<6} {:<4} {:<4}",
o.case_id,
truncate(&o.file, 39),
o.outcome_file_level,
o.outcome_rule_level,
loc,
o.security_finding_count,
o.non_security_finding_count,
);
}
}
fn print_metrics_table(label: &str, metrics: &Metrics) {
println!(
" {:<20} TP={:<4} FP={:<4} FN={:<4} TN={:<4} P={:.3} R={:.3} F1={:.3}",
label,
metrics.tp,
metrics.fp,
metrics.fn_,
metrics.tn,
metrics.precision,
metrics.recall,
metrics.f1
);
}
fn print_map_table(title: &str, map: &BTreeMap<String, Metrics>) {
println!("\n {}:", title);
for (k, m) in map {
print_metrics_table(k, m);
}
}
fn truncate(s: &str, max: usize) -> String {
if s.len() <= max {
s.to_string()
} else {
format!("...{}", &s[s.len() - max + 3..])
}
}
// ── Main test ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
#[ignore]
fn benchmark_evaluation() {
let benchmark_dir = PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")).join("tests/benchmark");
let corpus_root = benchmark_dir.join("corpus");
let gt_path = benchmark_dir.join("ground_truth.json");
let results_dir = benchmark_dir.join("results");
// Load ground truth.
let gt_bytes = std::fs::read(&gt_path).expect("read ground_truth.json");
let gt: GroundTruth = serde_json::from_slice(&gt_bytes).expect("parse ground_truth.json");
// Compute ground truth hash for provenance.
let gt_hash = format!("sha256:{}", sha256_hex(&gt_bytes));
// Filter cases.
let mut cases_skipped = 0usize;
let cases_to_run: Vec<&Case> = gt
.cases
.iter()
.filter(|c| {
if !should_run(c) {
cases_skipped += 1;
false
} else {
true
}
})
.collect();
println!("\n=== Nyx Benchmark Evaluation ===");
println!(
"Corpus: {} total, {} to run, {} skipped",
gt.cases.len(),
cases_to_run.len(),
cases_skipped
);
// Run each case.
let mut outcomes: Vec<CaseOutcome> = Vec::with_capacity(cases_to_run.len());
for case in &cases_to_run {
let diags = scan_corpus_file(&corpus_root, &case.file);
let security_count = diags.iter().filter(|d| is_security(d)).count();
let non_security_count = diags.len() - security_count;
let all_finding_ids: Vec<String> = diags.iter().map(|d| d.id.clone()).collect();
let file_outcome = score_file_level(case, &diags);
let (rule_outcome, matched, unexpected) = score_rule_level(case, &diags);
let loc_outcome = score_location_level(case, &diags, &matched);
outcomes.push(CaseOutcome {
case_id: case.case_id.clone(),
file: case.file.clone(),
language: case.language.clone(),
vuln_class: case.vuln_class.clone(),
is_vulnerable: case.is_vulnerable,
outcome_file_level: file_outcome,
outcome_rule_level: rule_outcome,
outcome_location_level: loc_outcome,
matched_rule_ids: matched,
unexpected_rule_ids: unexpected,
all_finding_ids,
security_finding_count: security_count,
non_security_finding_count: non_security_count,
diags,
});
}
// Sort outcomes by case_id for deterministic output.
outcomes.sort_by(|a, b| a.case_id.cmp(&b.case_id));
// Print per-case table.
print_case_table(&outcomes);
// Compute aggregates.
let agg_file = aggregate(&outcomes, "file");
let agg_rule = aggregate(&outcomes, "rule");
let by_language = aggregate_by_key(&outcomes, |o| &o.language);
let by_class = aggregate_by_key(&outcomes, |o| &o.vuln_class);
// Score at each confidence threshold.
let by_confidence = score_by_confidence(&outcomes, &cases_to_run);
// Print summary.
println!("\n=== Aggregate Metrics ===");
print_metrics_table("File-level", &agg_file);
print_metrics_table("Rule-level", &agg_rule);
print_map_table("By language (rule-level)", &by_language);
print_map_table("By vuln class (rule-level)", &by_class);
print_map_table("By confidence threshold (rule-level)", &by_confidence);
// Write results JSON.
std::fs::create_dir_all(&results_dir).ok();
let results = BenchmarkResults {
benchmark_version: "1.0".to_string(),
timestamp: chrono_now(),
scanner_version: env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").to_string(),
scanner_config: ScannerConfig {
analysis_mode: "Full".to_string(),
taint_enabled: true,
ast_patterns_enabled: true,
state_analysis_enabled: true,
worker_threads: 1,
},
ground_truth_hash: gt_hash,
corpus_size: gt.cases.len(),
cases_run: outcomes.len(),
cases_skipped,
outcomes,
aggregate_file_level: agg_file,
aggregate_rule_level: agg_rule,
by_language,
by_vuln_class: by_class,
by_confidence,
};
let results_path = results_dir.join("latest.json");
let json = serde_json::to_string_pretty(&results).expect("serialize results");
std::fs::write(&results_path, &json).expect("write results/latest.json");
println!("\nResults written to: {}", results_path.display());
println!("=== Benchmark complete ===\n");
// ── Regression thresholds (current baseline minus ~5pp) ────────
// Baseline (2026-04-24, post per-return-path PathFact landing):
// Rule-level P=0.947 R=0.994 F1=0.970 on the 316-case corpus
// (TP=179 FP=10 FN=1 TN=125). Adds 8 cases from the path-sanitiser
// FP cluster (rs-safe-014, rs-safe-016, CVE-2018-20997 +
// CVE-2022-36113 + CVE-2024-24576 patched/vulnerable pairs). Rust
// language F1 stayed at 1.000.
//
// Floors sit ~5pp below that baseline: a single-case flip is ~0.3pp
// on this corpus, so 5pp is generous enough to absorb honest
// FP↔TN trades while still catching a real regression in a
// vulnerability class. When you land a durable, measurable
// improvement, tighten these floors, do not relax them to paper
// over a regression.
let rule = &results.aggregate_rule_level;
assert!(
rule.precision >= 0.897,
"Rule-level precision {:.3} fell below threshold 0.897 (baseline 0.947)",
rule.precision,
);
assert!(
rule.recall >= 0.944,
"Rule-level recall {:.3} fell below threshold 0.944 (baseline 0.994)",
rule.recall,
);
assert!(
rule.f1 >= 0.920,
"Rule-level F1 {:.3} fell below threshold 0.920 (baseline 0.970)",
rule.f1,
);
// ── Per-class floors ────────────────────────────────────────────
// DATA_EXFIL: 13 TP fixtures across 8 languages. Baseline at the
// 0.5.x → next-minor ship is P=1.000 R=1.000 F1=1.000 with 6 paired
// safe fixtures (sensitivity-gate, sanitizer-wrap) holding FP=0 on
// the data_exfil-class noise budget. Floor at 0.85 absorbs a one-
// case regression (~0.077 on 13 cases) while still catching a
// structural break. When you land a durable improvement, tighten
// this floor; do not relax it to paper over a regression.
if let Some(de) = results.by_vuln_class.get("data_exfil") {
assert!(
de.f1 >= 0.85,
"data_exfil rule-level F1 {:.3} fell below threshold 0.85 (baseline 1.000)",
de.f1,
);
assert!(
de.recall >= 0.85,
"data_exfil rule-level recall {:.3} fell below threshold 0.85 (baseline 1.000)",
de.recall,
);
assert!(
de.precision >= 0.85,
"data_exfil rule-level precision {:.3} fell below threshold 0.85 (baseline 1.000)",
de.precision,
);
} else {
panic!("data_exfil class missing from by_vuln_class breakdown");
}
}
// ── Confidence-threshold scoring ─────────────────────────────────────
fn score_by_confidence(outcomes: &[CaseOutcome], cases: &[&Case]) -> BTreeMap<String, Metrics> {
let mut result = BTreeMap::new();
for (label, min_conf) in [
(">=Low", Confidence::Low),
(">=Medium", Confidence::Medium),
(">=High", Confidence::High),
] {
let (mut tp, mut fp, mut fn_, mut tn) = (0, 0, 0, 0);
for (outcome, case) in outcomes.iter().zip(cases.iter()) {
let filtered: Vec<&Diag> = outcome
.diags
.iter()
.filter(|d| d.confidence.is_some_and(|c| c >= min_conf))
.collect();
let (rule_outcome, _, _) = score_rule_level_with_diags(case, &filtered);
match rule_outcome {
Outcome::TP => tp += 1,
Outcome::FP => fp += 1,
Outcome::FN => fn_ += 1,
Outcome::TN => tn += 1,
}
}
result.insert(label.to_string(), Metrics::compute(tp, fp, fn_, tn));
}
result
}
fn score_rule_level_with_diags(
case: &Case,
security_diags: &[&Diag],
) -> (Outcome, Vec<String>, Vec<String>) {
if case.is_vulnerable {
for d in security_diags {
if !is_security(d) {
continue;
}
for forbidden in &case.forbidden_rule_ids {
if rule_matches(&d.id, forbidden) {
let unexpected = security_diags
.iter()
.filter(|d| is_security(d))
.map(|d| d.id.clone())
.collect();
return (Outcome::FP, vec![], unexpected);
}
}
}
}
let sec_diags: Vec<&&Diag> = security_diags.iter().filter(|d| is_security(d)).collect();
if !case.is_vulnerable {
if sec_diags.is_empty() {
return (Outcome::TN, vec![], vec![]);
} else {
let unexpected = sec_diags.iter().map(|d| d.id.clone()).collect();
return (Outcome::FP, vec![], unexpected);
}
}
let all_acceptable: Vec<&str> = case
.expected_rule_ids
.iter()
.chain(case.allowed_alternative_rule_ids.iter())
.map(|s| s.as_str())
.collect();
let mut matched = Vec::new();
let mut unexpected = Vec::new();
for d in &sec_diags {
let is_expected = all_acceptable.iter().any(|exp| rule_matches(&d.id, exp));
if is_expected {
matched.push(d.id.clone());
} else {
unexpected.push(d.id.clone());
}
}
if matched.is_empty() {
(Outcome::FN, matched, unexpected)
} else {
(Outcome::TP, matched, unexpected)
}
}
// ── Utilities ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
fn sha256_hex(data: &[u8]) -> String {
use std::io::Write;
// Simple SHA-256 via command, avoids adding a crypto dependency.
let mut child = std::process::Command::new("shasum")
.args(["-a", "256"])
.stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped())
.stdout(std::process::Stdio::piped())
.spawn()
.expect("shasum");
child.stdin.as_mut().unwrap().write_all(data).unwrap();
let out = child.wait_with_output().unwrap();
let s = String::from_utf8(out.stdout).unwrap();
s.split_whitespace().next().unwrap_or("unknown").to_string()
}
fn chrono_now() -> String {
// ISO 8601 timestamp without chrono dependency.
let out = std::process::Command::new("date")
.args(["-u", "+%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ"])
.output()
.expect("date");
String::from_utf8(out.stdout).unwrap().trim().to_string()
}